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9 May 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commandant, USASMA, Fort Bliss, TX 79918-5000

SUBJECT: Zero Population Growth, Hope For Future Generations?

1. Thesis Statement: Disproportionate population growth in lesser developed countries will require changes in U.S. Army defense doctrine, force structure, and training strategies by the year 2000.
2. Discussion: The current trend of negative population growth in the industrialized nations versus the extremely high positive population growth in lesser developed Third World countries will have an ever increasing impact on the political, socio-economic, and military status of the United States and other western industrialized nations. As the disparity grows there will be an ever increasing probability of a major, low intensity conflict involving the United States and one or more Third World countries.
3. Conclusion: Zero and negative population growth have been a statistical fact since the 1960s. Current demographic studies indicate that the birth disparity will continue well into the 21st century even if the United States and other western nations immediately began to achieve the minimum standard of 2.4 children per woman. The population factor in Third World lesser developed countries makes low intensity conflicts inevitable, which will most certainly have a significant impact on the manner in which the United States conducts war.
4. Recommendation: The United States must immediately develop strategic, operational, and tactical doctrines for the management of Low Intensity Conflicts to include the employment of armed forces if necessary.
5. Haines Award: I do/~~do not~~ request that this research paper be considered for the General Haines Award for excellence in research.

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ZERO POPULATION GROWTH
HOPE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS?

by

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9 MAY 1989

ZERO POPULATION
HOPE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS?

Thesis: Disproportionate population growth in lesser developed countries will require changes in U.S. Army defense doctrine, force structure, and training strategies by the year 2000.

- I. World Population Expansion in the Year 2000
 - A. Developed Countries
 - B. Lesser Developed Countries
- II. Impact on World Resources
 - A. Diminished Food Sources
 - B. Political Impact in Lesser Developed Countries
- III. Impact on U.S. Military Interests
 - A. Altered Battlefield Scenarios
 - B. Altered Tactics
- IV. New Military Strategies and Structures
 - A. Strategies
 - B. Structures
- V. Low Intensity Conflicts in Lesser Developed Countries
 - A. Third World Country Capabilities
 - B. Strain on U.S. Military Alliances
- VI. U.S. Army Reorganization
 - A. Light Infantry
 - B. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
 - C. Delta Force
- VII. Changes in Training Doctrine
 - A. Conventional Warfare Training
 - B. Unconventional Warfare Training

Two modern and widely accepted concepts are that the United States continues to experience the effects of the post World War II "baby boom" and that the next conflict this country will be involved in will be on the plains of Europe against Warsaw Pact nations. Initially these two concepts seem totally unrelated, but in reality a current, subtle trend is already altering how some military strategists predict U.S. forces will fight the next war.

The trend referred to is "Zero Population Growth" which is defined as "maintaining a replacement level of 2.4 births per child bearing age woman in the world" (Wattenberg, 4). In simple terms, in order for the population of the world or of a given country to neither rise nor fall each woman must give birth to 2.4 children sometime during her child bearing years. Conceptually, this would compensate for the standard rate of death from both natural and accidental causes excluding major armed conflicts. The chart at figure 1 shows the dramatic decline of births per child bearing age woman in the United States. This type of decline is common throughout the industrialized nations as families seek to maintain an acceptable standard of living by introducing the wife into the labor force. This along with urbanization and the advances in contraception have drastically affected the population of these countries.

We have already begun to see the effect of world demographic changes on the military posture of several of our allies. "Israel directs 30% of its gross national product to military

expenditures while requiring military service up to age 49"(Wattenberg, 85). "Belgium instituted a new draft law in 1986, increasing conscript time from 10 to 12 months, and placing stricter criteria on dispensation and exemption from service" (Dierckx, 25). While the United States and the majority of the Western World are concerned about the low birth rate and the effects this will have on the skilled labor pool and the economic position of the industrialized nations, the majority of the world in the form of the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) will see an overwhelming increase in their population. Those countries least able to provide housing, food, and employment will see the most dramatic change.

The LDCs will see a 70% increase in population between 1975 and the year 2000. This figure gains greater perspective when computed as a percentage of the world's population gain. The LDCs will account for 92% of the increase in the world's population. By the year 2000, 80% of the world's population will live in these Lesser Developed Countries (Council, 8-9). The charts at Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphic look at the changes in population growth since 1975, and what we can expect to see by the year 2000. The majority of people in these lesser developed countries will live in uncontrolled settlements within or near large urban areas.

The recent migration of people from the rural areas to the urban areas will continue unchecked. Sanitation and other public utilities in these uncontrolled settlements will be minimal at best. We can see the beginnings of this situation in

those areas around Mexico City and other large population areas. Even in Juarez, just across the border from Fort Bliss, and in the "colonias" of southern El Paso itself, we can see foreshadows of what these areas will resemble.

