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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ON INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES FOR INCLUSION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN GUATEMALA AND BOLIVIA**

by

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June 2020

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OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN GUATEMALA AND BOLIVIA**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis approaches the study of identity politics in Latin America through the two cases of Guatemala and Bolivia. Both countries have similar histories of racism, indigenous demographic majorities, indigenous mobilization, democratization moments, and institutions, and yet the 1999 Guatemalan referendum failed where the 2009 Bolivian referendum succeeded at delivering indigenous rights. Why? This thesis seeks to understand Latin America's indigenous movements and identity politics with implications for conflict resolution or management, combating inequality, and expanding notions of democratic governance. The leading explanations for indigenous movements and politics in Latin America tend to revolve around institutions, social movements, and party systems. However, by examining national histories, contemporary news sources, relevant scholarship, and original materials from relevant political actors, this study proposes another explanation. It stipulates that the success of an indigenous movement in constitutionalizing its demands rests upon the unification of the movement, its programmatic appeal, and its ability to form coalitions with meaningful political allies, thus explaining the disparities in the Guatemalan and Bolivian movements. The Pan-Mayan movement did not meet the preponderance of criteria whereas Bolivia's indigenous movement did, highlighting the importance of unity and broad appeal in diversifying the region's politics.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE

Indigenous movements have been a lively component of Latin America's political landscape since Imperial times and the present is no different. Understanding their nature has been central to managing conflict, decoding the direction of national policies, better understanding the region's historical tides, and helping expand notions of democracy and constitutional design beyond traditionally Northern Trans-Atlantic centered models.¹ As far as resolving long running conflicts and racial discrimination, indigenous entries into national and international politics have been key to addressing persistent injustices in countries such as Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which underwent national shifts toward more inclusive societies.² Political exclusion has been an enduring feature of politics throughout the Americas, where monuments enshrine white conquerors while shunting pre-Columbian or other non-white groups, creating national myths that underwrite the political-economic basis for the domination of white descendants.³

¹ Kay B. Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), X–XII; Raúl L. Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3; Peter Winn, *Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean*, 3rd ed (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), XI; Donna Lee Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 8; Gilda M. Waldman, "Historical Memory and Present-Day Oblivion: The Mapuche Conflict in Post-Dictatorial Chile," *Time & Society*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2012): 56–57; Amy H. Liu and Kevin Peters, "The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 17, no. 2 (2017): 265–80.

² Winn, *Americas*, XV; Marc Becker, *Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 12–13; Edgar Esquit, "Nationalist Contradictions: Pan-Mayanism, Representations of the Past, and the Reproduction of inequalities in Guatemala," in *Decolonizing Native Histories: Collaboration, Knowledge, and Language in the Americas*, ed. Florencia Mallon (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 196; Andrés Calla and Khantuta Muruchi, "Transgressions and Racism: The Struggle over a New Constitution in Bolivia," in *Histories of Race and Racism*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 299.

³ Mala Htun, *Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016): 1; Arturo Taracena Arriola, "From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944," in *Histories of Race and Racism*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 95; David A. Graham, "The Stubborn Persistence of Confederate Monuments," *The Atlantic*, April 26, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-stubborn-persistence-of-confederate-monuments/479751/>.

These notions of race, political-economic participation, and national legitimacy are intertwined with ideas surrounding constitutional designs and the meanings of citizenship as seen in places like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In these states, for example, citizenship often followed a Hispanic, Christian, and European-centric model that eschewed any other forms of cultural and communal expression with the aim of either assimilating or segregating indigenous communities and abrogating their rights.⁴ Racial notions also had impacts upon foreign policymaking in Latin America, as exemplified in the relations between the United States and Costa Rica where the Americans saw the Costa Rican state as a Jeffersonian, white, and Christian nation.⁵ The shared racial conception between the two countries may have moderated the United States' response to the Costa Rican civil war in 1948 in contrast with its other interventions in Cold War Latin America.⁶ The common thread among these highlights how race, racialized hierarchies, and their codification either through laws or norms perpetuate inequality and exclusion, to the detriment of large portions of the Americas, and shape international relations.

From this perspective, this paper argues the centrality of understanding how ethnic identity, political mobilization, and constitutionalization intermingle to create the vast array of nation-states one sees today. It focuses on how indigenous movements influence national constitutions in the region as these documents represent the highest form of law within most sovereign states and therefore codify the identity and hierarchization that organize their societies. Out of the world's 193 nations, ninety-four recognize indigenous peoples through constitutional fiat, underscoring the broader international dimension of

⁴ For Bolivia: Brooke Larson, "Forging the Unlettered Indian," in *Histories of race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2011), 134–56; For Ecuador: Carlos de la Torre, "Racism in Education and the Construction of Citizenship in Ecuador," *Race & Class*, vol. 42, no. 2 (October 2000), 33–45; For Peru: Mariella I. Arredondo, "Born Indigenous, Growing Up Mestizos: Schooling and Youth in Arequipa, Peru," in *Mestizaje and Globalization*, eds. Stefanie Wickstrom and Philip D. Young (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2014), 77–91.

⁵ Kyle Longley, *The Sparrow and The Hawk: Costa Rica and The United States during the Rise of José Figueres* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1997), 12; Bruce M. Wilson, *Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 13.

⁶ Longley, *The Sparrow and The Hawk*, 4.

understanding how these communities obtain such protections.⁷ It must also be recognized that not all groups obtain or demand constitutional provisions. An appreciable number make do, or are content, with enabling legislation that serves a very similar purpose, albeit with lesser degrees of legal or political resilience.

Given these notions, consider the following: Guatemala and Bolivia are both home to Latin America's largest national shares of indigenous populations, with estimates ranging from fifty to sixty percent all throughout their respective national histories.⁸ They experienced slightly different independence struggles that otherwise created similar states: oligarchic republics ruled by Spanish-descended white minorities who identified themselves with either assimilationist or segregationist nationalisms.⁹ They both underwent swings between segregationist conservative and assimilationist liberal governments whose elites were sustained by their privileged positions in landownership, agricultural production, and domestic and international trade.¹⁰ Both nations experienced periods of military intervention into national politics or outright rule and were heavily influenced by the United States' actions in the region.¹¹

Noticeably, Guatemala and Bolivia followed different paths during the Cold War but arrived at contemporaneous democratizing moments in the 1980s and 1990s albeit under different regimes and conditions.¹² Most importantly, both saw the multi-decade rise

⁷ Katharina Holzinger et al., "The Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights, Traditional Political Institutions, and Customary Law," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 12 (2018): 2.

⁸ Richard N. Adams, "The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Antihegemony," *Histories of Anthropology Annual*, vol. 1 (2005): 133; John L. Hammond, "Indigenous Community Justice in the Bolivian Constitution of 2009," *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 33 (2011): 650.

⁹ Adams, "The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala," 133; Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 144–49.

¹⁰ Greg Grandin, *Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 22, 26–34; Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 153, 156–7.

¹¹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005); Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910–1985* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 151–210; James F. Siekmeier, "Trailblazer Diplomat: Bolivian Ambassador Víctor Andrade Uzquiano's Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy, 1944–1962," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 28, no. 3 (June 2004): 385–406.

¹² Guatemala was noticeably impacted by a long-running civil war whereas Bolivia did not experience significant civil violence throughout and after the Cold War.

of indigenous movements and politics that based themselves on similarly powerful pre-Colonial traditions.¹³ And finally, in both countries these movements reached similar constitutional crossroads in pushing to overturn centuries of oppression and marginalization of indigenous populations that culminated in respective national referenda. Despite these broad parallels, in Guatemala the Mayan peoples were denied expanded constitutional recognition, freedoms, and rights whereas Bolivia's indigenous peoples wildly succeeded at inaugurating a plurinational constitution.¹⁴ Why? Why did these outcomes diverge so much and what does that generally say about ethnic-based movements in other parts of the Americas and the world?

To answer these questions, the following section will first define key terms in order to describe the topography that the Pan-Mayan and Bolivian indigenous movements had to navigate during their respective constitutional drives and review the relevant literature in order to lay the groundwork for a hypothesis.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Terms such as hegemonic system, political-economics, elites, and race and racism will be employed to provide the reader the outlines of the environments within which ethnic movements operate. Therefore, for the purposes of this study this section will standardize the meanings of these concepts that will be integral to conveying this perspective on indigenous politics and constitutionalizing. Additionally, it will also explore the debates around indigenous movements and identity.

¹³ Nancy Postero, *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017); Kay B. Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ For Guatemala's results: Kay B. Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum," in *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America*, eds. Kay B. Warren and Jean E. Jackson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003). For Bolivia's results: "Bolivia: 2009 Constitutional Referendum Results," Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, updated January 25, 2009, <http://pdpa.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/refconstit09.html>.

1. Explaining Hegemony, Race and Racism, and Identity

When this thesis uses terms such as hegemony, hegemonic system or arrangements, and hierarchization of various concepts relating to different modes of power within politics they are borrowed from Florencia Mallon's conceptions of hegemony.¹⁵ Harkening to Antonio Gramsci's conceptions of power, hierarchization, and notions of coercion and consensus stemming from convergence around an ideology; Mallon posits instead hegemony as a process. In Mallon's view, hegemony is the continuous contestation over the meaning, trappings, and legitimation of power in all forms whether they be political, economic, or cultural and so on.¹⁶

At the end of that process, is a precariously balanced systemic equilibrium that only last for as long as the interested actors accept it as legitimate. This equilibrium is hegemony.¹⁷ This accepted equilibrium includes overriding agreements as to how a nation sees itself, its symbols, how power and resources are to be distributed and managed, and the shape of societal norms that justify any number of inequalities and distribution of political economic power.¹⁸ Other properties of this conception of hegemony involve continual struggle at multiple levels and scales for it involves politics at the subaltern level outside of the government-civil society relationship such as those solely within civil society and how it organizes itself outside officialdom.

Thus, it allows for the influences of ethnic groups, non-governmental actors, and illicit actors among others to enter the arena of hegemonic competition and contest its meanings and trappings on equal footing with the state. This osmotic and contested relationship between local subaltern leaders—mayors, councilors, and indigenous *caciques*, etc.—and national ones—presidents, dictators, juntas, etc.—is what defines hegemony in terms of how power, political or economic, is distributed and how it is

¹⁵ Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and the Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995): 6.

¹⁶ Mallon, 6.

¹⁷ Mallon, 6–7.

¹⁸ A fusion of Mallon's concept of hegemony and philosophical observations made by Thomas Picketty, *Capital and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020): 1.

exercised. The momentarily agreed upon reasons for inequalities become the status quo distribution of political and economic rights, privileges, and power. Thus, this agreement is hegemony.

In Mallon's definition of hegemony, the core hegemon can be any group(s) or class(es) that have accumulated the largest concentrations or densest networks of political, economic, and cultural influence over the state and imprinted their identity onto the national ethos. As it shall be revealed in the following chapters, these factors are merely a constellation that can be combined in a myriad of ways to produce dominance within a nation state. As a result, all other groups not tightly woven within the core hegemonic sphere are then considered peripheral and experience an unequal power relationship with the core which is justified in any number of ways. This concept is important to our study not as a factor unto itself but more so as the topography that shapes the struggle and competition between core and peripheral groups. This is mainly decided by the material relationships and resources that imbue political alliances that enable their demands and preferences to become the dominant ideas that influence the conceptualization of the state and its identity, namely, for example, its constitution and governing norms.¹⁹

Through those processes, groups become part of or antagonists against the ruling coalitions who have privileged monopoly over the state, economic resources, and the ability to write the differential rules that govern the use of force and how the culture is expressed.²⁰ This is what this study means by hegemonic system, core versus periphery, and elites versus the subaltern classes or groups. And because elites are bounded by their benefits from dominating a country's internal hegemonic system, they are incentivized to defend it persuasively or coercively in any way they deem necessary. This is the basis for struggle and need to gain a position where one, for example, can rewrite a constitution or hold sway over a government in order to safeguard one's privileges or obtain greater rights or protections. The manner in which this study highlights these hegemonic struggles is by identifying the cleavages in the subject cases and tracing their evolution across the life-

¹⁹ Grandin, *Blood of Guatemala*, 13–14.

²⁰ Grandin, 14.

span of the case country. Their historical backgrounds can lay bare the challenges and incentives for why the hegemonic challengers arose in the first place and how and why the core hegemonic counter-reaction occurred the way it did.

These hegemonic structures in turn depend on conceptualizing and intertwining the idea of race with ascriptive political and economic roles. For example, a number of societies in Latin America are racially hierarchized as part of their colonial legacy. As it will be seen in the case histories, labor and ownership roles were often equated with race and these in turn acquired political overtones that influenced the growth of state and civil-society structures. Thus, race in Latin America was intersectional by converging ideas of proper economic, political, and gender roles with ascriptive properties such as phenotypic types or other cultural attributes. To define race and racism is hard under any circumstances, but for the purposes of this thesis race and racism are “rooted in consciousness, in the cognitive process that attributes social significance to the arbitrary fact of skin color.”²¹ These constructs provide a person with the heuristics to associate certain skin colors or other physical features with mythologized stereotypes that justify a given type of power relationship or hierarchy. These notions may be justified through pseudo-scientific arguments that presupposed primordialist or natural biological differences between different phenotypes ascribing to them political and economic values and roles.²² The mythologies can range between segregationist outlooks—the absolute separation and subordination of inferior groups—or assimilationist ones where out-groups can only obtain acceptance through the shedding of their identities and the adoption of the dominant ones.²³

Together, these concepts of race, racism, and hegemony scaffold the arenas within which ethnically based social movements struggle to obtain their political demands that at times include reimagining the state that upholds the hegemonic arrangement. The result is

²¹ Gary Peller, “Race Consciousness,” in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*, eds. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. (New York: The New Press, 1995): 128.

²² Peller, 128.

²³ Ibram X. Kendi, *Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America* (New York: Bold Type Books, 2016), 2–5.

an intersectional hegemonic system that ascribes political, economic, and social roles to racial stereotypes and operationalizes them into a hierarchized society that posits one dominant group above all the others making their interests central while peripheralizing others.²⁴ In this arena, for example, whiteness is conflated with political leadership, economic affluence, and the idealized social identity where in Latin America this meant being a Hispanicized Christian endowed with individual rights that are all reinforced through the organs of the state and the laws.²⁵ Consequently, the indigenous and other minority populations were subservient and depending on the regime needed to be segregated within the confines of circumscribed citizenship or erased through assimilation into the dominant national culture with either one being reinforced and instituted by the state and those who ruled it. Altogether, this is what this thesis means by hegemonic system which is the combined multi-level, multi-scale, and multi-domain dominance by one group and the structures it creates to safeguard that dominance either persuasively or coercively along racialized socio-political-economic lines.

At the heart of race and racism is the distorted societal need to establish bounded identities and its associated roles and hierarchies. The relevancy to this study comes through how certain schools of thoughts would grapple with the concepts of ethnic movements and parties. For example, on the one hand there are primordialist that maintain that identity is fixed at birth, ascriptive, and that it remains so for the rest of an individual's life or that it is very difficult to cast aside when society has identified an individual in a certain way.²⁶ Following this school, one would surmise that ethnically based movements or parties would be by their very nature exclusivist precluding them from forming political

²⁴ Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color," in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*, eds. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. (New York: The New Press, 1995), 358–60

²⁵ Arturo Taracena Arriola, "From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944," in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 96–98.

²⁶ Siniša Malešević, *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006): 19; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1986): 12. See other authors such as: Clifford Geertz, "Primordial Ties," and Steven Grosby, "The Inexpugnable Tie of Primordiality," in *Ethnicity*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 261–68.

alliances or attracting voters from other groupings thus limiting their success. On the other hand, constructivist argue that identity is fluid across spacetime and can either be activated by key actors or socio-political structures to become the organizing principal of a given movement.²⁷ Under this view, ethnic movements and their political instruments are not exclusivist by their nature but constructed and adaptable identities that can coexist with others making these organizations capable of being programmatically appealing to outside groups and potentially defusing any conflicts based on identity.²⁸ In this study, the constructivist path will be followed for it is the dominant school of thought that prevails today and also the one that provides the greater explanatory power and variety of theories to study indigenous politics across Latin America.

2. Explaining Indigenous Movements' Outcomes

Existing studies on indigenous movements in Latin America, and other regions, offer differing explanations for why some of these movements have successfully transformed the hegemonic structure while others have failed despite similar endeavors. A number of these studies are based on the shifting of citizenship regimes that exist in a given country case and how these regimes make indigenous identities salient to political discourse and mobilization. This idea posits that as old Cold War-era corporatist regimes and their syndical structures faded, the next reducible level of identity, ethnicity, is then made more salient for political mobilization which for example may explain why there are less labor-centered movements than indigenous based ones.²⁹ The extension of its logic is not that indigenous peoples have not rallied around their ethnicities in the past but that they did not do so to pursue indigenous agendas.³⁰ In short, institutions matter and variation is explained by how deeply can the state penetrate its society and project across a territory;

²⁷ See: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2016); Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, eds. John Keane and Paul Miller (London: Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1989).

²⁸ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 16–17.

²⁹ Deborah J. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4–5.

³⁰ Yashar, 5.

where the state is strongest it fosters an imposed shared civic identity where it is weak less reducible identities flourish.³¹

Others have proposed that indigenous movements will mobilize and only succeed if the state undergoes multiple crises that highlight the constraints of its constitutional order convincing the elites of the need to enact radical reforms in order to ensure the stability of the state.³² For example, an indigenous movements is most likely to obtain an expansion of rights and freedoms if it pursues them under the aegis of a burgeoning constitutional crisis therefore it maneuvers to ally itself with key elite groups in order to secure its political demands.³³ Variation is explained by the relative severity of the constitutional crisis because elites must believe that the state is no longer viable and that their interests are threatened by this and if not the political space will remain closed to reformers.³⁴ Another factor within this theory is the length and effectiveness of the constitutional redesign itself for if it takes too long or becomes a protracted political fight the less likely constitutional reformers are to succeed.³⁵ Finally, aside from the first two factors if the implementation of reforms is ineffective then the constitutional drive becomes a pyrrhic victory where reforms are enacted but in the absence of enabling legislation to operationalize them thus denying the rights to an indigenous community.³⁶

Yet others suppose that the indigenous movements arose and succeeded because their political instruments, i.e., parties, became explicitly non-ethnic even though they had origins in ethnically based movements and thus they were able to appeal to other classes or groups in building their coalitions.³⁷ In this scenario, the success of indigenous movements via indigenous-linked or allied parties hinges upon the degree to which its political programming is inclusively populist and how effectively its appeals across ethnic

³¹ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 4–5.

³² Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past*, 7.

³³ Van Cott, 26.

³⁴ Van Cott, 27.

³⁵ Van Cott, 30.

³⁶ Van Cott, 34.

³⁷ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 14–18.

boundaries.³⁸ The interplay between the degree of populism, intra versus inter-ethnic appeals, and the degree of fluidity in ethnic and other identities within a polity, according to this theory, can produce a variety of results. If a party is too ethnically exclusionist it may not be able to build a winning coalition and vice-versa.

These theories have tended to overlook the base self-conceptualizations of the movements' members and leaders in terms of how they fundamentally defined themselves ethnically or in some other social category. The shortcomings of these approaches in not being able to conceive the importance of socially-based identities—gender, issue driven, or ethnically based—were addressed by another collection of scholars who saw these cleavages as the fundamental drivers of change.³⁹ This new and more constructivist approach saw how these social identities posed significant challenges to the preconceived notions that were baked into state institutions and that could possibly end in their fundamental remaking. This meant that movements that based themselves in near-irreducible political identities—such as race or gender, for example—had the capacity to not only question the privileges of the elites but also challenge the underlying prerogatives of them being elites because of who they were.⁴⁰

3. Hypothesis

This thesis attempts to provide a partial answer from one perspective by analyzing the two cases of Guatemala and Bolivia. Within the context of wider repression against indigenous communities across Latin America, these two cases simultaneously represent the shared experiences of the indigenous peoples and the uniqueness of their circumstances. This thesis aims to parse out those ideas and concepts that can be regionally and globally generalized to other ethnically based politics and highlight the uniquely insightful aspects of their similar but divergent developments. It is important to emphasize that this is merely one study, one perspective, and one author's take on what are centuries-old movements

³⁸ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 18–19.

