

GLORY RESTORED?

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2008–2009 GAZA WAR IN TIMES OF EXTENDED CONFLICT

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Preface

The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self-admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter-arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults.

Twenty-eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two-plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation.

This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict.

This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.

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Executive Summary

Israelis were concerned in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 Second Lebanon War. A less than stellar military performance caused some to question whether the country's enemies might be encouraged to take advantage of perceived Israel Defense Forces (IDF) weakness. Military and political leaders alike confronted perceived shortfalls head-on and did so quickly. War with Hamas broke out in Gaza just two years later. Israel's military was prepared to reestablish its reputation, thereby giving any potential enemy reason for pause before they thought to strike.

Among the improvements made in those intervening 28 months were (1) refurbishment of ground maneuver capabilities, (2) revision of air-ground relationships, (3) adjustment of expectations for tactical intelligence, (4) upgrading of army equipment, and (5) development of more realistic appraisals regarding strategic objectives. Israel's military was thus prepared for the challenge when Hamas reinitiated large-scale rocket attacks in November 2008 despite considerable differences in Gaza's physical terrain, density of population, and other factors versus what it confronted in 2006. Initial airstrikes were successful. A three-axis ground attack a week later saw Gaza City cut off from the rest of the theater and rapid accomplishment of most IDF objectives. Israeli political leaders were careful to ensure that Palestinians were aware of Israel's lack of intent to destroy Hamas, occupy Gaza, or reinstall the Palestinian Authority as the ruling government in the Gaza Strip. IDF forces demonstrated considerable tactical acumen while working to achieve stated objectives, among them the reduction of rocket attacks and stabilization of the situation on Israel's western border. They withdrew within a month of the first bomb dropped having accomplished most of the stated political goals.

It is true that Hamas possessed nothing near the capabilities of the enemy confronted in southern Lebanon. Yet Gaza's extraordinary population density, intense urbanization, and adroit use of influence means provided significant challenges. Most were met. Some were not. Still others offered new lessons for other nations to consider as they ready for conflicts to come. The following twelve recommendations thought to be of value to U.S. armed forces and other agencies—and those of its allies and coalition partners—are drawn from these observations.

Do Not Over-focus on the Enemy of Today

Hamas, founded in 1987, rose to its current status during the years of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) prominence. Focusing on social programs and recruiting, Hamas built its reputation for legitimacy and lack of corruption while the PLO held the focus of Israel as the state's primary non-state threat. The lesson: Keep one eye on over-the-horizon threats even as you deal with those dominating your immediate attention.

Consider Asymmetry in More than a Military Context

Counterinsurgency theory strongly advises interdicting an insurgency in the first phase, before the insurgent develops the means to challenge its target nation state effectively. Hamas little revealed its insurgent character during those early years, choosing to focus on seemingly benign social programs even as it recruited converts to its anti-Israeli charter and built wider legitimacy within the Palestinian population. Defeating an insurgent or other irregular warfare threat will require intelligence capabilities able to detect potential capabilities in addition to those military. Identification and understanding of these threats' methods will inform development of the capabilities—military and otherwise—the counterinsurgent needs to successfully interrupt further development.

Focus on the Money

Hamas—like the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and Irish Republican Army before it—continues to rely on charitable contributions for part of its income. These and other sources of funding—be they from state, private, business, or other donors—are a green sea in which a non-state actor swims just as Mao's guerrillas and other insurgents of the past swam within the populations providing them the food, shelter, and information crucial to sustaining operations. In an increasingly urban world, insurgents and other foes can buy the support for which they used to rely on those living in villages, towns, and cities. The analogy holds as we remember that one of the counterinsurgent's goals is to separate the insurgent from his sources of support. Failing to deny the enemy money is akin to providing it safe haven. Financial transactions between countries, individuals, apparently (and actually) legitimate businesses, charitable organizations,

and the non-state threat of concern thus comprise another asymmetric challenge on which counterinsurgent intelligence must focus.

Expand Current Conceptualizations of Centers of Gravity and Decisive Points

The above consideration of finances supports a call for broadening current conceptualizations of centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points. Overly simplistic and too general definitions of “the population” as center of gravity are scarcely helpful to planners or operators. Better to view counterinsurgency and other irregular warfare contingencies in terms of networks of which COGs, decisive points, and other key nodes and their interrelationships are a part. Doing so promotes better understanding of those interactions and facilitates discovery of potential workarounds and means that a foe might use to compensate for friendly force neutralization of critical nodes or cutting of vital links.

This call for broadening is not meant to imply an increase in the number of COGs identified during planning. It rather suggests that those readying for campaigns and operations must look beyond centers of gravity representing only the conventional military realm. They in so doing may find that what would appropriately be designated as a COG during conventional operations instead assumes the character of a decisive point, another element of planning, or has little significance to the campaign, operation, or phase under consideration.

Maintain the Moral High Ground Without Crippling Friendly Force Efforts

Civilized nations’ morality is a vulnerability, albeit one their leaders and citizens would never choose to sacrifice. Protecting and respecting noncombatant welfare and caring for one’s wounded are among the examples easily taken from operations in Gaza, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. Foes like Hamas, Hezbollah, or insurgents elsewhere instead deliberately put the innocent at risk. The challenge for the men and women in the armed forces of civilized countries is to maintain their commendable standards while not allowing the constraints to preclude mission accomplishment. Israel’s military did so in Gaza by finding a balance between caring for its wounded while not allowing them to constrain operational effectiveness. Such challenges in balancing effectiveness with

operational ethics impact training and soldier psychological health regardless of the nations involved. Solutions require study beyond what is as yet available.

Influence Is More than Information. Plan the Influence Campaign Accordingly

Information is only one component of a successful influence campaign. Words must be backed by consistent policies and behaviors reinforcing the words. Education is the third critical component; information and action butt against an immovable wall if individual or group prejudices and ignorance cannot be overcome. Successful influence campaigns therefore require a campaign, one conducted before, during, and after an operation. Intelligence will be key. Without it there will be little understanding of which minds are open to messages or which individuals wield influence and thus the means to communicate friendly force intentions beyond themselves. Bringing these many parts together and sustaining them over time is a challenge heretofore seldom attempted, much less met and overcome. Relying completely on surrogates to promulgate influence, e.g., an indigenous government, sacrifices benefits crucial to U.S. success in the immediate and longer term. Yet this is too often the current default in lieu of a more appropriately balanced approach.

Treat the Media as a (Difficult) Coalition Partner

Israel's decision to bar media from Gaza may have eased operational security concerns. It simultaneously left potentially Hamas-sympathetic Arab correspondents unchallenged, meaning that the outflow of information during Operation Cast Lead had virtually no Israeli (or neutral) voice other than what was provided by the IDF or Israeli government. IDF information operations disseminated desired messages, but the absence of objective reporting—positive or negative—neutralized much of the benefit. The penalties were felt rather severely in the longer term when a postwar United Nations investigation could find little in the way of other-than-Israeli sources to substantiate IDF explanations in the face of Hamas's accusations. The result was a report perhaps more sharply critical than it would have been had objective witnesses been allowed to view operations firsthand during the execution of military action in Gaza. Fortunately, the armed forces of the United States and many other developed nations need take this lesson only as reaffirmation of procedures already in place.

Formalize Successful Procedures

Improvements in air-ground coordination marked one of the most notable adjustments made by the IDF between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead two years later. Many of the procedures key to those improvements were the result of decisions made by leaders fully versed in the shortcomings of the earlier conflict. The challenge, one interviewee noted, was to incorporate these enhancements in doctrine before savvy leaders moved on and their insights were lost. The same challenge exists for the U.S. and partner nation armed forces today. Operational tempo proceeds at such a pace that successes born of cooperating personalities and sharp intellects tend to be lost. There is call for greater institutional effort to ensure that vital insights enter the lessons learned process and, via that route, make their way into doctrine and training.

Commit Resources to the Study of Non-state Deterrence

The Cold War bequeathed a rich literature of deterrence theory and historical practice to national leaders and other policy makers. No such wealth of theory or doctrine exists for nation states seeking to deter undesired behaviors in non-state actors. The heterogeneity of non-state actor organizations and a lack of rules akin to tenets of diplomacy (formal or otherwise) make development of such guidance a significant challenge. Challenge or not, these obstacles cannot be permitted to preclude its creation.

Assign Liaison Officers to Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations

Aid groups in Gaza found the IDF more willing to facilitate their efforts than at any other time in recent memory. However, even unparalleled coordination mechanisms and real-time exchanges with remotely located liaison personnel could not prevent near-fatal incidents during which Israeli ground forces engaged civilian relief representatives. In addition, aid operations approval processes were inconsistent and insufficiently responsive. Understandable from the perspective of operational security or concerns for aid organization personnel safety, the IDF's notable efforts during Operation Cast Lead nonetheless left room for further development. It is a situation familiar to military personnel operating in Afghanistan and other theaters around the world today. Assignment of liaison personnel to accompany aid teams may hold benefits in

decreasing the risk of fratricide while improving the responsiveness of both civilian and military resources to the betterment of both groups and the noncombatants they hope to assist.

Continue to Refine Technologies of Value in Urban Environments, in Particular Precision-guided Munitions and Anti-fratricide Capabilities

As has been the case with most of Israel's wars, the rest of the world found much to contemplate in observing the IDF's use of new or innovative employment of proven technologies during Operation Cast Lead. Two particularly notable technological requirements remained at the end of the three weeks of fighting, despite successful innovations elsewhere. First, fratricide in urban environments remains a challenge, demanding the attention of those responsible for not only technological development but also leadership training, relevant doctrine, and command and control. The second demand involves the realm of precision technologies. Both Hezbollah and Hamas relied on subterranean hides to a considerable extent. The positioning of such facilities under or in close proximity to population concentrations, culturally sensitive structures, or other entities better left unharmed effectively denies modern armed forces engagement unless the value of the target is deemed worth the unfortunate consequences. Developing munitions or weapons to address the outstanding requirement would close this tactical gap, one with potentially significant strategic consequences.

Organize and Conduct Counterinsurgency and Other Irregular Warfare Operations Like a Conductor Does an Orchestra

Barring complete annihilation of a foe, military success alone will only suppress the violence that is the expression of popular displeasure. It will not address underlying causes. Like a building with a foundation of pillars, each support (among them economic development, humanitarian aid, building governmental capacity, education, and disarming insurgents and reintegrating them into a peaceful society) must bear its share of weight. Commanders have to design campaigns and orchestrate operations such that these pillars are able to assume a greater or lesser burden as security and other demands wax or wane in importance, much like a conductor directs prominence or supporting roles from each section of an orchestra.

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As ever, appreciation is due members of the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, whose continued support makes these analyses possible. Particular thanks to Scott Bamonte for recognizing how valuable a complement a study of Operation Cast Lead would be to my previous work on the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War, and to Duane Schattle whose support was vital to the concept becoming reality.

This document is the better due to the efforts of three superb reviews. General Avidor, Paul Smith, and David Dilegege offered excellent insights for which I am very grateful.

Abbreviations

Acronym	Expansion/Explanation
ATGM	anti-tank guided missile
BG	brigadier general
CA	civil affairs or California
CAIN	Conflict Archive on the Internet
CHF International	an aid organization, formerly Cooperative Housing Foundation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMINT	communications intelligence
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSP	Community Stabilization Program
CT	Connecticut
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DOS	U.S. Department of State
EBO	effects based operations
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAF	Israeli Air Force
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IED	improvised explosive device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition
K9	term used to refer to activities involving dogs (canines)
km	kilometer
KS	Kansas
LNO	liaison officer
LTG	lieutenant general
M	million
MD	Maryland
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO	nongovernmental organization
NY	New York
OPSEC	operations security
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
ret.	retired
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SLW	Second Lebanon War
T-55	a model of Warsaw Pact tank
U.S.	United States
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VA	Virginia
WFP	World Food Program

1. Introduction

While Hamas officials inside Gaza were signaling urgently for the bloodshed to stop, exiled leaders held out for all their conditions to be met.... Popular anger over Arab impotence has certainly left regimes such as Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's, as well as the rump Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, looking increasingly isolated in the region. But these American allies have long accused Hamas of acting in the interest of its friends, Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Shia militia, Hizbullah, to sabotage chances for a regional peace.... The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group and an ideological ally of Hamas, says security forces have arrested some 860 of its activists since the start of the Israeli assault, providing an indicator of the scale of public demonstrations that have shaken Egyptian cities, despite massive and heavy-handed police action. Such raised emotions are likely to leave long-term scars, and may continue to destabilize countries like Egypt. But they seem unlikely to produce quick gains for Hamas. In 2006 Hizbullah emerged battered, but claiming victory, in its war with Israel. The likely outcome for Hamas is that it will claim at least a moral victory among Arabs but, like Hizbullah, find its strategic options reduced in Israel's favour.¹

"Hamas and diplomacy: The pressures mount"

The Economist, January 17, 2009

The initial airstrikes caught many in Gaza unaware, an effective Israeli beginning to hostilities in December 2008. Perhaps calling it the "beginning" is a misnomer, however. It was certainly not initiation of conflict between Israel and the Hamas government of the narrow strip comprising only 360 square kilometers. It would likewise be inappropriate to label those airstrikes the initiation of fighting, as the conflict had seen many ground and air combat engagements during previous years. Hamas and various other groups antipathetic to Israel had launched rocket attacks against targets in the country—military and civilian—with greater or lesser regularity for many months. What uniquely marked the December 2008 aerial engagements and the less than a month of war that would follow was not the fighting. It was its intensity and importance: Intensity because the weeks entailed constant military operations rather than the occasional raid or retributive strike that had characterized most previous military undertakings. Importance because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operated in a spotlight no less intense than the fighting. The country's military had disappointed its citizenry, politicians, and itself 28 months before. Adjustments came quickly after the

¹ "Hamas and diplomacy: The pressures mount," *The Economist* 390 (January 17, 2009): 47–48.

Second Lebanon War. Now both Israel and the rest of the world watched: Was this the IDF of legend, or the force with glory lost two years ago?

Backdrop

Some commentators have said that giving up on the cease-fire was in both sides' interests—asserting that Hamas wanted to reclaim the mantle of “heroic resister” in order to reverse recent erosions in its popularity among Palestinians since its takeover of Gaza, while Israeli leaders wanted to prove their ability to defend Israeli citizens on the eve of national elections.²

Jim Zanotti, et al.

“Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009)”

Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli label for its military undertaking starting in late December 2008, saw the country's military, government, and citizenry largely supportive. The public attitude within Gaza was less straightforward. Hamas unquestionably constituted a “side,” its opposition to Israel a definitive theme. Fatah was another, after Hamas won the January 2006 elections and later used armed might to consolidate its control in the Gaza Strip. Hamas took advantage of Operation Cast Lead fighting to cover for eliminating more Fatah members who continued to reside in Gaza. It is therefore unsurprising that materiel and moral support for Hamas was not forthcoming from the government in the Palestinian West Bank. Equally unsurprisingly, given the existence of so deep a rift among Palestine's various governors, the mass of citizens living in Gaza was by no means as solidly behind their government as was Israel's. These individuals comprised another side—more accurately, many other sides—largely united by an exhaustion bred by economic, political, and diplomatic competition between Hamas and Israel that left them among the poorest populations in the world. Few considered another war to be in their interest. They would greatly suffer its consequences nonetheless.