"Increased populations will put a huge strain on all resources including land used to raise crops. Combined with the need to feed half again as many people as in 1975, this strain will only serve to increase political and social unrest. The major deficiency in crop production will be in the LDCs; those countries most in need of improved crop production" (Council, 17). The gap between the richest and the poorest nations will increase. There will be fewer resources to go around and more people using them up. The world will be more vulnerable to natural disaster and the exploitation of man by man. The stage will be set and the situation will be ripe for the USSR and other countries unfriendly to the aims and ideals of the United States and other democratic countries to ferment insurgencies. The poor and dissatisfied people in the LDCs will be used as surrogates to disrupt and challenge freedom in these countries. The "have-nots" will be prime candidates for offensive actions against those they perceive to be the "haves".

These factors, combined with the lowered birth rate problems the Great Russians within the Soviet Union itself will be suffering, will mean that the United States will more likely than not be faced with a very different military situation than it faces today. The most likely use of U.S. military forces will not be in a set battle scenario on the plains of Europe;

but rather counterinsurgency, counterguerilla, counterterrorist actions in countries the American public would not recognize by name. "Nearly all the armed conflicts of the past forty years have occurred in what is vaguely referred to as the Third World: the diverse countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Eastern Caribbean. In the same period, all the wars in which the United States was involved-either directly with its combat forces or indirectly with military assistance-occurred in the Third World. Given future trends in the diffusion of technology and military power, the United States needs a clear understanding of its interests and military role in these regions" (Commission, Supporting 34-35).

Additionally, these will be countries strategically important to U.S. interest either militarily or for the availability of scarce natural resources vital to the national defense or economy of the United States. These operations will require unique tactics as part of a new doctrine and a rethought force structure. These tactics will have to stress unconventional means to combat unconventional attacks. Sam C. Sarkesian indicates that "Third World conflicts will definitely continue to be low intensity in nature, fought using unconventional forces and tactics". He goes on to state that "operational control of such a battle will be with the Third World nations rather than the U.S. because current U.S. doctrine labels Low Intensity Conflicts as "something short of war" while the indigenous groups involved will view it as total, all out war in a no holds barred environment" (Sarkesian,12-13).

The military strategy/structure mandated to meet the socio-political situation in the year 2000 will be vastly different from the decade of the 1980s. As the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy said in its 1988 report to the Secretary of Defense, "We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out nuclear attack. By concentrating on these extreme cases, our planners tend to neglect attack that call for discriminating military responses..." (Commission, Discriminate 2).

Many military thinkers of today share the same tunnel vision for disaster that European military strategists suffered between 1918 and 1939. They prepared for a war in the future by planning strategies based on previous wars. They were not ready for the blitzkrieg tactics of the Third Reich. Likewise, the U.S. has no practical strategy or doctrine that realistically comes to terms with the concept of low intensity, unconventional conflicts. Our current doctrine places low intensity conflicts (LICs) in the same category as "surgical hit and run, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and insurgency-counterinsurgency actions" (Sarkesian, 8-9). We must plan for the war of the future: low intensity conflict in the Third World.

CPT Richard Moore, USMC, defines tactics as "...the art of combining techniques to meet the requirements of each unique combat situation" (Moore, 32). The dramatic increase in world

population in the LDCs will require significant changes to our military tactics, as well as the forces to execute these new tactics. The conventional military approach of preparing for war against Warsaw Pact forces on the plains of central and western Europe must be re-examined. "Conflicts in the Third World are obviously less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be, yet they have had and will have an adverse cumulative effect on U.S. access to critical regions, on American credibility among allies and friends, and on American self-confidence. If this cumulative effect cannot be checked or reversed in the future, it will gradually undermine America's ability to defend its interests in the most vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific" (Commission, Supporting 34-35).

As William J. Taylor says, "The United States will need the capability to consider military intervention at all levels--before, during, and following crises. Given scarce U.S. Army resources, such capacity must be linked to a strategy that envisions its use or non-use in particular places under specific circumstances. The days of general-purpose forces must be considered history." (Kupperman-Taylor, 51).

"The U.S. will need sound strategies for low intensity conflict that will enable the Army to anticipate, prevent, and if required, respond effectively to those conflicts that are identified as threats to national security. The strategy must not only be effective for prosecuting the conflict; it must also be supported by a national consensus and must have maintenance

of national consensus as one of its goals" (Commission, Guiding 4). The vastly increased populations of the LDCs will put extreme pressures on the world's resources and will cause turbulent political climates in those countries. The political situations, combined with an abundance of poverty in these countries, will make them ripe for both internal strife/revolution and external manipulation by the Soviet Union. The U.S. will have to be prepared to react to LICs throughout the world on very short notice.