³⁹ Kathryn Hochstetler, "Social Movements in Latin America," in *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*, eds. Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar (London: Routledge, 2012), 238.

⁴⁰ Hochstetler, 238.

and struggles for indigenous peoples to be accepted on equal footing with their fellow citizens.

Therefore, with a focus on how indigenous movements achieve constitutional change in the pursuit of hegemonic rearrangements, this thesis proposes that only when an indigenous movement is unified and seen as representative of the majority of the indigenous population, programmatically inclusive, and is well networked and allied with other meaningfully powerful actors that it can achieve constitutionalized rights and freedoms. For the purposes of this study, the dependent variable is the constitutionalization of indigenous rights and protections while the independent variables are the mobilization of an indigenous movement, unification of indigenous actors and organizations, and its ability to network with other political actors. In one variation, if a given indigenous movement has not unified the traditional indigenous political classes with its corresponding intellectual elites and together these have not resonated with the larger indigenous population the movement should be expected to fail even if it is considered inclusive of other groups and well-connected. The result is self-identified indigenous reformers seeking constitutional protections through other means such as non-ethnic parties or international aid in pressuring the ruling regime, both uncertain prospects. However, if a movement is unified but present an exclusionary agenda this may turn off support from other ethnic and non-ethnically based groups that could with their resources and organization have buttressed the indigenous movement. If a given movement becomes exclusionary to any other classes or groups it is expected to be relegated to the political fringes. Likewise, if a movement is unified and inclusionary but lacks meaningful political alliances it is expected to not gain much traction as the core hegemonic group will activate the entirety of its resources to thwart the reformist campaign.

4. Research Design

The evidentiary needs of this thought experiment will require an examination of the historical development of the contours of the hegemonic system within each of the chosen cases. This will be based on written histories, both modern and contemporary, political studies of certain time periods, election results, the programs of ethnic and non-ethnic

political parties, and other primary sources from significant ethnic and non-ethnic leaders. The choice of Guatemala and Bolivia, as recounted at the beginning of this chapter, stems from their rough historical similarities. Great weight is also given to their demographic resemblances by virtue of their respective indigenous populations being among the largest proportional ones in Latin America. The movements themselves, as well as the core-hegemonic counterparts, will be examined through their political programmatic materials, print interviews, and contemporary news coverage. Similarly, the respective referendums, constituent assemblies, and outcomes will be examined with similar sources while also consulting the applicable constitutions at the time, the actual contents of the ballot, the agreed upon election rules and formatting, the deployment of electoral infrastructure, and the political agreements between key players among other sources. With the premise for this study established, its standard terms defined, theoretical review outlined, and a theory put forward this thesis now moves into an overview of its structure.

5. Overview and Chapter

After this introductory chapter's outlining of theoretical foundations, this study will tackle each case within its own chapter which are similarly designed. In these empirical chapters, the historical development and modern outlines of each country's hegemonic system identifying the hegemonic core group along with those considered peripheral will be explored. Then the chapter shall isolate the respective indigenous movement and examine its constituent parts of how it arose, its intellectual lineages, key leaders and figures, and the role they played in the constitutionalizing moment as far as formulating political demands and participating in the process. This is followed by a similar analysis of the hegemonic counteraction as mounted by the core group, i.e., the elites and their allies, in defending the status quo hegemonic arrangements. An analysis of their demands, strategies, and responses to their hegemonic challengers will follow a similar pattern to that given to the indigenous movements.

The conclusion takes a unifying comparative view of Guatemala and Bolivia, synthesizing from the highlights of the empirical chapters a condensed view of the key differences and generalizations between the two cases. Then the chapter will summarize

the findings and provide concluding thoughts. Part of these thoughts is the hope that this study has provided the reader with an appreciation of how race matters not only in Latin American politics but in politics in general and how the twin pillars of nationalism and homogenization of national identity buttressed systems of indigenous and minority marginalization and oppression.⁴¹

⁴¹ Deborah J. Yashar, "Does Race Matter in Latin America? How Racial and Ethnic Identities Shape the Region's Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 94, no. 2 (March-April, 2015): 1–7.

II. GUATEMALA

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Guatemala held a referendum on affirming or rejecting the terms written by a peace process between the central government and the guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union—hereon known by its Spanish acronym, URNG—that sought to end ethnic and class tensions that had been violently raging since 1960.⁴² Rather than delivering the long-sought after epochal change that would herald equality and bridge the largest ethnic divide within the country, that between the Mayas and ladinos—unexclusive descendants of the Spanish colonists—it instead delivered a disheartening blow to a conflict that has been unresolved since 1821. The principal failure laid with the rejection of Guatemalan plurinationalism along with measures to widen and deepen the framework of citizenship. This cathartic event punctuated more than fifty-five years of targeted violence against the Mayan population by the core ladino group that dominates the Guatemalan hegemonic system.⁴³

Regionally, Latin America has only experienced a handful of ethno-national referendums and most notably, due to the high proportion of the indigenous population, this failure is telling in how the hegemonic dynamics within Guatemala forged the outcome of the civil war. This outcome is still evolving at this moment and permeates all throughout Guatemalan politics making it an excellent example for exploring variation in autonomic pursuits, especially when a similar nation with a similar demographic makeup, namely Bolivia, experiences a starkly different result.

Therefore, this chapter reflects on the historical development of the Guatemalan polity, outlines its currents and patterns, and then juxtaposes the hypothesis onto it seeking to explain the outcome of this referendum which by proxy represents the current state of

⁴² Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico [Commission for Historical Clarification; CEH] Guatemala: Memory of Silence / Tz'inil Na'Tab'al: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions, and Recommendations, 12 vols. (Guatemala: CEH, 1999). <https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf>.

⁴³ CEH, "Guatemala: Memory of Silence / Tz'inil Na'Tab'al."

Guatemalan power hierarchies. This paper argues that because the Pan-Mayan movement was not fully unified, not perceived as a pluralistic movement, and that its coalition building was lackluster that it was predisposed to fail in reforming the constitutional order within Guatemala and therefore dislodging the ladinos from their privileged positions within the nation.

1. Historical Patterns of the Guatemalan Hegemonic System

The nineteenth-century was characterized by struggles over individual and property rights as well as the shape of the national identity that would frame the political-economic nature of the nation-state.⁴⁴ Among the strongest legacies left behind by imperial Spain are the racial hierarchies, these posited political-economic power hereditarily and ordered society from black, to Indian, to ladino, to white and locked in the stereotypes that socially framed each group.⁴⁵ Simultaneously, the elite factions that shaped racial discourse, largely European-descendant creoles, argued that ladinos, mestizos of partly European and Indian descent, were merely reconfigured Indians and resultantly encouraged liberalism-based assimilation to unite all Guatemalans under one identity.⁴⁶ The liberal view that dominated the first phase of identity construction in Guatemala subsequently took inspiration from the French and American revolutions and wider enlightenment discourses on the nature of citizenship based on individual rights and service to the nation.⁴⁷ These are the lenses through which the creole elites viewed the ladinos and more so the indigenous as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive, liberal nation where the Spanish language, individual rights, Catholicism, private property ownership, and overall European culture were the standards they needed to meet.⁴⁸ Without these identity pillars, they

⁴⁴ Kim D. Butler and Aline Helg, "Race in Postabolition Afro-Latin America," in *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American History*, ed. Jose C. Moya (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 258.

⁴⁵ Carol A. Smith, "Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala over Time and Space," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988*, ed. Carol A. Smith, asst.ed. Marilyn M. Moors (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992), 4.

⁴⁶ Smith, "Introduction," 4.

⁴⁷ Arturo Taracena Arriola, "From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944," in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 96–97.

⁴⁸ Taracena Arriola, 97.

reasoned that a nation could not be truly united so long as most of its citizenry remained outside the purview of European culture thus uncivilized.

Under this guise, an odd pairing took place as the nineteenth-century progressed and citizenship debates became polarized along the lines of conservatives represented the adaptation of colonially segregationist norms and liberals stood for assimilationist republicanism. Continuing older colonial practices, but now under republican trappings, the conservatives sought to preserve the subordinated roles of each racial group and the segregated political-economic spheres that characterized them.⁴⁹ These went so far as to promote multilingualism, separate political-judicial administrations, communal titled land ownership, and the reinstatement of indigenous political leadership over these lands.⁵⁰ However, these notions were predicated on a paternalistic view of the indigenous populations as different in their learning abilities, needing to be compelled to work, and obligated to provide “public service”⁵¹ while being territorially segregated onto their ancestral lands.⁵² In many ways, more so for the creole elites than for the indigenous, these policies represented the conservative reinstitution of older colonial policies and practices that were seen to guarantee socio-economic stability in contrast with the chaos of liberalism.⁵³ In short, conservatives offered paternalistic protections that ensured the segregated and curtailed continuity of indigenous identity within a differentiated Guatemala whereas as we shall see the liberals offered an egalitarian framework of citizenship but that underwrote exploitation.⁵⁴

Under the liberals, Guatemalan Indians experienced the inverse where theoretically they were granted equality before the law and individually could access more diverse and

⁴⁹ Taracena Arriola, “From Assimilation to Segregation,” 98-99.

⁵⁰ Synthesis of: Taracena Arriola, 99; Juan Castro and Manuela L. Picq, “Stateness as Landgrab: A Political History of Maya Dispossession in Guatemala,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (2017): 793.

⁵¹ Taracena Arriola, 98-99.

⁵² Ralph L. Woodward, Jr., “Changes in the Nineteenth-Century Guatemalan State,” in *Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988*, ed. Carol A. Smith, asst.ed. Marilyn M. Moors (Austin, Tx: University of Texas Press, 1992), 67.

⁵³ Woodward, 64.

⁵⁴ Woodward, 67.

larger quantities of land throughout Guatemala versus under their old communal ways.⁵⁵ However, liberalism also economically chartered the path towards capitalistic exploitation with no economic support or protections from a state whose main preoccupation was the growth and development of Guatemala through agricultural exports and maintaining conducive economic conditions.⁵⁶ In the subject of capitalism, the liberals saw the state as an agent that would aid private capital in developing the land in ways that could be taxed by the central government to raise much needed revenues, however, because of weak governmental structures this did not come to fruition.⁵⁷ This made the incipient liberal government vulnerable to popular discontent and revolt, where the last materialized itself by the late 1830s resulting in the toppling of the liberal experiment and establishment of the conservative dictatorship.⁵⁸

One way to observe the emerging political-economic is through the manner in which the two camps coalesced around their perspective ideas of racial hierarchies and corresponding roles and privileges in terms of land ownership. As mentioned before, the liberals saw the dual political-economical role of the state as one that guarantees egalitarian rights from its citizenry while simultaneously developing the capitalistic agents of growth that would help steady it. With their return in 1871, the liberal reformers restarted their attempts at “modernizing” Guatemala through agricultural development with the prime obstacles being indigenous communal lands.⁵⁹ This required racially-charged bureaucratic maneuvers that first administratively whitened the indigenous population through their reclassification as ladinos whilst creating a registry for titled properties which did not recognize collective ownership.⁶⁰ This dual-faceted strategy yielded considerable amounts of lands that the government then granted to richer, whiter groups who had access to international financing and trade markets while now individualized Indians were bereft of

⁵⁵ Woodward, “Changes in the Nineteenth-Century Guatemalan State,” 60.

⁵⁶ Woodward, 60.

⁵⁷ Woodward, 61.

⁵⁸ Woodward, 61.

⁵⁹ Castro and Picq, “Stateness as Landgrab,” 793.

⁶⁰ Castro and Picq, 793–5.

the main form of capital in an agrarian economy. Coupled with the under-resourced and under-education levels of the indigenous populations, most did not have the ability to leverage the legal system to defend their rights.⁶¹ The end result was the mass-dispossession of entire Mayan communities without any forms of state assistance in aiding their collateral integration into wider Guatemalan politics and society.

As seen thus far, the contentious debates around citizenship and identity as they relate to the construction of a nation and a state have roughly condensed around the lines of racial differentiation, segregation, and the overriding need to develop the Guatemalan economy. These political-economic phenomena have now set the outlines that would heavily guide Guatemalan national discourse well into the twentieth-century. These identity projects would come to haunt the Pan-Mayan movement in the 1990s as they pushed for a reimagining of the Guatemalan state and among the obstacles were timeless features of the Guatemalan political landscape such as racism, concentration of wealth and power, and institutional biases against racial minorities.

1. The Guatemalan Civil War: 1960–1996

At its conclusion, the Guatemalan civil war had claimed the lives of over 200,000 people as a result of various military campaigns during which approximately 93% of human rights violations were committed by the military, mostly against the Mayas.⁶² The ensuing United Nations truth commission had concluded that the political-economic structures of Guatemala, alongside the marginalization of the indigenous communities, had resulted in a racist campaign to protect the elite minorities and their privileges.⁶³ These findings, published in 1999, attest to the continuity of the same racialized repressive norms and strategies that the creole elites had deployed against the very same Mayan communities little over a century before. In this section, as illustrated thus far, shall explore how the racialized political-economic conflicts of the nineteenth-century survived into the

⁶¹ Woodward, “Changes in the Nineteenth-Century Guatemalan State,” 60.

⁶² CEH, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.”

⁶³ CEH, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.”

twentieth-century with devastating repercussions for both the safety, survival, and continuity of the Guatemalan identity building project.

At the root of this conflict, we can observe the ossification of the nineteenth-century foundations where in the run up to the war, the peasantry, who were largely Mayan, had been confined to precariously shrinking pieces of communal land that were slowly degrading because of intensive agriculture.⁶⁴ Simultaneously, an alternative arrangement had revamped the paternalistic networks that nineteenth-century conservatives had revived from Spanish times where portions of the now-peasantry lived on lands owned by a wealthy ladino class without any labor or economic rights.⁶⁵ Essentially, the Mayan labor population had been reduced to peonage with a dependent relationship established between laborers and the *patrón* who owned various *haciendas* that were not necessarily located among the Mayan communities, causing laborers to travel to other parts of Guatemala. At the same time, the indigenous communities, much like their forebears, had been shut out from credit and financing networks that favored doing business with larger scale farms as both were dominated by the ladino elite who were tied to international markets.⁶⁶

This time period was also characterized by the collusion among the largely elite ladinos to capitalize on the underdevelopment of the indigenous communities via wage depression, eliminating labor competition, and the often-violent enforcement of written contracts although most Mayan workers were largely illiterate.⁶⁷ These political-economic pressures and repression of the Mayas precluded them from being accepted and were widely excluded by the ladino minorities from the identity building projects of Guatemala. Moreover, they represented the dichotomous challenges that the ladino elites never overcame, the dual-track strategy of ladinization and or elimination of the Mayas as the backward elements in a modernizing nation.

⁶⁴ Beatriz Manz, *Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 37.

⁶⁵ Manz, 37–8.

⁶⁶ Synthesis of: Manz, 39; Marcelo Bucheli, “Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899–1975.” *Business History* 50, no. 4 (July 2008): 439. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00076790802106315>.

⁶⁷ Bucheli, 441.

This ever-present struggle, the perceived ladino necessity to turn the Maya into something other than what they were while also preserving their ladinized political-economic privileges defined the Guatemalan civil war.⁶⁸ Ladino politics cannot be disassociated from their economic structures, norms, and strategies for they represented the othering of the indigenous communities and the continuation of the historical struggles between the two groups. In the 1970s, the same nineteenth-century acculturation processes were still regarded by the ladino elites, who went to lengths to prove their whiteness, as central to their acceptance of the Mayans into the national project.⁶⁹ This mentality, pervasive among the elites as much as it was among the military leadership, precipitated an atmosphere conducive towards the genocidal elimination of entire Mayan communities as witnessed in the 1982 massacres that took the lives of over 2,000 men, women, and children.⁷⁰

Against these backdrops are power consolidation, systemic bias against minorities, and the targeted military campaigns against Mayan communities which all laid bare the inherent design of the hegemonic arrangements within Guatemala and framed the challenges that the emergent Pan-Mayan movement would have in obtaining their demands. It was in the aftermath of these events, along with the wider regional pivot towards the deployment of neoliberal political-economic reforms, that the Pan-Mayan movement began maturing and expanding bridging a number of divides among the diverse array of Mayan communities. This is so because even though the preponderance of the violence highlighted the seeming timeless tensions between the core ladino hegemonic group and the peripheral Mayan communities, racism in Guatemala, like many other countries, did not function dichotomously or with precision.

⁶⁸ Marc Drouin, "Understanding the 1982 Guatemalan Genocide," in *State Violence and Genocide in Latin America the Cold War Years*, eds. Esparza, Marcia., Huttenbach, Henry R., and Feierstein, Daniel, (London: Routledge, 2010), 82.

⁶⁹ Drouin, 83.

⁷⁰ Drouin, 92–3.

2. Mayan Mobilization and Racism in Guatemala

In order to understand the peace process of the 1990s, we must first divest ourselves of homogenizing the Mayan peoples as a monolithically united bloc and instead embrace that they are comprised of a variety of fluidly multilingual communities with distinct regionalist tendencies. At the same time, we must contextualize and appraise ourselves with the equally fluid dynamics of Guatemalan racism and how it influenced, warped, and outlined current Guatemalan society as anchored in the geospatial experiences of the national events aforementioned in previous sections. Together, these two brief forays will help us understand how the peace process came to be and serve as contextually summarizing points that aid in transitioning away from civil war to the contemporary era of Guatemalan national politics.

Understanding current Mayan internal diversity is critical to understanding the development of the Pan-Mayanist movement and the competition for the lead position of their struggle against the racist and delimiting hegemonic dynamics of Guatemala. The Maya themselves make up approximately ninety-percent of the indigenous population of Guatemala, with the eastern Xinca and coastal Garifuna rounding out the remainder, and it is constituted by over twenty-two distinct groups who preponderantly speak four major inter-related languages.⁷¹ These languages—K'ichee', Mam, Kaqchikel, and Q'eqchii'—comprise the largest communities in over 190 municipalities across Guatemala which cover or surround some of the largest metro areas of the country such as Guatemala City, Quetzaltenango, and Huehuetenango.⁷²

The Mayan power to forge a unified front and project a common identity is further constrained by the fluid dynamics of race and racism in Guatemala. With varied categories of Euro-Guatemalan, creole, ladino, mistado, cholo, and Indian, Guatemalan racialization and racism varies in degrees and was based on descentance as well as outward cultural expression and social prowess which itself as a whole was ranked-compared with other

⁷¹ Mark G. Brett, *Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985–1996* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2008), 2.

⁷² Kay B. Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 16.

identities along a political-economic ladder. Today's ladinos, descendants of Spanish and other European immigrants that have intertwined with the indigenous population, occupy the higher rungs of Guatemalan society. As a group, they have historically monopolized political, economic, and socio-cultural power to the degree that over time they came to define the outlines of Guatemalan nationalism, citizenship, and the character of the nation-state.⁷³ Because of these historical privileges, the ladinos became the baseline for how to conceptualize Guatemalan-ness and therefore also define what constituted the ideas around the concept of 'passing off' between the different racialized categories.

As mentioned, a significant number of ladinos across Guatemalan history also intermingled with Mayan communities which gave rise to alternative identities such as *mistados* and *cholos* who find themselves straddling the boundaries between the two major groups. Collectively, and to varying degrees, they spectrally adopt and reject facets of indigenous culture as well as notions of ladino-ness presenting a challenge to the historically constructed bipolarity of racial relations.⁷⁴ The *mistados* posed a challenge to indigenous mobilization because unlike its resemblance to the term *mestizo*, found in other Latin American countries, in Guatemala it did not imply a distillation of two culture; instead it was a phenomenon where someone would self-conceptualize themselves with the identity of one parent or the other.⁷⁵ This racial category was heavily tied to the individual's ability to socially, economically, and or politically transcend—i.e., pass off as—their perceived phenotypical identity and thus allowed a ladino or indigenous person with a transcendental phenotype to become either or of those identities.