It is true the struggles in Gaza are part of a much larger conflict. It is one with regional and worldwide implications in addition to those internal. The December 2008–January 2009 fighting was a war in which conventional and irregular warfare approaches existed side by side. Entangled threads of insurgency and counterinsurgency permeated the more overt fighting, their nuances adding further complexity to the

² Jim Zanotti, et al., “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009),” Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2009, p. 7.

already complicated network of intra-national, factional, religious, diplomatic, political, economic, and social policies, agendas, and passions. U.S. elections the month before had bestowed lame duck status on a Republican administration strongly supportive of Israel. The incoming Democratic executive had signaled preference for more balanced policies once it assumed the reins of government in January 2009. Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for the same month. Israel too was in a period of political transition. The standing government awaited elections in several weeks, the results of which would see replacement of a prime minister weakened by his administration's performance during the Second Lebanon War. To the north, Lebanon planned spring elections, an event of significant consequence to Israel's 2006 Hezbollah foe, a military-political-social non-state actor with ambitions for increased influence in Beirut. One might argue that this quartet of elections comprised a perfect political storm, a tempest in which the brief period of a few weeks at the end of December and early January offered Israel's government an opportunity to capitalize on waning American sympathies and a chance to influence the outcomes of three elections vital in their consequences for Israelis.³

But explanations for the war's outbreak rest not only in the political realm. The IDF and Israel as a whole still nursed the sting of humiliation over its recent combat in Lebanon. More than one Israeli feared the prick had wounded the nation's capability to deter, a quality based on military prowess in a region history had repeatedly shown to be none too sympathetic. Rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza had deepened the wound. Effective and offensive media campaigns by Hezbollah and Hamas added salt, further irritating Israel's citizens and raising concerns over a slow but consistent erosion of the country's security foundation. Restoration of national pride and mending the basis of national security both offered reasons for seizing an opportunity to reestablish the armed forces' reputation as an entity to be reckoned with.

³ At least one analyst disputes the influence of pending Israeli elections on the decision to go to war, concluding that "the timing was not chosen *because* of the imminent elections but rather *despite* them.... The end of the operation did not meet the expectations of a significant portion of the public, despite the fact that the leadership deliberately did not create unrealistic expectations (a clear lesson from the 2006 war)." However, this perspective may reflect the influence of hindsight, as the argument cites a number of polls taken during and after the conflict. Yehuda Ben Meir, "Operation Cast Lead: Political Dimensions and Public Opinion," The Institute for National Security Studies *Strategic Assessment* 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=25&incat=0&read=2634> (accessed January 15, 2010).

Above all, however, Operation Cast Lead must be seen as a spike in violence during what is a continual conflict rather than an event independent of greater and long-standing troubles. The conflict is part of a wider regional quarrel in which the willingness of governments to support Israel or invest in groups seeking to do it harm varies in relationship to how their choices benefit or harm their own internal agendas. Gaza therefore represents but one part of a network of tumultuous regional and worldwide relationships. Perceptions of diminished deterrent effectiveness and vulnerability born of a pending reduction in support from its most stalwart international ally may have troubled Israel's leaders. December 2008 provided a window of opportunity to redress a multitude of challenges.

We will now undertake a brief review of the Second Lebanon War's consequences for the IDF to better understand the events that later transpired during Operation Cast Lead. Doing so provides a first step as we seek to answer the question, "How can a nation best ready itself for conducting irregular warfare operations during periods of extended conflict?" The relevance to Israel is obvious. It is little less so for the United States and other nations with recent or ongoing commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, southern Philippines, Timor-Leste, and elsewhere.

The Second Lebanon War and Its Influence on Operation Cast Lead

The morning of 25 June 2006, nineteen-year-old Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted by a group of Palestinians from three different militant groups including Ez El Din Al Qassam.... Next, Hezbollah fighters...on Wednesday, 12 July...kidnapped two soldiers and killed at least seven, while twenty-seven others were injured. Hezbollah fighters shelled the area north of Shula settlement near Nakoura on the border, which prevented the Israeli soldiers from retrieving the bodies of their fellow soldiers.⁴

Zaki Chehab
Inside Hamas

This very brief review of the Second Lebanon War (SLW) and its implications for the war in Gaza a bit over two years later reviews select IDF concerns in the period following the event and actions taken to redress those issues.

⁴ Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, NY: Nation, 2008, p. 67.

Hezbollah fighters executed their July 12, 2006 attack on an Israeli patrol with deadly efficiency. The magnitude of Israel's response appears to have come as a shock to the organization's leadership. Its deputy secretary general later related, "We were expecting the Israelis would respond at the most by bombing for a day or two or some limited attacks."⁵ For different reasons, the character of the Israeli military's reaction puzzled other observers as well. For example, reserve mobilization took place in excess of two weeks after the initial Hezbollah raid. Significant ground action was delayed in the apparent expectation that air action alone could accomplish the country's strategic objectives. One analyst believes the delay can at least in part be explained by an overabundance of faith in the Effects Based Operations (EBO) concept amongst key members of the IDF; they actually did believe attacks by the Israeli Air Force alone would be sufficient to subdue Hezbollah. The miscalculation may have been exacerbated by confusion stemming from the recent adoption of a new Systemic Operational Design-based doctrine.⁶ Many Israeli military officers found the doctrine more confusing than helpful in providing guidance to war planners and others executing operations. Budget cuts and the ground forces' high operational tempo demanded by internal security missions during the intifada meant the army, once called forward, was less well trained than was desirable for the type of operations it confronted in Southern Lebanon. Brigade commanders had not had the opportunity to train their units as a whole for several years. Others condemned IDF leaders for overly optimistic dependence on sophisticated weapon systems, one writer damning the resulting situation at large as "a witches brew of high tech fantasies and basic unpreparedness."⁷

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had made the Israeli government's objectives clear in an address to the Knesset five days after the July 12 attack:

⁵ "Scale of Israeli attack 'surprised' Hezbollah," originally published August 27, 2006 by Reuters, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/indepth/israelattacks/Lebanon/10062974.html> (accessed April 26, 2007). Dr. Karla Cunningham, who reviewed the offering, notes that Hezbollah's professed surprise could have been an effort at mitigating the antipathy directed at the organization in the aftermath of the destruction suffered by the Lebanese people. Dr. Karla Cunningham comments to Dr. Russell W. Glenn, January 26, 2010.

⁶ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 11-12.

⁷ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 14.

- “The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev [taken in the July 12, 2006 raid];
- A complete ceasefire;
- Deployment of the Lebanese army in all of southern Lebanon;
- Expulsion of Hizbullah from the area, and
- Fulfillment of United Nations [UN] Resolution 1559.”⁸

Whether due to failures of intelligence, a belief that Hezbollah’s military capabilities had little changed since the IDF’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, or other reasons, Israel did not expect the levels of resistance met when it eventually launched its ground offensive. Southern Lebanon’s terrain made the task more difficult. It is rife with hills scored by steep-sided, deep valleys. Innumerable wadis cut the gorges, further hampering dismounted and mounted ground maneuver or rendering it altogether impossible. Villages perch atop hills dominating surrounding terrain to provide anyone occupying them with excellent observation, superb fields of fire, and considerable protection against small arms and indirect engagement.⁹ Initial stretches of road from the Israeli-Lebanese border northward were heavily mined and covered by anti-tank weapons manned by fighters well trained in how best to engage Israeli military vehicles. Three *Merkava* tanks suffered missile penetrations; six IDF soldiers died and another 18 were wounded during an attack on one village secured only after seven days of combat.¹⁰ Uncharacteristic sheepishness on the part of some Israeli leaders during ground offensive action exacerbated the impact of these conditions.

One of the most troubling shortfalls in IDF performance involved the initial lack of cooperation between its ground and air forces. Unlike the United States military, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) possesses all helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

⁸ “Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, 17 July 2006,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Address+to+the+Knesset+by+PM+Olmert+17-Jul-2006.htm>, accessed April 26, 2007. Among the seven primary elements of the UN resolution were “calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” and a statement regarding UN support of “the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.” See “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/9/UN+Security+Council+Resolution+1559.htm, accessed April 26, 2007.

⁹ Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, pp. 2–3.

¹⁰ Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, p. 9. Alternative spellings for Maroun el-Ras include Maroun er-Ras and Maroun al-Ras.

assets in addition to manned fixed-wing aircraft. The beginning of the SLW saw a reticence on the part of the IAF to provide close air support during ground operations. Leaders in the air service considered fighter-bombers better used in support of strategic targeting. This left only helicopters and UAVs to provide direct support to army operations. Air force support had been further constrained after the arrival of the AH-64 Apache helicopter into the IAF inventory. The AH-1 Cobra rotary-wing aircraft had long supported ground missions. Akin to fixed-wing assets, however, the Apache came to be viewed as a capability particularly suitable for “focused elimination” of high-value enemy personnel targets. It too thus saw little commitment to ground operations.¹¹

Combat in Wadi Salouqi (see the circled area on Figure 1.1) provides other insights on problems plaguing ground operations during the war. On August 10, 2006, IDF leaders sent an armored column down the steep banks of the ravine to attack the town of Ghandourieh on its opposite side. Orders to abort reached the soldiers just as their lead vehicles reached the chasm’s bottom. Unit members made a careful withdrawal back to their starting point only to be told they were to once again attack along the same route two days later. Now wise to Israel’s approach, the enemy lay in wait, small arms and anti-tank weapons at the ready. An improvised explosive device (IED) destroyed the column commander’s *Merkava* tank as it reached the wadi floor. The explosion signaled the start of the ambush. Missiles slammed into eleven other *Merkavas*. Eight crewmen perished, dying with four of their comrades on foot or mounted in other vehicles.¹² Hezbollah weapons included AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and anti-armor capabilities that included Saggar, Kornet-E, and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles.¹³ It was these missiles that would prove the insurgents’ most effective killers during ground combat. They would in the end destroy fourteen Israeli tanks; mines would ravage another six.¹⁴ Even the IDF’s most advanced model, the *Merkava* 4, proved vulnerable.

¹¹ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves), Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

¹² Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, p. 11. Also see “Deconstructing Hizballah’s surprise military prowess,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, November 1, 2006.

¹³ “Deconstructing Hizballah’s surprise military prowess,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, November 1, 2006; and “Hizballah’s intelligence apparatus,” *Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor* (September 13, 2006).

¹⁴ “Israel introspective after Lebanon offensive,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, August 23, 2006.

Such tactical setbacks astonished most in Israel and many elsewhere. They did not surprise members of Hezbollah, which had spent years preparing southern Lebanon for defense and training to fight on the rugged terrain. Attacks on the Israeli homeland were equally well prepared. Short- and medium-range rockets destined for sites south of the border had been dug in months in advance. Hezbollah would ultimately fire roughly 4,000 rockets and missiles at military and civilian targets in Israel.¹⁵ Fifty-three



Figure 1.1

Map of Southern Lebanon showing locations of the Litani River (arrow) and Wadi Salouqi (ellipse)¹⁶

¹⁵ Andrew Exum, "Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63, December 2006, p. 5.

¹⁶ "Southern Lebanon Border Area original scale 1:150,000 1986 (2.9 MB)," from the Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_southern_border_1986.jpg (accessed March 1, 2010).

civilian dead would be among the casualties. Wounded ran into the thousands, and approximately 2,000 Israeli dwellings suffered either severe damage or destruction.¹⁷

The fighters using these weapons were better trained, better led, and more disciplined than many in the regular armed forces of countries Israel had confronted in earlier wars. They were part of tactical forces consisting of two general types:¹⁸

- Well-trained, full-time military personnel aged from their late twenties to late thirties. These numbered a few hundred and were assigned as snipers or given responsibility for indirect fire attacks on Israel and destruction of IDF vehicles with anti-tank missiles.
- Village guards, which though part-time included many who were veterans of previous fighting against Israel.

Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert believed the entire nation of Lebanon should be held accountable for the events triggering the war.¹⁹ The assumption was unsupportable. Hezbollah operated with few restraints and much autonomy in southern Lebanon. A reasonable argument could be made that Iran and Syria more greatly influenced the organization than did a Lebanese government whose sovereign authority only notionally extended south of the Litani River (see the arrow in Figure 1.1). Resultant air strikes against civilian targets inspired considerable anti-Israeli antipathy both within Lebanon and internationally. Perhaps responding to the consequent outrage, Olmert apologized to the Lebanese people on July 31, 2006, stating it was Hezbollah rather than the country's citizenry against whom Israel was fighting.²⁰ The SLW ended on August 14, 2006. With notable understatement, a senior Israeli officer concluded, "I cannot say we have deepened our deterrent

¹⁷ Uzi Rubin, "The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War," The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 71, June 2007. Casualty estimates differ. Mohamad Bazzi put the number of dead at 43. See his "Hezbollah cracked the code," *Newsday*, September 18, 2006. Online at <http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wocode184896831sep18,0,3091818.story?coll=ny-worldnews-print> (accessed April 2, 2007).

¹⁸ "Deconstructing Hizbullah's surprise military prowess," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 1, 2006.

¹⁹ Special Cabinet Communiqué, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Special%20Cabinet%20Communique%20-%20Hizbullah%20attack%2012-Jul-2006> (accessed May 3, 2007).

²⁰ Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, Paul Gallis, Dianne Rennack, John Rollins, Marjorie Browne, Steve Bowman, Connie Veillette, and Lawrence Kumins, "Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict," CRS Report for Congress, RL33566, August 7, 2006, p. 42.

image.”²¹ Israeli self-evaluations regarding the Second Lebanon War were harsh. Serving and retired Israeli military personnel identified several major issues of particular concern:

- An inappropriate defense strategy and failure to update campaign plans established the foundation for failure.
- IDF confusion on the battlefield was due at least in part to unnecessarily complex new concepts and doctrine.
- Preoccupation with intifada-type operations to the neglect of war fighting skills left the IDF unready to fight effectively.
- Inadequate synchronization of combined arms and joint capabilities crippled battlefield performance.
- Excessive concern regarding IDF casualties made what should have been a war of maneuver one of grinding attrition instead.
- IDF performance was further hindered by unrealistic intelligence expectations and problems with providing intelligence of use to those in the field.
- Some commanders had remained in their command posts, tied to sophisticated command and control systems, rather than moving about the battlefield to determine conditions themselves.

The IDF reacted quickly to identified shortfalls. Training in conventional (as contrasted to intifada-related) operations increased, to include reemphasizing maneuver and tactics applicable to the threat faced in 2006 Lebanon. Israel’s armed forces discarded its obtuse pre-SLW doctrine for more traditional and proven approaches. Leader training and joint operations received renewed emphasis. Key military leaders were replaced. The role of Israel’s air force in supporting ground operations underwent review; priorities saw renewed focus given to cooperation between the country’s ground and air arms during future conflicts. In short, the IDF demonstrated an adaptive capacity unusual for a national armed forces.

Over two years later, the end of 2008 saw increased rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza, some with ranges enabling them to threaten the major urban centers of Ashkelon (population 110,000), Be’er Sheva (185,000), Ashdod (210,000), and over 200 other

²¹ “Israel introspective after Lebanon offensive,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, August 23, 2006.

towns and villages. Nearly 15% of the country's population fell within reach, as did many key infrastructure facilities.²² The IDF had prepared. The sting from Lebanon lingered. And Hamas was providing a cause.

A Sampling of Israel's Post-Second Lebanon War Adjustments

Defeat cries aloud for explanation; whereas success, like charity, covers a multitude of sins.²³

Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan

Israel viewed its performance as unacceptable regardless of whether the rest of the world considered the Second Lebanon War a defeat. The government and its military forces were quick to begin a wide-ranging series of investigations to identify what underlay the performance and, as noted, was no less aggressive in taking action to rectify those faults. Several of the initiatives taken in the aftermath of the 2006 war are listed below, the influence of which was significant when fighting in Gaza erupted in December 2008. Each receives attention in turn.

- Importance of ground maneuver
- IDF joint operations
- Intelligence
- Other adjustments

Importance of Ground Maneuver

The expectation that air operations alone would bring Hezbollah to its knees proved a false one. IDF and Israeli political leaders realized the essentiality of ground operations against even irregular foes as they looked back in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War. Two related lessons were apparent. First, fires without accompanying maneuver had proved indecisive (e.g., attacks from the air). Second, this did not mean fires were unnecessary, but rather that decisive operations would require the orchestration of combined arms ground maneuver with the delivery of precision munitions from the

²² "The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects," The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 18.