The U.S. population will shrink; but not its economic interest around the world. Indeed, with increased scarcities of vital raw materials, U.S. economic interests will likely expand, not contract. "In the changing environment of the next 20 years, the U.S. and its allies, formal and informal, will need to improve their ability to bring force to bear effectively, with discrimination and in time to thwart any of a wide range of plausible aggressors against their major common interests - and in that way to deter such aggressors. Violence in the Third World threatens our interests in a variety of ways. It can imperil a fledgling democracy, increase pressures for large-scale migration to the United States, jeopardize important U.S. bases, threaten vital sea lanes, or provide strategic opportunities for the Soviet Union and its proxies" (Commission, Guiding 14). "At this time there are several third world nations capable of placing long term stress on the force structure of a greatly expanded 600 ship, 15 carrier U.S. Navy. Likewise, there are 48 LDCs with anti-ship cruise missiles, 19

with diesel attack submarines, and 21 with naval mining capabilities" (Dudney, 27-28). What happens when the U.S. is unable to project its military power due to insufficient personnel resources and forces/doctrine structured for an outdated mode of war? General Fred F. Woerner, CINC, U.S. Southern Command, Panama reminds us that "the southern U.S. flank is historically insecure. To make it secure would place such a drain on U.S. resources as to have a very, very significant impact on our world wide commitments" (Dudney, 28).

In the past, nations with small populations have been able to dominate as great powers by two means: superior organization and technology or alliances with other friendly countries. "If the current population trend continues, the U.S. will no longer be the most important country in the world. We could see a world where the alliance of western nations will no longer shape either the political agenda, the culture, or the direction of the global community" (Wattenberg, 8).

In the year 2000, the U.S. will not be able to rely solely on alliances with friendly countries because those friendly countries (western allies) will be suffering from the same malady - smaller labor pools from which to draw military personnel resources. The only alternative is improved organization and better technology in the form of doctrine/force structure molded for the world situation. "Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is qualitatively different from the kinds of wars for which the U.S. armed services have traditionally prepared. The American view of war, which has served us well for more than

200 years, has led the services to design forces, equipment, and doctrine for direct engagement of a foreign force and for defeating it decisively by combat operations" (Commission, Supporting 26). The vastly different scenario which will face U.S. forces in the next century will require a thorough re-examination of the current doctrine. The U.S. Army has taken the first tentative steps toward providing the necessary organization by fielding the light infantry divisions. However, these units are still conventional forces trained in conventional warfare against a conventional enemy. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and Delta Force units are also steps in the right direction. However, the RDJTF is geared primarily for use in Southwest Asia; Delta Force is designed for special purpose high risk missions such as hostage rescue. What happens when we need to field brigade size elements to three different areas of the globe for use in sprawling urban centers? (There will be over 400 cities of 1 million or more people by the year 2000) (Council, 12). As CPT Steven Daskal, USAFR says, "Due to the population density, relatively confined spaces can hide significant numbers...Using conventional military forces is difficult if not impossible" (Daskal, 38).

The U.S. needs redesigned forces, which must be ready to take over the role of RDJTF type units after initial stabilization, must be fully equipped and trained in the use of reliable squad radios, which will have to be capable of operating in subways, buildings, etc, antipersonnel weapons of

graduated lethality, and psychological operations. These personnel must be prepared to perform many police-type duties as well as more conventional military duties until the area of U.S. interest is completely stabilized. Today's conventional force, and even the RDJTF, is ill-equipped and ill-trained to adequately execute this type of mission. This mission is not unlike that of the British forces in Northern Ireland today. However, the degree of commitment of forces and preconceived desired outcome will have to be much more clearly defined. "The unit itself should be reconfigured so that it can operate in echelons, with that portion of the unit sent forward into the country of interest restrained in manning and equipment to the minimum necessary...Echelonment dictates dedicated communications capabilities for the transmittal of voice, imagery, and data..." (Commission, Supporting 43).

Currently two concepts are being evaluated. Army General James J. Lindsay, Commander-In-Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) suggests the possibility of a Fifth Armed Service, designated as the Joint Special Operations Force (SOF), to deal with low intensity, third world conflicts. He states that "The overall aim is to build military tools capable of intervening in local wars, beefing up friendly forces, carrying out antiterrorist actions, or striking behind Warsaw Pact lines in a major war. Already, SOF units have bounced back from post-Vietnam days, when their funding was cut ninety-five percent and many of the SOF units were disbanded. Since 1981, the \$9 billion that the Pentagon has spent on SOF has created a

new Army Special Forces Group, a Ranger battalion, more SEAL strength, and additions to the Air Force SOF. Manpower, now 38,000 active and reserve, will soon rise to 41,000" (Dudney, 24). The other is a four phase, low intensity conflict doctrine utilizing current Special Forces capabilities as well as advisory teams to provide various levels of economic and non-military assistance and aid. Combat forces would be employed from the rapidly developing "Light Fighter Infantry Divisions". The proposed use of these assets would coincide with the level of perceived or actual threat as shown below.