Another racial category found in Guatemala is that of the *cholo*, who, unlike the *mistados*, culturally and liberally borrow from two dominant groups, ladinos and Mayas, and distill a unique syncretic identity within the Guatemalan racial hierarchy. And while ladinos may view them as being poor cultural mimes while the Mayas see them as alienated

⁷³ Taracena Arriola, "From Assimilation to Segregation," 100–3.

⁷⁴ Charles R. Hale, "Mistados, Cholos, and the Negation of Identity in the Guatemalan Highlands," in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 254.

⁷⁵ Hale, 256–7.

members of the urban indigenous communities, ethnographically they represent an intermingling of both communities that challenge the policed permeability of both identities.⁷⁶ These two racialized categories pose assimilationist challenges to the borders and definition of indigenous identities insomuch that, from a ladino perspective, throw into question as to who should receive special rights and recognition. The differences that the Pan-Mayan movement had to overcome internally and peripherally at their racialized boundaries serve as reminders of how fluid identities can be and how these dynamics can affect the political-economic power of a group and in turn influence its ability to organize and present their demands in a united fashion.

Guatemalan racism distilled itself politically, economically, and culturally in such fashion that it laid the foundations for the hegemonic order within the country and imbued the state with its character and norms. As in other Latin American countries, but more so pronounced in Guatemala, neoliberalism reinforced the historical patterns of discrimination and social ranking with these shaping the now de-regulated economy.⁷⁷ As the ladino elites purchased and concentrated their land holdings, these destabilized the Mayan rural workers who would till their *milpas* and seasonally labor on large plantations and instead they would move onto estates and be compensated through sharecropping.⁷⁸

Because it is not only economic strength that imbues an ethnic group with hegemonic power but rather the sum of its dominance of political-economic and socio-cultural dialectically tense struggles that together mold and realize its hegemonic abilities within the confines of the nation state.⁷⁹ In this regard, the ladino minority enormously benefitted from the adaptive legacy of their colonial roots in regards to historical property ownership, legacy economic networks, and a state apparatus that had institutionalized

⁷⁶ Hale, "Mistados, Cholos, and the Negation of Identity in the Guatemalan Highlands," 266.

⁷⁷ Avrum J. Shriar, "Roads to Poverty: Exploring the Impacts of Economic Integration on Socioeconomic Conditions and Land Use in Northern Guatemala," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 28, no. 4 (June 2009): 456–69. doi:10.1177/0739456X08329472.

⁷⁸ Marcus J. Kurtz, "The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy - Lessons from Latin America," *World Politics* 56, no. 2 (January 2004): 273.

⁷⁹ Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 170–9.

ladino-centered culture and discourse. Eventually, the accords themselves, although containing a number of economic items, in sum represented a challenge to this historical multi-sectoral dominance of the ladino communities by potentially equalizing Mayan languages, cultural practices, political ideas, and resource ownership with those of the dominant ladino class. In this light, many opposition figures fostered fear over the failure to defend their position as the bearers of modern westernized Hispanic culture with its connotations of a Samuel Huntington-like clash of civilization with the hegemonic minority center being displaced and overtaken by the demographically superior periphery.⁸⁰

B. THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

Along with the intricacies and perils of Guatemalan racialization and racism, the peace process also highlighted the limits of the Pan-Mayan movement's ability to effect change which foreshadowed their performance during the 1999 referendum. Here, this project turns to the formation and composition of the movement as it emerged from the Guatemalan civil war and became a key player in the ensuing peace process.

In 1978, following a series of protests that trekked along the Pan-American Highway and involved over 150,000 people, mostly indigenous, rocked Guatemalan politics in what became one of the largest mass-demonstration of indigenous dissent since the 1950s. In May of that year, the various grass-movements coalesced into the United Peasant's Committee (CUC) which became the first indigenous-led civil organization with the explicit purpose of pressing for social justice.⁸¹ However, as the civil war grinded on into the 1980s it became an increasingly militant movement whose character was uniquely Mayan and ethnically based in contrast with the leftist insurgency's class-based struggle.⁸² The CUC eventually integrated most of its members in the Guerrilla Army of the Poor

⁸⁰ Kay B. Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum," in *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America*, eds. Kay B. Warren and Jean E. Jackson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 163, 174.

⁸¹ Arturo Arias, "Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala's Violent Transition to Modernity," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1530 to 1988*, ed. Carol Smith, asst. ed. Marilyn M. Moors (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992), 248–50.

⁸² Arias, 252–53.

(EGP) which in 1982 became part of the URNG.⁸³ In the mid to late nineteen-eighties, the URNG was experiencing a halting resurgence where they had achieved a chaotic stasis *vis-á-vis* the Guatemalan military which influenced their turn towards establishing their political power rather than militarily capturing the state.⁸⁴ Out of this stasis, came the first peace talks between the warring parties and a rapprochement between the URNG and CUC.

Once the war wound down, and the elections of 1990 took place, the parties began a series of negotiations that included the URNG, CACIF,⁸⁵ the state, and international third parties which haltingly progressed into the mid-nineties until the *Serranazo*, and auto-coup by President Jorge Serrano. In 1994, the *Serranazo* brought together over 150 indigenous organizations under the aegis of the Coalition of Organizations of the Maya People of Guatemala (COPMAGUA) with the purpose of presenting Pan-Mayan demands during the peace process in loose conjunction with the URNG, which was made up of ex-civil war Marxist combatants. The friction between the two organizations lay in their fundamental perceptions of what ailed Guatemalan society with COPMAGUA having an ethnically based understanding of Guatemalan violence, discrimination, and inequality whereas the URNG saw class-based oppression that was in line with their Marxist lineage.⁸⁶

As far as the development of a recognizable, coordinated, and self-identified indigenous movement; this came in the form of the dozens of member organizations within COPMAGUA. Their alliance with the URNG and their collective participation as one front within the peace process signaled the changing dynamics within Guatemala at the time. Arguably, this was the first time since the nineteenth-century that there was a sizable and politically mobilized indigenous movement that could rival other political centers within the Guatemalan establishment and exercise hegemonic maneuvering *vis-á-vis* the core group of ladino elites. On another historical front, because of their alliance with the URNG,

⁸³ Arias, "Changing Indian Identity," 252.

⁸⁴ Susanne Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 30–31.

⁸⁵ Acronym stands for Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF).

⁸⁶ Antonio Otzoy, "Guatemala The Struggle for Maya Unity," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29, no. 5 (March 1, 1996): 33–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.1996.11725758>.

COPMAGUA was also able to extend and to some extent present their demands across racial lines to include poorer ladinos.

However, one must ask whether this movement was largely unified, accepted, and representative of the Mayan peoples. On the one hand, intellectuals like Demetrio Cojtí were accepted as the philosophical founders of the principles that propelled the Pan-Mayan movement.⁸⁷ As the talks progressed, various high-profile actors within the movement came to be seen as either not radical or authentic enough to be seen as serious Mayan leaders often having accusations of selling out being leveled against them.⁸⁸ The movement itself continued its ideological struggle with more traditional leftist groups within the URNG and in the international sphere that stressed more class-based economic and individual rights discourses.⁸⁹ Ironically, these leftist movements themselves continued the assimilationist thought that had tainted government discourse since national independence in the nineteenth-century. Although these movements would share the language of autonomy, self-determination, and exploitation they did so purely on terms that universalized and watered down the unique experiences of indigenous peoples for the sake of maintaining support with international partners who campaigned on liberal universal rights that did not necessarily rhyme with ethnically based struggles.⁹⁰

There were also divisions among the activists, some who saw the demands of the Mayanist movement as not enough, others seeing them as racist against poor ladinos, and yet others saw them as illegitimate. One key group of Mayan leaders that the movement was unable to decisively integrate into their ranks, both organizationally and discursively, were the traditional municipal-level formal leaders of the hundreds of Mayan communities

⁸⁷ David Carey, "Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala: Ethnic Equality Rejected?" *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 31, no. 6 (November 2004): 71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X04270640>.

⁸⁸ Charles R. Hale, "The Authorized Indian," in *The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Greg Grandin, Deborah T. Levenson, and Elizabeth Oglesby (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 518.

⁸⁹ Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics*, 34.

⁹⁰ Warren, 35.

throughout Guatemala.⁹¹ These leaders, unlike many others, embodied the very indigenous values and structures that the movement sought recognition for and puzzling enough was unable to fully yield their support. These *municipales*, whose careers and styles were deeply emmeshed with their respective villages and at times seen as the embodiment of the town's will, were the basis of traditional local government that framed Mayan practices and leadership.⁹² Representing over fifty-percent of the Mayan population across over one-hundred-sixty municipalities, these *principales* would have been key to the referendum's, and the Pan-Mayan movement's, success and yet they largely chose to steer clear of national politics.⁹³

To these leaders at the municipal level, the movement threatened to transfer their authorities and autonomy away from the cantons or municipalities up to the national government thus diluting traditional Mayan political leadership.⁹⁴ Additionally, activist and movement leaders were seen as disconnected urbanites who had little concerns over and knowledge of municipal-level issues and thus were seen as internationally-backed interventionists.⁹⁵ Most Mayanist taking part in the movement were middle class, urban, educated, and have been characterized as close to *passing-off* as ladinos which fueled their differentiation from rural Mayan populations who govern themselves under traditional municipal arrangements.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Stener Ekern, "The Production of Autonomy: Leadership and Community in Mayan Guatemala," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 43, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 100. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X1000180X>.

⁹² Ekern, 102.

⁹³ Ekern, 101.

⁹⁴ Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 170; Dinorah Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum (Consulta Popular) and the Future of the Peace Process in Guatemala*, working paper 241, Latin American Program Working Papers (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999), 22. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Working%20Paper%20241.pdf>; Carey, "Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala," 80.

⁹⁵ Warren, 171.

⁹⁶ Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics*, 201; Betsy Konefal, "Defending the Pueblo: Indigenous Identity and Struggles for Social Justice in Guatemala, 1970–1980," in *Social Justice*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2003): 37–8.

The overall perspective on the Pan-Mayan movement is one of a strong, Mayan-led and defined political mobilization born out of civil war that was able to ally itself with a potent military-political force in the form of the URNG. However, this gave way to the historical disagreements between the indigenous movement and the leftist guerrillas who framed Guatemala's national challenges differently where the former was based on the realities of racism the latter saw capitalism as the ultimate oppressor. Considering the strength and intellectual depth of the Pan-Mayan movement, and its active shaping of demands throughout the peace accords, it was poised to become a central force in Guatemalan politics. However, the ideological divisions within the COPMAGUA-URNG alliance coupled with those within the Pan-Mayan movement stunted their reach and growth into the depths of Mayan communities.

The Pan-Mayan movement was seen as an internationally-backed urbanite intellectual movement that did not recruit or heavily jockey with local municipal and traditional leaders and thus were also seen as disconnected from the rural lives of the majority of the Mayan peoples. All of these factors made the Pan-Mayan movement a risky but attractive actor with whom the state elites and the URNG could work with in order to draft the peace accords and be able to say that they received Mayan inputs but that was hobbled in its ability to deliver results. In another way that the movement was not entirely united behind its alliance with the URNG, there were those who doubted that racism and uniquely indigenous problems would be resolved by a ladino-dominated revolutionary front.⁹⁷ However, the Pan-Mayan movement's alliance with the URNG and other leftist elements in Guatemala was bounded by the sheer enormity and intensity of state-sanctioned violence directed against Mayan communities and besides the significant reservations many Mayan activists had with the left these were quickly but not ideally forgotten in the face of a common enemy.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Konefal, "Defending the Pueblo," 40.

⁹⁸ Konefal, 43–44.

C. THE HEGEMONIC COUNTER-REACTION

Thus far, this project has briefly swept through Guatemala's historical patterns of hegemony and the hierarchy and relationships of power that it engendered, followed by a study of the roots and development of the Pan-Mayan movement, and also a review of its effectiveness. But, what about the opposition? How did it come to be and how effective was it? That will be the aim of this chapter as it examines the coalescence of various powerful interest groups within the ladino majority—namely the state, military, and business elites—and juxtaposes their strategies and effectiveness in thwarting the Pan-Mayan autonomic drive while preserving their core hegemony. Understanding their moves precludes understanding the failure of the Mayan movement within the wider political context of the time. We must therefore, chart a brief outline of Guatemala's journey from Cold War dictatorship to a neoliberal flawed democracy in order to learn the lineages of the main ladino interest groups that were present in the runup to the referendum.⁹⁹ Once their origins are revealed, their interests will be established enabling us to chart their strategies in dealing with the Pan-Mayan movement.

While the Pan-Mayan movement was in its infancy, the Guatemalan polity as led by Gen Efraín Ríos Montt had morphed from a corporatist, monocultural exporter state to a whole-of-government counterinsurgency apparatus at the command of the army.¹⁰⁰ While ladinos dominated on both sides of the conflict, by enlarge the elites of Guatemala self-conceptualized themselves as a white European-descended class who financially, politically, and socially dominated the country.¹⁰¹ Politically and economically, the business, military, and political elites had become intertwined with each other in reinforcing ways where one group monopolized the means of violence, and at times

⁹⁹ Adrian Karatnycky, ed, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998–1999* (New York, New York: Freedom House, 1999), 206. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/Guatemala>

¹⁰⁰ Terrance W. Kading, "The Guatemalan Military and the Economics of *La Violencia*," *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, vol. 24, no. 47 (1999): 59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.1999.10816776>.

¹⁰¹ Peter Winn, *Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean*, 3rd ed (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 278.

political leadership, while the others focused on resource extraction in order to engage in international trade.

Since 1944, the military had provided nineteen of the twenty-six heads of state while simultaneously being perceived as the only enduring political institution in the country.¹⁰² This developed into an interdependent relationship between the state and business elites in developmentalist, exploitative, and institutionalist ways as they reactionarily guarded the interests of the wider ladino-dominated elites.¹⁰³ By the 1980s, the military had become the chief arbiter of national identity because its leadership was largely comprised of ladino-descended officers who shaped the institution and thus the outlines of what it meant to be a citizen.¹⁰⁴

For the economic elites, their legacy was one where ownership over land, means of production, and labor were interwoven into one mindset of hierarchical relationships that could be racially transcendent in some instances, such as recognizing a fellow political leader in a Mayan elder, but often were not and thus shaped their view of Guatemala's social and economic order.¹⁰⁵ The systemic, multi-century expropriation of communal lands and the extreme concentration of land-ownership meant that during the time of the peace accords the elites owned nearly two-thirds of the land while only making up two percent of agricultural producers.¹⁰⁶ Further concentrations were driven by energy projects as well as privatizations of utilities alongside other neoliberal economic reforms that were made towards the end of the conflict which further solidified the business elites' control over the Guatemalan economy.¹⁰⁷ Their power over the state's finances, taxing structures, and exports was exemplified in 1985 when the government at the time announced a series

¹⁰² Georges A. Fauriol and Eva Loser, *Guatemala's Political Puzzle* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988), IX-X, 5.

¹⁰³ Peter Calvert, *Guatemala, a Nation in Turmoil* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 40–41.

¹⁰⁴ Fauriol and Loser, 46; Calvert, 43.

¹⁰⁵ Annalisa Mauro and Michel Merlet, *Access to Land and Recognition of Land Rights in Guatemala* (Rome, Italy: International Land Coalition, June 2003), 6–7, <https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2013/05/kpguatemala03.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Mauro and Merlet, 23.

¹⁰⁷ Castro and Picq, "Stateness as Landgrab," 797; Mauro and Merlet, *Access to Land*, 14–15.

of tariffs that affected their business networks that resulted in their demand the government fire a number of officials connected with that tax project.¹⁰⁸ Based on their power and influence over the Guatemalan economy, the business elites as represented by the trade organization CACIF, were among the groups that the Pan-Mayan movement needed to either confront or assuage and that the opposition needed to keep in their sphere. With their considerable influence, CACIF possessed the ability to decisively sway the referendum, and the following presidential election, towards either camp.

On the political elites, they consolidated their positions once Gen Ríos Montt was deposed by his own defense minister who ushered in democratic elections in 1985 that installed President Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo and paved the way for further democratizations at the end of the civil war.¹⁰⁹ President Cerezo Arévalo was then able to survive various coup attempts and pass on the presidency to Jorge Serrano Elías who in 1993 attempted an auto-coup in a bid to establish one-man rule which had the effect of uniting the political-economic, military elites and Pan-Mayan movement against him.¹¹⁰

The 1995 presidential and congressional elections resulted in the National Advancement Party (PAN) and the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) gaining control of both the legislature and the presidency which presented procedural hurdles to the Pan-Mayanist-allied party, New Guatemala Democratic front (FDNG), which needed two-thirds support.¹¹¹ With the parties of President-elect Álvaro Arzú and accused war criminal Efraín Ríos Montt in power, PAN and FRG respectively, they were poised to serve as the

¹⁰⁸ Lucy Hood, "Private Sector Threatens Nationwide Strike," United Press International Archives, April 18, 1985, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/04/18/Private-sector-threatens-nationwide-strike/9578482648400/>; To understand CACIF's political role: Gustavo Herrarte, "El CACIF es más influyente que los partidos en el congreso [CACIF is more influential than political parties in congress]," Plaza Pública, last modified August 15, 2012, <https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/el-cacif-es-mas-influyente-que-los-partidos-en-el-congreso>.

¹⁰⁹ José Elías, "Héctor Gramajo, ex ministro de [ex-minister of] Guatemala," *El País*, March 22, 2004, https://elpais.com/diario/2004/03/22/agenda/1079910007_850215.html.

¹¹⁰ Susan Berger, "Guatemala: Coup and Countercoup," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, vol. 27, no. 1 (July/August 1993): 4. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.1993.11723020>; Elías, "Héctor Gramajo, ex ministro de Guatemala."

¹¹¹ "Guatemala: 1995 House of Deputies Election," Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University and the Organization of American States, March 29, 2001, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/leg95.html>.

counter-reactionary forces against the Pan-Mayanist movement and the URNG. The significance of this to the coming referendum in 1999 lies in the potential allies or adversaries the Pan-Mayan movement would have to work with. On the one hand, they had a potential ally in President Arzú who could persuade undecided PAN conservatives to at least not hamper the vote while in the FRG they potentially had the single greatest threat to the procedural legitimacy of the constitutionalization drive. With PAN susceptible to fracturing between its pro and anti-accords members, it was imperative that the FDNG and the Pan-Movement move swiftly to ensure their support before the FRG could begin their interference.

The mandate delivered by voters was splintered between the former military ruler Gen Rios Montt, who through his proxy candidate received 48% of the vote, and President-elect Arzú who received 51% and ran on a platform of continuing democratization in tandem with the peace process.¹¹² Under those conditions, it is questionable that President Arzú received a decisive mandate from the electorate considering the split between his party and that of Gen Rios Montt who received support from some puzzling but key regions considering his commanding role in the bloodiest massacres of the civil war that took place in them.

Once inaugurated, President Arzú began a campaign to implement and ratify the peace accords signed in 1996 with the sacking of corrupt and criminally suspicious military and governmental officials as well as supporting the creation of the congressional committees needed to draft the referendum articles.¹¹³ Altogether, although it can be argued that the election of President Arzú could be in some significant ways interpreted as a sign of the broader electorate's desire to implement the peace accords likewise their support of the FRG diluted, if not weakened, this notion which casts doubt on the clarity of the national desire. On the one hand, one can observe a president who is willing to bring

¹¹² Georgetown University's Political Database of the Americas, "Guatemala: 1995 House of Deputies Election,"; Larry Rohter, "The Specter in Guatemala," *New York Times*, January 10, 1996, <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/10/world/the-specter-in-guatemala.html>.