²³ Alfred T. Mahan, *Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan*, ed. Allan Westcott, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1918, p. 257, http://books.google.com/books?id=0_8pAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA257&lpg=PA257&dq=Mahan,+%22defeat+cries+aloud+for+explanation%22&source=bl&ots=EpmHZyWf8a&sig=AYLgtlV5kntmU4iRnsIQfkCnpz0&hl=en&ei=ZdlRS8TwAtaOtgflmYigCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed January 16, 2010).

air.²⁴ Lessons drawn from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the Balkans or U.S. EBO doctrine implying otherwise had proved false ones. Interestingly, EBO had been withdrawn as U.S. armed forces doctrine several months before Operation Cast Lead.²⁵

Increasing the emphasis on ground maneuver in turn had direct impact on Israeli Army leadership and training. Operations might remain decentralized to an extent, as was the norm for many actions in dealing with intifada-related challenges in the West Bank or Gaza, but greater demands on all-arms coordination, less familiar terrain, and a new enemy meant commanders were told they had to be forward (or, at a minimum, they had to occasionally go forward) in order to stay abreast of battlefield situations. Those conditions also made new demands on training. Units trained with other arms and as part of larger organizations. Atrophied skills such as nighttime maneuver and coordinating fires were honed. Leaders and soldiers at all echelons understood the need to be adaptable in order to deal with varying types of terrain and enemy. Given the renewed emphasis on ground-air coordination, training also included the Israeli Air Force to an extent not seen in the months before the 2006 fighting in Lebanon.

IDF Joint Operations

The impact of the IAF's virtually unilateral decision to cease supporting the Israeli Army was immediately felt as ground forces moved into southern Lebanon in July 2006. Actions to correct the ill-conceived change in policy came quickly. In the words of Brigadier General (BG) Asaf Agmon (IAF, reserve), "We improvised on the spot the method of operation. The IDF is good at improvisation, but it shows you the lack of coordination previously given ground support by the air force prior to the Second Lebanon War."²⁶ IAF officers assigned to brigades operating in Lebanon arrived after the initiation of operations, strangers to units with no experience in integrating them or most of the aircraft they called on during operations. Improvisation allowed the IDF to

²⁴ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 84.

²⁵ As an example of the reaction to General Mattis's decision, see Robert S. Dudney, "Improvisation Won't Do It," *AirForce-Magazine.com* 91 (October 2008), <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/October%202008/1008edit.aspx> (accessed January 16, 2010).

²⁶ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

“muddle through” the month-long war, but it was apparent to all that a change in policy was essential.

Close air support operations in Southern Lebanon were hampered by over-caution once they began. General Agmon recalled, “In Lebanon, if a pilot had to attack a target in close proximity to ground forces, the order came from Northern Command, but [the Northern Command commander] had to go back and get permission from the air force. And if the attack involved [targets] less than 1000 meters from friendly forces, the Chief of the Air Force had to approve it personally.”²⁷ It was not a procedure designed for responsiveness.

The years following the Lebanon conflict saw a number of changes to address these shortcomings. During Operation Cast Lead, air operations, like all aspects of ground action, were the responsibility of the commanding general for Southern Command. IAF liaison officers had the authority to approve the close air support engagements that had required Chief of Air Force involvement in 2006. These air-ground coordination liaison officers (LNO) were assigned to every brigade headquarters. Select battalions readying for Operation Cast Lead received LNOs as well. All were flight-qualified officers on active flight status (a change from a previous policy of providing LNOs no longer on flight status).²⁸ Liaison officers and aircraft trained with their new partners, meaning the voice on the other end of the radio was familiar once operations began, as were the idiosyncrasies of ground force personnel to the pilots supporting them.²⁹ Analyst Barbara Opall-Rome summed up the changes by observing, “The joint war-fighting plan was fully refined and understood by all.... ‘I instructed my pilots to consider themselves the flying tank of the brigade commander,’ said Lt. Col. Gil, commander of the air force’s Magic Touch Apache squadron since June 2006. The air force officer candidly compared the supporting role of airpower in the summer 2006 Lebanon War with a ‘full partnership’ created in the Gaza campaign.”³⁰

²⁷ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

²⁸ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

²⁹ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

³⁰ Barbara Opall-Rome, “Gaza War Is Battle Lab for Joint Combat Ops,” *DefenseNews*, May 11, 2009, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4083045> (accessed August 4, 2009).

Intelligence

One of the accusations leveled against some IDF commanders after Lebanon was that they had gone to war with unrealistic expectations about the quality of intelligence forthcoming in support of their operations.³¹ The misunderstanding was not without basis. The decades-long Palestinian conflict meant that Israel's various intelligence services had been able to map potential operational areas in the West Bank and Gaza in extraordinary detail. Intelligence from human sources was often no less impressive, a consequence of those services having infiltrated key Palestinian groups or recruited informers. Leaders undergoing training after the war were made aware of the unrealistic nature of SLW commander expectations when it came to intelligence. As a result, they may have been pleasantly surprised at the quality of intelligence received once Operation Cast Lead began, at least in terms of initial intelligence. Given the return to familiar areas of operation, they benefited from intelligence much superior to what predecessors had drawn on in Lebanon. Analyst Matt Matthews observed,

With ample time to prepare, the IDF was also able to collect an unprecedented amount of highly sensitive information on Hamas, enabling it to gain complete intelligence domination. In fact, Israel had been preparing a "mosaic" of Hamas targets for years. The lull created by the ceasefire [in the six months before Operation Cast Lead] provided an opportunity to combine this information with recently obtained Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This created "a remarkably accurate picture of Hamas targets in Gaza that it constantly updated on a near real time basis," wrote Cordesman. The IDF and Israeli intelligence networks (Shin Bet) completely "penetrated" Hamas' network at all levels. More than one IDF commander commented that they had been "blind in Lebanon, but in Gaza they could see everything . . . The operations in Gaza were 200% better."³²

The above seems to imply that adaptation to lesser levels of support might have been unnecessary. However, IDF veteran BG (IDF, ret.) Gideon Avidor reminds that this was not the case. Exceptional as intelligence was during Operation Cast Lead, much was still unknown at the lowest tactical levels; specific locations of some underground facilities and their contents, the location of explosive devices and buildings rigged for demolition

³¹ One analyst wrote, "Commanders had come to rely on pin-point 'perfect' intelligence from informants and continual surveillance in this environment rather than on the aggressive use of reconnaissance to fight for information." Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 86.

³² Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 26-27.

as traps for Israeli soldiers, and plans for rocket launches are examples. Clues to explaining this apparent discrepancy between intelligence agency dominance in Gaza and incomplete situational awareness at the tactical level are evident in the results of air operations executed in the opening hours of the fighting. Initial IAF strikes against personnel and infrastructure targets were extremely successful. Later sorties found targeting more difficult. The explanation can be found in the nature of the targets. Israel's General Security Forces, those primarily responsible for collecting intelligence in support of IDF Palestinian operations, were able to provide extremely accurate information on the locations of key personnel and facilities *as they were prior to the outbreak of fighting* in December 2008.³³ Individual high-value targets moved once the IAF had completed its initial attacks, however, making them harder to find. The same explanation applies to IDF ground forces: once hostilities began, monitoring the adversary's tactical activities introduced intelligence requirements of an entirely different character than those demanded pre-hostilities. This observation suggests that caution may be in order regarding future intelligence expectations for any military. Contingencies in areas other than those where intelligence can dominate in times of relative peace are likely to see commanders in receipt of information at the beginning of conflicts more akin to that available at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War than Operation Cast Lead.

Other Adjustments

Ground Force Equipment

The years prior to the July 2006 outbreak of fighting in Lebanon saw expenditures on ground force equipment and training curtailed as intifada operations demanded the bulk of ground force resources. The IDF's new Chief of Staff after the war, Lieutenant General (LTG) Gabi Ashkenazi, directed that increased emphasis be paid to upgrading army training and equipment. The equipment emphasis took the form of a five-year procurement plan, *Tefen 2012*. It entailed upgrading hundreds of older tanks to *Merkava* Mk 4 standards; fielding of the *Namer*, a *Merkava*-based armored personnel carrier; and purchase of other capabilities, to include enhanced command and control

³³ BG (IDF, ret.) Gideon Avidor during Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves), Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009. General Avidor notes that the General Security Forces are more akin to the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) than to a military intelligence organization, further suggesting there are differences in the nature of intelligence obtained prior to and after the beginning of Operation Cast Lead.

systems.³⁴ These major end item requisitions had complements in purchases of soldiers' personal equipment, to include "10,000 ceramic protection vests, 30,000 helmets, 40,000 combat vests, [and] 60,000 night vision goggles."³⁵

Strategic Objectives

The Winograd Commission report, the most highly visible of the post-SLW investigations, concluded that Israel's leaders had violated the first of the IDF's principles of war: Mission and Aim.³⁶ Objectives set for the armed forces were thought to be unrealistic, e.g., securing the return of the two soldiers kidnapped during the event precipitating the war.³⁷ Objectives set by the prime minister and the head of the armed forces were more restrained at the outset of Operation Cast Lead. Again citing analyst Matt Matthews,

Unlike 2006, there were no grand pronouncements of unachievable strategic goals emanating from the Israeli Prime Minister.... There were no bombastic proclamations similar to that of former Chief of the IDF General Staff, Dan Halutz, that "[w]e have won the war." It seemed as if Israeli ground forces in Gaza had undergone a major cultural change in terms of decisiveness, aggressiveness, commitment to the mission and willingness to accept casualties. In this engagement, IDF commanders led from the front, cell phones were seized from Israeli soldiers, and the media heavily restricted from access to the battlefield. In a complete reversal from 2006, the IDF reserves were promptly called to duty and arrived on the battlefield well trained and well equipped.³⁸

³⁴ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 86.

³⁵ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 23.

³⁶ The outgoing IDF Chief of Staff, IAF General Halutz, initiated 70 investigations before stepping down. Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 22.

³⁷ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 89.

³⁸ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 5.

To preclude unrealistic expectations, the strategic focus was on “tangible and achievable goals: reinforcing deterrence, weakening Hamas, [and] sharply reducing or ending the threat from smugglers and rockets over time.”³⁹

³⁹ Matt M. Matthews, “Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 29–30.

2. Operation Cast Lead: Description and Analysis

One might reasonably argue that the Second Lebanon War and fighting in Gaza 28 months later were two parts of a single conflict, much as were World Wars I and II. Like those two 20th-century clashes, the adversaries confronted by Israel were not identical and there was an extended gap between periods of overt hostility. Yet the roots of Operation Cast Lead can be found to reach into southern Lebanon, just as factors influencing the outbreak of World War II are evident in the aftermath of the earlier war. Israeli concerns with the 2006 battering taken by their country's strategic deterrence and national pride likely played a role. The trigger for fighting in Lebanon was the ambush of Israeli soldiers along the southern border of Lebanon on July 12th of that year. Lost in the historic dust stirred up by the ensuing war against Hezbollah are earlier events in the south. Israel had, only two weeks before, conducted a failed raid to recover Corporal Gilad Shalit, kidnapped when Palestinian militants crossed the Gaza border on June 25, 2006. Hamas quickly demonstrated its support for the kidnappers. Israel responded by arresting 64 Hamas officials in Jerusalem and the West Bank on June 29 and attacking targets within Gaza.⁴⁰ On July 4, the Israeli cabinet approved "prolonged" activities against Hamas. Many observers conclude that Hezbollah's July 12, 2006 ambush was in retaliation for these actions against the ruling government in Gaza.⁴¹ Events in Gaza may have driven those in 2006 southern Lebanon; two years later the consequences would come full circle.

And so, in turn, memories of the SLW simmered as the pace of rocket attacks from Gaza increased in the autumn of 2008. Israeli reprisals led Hamas officials to declare an end to the six-month truce agreed upon on June 19 of that year. "The end of the truce was greeted by a relative calm," *The New York Times* reported on December 19, though "officials and analysts [say that] both sides need the truce [and] will probably grope their way back to it."⁴² It instead proved a very short calm before the storm released by

⁴⁰ Hamas did not kidnap Shalit but later took custody of the soldier. Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 62.

⁴¹ Jeremy M. Sharp, et al., "Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict," Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, September 15, 2006, pp. 31-33.

⁴² Edi Israel, "Gaza Truce May be Revived by Necessity," *The New York Times*, December 19, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/world/middleeast/20middleeast.html> (accessed January 15, 2010).

the Israeli Air Force with strikes on targets throughout the Gaza Strip on December 27, 2008.

Background: Gaza and Hamas

The population of the Gaza Strip is 1.5 million, with more than 1 million classified as Palestinian refugees—and 45% of the Gaza population is 14 years of age and younger. The predominant ethnic group—at 99%—is Palestinian Arab.⁴³

Penny L. Mellies

“Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics”

Few places in the world are as densely populated, as impoverished, and with so homogeneous and young a population as the Gaza Strip. The combination would provide ingredients for instability regardless of location. That Gaza shares a border with the government many of its residents blame for their difficulties makes the mixture all the more volatile. The election of Hamas, an organization with a history of antagonizing Israel, was akin to the striking of a match.

The Origins of Hamas

Hamas, a truncation of *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic Resistance Movement), is a very recent addition to the Middle East’s centuries of conflict, having emerged from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood only in 1987. Political party, military force, social welfare provider, and—as of January 25, 2006—elected government of Gaza, at the end of 2008 it stood as the most visible of Palestinian groups encouraging conflict with Israel. Its primary political leadership is physically divided between two locations—Gaza and Damascus, Syria—a division not infrequently representative of significant differences in views on policy and future courses of action. Such rifts are familiar to Hamas, just as they are to Palestinians in general; the divide within the organization pales in comparison with that separating it from Fatah and the Palestinian Authority ruling the West Bank. Barriers separating the two solidified with Hamass’ bloody purge of Fatah forces from Gaza in 2007.

In addition to some access to public funding since its election, Hamas draws on support from Palestinian expatriates and money provided by wealthy Saudi Arabians and

⁴³ Penny L. Mellies, “Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 55. (Emphasis in original.)

citizens of other Arab nations. State supporters include Iran (though to a lesser extent than is enjoyed by Hezbollah). Israeli scholar Reuven Paz estimates that Hamas dedicates some 80–90 percent of its \$70–\$90 million annual budget to “social, welfare, cultural, and educational activities,” initiatives aided by funds from charities in Europe, Canada, and the United States.⁴⁴ This social focus abetted the organization’s early growth, a period when Israel was primarily concerned with the Palestine Liberation Organization. These were years of Hamas incubation; initiatives sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood helped to increase the organization’s influence among members of the population both in Gaza and the West Bank. Programs included creation of kindergartens, education on the Koran, free circumcisions (along with sponsorship of the celebrations accompanying such events), and provision of free or highly subsidized medical care. The Muslim Brotherhood—and later Hamas—complemented these educational and charitable actions to further penetrate Palestinian society via increasing their influence in the areas of labor representation and professional associations. Despite its purportedly more fundamentalist approach to Islam, Hamas wisely included support of women’s groups in its activities, thereby competing with more secular organizations where it otherwise would have been influential.⁴⁵ In short, Hamas competed with Fatah’s—and, arguably Israel’s—established authorities across the spectrum of government, a highly effective policy reminiscent of Hezbollah’s approaches.

Hamas’s successes can be seen to be as much a consequence of its Fatah competition’s shortcomings as its own capabilities. Its perseverance in the 2007 conflict versus Fatah, in the words of a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study, was “far more because of a lack of leadership and elementary competence on the part of the Fatah/Palestinian Authority forces than any great skill on the part of Hamas.” Reflective of its later performance during Operation Cast Lead, the study went on to observe, “Unlike the Hezbollah, Hamas never had to develop the combat skills necessary to fight an effective opponent” during its emergence as an insurgent and terrorist

⁴⁴ “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2009, www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (accessed August 3, 2009); and Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, p. 237.

