



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**STRENGTHENING U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION  
IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC BY IMPROVING RELATIONS  
BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA:  
THE CASE OF CHILE-ARGENTINA AS A MODEL**

by

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June 2020

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> June 2020	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> STRENGTHENING U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC BY IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA: THE CASE OF CHILE-ARGENTINA AS A MODEL			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Franklin E. Agli				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b> A	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  This thesis studies the relationship of Japan–South Korea and Argentina–Chile to seek means to improve future U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. By approaching the Japan–South Korea case from the post-war period, I develop the points of friction that inhibit their improved relations, from historical conflicts, military-to-military relations, and economic interactions. By examining these points of tension, I explore how each factor is linked and why there are certain restrictions on interactions between Japan and South Korea. I examine comparable sources of tension in the Chile and Argentina case—namely memories of past historical conflicts, political stability, and trade relations—to find out how Chile and Argentina were able to lessen tensions and develop more cooperative relations. The research found that when approaching the Japan–South Korea relationship, third-party intervention will be the viable choice to achieving sustained relations. Additionally, the use of (CBMs) with the Japanese–South Korean relationship will support U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. The study notes that CBMs will take time to develop better relations between Japan and South Korea; however, the expectation is that as the partnership grows, CBMs will build trust and meaningful present-day interactions that will eventually overshadow past atrocities.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> U.S. security cooperation, Japan–South Korea relations, Chile-Argentina relations, legacies, historical atrocities, military-to-military relations, arms race, economic tensions, trade wars, confidence-building measures, CBMs			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 83	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	

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THE CASE OF CHILE-ARGENTINA AS A MODEL**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis studies the relationship of Japan–South Korea and Argentina–Chile to seek means to improve future U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. By approaching the Japan–South Korea case from the post-war period, I develop the points of friction that inhibit their improved relations, from historical conflicts, military-to-military relations, and economic interactions. By examining these points of tension, I explore how each factor is linked and why there are certain restrictions on interactions between Japan and South Korea. I examine comparable sources of tension in the Chile and Argentina case—namely memories of past historical conflicts, political stability, and trade relations—to find out how Chile and Argentina were able to lessen tensions and develop more cooperative relations. The research found that when approaching the Japan–South Korea relationship, third-party intervention will be the viable choice to achieving sustained relations. Additionally, the use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) with the Japanese–South Korean relationship will support U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. The study notes that CBMs will take time to develop better relations between Japan and South Korea; however, the expectation is that as the partnership grows, CBMs will build trust and meaningful present-day interactions that will eventually overshadow past atrocities.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN+3	Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Three
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
MERSCOSUR	Latin American Regional Trade Agreement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PANC	Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol
RADAR	Radio, Detection, and Ranging
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAREX	Search and Rescue Exercise
SPY	S - Water (surface ship), P - Radar, Y - Surveillance (target detecting and tracking) and Control (fire control and/or air control)
UNSC	United Nations Security Cooperation
WWII	World War Two

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to say “Thank You” to Dr. Meyskens and Dr. Matei for their patience and understanding while working with me on this thesis. Together they guided and shaped my thoughts on the important subject of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Initially, I had my doubts about being able to write a thesis, but their encouragement and dedication gave me the confidence to complete it.

I chose this topic because I believe that the Japan–South Korea relationship is an important alliance in the East Asian region. I have lived and worked in this area of responsibility through two separate tours, conducting joint operations with both nations and their militaries. During this time, I saw the potential of a trilateral relationship among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and hope that this thesis contributes to increased positive bilateral relations in Japan and South Korea’s future.

Finally, I want to especially thank my family for supporting and working around my academic schedule here at NPS. My wife, Deborah, has sacrificed much of her time in Monterey and committed most of her effort into raising our kids. Her contribution allowed me the time to focus on my academics and give it my best. I would also like to thank my family at home for their continuous support of my endeavors. My ultimate appreciation goes to my wife and kids for their selfless support of my journey here at NPS.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Since World War II, the United States has been a power in the Asian-Pacific region, linked by historical, military, and economic ties to its regional partners. Japan and South Korea are two of the US's strongest allies in the Asian-Pacific region. In this connection, after World War II, Japan was reconstructed politically and economically off the American democratic model. Additionally, since 1950, the U.S. supported the Republic of Korea, in efforts to stop the advancing communist threat from North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. Together the "Tri-Alliance" between the US-Japan-South Korea has fostered a safe environment in the region of East Asia for decades. However, economic and security tensions between South Korea and Japan still act as a roadblock to even stronger security cooperation.

Post World War II sentiment between Japan and South Korea has created a lot of friction over the past seventy-five years. Some of these issues include the Japanese use of Korean comfort women after the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Border disputes, such as those involving the Takeshima/Dokdo islands, also continue to cause problems between these semi-friendly neighbors. These issues have caused economic and security tensions between not only Japan and South Korea, but the entire East Asian region and the rest of the world. These discords persist as South Korea feels that Japan has not atoned for its egregious crimes, like comfort women, and without proper compensation, South Korea may not agree to work consistently with Japan. In searching for a model of success in improving bilateral relationships, the case of Chile-Argentina, who have successfully dealt with over a century of disagreements, may apply to the Japan-South Korea situation.

The Japan-South Korea case has notable similarities with the Argentina-Chile case. Connections can be drawn in relation to the border disputes which plagued Argentina and Chile for almost a century and are also a sticking point in Japan-South Korean relations. Argentina and Chile also faced military pressures against each other

and experienced economic tensions like South Korea and Japan today. Andrea Oelsner reveals Argentina and Chile were able to overcome many of their differences when they signed the Peace Treaty of 1984, which effectively silenced past tensions and opened negotiable agreements for their future endeavors.<sup>1</sup> The question raises what the Argentina-Chile case offers as potential avenues for Japan and South Korea to better cooperate with each other and the United States, even though the two cases originate in different time periods, regions, and capacities.

Toward this end, this thesis will study the relationship of Japan–South Korea and Argentina-Chile to seek means to improve future U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. By approaching the Japan–South Korea case from the post war period, I will develop the points of friction that inhibit their improved relations are historical conflicts, military-to-military relations, and economic quarrels. By examining these points of tensions between these two countries, I will explore how each factor is linked to why there are certain restrictions on interactions between Japan and South Korea and both with the United States. I will examine comparable sources of tension between the Chile-Argentina Case—namely memories of past historical conflicts, military to military interactions, and trade relations—in order to find out how Chile and Argentina were able to lessen tensions in these various areas enough to develop more cooperative relations. The goal of this research is to find new ways to support improving U.S. security cooperation in East Asia by developing better relations between Japan and South Korea.

## **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

This research is highly relevant to the government of the United States for a variety of reasons. With the regional security environment eroding from threats—such as North Korea & their nuclear missile program, China’s increasingly aggressive military and economic assertiveness, and Russia’s resurgence—increasing military stability between U.S., South Korea, and Japan is crucial to advancing U.S. interests in East Asia. Since the Second World War, the United States has been able to tie together Japan and

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<sup>1</sup> Andrea Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern Cone* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

South Korea, two nations whose views have often been juxtaposed. Japan's surrender in World War II brought the Japanese occupation of East Asia to an end and with it the need for U.S. foreign aid to both Seoul and Tokyo. The strategic value of the U.S.'s presence within Japan and South Korea, during wars like Vietnam, could not be replicated by any other world power at the time.

Through the 20<sup>th</sup> century, U.S. security cooperation with Japan and South Korea has provided a security blanket for many East and Southeast Asian countries. Even in cases such as Taiwan, the ability for the U.S. to stage amphibious landing forces in Okinawa, one-day travel from the Taiwan Straits—warrants huge strategic advantages against China. Additionally, the U.S. imprint on the region has also resulted in huge economic returns. Japan, for much of the late-20th century, was the world's leading economy, experiencing what may be known as the Japanese Economic Miracle. South Korea, one of the Four Asian Tigers, partially mimicked the financial success of Japan and with U.S. support also took off economically in the 1960s. The decreasing economic interaction between Japan and South Korea has begun to weaken East Asia's economic progress, with shockwaves felt in the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world. With the sudden decline in military interaction and onslaught of economic prohibitions, the region's importance grows even higher.

In the last fifty years, despite small quarrels between the Japanese and South Koreans, the alliance with the U.S. has continued to shore up regional security. This level of stability has been "status quo" for almost a half century, but now it has begun to erode due to North Korean missile launches, China's rise, and Russia's increasing assertiveness abroad. If a breakdown of the US-Japan–South Korea relations should ever occur, the U.S. would lose a significant strategic foothold in the region and leave East Asia vulnerable to other regional powers, like China or Russia. A hegemonic upset could also create a deep regional fear towards who would be next to take the position, especially with the recent history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century still fresh in the minds of the East Asian citizens. This problem continues to divide two of the US's strongest allies, Japan, and South Korea, but it presents a furtherance of uncertainty for the East Asian region.



Figure 1. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and Japan.  
Source: Tina C. Stillions, Office of Corporate Communications NAVSUP  
Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka.

To this day many wartime atrocities continue to haunt the Japan–South Korea relations and breakdown any chance of enhancement in security cooperation between the “Tri-alliance.” 2018 headlines resurfaced grim facts of Japanese conquest of the Korean peninsula in 1910, specifically the poor treatment of the Korean population and the annexation the island formally known as Liancourt Rocks.<sup>2</sup> These images have sparked another rise of controversies that South Korea feels have not been settled, contrary to Japan’s belief that the 1965 Treaty concluded negotiations. Increased tensions have incited military confrontations, for example the 2018 incident between a South Korea warship and a Japanese Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) plane.<sup>3</sup> Although no actual shots were fired, the South Korea warship engaged the Japanese

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<sup>2</sup> Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean–Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets Dispute,” *Pacific Review* 28, no. 3 (2015): 363, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209>.

<sup>3</sup> Jeff Jeong, “Is ‘Radar Feud’ Sign of Future Military Confrontation between South Korea and Japan?,” *Defense News*, December 26, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/12/26/is-radar-feud-sign-of-future-military-confrontation-between-south-korea-and-japan/>.

Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ISR plane with fire control lock, which the Japanese accuse the South Koreans of escalating the situation.

In 2019, Japan–South Korea relations have taken a turn for the worst with the two disbanding the shared information agreement of which the U.S. is a partner. The impact of this decision has severely decreased the U.S.’s ability to maintain security in the region because of the two nation’s inability to solve their past differences. In 2019, with two of the largest East Asian economies going tit for tat, the world’s economy has been rocked. The stability of these two nation’s economies have lasting effects on the world due to their reliance on their exports, and with each nation disrupting another, it undermines the global economic stability.

This research also benefits both Japan’s and South Korea’s governments. The Argentina-Chile case follows the commonality of Japan and South Korea’s issues and is an unexplored option to understanding future steps that may lead to a peaceful unity. Since the 18th century, relations between Chile and Argentina emerged from overcoming colonization and uneven establishment of two independent nations. Similar to Japan–South Korea’s major issues, historical conflicts, border disputes and economic turmoil have plagued the two most southern Latin American nations. Progressing to the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, different legacies challenged the partnership through forms of border disputes from Patagonia to the Straights of Magellan. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, security mistrust developed through military arm sales with neighboring enemies of each nation, sparking an arms race that propelled the two nations towards war. As tensions rose, the Beagle Channel incident was handled carefully and marked a turning point for the two nations in negotiations. The Peace Treaty of 1984 secured the two nations security without any wars. This was obtained through extended periods of trial and error. Furthermore, the Chile-Argentina model shares many similarities with the Japan–South Korea case that can be used to further develop U.S. involvement and the notion of improved security cooperation as the center piece.

Finally, this investigation is useful to policymakers in other countries that undergo similar tensions like the historical conflicts, poor military relations, and economic differences. The Chile and Argentina case can helpful because it shares many parallels

with Japan and South Korea and the relation to the past. The clear overlapping tensions of the two cases are especially useful to research because in the South American case, there was a path to peaceful resolution. The takeaways that may be obtained by this research are positive bilateral relations, improved regional security cooperation and heightened economic development. By undertaking this research, many benefits may be discovered and formulated to foster positive outcomes to international tensions.