¹¹³ Karatnycky, ed, *Freedom in the World*, 206; Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 190.

about constitutional reforms while noting significant programmatic and institutional challenges within congress that would water down the perceived popular mandate.

Altogether, the opposition was fairly united with significant power centers in the congressional committees in the form of the FRG, CACIF's network of over eighty-thousand businesses and individuals, and a military that still held the URNG-COPMAGUA as a direct challenge to their authority. Even within President Arzú's cabinet there were deep divisions between those who wanted to see the peace accords to its conclusion and who drifted closer to the FRG's no-vote position. These divisions are noticeable inasmuch that they show the extent of support the conservatives enjoy across party-lines and these representing bridges through which they create coalitions against a favorable Pan-Mayan outcome. Even though Arzú himself is for the accords and had shepherded them his government was not wholly unified therefore giving the Pan-Mayan movement one more flank to watch and the FRG another avenue for counter-action.

For example, the entirety of the peace process, from the beginning of congressional deliberations, to the ratification of ILO-169, to the political inclusion of the URNG and the Pan-Mayanist movement, the signing of the baseline accords, it was President Arzú pushing the PAN—and its conservative factions—along while cajoling the FRG to at least dampen their innate resistance to peace.¹¹⁴ However, first he was stymied and delayed repeatedly by his coalition partners and perennial challengers the FRG. Considering their closeness to victory in the last election, and an upcoming election in 1999 shortly after the referendum, the FRG transformed itself into a staunch opponent to peace and made it its mission to obstruct the PAN and President Arzú's progress.¹¹⁵

In this regard, President Arzú being ineligible for reelection severely reduced the chances that if successful the referendum would be implemented faithfully, given the enormous opposition within his and other powerful parties, and if unsuccessful that the

¹¹⁴ ILO-169 refers to the conferring of international recognition to rights of self-determination for indigenous populations, this was adopted by Guatemala in June 1996. "C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)," International Labour Organization, accessed April 9, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.

¹¹⁵ Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 190.

pro-referendum would regroup. This is in addition to his cabinet being divided between conservative anti-referendum PAN members and pro-referendum appointees highlighted the Achilles heel of his presidential leadership if he were to become unavailable or sidelined. Through negotiations between the PAN, FRG, and COPMAGUA the opposition elements were able to dilute and mushroom the range of articles that would be presented to voters which had grown from thirteen provisions to over fifty articles across four categories.¹¹⁶

Among the elites, considering that President Arzú's support oscillated between thirty-three and fifty percent of polls as well as the fact that he became president after a runoff one can argue that the overall position of the elites is one of tepid but brittle openness to the referendum.¹¹⁷ Consequently, the electorate titillated between supporting the FRG and PAN in the runup to the 1995 election which handed the presidency to Arzú but legislative power to Gen. Ríos Montt, president of the chamber of deputies, similarly dividing the elites. This is because the referendum threatened their hegemonic preeminence when it came to property rights, social rights, and economic exclusivity as well as opening the door to prosecuting military leaders who committed genocidal crimes protecting elite interests. As a result, there's an elite faction who wants to avoid international sanctions against the country and emmesh themselves in the then-emergent trend of globalization and another faction made up by the FRG and some members of CACIF who wanted to retain control over the apparatus of state and *modernize*, i.e., eliminate the Mayas.

A collateral result of the referendum negotiations was also the delay of the vote into the spring of 1999 which was a general election year during which everything would predictably become politicized.¹¹⁸ To this end, conservatives within the FRG and various nationally-allied organizations began a systematic media campaign with columns, television pieces, and newspaper articles of which some were written by anti-referendum Mayan activist themselves. To this effect, the opposition employed noted Mayan journalist

¹¹⁶ Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 192.

¹¹⁷ Larry Rohter, "Guatemala Hopes Vote Ends War," *New York Times*, November 12, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/12/world/guatemala-hopes-vote-ends-war.html>.

¹¹⁸ Jonas, 194.

Estuardo Zapeta who passionately argued to ladino audiences that identity was not a national question but rather a social and individual one.¹¹⁹

He furthered his criticism in assimilationist and instrumentalist terms, depicting international organizations and Pan-Mayanist as working in tandem to invent Mayan languages, benefiting from each other economically, and arguing that there was no basis for multiple systems of law within a country.¹²⁰ Additionally, the opposition carried out a campaign of fear that warned against the Balkanization of the country, that traditional religious practices would supplant the Christian faith, and that ladino children would be forced to learn indigenous culture.¹²¹ The conservative factions then resorted to legal challenges, where in one case they called into question the layout of the questions themselves and other minutia in order to further deaccelerate the process.¹²² All of this was pitted against organizations such as MINUGUA, the European Union thru the Coordinating Committee of Europeans, and the United States who as a whole funded various radio, newspaper, and television pieces in attempts to rally support behind the Yes vote.¹²³

As far as the CACIF and the business elites it represents, initially it was in favor of the peace accords and the referendum as they seemingly promised an end to three decades of continual political violence and thus stability for the commercial sector.¹²⁴ However, as the constitutional process encountered delays in congress CACIF's support eroded and finally caved when dozens of amendments were made, having increased from a dozen to fifty, which gave the impression that control over the process had been lost.¹²⁵ Because of its international portfolios and its business-friendly initiatives, although CACIF was

¹¹⁹ Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 171.

¹²⁰ Warren, 172.

¹²¹ Warren, 173.

¹²² Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 195-200.

¹²³ Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum*, 32; MINIGUA stands for United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala.

¹²⁴ Azpuru et al., 28.

¹²⁵ Azpuru et al., 30.

cautious about abandoning the *Yes* camp because it would ultimately run afoul of the vested international players it nonetheless found its way to reassert its majoritarian-ladino identity.¹²⁶ Although CACIF was not one of the active litigants against the constitutional reforms or vociferously against the *idea* of a referendum it nevertheless chose the conservative option of supporting certain continuities of the status quo. Days before the national vote, it revoked its support for the referendum and allowed a cascade of *No* add-campaigns that warned Guatemalans of the country's coming Balkanization, the confiscation of private property, the imposition of indigenous law, and the overthrow of Hispanic culture.¹²⁷

As for the Guatemalan military, although it was the initiator of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s its institutional momentum was still towards maintaining a weakened democratic system where military power would ensure influence over the political state.¹²⁸ And although the military repeatedly safeguarded the transition to democracy, it would ultimately negotiate various privileges for itself in order to maintain its primacy over politics and civil society as the ultimate guarantor of Guatemalan identity and political order.¹²⁹ It also avoided complete demobilization or the reformation of its officer ranks, an issue of note because of the corps' near-total composition of ladinos which influence the military's doctrine of indigenous subjugation which was in addition to its maintenance of the notorious civil defense patrol units.¹³⁰ These civil defense units were one of the main forms of oppression against the indigenous population during the era of the counterinsurgency state and the military was able to lobby for their compensation.¹³¹ In addition to that lobbying, because the military had accepted the premise of reforming the Guatemalan state it effectively shielded itself from further reforms to its own privileges

¹²⁶ Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum*, 33.

¹²⁷ Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 196–197.

¹²⁸ Azpuru et al., 44.

¹²⁹ Elías, "Héctor Gramajo, ex ministro de [ex-minister of] Guatemala."

¹³⁰ Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 157; Carey, "Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala," 70.

¹³¹ Carey, 70.

as civilian authorities lacked the executive direction to shape their relationship with the generals.¹³² As a result, the military was able to eliminate the two provisions from the referendum that most threatened its domestic preeminence; that which limited their freedom to operate authoritatively within Guatemala and the call for a civilian defense minister.¹³³

In sum, the ladino-dominated elites and authoritative establishments had risen up alongside the Pan-Mayan movement and its allies in both subtle and overt ways in order to maintain their position as the country's core hegemon. The intricate and interdependent power centers of the political, commercial, and military establishments proved to be adept generators, organizers, and user of hegemonic power to reinforce the historical arrangements that had woven the politico-economic-racial hierarchy of Guatemala. With a divided but reluctant political class that was trying to balance its historical prerogatives, international appeals, and domestic supporters, the articles of the referendum were swamped under layers of congressional wrangling and legal litigation in order to procedurally blunt its effects. This was even when segments of the elites tepidly accepted its premises. The commercial class, influenced by their drive for stability and the allure of NAFTA-like free trade discussions across the Americas, proved to be more cautious but in the end their opposition contributed to the outcome of the referendum.¹³⁴ Likewise, for the military their only purpose was the maintenance of their historical privileges regardless of the effects on the civilian government and although many elements opposed the referendum the institution allowed it to march forward knowing that their interests were intact.

¹³² Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum*, 46.

¹³³ Azpuru et al., 46–47.

¹³⁴ For a timeline of free trade agreements: James K. Jackson, *U.S. Trade with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Partners*, CRS Report No. R44044 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2018), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44044>; For Summit of the Americas discussion: Peter J. Meyer, *2018 Summit of the Americas*, CRS Report No. IF10863 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2018), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10863>; On future agreements see: Katarina de la Rosa and M. Angeles Villareal, *Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)*, CRS Report No. IF10394 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10394>.

At this point in the study, we now see how the historical patterns of racism influenced the hegemonic hierarchies and social constructions of group relationships as manifested by the political-economic and cultural concentrations of power in a historic core hegemon, the ladinos, with other groups relegated to the peripheries. This study has also shown how the Maya constructed their identity and how it became the cornerstone of their resistance to the state during and after the civil war in the form of both armed and political mobilization. In turn, one can observe the dominant group, ladinos, rallying around their traditionally privileged power structures to yield the weight of national government, the military, and the economy against the Pan-Mayan movements and its autonomic drive. Now, this work proceeds into outlining the development and outcome of the ultimate Pan-Mayan goal, the 1999 constitutional referendum.

D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVE OF 1999

Our current question is what did the Guatemalan electorate ended up voting upon and how was the ballot developed? What was the outcome and its significance for the hegemonic arrangement within Guatemala? The answers to these questions lie in the deliberations taken within the national congress and in the eventual body of text that voted upon in May 1999. As detailed in prior sections, the Pan-Mayan movement was by no means entirely unified as it had significant divisions between its political and intellectual leadership and these with the wider Mayan populace and communal leadership. Likewise, the opposition was not preponderantly unified as there were establishment actors, such as President Arzú, who were actively pushing the accords along while others, such as the FRG, CACIF, and some members of the presidential cabinet, who had either wavered and had been decidedly against the peace process. Both sides resorted to intensive media and political campaigns to mobilize their respective bases and drive voter turnout in their favor however it proved foreboding that the conservative-led *No* vote was widely recognized as the more organized and funded campaign. Therefore, the product of the congressional committee processes alongside the ongoing political negotiations between all sides was an unruly document that muddled the highest expectations of the Pan-Mayan movement and safeguarded the interests of the ladino political-economic establishments.

The document produced symmetrically reflected the political environment that engendered it, a product that sought to culminate nearly four decades of violent ethnic conflict and oppression which themselves were the products of nearly two-hundred years of systemic racism and exclusivist nationalism. Aside from the growth and establishment of the Pan-Mayan movement and its unprecedented drive to constitutionally reimagine the Guatemalan state, the established forces of the PAN, FRG, and the military leadership along with the oligarchy were able to both procedurally blunt and operationally hamper the outcome of the referendum. The first step in the process began under UN moderation: bringing the government, CACIF, and the COPMAGUA-URNG together to create a common forum for negotiations that eventually included indigenous rights.¹³⁵ Out of these negotiations, the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) was established to negotiate the end of the civil war and its settlements in a multi-sectoral way.¹³⁶ In March 1995, after months of haltingly tense discussions the Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was signed by all parties with significant concessions to COPMAGUA-URNG on issues that would constitutionalized indigenous rights and protections.

This accord served as the forerunning template for the 1999 referendum agreement and ballot insomuch as it included provisions such as a declaration of the country as multiethnic, demilitarization, cultural protections, recognition of customary law, and land reforms.¹³⁷ During the drafting of demands, COPMAGUA advocated for a federated, regionalized, and pluricultural platform that integrated the historical needs of the Mayan communities such as; recognition of indigenous leadership practices and governance, collective ownership of land and resources, expanded religious freedoms, and regional autonomy.¹³⁸ On the other hand, the URNG advocated for national unification based on class and corporatist ideas of labor and guild affiliations in order to bridge the ethnic tensions that had fueled the most violent periods of the civil war.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves*, 43.

¹³⁶ Jonas, 44.

¹³⁷ Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 158.

¹³⁸ Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics*, 56.

¹³⁹ Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics*, 198.

In the exchange between the camps, historical issues such as assimilationism, the hegemonic hold of ladinos, and the willful erasure or obliviousness to the systemic racial hierarchies of Guatemala resurfaced. Where the URNG saw American imperialism and the perils of capitalism, the COPMAGUA saw innate and adaptive continuities of racial discrimination and segregation that were tightly interwoven with the social and economic relationships of Guatemala.¹⁴⁰ This was their basis for insisting on a federated state, regions that had their own governments and localized authority over education and cultural matters; however, the URNG and other leftist elements resisted any alternatives to the current Guatemalan state on the basis that doing so would risk ethnic conflict.¹⁴¹

Thus, the fifty articles generated by the ASC, ramrodded through congress, and printed upon the referendum ballots touched upon four distinct areas that diluted the indigenous demands. The bulk of the indigenous demands were amalgamated under the banner of *Nation and Social Rights* that included the reclassification of the state as multiethnic, recognition of indigenous languages, general healthcare for the entire population, abolition of the military draft, and strengthened social services.¹⁴² The second area entail legislative reforms such as the expansion of the number of congressional seats and the creation of intelligence oversight and language officialization committees.¹⁴³ The third category dealt with executive branch reforms, these revolved around the civilianization of the Minister of Defense position, extricate the army from domestic operations, increasing civilian control of military operations, and the creation of community councils to advise the president on local matters.¹⁴⁴ And the final and fourth category deal with judicial reforms, these included the professionalization and depoliticization of the judiciary and the integration of indigenous governance and legal

¹⁴⁰ Otzoy, "Guatemala The Struggle for Maya Unity," 34.

¹⁴¹ Santiagos Bastos, "La movilización Maya en Guatemala: exigiendo derechos y construyendo multiculturalidad en un contexto de postconflicto [Mayan Mobilization in Guatemala: Demanding Rights and Constructing Multiculturalism in a Post-Conflict Environment]," in *Cahiers des Amériques latines* [Latin American Notebooks] (Paris, France: 1985): 44.

¹⁴² Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum*, 2; Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 168.

¹⁴³ Carey, "Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala," 72.

¹⁴⁴ Carey, 72.

systems into the national legal frameworks. These articles were approved and disseminated merely seventy-six days before the vote, not enough time for the electorate to have been educated on the nature and purpose of the provisions and to have had substantial debates over them.¹⁴⁵

With an abstention rate of 81%, 53% of voters who did cast a ballot voted against the referendum and thus rejected decade-long negotiations, campaigning, and political wrangling between the Pan-Mayan movement and the conservative forces within the country. Even within the eight regions that the Mayan communities dominated, they averaged an abstention rate of 78% and only carried four of them in the *Yes* column. If one breaks out these eight regions by the four categories the Mayan movement garnered the yes vote on the question of broader national and social rights in six out of eight regions, the yes vote on the legislative and executive reforms in only four regions, and on the judicial changes in five regions.¹⁴⁶ Broadly, on the questions of indigenous rights, the majority of which were contained in the national and social rights category, the indigenous populations overwhelmingly approved of them but not enough to offset the ladino vote that was concentrated in the more heavily populated metro areas.

As seen in Table 1, the Maya-majority areas highlighted in yellow attest to their unanimity—six out of eight departments—on the question of the nation and social rights which included the preponderance of indigenous rights. On all other categories, the Maya were scattered across the board with offering mixed support for an overhaul of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Also, of note, when averaged out the abstention rate for non-Maya departments was around 83% whereas in the Mayan departments it was closer to 78% indicating that the Maya were relatively more enthusiastic about the vote than others. However, all of this is relative considering that only roughly 19% of registered voters casted a ballot.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Carey, “Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala,” 73.

¹⁴⁶ Warren, “Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala,” 161–2.

¹⁴⁷ Carey, “Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala,” 73.

Table 1. Guatemalan 1999 Constitutional Referendum Results by Department¹⁴⁸

Department	Abstention Rate	Overall Yes Vote	Overall No Vote	Nation and Social Rights Reforms		Executive Branch Reforms		Legislative Branch Reforms		Judicial Branch Reforms	
				Yes Vote	No Vote	Yes Vote	No Vote	Yes Vote	No Vote	Yes Vote	No Vote
1 Alta Verapaz	73.76	62.75	37.25	65.11	34.89	60.93	39.07	61.59	38.41	63.37	36.63
2 Baja Verapaz	81.88	47.77	52.23	50.8	49.2	45.63	54.37	45.99	54.01	48.67	51.33
3 El Quiché	80.77	60.86	39.14	62.22	37.78	59.87	40.13	59.94	40.06	61.42	38.58
4 Huehuetenango	80.16	55.64	44.36	58.16	41.84	53.62	46.38	54.17	45.83	56.61	43.39
5 Quetzaltenango	79.41	37.89	62.11	42.46	57.54	33.9	66.1	35.28	64.72	39.9	60.1
6 San Marcos	82.99	47.14	52.86	49.78	50.22	45.09	54.91	45.86	54.14	47.83	52.17
7 Sololá	70.01	67.03	32.97	69.21	30.79	65.21	34.79	66.01	33.99	67.68	32.32
8 Totonicapán	78.8	48.68	51.32	59.53	40.47	41	59	41.3	58.7	52.87	47.13
9 Chimaltenango	74.87	48.85	51.15	53.05	46.95	45.17	54.83	46.97	53.03	50.19	49.81
10 Chiquimula	85.01	40.11	59.89	41.84	58.16	37.97	62.03	39.33	60.67	41.28	58.72
11 El Progreso	84.57	27.44	72.56	31.41	68.59	24.39	75.61	25.94	74.06	28.03	71.97
12 Escuintla	84.28	35.41	64.59	37.8	62.2	33.12	66.88	34.21	65.79	36.5	63.5
13 Guatemala	80.09	25.51	74.49	27	73	20.89	79.11	23.57	76.43	26.58	73.42
14 Izabal	83.35	43.07	56.93	45.33	54.67	41.51	58.49	41.8	58.2	43.62	56.38
15 Jalapa	89.39	44.8	55.2	47.93	52.07	41.79	58.21	43.39	56.61	46.07	53.93
16 Jutiapa	91.68	36.76	63.24	39.7	60.3	34.01	65.99	35.32	64.68	37.99	62.01
17 Petén	86.66	71.16	28.84	72.08	27.92	70.37	29.63	70.25	29.75	71.94	28.06
18 Retalhuleu	82.98	37.66	62.34	40.26	59.74	35.34	64.66	36.18	63.82	38.87	61.13
19 Sacatepéquez	79.21	28.4	71.6	32.88	67.12	24.51	75.49	26.01	73.99	30.2	69.8
20 Santa Rosa	87.16	30.95	69.05	33.85	66.15	28.49	71.51	29.38	70.62	32.08	67.92
21 Suchitepéquez	81.66	36.08	63.92	38.65	61.35	33.74	66.26	34.74	65.26	37.19	62.81
22 Zacapa	80.96	28.76	71.24	30.19	69.81	27.63	72.37	27.8	72.2	29.42	70.58

All Mayan majority departments are highlighted in yellow. The winning side the various votes are highlighted in black fill and white lettering

¹⁴⁸ Adapted from Warren, "Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala," 162.