⁴⁵ Sherifa Zuhur, “Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics,” Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, pp. 7 and 27.

organization.⁴⁶ Whereas Fatah offered years of corruption, Hamas cultivated a reputation for honesty and commitment to the Palestinian people. Little wonder that in January 2006 many voted for Hamas despite reservations about the organization's fundamentalist declarations and open hostility toward Israel's continued existence.⁴⁷ Israelis only belatedly recognized the astuteness of the Hamas strategy; in the view of an IDF colonel, "There really isn't any alternative to Hamas. Fatah is a proven failure and at least Hamas is attempting reconstruction with Iranian money versus stealing it like Fatah did."⁴⁸ It should not surprise that Israel, the United States, and other governments are viewed with suspicion by Palestinians, given those countries' failure to recognize the voters' choice of Hamas as the legitimate representative of the population in the Gaza Strip.

The Hamas charter, released the year after formal organization of the group in 1987, contrasts with the humanitarian image Hamas maintains for internal and broader Muslim audiences. Its stated objectives include "discarding the evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert [to their owners], calls for prayer be heard from their mosques, announcing the reinstitution of the Muslim state. Thus, people and things will revert to their true place.... So-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.... Leaving the circle of conflict with Israel is a major act of treason and it will bring curse on its perpetrators."⁴⁹ Today the organization's leaders state that such aggressive attitudes are no longer representative of Hamas. The charter's condemnation of Zionism and other anti-Israeli declarations should not, in the words of Hamas leader Khalid Mish'al, "be regarded as the fundamental ideological frame of reference from which the movement takes its

⁴⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 'Gaza War': A Strategic Analysis," Final Review Draft, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, p. 5, csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (accessed January 15, 2010).

⁴⁷ Though demonstrating a less secular religious position, the nature of Hamas's fundamentalism should not be equated to that of Al Qaeda or more extreme groups. Hamas accepts the legitimacy of the nation state as a concept and does not support *takfir*, the rejection of others viewed as "false" Muslims. Hamas has in fact resisted Al Qaeda influence in Gaza. See Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, pp. 5, 13, and 60.

⁴⁸ Penny L. Mellies, "Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 48–49.

⁴⁹ Ulrich W. Sahn, "The Hamas Charter – The Covenant of the Hamas 1988," EuropeNews, <http://europenews.dk/en/node/9625> (accessed January 29, 2010).

positions.”⁵⁰ Hamas’s deputy foreign minister similarly dismissed the charter as “not an important document—we don’t use it. Why should we change it when we never use it?”⁵¹ There is reason to believe the charter may serve a propaganda purpose that contrasts with the group’s actual political stance. Analyst Sherifa Zuhur observes that “HAMAS has come to accept a two-state vision, even with the contradiction in terms between this aim and the rights of historic Palestine.”⁵²

The Theater of Operations and Hamas Military Capabilities

A significant difference between military operations characteristic of the Second Lebanon War and those during Operation Cast Lead is the nature of the physical environment. Gaza in its entirety covers only 139 square miles (360 square kilometers). (By contrast, Washington, D.C. encompasses 68.3 square miles; the area between Lebanon’s Litani River and Israel’s northern border occupied at the end of the last century covered 440 square miles.⁵³) Whereas the terrain the IDF faced in 2006 southern Lebanon was creviced by deep valleys and severely compartmented, Gaza is primarily flat to rolling in character. Its small size permitted virtual surrounding of the area involved in the 2008–2009 fighting.⁵⁴ Not all Gaza’s topography worked to Israel’s advantage, however. Its dense urbanization created significant tactical challenges. The population per square kilometer in Gaza is 4,311, putting the density measure *for the*

⁵⁰ Sherifa Zuhur, “Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics,” Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 31.

⁵¹ “Acceptance versus recognition,” *The Economist* 392 (August 31, 2009): pp. 41–42.

⁵² Sherifa Zuhur, “Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics,” Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 45. Some Israelis, of course, point to the charter as evidence of Hamas’s continued commitment to the elimination of Israel. The impact of the charter in lending credence to such arguments is stronger because Hamas has not formally repudiated the document. Repudiation would probably be seen as a step forward in negotiations; it would not eliminate the influence of its words on future perceptions. W. Andrew Terrill notes how even historical documents can be manipulated for propaganda ends, as he wrote of the growth of antipathy Lebanon’s Shi’ite population felt for Israel in the aftermath of the IDF’s 1982 invasion of that country: “The Israeli decision to stay in southern Lebanon for an undetermined period was not well-received by the Shi’ites. A variety of early Zionist literature had suggested that the lands and waters of southern Lebanon were appropriate for incorporation into the Jewish homeland. While in Israel such literature had largely been relegated to an ideological past, the Shi’ites now began to reconsider the significance of these works.” W. Andrew Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” *Conflict Quarterly* 7 (Summer 1987): p. 24.

⁵³ The value for the territory occupied during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon is from Curtis F. Jones, “A Retrospective on the Infernal Triangle: Lebanon, Syria and Israel,” http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_14/jones_tri2.html (accessed January 15, 2010).

⁵⁴ Penny L. Mellies, “Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 58.

entire Strip on par with some urban areas.⁵⁵ (One of the most densely populated countries in Europe, the Netherlands, has a value of 493 persons per square kilometer of land area;⁵⁶ the population density for Los Angeles, California is 3,156 persons per square kilometer.⁵⁷)

Problems related to density of population were exacerbated by Hamas's extensive reliance on underground facilities for command and control facilities, storage of weapons and munitions, and use of tunnels for transport. Many of these were located under or in close proximity to densely populated areas. Israeli operations were further complicated by the presence of eight UN-sponsored refugee camps at various locations in the Gaza Strip.⁵⁸

Estimates differ regarding the forces Hamas could muster in December 2008. Most estimates regarding the strength of the Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades (the military branch of the organization, generally referred to as "Qassam Brigades") ranged between 6,000 to over 15,000, though in mid-summer of 2007 the numbers were perhaps half what they would be 18 months later,⁵⁹ a situation reflecting what must have been limited levels of training and experience for the more recent arrivals when war broke out.⁶⁰ Additional internal security forces were estimated at 13,000 or more; this

⁵⁵ Population density calculated from values at "Middle East: Gaza Strip," The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html> (accessed January 22, 2010).

⁵⁶ Population density calculated from "Europe: Netherlands," The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html> (accessed January 22, 2010).

⁵⁷ "Los Angeles," City-Data.com, <http://www.city-data.com/city/Los-Angeles-California.html> (accessed January 22, 2010).

⁵⁸ Penny L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 59.

⁵⁹ Force strength estimates from Penny L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 50–52; and Sherifa Zuhur, " Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 59; and "The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects," The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 29. It is Zuhur who states that "in the summer of 2007, Hamas vowed to double its numbers to 12,000." The value in excess of 15,000 comes from "The Operation in Gaza," which states the estimate is from Hamas itself.

⁶⁰ Analyst Penny Mellies concludes that "only a few hundred can be categorized as highly proficient Hamas fighters and leaders. Most of this latter group has participated in training in Syria and Iran and/or with Hezbollah in Lebanon, [the last] staffed by foreigners, most notably IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] advisors and trainers. Geographically, the crowded Gaza Strip does not afford such training opportunities." Penny L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 50–52.

number is high, however, as some of these forces are also members of Qassam Brigades. Internal security forces were divided into five primary groups:

- Police (formerly the Executive Force, which includes the elite Rapid Intervention Force and Naval Police)
- Internal Security Service
- Security and Protection Force
- National Security
- Civil Defense Service.⁶¹

The police are the centerpiece of the internal security forces. They were estimated to number more than 6,000 personnel in late 2008, “armed with Kalashnikov or M-16 assault rifles, hand grenades, and anti-tank weapons.”⁶² The Naval Police numbered in the hundreds, armed with “light arms and various IEDs.”⁶³ It was this force that attempted to engage Israeli naval vessels and was involved in shooting at navy patrol boats.⁶⁴ (The IDF strength in December 2008 was in excess of 150,000.)

Hamas military units comprise the most able Palestinian armed force of any size, as demonstrated by their rapid ouster of Fatah forces from the Strip in 2007.⁶⁵ This is not to say there were not other forces willing to fight the IDF, organizations that at times coordinated their activities with Hamas leaders. These included the Palestinian Islamic Jihad with over 1,000 personnel, and the Popular Resistance Committee, estimated at several hundred.⁶⁶

Though lacking in heavy weapon systems, Hamas armament reportedly included small arms (to include sniper rifles), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled

⁶¹ “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects,” The State of Israel, July 2009, pp. 29–30.

⁶² “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects,” The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 30.

⁶³ “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects,” The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 30.

⁶⁴ “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects,” The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 30.

⁶⁵ Matt M. Matthews, “Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 24–25.

⁶⁶ Penny L. Mellies, “Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 50–52.

grenade launchers (RPG), and various mortar and rocket systems.⁶⁷ The latter ranged from homemade Qassam rockets to much longer-range Iranian 122mm Katyushas. Reports of various air defense capabilities remain unconfirmed by employment against Israel. (The same is true of anti-tank capabilities other than RPG-type weapons.⁶⁸) The rocket systems endanger both life and infrastructure and have economic consequences for Israel, which has expended millions of dollars in active and passive defense systems to defeat the threats.⁶⁹

Israel and Hamas: A Difficult History

Hamas attacks on Israel killed an estimated 185 and wounded over 1,200 more between 1989 and the beginning of the Second Intifada in September 2000.⁷⁰ The pace of death quickened thereafter; Hamas sponsored 425 attacks between September 29, 2000 and March 24, 2004, resulting in 377 killed and 2,076 wounded.⁷¹ Not all violence has been directed toward Israel. Hamas representatives killed 21 Palestinians in August 2008, including the radical Sheikh Abu al-Hour al-Maqdessi, head of Jun Ansar Allah (Soldiers of the Partisans of God), who had challenged Hamas by accusing its members of being insufficiently Islamic. A spokesman made it clear that Hamas would not tolerate challenges to its authority in a public declaration, stating, "It is not permitted to any party or individual to enforce their own laws because this is the responsibility of the security forces."⁷² As noted, Hamas's desire to be the sole arbiter of law in Gaza would

⁶⁷ Penny L. Mellies, "Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 50–52

⁶⁸ Yiftah Shapir, "Hamas' Weapons," The Institute for National Security Studies *Strategic Assessment* 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2649> (accessed April 10, 2009).

⁶⁹ Jim Zanotti, et al., "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009)," Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2009, p. 3. Among likely future U.S. challenges revealed in studying of Operation Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War: state and non-state actor possession of increasingly accurate and ever longer-range indirect fire weapons. Pursuit of technological solutions is underway; doctrine and training will also have to be adapted.

⁷⁰ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, p. 12.

⁷¹ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, p. 12.

⁷² "Radical Muslim cleric among 21 killed in Gaza clashes," CNN, August 15, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/08/15/gaza.clashes/index/html> (accessed August 15, 2009); and "13 die as Islamic radicals, Hamas clash in Gaza," CNN.com/world, August 14, 2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/08/14/gaza.clashes/index.html> (accessed January 17, 2010).

be reinforced during Operation Cast Lead with the purge of additional Fatah authorities.⁷³

The United States continued to communicate with Hamas, and the group avoided being labeled a terrorist organization for a number of years after its 1987 formation. Formal intercourse ended when a Department of State verification of having met with representatives in March 1993 prompted Israeli protests.⁷⁴ Relations between Hamas and U.S. administrations have been strained since, though group leaders emphasize that Israel is its only declared foe and any antipathy with regard to the United States pertains to the country's government and not its citizenry. Europe's relations are less absolute in character. The European Union (EU) cut ties only with the military wing of the organization despite U.S. and Israeli efforts to deny Hamas recognition.⁷⁵

The implications of even partial withholding of recognition for Hamas as a legitimate government has been costly, as has been the closing of the region's borders by its only two neighbors, Egypt and Israel. It is the people who suffer the most. The loss of \$600 million in EU and \$420 million in American aid has caused severe shortages of medical supplies, fuel, food, and energy in Gaza. In mid-2006, 87.7% of households were living in poverty and 61.5% reported lacking money for daily requirements.⁷⁶ It was a case of the bad getting worse. Even in 2003, prior to Hamas winning the January 2006 elections, the Gaza Strip suffered a 33.5% unemployment rate; 30% of its children suffered from chronic malnutrition, and 21% from acute malnutrition. By 2004, three-quarters of its population survived below the poverty line of \$2 per day.⁷⁷ Pro-Palestinian sources state that one million of Gaza's 1.5M population in 2008 relied on United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAS), and various Arab and Islamic charities; 70% of the

⁷³ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 'Gaza War': A Strategic Analysis" (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, www.csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), p. 59.

⁷⁴ Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 60.

⁷⁵ Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 61.

⁷⁶ Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 58.

⁷⁷ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, pp. 5-6.

population had access to water only eight hours for two days in a week.⁷⁸ Lest these claims be discarded too quickly, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated Gaza's 2008 unemployment rate as 41.3% (up from 34.8% two years before); it determined that 80% of the population lived below the poverty line in 2007.⁷⁹ Actions such as Israel's cutting off electricity to Gaza, withholding of tax and customs money collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and the Israeli Army's destruction of Gaza's only airport serve both to aggravate these problems and handicap efforts to establish a viable economy.⁸⁰ These policies have been somewhat offset by aid from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and other nations, the Saudis having stated the funds are "humanitarian assistance" in response to U.S. protests.⁸¹ Iran's proportion of aid appears to be considerably less than that from Arab nations (though a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency estimated the amount of Iranian funding for Hamas at \$100 million over the period 1988 to 1994).⁸² Some of the Persian "aid" has apparently come in the form of munitions such as Katyusha Grad missiles.⁸³ While specifics on the extent of Iran's support are unknown, an article in *The Economist* concluded that it "appears to be more theatrical than practical."⁸⁴ Difficulties experienced by Palestinians in completing the *haji*, the pilgrimage to Mecca (one of the five basic requirements for a pious Muslim)⁸⁵ serve to emphasize the religious component of Israeli-Gazan frictions.

⁷⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 'Gaza War': A Strategic Analysis" (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, www.csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009).

⁷⁹ "Middle East: Gaza Strip," The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html> (accessed January 17, 2010).

⁸⁰ Jeremy M. Sharp, et al., "Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict," Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, September 15, 2006, p. 31; Anonymous interview with author; Alan Johnston, "Years of delays at Gaza airport," BBC News, April 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4449461.stm (accessed July 11, 2009); Bernard Wasserstein, *Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?* New Haven, CT: Yale, 2004, p. 65; and Tim Butcher, "Israelis accused of vandalising airport," *The Telegraph* (December 14, 2006), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1536933/Israelis-accused-of-vandalising-airport.html> (accessed July 11, 2009).

⁸¹ Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 51.

⁸² Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, NY: Palgrave, 2008, pp. 34–35.

⁸³ "Iran and Hamas: How Iran fits in," *The Economist* (January 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/world/middleeast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12959539&source=login_payBarrier (accessed January 24, 2010).

⁸⁴ "Iran and Hamas: How Iran fits in," *The Economist* (January 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/world/middleeast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12959539&source=login_payBarrier (accessed January 24, 2010).

⁸⁵ Sherifa Zuhur, "Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-based Politics," Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008, p. 52.