## C. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 1. Legacies of Japanese Colonialism

One major explanation of Japan–South Korea tensions is the legacy of the Japanese empire in Korea. There are three main historical cases that continue the divergence between Japan and South Korea. The first justification regards comfort women, which continues to attract the media’s attention. The recent mention of them comes at a time where a potential for the end of the Korean War and Reunification of the North and South nations are in sight. This reveals the important historical role Japan plays on the Korean Peninsula. Motoko Rich alludes to how historical disagreements between Japan and South Korea can affect future security cooperation and may push South Korea to reconsider their relations with the U.S.<sup>4</sup>

The second historical issue arises from the annexation of Dokdo/Takeshima Island in 1905. Ji Young Kim states, “Dokdo symbolizes thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule.”<sup>5</sup> Kazuhiko Togo expands on this perspective, explaining that “there is total lack of understanding on the Japanese side, that the Dokdo issue is for the Koreans the most symbolic and representative image of Japan’s colonization.”<sup>6</sup> Scholarship

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<sup>4</sup> Motoko Rich, Edward Wong, and Choe Sang-Hun, “As Japan and South Korea Feud Intensifies, U.S. Seems Unwilling, or Unable, to Help,” *New York Times*, August 4, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/world/asia/japan-south-korea-feud.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Ji Young Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes Between South Korea and Japan,” *Asian Perspective* 38, no. 1 (2014): 51, <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2014.0001>.

<sup>6</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “How to Alleviate the Security Threats to Northeast Asia Arising Out of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands Dispute: Applying Lessons Learned from Japan’s Other Territorial Conflicts,” *AIST Industry Law* 47, no. 3–4 (2014): 154, [https://ksu.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository\\_action\\_common\\_download&item\\_id=2047&item\\_no=1&attribute\\_id=22&file\\_no=1](https://ksu.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=2047&item_no=1&attribute_id=22&file_no=1).

surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima Island dispute reinforce the underlying historical residue that plagues the two East Asian nations.

The final historical issue belongs to the rejection of Japanese Tsukurukai textbooks in the South Korean education system, more specifically, the Korean population's rejection of information regarding the colonial period and the Japanese claims of legal annexation of Korea. The contentious topics within the Tsukurukai textbooks, which supported the "comfort women" and Takeshima Island issues, ignited the hearts of the Korean people against anything Japanese related. Ji Young Kim states, "the Korean media, civil organizations, and politicians criticized the Japanese government for advocating a "distorted" textbook"<sup>7</sup> Additionally, with the Korean people outraged by the lack of political intervention in the production and negotiation of these Japanese textbooks, relations began to deteriorate again. From Motoko Rich's point of view, during the early 2000s, the two governments were navigating through the historical issues in effort to come closer together. She states that after Japan and South Korea co-hosted the World Cup in soccer, tourism began to strengthen their bonds due to a mutual dependency.<sup>8</sup> However, most of Japan and South Korea's attempts at alleviation have been insignificant, as within a decade later tensions began to rise again.

These three historical aspects allude to the erosion that has continued over the last seventy years between U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Ji Young Kim expresses that the Koreans feel as if the Japanese never fully apologized for the war crimes and that they are cheated from reparations to mend these wrongdoings.<sup>9</sup> Supporting Kim's argument, Rich persists that these war atrocities continue to present grounds for Koreans to unite against any efforts towards creating stronger bonds with Japan. This presents an increasingly difficult dilemma for the U.S., especially if the situation is not monitored meticulously. Both Kim and Rich agree that tensions concerning the historical context spill over into other categories such as Japan-South Korea military relations.

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<sup>7</sup> Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle," 47.

<sup>8</sup> Rich, Wong, and Sang-Hun, "As Japan and South Korea Feud Intensifies."

<sup>9</sup> Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle."

## 2. Japan–South Korea Military-to-Military Relations

Other authors point to the rise in tensions involving joint military cooperation between Japan and South Korea without the presence of the United States. Face-to-face encounters between the South Korean and Japanese militaries have often been blighted by their long history of mutual distrust. Sukjoon Yoon states, “South Korea and Japan have endured seven decades of profound distrust, but the time has come to acknowledge the security concerns and wider geopolitical interests.”<sup>10</sup> The distrust has impacted mil-to-mil relations due to the intense nature of potential deadly force that surrounds foreign military interactions. Lee and Oba consider the period of time as “hitting an all-time low” between the two nations after the Japanese ISR plane was locked on by a South Korean warship.<sup>11</sup> They also claim that if North Korea was the glue that held up the trilateral relations before, now that the U.S. under the Trump administration is seeking diplomacy with Pyongyang, all of the prior work may be undone.<sup>12</sup>

Multilateral security and military coordination between Japan and South Korea need to be considered beyond the immediate region. Sukjoon Yoon believes the benefits which could evolve naturally out of improving multinational military cooperation would be immeasurable for the three allies the U.S., Japan and South Korea.<sup>13</sup> Capabilities that are currently engaged are: monitoring illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers between Chinese oil tankers and North Korean ships in the East China Sea, sortieing unauthorized flights by Russian spy planes over the East Sea and combining anti-ballistic missile defenses in efforts to contain North Korean advances. The large scope of defense these capabilities provide to the world raise the importance of the relationship of Japan and South Korean militaries. Helene Cooper writes, “Washington and Seoul have canceled ... in order to

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<sup>10</sup> Sukjoon Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations,” *The Diplomat*, March 2, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/rethinking-japan-south-korea-defense-relations/>.

<sup>11</sup> Ji-Young Lee and Mintaro Oba, “Japan-Korea Relations: Hitting an All-Time Low,” *Comparative Connections* 21, no. 1 (May 2019): 105–14, [http://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/12\\_1901\\_JapanKorea.pdf](http://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/12_1901_JapanKorea.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations.”

<sup>13</sup> Yoon.

avoid roiling Pyongyang.”<sup>14</sup> She brings up the added factor of the U.S. political relations with neighboring nations and that diplomacy effects how allies interact in the meanwhile.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea all contribute surveillance aircraft and staff to support operations to deter North Korean development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and is implemented by the United Nations Security Cooperation (UNSC) resolution.<sup>15</sup> However, with the Trump administration set on denuclearization, all partners could be set aside, leaving Japan and South Korea to manage themselves, without the U.S. as a mediator. As the U.S. presence fades, the mil-mil relations follow as South Korea backed down from the Intelligence Sharing Pact in late August of 2019.<sup>16</sup> Christy Lee points out with the lack of U.S. intervention, the erosion of military relations has not only affected bilateral affairs, but it has decreased the ability to address the nuclear threat North Korea poses.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the bilateral affairs weaken the regional security as well as the economic nature between Japan and South Korea.

### **3. Economic Tensions between Japan and South Korea**

As economic pacts between the Japanese and South Koreans deteriorate, the loss of trade has worldly impacts. Authors like Christy Lee and Lee Seong-hyon claim that these economic trade tensions, may not be politically drive, but they are “undermining regional stability.”<sup>18</sup> In a series of trade wars, food, tourism and vital materials, ramp up the economic factor and affect not only the region, but the world’s economic growth. In two articles, Ji-young Lee states that while the trade tensions may not appear to be politically driven, they must eventually be acknowledged by Tokyo and Seoul otherwise

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<sup>14</sup> Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Again Suspends Large-Scale Military Exercises with South Korea,” New York Times, March 1, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/asia/us-military-exercises-south-korea.html>.

<sup>15</sup> Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations.”

<sup>16</sup> Cooper, “Pentagon Again Suspends Large-Scale Military Exercises with South Korea.”

<sup>17</sup> Christy Lee, “Seoul-Tokyo Trade Tension Could Complicate US Efforts on North Korea Denuclearization,” Voice of America News, July 11, 2019, ProQuest.

<sup>18</sup> Lee.

the world may experience another recession. Furthermore, most authors agree that the U.S. has stepped back in its role as “mediator,” between Seoul and Tokyo, leaving Japan and South Korea to fend for themselves, which only fuels the rise of regional instability.<sup>19</sup>

Lee Seong-hyon claims although economic regulations between the two nations has grown steadily over the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with the reemergence of the historical controversies South Korea’s tourism in Japan has declined significantly. These shifting international interactions cause Japan and South Korea to impose trade embargos, especially when the U.S. is not around to mitigate tensions. Ji-young Lee notes relations between the two nations are “Hitting an all-time low.”<sup>20</sup> In her view, this is because in the past Tokyo and Seoul could always rely on U.S. financial support to fill in gaps that may have opened during bouts with each other.<sup>21</sup> Conclusively, the two nations continue a vicious spiral downward in relations and do not seem to have a clear path to improving any relations.

#### **4. On Chilean-Argentine Border Disputes**

Border disputes between Chile and Argentina date back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and have divided the nations. Over the history of Chile and Argentina relations, a key sticking point has been disagreements over the ownership of Patagonia, the Beagle Channel, and portions of Antarctica. Oelsner and Howkins discuss how these tensions caused significant effects around the world and the need for 3<sup>rd</sup> party intervention at times to close the book on disagreements. According to Howkins the discrepancies between each nation’s territorial claims and the lack of geographical evidence led to continued

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<sup>19</sup> Lee Seong-hyon, “Where Is Washington? The Missing Mediator between Seoul and Tokyo,” *Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (2019): 89–110, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1593767>.

<sup>20</sup> Lee and Oba, “Japan-Korea Relations.”

<sup>21</sup> Lee and Oba.

disagreements.<sup>22</sup> Oelsner posits that had these border disputes been given more attention earlier on, later political and military issues would not have developed.<sup>23</sup>



Figure 2. The Southern Cone — 3<sup>rd</sup> Longest Border in the World.  
Source: CIA Factbook.

<sup>22</sup> Adrian John Howkins, “Frozen Empires: A History of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, 1939-1959” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*.

The disputes over the 3<sup>rd</sup> longest border in the world created a historical rivalry between Chile and Argentina, which can be attributed to invalid treaties. Oelsner refers to multiple border treaties attempted by each nation, as “poorly designed and with no future legitimacy.”<sup>24</sup> The historical rivalry regarding the disputed Patagonia territories and Beagle Channel, plagued the southern cone repeatedly as each nation attempted to solve the issue diplomatically and scientifically. However, the underlying issue that Chile and Argentina faced concerned their geographical closeness to Antarctica and the fact it had not yet been claimed. Howkins discusses the “scramble for Antarctica,” which took place in 1946–47 as the nations of Chile, Argentina, the United States and Great Britain vied for “effective occupation.”<sup>25</sup> With so much on the line for these developing countries, Chile and Argentina eroded any hope of mutual relations for the next few decades.

Eventually, Chile and Argentina border tensions increased to the point of a potential regional war because neither nation could diplomatically trust the other. Oelsner claims the mutual perception between Chile and Argentina reflected a view of adversaries and potential enemies, which continued to grow over decades of mistrust.<sup>26</sup> Having differing claims regarding Patagonia, the Beagle Channel waterways within the Magellan straights, and the Antarctic conquest, Chile and Argentina found themselves unable to fully read the other’s intentions. Oelsner describes the anxiety of each nation, when considering how the other may react towards the border, as a major factor behind a regional arms race in Latin America.<sup>27</sup> However, with political agendas shifting and military coups occurring in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina in 1976, there was a release in pressure on the border. A brief positive negotiation period formed between the two dictators, Augusto Pinochet of Chile and General Reynaldo Bignone of Argentina, as they attempted to run their countries in the newly formed authoritarian regimes.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Oelsner, 110.

<sup>25</sup> Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 107.

<sup>26</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 126..

<sup>27</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*.

<sup>28</sup> Andrés Villar Gertner, *Autonomy and Negotiation in Foreign Policy: The Beagle Channel Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

Conversely, following each country's transition to democracy, more effective diplomacy was applied to the border dispute issues and stronger, more valid, treaties were written and upheld.

## **5. Chilean-Argentine Military-to-Military Relations**

One major explanation for poor military relations was mutual mistrust between Chile and Argentina due to competing border claims, which spurred an arms race. In 1902, The governments of Chile and Argentina signed the "May Pacts" with the support of the British as a 3<sup>rd</sup> party intervener, in an attempt to reduce the chaotic increase in naval weaponry and military forces that were amassing.<sup>29</sup> Yet a few decades later, expeditions to Antarctica continued to disrupt the political actions of Chile and Argentina regarding the issue of border disputes. As Howkins notes the strategic interest in establishing legitimacy on the Antarctic Peninsula drove up rising military tensions, especially due to the U.S. and Great Britain competition over the region as well.<sup>30</sup>

Another scholarly explanation of what caused troubled military relations were Chile and Argentina's unstable political systems. In the mid-1900s, Argentina and Chile both experienced coups that had resonating effects on the attempts for closer military relations and the settlement of border disagreements. A positive situation initially developed between the two nations, which quickly established economic trade and political partnership deals.<sup>31</sup> While these negotiations sounded great on paper, they were not designed to hold up given the state of either government after the coup.<sup>32</sup>

The third causal factor scholars highlight for incompatible military partnerships were Chile and Argentina's inability to effectively agree on concrete treaties. The progression of controversies continued through the later 19<sup>th</sup> century, where Chile and Argentina continued to fall in and out of negotiations for peace. Treaties were signed but they held no weight and usually lasted less than a decade leaving tensions between armies

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<sup>29</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 110.