Phase I--Economic and non-military assistance and aid

Advisory Teams

Phase II--Special Forces "A" Teams plus Phase I assets

Phase III--Special Forces "HQ, B, and C" Teams, additional A Teams, plus Phase I and II. Possible Light Infantry

Phase IV--Light Infantry plus administrative/logistical support as well as Phase I/II/III assets

(Sarkesian, 12)

One important aspect of tomorrow's LIC environment is the need to be prepared; not just structured and equipped. This is not an easy job. How can we be fully prepared and "trained" for tomorrow's battles? "It is reasonable to find a basis for conventional warfare training, in that we have a very fair idea of the type of enemy we shall be fighting, the weapons and tactics that he will use, and we know that, within limits, certain rules are likely to be followed. This is far less so in

counter-insurgency warfare, where the circumstances are highly unpredictable; the enemy will range from...communist "volunteers" perhaps to "insurgents" worldwide in a variety of forms...Training must include a thorough knowledge of the probable enemy, his methods and weaknesses, as well as a study of the civil aspects of cold war campaigning...It is a far cry from being skilled in "APC drills" in Germany." (Paget, 166).

There will be a greater requirement for more integration of counter-insurgency training for all military personnel. This training should also stress how military and civilian forces must work together to win unconventional conflicts. The units to be deployed in tomorrow's LIC environment must be trained not only in small unit operations; but they must also be well schooled in security type missions. Security assistance, especially in training the friendly local forces to combat unconventional adversaries, will be of prime importance. Soldiers will have to be able to train, and that means communicate, with their local counterparts. They will have to work closely with both military and civilian authorities. This will require training in language, civil affairs (as it pertains to specific geo-political situations), and conflicting ideologies (as evidenced by the civilian action programs during the Vietnam Conflict). This will be of utmost importance in future LIC warfare. Our forces today are not trained in the disciplines required to achieve this aim.

We must begin planning today in order to be able to achieve these goals tomorrow. We can not train our military forces to


meet and defeat highly mechanized forces in open terrain and expect our forces to perform well against unconventional forces using unconventional, primarily small unit tactics. To be prepared in the year 2000, we must examine our training methodology now. As William J. Taylor Jr. states, "If the U.S. Army were to attain the technological level of excellence it has set for itself in preparing for the improbable European conflict, could the Army "win" a Vietnam War revisited? The sobering guess is that we could not - because we would be pitting hardware developed for other purposes against forces nearly integral with the population from which they spring. Technology cannot and should not be asked to replace an understanding of the conflict, its participants, and the objectives of the U.S. involvement." (Kupperman/Taylor, 77) We must begin immediately to reassess the training of our military forces. We must ensure that our forces are properly trained in unconventional, counter-insurgency, and low intensity conflict operations. "In the coming decades the United States will need to be better prepared to deal with conflicts in the Third World. This will require new kinds of planning, since they often call for missions, force structures, and equipment not now available in the U.S. inventory. If we do not improve our ability to counter this lesser violence (LIC), we will surely lose the support of many Third World countries that want to believe the United States Can protect its friends, not to mention its own interests" (Commission, Supporting 34).

Force structure and training doctrine changes and improved technology applied to military requirements must all be considered crucial objectives in order to fully equip the U.S. Army for war in the year 2000. We have made spectacular advances in technology; we have experimented with development of unique ability equipment such as the high technology test bed (HTTB); we have made strides in tailoring individual units for special purpose missions. However, we must now meld these individual actions into a unified program. This program must be aimed at tomorrow's battlefield and it must address the geopolitical and demographic realities of the year 2000. We cannot languish in the mistaken belief that our enemies will fight the war we want them to fight.

The United States won independence, achieved greatness, and still stands as a beacon of hope for freedom for all mankind; not because we changed with a changing world; rather, we initiated changes that changed the world. The world, both in terms of human and natural resources and in political make-up, is changing. If the United States is to continue to maintain its position as the leading free-world power, we must recognize the tremendous impact that lesser developed countries and low intensity conflicts are having and will continue to have on our ability to defend our country and the free world. We must make drastic changes to our military to meet the threat. We cannot afford, indeed the free-world cannot afford, to go into the 21st century with forces structured to repel a 20th century foe.

U.S. BIRTH RATE

SOURCE: "BIRTH DEARTH"



WORLD POPULATION 1975-2000

SOURCE: GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT




FIGURE 2

WORLD POPULATION 1975-2000

SOURCE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT




FIGURE 3

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