One individual familiar with Gaza's internal situation questioned the long-term wisdom of Israel's embargo. His observations substantiate the need to carefully investigate second- and higher-order effects of counterinsurgency and other stability operations policies and monitor the effects of those policies once they are implemented:

A lot of us think that Israeli policy is counterproductive.... The embargo has caused factory after factory and business after business to go belly up, and Hamas cronies are buying them up for a penny on the dollar.... Eventually these will be economically viable entities again [and it will be Hamas that benefits].⁸⁶

Operation Cast Lead: A Summary of Tactical Action

After implementing a highly detailed deception plan, which convinced Hamas that it had no plans to engage in a full scale conflict, the IDF launched Operation CAST LEAD. At 1130 on 27 December, IAF aircraft roaring in from the Mediterranean struck numerous Hamas targets in an expansive assault that was the largest ever carried out in Gaza. In the first passes 180 Hamas targets were hit. Weapon storage facilities, rocket assembly plants, Hamas training camps, command centers, communication networks and other targets were destroyed with masterful precision.⁸⁷

Matt M. Matthews

"Hard Lessons Learned"

The months before the outbreak of violence in December 2008 were largely relatively peaceful ones along the Gaza-Israel border. (See Figure 2.1.) That began to change in November despite the June six-month ceasefire agreed to by the respective parties still being in effect. "Relatively peaceful" did not mean violence free, however. An Israeli ground forces raid on November 4, allegedly an operation to interdict further Hamas attempts to kidnap Israeli soldiers, precipitated the renewal of rocket attacks that month. Egyptian attempts to broker continuation of the ceasefire failed, Hamas declaring it ended when the original agreement expired on December 19, 2008.

Israel received a deluge of some 60 rockets launched from the Strip five days later, on December 24, 2008. Some analysts speculate that Hamas had little interest in renewing

⁸⁶ Anonymous interview with author.

⁸⁷ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 26–27.

□




Figure 2.1
Rocket Attacks Against Israel from Gaza in 2008⁸⁸

the ceasefire, given the pending expiration of Palestinian Authority President Abbas' term.⁸⁹ Overlooked in pundits' and other analyses is the timing of Israel's raid into Gaza and its denial of media representative entry into the Gaza Strip, both of which came in November and before the spike in rocket attacks, perhaps implying an effort by some in Israel to influence the timing of an outbreak of hostilities.⁹⁰ Similarly, in late November,

⁸⁸ Figure 2.1 from Itay Brun, "Operation Cast Lead: A Strategic Overview," briefing provided during the Hybrid Threats Discovery Seminar, Suffolk, VA, October 19, 2009; Data also available at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/Rock_mort_gaza_2008.JPG (accessed January 30, 2010).

⁸⁹ Jim Zanotti, et al., "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009)," Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2009, p. 2.

⁹⁰ In response to the author's question why Israel might have denied access to media so far in advance of its initiating operations in late December, Dutch Middle East correspondent Conny Mus replied, "That was preparation for the war. We know that. I was then board member of the Foreign Press Association in Israel. We went to court on that issue [denial of access to Gaza] because they [Israelis] don't have a right to do that because Gaza is not their territory... The court decision that we should have free access in Gaza came...after the end of the war." Conny Mus, interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Jerusalem, Israel, October 12, 2009.

roughly a month before the initiation of Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli Army released its estimate of \$4.24 million a day as the cost of a major operation into Gaza.⁹¹

Israel had developed a detailed and well-designed military deception plan to conceal its intentions. A high-level political visit, including Foreign Minister Livni, went to Egypt, helping to reinforce the ruse. (The visit led Hamas to later accuse Egypt of having been aware of Israel's plans and failing to inform the Palestinian government in Gaza.) Other senior officials visited the Gaza region in a manner implying continuation of normal routines.⁹² Israeli soldiers were permitted to take leave, and IDF graduation ceremonies were held as normally. Steps to improve operations security were also implemented. Hezbollah had demonstrated the capability to monitor IDF soldiers' cell phones and perform direction-finding operations to determine users' whereabouts. Cell phones were therefore prohibited in units moving forward for the attack into Gaza.

Sweeping in from the Mediterranean at 11:30 am on December 27, 2008, Israeli Air Force jets struck Hamas targets throughout Gaza, catching many Palestinians by surprise and increasing the effectiveness of the targeting. It was the largest air operation in IAF history. Initial sorties hit 180 targets, to include command centers, rocket assembly factories, training camps, weapons storage facilities, communications capabilities, and others.⁹³ (Evidence suggests the surprise was not complete, however. Senior Hamas leaders are reported to have moved into hiding two days before the strikes, and select computer and other assets were likewise repositioned.⁹⁴ Some Hamas police and military personnel chose to remain outside their police stations or Qassam Brigade positions, avoiding death or injury when they were struck in the first

⁹¹ Omar Karmi, "Gaza stripped – Israeli blockade leaves Gaza vulnerable," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (December 11, 2008).

⁹² Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 'Gaza War': A Strategic Analysis" (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), p. 15; and Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 26–27.

⁹³ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 26–27.

⁹⁴ It is very likely that Hamas leaders had prepared to reposition critical assets and suspected an Israeli attack to be in the offing. An international aid representative told the author, "Since August, everybody was expecting the operation. The Israeli focus was on Gaza. It was very much planned. It was in the air." Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

attacks.⁹⁵) The IAF hit approximately 450 targets by December 31. IAF leadership responded to early Hamas dispersal of assets by shifting priority to the following six lesser-priority target groups:

- Infrastructure
- Manufacturing facilities
- Storage areas
- Rocket launch sites (to include buried positions)
- Tunnels and sheltered underground facilities
- Hamas leader homes
- Hamas combat forces.⁹⁶

It was in attacking structures suspected of possibly holding noncombatants (the IDF referred to them as “noninvolved” rather than “innocents”)⁹⁷ that Israel initiated its “knock on the roof” use of very small munitions on rooftops to warn any civilians of the structures’ pending demolition, the aerial equivalent of firing a shot across the bow of a vessel at sea.⁹⁸ According to Israeli sources, other means of warning noncombatants included phone calls, radio broadcasts, and leaflet drops.⁹⁹

Israel initiated its ground campaign (also referred to as the “air-ground phase”) on January 3, 2009 after approximately a week of aerial bombardment. Defense Minister Ehud Barak emphasized the country’s inclusion of humanitarian concerns in its charter for the operation, this after another official’s announcement of the initiation of the air-land phase in a statement devoid of any implication that Israel desired to occupy Gaza, destroy Hamas, or invite the Palestinian Authority to reassume responsibility for

⁹⁵ Penny L. Mellies, “Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 69.

⁹⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), p. 19.

⁹⁷ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

⁹⁸ Erlanger, Steven. “A Gaza War Full of Traps and Trickery,” *The New York Times*; and Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

⁹⁹ “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects,” The State of Israel, July 2009, pp. 24-99.

Gaza.¹⁰⁰ The three-brigade Gaza Division had been moving into position since late the month before under the oversight of the IDF's Southern Command. Infantry units were supported by tanks and attack helicopters assigned to them. Gaza Division did not "own" these units. It was a territorial headquarters with very few organic organizations. For Operation Cast Lead, three of the four brigades falling under command were the Paratroopers Brigade, Givati Brigade, and Golani Brigade (operating in and around Gaza City (see Figure 2.2). The fourth, the Iron Tracks armored brigade, cut across Gaza to the south of the city, separating the northern and southern Gaza Strip. All four units operated with considerable autonomy during the ensuing campaign. A number of reserve brigades would likewise fall under the control of Gaza Division, but the extent of reserve commitment during the conflict would be limited.¹⁰¹ Rules of engagement for the ground forces were relaxed in order to reduce Israeli soldier casualties. A virtually unavoidable consequence was an increase in the number of civilians killed or injured. Wanton destruction was not to be the order of the day, however. Precision-guided and limited effects munitions such as the 250-pound class GBU-39 "Small Diameter Bomb" or "Small Smart Bomb" helped to reduce noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. The Small Smart Bomb contains only 50 pounds of explosive but has the same penetration capability as some 2000-pound munitions.¹⁰²

The Paratrooper Brigade task force attacked from the north along the Mediterranean coast. Its immediate objective was to prevent the firing of rockets from the area. To the south, the Givati Brigade task force began near the Karni crossing to penetrate westward south of Gaza City, while a task force built around the Golani Brigade struck toward the city from the northeast.¹⁰³ The attackers avoided obvious avenues of approach, relying on *Tsefa* mine-clearing systems to cross suspected minefields or blast

¹⁰⁰Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 'Gaza War': A Strategic Analysis" (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), p. 36.

¹⁰¹ Matt M. Matthews, "Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰² "Small Diameter Bomb/Small Smart Bomb," Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm> (accessed January 18, 2010).

¹⁰³ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 91.



Figure 2.2
Primary IDF Ground Force Attacks into Gaza¹⁰⁴

paths through built-up areas after imagery from UAVs helped commanders select the most promising routes of advance. The army favored night operations, knowing that Qassam Brigade and other forces that might be supporting Hamas were deficient in both night-vision systems and the training needed to effectively operate under conditions of limited visibility. Combined arms tactics sought to maneuver the enemy out of position or employ firepower to eliminate threats in-place with minimal danger to IDF personnel.¹⁰⁵ Infantry led the way in urban areas, calling tanks, armored bulldozers, or

¹⁰⁴ Adapted from image in Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 92. Map from "Middle East: Gaza Strip," The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html> (accessed January 18, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 92–93.

other support forward when needed. Gaza City was soon cut off from the Gaza Strip's primary north-south highway.¹⁰⁶

Hamas forces offered limited serious resistance to IDF ground forces, a reflection of its relative ineffectiveness as a fighting force in comparison to Hezbollah in 2006 and the well-conceived Israeli tactics designed to avoid Qassam Brigade engagement areas and traps. As noted, Hamas was also occupied with other agendas during this time. In the words of an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, "Approximately 1,200 Fatah men—including a member of Fatah's Higher Leadership Council in Gaza—were put under house arrest [and] Hamas executed those considered 'most dangerous.' Commenting on Hamas's practice, a politically independent Palestinian said that while killing collaborators during wartime was tantamount to 'self-defence,' some militants seized the opportunity for brutal score-settling."¹⁰⁷ In addition, Qassam Brigade members continued to police the strip in conjunction with civilian policemen. Children of the Mosque members, the military youth wing of Hamas, assisted their efforts by reporting disturbances. The result was little loss of order. The same ICG report notes Hamas's ensuring no loss of that control in the immediate aftermath of the war: "The government resumed policing immediately after the fighting, with officers quickly returning even to tasks such as rousting teenage truants from parks and clearing unlicensed sidewalk vendors."¹⁰⁸

Up to 80 rockets struck Israel daily from Gaza at the beginning of Operation Cast Lead. By the end of the war, the number had dwindled to 20 or fewer.¹⁰⁹ Israel declared a cessation of hostilities at 2 AM on January 18, two days prior to Barack Obama's taking the oath of office as President of the United States. Israeli government officials predicted that the outcome would give Israel two years of calm.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 92.

¹⁰⁷ Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, pp. 4–5.

¹⁰⁸ Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Penny L. Mellies, "Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 69.

¹¹⁰ Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, pp. 18–19. Regarding the termination of hostilities, Ben-David Alon states "With the inauguration of US President-elect Barack Obama looming on 20 January, US Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice made clear to Israeli diplomats their 'unwillingness' to allow the operation to continue into the new administration,

Estimates of casualties differ. The Palestinian Ministry of Health and several human rights organizations put the number of Palestinians killed at over 900, with injured exceeding 4,250. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights set the number killed at 1,417 and provided names and ages for each of the dead, including over 900 civilians. Israeli Defense Forces estimates fell between these values, the number cited as dead being some 1,300. (A second IDF source cited this number as 1,166, of which “more than half were ‘ Hamas terror operatives.’”) The most significant point of disagreement is on the proportion of civilians to Hamas fighters who lost their lives, Israel claiming that up to two-thirds were enemy combatants. An IDF investigation into 900 of the Palestinians killed reported that 750 had been Hamas personnel. A correspondent for the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* determined the number of Palestinian dead at between 500 and 600 with under 5,300 wounded, the majority of both groups being 17–23 year old members of Hamas. Public infrastructure and private property suffered considerably, with damage estimates again varying considerably. Satellite photography showed that the worst destruction occurred in Gaza City and the Philadelphia Corridor regions. (See Figure 2.3 for the location of each.) The numbers given for those killed and wounded due to rocket attacks on Israel were 4 and 250, respectively.¹¹¹

according to sources familiar with the talks.” Ben-David, Alon, “Israeli offensive seeks ‘new security reality’ in Gaza,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (January 8, 2009).

¹¹¹ Estimates of casualties and damage from Kevin Flower, “U.N. human rights investigators enter Gaza,” June 1, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/01/mideast.gaza.probe/> (accessed July 8, 2009); Steve Weizman, “Gaza: Israeli military disputes Palestinian death count,” *Charleston Post and Courier* (March 27, 2009): p. 6AA; John Zarocostas, “UN reports big increase in civilian casualties in Gaza,” *BMJ* 338 (January 17, 2009): p. 127; and Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009).

Regional Implications of Operation Cast Lead

The most prominent characteristic of the Arab world's response to Operation Cast Lead was division and weakness.¹¹²

Ephraim Kam

"Operation Cast Lead: Regional Implications"

"Divisive" might be the single word best describing the implications of the Palestinian issue. It cuts rifts between Palestinians themselves. It segments Israel. It factionalizes the Arab and the larger Muslim world, both intra- and internationally. Egypt, for example, rejected Hamas demands to open the Rafi crossing between the Sinai and Gaza



Figure 2.3
Gaza City and the Philadelphia Corridor¹¹³

¹¹² Ephraim Kam, "Operation Cast Lead: Regional Implications," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2635> (accessed March 27, 2009).

¹¹³ Locations of Gaza City and the Philadelphia Corridor added to map image "[Gaza Strip](#)," May 2005, University of Texas Libraries, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/gaza_strip_may_2005.jpg (accessed January 21, 2010).

during Operation Cast Lead. Egypt defended its decision by reminding Hamas that it refused to allow Israeli oversight of aid imports via that route as required by a 2005 crossings agreement. Egypt's media at the same time reminded its audiences of Hamas's status as an implement of Iranian influence.

Egypt's actions are reflective of those exercised by many moderate Arab states: they at once would like to see Hamas undermined if not reduced to inconsequential status but retain concerns about the welfare of Palestinian residents in Gaza.¹¹⁴ This makes these governments uneasy allies-of-a-sort with Israel, the policies of which support moderate Arab aims with respect to Hamas even as they work to counter-purposes regarding the Palestinian population. (In the case of Egypt, the antipathy toward Hamas is perhaps considerably stronger than in countries less threatened by proximity and the organization's history with the Muslim Brotherhood.¹¹⁵) The relationship between moderate regional governments and Israel is further complicated by the latter's occasional unilateral military actions that at a minimum embarrass affected rulers and sometimes constitute violations of national sovereignty, e.g., the unauthorized use of airspace during the 1981 attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor complex and air attacks on a convoy of 23 trucks in northeast Sudan in January 2009, trucks allegedly hauling arms and ammunition to Hamas for smuggling into Gaza from Egypt.¹¹⁶

The divisive impact of the Palestinian issue also came to the fore when Turkish government leaders, visited by the Israeli prime minister just before Operation Cast Lead began, later expressed indignation that no mention of the pending attacks had been forthcoming. The passions resulting from the perceived snub were further enflamed when Turkey felt that its efforts to negotiate a ceasefire during the subsequent fighting were relegated to secondary status by Egypt's similar initiatives. Turkey joined Qatar (which also maintains diplomatic ties with Israel) in strongly condemning the

¹¹⁴ Ephraim Kam, "The Arab Reaction to Operation Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies *Strategic Insight* 86 (January 6, 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2512> (accessed April 10, 2009).

¹¹⁵ Ephraim Kam, "The Arab Reaction to Operation Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies *Strategic Insight* 86 (January 6, 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2512> (accessed April 10, 2009).