These results stemmed from a combination of the short campaign season that the Yes vote had between the approval of the ballot and the election date as well as the fact that most voters, when questioned, asserted they did not know enough about the provisions being voted upon.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, one must also account for the fact that most of the Mayan population resides in rural areas that are often unreachable under certain conditions and that voting were concentrated in urban areas making transportation, logistics, and access major factors in dampening the vote.¹⁵⁰ Along with the challenges of a rural population, one must also account for its educational levels where at the time ninety-two percent of the adult population possessed less than six years of formal education on top of the fact that many communities did not want to empower the government to be involved in their affairs.¹⁵¹ Another inhibiting factor was also that a great majority, seventy-one percent, did not see any personal benefits from the peace process and believed that wider Guatemalan society did not want to see change.¹⁵²

Altogether, the results of the referendum were dispiriting to the Pan-Mayan Movement because after a thirty-six civil war, nearly a decade of fraught negotiations, and overcoming centuries of racism, political-economic oppression, and staving off one of the region's most ruthless militaries it was not able to overcome the inertia of disengagement. The opposition, through their political-economic-cultural hegemony, was able to blitz the Yes campaign with a constant barrage of negative television, radio, and newspaper ads in addition to splintering the Mayan and leftist intellectual classes. Politically outmaneuvered, stunted at the ballot box, and coerced into continuing the historical patterns of hegemony, the Pan-Mayan movement sputtered shortly thereafter never to recoup their former strength nor make the transition into a formal political party unlike those in other Latin American states.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Azpuru et al., *The Popular Referendum*, 17.

¹⁵⁰ Carey, "Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala," 76.

¹⁵¹ Carey, 78–9.

¹⁵² Azpuru et al., 17.

¹⁵³ Kevin Pallister, "Why No Mayan Party? Indigenous Movements and National Politics in Guatemala," in *Latin American Politics and Society* 55, no. 3 (September 2013): 117–38. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00205.x>.

E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE GUATEMALAN CASE

After considering the historical development of the Guatemalan state, reviewing its systems of racism and hegemonic enforcement, while also distilling the ways the Mayas constructed their identity and politically mobilized around it, and faced the hegemonic counter-reaction, this chapter now arrives at its overall conclusion. Per the proposed theory, whenever an indigenous movement seeking constitutional change is unified, pluralistically appealing, and in possession of a strong coalition it can achieve increased autonomy or the sought-after constitutional reforms. In the case of the Pan-Mayan movement, we see that it was not as strongly unified as it was seen at the time with numerous divisions existing among its leaders, the rank and file, among the intellectual, traditional Mayan leaders, and the rural populations. In addition to this challenge, the referendum bares out that they were not universally appealing considering the effectiveness of the *No* coalition's fear campaigns and warnings against granting what they termed *special rights* to what they perceived as regular Guatemalan citizens. And lastly, the COPMAGUA-URNG coalition was not broader than the leftist elements in both the domestic and international spheres and even internally suffered from ideological disagreements that hobbled the formulation of demands and the struggle for them.

In line with our theoretical expectations, the Pan-Mayan movement simply did not build enough political strength across a wide enough range of actors to enact their reformist agenda. The hegemonic core group of Guatemala controlled a wide array of resources and institutions in such a way that it proved too resilient for even a former armed movement, such as COPMAGUA-URNG, to dislodge them from the center of that system. With these lessons in mind, our gaze now turns to the Andes where another nation with similar demographics, history, and social struggles experienced a starkly different outcome. That nation is Bolivia.

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III. BOLIVIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In many ways, Andean Bolivia is mostly a world away from the steamy tropical jungles of Guatemala but it shares in many ways the same historical trends that both countries endured since Pre-Columbian times. The forerunners of both nations were peoples who were mixed between rural networks and urbanized cultures that were held together by a variety of linked languages and political structures. Much like the Maya, their Andean counterparts, the Inca, had built expansive trading networks, amalgamated different peoples within the breadth of their influence, and built upon the traditions of disparate South American cultures. Much like their Mesoamerican counterparts, these civilizations would be conquered and annexed by the Spanish Empire as it expanded across the Americas and would be similarly governed for nearly four centuries.

Both countries experienced similar journeys to independence—Guatemala in 1821, Bolivia in 1825—followed by liberal republican periods, a myriad of autocratic governments, the onset of the Cold War and the ever-looming United States, and finally democratization in the 1990s. In both countries, the indigenous population are demographic majorities. However, as we have seen in the Guatemalan case democratization in the 1990s only brought disenchantment to its burgeoning indigenous movement as it was strangled by its hegemonic arrangements and failed to realize the more plurinational and equitable state that they sought. On the other hand, only ten years after the Guatemalan failure, Bolivia had not only elected its first self-identified indigenous president but the movements and coalitions behind him were able to convene a constituent assembly that inaugurated a reimagined state. Their achievement ushered in the re-designation of the country as a plurinational state with protections, rights, and autonomic powers for an indigenous people that had been excluded from the centers of power since the Spanish conquest. Why? Why did these two similar trajectories diverge so dramatically? These and others questions will be the focus of this chapter.

In this portion, this study will briefly survey the historical patterns of hegemony within Bolivia, then establish an understanding of the emergence and effectiveness of its indigenous movements, and contrast these with the hegemonic counter-reaction. Then, we shall examine the events in and around the constituent assembly of 2009 to examine the coalition building and political processes behind the rewriting of the constitution. Altogether, this chapter shall argue that, unlike in Guatemala, Bolivia not only had a strongly unified indigenous movement but that it also possessed a pluralistic program that allowed it to build coalitions across Bolivian politics in order to contest and renegotiate the hegemonic arrangements within that country.

This will be set in contrast to our findings thus far in the Guatemalan case, where we identified a Pan-Mayan that was only loosely unified and its intellectual drivers were barely in synch with the traditional leadership structures of the indigenous communities in a seeming urban and rural divide. This weakness further influenced the movement's entry into Guatemalan politics during and after the civil war where their demands became captive within the overall leftist programs put forward by their far-left allies. In turn, these demands were not inclusive of other key groups or parties within Guatemalan politics and thus hampered the Pan-Mayan movement's ability to attract capable partners and appeal to other ethnic or class-based movements or groups. In the face of the historical hegemonic domination of the ladino elite, and their well organized counterreaction response, the Pan-Mayanists' challenge to the Guatemalan hegemonic hierarchies thus failed for lack of unity, programmatic inclusiveness, and effective alliances.

1. Bolivia's Colonial Legacies

Much like in Guatemala, the Spanish Empire found in South America a land that was not at all dissimilar from Europe with centuries-old urban settlements, rural populations, and a variety of governing systems that wove their different sovereignties across the length of the continent. Chief among them was the Incan Empire, a centralized state whose capital Cuzco controlled a massive network of trade, societies, and services across the Pacific side of the South American continent from southern Colombia to the northern regions of Chile. In the Altiplano that spanned across the modern states of

northern Argentina and Chile, southern Peru, and nearly all of Bolivia, there developed a variety of both urbanized and rurally-based cultures that possessed a variety of systems of sovereignty derived from the different but complimentary ecological zones.¹⁵⁴ The various systems of agriculture, food storage and trade, urbanization, and political-economic extraction of resources from different altitudes of the Altiplano attest to the diversity and sophistication of the societies the invading Spanish encountered upon their conquest of the former Incan networks and allies. And also, just as in Guatemala in the fifteenth and sixteenth-centuries, the Spanish were able to coopt existing political-economic structures of the indigenous cultures in order to benefit and fortify their colonization while interlacing these with the politico-economic-cultural hierarchies already pioneered in other parts of the Americas.

The centrality of Bolivia's colonial legacy to this study lays in its contextualizing effect. The history of racialized political-economic and social relations in Bolivia serves to properly demonstrate the scale of the challenges that the indigenous movements across its history would face and also to capture the centrality of these relations to Bolivian politics which persists to the modern day. By capturing their scale, it aids in understanding the pathways that indigenous movements followed in Bolivia in contrast with those followed in Guatemala.

One of the legacies of the Incan Empire that were appropriated by the Spanish colonial authorities was the *mit'a* system that bequeathed the Incas with an on-demand labor supply that spanned the breadth of their dominion.¹⁵⁵ This labor supply could be leveraged for a myriad of state needs such as water drainage projects, irrigation networks, and the construction of agricultural infrastructure which were all determined by the central authorities. Certain types of labor and production were mapped according to the resources and locales of each of the distinct ethnic groups within the empire which in turn fed a variety of products into state supply networks that ensured certain levels of provisions for

¹⁵⁴ John V. Murra, "Verticality and Complementarity," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 30–33.

¹⁵⁵ Terence N. D'Altroy, *The Incas*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 395.

a given region or settlement.¹⁵⁶ Among the types of labor that the Spanish found most lucrative, and that they enduringly exploited, were those mitas that had to do with mining which became central once the famed mines of Potosí were discovered.¹⁵⁷ In this case, because Spanish officials applied two criterion—distance to the mines and elevation of the target people—they grafted the mita upon specific communities that they held were more predisposed to labor in the mines.¹⁵⁸ These discriminatory practices went to weave a limiting atemporal institution unto these populations that limited their ability to own lands, participate in the market, and obtain economic development through the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries through a series of institutional and political-economic continuities.¹⁵⁹

As the Spanish Empire consolidated its possessions within the Americas, its adaptation of indigenous institutions continued in other ways that were further imbued with their imagined concepts of accepted levels of development, definitions of rights and citizenship, as well as economic participation. One form was the census, something that also performed by the Incan Empire, but was furthered and adapted by the Spanish for their own needs gave rise to initial political, economic, and social stratifications within colonial Bolivia.¹⁶⁰ In the Bolivian census at the time, ethnicity was racialized *vis-a-vis* the newly arrived Spanish and other immigrant nationalities, the creole descendants of the first conquistadors, and these definitions became naturalized along with certain economic roles. Once intermediary identities or political-economic roles, such as the *caciques* or local indigenous leaders—whom were responsible for conducting smaller censuses, organizing labor, and conveying tribute to the authorities—were liquidated, the whole the of

¹⁵⁶ D’Altroy, *The Incas*, 397–98, 401.

¹⁵⁷ Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining *Mita*,” *Econometrica*, vol. 78, no. 6 (November, 2010): 1867.

¹⁵⁸ Dell, 1868.

¹⁵⁹ Dell, 1887–99.

¹⁶⁰ D’Altroy, 398; Rossana Barragán, “The Census and the Making of a Social ‘Order’ in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia,” in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 111.

indigenous populations was homogenized.¹⁶¹ This was accomplished through the paternalism that imbued the actions and policies of the colonial government as it saw the indigenous population as naturally indigent, better fitted for service, and limited in their intellectual capacities which meant that the Spanish elites needed to “care for them.”¹⁶² Ironically, because of their natural inferiority the indigenous populations were simultaneously granted exemptions from certain Spanish laws but also marginalized or limited in their actions or rights under others.

By the end of the nineteenth-century, through various iterations the Bolivian state had solidified the political-economic role of the indigenous populations through the various qualifications that characterized citizenship and the obtainment of rights. In future censuses, the ability to own property and engage in commerce—which collaterally meant that the person was educated—became deeply intertwined with the *blancos*, or descendants of the Spanish creoles. Inversely, this made having property, being educated, speaking the Spanish language, and being catholic the prerequisites for being a Bolivian citizen.¹⁶³ Whereas the indigenous became identified with being laborers, farmers, artisans, and servants which created a peasant-like veneer over what it meant to be indigenous and therefore to have a diluted citizenship.¹⁶⁴ In between these two major groups were the *mestizos*, whom shared traits, culture, and belonging with both spheres but that throughout Bolivian colonial and republican history were often pushed and pulled out of the indigenous and blanco classes. In what was a heavily stratified society at the time, where economic class and race often converged, the *mestizos* served as a buffer to buttress the white elites in the urban areas and fill niches that were too *high* for the indigenous peoples to obtain or too *low* for the white classes to hold.¹⁶⁵ This interplay between economic status and race would not be confined to censuses but also spill out into the world beyond

¹⁶¹ Barragán, “The Census and the Making of a Social ‘Order,’” 117–19.

¹⁶² Barragán, 118.

¹⁶³ Barragán, 126–27.

¹⁶⁴ Barragán, 126–27.

¹⁶⁵ Barragán, 124–25.

officialdom as administrative powers became the premise for social and political-economic hierarchization that built the contours of the Bolivian hegemonic system.

Based on these colonial legacy hierarchies, the streams of power were dammed and channeled to concentrate political-economic and social power within the landed blanco elites who opportunistically over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century would ally on-and-off with the mestizos against the indigenous. These concentrations of power became so extreme that they warped the social fabric of Bolivian society and one metric was landownership where eight-percent of landowners held ninety-five percent of the cultivable land of which less than one percent was farmed.¹⁶⁶ In contrast, the mestizo and indigenous groups mostly owned farms that had less than ten hectares of land but that constituted little over more than two-thirds of the total number of farms of any size within Bolivia in the early decades of the twentieth-century.¹⁶⁷ As a result, these measures serve as metaphors for the overall conditions under which Bolivian society transitioned into the twentieth century.

2. Post-independence to 1952

As this system trotted along in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific, which in 1880 claimed Bolivia's coastline in a lost to Chile, it was further primed by the emergence of an oligarchic republic that would vent formal power away from the military juntas of the nineteenth-century.¹⁶⁸ Alongside the emergence of party politics, Bolivian mining made grew significantly in the way of tin and silver exports to world markets that furthered strengthened the hand of the blanco elites and ensnared indigenous laborers in similar ways the Spanish had previous done so in colonial times.¹⁶⁹ The emergent oligarchic-republican politics, racially distilled that the basics of indigenous identity—communal ownership in the *ayllus* alongside traditional religion and languages—ran counter to the republican

¹⁶⁶ Deborah J. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156.

¹⁶⁷ Yashar, 157.

¹⁶⁸ Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 144.

¹⁶⁹ Klein, 145.

principles of individual liberty and market economics.¹⁷⁰ As the white class developed ideological divisions, between the conservatives who sought to preserve a neocolonialist and segregationist society and liberals who believed in republican but assimilationist principles, various alliances began to take shape between the indigenous and mestizo communities.

Thus far, Bolivia had developed a nation-state building project that was being driven by the republican-oligarchies who were expanding their political-economic authority over the state while simultaneously subsuming those outside of the white class into an economic rather than ethnic group. The core hegemony within Bolivia at this time was sustained and fueled by the expanding mining industry and the white class' vast land holdings along with their drive to rid the country of what they saw as its incompetent military leadership and thrust it into modernity by boosting its infrastructure development and reestablishing regional financial ties.¹⁷¹ With the establishment of a civilian presidency and a parliament, the elites consolidated their inherited political and economic dominance ensuring their hold on their identity-based privileges in defining the Bolivian nation in contrast to the indigenous and other ethnic groups.¹⁷²

Another defining event from pre-1952 Bolivia was the 1899 Revolt, where the global economics that had supported the fortunes made from silver mining shifted in favor of tin mining and likewise shifted political-economic power away from the conservative-segregationist regimes to the assimilationist liberals and their indigenous allies. In their first mass military-political engagement since the eighteenth-century Tupac Amaru rebellion, the indigenous masses rallied behind the traditional Aymara leader Pablo Zárate.¹⁷³ Although not necessarily the first time or arguably the largest alliance enjoyed between the liberals and indigenous populations, having allied before in the 1870s against

¹⁷⁰ Xavier Albó, *Movimientos y poder indígena en Bolivia, Ecuador, y Perú* [Indigenous Movements and Power in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru] (La Paz, Bolivia: Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, 2008), 24.

¹⁷¹ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 145–6.

¹⁷² Klein, 146.

¹⁷³ Klein, 156.

the hated caudillo Mariano Melgarejo¹⁷⁴; this time around the liberals would succeed in breaking the conservative hold on the state.

This odd alliance between liberal tin mine owners and indigenous communities against the ruling conservative silver mine owners was unique inasmuch that the white elite divide was not very wide. However, the motives of the indigenous were tied to the liberals' promises to respect communal landownership and institute traditional political structures.¹⁷⁵ The hegemonic hierarchies that were established in the wake of Bolivian independence reemerged when during the war indigenous forces turned on their liberal allies resulting in the killing of liberal soldiers due to local conflicts. Reactionarily, the liberal leadership fearing the growing power of the indigenous forces decided to bid their time until the war was won to arrest the indigenous leaders, with Zárata among them, and execute them while also disbanding their militias.¹⁷⁶

This outcome of the 1899 Civil War cemented the character of the indigenous in the minds of many white political leaders, where the Bolivian state resurrected the notions of indigenous incapacity to govern, to progress, and to modernize without its paternal oversight. In this primordial imagining, the indigenous were seen not only as enemies of the state but as a race that needed to be dispensed off, either through assimilation or annihilation. Indigenous culture, in the liberal imagination, was wholly incompatible with the enlightenment values of individual rights, private ownership and enterprise, and the market economy thus morphing them into the national obstacle towards joining the global economy.

Even with their ideological differences, the elites more or less maintained a stable system that disenfranchised and marginalized the vast majority of the indigenous population, estimated to be around fifty-one percent of a population that was nearly three-quarters rural at the turn of the century.¹⁷⁷ Up to 1934, the status quo for Bolivia meant

¹⁷⁴ Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 19–20.

¹⁷⁵ Gotkowitz, 36–37.

¹⁷⁶ Gotkowitz, 38.

¹⁷⁷ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 147.

that the white elites maintained power through mining and agricultural landholdings, monopolized financing, and enforced their rule through a newly professionalized military that suppressed traditional indigenous leadership and protest movements. This stasis would continue up to 1952, when the Bolivian system received yet another jolt that would mold it into a more readily recognizable form of what it is today.

3. 1952 to the Katarista Movement

After 1900, the indigenous movements and their leaders never again allied with the established political parties and instead began percolating the concepts of indigeneity which sought to reinsert into the national conversation debates over the outlines of indigenous identity and its pertinent rights.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, great portions of the liberal and conservative factions began converging on the national projects of spreading education—in the collateral hopes that it would eliminate indigeneity—and infrastructurally connecting Bolivia to the world market. The latter goal took the shape of railroad building which at times partitioned what use to be communal ayllu lands which were acquired through land seizures or other land liberalization tactics. Therefore, the post-1899 Civil War landscape was one of national consolidation through the strengthening of state bodies, entrenchment of a national identity that eschewed indigenous languages and customs, and the export of metals and agricultural products to European and American markets. These developments further solidified the white elites' hold on national resources and along with that economic power came political power as well which enabled them to imbue the state institutions with their proclivities and use them to preserve their group privileges.

On the other hand, this period in the early twentieth-century proved to be a fertile time for indigenous movements within Bolivia as concepts of *indigenismo*, socialism, and nationalism all clashed, merged, and synthesized with each other with the backdrop of stable liberal rule and metastasizing regional conflicts. Among the key developments was that the *caciques-apoderados*—apoderados for short—emerged as the political leaders of

¹⁷⁸ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 44–45.

indigenous communities and largely took on the role of defending their land claims, cultural rights, and interfacing with the central government.¹⁷⁹ Made up of largely Quechua and Aymara leaders, the *apoderados* endeavored to reverse the losses that indigenous communities had suffered since the onset of liberal rule in 1900 and as a result built a national network of Indian communal leaders that had no counterpart in the Andean region.¹⁸⁰

These *apoderados* channeled a primordialist attachment to the traditional entitlements of the *ayllus* of old, this connection being established through bloodlines and land titling done under the Spanish Empire or earlier conservative governments, which altogether was meant to unify communities under one protector as they had been in centuries past.¹⁸¹ This political claim to indigeneity proved to be salient and powerful, because as their networks grew denser they began to tie multi-sectorial communities—artisans, miners, laborers—and in other cases multi-racial, such as the mestizos. The caciques then grew into the forerunners of the labor and indigenous movements that would dominate Bolivia later in the twentieth-century. Thus far, it can be seen that the white elites and then indigenous movements and its alliances are now beginning to take their modern form and set the stage for Bolivian hegemonic mechanics going further into the twentieth-century. At this stage, the hegemonic core, occupied by the white elites, had become fully and sustainably established through their cooption of the state to their interests. While the peripheral groups, such as the indigenous communities, were only then beginning to strengthen the networks that would enable them to challenge the ossified social hierarchies and privileges later on in the century.