<sup>30</sup> Howkins, "Frozen Empires," 110.

<sup>31</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 131.

<sup>32</sup> Howkins, "Frozen Empires," 343.

high. The lack of consistency drove the arms race between the militaries to extremes and caused incidents like the 1965 border dispute within the Beagle Channel to occur. Scholars agree that even after the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified it took decades for military relations to warm. Oelsner claims this result was due to “sporadic attempts and frequent rhetoric, of the states failing to trust each other.”<sup>33</sup> However, both Howkins and Oelsner claim the difference was clear, the Peace Treaty of 1984 allowed a sense of relief to form and eventually gave way to more positive military relations between Chile and Argentina.

## **6. Economic Differences between Argentina and Chile**

One explanation for Chile and Argentina’s ability to economically develop after independence is related to their available natural resources. Mikael Wigell explains that during the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Chile exploited its limited natural resource of nitrate, which is used to make fertilizer.<sup>34</sup> Unfortunately for Chile, the nitrate market fluctuated frequently, because farmers would cut back on its use during off seasons or depressions. On the other hand, Argentina discovered it had an abundance of natural gas deposits and the demand was high, even from its Chilean neighbor.<sup>35</sup> Chile and Argentina formed trade partnerships that centered on the natural resource reserves amongst themselves, but these partnerships were unable to decrease tensions between the two countries.

Other scholars highlight how the growth of tradable goods from Chile and Argentina to global markets fostered tensions between them. Argentina opened their Free Trade in MERCOSUR, a Latin American regional trade agreement, which started with Brazil and later extended to Chile. Oelsner describes an asymmetry in the economic infrastructure and large-scale trade of Argentina that left Chile behind in the international market.<sup>36</sup> Argentina with the benefit of their relations with Brazil focused on trade for

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<sup>33</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 113.

<sup>34</sup> Mikael Wigell, “Governing the Poor: The Transformation of Social Governance in Argentina and Chile” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010), 115.

<sup>35</sup> Gustavo González, “Chile-Argentina: Gas Cuts Undermine Relations,” *Inter Press Service*, May 5, 2004, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/05/chile-argentina-relations-strained-by-gas-dispute/>.

<sup>36</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 123.

economic growth early in the 1990s, through the Treaty of Asuncion. On the other hand, it took Chile almost another twenty years to become actively involved in the Free Trade market of the Southern Cone. The more disadvantageous position for Chile, in the global economy, stimulated tensions with Argentina.<sup>37</sup>

Another explanation for the cause of economic tensions between Chile and Argentina can be drawn from their transition from dictatorships to democracies. Some scholars, such as Zeev Maoz, tie this economic revival to the Democratic Peace Theory and argue that when Chile and Argentina became democracies, economic tensions between them decreased.<sup>38</sup> Others, like Glen Biglaiser, claim that based on Chile's experience, the authoritarian regime provided the ideal circumstances for the attainment of economic growth in the medium and long run and provided examples for countries like Argentina to use in their own development.<sup>39</sup> Regardless, Chile and Argentina's paths converged at the conclusion of each's dictatorship, when both countries democratized and obtained major economic gains through partnered trading. Concurrently Erica Salvaj noted, that the revival of democracy positively changed both nations' economies, and brought relations with one another to the closest they had ever been.<sup>40</sup> In any case, the economic stability has proven itself over the last thirty years of Chile and Argentina's relationship and has reaffirmed the possibility of peaceful futures for democratic countries that had once been at odds.

#### **D. ROADMAP**

To accomplish this research, I will use secondary sources—a combination of books, articles and journals written by scholars in the fields of history, military

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<sup>37</sup> Oelsner, 124.

<sup>38</sup> Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 176, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539333>.

<sup>39</sup> Glen Biglaiser, "Military Regimes, Neoliberal Restructuring, and Economic Development: Reassessing the Chilean Case," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34, no. 1 (1999): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687602>.

<sup>40</sup> Erica Salvaj and Andrea Lluch, "A Comparative Study of Interlocking Directorates at the End of the Import-Substituting Industrialization Period in Argentina and Chile," *Redes: Revista Hispana Para El Análisis de Redes Sociales* 23, no. 3 (December 2012): 97, <https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/redes.440>.

cooperation, and economic relations—for each case. By dissecting these sources, I expect to find what techniques in political compromise were used in Chile and Argentina regarding historical disputes and assess whether they apply to Japan and South Korea. Additionally, by reviewing the military relations of these nations I will attempt to determine what factors have fueled tensions and cooperation in each case and determine what factors have led to improved military relations. Lastly, I will examine the impact that economic development and increased trade had in both cases and determine whether it was an important factor behind the development of more favorable relations. Ultimately by engaging in the above analysis, I can develop a detailed comparison of the two case studies and produce a potential policy proposal for how Japan and South Korea can develop closer relations and take better part in U.S. security cooperation in East Asia.

The purpose of this research is to strengthen U.S. security cooperation within the East Asian Region. To do so, Chapter I will develop the main research question as well as raise the significance behind it, while providing a review of the relevant academic literature and a roadmap of how the research question will be approached. Chapter II will discuss the handling of war memories and military and economic relations between Japan and South Korea in the postwar period. Chapter III explores how Chile and Argentina settled their historical disputes and built positive military and economic relations in a peaceful manner. Chapter IV will offer a comparative analysis of the two cases and conclude with solutions that may lead to outcomes in the East Asian region like those of Chile and Argentina.

## II. THE JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA CASE

Japan and South Korea belong to a special group of nations who emerged in the post-World War II era as swiftly rising economies. Japan immediately took off economically and rose to become known as the “East Asian Miracle.” Perkins explains, it did so by reindustrializing and openly trading with the world following its defeat in WWII.<sup>41</sup> Haggard also eludes the private sectors were monitored by the Japanese government but limited restrictions were set in place to allow for extreme and rapid growth, which Chalmers Johnson attributes to the centrality of Japanese business-government relations.<sup>42</sup> Following the Japanese model, South Korea launched itself into a similar trajectory and began its economic reformation process. South Korea became known as one of the Four Asian Tigers, alongside Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, settling into a superior economic tempo.<sup>43</sup> Throughout each nation’s growth, the United States remained a mantle of protection allowing the two states to focus less on defense spending and more on domestic and foreign trade management. This freedom from defense spending has allowed Japan and South Korea to grow into booming economies, which have great impact on the world financially.

Militarily, Japan and South Korea have become increasingly active over the past few decades, supporting U.S.-led exercises, and building their own individual defensive postures. As U.S. allies, they share unique and aligning capabilities, interconnecting military technology and defense doctrine under the U.S. security blanket. Additionally, each country has adopted American tactics from the countless military training exercises conducted with U.S. counterparts. From the Vietnam era to more recent events like Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan and South Korea have continued to implement their

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<sup>41</sup> Dwight H. Perkins, *East Asian Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

<sup>42</sup> Stephan Haggard, *Developmental States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108552738>.

<sup>43</sup> Perkins, *East Asian Development*.

militaries in emerging partnerships around the world.<sup>44</sup> At times each nation has provided troops, supplies or geographical locations to foster new footholds for U.S. forces to attain strategic advantages. The strategic support provided by South Korea and Japan contribute to the increased resiliency of U.S. operations around the world. However, these interactions have limitations due to the incomplete Japanese-South Korean relationship. These military limitations originate from the friction caused by the historical legacies of Japan's colonization of Korea.

Since basic relations were formed post-WWII, Japan–South Korea relations have been plagued by many historical controversies. Cases, like the Korean population used in labor camps and the women as sex slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army, have raised the most disruptions.<sup>45</sup> Japan's legacy of wartime atrocities inhibit a potentially stronger relationship with South Korea. In the interim, the United States' alliance with Japan and South Korea insulates the unofficial bilateral relationship, allowing for interactions between Japan and South Korea to remain peaceful and unbroken. Unfortunately, these uncorrected points of friction have kept Tokyo and Seoul at arm's length from one another economically and strategically. It has become clear that Japan and South Korea are unconcerned with the United States' opinion on security cooperation within the region and are determined to promote their own interpretations of dealing with inter-regional affairs.

This chapter reviews the relationship between Japan and South Korea over the past seventy years, focusing on the factors of economic relations, military to military relations, and historical atrocities that continue to affect their relationship. First by focusing on where Japan/South Korea relations have been the strongest we look at the economic ties that have formed over this period. Next the chapter dives into the limited military interactions that occur between the two nations and uncovers why there is not more cohesion between the two United States' allied forces. Then, the chapter focuses on

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<sup>44</sup> Stephen A. Carney, *Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, CMH Pub. 59-3-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 2011), [https://history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-3-1/CMH\\_59-3-1.pdf](https://history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-3-1/CMH_59-3-1.pdf).

<sup>45</sup> Elise Tipton, *Modern Japan*, 3rd ed. (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2016), 250.

the struggle of approaching the subject of historical atrocities which continue to cause tensions between the two neighboring nations. Finally, it wraps up with the findings. Ultimately, this chapter explores why, although Japan and South Korea would make strong allies, they have somehow not been able to completely unite under a formal agreement.

#### **A. STRONG ECONOMIC TIES**

Japan and South Korea share comparable economic features that reveal similarities regarding financial significance, but also their strategic role in the region. Economic interdependence and the development of a Free Trade Agreement between Japan–South Korea, within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Three (ASEAN+3), are a prime image of the relationship that has gained notoriety over the past fifty years.<sup>46</sup> Since the Treaty of Basic Relations<sup>47</sup> was signed by Tokyo and Seoul in 1965, Korean dependence on the Japanese economically has been crucial to its path to financial success. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) owed to South Korea played an essential role in their expressed economic development in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>48</sup> Overall reparations, amounting to approximately \$800 million dollars, were paid to South Korea by Japan, beginning the economic stimulation South Korea used to become one of the Four Asian Tigers.<sup>49</sup> However, the economic interactions between the two growing nations did not end with reparation payments. Quite to the contrary, they flourished into highly integrated trade connections and market investments.

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<sup>46</sup> Kim Gyu-Pan, “Korea’s Economic Relations with Japan,” in *Korea’s Economy*, ed. Troy Stangarone, vol. 31 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2017), 28, <http://keia.org/category/publication-category/koreas-economy/koreas-economy-volume-31>.

<sup>47</sup> The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea was signed on June 22, 1965 to establish basic relations to include trading rights, compensation for wartime atrocities and international recognition of peace.

<sup>48</sup> Gyu-Pan, “Korea’s Economic Relations with Japan,” 24.

<sup>49</sup> Michael J. Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 178.

Over the last half century, Japan has continued to provide South Korea economic support by investing in its export capabilities and developing sustainable trade relations. Japan's investment in heavy industries like Korea's Hyundai Motors and Samsung Electronics were key in the early stimulation of South Korea's economic development.<sup>50</sup> In 1974, South Korea even expanded Hyundai Heavy Industries into a shipbuilding manufacturing and repair capable company, opening the door for future economic stimulus as the Pacific waterway's traffic continued to rise.<sup>51</sup> Another connection revealed by economic statistics rises from the tourism that occurs between the two nations. Japan and South Korea are noted as having the highest foreign travelers to each country over the past five decades, stoking the support of economic transactions between the countries. From 1977 to 2008, the number of Japanese tourists visiting Korea has averaged around 40% of the overall tourism pool.<sup>52</sup> The Japanese economic contribution to South Korea has persisted despite a constant turmoil regarding historical legacies.

During the Kim Young Sam and Ryutaro Hashimoto period of relations, approximately from 1993–1997, trade and investments began to fluctuate. The economic ties were strained when South Korea attempted to bolster economic relations and Japan made stark claims regarding ownership of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. Kim Young Sam wanted to quit “Japan bashing” following Morihiro Hosokawa's apology in 1994 and maximize the economic advantages to a balanced Korean-Japanese plane.<sup>53</sup> Talks of raising a Free Trade Agreement arose following the Asian Financial Crisis, due to multiple shifts in theater interactions with the United States. As South Korea struggled to regain its development, Japan took advantage of the lack of U.S. support to press for stronger relations.<sup>54</sup> However, FTA talks were set aside in the meanwhile, as tensions

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<sup>50</sup> Gyu-Pan, “Korea's Economic Relations with Japan,” 32..

<sup>51</sup> Hidehiko Mukoyama, “Japan-South Korea Economic Relations Grow Stronger in a Globalized Environment,” RIM: Pacific Business and Industries 12, no. 43 (2012): 23, <https://www.jri.co.jp/MediaLibrary/file/english/periodical/rim/2012/43.pdf>.