¹¹⁶ "Israel's new government: Change your tune," *The Economist* 391 (April 4, 2009): p. 50; and "Israel bombed arms smugglers in Sudan," Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, March 27, 2009, <http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/middleeast/090327-Israel-Sudan-redirected> (accessed January 22, 2010).

attack into Gaza.¹¹⁷ There are potentially severe implications of these irritations originating with the Palestinian issue; e.g., there are concerns that the strained ties with Turkey may affect that country's willingness to continue in its role as broker in Syrian-Israeli communications. The complexity of the Palestinian situation can disrupt countries' internal operations as well; the removal of Jordan's head of general intelligence services in January 2009 was reportedly due to activities during his efforts to improve Jordanian-Hamas relations.¹¹⁸

Though the line sometimes seems fairly clear (Iran, Syria, and fundamentalist non-state actors favoring Hamas; more moderate national governments supporting the Palestinian Authority), both past and present show these delineations of support for Hamas to be more blurred than cursory investigation might imply. Fatah and its leader Arafat alienated a number of Arab governments with their support for Saddam Hussein after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Palestinians were ousted from their jobs and deported in a number of Arab countries. Fatah's diplomatic loss was Hamas's gain; Hamas consequently benefited from financial support by Saudis and Kuwaitis in particular.¹¹⁹ The death of Arafat and Hamas's alignment with Iran have led to yet further evolution of these policies.

Aside from whatever deterrence benefits Israel might have reaped from its attacks in December 2008 and January of the following year, the above discussions reflect that regional consequences as viewed a year later seem to be predominantly negative. The same is true for the operation's impact within the Palestinian population. An International Crisis Group report on Operation Cast Lead warns that the fighting may have served to further solidify pre-war factionalism within Palestine's population:

The Israel-Hamas war has ended but none of the factors that triggered it have been addressed. Three months after unilateral ceasefires, Gaza's crossings are largely shut; reconstruction and rehabilitation have yet to begin; rockets periodically are fired into Israel; weapons smuggling

¹¹⁷ "Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 21.

¹¹⁸ Oded Eran, "Operation Cast Lead: The Diplomatic Dimension," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2651> (accessed March 27, 2009); and Yossi Melman, "Jordan's King Abdullah fires intel chief over Hamas support," Haaretz.com, October 20, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058438.html> (accessed January 29, 2010).

¹¹⁹ Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, NY: Nation, 2008, p. 151.

persists; Corporal Shalit remains captive; and Palestinians are deeply divided.... The challenge is not humanitarian.... It is, as it has always been, political.... Assuming a united government cannot be formed, a real risk is that the West Bank and Gaza will establish increasingly different and, eventually, incompatible governing systems.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ "Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 35.

3. Observations and Insights from Operation Cast Lead

A Positive Legacy of the Second Lebanon War: A Restrained Hezbollah

On the morning of January 8, 2009, Katyusha rockets were fired at Israel from Lebanon. Hizbollah hurried to deliver an official announcement that the organization had not carried out this operation.¹²¹

Amir Kulick

"Hizbollah and the Palestinians: From Defensive Shield to Cast Lead"

Israel's perspective on deterrence is somewhat different from that of other nations. The use of military might to gain a few years of intimidation and relative peace is considered a worthy expenditure of blood, funds, and image in the service of national security. We have noted Israeli concerns in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War regarding its negative consequences in terms of diminished deterrence. Those concerns addressed the country's larger regional perspective; IDF leaders and their political masters were confident that Hezbollah had received a rebuke sufficient to preclude renewed hostilities on Israel's northern border for several years. Evidence substantiating this conclusion was forthcoming when midway through Operation Cast Lead the rocket attack described in the quote above struck Israel. Hezbollah's senior representative in Lebanon's government quickly made a public announcement denying the group's participation in the attack. The reaction contrasted with earlier verbal support for Hamas provided by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in proclamations made at the beginning of Operation Cast Lead.

However, the author of the above quote suggests that Hezbollah's reasons for withholding more than verbal support for Hamas may have had another source,

Following the [Second Lebanon War] and the severe blow suffered by Hizbollah, there is no doubt that the organization is more cautious, both in its behavior and its assessments of Israel's

¹²¹ Amir Kulick, "Hizbollah and the Palestinians: From Defensive Shield to Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2636> (accessed March 27, 2009).

response. Its self-confidence was shaken.... Hizbollah acts on a number of planes. The first and most basic is the ideological level.... A second plane is the Shiite community.... Therefore, another round of escalation with Israel that smacks of Iranian involvement and brings unforeseeable results would do further damage to Hizbollah's public standing and the willingness of various factions in the Lebanese system to accept its armed presence.... Another likely factor underlying Hizbollah's underplayed response to Operation Cast Lead is the Lebanese parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2009. [The] organization's response to Operation Cast Lead showed even jihad on behalf of the Palestinians can wait when Hizbollah's political interests in the Lebanese theater are at stake.¹²²

The pending Lebanese elections may therefore have played a greater role in Nasrallah's reticence than an overarching fear of another war with Israel. However, it serves as evidence that Israel's actions in 2006 purchased a suspension of hostilities in Lebanon even if the hesitation to provide stronger support for Hamas was based on concerns about the possibility of an Israeli response.¹²³

The IDF as a Learning Organization: Applying Lessons from the Second Lebanon War

Intelligence and Operations Security

Having prepared leaders to expect less in the way of detailed intelligence, the IDF and cooperating agencies nonetheless sought to provide those conducting Operation Cast Lead with the best information possible and the means to employ it effectively. IAF UAVs flying 500 meters in advance of ground attacks sent color imagery back to users to show obstacles ahead, possible ambush sites, and likely enemy positions and fields of fire. Both battalion and brigade level headquarters formed intelligence fusion cells prior to operations, each with air force liaison officers, Arab linguists, and geospatial specialists. These cells were the nodes through which information from lower-level tactical units passed to be synthesized and analyzed in light of human, signals, and communications intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, and COMINT, respectively) before getting "pushed" back down to those leaders for whom it was relevant.¹²⁴ HUMINT

¹²² Amir Kulick, "Hizbollah and the Palestinians: From Defensive Shield to Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2636> (accessed March 27, 2009).

¹²³ Amir Kulick, "Hizbollah and the Palestinians: From Defensive Shield to Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2636> (accessed March 27, 2009).

¹²⁴ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 91-93.

sources reportedly included Palestinian Authority members who had infiltrated Hamas and provided valuable information on headquarters and other facilities, to include maps of tunnels in Gaza City.¹²⁵ It must be assumed that a considerable number of Israeli undercover personnel also assisted with intelligence collection.

The aforementioned operational security (OPSEC) procedures forbidding soldiers to carry cell phones forward and restricting media access accompanied these efforts. The latter proved a two-edged sword that cut deeply into international perceptions of Israeli legitimacy and had long-lasting negative impacts. Dutch Correspondent Conny Mus related that the IDF did allow what he felt was a completely ineffective form of media embedding, which he described as follows:

They didn't think of embedding us except on a few occasions. These embedded situations were a total joke. None of us was able to judge and really see what was going on.... If you take journalists on a tank ride for one kilometer inside [Gaza] and stop at the safe base that was out of range of anything and give them binoculars so they can see the same thing they can see from the border, that is not what I see as embedded.... I see embedded as how the Americans did it in Iraq, which is the right thing to do for a democratic state that is going to war.... In Afghanistan...the coalition forces are doing the same thing there. They are very well prepared for media there.... I've been a couple of times with combat units there with Dutch coalition forces [that went] into areas where they get hit all the time.... Taking us with them is the way to do it.¹²⁶

The denial of Western media did not mean there were not correspondents in Gaza. Arab television and other media representatives provided daily coverage, unsurprisingly communicating a Palestinian perspective on events (given their lack of access to IDF sources). Accusations of IDF excessive use of force and improper employment of munitions (Israeli use of white phosphorus rounds gained particular notoriety during the conflict) therefore went virtually unchallenged by other than Israeli sources. Negative consequences of the media policy may also have made it difficult for investigators with the United Nations Fact Finding Mission to obtain objective firsthand witnesses when looking into controversial issues prior to their writing the Goldstone Report. The denial of media access to Gaza during Operation Cast Lead (there were some very limited exceptions in addition to the “embedded” cases described by Mus) therefore resulted in both immediate and longer-term embarrassment for Israel,

¹²⁵ Mohammed Najib, “Hamas is ‘on the defensive’ in Gaza crisis,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (January 14, 2009): p. 5.

¹²⁶ Conny Mus, interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Jerusalem, Israel, October 12, 2009.

undermining the effectiveness of other influence operations. The following extracts from the Goldstone Report provide a caution for nations considering similar media (or human rights monitors) control measures in the future:

The Mission notes that, during the military operations in Gaza, there were a number of Palestinian human rights organizations conducting independent monitoring of international human rights and international humanitarian law. As noted elsewhere in the present report, the Mission found the work of these organizations to be of very a high professional standard and one that deserved recognition given the extremely difficult circumstances under which they usually operated, particularly during the Israeli military operations.... Israeli military authorities stopped allowing foreign journalists into the Gaza Strip, without prior notification to media organizations, on 5 November 2008 when hostilities escalated.... On 23 January 2009, five days after its unilateral ceasefire, Israel removed all restrictions put in place in early November 2008 and the media was given free access to Gaza. On 25 January 2009, the Supreme Court of Israel issued its final ruling, overturning the blanket ban and stating that reporters should have access to Gaza “unless the security situation changes drastically in such a way that the Erez crossing has to be closed completely for security reasons, and we assume that this will happen only in dire circumstances of concrete danger.” ... The media ban, coupled with the comments made by the Director of the Government’s Press Office have raised concerns, aired in the media, that the ban was aimed at controlling the narrative of the conflict for political reasons.

The denial of access to Gaza had an impact not only on the media, but also international human rights monitors, who required access to report violations and, like journalists, make events in Gaza known to the public. The Mission also notes that the presence of international human rights monitors is likely to have a deterrent effect, dissuading parties to a conflict from engaging in violations of international law.¹²⁷

The Mission is of the view that the presence of international human rights monitors would have been of great assistance in not only investigating and reporting but also in the publicizing of events on the ground.¹²⁸

The author found no evidence of Israel having drawn on its experiences with Hezbollah media control activities during the Second Lebanon War when developing its own policies 28 months later. However, it is interesting to note the limited and relatively short-lived criticism received by the non-state actor Hezbollah resulting from its extremely restrictive and manipulative media policies during the 2006 conflict. The

¹²⁷ “Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,” United Nations document A/HRC/12/48, September 25, 2009, pp. 375–378.

¹²⁸ “Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,” United Nations document A/HRC/12/48, September 25, 2009, p. 375.

lesson to be drawn seems to be what one would expect despite its inherent partiality: nation states are held to a higher standard of behavior than non-state actors.

Logistics

Logistics support was more aggressive during Operation Cast Lead than had been the case in southern Lebanon. Brigade support areas pushed supplies to their battalion support areas that in turn provided needed items to subordinate units. The focus was on maintaining attack momentum and sustaining high-tempo operations, another notable difference from the Second Lebanon War in which medical evacuations sometimes dictated the course of a fight. Casualty evacuation during Operation Cast Lead took advantage of any viable means available to transport the wounded to safe areas.¹²⁹

Fighting in Urban Areas

Israel's new urban training facility north of Be'er Sheva helped in preparing Israeli Army soldiers for the challenges of densely urbanized Gaza. Training there and elsewhere emphasized avoiding densely populated and confined sections of urban environments when possible. Whereas the use of dogs in southern Lebanon had been rare, every infantry unit entered Gaza accompanied by K9 (*Oketz* or "Sting") units. Dog and handler were often the first to enter a building (generally through breaches made by soldiers rather than doors or windows possibly incorporated in enemy fields of fire) to detect weapons stores, improvised explosive devices, or enemy fighters. Other dogs served in specialty roles as search and rescue or attack animals. A number were killed or injured.¹³⁰ Robotic capabilities helped with building reconnaissance as well. Soldiers used the Bull Island "gimbal-mounted camera inside a clear plastic sphere about the size of a tennis ball. This can be thrown into any building, room, or stairwell prior to soldiers entering. The camera transmits 360-degree imagery to a terminal with the troops waiting on the outside of the structure (or around a street corner)."¹³¹ It was a form of

¹²⁹ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

¹³⁰ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

¹³¹ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

“instant intelligence.” Every soldier was equipped with a protective vest and helmet.¹³² Finally, not yet in possession of *Namer* armored personnel carriers, units moved into combat in the venerable M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC) fitted with steel mesh screens as a defense against shaped-charge, anti-armor weapons), the *Achzarit* APC based on a T-55 chassis, or the Puma combat engineer vehicle built after removing the turret from a British Centurion tank.¹³³ Using dogs, vests, robots, and specially designed vehicles all enhanced soldier safety and reduced the likelihood of casualties, but the most significant change from the Second Lebanon War may have been the reduced restrictions associated with rules of engagement.¹³⁴ Firepower, not soldiers, led the way during many attacks during Operation Cast Lead.

The tribulations confronted in built-up areas made themselves evident despite this training, the tactics seeking to avoid urban combat when possible, and reliance on firepower when it was unavoidable. In one of several fratricide incidents, three soldiers lost their lives and another 24 were wounded when an Israeli tank fired into a building occupied by Golani Brigade soldiers locked in combat with Hamas. The incident points to a number of challenges characteristic of urban fighting: difficult command and control, limited line of sight, and difficulty of combat identification, all of which can encourage soldiers to make the mistake of clustering together in too small an area. Frustrating for the IDF: similar situations had occurred in Lebanon two years before, a reminder that even lessons learned can be difficult to put into practice.¹³⁵

Other Technologies

In addition to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to inform maneuver commanders, IDF targeters took advantage of imagery from up to 12 UAVs over the small operational area. Such responsive sources were particularly important after the initial strikes from the air as pre-operation intelligence became almost immediately dated. Small Diameter

¹³² Steven Erlanger, “A Gaza War Full of Traps and Trickery,” *The New York Times* (January 10, 2009), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/world/middleeast/11hamas.html> (accessed April 9, 2009).

¹³³ Greg Grant, “Hamas Unable to Counter IDF Armor,” *DoD Buzz* (January 16, 2009), <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/01/16/hamas-unable-to-counter-idf-armor/> (accessed April 7, 2009).

¹³⁴ BG Avidor disagrees with sources stating that rules of engagement were loosened during operations in Gaza. He suggests that ROE were in fact more restrictive during Operation Cast Lead than during the Second Lebanon War but that the intense urbanization created an increased perception of devastation in comparison to the relatively rural areas of operation for ground forces in 2006 Lebanon. BG Gideon Avidor (IDF, ret.) review comments to Dr Russell W. Glenn, February 13, 2010.

¹³⁵ Matt M. Matthews, “Hard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overview,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 31–32.

Bombs—mentioned above—or other precision munitions were the choice for most urban targets. The IAF released larger, 500-pound class Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) or PB500A1 laser-guided “bunker busters” against deeper tunnel and hard point targets. These air munitions had a ground counterpart. Rafael’s Matador anti-tank missile underwent modification for use in an anti-structure role.¹³⁶ Effective as these were, there remains no technological means of addressing targets embedded deeply beneath urban features or in such close proximity that attack would destroy features better left intact.¹³⁷

Israeli domination on the ground and in the air had a match in the electromagnetic spectrum, where the nation’s armed forces jammed radio, cell phone, and television signals.¹³⁸

Additional Lessons from Operation Cast Lead

The actions by the IDF in Gaza had the impact, perhaps the greatest impact, was to fuel the myths of the monster that is Israel.... It won’t be easier to have an impartial view of the Israel after such an attack. The long-lasting impact of the fighting on the younger generation might well be the most important result of the conflict.

Major General Robert Mood,
Head of Mission, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, speaking at a recent, fractious Arab summit meeting in Kuwait, gave warning to Palestinians that their own rifts were “More dangerous than Israeli aggression.”¹³⁹

“Diplomacy after the Gaza war: Now get back to making peace,”
The Economist

¹³⁶ Abe F. Marrero, “The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

¹³⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), p. 17; and Abe F. Marrero, “The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

¹³⁸ Abe F. Marrero, “The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD,” in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 94–99.

¹³⁹ “Diplomacy after the Gaza war: Now get back to making peace,” *The Economist* 390 (January 24, 2009): p. 51.