At the same time, unlike in Guatemala's Mayan movement, the intellectual class within the indigenous movement was beginning to culturally resurrect if not modernize the discourse around indigeneity and how it could serve as a moral and identity anchor for

¹⁷⁹ "Revolutionary Currents," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 323.

¹⁸⁰ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 46.

¹⁸¹ Santos Marka Tola and the *Cacique Apoderados* [empowered chieftains], "The Laws of the Land," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 328.

Bolivian national identity. These intellectuals challenged what it meant to be an Indian, pushed back against both segregationist and assimilationist understandings of the indigeneity, and developed a counter-narrative of what Bolivia could become without espousing the dilution of any one race.¹⁸² Among these thinkers was Franz Tamayo, a mestizo, who represented a bridge from the old conservative segregationist tendency to sideline the Indian and the liberal assimilationism that sought to submerge them within a unified national identity.¹⁸³ Similar to the ideas found within contemporary Mexican author Jose Vasconcelos' *Raza Cosmica*, Tamayo elucidated on the primordial virtues of the indigenous race within the context on how its marriage with the European races created a uniquely positioned mestizo who could embody both worlds.¹⁸⁴ What was key from the ideas espoused by Tamayo and others, such as the socialist Gustavo Navarro and Tristán Marof, was that the indigenous populations were inheritors of a bedrock civilization that compared in many ways to European achievements in the old world. Their primordial resiliency and skillfulness as witnessed in those areas where they were permitted to apply themselves were harbingers of their enormous potential for serving as the core identity of a fully integrated Bolivia.

Thus far, on the one hand one can observe how the *cacique apoderado* represented the reestablishment of the traditional indigenous political leader and the intellectuals the reimagining of indigenous identity and how it related to the concept of the nation and state. Taken together, the two developments provided both the political-economic and intellectual-social basis for the synthesis of an indigenous movement that was both rooted in the traditional political structures of indigeneity while also asserting its claim to being part of the Bolivian nation thus rejecting segregationist and assimilationist views. This synthesis is most readily seen in how Tristán Marof's *Grupo Tupac Amaru* called for the breakup of large haciendas and restoration of indigenous rights and the caciques

¹⁸² Franz Tamayo, "Resurrection of the Race," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 331.

¹⁸³ Tamayo, 331.

¹⁸⁴ Tamayo, 334; José Vasconcelos, "The Cosmic Race," in *The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 15–19.

apoderados' continual land claims in the 1920s. These claims evoked historical and primordial links to acts that were carried out in colonial times and previous presidencies while being petitioned by traditional leaders who saw themselves as heirs to the ancient caciques but now adapted to the republican structures in which they found themselves.¹⁸⁵

As Bolivia approached yet another historical fulcrum in the 1950s, it did so with a fully cemented white upper class that held sway over large portions of the economy and largely ruled unopposed within state institutions alongside a burgeoning indigenous movement that was ideologically and political maturing. From this perspective, the hegemonic landscape within Bolivia is becoming ever more contested but not to the point of a rearrangement or re-negotiation of hegemonic privileges or rights. However, the building blocks from the constitutional drive of the twenty-first century are starting to appear and take shape.

The 1952 Revolution formally inaugurated the Cold War within the frontiers of Bolivia, and with it came an inflection point in the solidification of the indigenous movement and a period of conflict among the white elites. This began a period of *military socialism*, where zealous young army officers, who were veterans of the Chaco War, led the Bolivian state through some of the most radical reforms since independence. These included the redesigning of the constitution to reorient property ownership away from an inalienable right towards one contingent on social utility and nationalization of oil production alongside the manipulation of metal exports to increase government revenue.¹⁸⁶ Within the conservative counter-reaction known as the *Peñaranda* emerges the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR). These parties' platforms proved to be the cascading evolution of the previous indigenismo-cacique apoderado networks and ideology. These parties were both leftist and they called for the nationalization of mines and unionization of labor but differed on indigenous rights. The PIR, along with a Trotskyite party, called for the breakup of landed

¹⁸⁵ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, 57–61.

¹⁸⁶ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 190–93.

estates and peonage among the indigenous communities whereas the MNR, being composed of middle-class whites, was absent on this issue.¹⁸⁷

The clash between the traditional oligarchic elites and the emerging leftist movement, which was allied with indigenous groups, came to a head in the election of 1951 when the MNR won a commanding victory. In response, the elites and the army launched an assault to halt the creation of an MNR government and annulled the electoral results while MNR responded with its own military mobilization, also supported by armed indigenous groups, that in 1952 successfully defeated the military enabling the party to seize power.¹⁸⁸ As a result, the MNR responded by granting indigenous communities freedom from labor peonage, communal land reforms, and eliminating literacy requirements that delivered voting rights to the indigenous population.¹⁸⁹

However, aside from the party's newfound openness to social justice and rights for the indigenous communities the MNR fundamentally still saw Bolivian society through a corporatist lens. This meant that for all the social progress, the MNR primarily saw and focused on economic class-based issues with an emphasis on unionizing all labor sectors.¹⁹⁰ In that light, it began corporately federating across various economic sectors, which given Bolivia's history were intertwined with racialized social roles; this had an adverse effect on the overt campaign for indigenous rights insomuch that the government officially became color blind. What this meant was that to the MNR there were only peasants where there was indigenous and so on. There were middle-class foremen and managers where there was mestizos. And naturally, there were union leaders or local officials where there were white elites. As demonstrated in other contexts, color-blind constitutionalism can serve as the pretext for threatening or lessening the diversity of race and culture within a state as a result from unabashed assimilationism into a perceived

¹⁸⁷ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 198.

¹⁸⁸ Donna Lee Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 126.

¹⁸⁹ Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past*, 126; Klein, 212.

¹⁹⁰ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 156.

higher cultural or political-economic identity leaving in place less overt form of racism and domination.¹⁹¹

This fundamental reinterpretation of Bolivian society along class lines had the effect of diluting indigenous identity across those areas where there was not a strong indigenous political superstructure in the form of an established ayllu with a cacique apoderado; in the absence of these they turned to syndicalism.¹⁹² In this regard, the syndicalism of the MNR represented yet another evolutionary stage of the white elites' monopolization of political-economic power. Through their reimagined efforts, the newly emergent elites were able to redefine the contours of citizenship, social organization, and structures of labor and production across the Bolivian economy. However, the MNR's syndicalism did not lessen or dampen the steady growth of indigenous movements nor the subaltern saliency of indigenous identity as an alternative to the syndicalist structures. The syndicalism may have limited the political power of mobilizing around indigenous identity but it did not preclude organizing and theorizing around that notion.

Even though the MNR discouraged the use of indigenous languages, dress, and other cultural expressions they could not dissuade or assimilate Indians into the peasantry or middle classes because during this time there was a significant indigenous discourse and social mobilization around its ideas.¹⁹³ In direct challenge to the re-imagining of indigenous communities into a peasant, artisanal, or labor classes had relabeled Indians economically, continued their traditional political structures and self-conceptualization which negated their white-elite forged identities.¹⁹⁴ In essence, their marginalization, and also their self-conceptualization, was not simply due to the state's citizenship regime but an adapted racism that channeled white's hierarchization of society in novel ways that

¹⁹¹ Neil Gotanda, "A Critique of 'Our Constitution is Color-Blind'," in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*, eds. Kimberlé Crenshaw et. al. (New York: The New Press, 1995), 268–69.

¹⁹² Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past*, 126.

¹⁹³ Raúl Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 39.

¹⁹⁴ Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 161.

enabled their political-economic interests considering the core resource-supporters of the MNR. Percolating in this atmosphere was the burgeoning Katarista movement.

The political-economic basis for the Kataristas' re-mobilization of indigenous identity in direct challenge to the corporatism that had redesigned Bolivian society was the subaltern continuity of indigenous life. In a number of cases, the syndicalization of certain haciendas and its associated laborers merely followed the contours of the previous ayllu and in their daily life reproduced indigenous politics albeit re-labeled but unchanged.¹⁹⁵ The explicit aim of the land-reforms, increasing access to education, and political integration was not to allow for the liberty of indigenous expression but rather to assimilate the communities into a federated-capitalist society so as to dilute their core identity and subsume it into a nationalistic one.¹⁹⁶ During this time parties such the Indian Party of Bolivia (PIB), were founded and relied upon *Indianismo* which counterintuitively argued that indigenous beliefs and practices were inherently superior to those of Hispanicized Bolivian society.¹⁹⁷ This was counterintuitive inasmuch that presupposed the superiority of indigenous cultures in much the same way the Hispanicized culture presupposed their superiority. As Bolivia entered a renewed period of military rule, following a near-bloodless coup that toppled the MNR in 1964, Fausto Reinaga, PIB's founder, penned that Bolivia must restore itself through the rebirth of indigenous culture and finally and definitely decolonize its imaginings of what meant to be Bolivian could be. Among these was the renewal of veneration for the great figures in indigenous history such as Tomás and Tupac Katari, reorient the intelligentsia away from imperialist discourses and ideologies—such as liberalism and communism—and liberate the Indian from the discursive and overt domination by the imposed European descendants.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Albó, *Movimientos y poder indígena*, 31; Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 159.

¹⁹⁶ Andrew Canessa, "Contesting Hybridity: Evangelistas and Kataristas in Highland Bolivia," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 32, No. 1 (February 2000): 122–24.

¹⁹⁷ Fausto Reinaga, "Iconoclast and Prophet," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 399.

¹⁹⁸ Reinaga, 399–405.

And thus, the ideological and political-economic foundations for Katarismo were established. Fausto's discourses were key to the realization of a coherent line of thought and the subaltern continuities of indigenous political-economic life and leadership were central to concretizing political demands based on spatialized living conditions; these together became the basis for Katarismo. Named in honor of the fallen Aymara leader Tupac Katari, who was quartered by the Spanish, the Kataristas would lay the foundations for a plethora of groups, parties, and movement that would succeed, fail, splinter, and regroup throughout the remainder of the Cold War and especially blossom following Bolivian democratization in 1982. These groups would range from political parties to militant factions,

In essence, Katarismo criticizes the lack of cultural integration, economic prosperity, and circumscribed political participation on part of the indigenous communities but unlike *Indigenismo* it does not seek to supplant Hispanicized Bolivian identity rather to broaden the contours of what it is to be Bolivian.¹⁹⁹ Their plurinationalism and integrationist discourse and motives are laid within their "Manifesto of Tiwanaku," where they not only outline the marginal existence of indigenous communities but call on the state, the press, the religious orders, and other socio-economic classes to join in their petition.²⁰⁰

In contrast, the white-elites, as represented by a speech given by General Hugo Banzer Suárez, responded with the need to impose order, for peace in exchange for labor, to reject communism, decentralization of landownership, and promises of economic development.²⁰¹ In the former, an integrationist message and in the latter, a segregationist or assimilationist one. Katarismo's interweaving of class and ethnic solidarity and the call

¹⁹⁹ Aymara and Quechua Peasant Organizations, "In the Name of Katari," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 439–446.

²⁰⁰ Aymara and Quechua Peasant Organizations, 445.

²⁰¹ General Hugo Banzer Suárez, "The Military-Peasant Pact," in *The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Sinclair Thompson et. al. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 437–38.

for an integrated ethnically based Bolivia would be pillars of indigenous party evolution and building in all the way from the 1970s to the early 2000s.²⁰²

Katarismo would veer between allying with centrist or leftists within the MNR while integrating various peasant and labor organizations such as the Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB).²⁰³ The merging of Katarismo with the syndicates under which the ayllus had been subsumed represented the fusion of two vital components of an indigenous movement, a guiding intellectual frame and that of indigenous political-economic institutions in the way of the syndicated ayllus and their legacy of cacique apoderados.²⁰⁴

Taken altogether, the colonial legacies, the first several decades of independent Bolivia, and later its experiences under both leftist autocratic and military regimes all broadly shaped the contours of the Bolivian hegemonic system and would influence the outcome of the constitutional drive of 2009. From these distinct time periods, we see the emergence of a continuous but divided white-elite that adapted its colonial inheritance to the structures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the monopolization of political, economic, and cultural power. The landed oligarchs of the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries had perfected the hierarchization of Bolivian society with whiteness at the top, mestizos being battered between top and lower halves of society, and the indigenous continually and paternalistically at the bottom.

Once these social and political-economic cleavages cemented, they influenced how Bolivian politics developed. Most overtly, one can see these dynamics in how a seemingly friendly political party, the MNR, could still be marginalizing and circumscribing to the indigenous communities. However, on the other hand we also see continuities in indigenous political-economic leadership that was later married with the intellectual

²⁰² Donna Lee Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53.

²⁰³ Van Cott, 55.

²⁰⁴ Xavier Albó, “¿...Y de kataristas o mnristas? La sorprendente y audaz alianza entre aymaras y neoliberales en Bolivia [Of Kataristas or MNRistas? The surprisingly audacious alliance between Aymaras and neoliberals in Bolivia],” *Boletín de Antropología Americana*, vol. 25 (July 1992): 5. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1311050361/>.

revivals on the 1930s and 1960s to create the ecosystem that would later make autonomic drives in 2009.

With these concepts in mind, we now have the outlines and norms of the Bolivian hegemonic system. The continuity of coloniality through either segregationist or assimilationist elites who concentrated political-economic and cultural power under various ideological constructs whether they were oligarchic republicanism, liberalism, corporatism, military dictatorship, or neoliberalism. The anchor of the elites would always be the white landowning classes who dominated the agricultural, financial, and political sectors and institutions. On the other hand, we also a continuity of not only indigenous culture and identity but of outwardly and inwardly recognized political-economic institutions who are imbued and steeped in indigenous identity. Along with this indigenous continuity was also a continuity in their centrality to any movement that desired to rule Bolivia as their demographics and sectoral power made them a force to be courted throughout Bolivian political history until the indigenous developed their own ideology. Katarismo proved to be the intellectual movement that would enabled indigenous political leaders to unify and mobilize their communities to rise above their individual tribes or groups. With this political unity came political potency as the white-elites became ever more divided.

4. The Basis for the Constitutional Moment of 2006–2009

Prior to the constitutional drive of 2006–09, there were two significant events that would color that constitutional drive; one was the increasing lucrativeness of coca and natural gas exports in the 1980s through the 2000s and the other was the constitutional reforms of 1994–95. The construction of various pipeline networks between Santa Cruz in the southeast and natural gas consortiums in Argentina and Brazil quintupled production between the 1990s and mid-2000s making it the top Bolivian export by 2001.²⁰⁵ These economic leaps then converge with the democratization of Bolivian politics which led to the fracturing or discarding of traditional alliances, centralism, and peasant-loyalty

²⁰⁵ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 249.

guarantees as well as the mobilization of indigenous protests such as the 1990 march from El Beni to La Paz by dispossessed Indians.²⁰⁶ In 1993, the MNR returned to power with the support of Katarista parties and over the following two years reformed certain constitutional provisions that re-designated Bolivia as a multiethnic and plurinational state while also legalizing communal land ownership and traditional indigenous political institutions and offices.²⁰⁷ These alliances between the Kataristas and the MNR resembled the earlier indigenous-MNR alliances that were forged in the wake of 1952 Revolution albeit without the syndicalist trappings. However, in contrast with the 1950s these new alliances were taking place in a much-reconfigured political landscape where the Kataristas were now the headliners of powerful localized indigenous parties.

Along with these overtures to the indigenous vote, the MNR also instituted a decentralization and devolution of autonomy to the different municipalities within the country.²⁰⁸ These measures enabled indigenous candidates to stand for election and win over two-thirds of municipal offices and further localize Bolivian politics.²⁰⁹ Against the backdrop of privatization of the state oil, railroad, and power companies, emerged significant social pushback from civil organizations that saw these neoliberal moves as straightjacketing national sovereignty and the imposition of foreign economic domination.²¹⁰ In this instance, these social movements against neoliberal economic policies mostly focused on spatial occupation and visibility to build their political capital and enforce their demands of free and national use of natural resources, economic

²⁰⁶ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 256–57.

²⁰⁷ Klein, 257; “Republic of Bolivia: 1967 Constitution with 1994 Reforms, agreed text of 1995 and reforms of 2002, 2004, and 2005,” Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, updated July 16, 2008, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/consboliv2005.html>.

²⁰⁸ Klein, 258.

²⁰⁹ Klein, 258.

²¹⁰ Klein, 259; Blanca S. Fernández and Florencia Puente, “Configuración y demandas de los Movimientos sociales hacia la Asamblea Constituyente en Bolivia y Ecuador [The nature of social movement and their demands of the constituent assemblies in Bolivia and Ecuador],” *Íconos*, vol. 44 (2012): 50.

development assistance, and the immediate halt to land privatizations.²¹¹ Among these demands were also the petition for the creation of a constitutional convention.

This social mobilization, in response to the now-labeled neoliberalization of the Bolivian economy—itself a continuing tradition of the elites’ monopolization of national resources and seeking of international trade—helped pave the road towards the constituent assembly in 2006. This conjunctural moment brought together the long running trends of strengthening indigenous movements, increasing fracturing among the elites, and the now omnipresence of democratization efforts among the breadth of the Bolivian polity. In addition to the indigenous waves that washed over municipal institutions and their empowerment by the central government, the ayllu leadership of old now found themselves in the halls of formal legal power within the governments that once sidelined them. Out of this milieu emerged the actors, parties, and alliances that would compete for the special election of 2006 that would decide who would take part in the constituent assembly that would draft the future constitution.

B. THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

The first question in this section is who is the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and its leader Evo Morales and how were they were able to patch together and overcome the immense diversity of indigenous movements—from Aymara to Quechuas, Kataristas to Indigenistas, Urban and Rural, laborers and middle-class managers—to create a united front against an organized and entrenched opposition? How effective was their coalition building? These questions and others are the heart of the following analysis for it will strive to reveal how Morales, the MAS, and their allies were able to reasonably consolidate their position in order to redraw the contours of Bolivian hegemonic mechanics. The challenge of unifying thirty-six different ethnic and linguistic groups spread across the country in urban and rural settings was daunting to say the least especially when more than half of the

²¹¹ Fernández and Puente, “Configuración y demandas [Nature and Demands],” 59.

indigenous population was divided between equally sized groups, the Aymara and Quechua who often quarreled with each other.²¹²

MAS itself was a party that evolved in 1998 that, similar to the Pan-Mayanists in Guatemala, was anchored in a specific region, the department of Cochabamba, a specific group, Quechua-speakers, and a specific sector, coca growers known within Bolivia as *cocaleros*.²¹³ However, their expansion beyond these confines must be placed within the context of continuous political experimentation by a variety of Aymara-specific Katarista parties that emerged before and after the period of democratization in 1982. Among these were the MITKA, MRTK, MRTKL, FULKA, MKN, and *Eje Pachakuti* (EJE), as one can observe by the recurring letter of their acronyms being ‘K’ which stands for *Katari* all of these parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s but struggled to attract voters because of their exclusivist platforms.²¹⁴ Their platforms were characterized by intense Aymara nationalism that alienated other indigenous peoples such as Quechuas as well as non-elite white or mestizo parties and groups that shared economic or political woes with the indigenous communities.²¹⁵ They also did not recruit candidates from these other groups and predominantly focused their efforts only in Aymara-dominated regions. Consequently, MAS’ origins with a specific regional community and labor group were not out of the norm for an indigenous party but what was extra-normative was their political ascendancy.

In response to both the ongoing neoliberalization of the economy and the United States’ anti-drug eradication efforts against coca farming, the *cocaleros* in 1988 Cochabamba decided to join forces with other syndicates (i.e., thinly relabeled indigenous groups) through the Aymara-Katarista-created CSUTCB.²¹⁶ One the central nodes around

²¹² John L. Hammond, “Indigenous Community Justice in the Bolivian Constitution of 2009,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 33 (2011): 652.