<sup>52</sup> Cheol Hee Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts: Korea-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 15, no. 2 (2008): 33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439000802511125>.

<sup>53</sup> Park, 35..

<sup>54</sup> Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and Korea: Should the US Be Worried about Their New Spat in 2001?,” *Pacific Review* 15, no. 1 (2002): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740110110846>.

began to rise after controversy over the Dokdo-Takeshima Islands and Takeshima Day became a national holiday in Japan.<sup>55</sup> Since the talks regarding FTA started, Japan and South Korea have set them aside multiple times following points of friction. In May of 2001, polls were conducted in Korea to assess if Korea should break ties with Japan, which the result that 59.2% of Koreans surveyed were in favor of severing ties.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the domestic friction of South Korean nationalism towards the Japanese, Japan–South Korean economies continued to interact and successfully adjust to the constant fluctuations. Gilbert Rozman raises the discussion of the spat that occurred during 1990s, where Japan and South Korea contested the content of middle school texts books that were produced in Japan. During what Rozman calls the “textbook war,” ties were placed in heavy strain; nonetheless, trade persisted.<sup>57</sup> Also, during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis both countries recovered through one another’s support.<sup>58</sup> The consistent economic relations between Japan and South Korea reveals a good portion of why trends in trade and investments have continued to occur despite the fluctuations regarding the historical legacies and greater worldwide economic factors. However, with the rise of globalization, consistent economic ties allowed for a transition of economic superiority to occur between Japan and South Korea.

Due to the growth of globalization, Japan and South Korea’s economic relations may have hit a critical point of role reversal. Hidehiko Mukoyama, a senior Japanese economist, describes the rise in globalization as another key factor to why Japan–South Korean relations have persisted.<sup>59</sup> He breaks down the economic trends by pointing out how globalization has increased the difficulty of competition in the markets and trade wars. He argues that by opening Japan and South Korea’s markets to the world, it caused a shift in dependency where Japan products began to lose out to South Korean products

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<sup>55</sup> Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts.”

<sup>56</sup> Rozman, “Japan and Korea,” 10.

<sup>57</sup> Rozman, 12.

<sup>58</sup> Rozman, 20..

<sup>59</sup> Mukoyama, “Japan-South Korea Economic Relations.”

in many of its former markets.<sup>60</sup> Rising through the early 2000s, South Korean goods, like electronics, automobiles and ships, overtook the Japanese market and continued to rise despite both financial crises. As globalization opened more doors for South Korea, it became more attractive for Japan to depend upon South Korea as its major export partner, especially with Japan experiencing its economic stagnation.

Despite Hidehiko's discovery of the emerging role reversal between Japan and South Korea, one factor that has remained relatively unchanged is the growing trade deficit between South Korea and Japan. Since the early 1990s, Japan has continued to provide South Korea the necessary goods to continue their export of goods, causing a trade imbalance to occur and continuation of a trade deficit between the two countries.<sup>61</sup> This occurrence affects Japan–South Korea economic relations in two ways: one, it continues their economic interdependency and two, it provides a consistent economic baseline for each nation to fall back on.<sup>62</sup> The takeaway from Mukoyama's discovery in the 1990–2010 period was Japan and South Korea, for the foreseeable future, could expect to see strong continued economic ties in their trade sectors, which has been true as of this writing.

Economic dependency has not remained localized to each country's financial sectors. Outside events, like the 2011 "Great East Japan Earthquake," spurred notable growth and interaction between Japan and South Korea.<sup>63</sup> The damages caused by the earthquake to Japan's energy sector also impacted trade with South Korea. The aftereffects of the earthquake were seen when a rise of trade for petroleum products occurred between Japan and South Korea. As Mukoyama reveals, a 126% increase in total imports related to petroleum was reported following the 2010 report.<sup>64</sup> Beyond the energy sector, Japan has shown increased interest in South Korea's electronics, such as smartphones and televisions. The success of South Korea's investment in research and

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<sup>60</sup> Mukoyama.

<sup>61</sup> Mukoyama.

<sup>62</sup> Gyu-Pan, "Korea's Economic Relations with Japan," 28.

<sup>63</sup> Mukoyama, "Japan-South Korea Economic Relations," 7.

<sup>64</sup> Mukoyama, 14.

development of their electronic sectors has spilled over into attracting Japanese consumers, as shown when the 2011 report publicized an 86% increase in Japanese purchasing of South Korean products such as Samsung and LG.<sup>65</sup>

Overall, the enduring economic relations between Japan and South Korea may not seem likely given their historical disputes; however, upon further review, their interdependence becomes clear. From post-war growth to modern-day progress, Japan and South Korea's relationship has continued to develop as if they were allies with a strong free trade agreement. They support one another's markets and invest in each other's innovations, feeding the research and development sectors. While they may not officially claim to be allies, their economic partnership portrays otherwise. Like their economies, Japan and South Korean militaries share many commonalities that provide support for why each nation has remained close despite their historical legacies.

## **B. MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS WITH LIMITATIONS**

Japan and South Korea are two nations that fall under the U.S. security umbrella and contribute to the stability the East Asian Region has experienced since the end of World War II. Post-war establishments set in place by the United States have structured the region to allow for certain alliances to form and others to persist without formal ties. Japan and South Korea have interacted with the United States military for over seventy-five years, but neither Japan nor South Korea has formally agreed in aligning through bilateral ties. For example, Operation Key Resolve is a U.S.-South Korean bilateral training exercise, backed by Japan, to enforce security within the East Asia region.<sup>66</sup> Although the Japanese Self Defense Force does not participate directly with the South Korean forces during this training event, they do provide support for the U.S. military throughout the timeline of the drills. Ongoing historical disputes cast poor lighting on Japanese-South Korean relations, causing animosity to persist and limitations to emerge regarding the number of interactions the nations have militarily.

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<sup>65</sup> Mukoyama, 14.

<sup>66</sup> U.S. Forces Korea, "Key Resolve Begins in Korea," U.S. Army, March 10, 2009, [https://www.army.mil/article/18017/key\\_resolve\\_begins\\_in\\_korea](https://www.army.mil/article/18017/key_resolve_begins_in_korea).

The start of postwar military relations between Japan and South Korea can be traced back to the Korean War. Richard Allen claims it began in 1953, when South Korea formed the Syngman Rhee Line, a fishing zone that sparked a clash of various military interactions between the two nations.<sup>67</sup> The first interaction was facilitated when Republic of Korea Coast Guard ships fired at, detained and drove off Japanese fisherman, prompting the necessity of a military agreement. It was not until 1957, with United States intervention and the slowdown of tensions following the Korean War, that Japanese and South Korean militaries began to work together.<sup>68</sup> The shift away from aggression occurred after the release of all 850 Japanese fishing detainees from Korean prisons in exchange for the return of 460 Korean War prisoners and 1,100 illegal immigrants, marking a starting point for improved relations.<sup>69</sup>

Also, during the Korean War in 1950, Japan's integration into United States security infrastructure in East Asia can be linked to the beginning of temporary control of tensions between Japan and South Korea about their past histories. One undervalued fact was that Japan supplied the United States and South Korean forces during the war in a noncombatant role.<sup>70</sup> The overlooked support of the Japanese is notably significant because up to 1965, Japan and South Korea's relations were not revealed as positive or existent. In 1965, when Japan and South Korea signed the Treaty of Basic Relations, some positive results began to emerge from social and economic interactions, discussed previously.<sup>71</sup> There developed a mutual relationship that was focused on growth, prosperity and defense against the impending threat of the Soviet Union and more broadly the communist threat. During the Cold War, for the United States the issue of

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<sup>67</sup> Richard C Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2016).

<sup>68</sup> Min Gyo Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place* (New York: Springer New York, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89670-04.3.1> Initiation and Escalation Phase.

<sup>69</sup> Koo.

<sup>70</sup> Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 18.

<sup>71</sup> Kan Kimura, *The Burden of The Past: Problems of Historical Perception in Japan-Korea Relations* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 25.

stopping the spread of communism took precedence over handling South Korea and Japan's historical tensions, and territorial disputes were set aside.<sup>72</sup>

Since the 1980s, the appearance of the fluctuating interactions between Japan and South Korea have created a trend of uncertainty in their willingness to cooperate. Some years have high points when each nation supports mild exercises like Search and Rescue exercises (SAREX) or diplomatic representative exchanges. Unfortunately, following any news that involve past historical problems, the subsequent years have shown the limiting effect that South Korean-Japanese sentiments can have on the country's military exchanges.<sup>73</sup> This trend has continued in recent decades even as new threats, such as China's rise as a stronger economic and military opponent or North Korea's pursuit of its nuclear research, changed the security dynamic for the United States, Japan and South Korea.

The United States has looked to their Japanese and South Korean counterparts for support as they would again have to come together to face the growing regional adversity. As Victor Cha describes, South Korea and Japan were considered "virtual allies" by the turn of the century and were experiencing uniting trends bilaterally that seemed promising.<sup>74</sup> Yet, reemerging historical tensions between Japan and South Korea undermined these efforts. For instance, in 2018, a ROK Naval Destroyer flagged a JMSDF Patrol Aircraft with its fire control radar during a rescue operation, believing the Japanese aircraft was presenting aggressive nature towards the warship.<sup>75</sup> Although no shots were fired, Jeff Jeong notes this is a representation of the U.S. misassumption that Japan and South Korean militaries will simply work together should the need arise. In the past, Japan and South Korea's interactions were coordinated by the United States more

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<sup>72</sup> Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia*, 8.2.2.

<sup>73</sup> Sam Brustad and Ji Young Kim, "Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific Security Relations: Understanding the Foundation of Australia–Japan Versus Japan–South Korea Defense Relations," *International Politics*, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00196-6>.

<sup>74</sup> Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

<sup>75</sup> Jeong, "Is 'Radar Feud' Sign of Future Military Confrontation between South Korea and Japan?"

visibly, but as pressure from China and North Korea has risen, their individual efforts at defense have taken precedence.

Another recent example surrounds the tri-lateral information sharing pact, known as General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement or GSOMIA. The pact began in 2016 and continued to be a centerpiece for many news agencies as they discussed Japan–South Korea military relations.<sup>76</sup> The latest pinnacle of tensions was reached in 2019, as South Korea threatened to pull out of the agreement, pending conditions it felt Japan needed to meet to resolve controversial historical atrocities, such as comfort women. As a result, Japan and South Korea’s military relations have shown small signs of improvement and leave the U.S. presence questionable regarding the future of the eastern Pacific.



Figure 3. Map of Japan and South Korea.  
Source: U.S. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs.

<sup>76</sup> Kim Tong-Hyung, “South Korea Will Keeps Its Military Intelligence Pact with Japan – For Now,” *The Diplomat*, November 23, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/south-korea-will-keeps-its-military-intelligence-pact-with-japan-for-now/>.

Japanese and South Korea militaries have made multiple headlines in another arena, clashing over reemerging territorial disputes. Forward aggression between the two nations raised tensions over the disputed Takeshima/Dokdo/Liancourt Rock to new highs, as South Korea enhanced its naval and military exercises around the island, which started back in 1986.<sup>77</sup> This increase in activity has been considered a show of force towards the Japanese and other military forces, as well as South Korea's way displaying ownership and maintenance over the islands. However, despite these claims, relative peace remains between Japan and South Korea. Overall, Victor Cha considers the dispute "a war of words, rather than a military conflict," because the two nations continue to cooperate peacefully under the United States as the lead defensive role in the region.<sup>78</sup>

Another aspect to consider when observing Japan and South Korean relations derives from the aspect of media manipulation and corruption of internet sources, emitting a negative light on military to military exchanges. One may find it hard to obtain positive headlines regarding military to military interactions between Japan and South Korea. That is to not say that there are not any positive interactions, but rather that they are not publicized as much as negative ones. Many positive interactions between Japan and South Korea have occurred, even as far back as the Korean War, when Japanese forces supported the South with supplies and evacuations. In 2011, South Korea was also among the first responders to support the Japanese triple disaster of Fukushima.<sup>79</sup> Although these interactions may be puzzling at times, there are many underreported examples in Japanese and Korean media of supportive and aligning roles the Japanese Self Defense Force and the Republic of Korean Force have conducted together.

If one relies completely on the media, it might be that bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea are nonexistent. However, if one looks deeper into the facts behind the obstruction to their relationship, one can see indirect trend lines forming. Each

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<sup>77</sup> Wiegand, "The South Korean-Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets Dispute."

<sup>78</sup> Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism.