The above pair of quotes point in dichotomous directions. On the one hand, a neutral observer notes the potential long-term negative implications of Israel maintaining its current course in dealing with the Palestinian population. The second hints at possible allies should a change in tack be considered. Concerns about Iranian influence, the millions of social assistance dollars Arab nations pour into the black hole of Gaza, and the frictions Palestinian politics generate regionally help to explain the more overt willingness by regional Muslim nations to assume the role of mediator in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Though opportunity knocks, there has thus far been no one particularly anxious to answer. Operation Cast Lead instead serves to remind us of its being part of a much larger conflict with significant Israel-internal, regional, and wider international implications, virtually all of which are negative in character.

Humanitarian Relief and Other Aid as a Tool of Influence

The combined application of force and economic incentives, including the relocation of refugee camps and opportunities to work in Israel itself, produced results rather rapidly. Within six months incidents dropped off sharply and by the end of 1971 violence was contained, though not totally eradicated.¹⁴⁰

Gunther E. Rothenbreg

“Israeli Defence Forces and Low-Intensity Operations”

The nature of IDF objectives and the short duration of 2006 activities in southern Lebanon, combined with the area of operations being part of another sovereign nation, permitted Israel to step away from the Second Lebanon War without assuming humanitarian or government development responsibilities. The same was less true in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, despite statements of even less ambitious objectives and a choice not to occupy the Gaza Strip. Gaza citizens rely on Israel for survival, a situation in considerable part resultant from Israeli policies. The relationship might be described as an occupation without physical presence. Gaza’s government—led by Hamas—thus looked to Israel to address the repercussions of Operation Cast Lead. Hostilities had further worsened a situation that was in part of Israel’s own making. International expectations therefore placed the burden for recovery assistance on the attacking nation. The welfare of the Palestinian people in Gaza became an

¹⁴⁰ Gunther E. Rothenbreg, “Israeli Defence Forces and Low-Intensity Operations,” in David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell, *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis*, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989, p. 67.

international image issue with potential to influence longer-term support of erstwhile supporters in the United States and Europe.

Israel recognized the existence of humanitarian challenges prior to its December 23, 2008 initiation of hostilities. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni reportedly brought members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), World Food Program, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and EU together once Operation Cast Lead commenced to coordinate support for Gaza's residents during and in the aftermath of the pending attack.¹⁴¹ (The timing of this very late initiative, and of a similar meeting held just hours before initial air attacks, was likely driven by Israeli operational security concerns.) A "Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration" acted as the overarching go-between for international aid organizations and the Israel Defense Forces; an additional organization, the Humanitarian Coordination Center, coordinated specific activities of aid organizations going into Gaza.¹⁴² A post-war report by the Israeli government states that the IDF additionally established an Infrastructure Coordination Center to identify infrastructure repairs requirements and coordinate responses.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ "The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects," The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 101. There appears to be a typographical error in this entry. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was not invited to this meeting, nor did it play a humanitarian or related role in Operation Cast Lead, activities that would have fallen outside its normal responsibilities. The error may be due to accidental substitution of UNTSO's acronym for another from the UN. The author thanks Mr. Marco Carmignani, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Senior Advisor, for his response to the author's question regarding this matter. Marco Carmignani email to Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Subject: Question for Mr. Carmignani, January 21, 2010.

¹⁴² "The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects," The State of Israel, July 2009, p. 101.

¹⁴³ The terms used here to refer to organizations playing a role in coordinating humanitarian aid operations are those employed by the source cited. Printed and interview sources make use of a variety of overlapping and sometimes incorrect terms to refer to the Israeli government's mechanisms for coordinating aid. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) is a permanent component of the IDF. (Former IDF Major General Baruch Spiegel noted that COGAT is also referred to as the "Civil-Military Authority" at times. Baruch Spiegel, Advisor to the Minister of Defense, interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Tel Aviv, Israel, June 13, 2006.) COGAT reportedly formed a Joint Humanitarian Coordination Cell (referred to as the "humanitarian cell" by some aid providers) to address the challenges of orchestrating humanitarian aid groups during the operation in Gaza. Another entity, the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA), "is the gatekeeper at the crossings" (Gaza crossing points). "Civil Administration" is generally used when referring to the Israeli (as opposed to Palestinian) government authority in the West Bank or, more broadly, Palestinian territories. Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn and "Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities," August 29, 1994, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Agreement%20on%20Preparatory%20Transfer%20of%20Powers%20and%20Re> (accessed January 28, 2010). Also see "New Procedures of Entry and Exit to the Gaza Strip at the Erez Crossing Point," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2004, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/New+Procedures+of+Entry+and+Exit+to+the+Gaza+Strip.htm> (accessed January 28, 2010).

Evaluations gauging the effectiveness of these initiatives commended the efforts, finding them a welcome change from Israeli policies on the provision of humanitarian aid and other assistance to Gaza as practiced in the months leading up to Operation Cast Lead. A senior representative of one major international aid agency commented,

Before the military operation, until December 27, Gaza was under strict embargo. To have any humanitarian assistance enter Gaza, we had to go through a quite complex system, what they called the Civil Administration under the Minister of Defense, before anything could enter through the two main entry points into Gaza. Before the fighting, we got a message from Jerusalem that said we want to simplify entry into Gaza, and it worked. Not the very first day, but items that were blocked for months—spare parts for ambulances, for example—were suddenly approved. We had the green light, but security was very different, and our movement in the Gaza Strip had to be coordinated with the IDF—each and every movement. We also tried to coordinate with the Palestinian factions to make sure we're not in the wrong place at the wrong time. In the first few days the IDF got hundreds of phone calls from us and others to allow evacuation of wounded and the like. The IDF set up quite a sophisticated contact point outside Ashkelon with something like 100 officers operating 24/7. This was part of the Civil Administration, the liaison Coordinator of the Government Activities in the Territories. The Israelis were in uniform, a military entity coordinating with civilian agencies. They are the ones liaising with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and controlling access to the Gaza Strip.¹⁴⁴

While pleased with the ability to increase assistance, the speaker went on to relate that not all difficulties were overcome. There were some tense moments as a result:

This is where I enter into the most complex issue. We were on the phone with a CA [civil affairs] officer. We had a convoy moving into the Gaza Strip. We said we are moving on Road 2 into the Gaza Strip. We had the same map. "Is it okay?" "Yes, it is." And we stopped at a point and said "We are at this point, can we continue?" And our CA liaison officer said, "Yes, you can continue." And we did, and we were engaged by a tank. And we called and the liaison officer said, "You must give me time to contact the tank." We never had a serious incident, but we had many warning shots. The problem was that the message had to go from the liaison officer to the division, to the brigade, and down to the tank.... A small Red Cross vehicle is not visible from 10,000 meters. And we had this problem with liaison because we did not have direct coordination with units.¹⁴⁵

The situation was further complicated by the hesitance of Palestinian emergency responders to move without an escort from international aid agencies able to coordinate with the IDF. These Palestinians had no means of communicating with Hamas's foes and feared being engaged. The same inability to coordinate hamstrung the maintenance of essential infrastructure services. Approximately two weeks into the second phase of

¹⁴⁴ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

¹⁴⁵ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

Operation Cast Lead (the air-ground phase), Hamas allowed Fatah authorities to reassume Ministry of Health and Water Ministry responsibilities in the Gaza Strip, as they could coordinate with Israeli authorities (something Hamas was unable to do given Israel not formally recognizing the organization's government in Gaza).¹⁴⁶ Coordination between international aid organizations and the IDF suffered challenges as well, this despite the above-noted mechanisms put in place on the eve or soon after initiation of the air phase. The same senior aid representative quoted just above estimated the average time to receive a response from the IDF after submittal of a mission request was 25 hours, "and a large number of these requests were denied with no reason given."¹⁴⁷ Operations security considerations or concerns regarding the safety of aid group personnel may have played a role in many such cases. Nevertheless, refusal by many Palestinian emergency service providers to move for fear of attack, combined with slow response times, obviously left calls for help with medical cases requiring immediate attention unanswered.

Not all coordination of Israeli support for international aid operations was left to the last minute. Previous operations in Gaza had educated Israel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alike regarding what was called for. Representatives of each met regularly prior to Operation Cast Lead to exchange information. NGOs received maps identical to those used by the IDF, the better to coordinate civilian activities. These maps used common codes and location systems to reduce chances of confusion during operations. Such preliminary coordination and changes in Israeli policy led one observer to estimate that aid (food, medical supplies, other) reaching Gaza's citizens during the war exceeded that prior to the outbreak of hostilities. "The most problematic issue was not the amount of assistance received," the observer noted. Reinforcing the observation at the end of the previous paragraph, he noted, "The most problematic was the removal of wounded from neighborhoods where fighting was occurring. We could not get clearance, and when we arrived in these neighborhoods after three or four days, people were dead."¹⁴⁸

An analysis by Anthony Cordesman did not view the consequences of the government's efforts with particular favor despite these IDF initiatives. Though he noted, "states do

¹⁴⁶ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

¹⁴⁷ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

¹⁴⁸ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

not have an obligation to provide humanitarian relief to their enemies or to enemy populations in wartime,” the analysis confirmed that international expectations have come to be more demanding in this regard in recent decades. In summary, the study concluded that

Israel did carry out some humanitarian activities during this period, but they were limited and often consisted of allowing the UN and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] to carry out limited action and shipments into Gaza.... As events showed during the air-land phase, Israel was forced to steadily provide humanitarian relief with time, and eventually to make it a major part of the campaign. It did so, however, far too late to be effective in terms of winning the war of perceptions or minimize the strategic damage done to its relations with outside states.¹⁴⁹

Cordesman goes on to review relief efforts as Operation Cast Lead progressed, finding “a growing pattern of humanitarian efforts over time, and a wide range of humanitarian activities did take place by the time of the ceasefire.” Importantly, however, “the IDF often was coordinating aid provided by international organizations and countries other than Israel” rather than providing the aid via Israeli government or the country’s private humanitarian efforts.¹⁵⁰

Still, the willingness to abet international organizations’ capabilities to mitigate human suffering is notable and worthy of emulation given the benefits provided by nongovernmental augmentation during conflicts. Israel approached Operation Cast Lead as a wartime contingency rather than police action. It is therefore unsurprising that their relief and capacity-building efforts would initially take a backseat to combat operations. Hamas’s failure to provide basic services to the Palestinian residents during the war is also understandable, given the external threat and concern for the very existence of its government. (However, theft of provisions by Hamas representatives was not justifiable. The UNRWA halted imports of aid into Gaza after Hamas policemen seized blankets and food from its distribution center on February 2, 2009, a Hamas Interior Ministry spokesman justifying the action because the United Nations

¹⁴⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), pp. 31, 32.

¹⁵⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Final Review Draft), Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2009, csis.org/publication/gaza-war (accessed August 4, 2009), pp. 64 and 65.

organization had allegedly stored supplies in a location not owned by the UN. Two days later, Hamas representatives stole 10 truckloads of flour and rice.¹⁵¹)

What is perhaps less understandable is why Israel did not take advantage of Hamas's inability to meet citizens' needs by employing aid as a means of favorably influencing opinion. Israel's lack of a large-scale effort to address suffering once fighting passed through an area was a lost opportunity to favorably influence Palestinian and international attitudes. The extent of the opportunity forgone was magnified after the war, when Israel similarly conducted no significant recovery assistance. The earlier-mentioned International Crisis Group report implies that quite the reverse was the case, stating that withdrawing IDF forces conducted a form of scorched earth retribution in which "many factories, which had survived most of the war, were destroyed by Israeli troops as they withdrew... In the east destruction was systematic and close to complete, with the entire expanse from the Israeli border to the rocket-launching area of Jabal al-Rais—a distance of some 1.5 km, including farms, factories, and homes—virtually flattened."¹⁵² If true, the policy was self-defeating in terms of winning favor in the immediate term or in the impressionable minds of the large youthful proportion of the population. Hamas, in stark contrast, immediately resumed provision of public services after the conflict. In addition to maintaining order via constant policing both during and after the fighting, the organization's leaders demonstrated their understanding of the power in linking words with deeds:

Bearded Hamas leaders on Friday delivered an envelope with five crisp \$100 bills to a veiled woman whose house was damaged during Israel's invasion of Gaza, the first of promised relief payments by the military group... Since a truce took hold this week, ending Israel's three-week onslaught, Gaza's Hamas rulers have declared victory and gone out of their way to show they are in control. They have pledged \$52 million of their own funds to help repair lives... This would include \$1,300 for a death in the family, \$650 for an injury, \$5,200 for a destroyed house and \$2,600 for a damaged house. More than 4,000 houses were destroyed and about 20,000 damaged, according to independent estimates. "We are in control and we are the winner," Hamas legislator Mushir al-Masri declared this week after attending the funeral of four Hamas gunman.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ "The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects," The State of Israel, July 2009, pp. 24–75; and "UN reports Hamas seized aid reaching Gaza," *World Tribune.com*, February 5, 2009, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/me_hamas0105_02_05.asp (accessed January 21, 2010).

¹⁵² Gaza's Unfinished Business," International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁵³ Karin Laub, "Hamas officials begin repair, relief efforts," *The [Charleston, SC] Post and Courier* 108 (January 24, 2009): p. 8A.

Most Gaza residents would dispute a conclusion of “We are the winner” in the sense of success in combat. Though the claim may have been deliberate hyperbole for propaganda purposes, the speaker understands that victory in irregular warfare often is little related to the outcomes of its armed encounters. Military action might be decisive during irregular warfare, but it may be on battlefields other than those involving combat.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) sought to redress its reputation in Gaza with a three-phase campaign to assist the population’s recovery. It distributed approximately \$20 million in United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-provided funds as emergency cash assistance to help some 9,000 families whose homes were badly damaged or destroyed. The second phase involved transfer of funds to Gaza banks for distribution to residents suffering most grievously after the war. This money was likewise targeted primarily at the housing sector, its distribution being overseen by CHF International (an organization formerly named Cooperative Housing Foundation).¹⁵⁴ The third phase was to address the agricultural and additional aspects of the private sector.¹⁵⁵ While at first glance the plan would seem encouraging in bolstering Palestinian government legitimacy in Gaza, Israeli policies that continue to restrict import of essential building materials into the Gaza Strip (e.g., cement) likely neutralize much of its potential positive effect. It is also questionable how much value they had in bolstering Fatah and the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy amongst government employees. The \$20 million in UNDP funds allocated to Phase 1 was diverted from its original purpose of paying PA employee salaries for those working in Gaza.¹⁵⁶

Opportunities to better assist Palestinians were forgone by international agencies as well. Relief efforts were hindered by policies restricting access to those most in need and a reticence to become too deeply embroiled in Gaza’s entrenched environment of deprivation. United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) guidance, for example, limits its efforts to aiding only refugees. Though some two-thirds of the Strip’s population can be classified as refugees, the areas suffering most from damage during

¹⁵⁴ “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 29.

¹⁵⁵ “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 30.

¹⁵⁶ “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, pp. 8–9.

the armed conflict were the primary home to the unqualified third. Reports also stated that UNRWA was hesitant to assume too great a responsibility for Gaza governing, given the possible long-term implications of involvement.¹⁵⁷

Aid alone is only a temporary expedient. In the absence of policies facilitating recovery (e.g., allowing building materials to enter affected areas), it is at best of limited utility. A European Union Institute for Security Studies report on Gaza in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 fighting noted that “There is a need for a shift in donor policy focus from immediate humanitarian needs to rights, human security, and longer-term state building objectives.”¹⁵⁸

Additional Influence Operations Observations

The evidence points to Israel having learned—perhaps overlearned—lessons on influence operations from 2006 Lebanon. The previously mentioned prohibition against soldiers taking cell phones forward served to both increase operations security, control message content in communications available to the public (voice, text, and photographic), and preclude premature or false information from reaching audiences. We have noted that denial of media had similar but less positive effects. Restrictions were by no means the only facet of government and military information initiatives, however. The country’s ambassadors worldwide were provided with briefing materials from both civilian and military sources.¹⁵⁹ Demonstrating savvy of newly established means of mass communication, the IDF launched a well-publicized YouTube site during the conflict and updated it regularly.¹⁶⁰ Traditional means employed in support of psychological operations saw enhancements, with leaflets providing recipients with email addresses and telephone numbers for reporting weapons locations or other information to the IDF.¹⁶¹ The potential benefits included both those obvious for intelligence gathering (though it is unknown to the author the extent to which any such reports were received or found to be accurate) and psychological, the latter in causing

¹⁵⁷ “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, p. 31.