²¹³ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 72.

²¹⁴ Madrid, 43–45; The acronyms, in the order written above: Tupác Katari Indian Movement, Tupác Katari Revolutionary Movement, Tupác Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement, United Front for Katarista Movement, National Katarista Movement [Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America*, XVIII–XIX].

²¹⁵ Madrid, 44.

²¹⁶ Madrid, 41; Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America*, 58.

which MAS was able to expand beyond its Quechua confines was its class-based connection with coca growing. The cultivation of coca was a shared feature of Andean indigenous culture and served as the unifying nexus between Aymaras and Quechuas because it was also a proxy for indigenous identity which was threatened by the Bolivian state and its American ally.²¹⁷ This issue resonated across ethnic and class-based groups.

MAS percolated within the *cocalero* movements that were permeating and allying with other groups across the ethno-syndical political system of neoliberal Bolivia that resulted in CSUTCB being dominated by Quechua *cocaleros*, Evo Morales among them.²¹⁸ As the future-MAS members splintered from various indigenous organizations, such as the CSUTCB and Lowland indigenous-oriented *Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB), they created *Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (IPSP).²¹⁹ In turn, through the IPSP Morales sought to reach out to a broad set of electorates that were cross-ethnic, cross-class, and cross-regional. These included Quechua speakers, white and mestizo voters, urbanites, and rural workers through inter-ethnic, inter-class, and broad populist appeals.²²⁰ The long-range result was that in 2005 nearly two-thirds of MAS' voters were indigenous language speakers, nearly a quarter of mestizo Spanish speakers, and about seven percent white.²²¹

In the aftermath of the democratization and liberalization of Bolivian politics in the mid-1990s and the neoliberalization of its economy, the indigenous movements responded politically through the ballot and the street protest.²²² A significant number of MAS supporters emerged from the landownerships protests in the Bolivian lowlands who had been affected by neoliberalization's encroachments onto their properties and

²¹⁷ Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America*, 58–59.

²¹⁸ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 53.

²¹⁹ Madrid, 54.

²²⁰ Madrid, 54, 59, 60, 62.

²²¹ Madrid, 62.

²²² Nancy Postero, *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 29.

livelihoods.²²³ The lowland organization CIDOB would be one of the key organizations that would call for a constituent assembly in 2002. These and others would come to create the *Pacto de Unidad*, a pact formed in 2004, before the electoral coming of Evo Morales, and collectively they represented not only various organizations but the latest in a long, continuous line of indigenous activism and demands that in cases stretched back to the early twentieth century if not longer.²²⁴ The PdU's composition is Bolivian indigenous activism history writ-large and collected under one umbrella front, from lowland communities, highland Aymara Kataristas, and urban dwelling indigenous communities like those in Cochabamba.²²⁵

It must also be noted that MAS itself was not conceived strictly in indigenous terms, although its leader, Evo Morales—an Aymara cocalero farmer—and a number of organizations that would compose were, it also served as a bridge for traditional syndicalist organizations to mobilize.²²⁶ These other organizations included leftist, Trotskyites, self-identifying peasants, and poorer landowners which altogether meant that MAS was not necessarily tied to any one indigenous community or syndicated sector but had an inherent ideological flexibility and organizational capacity to absorb or fully mesh with any needed political ally.²²⁷ Therefore, unlike say the Pan-Movement in Guatemala where it had neither an indigenous party or a broadly accepted political ally, the MAS in Bolivia had the capacity to ally with or widely dispersed and differing ethnic groups or class-based sectors and was able to do so without necessarily alienating any one sector entirely. However, one drawback to this key feature is the MAS vulnerability to in-fighting and ideological dissonance hence one must ask how did they overcome such potential divisions in its confrontation with Bolivia's entrenched elites?

One way the MAS was able to coopt any internal divisions and unify the preponderance of indigenous organizations was to emphasize itself as a political tool, after

²²³ Postero, *The Indigenous State*, 29–30.

²²⁴ Postero, 46.

²²⁵ Postero, 47–48.

²²⁶ Postero, 31.

²²⁷ Postero, 31.

all this aspect is highlight in the full name, *Movement towards Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples*. Once they become an elected opposition party within the legislature in 2002, MAS emphasized their access to the state and its potential for increasing indigenous participate within it.²²⁸ As a result, they united forty legislators from three different parties into a parliamentary coalition. This enabled MAS to represent the indigenous communities, their supporting non-government organizations, and allied syndical elements as a viable oppositional force.²²⁹ This legislative presence allowed the MAS to become, for the first time in Bolivian history, the de facto conduit for indigenous opposition within the state and tie their interests to that of other marginalized economic classes. One party within the coalition, the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* (MIP), was explicitly indigenista, while others surprisingly emanated from the right such as a few members from the *Nueva Fuerza Republicana* (NFR).²³⁰

Thus far, the MAS had avoided the mistakes made by earlier indigenous-driven or inspired parties, such as the original Kataristas in the 1980s and 1990s who failed to make gains beyond their Aymara base or indigenista sympathizers because of their emphasis on ethno-nationalism, which excluded mestizo and Quechua populations.²³¹ As a result of this lesson, Morales and the MAS' allies began pressuring the government to grant the nation a constituent assembly that would address what they saw as the structurally foundational and primordial problems of the Bolivian state and subsequently the economy that they argued affected every social class.

After obtaining experience in the legislature and further consolidating their alliances, the MAS headed into the 2005 elections with momentum and with Evo Morales headlining the presidential ticket they garnered a historic victory for the indigenous communities. Not only did indigenous representation across multiple levels of government dramatically increase, for the first time in the country's history a self-identified indigenous

²²⁸ Albó, *Movimientos y poder indígena* [Indigenous Movements and Power], 67.

²²⁹ Albó, 72.

²³⁰ Albó, 72.

²³¹ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 44.

candidate won and did so decisively with nearly 54% of the vote.²³² The platform that Morales campaigned on during this election included calling for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution.

Thus far, in this section we have detailed how the MAS was formed, the effectiveness of their alliances and the inclusiveness of their program as well as their broader demands. Although MAS in of itself was not a historic indigenous organization, it benefitted from an environment that had been shaped by many other forces before them such as the development of the cacique apoderados and the continuing evolution of the Kataristas alongside the continuities of indigenous political-economic structures that existed under a syndicalist veneer. Together, along with the democratization that began in 1982, these forces allowed the emergence of many Katarista parties that competed and failed to win meaningful representation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The liberalization brought about by the constitutional reforms in 1995 further strengthen the growth of indigenous parties and set the stage for their sweeping return in the 2002 elections. With the economic backdrop of neoliberalism and its inspiring of intense backlash from indigenous communities, the MAS was able to evolve from an Aymara-dominated regional parties with syndicalist overtones into an electoral alliance that was sectorally and ethnically diverse. By recruiting candidates and striking pacts with syndical, class-based, ideologically different, and cross-ethnic groups the MAS was able to turn itself into the main opposition conduit and seize an overwhelming victory in 2005.

In light of these developments, a strong, distinct, and cohesive indigenous movement can be observed which was also in-touch with both traditional indigenous politics and an intellectual class that had forged a path towards integrating indigenous beliefs into a liberalist state through Katarismo. Through their alliances with mestizo, white, and other syndical groups we can also observe that MAS' goals connected with significant portions of the elites who leaned towards them and in addition to this they were able rally civil society groups who were now taken advantage of the rights extended to them in 1995. Altogether, these elements serve to starkly contrast the effective unity and

²³² Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 51.

broadly and saliently acceptance of the MAS' program with the fragile unity that the Pan-Mayan movement enjoyed in Guatemala additionally hobbled by their weak coalition building.

The key lessons from this brief study on the development of indigenous movements and more specifically the MAS is their unity, broad coalition building, and programmatic inclusiveness by the year 2005. These features tell us that the MAS and its indigenous allies were a formidable political force that although was historically rooted in the indigenous communities and indigenous intellectual traditions such as Katarismo they were able to also appeal to non-indigenous electorate. This enabled them to rise above the mistakes of the first Katarista parties and build a network of alliances that could challenge the hegemonic hierarchies of Bolivia.

C. THE HEGEMONIC COUNTER-REACTION

One aspect about the opposition that becomes readily apparent is its continual dilution and fragmentation since the fall of the military junta in the early 1980s up to the run up to the constitutional referendum in 2009. Gone are the powerful landed oligarchs who through their collective ownership dominated the Bolivian economic in every way from production to export. Gone were the conservative segregationist that sought to preserve the colonial relationships between the white elites and the indigenous populace. Gone were the liberal assimilationist who utilized the indigenous communities to defeat the conservative and even though they extended rights, education, and economic development to them it was with the ulterior motive of dissipating the Indian from Bolivia society. Gone are the corporatist who subsumed indigenous communities into their syndicalist imaginings along with the military juntas who rebirthed a new colonialist structure.

In the aftermath of these changes was democratization and the fragmentation of the elites, even though they still held economic power and this was increased in the 1990s with the advent of neoliberal political-economics that power alone could not guarantee their monopoly on state power. Therefore, this section seeks to outline the nature of and effectiveness of the opposition in the run up to the 2005 elections starting with the post-

Cold War era. The purpose of this is to outline their strategies and methods of contestation in light of the indigenous movements' demands for a hegemonic renegotiation.

The opposition that struggled against the MAS and their allies was made up of the omnipresent landowning elites who dominated the agricultural business of the eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Beni, and Pando which together geographical resemble a half moon and it is why these groups became known as the *Media Luna*.²³³ Together they represented the centuries-old hegemonic arrangement with their concentration of wealth and privileged political positions which were furthered intensified by the post-Cold War neoliberalization of the Bolivian economy. In the late 1980s, with the onset of democratization political parties dominated by the white core hegemonic group began appealing to the newly empowered indigenous groups first through corporatist or clientelist language and later moved on to setting programmatic appeals. These included the Bolivian approval of the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, recognizing indigenous landownership, and the decentralization constitutional reforms of 1995–97.²³⁴

Also, in 1993 the decades-old MNR returned from its political exile to lead a government that would usher in the tenets of neoliberalism and resultantly reform the economy in such a way that it threatened the livelihoods of the indigenous communities, especially those areas with natural gas and agribusiness.²³⁵ In turn, much like the MNR in an earlier age, these economic reforms were tied to loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which were meant to accelerate the privatization of government mines that had the effect of eliminating thousands of miners from the labor market.²³⁶ For these economic changes, the MNR was routed in the 1997 elections which gave way to a unique figure in Bolivian politics, Hugo Banzer.²³⁷ However, Banzer, a former military

²³³ Nancy Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia," in *Latin American Studies Association*, vol. 45, special issue, (2010): 64. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2010.0035>

²³⁴ Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*, 46–47.

²³⁵ Postero, *The Indigenous State*, 29

²³⁶ Postero, 29.

²³⁷ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 260.

dictator of Bolivia, pursued an uncontroversial administration and as he fell to ill health was replaced by his vice-president who was not elected to a full term in 2002.²³⁸ Instead, the MNR returned with Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada as its leader and disastrously followed the same neoliberal policies that had fueled the emergence of MAS and its allies in the national legislature. The privatization of water networks, the state natural gas company, and the historical re-linking with Chilean financing and extracting Bolivian resources and shipping them to the sea across Chile all contributed to the eventual banishment of the MNR in 2005.²³⁹

As it can be traced thus far, the opposition in Bolivia had dramatically changed and collapsed. Although they retained certain significant economic privileges that were historically rooted in the white upper classes' hegemonic domination, politically they had collapsed in the face of democratization and, ironically, neoliberalization. Although in other Latin American states neoliberalism tended to benefit the established core hegemonic elites, and it did in Bolivia as well, it can also be observed that in this part of the Andes it came with a heavy political price. After winning elections with razor thin margins in 1995 and 2002, and even after granting by historical standards significant rights and freedoms to the indigenous communities and other minorities it was not enough to abate the sense of frustration and injustice felt in part by those communities. As a result, in 2002 politically-speaking the elites collapsed and dissolved into various smaller parties that hollowed out any potential coalitions that could have rivaled the MAS. In addition, no one significant elite personality emerged that could politically unite the traditionally non-indigenous main parties and thus the landscape not only shifted in favor of the MAS but it became an overwhelmingly permissive environment for them. The opposition's few remaining tools, economic dominance for example, were not enough to dislodge the foothold that social

²³⁸ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 260.

²³⁹ Klein, 262; Collectively these events became known as the Water and Gas Wars, respectively, that took place temporally separately at Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. See; Manuel de La Fuente, "A Personal View: The Water in Cochabamba, Bolivia: Privatization Triggers an Uprising," in *Mountain Research and Development*, vol. 23, no. 1 (February, 2003): 98–100; Jim Shultz and Melissa Crane Draper, eds., *Dignity and Defiance* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008).

movements who mobilized with the MAS had on the legislature and eventually the presidency.

In December 2005, the surviving opposition elite-party, PODEMOS, garnered little over forty percent of the vote in light of the MAS' nearly fifty-six percent. Shunned by voters at the national level, the opposition retreated in the Media Luna areas where their economic wealth was concentrated enough to ensure their regional political prospects.²⁴⁰ In an intriguing manner, the hegemonic dynamics of Bolivia became asymmetrical, where political and economic power became nearly decoupled as the indigenous movements consolidated their national and municipal holdings the white-elites furthered the economic standing in the periphery. In this regard, the elites had insulated themselves economically from a peripherally regional perspective but had been turned into a *de facto* or *de jure* politically peripheral group. Therefore, Bolivian hegemonic mechanics, unlike in Guatemala, decoupled political and economic power and produced an interesting core-peripheral hegemonic relationship between the white, mestizo, and indigenous communities.

The main take away from this section is the fractured, decoupled, and regionalize nature of the conservative parties in the face of the MAS and its allies. The white hegemonic elites were still economically powerful but their political power had been diminished to the point where they did not hold credible sway over the state and had been reduced to a regional peripheral existence. In this regard, the MAS had already rearranged a large of component of the Bolivian hegemonic system. This was the regionalization of what use to be the national order of power. Now that PODEMOS and its allies had been reduced to a regional block we now look to how these dynamics played out during the constitutional drive itself.

²⁴⁰ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 265.

D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVE OF 2005–2009

With 53% of the vote won by MAS in December 2005, the path towards redefining the Bolivian hegemonic system was in play.²⁴¹ Evo Morales had made rewriting the constitution one of his main pledges during the campaign and in 2006 began pursuing that goal. The Bolivian constitution of 1967, as amended in 1994–95 and 2005, contained two provisions on how to rewrite it; one entailed obtaining a two-thirds majority in the legislature to write and approve constitutional provisions or call for a constituent assembly special election, in either way the new provisions would have to be put to a national referendum for final approval.²⁴² In light of the tectonic shifts in Bolivian politics with the indigenous' resurgence and the elites' collapse, Morales commanded a broad mandate to rewrite the constitution his coalition did not have a two-thirds majority. As a result, the route that the MAS and their allies would take would be through a special election in 2006 that would elect the delegates who would then compose the constituent assembly (hereon the CA) tasked with rewriting the constitution.

In the runup to that election, the opposition rallied around the “June Agenda” that in essence sought to regionalize what had been the national hegemonic arrangements that had benefitted the hereditary landowning class that now economically dominated the lucrative peripheries of Bolivia.²⁴³ The irony was that the autonomic demands that had long been the domain of indigenous politics were now being discursively coopted by the near-former core-hegemon of Bolivia as a means to further and entrench their group privileges in the Media Luna regions. In another interesting development within the Bolivian autonomic drive was the reversal of discursive elements between the indigenous and elite-linked parties. And thus, this became the basis of their counter-reactive strategy on the road to the 2006 special election. Another concept the Media Luna elites coopted was bargaining for formulaic proportional representation in the election of CA delegates

²⁴¹ Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Bolivia: 2005 Presidential Election Results.” <https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/pres05.html>.

²⁴² Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Bolivia: 1967 Constitution.” <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/consboliv2002.html#parte4titulo2>.

²⁴³ Kepa Artaraz, *Bolivia: Refounding the Nation* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 64.

that would still reward parties that under other circumstances and rules would normally have not been awarded representation.

This entailed wrangling the MAS to accept that the country be partitioned into seventy-three-member constituencies of which two would go to the party with a plurality of the vote while the runner up would obtain the third member seat.²⁴⁴ Additionally, the country's nine regions would also be given CA delegates in the form of five-member-delegations. These would be decided in the following manner; the majoritarian party would receive two seats where the following three runner ups would receive one seat each.²⁴⁵ The MAS counter-offer to this breakout was to accept the premise of the constituency partitions but with a winner-takes-all provision where any party that wins a majority in a given constituency is awarded all the seats in it.²⁴⁶

The impetus behind this PODEMOS demand was to blunt and contain the overwhelming percentages that MAS was expected to generate, because if MAS was able to accrue say fifty-five percent of the vote this proportion would not translate into fifty-five percent of the seats for a given electoral division. If anything, the most an outright victor could win was two seats at the constituency level and an additional two at the regional one. Altogether, a party that could muster a victory similar to MAS' 2005 could be theoretically locked into only obtaining one-hundred-fifty-eight seats out of an available two-hundred-fifty-five; a number short of the two-thirds majority in the CA.

Altogether, MAS dropped their natural objections to this demand and granted it to the opposition PODEMOS citing the need to have a multi-perspective and broad consensus-driven drafting process with the CA. On the other hand, MAS also had a blunting strategy as well because it was composed of various organizations who could also run their own candidates which meant that even if MAS won a large enough margin that trigger the theoretical ceiling independent but sympathetic candidates winning through

²⁴⁴ Artaraz, *Bolivia: Refounding the Nation*, 65.

²⁴⁵ Artaraz, 65.

²⁴⁶ Franco Gamboa Rocabado, *Dilemas y conflictos sobre la Constitución en Bolivia: Historia política de la asamblea Constituyente* [Dilemmas and Conflicts over the Constitution in Bolivia: A Political History of the Constituent Assembly] (La Paz, Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e.V. 2009), 41.

smaller parties would pick up the remaining seats. Together, they could create coalitions to obtain a two-thirds majority.

On this basis, the elections took place in July 2006 and unsurprisingly MAS won little more than fifty-percent of the vote with their next closest rivals ranging in the sixteen to seven percent reflecting the fragmented and incohesive elite-linked parties.²⁴⁷ This result further solidified the hegemonic decoupling along geographical, ethnic, and socio-economic lines as the western indigenous-dominated but poorer departments gain majorities in contrast to the eastern white-dominated but richer departments won lower numbers of seats.²⁴⁸ The final count was 137 assemblypersons for MAS and with the remainder scattered across PODEMOS and other opposition parties, short of the two-thirds majority. However, symbolically, that number represented a mandate for Evo Morales and his allies. With over fifty-five percent of delegates self-identifying as indigenous, little more than half being below the age of forty, and a third being women.²⁴⁹ The CA was truly diverse and representative of the MAS' reach across different segments of society which made it a historical development unto itself.

Beginning in August 2006, the assembly began the formal debate and procedures for generating, discussing, and designing the reforms that would supplant the 1967 constitution. The first scuffles between the factions revolved around what constituted majorities for the passing of articles, with MAS demanding they be approved by simple majority whereas PODEMOS pushed for two-thirds votes. PODEMOS overcame in this first battle through effective street campaigning and protesting outside the CA's convention center resulting in articles needing two-thirds approval to move to the final referendum while MAS was able to propose articles with simple majorities, marking this as one of the more significant conservative victories..²⁵⁰ Later conflicts revolved around the location of the seat of government, independence of the CA from the state, the influence of external

²⁴⁷ Gamboa Rocabado, *Dilemas y conflictos* [Dilemas and Conflicts], 65.

²⁴⁸ Albó, *Movimientos y poder indígena* [Indigenous Movements and Power], 92.

²⁴⁹ Albó, 98–99.