<sup>79</sup> Julian Ryall, "Japan Says Food from Fukushima Is Safe but South Korea Isn't Buying," South China Morning Post, April 12, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3005871/japan-claims-food-products-fukushima-are-safe-south-korea-isnt>.

nation operates actively with the United States, utilizing U.S. joint technology, like the SPY-1 radar.<sup>80</sup> The SPY-1 example is significant because it is one of the most advanced RADARs in the U.S. arsenal and is capable of full integration between forces. Also each nation conducts joint and bilateral operations with the United States on land, sea and in the air, which also reinforce the importance of shared values, interest and ideals amongst the three nations.<sup>81</sup> This unique cooperation between United States-Japan–South Korean militaries reveals the interoperability of the two nations isn’t completely farfetched. An example of their interoperability occurred in the 2017, through a display of force, conducted by the United States, Japan, and South Korea towards China and North Korea’s more recent aggression.<sup>82</sup> American-Japanese-South Korean Naval and Air Forces came together to represent a warning to Kim Jong Un, if he did not consider slowing or ceasing his nuclear programs. By conducting trainings and joint operations yearly with the United States over the last few decades, more defined ties can be made that the Japan and South Korea could operate bilaterally independent of the United States, if necessary.<sup>83</sup>

### C. LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM

Economic interoperability and progressive military relations between Japan and South Korea may point to eventual converging relations, but tensions remain in place preventing a full alliance from forming. The major source of tension undermining partnership between Korea and Japan derives from the legacies of Japanese colonialism. The situation is overwhelmingly complex due to the nature of the historical atrocities that occurred when Japan colonized Korea in 1905.<sup>84</sup> The multiple obstructions to bilateral

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<sup>80</sup> The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (February 2019), <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmib20/119/1?nav=toCList>.

<sup>81</sup> Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

<sup>82</sup> Leon Cook and Tyler Hlavac, “Navy Shows off Its Airpower during Rare Tri-Carrier Drills near Korean Peninsula,” *Stars and Stripes*, November 13, 2017, <https://www.stripes.com/news/navy-shows-off-its-airpower-during-rare-tri-carrier-drills-near-korean-peninsula-1.497673>.

<sup>83</sup> Brustad and Kim, “Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific Security Relations.”

<sup>84</sup> Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea*, 2:39.

relations between Japan and South Korea sprout from issues including the abuse of comfort women, the visitation of the Yasukuni shrine commemorating war criminals, the content of history textbooks, and legal issues over the reparations to those affected by WWII. The South Korean viewpoint of Japan's colonial abuse and exploitation of the Korean population without full compensation is the first stopping point for many attempted bilateral agreements.

Historical issues became prominent after the end of the Cold War when a clear link began to form from historical atrocities and international exchanges with Japan throughout the East Asian and Southeast Asian regions. Some examples of the rising tensions originate from the survivors of the atrocities, especially with the appearance of the comfort women. It took decades for these women to feel comfortable enough to speak out, but after years of feeling shame have come forward with their stories. Through what could be considered poor timing, the cases of these women had come at times when progression of a peaceful partnership looked promising between Japan and South Korea.

The topic of comfort women usually is followed with the discussion of reparations to end their pain and suffering. This is notable because there have been multiple attempts at ending the controversy between Japan and South Korea on the comfort women subject, at times, even from outside support. In 2007, House Representative Democrat Mike Honda stated, "the Japanese government should accept historical responsibility and apologize for coercing young women into sexual slavery," introducing a resolution that was quickly followed by the Philippines, Netherlands, Canada and the European Union.<sup>85</sup> These external pressures ignite Japan's defense in the matter, as Shinzo Abe has repeatedly defended the notion that Japan has already paid reparations, like those in 1993. In 2015, Japan, again under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, agreed to another formal apology and reparations were paid, once more, amounting to approximately \$8.3 million.

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<sup>85</sup> Agnes Constante, "Who Are the 'comfort Women,' and Why Are U.S.-Based Memorials for Them Controversial?," NBC News, May 7, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/who-are-comfort-women-why-are-u-s-based-memorials-n997656>.

In addition, in the past Japanese officials have made notably poor cultural decisions, either speaking negatively towards the subject of comfort women or indirectly portraying signs of disrespect by visiting controversial sites, like the Yasukuni shrine. For example, in 2007, Prime Minister Abe supported the claim that comfort women were not coerced into forced slavery and served willingly under the Japanese Empire.<sup>86</sup> The South Korean response was to install statues representing the many faces of Korean comfort women, strategically located in places where Japanese officials worked, such as the Japanese Embassy in Busan, South Korea.<sup>87</sup> Disrespectful comments, like Abe's, are the main cause that reignites the spats between Japan and South Korea and forces them to continue down a path of uncertain relations.

Another example of historical controversy that disrupts relations originates from the polarized views of history held by Koreans and Japanese. Each side has its own viewpoint of what happened, which only further ignites the controversy. One other area of tension is the portrayal of history in textbooks. For instance, the publication of a 1980s Japanese history textbook that “challenged or ignored some of the most sensitive aspects of Japan’s twentieth-century historical experience in Asia” rapidly caused many Koreans to shift from the increasingly positive relations with Japan.<sup>88</sup> The Japanese version of history books largely left out Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula and downplayed Japanese atrocities against Koreans. South Korea’s immediate response was to pull all Japanese-produced history textbooks from their schools and begin production of Korean-made books utilizing their historical perspectives of the war.

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<sup>86</sup> Ankit Panda, “The ‘Final and Irreversible’ 2015 Japan-South Korea Comfort Women Deal Unravels,” *The Diplomat*, January 9, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-final-and-irreversible-2015-japan-south-korea-comfort-women-deal-unravels/>.

<sup>87</sup>Panda..

<sup>88</sup> Tipton, *Modern Japan*.



Figure 4. United States and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Conducting Show of force Screen Formations during 2017 Tri-Carrier Operations.

Source: Michael Russell, U.S. Navy.

The 2019 disagreement over the Imperial Japanese “Rising Sun” flags used on warships is yet another example of past negative connotations and, in this case, of an image that represents different pasts. From South Korea’s perspective, the image of the flag revives negative feelings towards Japan, and Japan’s reluctance to fully accept its past mistakes has continuously plagued bilateral relations between the nations.<sup>89</sup> For Japan, the flag represents its heritage as a strong nation both militarily and culturally. The different perspectives reveal why the historical clashes remain and that some acceptance will be required on both sides of the tensions.

In 2019, tensions rose again between Tokyo and Seoul due to a shift in trading preferences and sanctions that Japan placed against South Korea. In August, Japan enacted new sanctions on South Korea following its court rulings for Japanese companies

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<sup>89</sup> Julian Ryall, “South Korea Wants ‘War Crime Flag’ Banned but Is Japan Listening?,” *South China Morning Post*, September 12, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3026889/south-koreas-complaints-about-rising-sun-war-crime-flag-fall>.

to pay reparations to Korean forced labor from working in factories in WWII.<sup>90</sup> This friction has been agitated by the trade war that was spurred following the ruling. Japan has withheld the shipment of vital semiconductors to South Korea, items that are essential to their major export industries, like Samsung or LG.<sup>91</sup> The continued “tit for tat” that the relationship of Japan and South Korea experiences not only hinders their economic ties, but persistently limits the security cooperation with each other and the United States.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

As this chapter suggests, Japan and South Korea’s economic partnership has functioned as a baseline for the two nations to rely on one another. Japan and South Korea’s FTA has proven to be an essential asset to the world as both nations are within the top ten largest world GDPs. The convergence of Tokyo and Seoul through their economic ties reveals how strong the relationship is compared to its outer appearance. It shows that despite their past, Japan and South Korea can work well together. Similarly, Japan and South Korea’s military operations with the United States are a constant that exposes emerging trend lines. These lines provide the groundwork for a greater trilateral response to growing forces in the East Asian region. As Victor Cha alluded, each nation has the capability, shared values and means to cooperate, it is just getting over the median that keeps them from merging.<sup>92</sup> The JMSDF and ROKAF are superior forces, which combined with the U.S. alone can be considered formidable; however, overcoming limited military operations remains contingent on these historical factors. Whether Japan and South Korea can concretely smooth over the past lingers on an agreement putting the historical atrocities behind them.

Japan and South Korea’s early 20<sup>th</sup> century historical disputes can be considered as the epicenter of their current inconsistent relations. The effect it has on the United States’ role in the region grows more challenging as the contentious relationship persists.

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<sup>90</sup> Gregg A. Brazinsky, “How Japan’s Failure to Atone for Past Sins Threatens the Global Economy,” *Washington Post*, August 11, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/11/how-japans-failure-atone-past-sins-threatens-global-economy/>.

<sup>91</sup> Brazinsky.

<sup>92</sup> Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*.

Brad Glosserman claims economic trends and limited military to military relations are the gateways available to support a more united partnership between Japan and South Korea.<sup>93</sup> Tensions over historical issues have, however, resulted in social clashes between the two nations, as in the example of South Korea attempting to remove the Japanese Naval Force's flag.<sup>94</sup> The effects are not limited to just Japan and South Korea, but also affect the United States and all partnering countries who interact financially and fall under the same security umbrella. Japan and South Korea will have to take a conciliatory approach to historical issues; otherwise, a complete breakdown in interactions may leave both unwilling to work with each other in future endeavors.<sup>95</sup> The evidence in this chapter suggests that tensions over historical issues will continue to serve as an impediment to South Korea and Japan developing closer relations. South Korea will likely continue to strive for reparations that meet and cover all the atrocities Japan enacted during its occupation and throughout the war. On the other hand, it seems as if Japan will continue to support the claims that reparations that were agreed upon in the past nullify any further negotiations.

In the next chapter, the case of Chile and Argentina will explore two neighboring countries that democratized around the same time, opened free trade agreements, and shared similar historical disruptions in bilateral relations. The difference is that after decades of disruption they ultimately came together peacefully and were able to let the past go amicably. The next chapter will utilize the Chile and Argentina case to uncover where the breakdowns were overcome and develop the tools used to ensure their partnered success.

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<sup>93</sup> Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash*.

<sup>94</sup> Ryall, "South Korea Wants 'War Crime Flag' Banned but Is Japan Listening?"

<sup>95</sup> Kimura, *The Burden of The Past*.

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### III. THE CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE STUDY

This chapter seeks to complement the Japan–South Korea case with another relationship that struggled in its early attempts at bilateral relations. The case study of Chile and Argentina offers a comparison of two nations who strived to become bilateral partners but could not for a long time due to persistent territorial disputes but eventually were able to resolve their conflict. Chile and Argentina share the third longest border in the world, stretching along the Patagonia mountain ranges, islands on the southern cone and territories in Antarctica.<sup>96</sup> The chapter seeks to demonstrate that the disputed territorial claims undermined relations and impacted two additional factors effecting the attempts to improve relations. First, the border disputes kept Chile and Argentina frequently trying to develop treaties in effort to solve these tensions. Next, unstable political and economic conditions in Argentina and Chile contributed to territorial tensions repeatedly rising and falling, remaining a major impediment to closer relations. Another factor which led to the resolution of territorial disputes was the use of international mediators who facilitated negotiations over territorial issues and helped establish confidence building measures (CBMs) to reinforce closer bilateral relations. These relations were made even stronger by the mutual economic benefits that were gained from CBMs.

The race for Antarctica, starting in the 1940s, was a leading cause in the rising tensions over territorial disputes. Antarctica is an example of great power competition that involved Chile, Argentina, the United States, and Great Britain over who would obtain the rights to unexplored land on the southernmost continent.<sup>97</sup> However, it quickly reminded the world that competition is meaningless without motivation. As the four nations explored the region, interest began to fade due to a lack of confidence in the availability of natural resources compared to the cost of retrieving them. Great power

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<sup>96</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 114.

<sup>97</sup> Howkins, “Frozen Empires,” 107.

competition, between the four nations, over Antarctica diminished over a decade as each nation refused to fund the low return expeditions.



Figure 5. Antarctica Geography and Bases Claimed as of 2013.  
Source: Maps of the World.

As Antarctica became less of a priority, territorial disputes shifted to the territories along the southern cone of South America and became more violent over time. The Beagle Conflict began at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century pitting Chile and Argentina against one another over the Patagonia mountain ranges and Beagle Channel. The Beagle Conflict increased in intensity during the 1950s when Chile and Argentina fought over claims on the Patagonia border and Beagle Channel for the resources and strategic positioning they provided. At the same time Chile and Argentina's political instability became a serious concern and drew international attention due to the growing potential of war. In the 1970s, tensions rose to their highest when Chile and Argentina had armed conflicts over portions of the border in the southern cone. Also, in the late 1970s, regional

instability was high as Argentina and the United Kingdom faced off over the Falkland Islands, with Chile supporting the U.K. to spite Argentina and its disagreements over borders in the south.

In the early 1980s, tensions reached their pinnacle, prompting the clear need for third-party intervention to subdue the two neighbors. With war inevitable without interjection, the United States attempted to defuse the situation by arbitrating a peaceful resolution, which was quickly rejected by the Argentinians. Chile and Argentina rejected support from the United States and United Kingdom regarding any South American regional disputes, due to an anti-imperialist mentality built up from historical events. To accommodate Chile and Argentina's beliefs equally, the Vatican stepped up and under the observation of Pope John Paul II, offered to oversee the resolution. In 1984, The Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed, through arbitration of the Vatican, pairing Chile, and Argentina as bilateral partners from that point on.<sup>98</sup>

The continued success of the 1984 Treaty can be attributed to the use of CBMs that were implemented upon the signing of the treaty. Marcial Suarez defines CBMs as “a system set in place to rebuild layers of trust that had been improperly maintained in past interactions.”<sup>99</sup> From 1984 on, the CBMs enabled a stronger trade partnership and effectively develop mutual agreements on border matters between the neighbors. The positive effects from third-party mediation resolved territorial disputes, stabilized perceptions of political intentions and joint economic progression. The endurance of the Peace and Friendship Treaty is a testament to the strength CBMs provide when nations are initially distrustful of each other and need to build confidence securely over time.

The roadmap for this chapter lays out the historical timeline of border disputes and draws a connection to the success of the CBMs following mediation. The first section gives an overview of the great power competition surrounding Antarctica and territorial struggles that shaped interactions. Next, the chapter shifts focus to how other territorial

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<sup>98</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 118..

<sup>99</sup> Marcial A. G. Suarez, Rafael Duarte Villa, and Brigitte Weiffen, eds., *Power, Dynamics, and Regional Security in Latin America* (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 140.

tensions contributed to the political instability that impacted Chile and Argentina's relations. The last section discusses the impact of the 1984 treaty on the relationship and the positive outcomes the CBMs provided to each nation's stability. Ultimately, this chapter summarizes Chile and Argentina's tense relationship over the 20th century seeking to reveal the effectiveness of internationally mediated CBMs and provide positive evidence the CBMs may be an asset in the Japan–South Korea case.

#### **A. FROM GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN ANTARCTICA TO HEIGHTENED TENSIONS OVER SHARED BORDERS**

Chile and Argentina's race for the Antarctic in the 1940s during and following WWII can be considered one of the earliest opportunities for alliance. In 1941, excitement began over the southernmost continent when Japan made claims to the region during its Pacific campaign.<sup>100</sup> Chile, Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States were quick to denounce the Japanese claims and began making preparations for their own interests. In the wake of WWII, Great Britain and the United States began to express greater interest in the continent of Antarctica. Although Antarctica was given little attention initially by Chile or Argentina and its leadership, neither wanted to let their claimed rights to fall to outside nations.<sup>101</sup> With concern, Antarctica received sufficient support to keep both Chile and Argentina's presence large enough to contest foreign ventures. At times, the cost of the efforts to maintain presence in Antarctica included partnering with one another to ensure the strength of Latin America against the potential oppression of the world powers.<sup>102</sup> The Treaty del Rio, in 1947, brought Chile and Argentina closer under the agreement to stand against imperialist nations as they attempted to enforce their will over what Chile and Argentina agreed to as their own undisclosed territories.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Howkins, "Frozen Empires," 83..

<sup>101</sup> Howkins, 87.

<sup>102</sup> Howkins, 4.

<sup>103</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 113..

During the expeditions of Antarctica, a new relationship emerged between Argentina and Chile. In the 1940s, neither Chile nor Argentina had suitable ships for traveling in the inclement weather Antarctica offered.<sup>104</sup> Initially to spite the British, Argentina offered the Chileans a ride during their expedition in 1946. Howkins observed other attempts at partnership, such as when Chile refused an offer for a Chilean official's trip on the United States' private expedition led by Finn Ronne, specifically due to the price of approximately \$20,000.<sup>105</sup> The relationships formed by explorers researching Antarctica did not always align with their parent nations' feeling towards one another and thus joint progress was shelved with each new expedition carried out. Even working together, the explorers experienced conditions that were harsh, making the ability to find suitable evidence of natural resources scarce and even when suitable resources were discovered they were difficult refine.<sup>106</sup>

The uncertainty of what natural resources were available on the continent eventually drove the countries to discontinue searches and decreased pressure amongst the parties. Even when Chile, during their ramp-up of military arms, purchased a vessel suitable for the Antarctic conditions, it could not fund expeditions to explore the harsh unknown land.<sup>107</sup> The price of exploration remained high, reducing the priority on many of the leaders' minds when it came to supporting the expensive ventures. Altogether, the race for Antarctica drove the four nations, Argentina, Chile, Great Britain, and the United States, to seriously reconsider their partnerships and obligations to one another before anyone continued pressure in the region.<sup>108</sup>

Additionally, in the late 1940s, tension rose between Great Britain and Argentina over opinions on the Falkland Islands and called into question the United States' loyalty to its bilateral alliances with Britain and with the Argentinians covered by the Monroe Doctrine. At the time, President Peron of Argentina, was intent on regaining his

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<sup>104</sup> Howkins, "Frozen Empires," 34.

<sup>105</sup> Howkins, 130.

<sup>106</sup> Howkins, 251.

<sup>107</sup> Howkins, 102.

<sup>108</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 114.

popularity; to do so, he was set on obtaining a portion of the Antarctic and/or removing the British from the Falklands. He believed either would give him the prestige he required to maintain his presidency; however, he never raised the funds to commit to this idea. Instead of refocusing on economic matters, President Peron increased Argentinian militarization, causing British forces on the Falklands to prepare for an invasion, while indirectly causing Chile to send forces to defend its borders. Marcial Suarez considered the situation the most intense since the start of the expeditions to Antarctica.<sup>109</sup>

As the tensions peaked, the United States urged a mutual agreement between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands issues. The multinational affair grew as Chile joined the discussions and in 1948 a Tripartite Agreement was struck between Argentina, Chile and Great Britain.<sup>110</sup> The treaty declared that Argentina would allow the British to maintain control over the Falkland Islands without developing a major military presence, and provide the opportunity for Argentina to build bases on the Antarctic Peninsula. Additionally, Chile would be able to maintain two of its already established bases without resistance of the foreign powers. This United States-backed treaty kept the peace over the Falklands for almost a decade and allowed the race to explore Antarctica to fade peacefully over time and with little to no resentment between the four nations.

Following the Antarctica race, Chile and Argentina shifted focus towards other bilateral struggles, mainly their disagreement on border issues in Patagonia and the Beagle Channel. Aftereffects from the race for Antarctica and its resources disrupted many of the previous agreements regarding the Beagle Channel and portions of the southern cone. In the early 1950s, with claims going back to precolonial times, Chile attempted to utilize history as just cause for its territorial assertions on the Beagle Channel.<sup>111</sup> In 1955, Chile's effort for the land coincided with a political upheaval in Argentina as President Peron was exiled. Argentinian General Aramburu took over and

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<sup>109</sup> Suarez, Villa, and Weiffen, *Power, Dynamics, and Regional Security in Latin America*.

<sup>110</sup> Howkins, "Frozen Empires," 218.

<sup>111</sup> Howkins, 68.

began enforcing stricter military force on borders along the southern cone.<sup>112</sup> While the border treaties along the southern cone were again trampled by regime change in Argentina, in response Chile reinforced its position along the border.

New points of friction over the Beagle Channel occurred due to armed disagreements and led to physical conflicts. Throughout the late 1950s–60s, the border along the southern coast became a hotbed of activity between militaries and naval forces. Multiple episodes of close calls over built-up tension within the Beagle Channel usually ended with little to no casualties between the two sides. For example, Andres Gertner describes an incident which took place in 1958, the Snipe incident. The Snipe incident is one of the earliest physical conflicts between Chile and Argentina regarding borders, which resulted in no casualties but did cause numerous lighthouses to be constructed and torn down.<sup>113</sup> The incident brought Chile and Argentina to the table, once again, to discuss territorial entitlements.

While Chile and Argentina met to work on the Snipe Incident in 1959, it was only a few years before relations fell apart again, this time due to a deadly quarrel. The Laguna del Desierto incident was another physical conflict. This incident occurred in November of 1965, when one Chilean Lieutenant was shot and killed, a Sargent was wounded, and two others, a major and Sargent were captured, but later released.<sup>114</sup> The incident was disregarded by both sides because no one would confess to who actually initiated the attack. However, Argentina relinquished its control over the contended area and allowed Chile to rebuild its lighthouse for channel safety. The shelling of lighthouses, and the Chilean and Argentinian forces meeting head-on, raised the stakes between the two nations over who would emerge victorious regarding territorial claims.

Throughout the 1970s, tension over borders rose high enough that they finally caught international attention and third-party intervention was offered as a new option. Initially, Chile and Argentina considered Great Britain's offer for guidance over how to

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<sup>112</sup> Villar Gertner, *Autonomy and Negotiation in Foreign Policy*.

<sup>113</sup> Oelsner, *International Relations in Latin America*, 111.

<sup>114</sup> Oelsner, 124.

resolve the contested land; additionally, the United States and the international court played minor roles in attempting arbitration.<sup>115</sup> However, due to existing differences with Great Britain and the United States over sovereignty of the Falklands and Antarctica, Argentina and Chile began to look elsewhere. In 1977, the International Court of Justice, along with the British Crown, awarded the contested zone of Patagonia to Argentina and the Southern portions surrounding the Beagle Channel to Chile.<sup>116</sup> Following an international study conducted over the areas of Patagonia and the southern region of South America, the scientific ruling was quickly countered by both nations only furthering tensions.<sup>117</sup> The rejection from both sides revealed the unwillingness of each nation to work with the other, appearing as if it were becoming impossible for them to overcome their differences.

## **B. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AGGRAVATING THE BORDER TENSIONS TO THE BRINK OF WAR**

Political instability only made it more difficult for Chile and Argentina to establish consistent terms over the treaties signed throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>118</sup> Many of the early treaties were nullified quickly or were unable to accommodate the emerging relations between Chile and Argentina. Audrey Oelsner refers to their framework as “poorly designed and with no future legitimacy” due to the treaties’ inability to foresee potential obstructions. Trust eroded between Chile and Argentina, due to multiple coups and unsuccessful treaties involving their disputes borders. For example, in 1973, General Pinochet performed a military coup and overthrew the failing democratic political structure that Chile had been suffering under since the late 1960s. The dissent in Chile

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<sup>115</sup> Mark Laudy, “The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building,” in *Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, ed. Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 302.

<sup>116</sup> Laudy, 293.

<sup>117</sup> C.A. Brebbia, *Patagonia: A Forgotten Land: From Magellan to Peron* (South Hampton, UK: WIT Press, 2007).

<sup>118</sup> Suarez, Villa, and Weiffen, *Power, Dynamics, and Regional Security in Latin America*.

over failing democratic policies, like agrarian reform and the state's increased role in the economy, drove the social unrest and forced the political shift.<sup>119</sup>

The military overthrows by Argentinian General Aramburu in 1955 and Chilean General Pinochet in 1973 provide examples of the chaotic state of each nation's political realm.<sup>120</sup> The goals of the authoritarian Chilean and Argentinian leaders was to prove to the people their ability to lead, as well as shore up their political position. The inconsistency of Santiago and Buenos Aires to maintain political stability lessened the importance placed on territorial claims, also leaving little regard for the potential of future economic prosperity. Thus, from the end of the 1960s to approximately the mid-1980s, Chile and Argentina's economies had flatlined and left economic growth stunted with little trade agreements to assist.



Figure 6. Tiera Del Fuego Island and Snipe Island  
Source: Generic Mapping Tools.

<sup>119</sup> Wigell, "Governing the Poor," 58.

<sup>120</sup> Biglaiser, "Military Regimes, Neoliberal Restructuring, and Economic Development," 12.

The difference between the Argentina and Chile's economic situation during this period came from the world's desire for oil and Chile's ability to supply it. As Tad Szulc notes, "Tierra del Fuego would have been forgotten without the discovery of oil."<sup>121</sup> The unearthing of oil on the island not only began to support Chile's economy, but drew the two nations together over existing border concerns within the southern cone. The Beagle Channel issues resumed tensions and the arrival of the oil forced Chile and Argentina to meet once again. Leaders began talks regarding free trade agreements (FTA) in the late 1950s and early 60s, which would allow Chile and Argentina to expand their export options.