²⁵⁰ Albó, 100; Postero, *The Indigenous State*, 49.

actors and their parties over the CA voting blocks, and frequently the MAS became a mediator of sorts between extremes.²⁵¹

However, for all their overwhelming electoral mandate the MAS could not outright dismiss the PODEMOS factions for they continued their pressure campaign outside the confines of the CA and the ballot box. They organized marches, sit-ins, and hunger strikes and while attracting considerable press coverage aimed to paint the MAS as totalitarians bent on tearing Bolivia and instituting indigenous domination.²⁵² This was resolved by requiring a two-thirds vote at the committee then full-CA levels as well as a final collective two-thirds approval on the entire text.²⁵³ In this manner, the hegemonic counter-reaction was resorting to bureaucratic procedures and popular protests and civil disobedience to slow down or dilute the texts of the individual articles on topics such as land reform and regional autonomy among others.²⁵⁴ The next question then becomes, what did Bolivians actually vote on?

The actual text of the constitutional reforms contained various provisions that had been sought after by the indigenous communities for centuries. The declaration of Bolivia as a plurinational state, decolonization of the state and society, autonomic architectures for the Ayllus, and the complete elimination of monoculturalism and filtered citizenship.²⁵⁵ On economic matters, the Media Luna civic committees that represented the oligarchs and financiers were more successful in having the MAS compromise. One principal was the curtailment of absolute localization of natural resource rights where the state maintained a strong mandate to utilize them for the national benefit however with prior non-veto consultation with the local community, a compromise between indigenous communities and regional oligarchs.²⁵⁶ The state was to also recognize thirty-seven indigenous languages alongside Spanish as well intercultural unity through a decentralization that was

²⁵¹ Postero, *The Indigenous State*, 48.

²⁵² Postero, 50–51.

²⁵³ Postero, 50.

²⁵⁴ Postero, 50.

²⁵⁵ Postero, 53–59.

²⁵⁶ Postero, 60.

heavily guarded by a government-led process.²⁵⁷ Overall, the final text that was presented to voters on January 25, 2009, contained over five-hundred articles that were generated by twenty-one committees over the span of little over a year.²⁵⁸ With 61% of voters approving the final document, promulgated the following February.²⁵⁹ This vindicated centuries of indigenous activism and political-economic-socio continuity in the face of five centuries of multi-modal oppression and a conservative campaign that painted the central government as totalitarian and exclusivist.²⁶⁰ For their part, the conservatives continued asserting for the right to create autonomous regions and limited their campaign to a passive acceptance of the new constitution and promises to contest it through future legislation²⁶¹

E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE BOLIVIAN CASE

When contrasted with the Guatemalan case, the Bolivian outcome seems astounding. The indigenous movement that competed in the elections following democratization in 1982 and that won a complete revamping of the constitution in 2009 were deeply rooted in Bolivian history and represented the continuity of indigenous communities from Pre-Hispanic times to the present. They were able to coalesce a distinct indigenous identity at the ayllu, municipal, and regional levels that preserve their traditional power structures while adapting their self-conception to the trappings of the liberal state that had come to encompass their traditional lands. In the face of a simultaneously segregationist and assimilationist early republican and oligarchic government in the late nineteenth-century, the indigenous peoples were able to reclaim some of their communal lands and the offices of their traditional caciques which laid their political-economic foundations for future actions. In the face of a corporatist revolutionary government, they preserved these structures even when they were subsumed by the state's

²⁵⁷ Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia*, 291.

²⁵⁸ Gamboa Rocabado, *Dilemas y conflictos* [Dilemas and Conflicts], 279.

²⁵⁹ "Bolivia: 2009 Constitutional Referendum Results" Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, updated January 25, 2009, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/refconstit09.html>.

²⁶⁰ Simon Romero, "Bolivians Ratify New Constitution," *The New York Times*, January 25, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html>.

²⁶¹ Romero, "Bolivians Ratify New Constitution."

reimagining of their identity and in spite of that still developed the Katarista intellectual movement that gave them an intellectual pole to rally around and imbue future movements with. Finally, in the face of a segregationist-corporatist military junta they were able to form the first indigenous parties but were only able to compete in elections once that regime gave way to democracy.

Under democracy, the indigenous movement, by now fusing the traditional power structures with a Katarista self-conception, quickly expanded and capitalized on their demographic and mobilization advantages to broaden their coalitions to include other economic classes and ethnic groups. This first fragmented the elites and later eroded the 1967 constitution to such a degree that they were able to expand their political freedoms for the first time since 1952. These freedoms then became the launch point for their legislative victories in the 2002 and 2005 elections which paved the way for the establishment of the constituent assembly that would eventually topple over five centuries of indigenous marginalization.

The main points one needs to keep in mind from this section are the larger contrasts between Bolivia and Guatemala. Aside from the fact that both countries possessed indigenous majorities and both saw the rise of indigenous movements, only one of these was able to reimagine the state and enshrine its autonomic rights and protections. Whereas in Guatemala the Pan-Mayanists struggled in many ways to connect with the indigenous communities and national politics, the Bolivian movements bridged these divides inclusively and effectively. Where in Guatemala the conservative counterreaction was well organized and effective, the Bolivian opposition was fragmented and unable to hold onto to their national hegemony causing them to regionalize themselves. These and a number of other reasons are why the two cases are instructive on the matter of identity, socio and political mobilization, and how these influence the construction of nation-states.

As this study draws to its final conclusion, the outlines of our theory and how it fared in two very similar situations with wildly different outcomes had become clearer. The keys of a unified and solid indigenous identity and is able to build a broad multi-sectoral and multi-ethnic coalition stands a greater chance of obtaining enhance constitutional protections or greater autonomic, self-determination provisions.

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IV. CONCLUSION

As this thesis ends the story of two cases of indigenous mobilization and attempted constitutional transformations, it takes stock of what has been discovered. It examined the historical development, progression, counterreaction to, and aftermath of the Guatemalan Pan-Mayan and Bolivian Indigenous movements in order to offer an alternative explanation to their wildly divergent outcomes. Whereas in Guatemala nearly twenty-years of political work culminated in a failed referendum that would have expanded indigenous rights, freedoms, and protections, the Bolivian movement was not only able to escape a similar fate but usher in a plurinational state.

This study argued that for an indigenous movement to become strong enough to significantly rearrange the hegemonic hierarchy or successfully obtain expanded constitutional rights, freedoms, and protections it needed to: achieve widely accepted unity and be representative of the majority of indigenous communities, be programmatically inclusionary, and form alliances with other ethnic and non-ethnic groups to create a strong enough coalition against the core hegemon. The structure of this work necessarily limited the analysis and exploration into other equally relevant subjects that can enlighten the reader on how indigenous politics blossomed across a region despite being suppressed, subsumed, and ostracized by generations of political-economic elites and outside powers. The path of this thesis reflects an earnest attempt to compartmentalize and streamline a narrative that is cohesively insightful in providing an additional perspective on the aforementioned questions and others tackled within this tome.

To obtain possible answers, in the case of Guatemala this project first explored the broader outlines of its hegemonic canvas. This was done by tracing how race, racism, and political-economic roles and privileges intertwined with each other through the establishment of its colonial society, liberal and conservative governments of independent Guatemala, and later through the various military governments that dominated its landscape up to the end of the Cold War. Along that journey, the continuity of traditional Mayan institutions was charted and the rise of the intellectual Pan-Mayanist schools noted

as the Guatemalan indigenous movement progressed and matured under a brutal civil war that culminated in a genocide against Mayan communities in the early 1980s.

Once this hegemonic canvas was established and the development of the Pan-Mayan movement understood, this paper later then examined the elite-military-led counterreaction campaign against the movement's demands for constitutional reforms via a popular referendum. At this stage, it became apparent that the Pan-Mayanist were hampered by a number of strategic weaknesses that compromised their campaign in the face of a strong, cohesive, and well-resourced counterreaction. These took the shape of a disconnect between the intellectuals that developed the ideas of Pan-Mayanism and the traditional Mayan political leaders who represented the continuities of Mayan customs, legal ideas, and social organization. This disadvantage was magnified by the movement's inability to expand their political coalition beyond their largely-urban base and subjugation to broader ladino-leftist demands and discourses that were the central points of their URNG's ally's politics. Even though the movement enjoyed the direct and indirect support of a number of international state and non-state actors this was not enough to overcome their domestic liabilities.

They were overwhelmed by the concerted campaign mounted by the military-economic-political elites who leveraged their significant blocks in the national congress, a media blitz operation, and constitutional tools to dilute the indigenous demands within a convoluted and haphazardly written ballot. The opposition further beat back the Pan-Mayanist through their limiting of polling stations and resurrecting racist tropes that had historically defined Guatemalan political discourse as far as its conceptions of indigeneity. Altogether, the opposition was able to effectively exploit the weaknesses and blockade the Pan-Mayanist attempts to leverage their demographic advantages and guarantee that the vote was rejected by three-quarters of voters who casted a ballot. With this ignominious defeat, the Pan-Mayanist dream of a plurinational state that granted rights, freedoms, and protections to the Mayan and other minority communities seemingly came to an end.

In stark contrast, the indigenous project in Bolivia progressed under similar hegemonic arrangements that intersected the mediums of race, political and economic privileges, and cultural ideas that confined the indigenous population under a variety of

circumscribed regimes. As a result of the colonial legacy, independent Bolivia continued adapting these hegemonic tropes through successive forms of government whether they were oligarchic-republics, military juntas, or corporatist rulers. Traditional indigenous forms of organizing society and politics, embodied through the *ayllus*, continued under various guises that were projected onto them by the ruling elites as they shifted their ideologies. In the post-MNR-rule of the 1960–70s, the rise of the Kataristas resurrected indigenous mythologies and married these with political ideologies with critiques of capitalism and racism that they then connected with the indigenous unionist leaders who had inherited the political capital of the *ayllus* under the corporatist national institutions. Together, they experimented with various forms of political organization before and after the installment of a military junta that had come into power in 1966 and lasted until 1982. With the elites fractured by the constant struggles between conservative and liberal factions, the indigenista parties spawned by Katarismo attempted to achieve electoral victories in the 1980s and beyond with little support for their exclusionary-indigenista-based messaging and demands. Not until the mid-1990s and with the emergence of neoliberalist economics in the post-Cold War, did Bolivia see successful mass indigenous political mobilization through the fading corporatist veneer that arose with the privatization of numerous state-owned enterprises and industrial sectors.

Through various protest movements and the merging of class-based and identity-based politics with populist rhetoric, the indigenous movements were able to add to the pressure on the fractured to liberalize the constitution and with the reforms of 1995 they achieved their first national victory. With the reforms in place, indigenous parties with more inclusionary appeal began gaining electoral traction through attacks upon the neoliberal elite-backed regime until their entry into the national congress in 2002. With Evo Morales as their leader, the indigenous parties further reached across other class-based and ethnic groups to create a populist coalition against the neoliberal elites that were finally toppled in 2005 with the election of Morales, Bolivia's first self-identified indigenous president.

In the aftermath of his 2005 victory, Morales and his MAS immediately began debating and pushing for a rewrite of the 1967 constitution that was then in force. With

elites' influence diminished within national politics, the MAS was able to muscle the enabling legislation that authorized a special election for choosing the members of the constituent assembly which they dominated once again. However, MAS found itself relying heavily on their inclusionary program which made the arbiters between the indigenous parties and the traditional elites. After months of debate and committee work, the MAS and its allies were able to produce a constitutional proposal that reimagined Bolivia into a plurinational state that recognized indigenous rights, political institutions, and cultural freedoms. In 2009, this proposal was ratified through a national referendum and came into force later that year. The end result was interesting inasmuch that it not only included the rearrangement of the Bolivian hegemonic system but the decoupling of power elements within and between hegemonic groups. Whereas the indigenous movement democratically seized the political sphere in Bolivia and thus sway over the state, what had been the hegemonic privileges of the traditional white elites had been reduced to regionalized economic dominance. These traditional elites were then relegated to the economic core of the eastern Bolivian departments where the political dominance of the indigenous parties had been nationalized.

A number of interesting conclusions and lessons can be drawn from these two outcomes. It was found that the connection between traditional indigenous political organs and leaders—the *principales* in the municipalities of Guatemala and the *caciques* in the *ayllus* of Bolivia—and the intellectual elites that rooted political ideas in indigeneity proved decisive in the political unity and success of a movement. This lack of connections between traditional leaders and modernist intellectuals was missing in Guatemala and very much alive in Bolivia through Katarismo. Even though indigenous or indigenous-inspired intellectuals could be found in Guatemala—like Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil and others—but these did not build coordinating connections with the *principales* in order to mobilize across the Mayan political landscape. Considering that the opposite was true in Bolivia, this text theorizes that it is vital that indigenous activists and intellectuals ally with each other and include traditional local indigenous leadership and recruit them in creating a wider-accepted and operationalized political ideology that can unify different groups.

Without this cohesive messaging, any incipient movement is vulnerably to disruption or fragmentation.

Other findings included that political and economic hegemony can in fact decouple from each other and potentially fragment hegemonic power in interesting ways that were unexpected at the beginning of this study. This was observed in Bolivia, where the elites had fractured so much that they could not mount a political offensive or defensive campaign against the growing MAS coalition. The result was an unanticipated reconfiguration of hegemonic arrangements, where the national means of domination that the white elites had employed in the past collapsed into regional versions of themselves along with those now-regional elites adopting political demands similar to that of the indigenous movement when it first began. These now-regionalized elites were all the suddenly for regional autonomy and protections, local control of resource exploitation decision, and decentralizing national authority. Quite an ironic twist. This last observation demonstrates both the importance of political *and* economic domination but also that the possibility that they can diverge is real. In Bolivia, possibly because of its democratic nature this resulted in a demographic ethnic-majority takeover of national political power and a concentration of wealth in a minority ethnic group.

The other impact of these two constitutional outcomes is how in Guatemala there continues to be rampant discrimination and circumscription of indigenous peoples and to the present continues to experience waves of political and criminal violence that largely trace along ethnic lines.²⁶² Crime preponderantly affects the urban poor who tend to be ethnic minorities that are caught in the racist cycle of poverty and dispossession. Would-be immigrants tend to come from these communities as they look for greater opportunities abroad. Gangs and drug-trafficking tends to be common in indigenous areas and disproportionately affect their communities which are in turn denied or received diluted

²⁶² Maureen Taft-Morales, *Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report No. R42580 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2019), 1, 3, 12–13, 15, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf>.

aid from the state because it does not see them.²⁶³ And thus, Guatemalan racism and neo-coloniality continues to metastasize in various ways across various issues that have domestic and international consequences.

Altogether, this project sought to contribute to the wider fields of constitution making, identity politics, race and racism and how these relate to ideas of power and governance among other arenas. It demonstrates the irreducibility of ethnic identity and its power to mobilize people in a such a manner that it can reshape a nation-state. It also posits that bringing historical perspectives and continuities is central to understanding the motivations, demands, and actions of central political actors and this is most evident in conflicts or struggles involving identity.

Some of the limitations this study readily highlights mainly have to do with how outside powers influence and shape the hegemonic processes within a nation-state. For example, in Guatemala the United States played a central role in the government's brutal civil war and supported the counterinsurgency campaigns that explicitly identified Mayan communities for eradication. Considering Guatemala's demographic and the decoupling between political and economic power seen in Bolivia, could the elites in Guatemala had seen the nature of their dominance splinter in a similar fashion had they not had American support? Could this have steered the conflict differently? More research on the subject is needed. In Bolivia, had the United States not supported the military junta and instead allowed the corporatist government to continue could we have seen an earlier democratization without a mature and experienced Katarista movement? These questions take the subject into the international realm in acknowledgement that elites and subaltern groups do not solely exist in a domestic sense but also have international ties that need to be explored and accounted for.

Another limitation of this study is that it does not do justice to the largest difference between Guatemala and Bolivia, that the former was a post-war state while the latter was

²⁶³ Emiliano Rodríguez Mega, "Cocaine Trafficking is Destroying Central America's Forests," *Science Magazine*, June 16, 2017, <https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/cocaine-trafficking-destroying-central-america-s-forests>; Diego Arguedas Ortiz, "How Indigenous Tribes are Fighting the Drug Cartels," *Vice News*, April 2, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypwvem/indigenous-tribes-vs-the-drug-cartels.

not. How did having just emerged from a thirty-six civil war affect the growth and maturity of the Pan-Maya movement? How did the absence of war contribute to the Bolivian indigenous movements' emergence? How do lingering war enmities affect political decision-making? This vital difference is worthy of its own thesis endeavor. It also does not tackle other facets of identity such as those intersections between race, class, and *gender*. Indigenous women are subject to unique experiences that are framed both through your race *and* gender in addition to their economic status and an exploration of how their stories, struggles, and contributions influenced the indigenous movements and wider identity politics of Latin America is sorely needed. Other avenues for further study include uncovering how did Gen Rios Montt's party, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), receive more than two-thirds of the vote in the second round of the 1999 Presidential Election six months after the failed referendum in a Maya-majority country?²⁶⁴ What fuels this curiosity even more is the fact that it was Gen Rios Montt who oversaw the genocidal campaigns against the Maya in 1980–1983. Was it disenfranchisement? The party politics or structures? Also, why did the Maya not expand their programmatic appeals beyond their indigenous base? What was the nature and intensity of the internal debates within Guatemala and Bolivia's indigenous groups over ideological purity versus political networking and coalition broadening?

All in all, the study of indigenous movements and their constitutional drive provides a highly didactical event that sheds light on the inner workings of identity politics in a region that has long been defined by them. In understanding indigenous struggles one can come closer to grasping the intricacies of managing centuries-old conflicts in the region, reimagine what it means to build an effective government, and how can policymaking in the region move beyond Euro-American models and embrace its autochthonous traditions. With ethnic conflicts having taken or taking place in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, between Haiti and Dominican Republic, and Mexico it behooves international policymakers to understand the foreign and domestic dimensions of identity

²⁶⁴ "Guatemala: 1999 Presidential Elections Results/Second Round," Georgetown University's Political Database of the Americas, last modified February 11, 2000, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/99elec2.html>.

politics and how these warp conflict resolutions.²⁶⁵ And with significant indigenous parties shaping national politics in, for example, Bolivia and Ecuador it becomes a greater imperative how indigenous beliefs and demands shape the national direction of these two important Andean countries and any others with significantly mobilized autochthonous communities. In the end, politics is a never-ending continuous struggle over the power to shape hegemony and its pertinent meanings, contours, and procedural outcomes.²⁶⁶ It hinges on a constellation of factors that come together to forge an identity which then serves as the fulcrum for not self-conception but also for imbuing the properties of power with its characters. Because peoples can never agree on the meanings of symbols, institutions, and constitutions there will always be struggles over the powers that control them in a cyclically endless way.

²⁶⁵ For Argentina: Claudia Salomón Tarquini, “Procesos de subalternización de la población indígena en Argentina: los *ranqueles* en La Pampa, 1870–1970,” *Revista de Indias*, vol. LXXI, no. 252 (2011): 545–70. For Brazil: Fernanda Frizzo Bragato and Pedro Bigolin Neto, “Conflitos territoriais indígenas no Brasil: entre risco e prevenção,” *Direito e Praxis*, vol. 8, no. 1 (March, 2017): 156–95. For Chile: Gilda Waldman, “Historical Memory and Present-Day Oblivion: The Mapuche Conflict in Post-Dictatorial Chile,” *Time & Society*, vol. 21, no. 1 (March, 2012): 55–70. For Ecuador: Marc Becker, *Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). For Haiti and the Dominican Republic: Edward Paulino, *Dividing Hispaniola: The Dominican Republic’s Border Campaign Against Haiti, 1930–1961* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). For Mexico: “Murder in the Backwoods; Mexico’s Indigenous Conflicts,” *The Economist*, vol. 396, no. 8694 (August 7, 2010).

²⁶⁶ Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and the Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995): 330.

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