The Latin American Free Trade Association, in the 1960s, allowed a new type of connection to form between Chile and Argentina that had not occurred in previous ventures. The prospect of opening markets presented good opportunities for South American nations as the initial growth rate rose to roughly 3% between Chile and Argentina.<sup>122</sup> However, the sporadic military coups disrupted each nation's effectiveness individually, again causing social unrest to derail the progress. In 1974, Argentinian President Juan Perón made clear his intentions to settle the Beagle Conflict to Chilean President Augusto Pinochet; however, neither President supported this claim. The political pressure over the Beagle Channel continued the economic stagnation period leading up to the 1980s. The rise in pressure and poor growth ensured the two presidents coming together in an attempt at resolving the conflict peacefully under another treaty.

The Act of Montevideo was established in 1977. The Act served for two years as a binding negotiation between Chile and Argentina, temporarily quelling their disputes over the Beagle Channel. It was not until the Act of Montevideo was ratified that tensions slowed temporarily, and the two nations once again attempted to work together on the territorial issues. The treaty dissolved when large military movements by Argentina in the southern cone caused misinterpretations on both sides. On January 3<sup>rd</sup> 1979, the Beagle Conflict forced Chile to agree to a revised version of the Montevideo border treaty with

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<sup>121</sup> Tad Szulc, "The Bottom of the Map," New York Times, April 7, 1957, ProQuest.

<sup>122</sup> Wigell, "Governing the Poor."

Argentina because of the overwhelming military pressure and not wanting to incite a war during their economic depression.<sup>123</sup> With the revision to the Act of Montevideo, Chile and Argentina once more silenced their aggression over the southern territory, but were brought into a new conflict as Argentina challenged the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands in 1982.

The decade of tensions and conflicts leading up to the Falklands War set the stage for Chile to oppose Argentina in any venue possible, and siding with the U.K. gave them that opportunity. As Sir Lawrence Freedman states, “The Beagle Conflict can be considered the main reason for the Chilean support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War of 1982.”<sup>124</sup> Finally, when Chile formalized support for the United Kingdom, tensions with Argentina erupted. Freedman notes that Argentina’s naval capacity in the Falklands War suffered because they had split their forces to defend the Beagle Channel against the threat of a Chilean invasion.<sup>125</sup> The atmosphere through the Beagle Conflict and Falklands War can be linked to the underlying border tensions that plagued Chile and Argentina’s bilateral relations.

Following the defeat against the United Kingdom, Argentina was left vulnerable against Chile. Argentina’s disadvantage only raised the tensions further with Chile, as the Argentinians were unwilling to allow Chile to peacefully take the Beagle Channel. The continued border tension caught international attention and a call for peace between Chile and Argentina. The Vatican offered to mediate a solution between the two primarily catholic countries because of the religious commonality. Argentina and Chile both accepted the offer of the Vatican over other propositions from the United States and United Kingdom. Following the win in the Falklands, Chile began to protect their claims more assertively, reinforcing troops and arms in the contested areas. On the other hand, Argentina’s acceptance to negotiations only came when they were left with little to no

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<sup>123</sup> Suarez, Villa, and Weiffen, *Power, Dynamics, and Regional Security in Latin America*.

<sup>124</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “The Falklands Campaign – the Chilean Connection,” April 30, 2012, <https://web.archive.org/web/20120430052441/http://www.spyflight.co.uk/chile.htm>.

<sup>125</sup> Freedman.

options, nonetheless they remained stationed along the Beagle Channel until negotiations were ratified.

Finally, late in 1984, the tensions were successfully quelled after the mediation led by the Vatican and Pope John Paul II. The outcome was a well-outlined treaty that Chile and Argentina would agree on. While previous diplomatic negotiations were unsuccessful because of the mistrust between the two nations, their religious commonalities offered a viable bridge to the solution. In 1984, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed by Chile and Argentina, concluding all disputes, and setting aside the territorial claims until further scientific research provided evidence that proved either's claims. The conclusion of Chile and Argentina's tense neighboring conflicts was coupled with the introduction of CBMs.<sup>126</sup> CBMs were set in place to ensure the fortitude and longevity of the pact. Following 1984, these CBMs established a strong trade partnership and effectively develop mutual opinions between the neighbors.

### **C. THE IMPACT OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ON CHILE-ARGENTINA RELATIONS**

Since 1984 both nations have seen consistent growth periods and strong resistance to economic hardships. With CBMs in place to support Chile-Argentina bilateral relations, situations like the 1998 Argentinian Great Depression were successfully curbed.<sup>127</sup> This can be attributed to the more defined sections and actions in the treaty. For example, within the treaty, under the Economic Cooperation and Physical Integration clause – Article 12, it states, “The Parties agree to establish a permanent bi-national commission with the aim of strengthening economic cooperation and physical integration.”<sup>128</sup> Through their partnership and renewed perspectives towards previously disputed borders, regions like Patagonia and Antarctica offered new opportunities for

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<sup>126</sup> A system set in place to rebuild layers of trust that had been improperly maintained in past interactions, Marcial Suarez.

<sup>127</sup> Judith A. Teichman, *The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America Chile, Argentina, and Mexico* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

<sup>128</sup> “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, May 11, 1995, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>.

economic ventures. Sharing natural resources that these locations offered, without fighting over who owned them, greatly improved their export abilities, and kept their defense spending under control.

Natural gas provided by Argentina to Chile, came about in the early 1990s. This supplied the Chileans with electricity and fuel transforming their living conditions drastically. The economic facet of the treaty began to break through the marred past relations, driving productivity and monumental increases in human welfare. Singlehandedly Argentina became Chile's natural gas supplier, boosting Argentina's export trade numbers by approximately \$336 million by 2004.<sup>129</sup> The economic CBMs provided a safety net for the Chileans through the trust established by Argentina's cooperation. Although Chile too, supplied Argentina with the oil from the Tierra del Fuego as a response to the CBMs laid out by the treaty, but the impact was far less due to Argentina's involvement with the Regional FTA.<sup>130</sup>

CBMs continued to define the relations between Chile and Argentina and develop into a norm that surpassed all previously attempted treaties. The partners' economic interactions improved drastically even though Chile was not included in some of the South American FTAs. As financial affairs within Argentina flourished, CBMs revealed other economic benefits of the bilateral relations. For example, Chile's reemergence into the world market saw improving growth rates of 2% and up, following the partnership with Argentina.<sup>131</sup> In Argentina, a positive trend in growth resurfaced, but the country was unable to regain its large GDP growth rate of 7.7%.<sup>132</sup> Finally in 1996, Chile was invited into the Southern Common Market, otherwise known as

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<sup>129</sup> González, "Chile-Argentina: Gas Cuts Undermine Relations."

<sup>130</sup> Paul Alexander Haslam, "Overcoming the Resource Curse: Reform and the Rentier State in Chile and Argentina, 1973–2000," *Development and Change* 47, no. 5 (2016): 1146–70, <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12259>.

<sup>131</sup> Teichman, *The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America Chile, Argentina, and Mexico*.

<sup>132</sup> Teichman.

MERCOSUR FTA, which was a conglomeration of South American nations trading regionally that had previously rejected Chile as a potential partner.<sup>133</sup>

The CBMs provided financial stability for Chile and Argentina, solving past differences in the economic realm, and providing new grounds for development to form. Although it took time, the economic repercussions of the signing of the 1984 Peace and Friendship treaty was a pivotal moment in the bilateral relationship and additional positive results continued to persist. In addition, it assisted in lowering the political upheavals that occurred in each country because trust features had been established across the bilateral relations. Following the signatures on the treaty, both nations had relative growth for almost a decade, until Argentina suffered another economic downturn in late 1990s. While Argentina worked to right its economy, the relations with Chile remained strong and new practices between Santiago and Buenos Aires formed under the assistance of International Monetary Fund (IMF).<sup>134</sup> This led to new ventures in the previously disputed territories of Antarctica, Patagonia, and the Beagle Channel.

In the later 1990s, Chile and Argentina returned to Antarctica, however under their successful friendship treaty, they have formed the Joint Antarctica Naval Patrol (PANC).<sup>135</sup> The partnership formed for many reasons, to include climate change, the support of marine animals that inhabit various locations, and general security in the region. As Alejandro Sanchez states, PANC is an prime example of how military cooperation can provide a fair share security system to a large region of the world.<sup>136</sup> With over 14 million square miles of land to cover, the task of PANC to provide security isn't always enough, but the treaty has also led to on other shift.<sup>137</sup> The additional

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<sup>133</sup> Teichman.

<sup>134</sup> Teichman..

<sup>135</sup> W. Alejandro Sanchez, "Argentina, Chile and the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol: A Successful Confidence Building Mechanism," *Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 181, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2017.1310488>.

<sup>136</sup> Sanchez, "Argentina, Chile and the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol."

<sup>137</sup> Peter J. Beck, "International Relations in Antarctica: Argentina, Chile and the Great Powers," in *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica*, ed. Michael A. Morris (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990), 101, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10075-0\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10075-0_7).

support of previous adversaries in the region, the United States and United Kingdom, are welcomed help when conditions are too difficult for their aging vessels or inability to respond.<sup>138</sup> Thus, providing one final example of how much positivity the CBMs between Chile and Argentina brought under the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

Through the examination of Chile and Argentina the chapter determines that border disputes were the main factor that disrupted efforts of alliance. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the repeated attempts to work together on territorial issues continuously resulted in poor trust and eventually aggravation almost to the point of war. The impact on each nation's economy while trying to obtain oil and contested territories created social unrest over the decline in living standards. These impoverished living conditions supported overthrowing the democratic became a common theme, as Chile and Argentina struggled to right their failing democracies. The answer to creating bilateral relations came after attempts at third-party mediation, The Vatican was chosen to arbitrate a treaty. The Pope John Paul II delivered a strong well-balanced treaty but most importantly, the treaty introduced CBMs. The result of these CBMs came in the form of growth within Chile and Argentina's economies and the establishment of stability on the southern cone. Overcoming the main factor of border disputes, allowed for follow-on effects of political stability and economic growth to occur unencumbered by previous hold ups, like in Antarctica.

The race for Antarctica became a case of great power competition due to the interest in territory on the southern continent. The United States, United Kingdom, Chile, and Argentina all were determined to maintain their presence in the region, however once they learned that the cost-to-benefit ratio was high the situation defused and became too costly to sustain. As great power competition over Antarctica dissolved, Chile and Argentina returned to their neighboring border disputes amidst Patagonia and the Beagle Channel. The decreased drive to compete over Antarctica occurred due to lack of

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<sup>138</sup> Beck, 102.

resources available to support the cause. However, in the Beagle Channel, cases like Tierra del Fuego found that competition spiked after the discovery of oil. While in other cases, like the Laguna del Desierto incident, armed conflict occurred over the border tensions reached breaking points. This reveals the significance of the effectiveness in third-party intervention and the follow-on CBMs that were developed to prevent tensions over borders from forming again.

Likewise, the political interests over the territories contested by Chile and Argentina, fueled the increasing tensions throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For example, at the conclusion of Argentinian President Peron's second term, political discourse was heightened by the ambitious General Aramburu who overthrew him. He increased military forces along the border in the interest of popular and economic gains. However, when the authoritarian government's attempts failed at obtaining the land of quelling civil unrest, the political turmoil on drove the situation over border disputes further towards war. Following the intervention of the third-party actor, these uprisings were surprised, democracy was mostly restored to Chile and Argentina, and the Chilean and Argentinian governments were stabilized through effective CBMs.

The introduction of the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty and CBMs not only settled the border disputes, but a keynote was that it opened the door to new opportunities for Chile and Argentina to form improved relationships. The cases of sharing gas and oil resources presents a strong trade alliance, which formed through the assistance of the CBMs. The impact of the FTA alone improved living conditions in Chile immensely and added to the regional stability that was already improving following the signing of the treaty. Another crucial but overlooked fact was the creation of the PANC, between Chile and Argentina who previously competed over the Antarctic. Along with their bilateral relations, the support provided from the United States and United Kingdom also prove the effectiveness the third-party meditation had a lasting impact of the CBMs.

Overall, the Chile and Argentina case revealed the benefits of aligning two neighboring nations who may have had past differences. The case provides an example of an outcome that occurred after brining two neighboring countries, who share similar values, together under bilateral relations. The benefit to Chile and Argentina after the

third-party intervention and adoption of CBMs impacted both nations equally and fairly. The alliance removed the uncertainty of war over border claims, potential for political instability and lack of economic support. The addition of CBMs perpetuated the treaty's conditions and continued to fuel the confident results felt by Chile and Argentina. The Chile and Argentina case presents a clear example of how two close, but differing nations can come together bilaterally, if the right conditions, such as third-party intervention, are met and can be followed through CBMs.

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## **IV. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This thesis aspired to create a positive bridge in a relationship that lacks the confidence of bilaterally aligned nations. It looked at the historical background along with some present-day factors influencing Japan–South Korea relations in order to determine how their conflicted situation came about. The thesis then compared the Japan–South Korea case to Chile and Argentina, a case where two nations were able to overcome their differences and grow into strong bilateral partners. This chapter provides the findings of the research, presents a comparative analysis of the two cases, followed by recommendations for how Japan and South Korea can find ways to improve relations in the future in light of the sources of reconciliation between Chile and Argentina.

### **A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

The Japan–South Korea relationship is a complex case with various factors that contribute to their inability to align bilaterally. Japan and South Korea’s historical tensions were the main causal factor for their strained relations. The follow-on limitations of military to military cooperation and economic success were also impacted by the wartime atrocities factor. While the historical setbacks are clearly impeding Japan and South Korea’s potential for harmony, their economic partnership has reaped undeniable benefits. The prospect of mutual gains reveals that the likelihood of improvement is expected, because of the mutual benefit in economics between Japan–South Korea’s limited relations.

The Chile and Argentina case began with similar conditions that diverged relations, however theirs occurred over border tensions. The territorial disputes were comparable to the atrocities because they too drove the political and economic interactions of Chile and Argentina. The Chile-Argentina case presents evidence that third-party intervention assisted by CBMs can produce strong bilateral ties that benefit both parties. This study suggests that the Chile and Argentina case may provide guidelines to assist with improving the South Korea and Japan bilateral relationship. Implementing the lessons learned from the Chile-Argentina case into the Japan–South Korea case presents two possible outcomes:

one positive with Japan and South Korea as closer bilateral partners and the other leaving the two nations to continue their rocky relations to an unknown conclusion.

## **B. SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN CASE**

Japan and South Korea's tensions occur primarily over historical atrocities from WWII. Regional stability has, however, remained relatively calm due to several factors. One strong feature of Japan–South Korea relations has been their economic development. Japan and South Korea lean on one another for the resources they require to create their domestic products. For the most part Japan and South Korea have been able to do so without a formal trade agreement to officially mark their economic ties. However, in examples like the 2019 GSOMIA breakdown, South Korea threatened to divide the trilateral intelligence-sharing agreement of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, again due to historical controversies between Japan and South Korea. The result of maintaining unofficial trade agreements and mismatched investments yield significant economic repercussions because of their lack of improvement in their bilateral relations due to tensions surrounding historical controversies.



Figure 7. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and South Korea Conducting Joint Show of Force Operations.  
Source: The South Korean Ministry of National Defense.

Japan and South Korea's inability to look past wartime crimes also seeps into their military relationship and its potential conjunction with the United States. The examples of military cooperation between United States-Japan-South Korea reveal the interoperability of the two nations is not completely farfetched. By conducting trainings and joint operations with the United States on a yearly basis for the last few decades, it can be assumed that the Japan and South Korea could operate bilaterally independent of the United States, if necessary. However, the wartime atrocities of World War II prevent this from occurring and create a clear resistance to better mil-to-mil relations. Thus, presenting a fractured military alliance with the United States and weakened regional security cooperation.

The main point of tension derives from issues such as, comfort women, forced slavery and the lack of respect towards historical events by Japan. These categories cause sour feelings to erupt from South Korea and at times retract progress that may have been gained over time. For example, in 2007, Prime Minister Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, with remarks contrary to the historical facts of World War II, sparked a resurgence of ill-feelings between South Korea and Japan. The impact of the historical legacies between Japan and South Korea continue to set the stage for the follow-on factors that affect their relationship.

During World War II, Japan violated many other nations, however South Korea felt the most victimized by the Japanese attacks and has refused to let that disrespect pass. The tension is integrated into all aspects of their relations and has rerouted many of their potential instances to join as bilateral partners. Since the turn of the century, East Asian has become a hotbed of military threats with the resurgence of Russia, China's rise, and the nuclearization of North Korea. Logically, a Japan-South Korea bilateral security cooperation would make sense given their proximity to the threats and already standing bilateral relations with the United States. However, controversy over historical disputes has led to instability as each year passes. Japan and South Korea's resistance to working alongside one another has stunted their national growth capacity and support of the United States. The contrasting case of Chile and Argentina lays out a similar case that concludes with a positive turnaround once the hurdle of border tensions was overcome.

### C. CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE

The Chile-Argentina case presented a reflection of the Japan–South Korea case, revealing two nations that were similarly divided over an issue, in this incident, border tensions. Antarctica became a frontier of great power competition as the United States and Great Britain entered the region. The diffusion of the great power competition only occurred when the external parties retracted their assertiveness on the territory, thus allowing Chile and Argentina to refocus their efforts on the southern cone. The Beagle Crisis caused follow-on effects reducing political stability and economic growth because no settlement could be reached over the territory.

While political turmoil racked the two nations, the struggle for control of land furthered the chaotic situations. The coups that occurred following contention of the territories, like the 1959 Laguna del Desierto incident were examples of the inability for Chile and Argentina to solve their territorial disputes without assistance. The discovery of oil on the Tierra del Fuego, reignited tensions on the southern cone over whose claim was legitimate, giving Chile or Argentina the authority to begin unearthing the resources. The impact border tensions had on each nation's economy, not only lessened growth, but left the population with less than desirable living conditions and without much support. The social unrest caused by these conditions only furthered the complexity of each nations political system and prolonged any chance of convening a successful end to the territorial disputes.

Up to 1984 Chile and Argentina's attempts to quell the domestic disputes were unsuccessful and showed no signs of slowing. In the 1980s, the international community stepped in once the threat of war reached its pinnacle and the third parties began working on potential mediation. However, Chile and Argentina's previous territorial disputes with the United States and United Kingdom hampered their attempts at mitigation, leaving the Vatican as the optimal choice between the primarily Catholic nations. The addition of CBMs fortified the treaty's terms and allowed trust form between Chile and Argentina's bilateral interactions. Ultimately, the third-party mediation and implementation of CBMs created the atmosphere required for Chile and Argentina to cooperate under strong bilateral relations.

## **D. TWO POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS**

### **1. Factors That Could Cause Tensions to Continue or Lead To an All-Out Breakdown**

Of the outcomes Japan and South Korea face, the potential for continued divergent relations to occur is high without the intervention of a third-party. Prolonged separation of Japan and South Korea will begin form a cycle of continued tensions. If more instances of Japan's leaders visiting controversial sites, like the Yasukuni shrine, or misrepresent historical facts in published textbooks occur, these relations may stagnate for a long time. The lack of an outside catalyst, such as a third-party, to prompt change could potentially leave the two nations with mutual tunnel vision on their past issues. Thus, disabling their ability for compromise or to make progression when attempting to move forward with their relationship.

The potential for a stagnant cyclical relationship to form between the Japanese and South Koreans is evidenced by decades of attempted treaties and reparation that have come and gone. Multiple apologies by the Japanese have been found insufficient in the South Korean's view and any additional tries could perpetuate the historical atrocities factor. The continued contention of wartime crimes could wash over into the military interactions and block any attempts at the improvement of relations. Persistence in tensions could also erode or at least lessen the economic interactions Japan and South Korea have outside of those supported by the United States and cause a loss in incentives to work together. The formation of a cyclical relationship with underlying tensions as a sticking point could leave Japan and South Korea with very limited and restricted interactions in the future.

Also, breakdown in the economic partnership could force Japan and South Korea to consider other regional trade partners, like China, and leave the other in a desperate condition financially. The loose economic ties already possess great influence on the work and if those ties were to be cut it would require worldwide economic adjustments. Additionally, if any further breakdown in relations were to occur it could trample the remaining trust and leave the two less likely to realign as distant associates. As seen in the Chile-Argentina case, the lack of reinforced treaties and agreements created a cycle of

mistrust between the contesting nations. In the Japan–South Korea case it could be possible that reoccurring disputes over reparations pay for comfort women could lessen the trust Japan has for South Korea and their ability to uphold financial agreements.

However, in a worst-case scenario, if Japan continues to display disrespect towards the historical atrocities and spur South Korean disapproval, the strained relationship may also reach a heightened state. As seen in the Chile-Argentina case, the continued disputes over borders drove the two nations to the brink of war. In the Japan–South Korea case, a collapse of the partnership between Japan, South Korea, and the United States may escalate the regional tensions to potential war. Currently, Japan and South Korea support the United States efforts in the region through indirect or supplemental support. Therefore, if South Korea were to fall out of the alliance and begin tighter relations with China it may tip the balance of powers in East Asia enough to lead to potential war.

The budding chance of Japan and South Korea’s falling out yields multiple follow-on effects that could impact the world. The security blanket provided by the U.S. through its bilateral relations with each country would be inconvenienced due to the additional measures it would have to take when working with each nation. The bearing economic ramifications would have on the world if a breakdown between the Japan–South Korean investments would severely degrade infrastructure the relationship holds together. The collapse of what limited interaction Japan and South Korea have now would also open more opportunities for regional challenges by countries like, China and Russia. This would leave Japan, South Korea and the United States scrambling to reestablish their identities and alliances in preparation for the shift in forces and capabilities. Ultimately, the world would lose significant privileges it has come to enjoy over the past 75 years if Japan and South Korea were unable to solve their tensions.

## **2. Factors That Can Lead to More Amiable Relations and Potential Bilateral Agreement**

While there are many signs that point to Japan and South Korea remaining distant, there are some that counter that image. Their economic cooperation presents a strong example of how well South Korea and Japan can work together, given they have not signed

an official FTA. As previously stated, the military integration has become an annual routine reveals both nations already possess the capabilities needed to operate jointly. Additionally, in the past Japan and South Korea have come close to resolving their differences, like in 2004 when they agreed to pay further reparations to settle the comfort women dispute. However, if third-party intervention had occurred there may have been a higher chance of creating agreements that were well balanced and maintainable. The Chile-Argentina case reveals that the implementation of CBMs is an added measure to ensure the sustainment of a treaty or agreement. The Japan–South Korea case would likely also benefit greatly from reinforced terms.

Should the United States take a more active role in the matter, Japan and South Korea would perhaps have to consider more their strategic situations. Allowing the United States additional leverage into their domestic and neighboring disputes may cause additional tension in the region, leading to more imbalance in the alliances. Therefore, it may be better to consider intervention from a group such as the United Nations, with the focus of improving global politics, rather than a potentially misinterpreted grab for power by the United States as the mitigator. If the United Nations stepped in and led the discussion of bilaterally aligning Japan and South Korea, it would be imperative they ease the tensions over the wartime atrocities before they proceed with any further treaty terms. The factual history of World War II, along with Japanese and South Korean impressions of one another's actions during the war would have to be considered and tactfully managed when defining terms in the treaty.

Additionally, as the terms of the treaty are formulated, the UN would have to consider the sustainment of these terms. To do so, it would behoove the treaty to develop an atmosphere that allowed Japan and South Korea to repair the trust factor over time. The CBMs implemented would need to strengthen what infrastructure is already established and give the impression of visible improvements over time. Japan and South Korea's economic ties already have positive tendencies, but could benefit from tangible improvements, like increased bilateral investments, spaced out enough to grow into the establishment of a Tokyo-Seoul FTA. Also, a step-up military alliance that would allow Japan and South Korea time to build up operational experience before a more substantial

cooperation in military affairs. As time passes the benefits felt by each nation would continue to perpetuate positive relations and ensure they do not slip back into a waning relationship.

If the two nations under third-party intervention and the assistance of CBMs came together under a bilateral treaty, the benefits could be significant. The Asian-Pacific security umbrella between the United States, Japan and South Korea would be complete, allowing pressure to be taken off the U.S. for regional presence. An FTA could be officiated allowing secured investments to flourish and develop each nation's GDPs further. Additionally, the historical atrocities could be laid to rest with the proper respect given by both sides and allow time to heal the past wounds. If South Korea were to forgive Japan for its past, it would set a new tone for other East and Southeast Asian nations to follow in future ventures.

Ultimately, the Chile and Argentina case provided a strong contrast to the Japan–South Korea case, as the former led to a resolution while the latter did not. That said, lines can be drawn from border tensions to historical atrocities, disrupted governments to military to military relations and sporadic economic agreements to positive trade trends that the two cases overlapped in enough respects for a comparison to be made. By utilizing Chile and Argentina's results new avenues for solutions between Japan and South Korea have been established, and steps have been laid out of how they should proceed to bring their relationship closer. The effectiveness of third-party intervention and CBMs are revealed through Chile and Argentina's ability to overcome their obstacles and move onto becoming strong bilateral partners. Their success reveals promise for Japan and South Korea if tools from Chile and Argentina's case are applied correctly. If so, not only will Japan and South Korea, but the United States and the rest of the world will benefit immensely from their convergence in finally forming bilateral relations.

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