¹⁵⁸ Esra Bulut, “Lessons Learned and Strategic Thinking After the Gaza Crisis,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies Seminar Report*, March 30, 2009, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=215&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[pS\]=1230764400&tx_ttnews\[pL\]=31535999&tx_ttnews\[arc\]=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=1203&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=106&cHash=5d75cfbf94](http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=215&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[pS]=1230764400&tx_ttnews[pL]=31535999&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1203&tx_ttnews[backPid]=106&cHash=5d75cfbf94) (accessed July 26, 2009), p. 7.

¹⁵⁹ Hirsh Goodman, “Israel’s Public Diplomacy in Operation Cast Lead,” *The Institute for National Security Studies Strategic Insight* 90 (January 15, 2009).

¹⁶⁰ “Watch: YouTube pulls some IDF videos showing Gaza assault,” Haaretz Service and The Associated Press, December 31, 2008, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051593.html> (accessed July 11, 2009).

¹⁶¹ Ulrike Putz, “Israel and Hamas: Psychological Tricks to Demoralize the Enemy,” *Spiegel OnLine* (January 16, 2009), <http://www.spiegel.de> (accessed January 17, 2009).

Hamas members to be concerned lest unsympathetic members of the population report their activities. Likewise, calls to individual cellular phones warning of pending attacks or other means of communicating these or similar messages had multiple benefits, e.g., reducing the number of noncombatants in the areas of most intense combat, thereby decreasing the incidence of noncombatant death or injury, and demonstrating to both domestic and international audiences a concern for innocents' loss of life (a notable contrast to the behavior of Hamas in a number of instances, though the lack of international media effectively precluded objective reporting of this difference).

The primary target of IDF influence programs, however, was Israeli society. It was a largely successful one. Though citizens' perspectives on individual politicians or parties waxed and waned during the war and in its immediate aftermath, support for IDF operations remained more positive throughout than had been the case during operations in Lebanon two years before.

Internationally the result was less favorable. Popular support in non-Muslim nations tended to be restrained at best (a notable exception being the U.S. House of Representatives' 390 to 5 vote on a bill declaring "unwavering commitment" to Israel).¹⁶² This less-than-enthusiastic support was likely in part attributable to Hamas influence efforts and reports coming from al-Jazeera or other Arab media sources little affected by the Israeli ban on correspondents. Western media was forced to look to such sources, given denial of their entry into Gaza. Summing up the immediate consequences, one analyst concluded:

Three issues continued to engage the international community even after the last Israeli soldier left the Gaza Strip. One is the (dis)proportionality of Israel's response to the Qassam rocket attacks on Israelis, the second is Israel's use of certain types of weapons and ammunition, and the third is Israel's firing on buildings belonging to international institutions operating in the Gaza Strip. The preoccupation with these topics is the price Israel will have to pay in order to establish, to the extent possible, a new equation in its asymmetrical war against terrorist organizations operating against it from within innocent or semi-innocent civilian populations.¹⁶³

¹⁶² "The role of the media: A war of words and images," *The Economist* 390 (January 17, 2009): p. 48.

¹⁶³ Oded Eran, "Operation Cast Lead: The Diplomatic Dimension," *The Institute for National Security Studies* 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2651> (accessed March 27, 2009).

It is a “preoccupation” the negative consequences of which might have been muffled by more careful consideration of the benefits offered in allowing freer access by international media representatives, despite the risk of unfavorable reports to accompany positive ones. Instead, Israel found itself on the information defensive even before the end of the operation. Responses to the United Nations Goldstone Report and other accusations (responses that include the Israeli government’s “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects”) have at times come across as defensive despite their citing neutral sources as evidence to bolster author arguments. Reported instances of IDF officers contradicting official IDF spokesman information, cases of Israel’s Supreme Court rulings being ignored in past years, and the policy of banning media together undermined otherwise well-conceived initiatives in the influence realm. Here again, fair or not, a nation state is held to a higher standard than a non-state actor like Hezbollah or Hamas.

Israel was not unchallenged in addressing other-than-Arab audiences, nor was Hamas its only competitor. Just as Israel communicated directly with citizens in Gaza, Hamas returned the favor. Twenty-five year old Israeli Hagar Mizrachi reported receiving a text message from Qassam.hamm warning of looming attacks on Israel’s urban areas. The message was signed “Hamas.” Mizrachi, an editor with an online news organization, found it “unnerving to receive something like that... It feels like they’ve invaded you.”¹⁶⁴ The targeting of Mizrachi is notable; her status made it more likely for news of the texting to be magnified by her reporting the incidence to an audience aware of both the power of text messaging and the technological (and intelligence) savvy required to get through to a specific individual.

Groups other than Israeli-based ones seeking to undermine Hamas legitimacy are likely to use the results of Operation Cast Lead, to include the citizenry’s suffering, as material to support their own influence efforts. Analyst Yoram Schweitzer observed, “Global jihadists and al-Qaeda leaders who criticized Hamas’s political path and viewed it as doomed to failure will try to capitalize on the difficulties imposed on the Gaza

¹⁶⁴ Jim Michaels, “Cellphones put to ‘unnerving’ use in Gaza,” *USA Today* January 13, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2009-01-13-gazaphones_N.htm (accessed July 25, 2009).

population by the campaign and intensify their efforts to recruit new volunteers into their ranks.”¹⁶⁵

In closing this section, it is worth noting that the broad condemnation of Israel’s strategic and operational level targeting during the Second Lebanon War seems to have had limited effect on its choices in this regard in Gaza. Strikes against Beirut’s international airport were among several aimed at influencing Lebanon’s government to coerce Hezbollah behaviors in ways favorable to Israel. Both the presumption that the government had any such influence and the choice of civilian targets drew widespread ire. Though Israel demonstrated caution in using precision-guided munitions to a previously unseen level in Gaza, the targeting of these weapons appeared to have neglected lessons evident in the wake of 2006 Lebanon:

Every public building of any sort associated with the Palestinian government of Hamas has been thoroughly destroyed. All the police stations, ministry buildings, homes of Hamas officials, even minor facilities like a community conflict resolution office—essentially the entire infrastructure of the Palestinian government in Gaza. Even the Palestinian Children’s Parliament building in Rafah, a civics project for students, was blasted into chunks of concrete and twisted steel reinforcing rods. There were many other targets with no apparent rationale. The relatively new, \$7 million campus of the American School was completely demolished in air strikes.¹⁶⁶

In a situation reminiscent of Iraq, where police recruits killed by insurgents were viewed simply as individuals attempting to secure honest work, Israel’s targeting of police and other nonmilitary targets may have had more negative than positive effect.

Most Gazans view the police—and especially the 50 new traffic officers killed during a graduation ceremony at the Gaza City police station—as civilians. Even many who oppose Hamas saw little purpose in this attack. As a Fatah supporter put it, “they are the lucky ones who managed to get jobs. They had only just finished their training. What did they ever do to anyone?” Not only have all civil police stations been hit, but so too have the interior, foreign affairs, finance, public works, justice, education, labour and culture ministries, as well as the presidential compound, prime minister’s office and parliament. A politically independent observer said, “these are the institutions of the people, not of Hamas.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Yoram Schweitzer, “Ramifications of the Gaza Campaign for Local Terrorist Organizations,” The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=256&incat=&read=2638> (accessed March 27, 2009).

¹⁶⁶ Rod Nordland, “Gaza City Counts the Dead,” *Newsweek*, January 18, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/180335> (accessed August 2, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ “Ending the War in Gaza,” *International Crisis Group*, Middle East Policy Briefing No. 26, January 5, 2009, p. 7.

Not unlike the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during coalition operations in the Balkans, a tactical engagement can have immediate strategic consequences. The “Goliath picks on David” impact of that influence is magnified when aircraft are the means of delivering that attack. The extent of Israeli strikes on questionable targets tends to weaken claims of careful analysis and conservative selection.

Analyst Stephanie Gutman writes, “It’s hard to find a date for the beginning of any war, especially one like the second intifada, which existed on two planes. There was an actual ground war in which people died, and there was a war of competing narratives played out in the mass media.”¹⁶⁸ Her observation points clearly to the larger conflict, of which the fighting of December 2008–January 2009 was but a small part. An influence campaign should permeate any conflict in which a state has a significant interest. The result is a constantly waged, constantly adapted campaign within the conflict, a campaign consistent in its actions and messages before, throughout, and after any outbreaks of violence. Well executed, a result of such a campaign may be fewer of those violent periods, a reality recognized by the Athenian Diodorus in 427 BC:

The right way to deal with free people is this—not to inflict tremendous punishments on them after they have revolted, but to take tremendous care of them before this point is reached, to prevent them even contemplating the idea of revolt, and, if we do have to use force with them, to hold as few as possible of them responsible for this.¹⁶⁹

Concluding Observations on the Efficacy of Operation Cast Lead

The lesson is that while there are military victories there never is a military ‘solution’. There’s only military action that creates the space for economic and political life.¹⁷⁰

David Miliband

British Foreign Secretary, 2007

Today the question is still asked, “But how do we WIN?” And that is another question coming directly from a Western mindset. There is no such thing as winning in this new kind of war. The war is ongoing, with periods of more violence and periods of less violence, during which the enemy regroups and plans his next attack. When we feel the enemy is getting strong, we must be

¹⁶⁸ Stephanie Gutman, *The Other War: Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle for Media Supremacy*, San Francisco, CA: Encounter, 2005, p. 9.

¹⁶⁹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Trans. Rex Warner, NY: Penguin, p. 221 (Book 3, Section 46).

¹⁷⁰ David Miliband, “We must learn lessons,” *BBC News*, September 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7012342.stm (accessed April 13, 2009).

prepared to make preemptive strikes, hard and fast at key targets, with viciousness, as the enemy would do to us. Only then can we acquire, not peace, but sustained periods of relative calm.¹⁷¹

Ariel Siegelman

"We must learn lessons," 2009

Israel may have won another two, three, or more years of relative peace along its western border with its attack into Gaza. Yet, the future is ripe with promise of more demands on the Israeli form of deterrence: deterrence through occasional war. Israel's enemies will adapt. Their technologies will improve, allowing them to target the country's population more accurately and at longer ranges. Just as it adjusted to its shortfalls after the Second Lebanon War, the nation's leaders and military will find ways to either forestall successes such as those experienced by Hezbollah in that war or adapt once again when vulnerabilities are brought to light. Strategically the situation offers both hope and promise regarding further tribulations. The willingness of moderate Arab states to mediate in peace processes may be the most important step toward normalcy the Middle East has seen since the birth of Israel. Less promising are future demographics. Surges in Israel's Jewish population growth are probably a thing of the past. No massive population segment remains to spike those numbers now the deluge from Russia is past.¹⁷² Palestinians have one of the highest population growth rates in the world; there is little reason to believe the trend will cease in the near future, given the numbers of youth approaching peak reproductive years in Gaza and the West Bank. The former may become a modern Malthusian catastrophe in the absence of successfully addressing its invasive poverty.

The Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead therefore join Israel's earlier wars in reinforcing confidence in the use of the IDF as a success agent of deterrence. The nation's soldiers demonstrate the apparent viability of a strategy based on an armed forces repeatedly relieving excessive political and diplomatic pressures via combat. At the tactical level the demand for constant successful evolution is unceasing.

Strategically the situation is largely one of stasis, what Israeli author Yaakov Amidror calls "sufficient victory": "a victory that does not produce many years of tranquility, but

¹⁷¹ Ariel Siegelman, "From Lebanon to Gaza: A New Kind of War," *Colloquium 2* (March 2009), <https://coin.harmonieweb.org/Knowledge%20Center/Colloquium/Siegelman.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2009).

¹⁷² Bernard Wasserstein, *Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?* New Haven, CT: Yale, 2004, pp. 25–26.

rather achieves only a 'repressed quiet' requiring the investment of continuous effort to preserve it."¹⁷³ Major General Gadi Eisenkot, former commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, similarly described the ends sought by Israel with its current strategy regarding Hezbollah and Hamas, first articulating them in his own words and subsequently drawing on fellow Israeli Israel Tal:

Operative goals need not always be to seek **annihilation**.... In some instances, the operative goal would be to contain a given arena and to keep it in a **specific, desirable state** for an extended period of time... It seems that the use of the term "annihilation" in the strategic domain is highly problematic. [This] view is supported in Israel Tal's book, *National Security*, where he writes: "A state which adopts absolute strategy, striving to attain pretentious war objectives, with no regard to the reality of power boundaries, eventually suffers defeat and pays for it dearly. The strategy of compromise is derived from moderate national goals and it defines no rigid end goal. No world, political or social processes can be foreseen; therefore compromise contains inherent freedom of historical dialectics due to changes and opportunities. An interest considered vital today may become less so tomorrow."¹⁷⁴

For the United States, such ends may not serve its objectives as it confronts irregular warfare challenges around the world. The above pages nonetheless reveal many lessons of value for our country. It is to the implications of those that we now turn.

¹⁷³ Yaakov Amidror, "Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience," undated, www.jcpa.org/text/Amidror-perspectives-2.pdf (accessed August 15, 2009), p. 8.

¹⁷⁴ Gadi Eisenkot, "Changes and Challenges in the Combat Against Terrorism," After action report completed by the author at the conclusion of his 2003–2005 service as commanding officer, Judea and Samaria Division, Israel, undated. (Emphasis in original).

4. Recommendations for U.S. Armed Forces in Light of Operation Cast Lead

Warn Americans against having an Army so focused on irregular war and counterinsurgency warfare that it can no longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy.¹⁷⁵

Robert M. Cassidy, quoting an Israeli officer in
“Counterinsurgency and Military Culture”

The above warning came after the Second Lebanon War. As in 1967 and 1973, the fighting in 2006 caused members of the American military to look at themselves and evaluate their readiness in light of recent Israeli performance. As they had from those former conflicts, the Americans found much to learn. In 1973, for example, the specter of anti-tank guided missile waves as employed against the Israeli Army in the Sinai gave pause. The Second Lebanon War saw U.S. leaders questioning whether long commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan had caused slippage in their country’s conventional effectiveness. Those lessons came free of charge, a whisper in the ear providing a chance to make adjustments without having to suffer the consequences of whatever shortcomings might have existed.

Differences in the Israeli and U.S. Operational Environments

Operation Cast Lead once again offers a similar opportunity. As with any study of lessons from another event, the first step must be consideration of how that contingency differs from those the armed force of concern will experience. That understanding allows one to put the new material in context, thereby hopefully preventing misapplication and instead allowing application of resulting insights to situations entirely different from the original. One of the most significant differences between the fighting in Gaza and most U.S. cases has already been addressed: the minute size of the Operation Cast Lead theater provided a rarely paralleled opportunity to focus much of Israel’s air, intelligence, ground, and other applicable resources found necessary to dominate the foe. And it did dominate. True, the thousands of Qassam Brigade personnel were less well trained, less well led, and less well provisioned than the IDF

¹⁷⁵ Robert M. Cassidy, “Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars,” *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 10 (2008): pp. 77–78.

and Hezbollah's fighters two years before. They lacked intelligence collection and other technological capabilities the enemy in southern Lebanon could bring to bear in support of operations. Yet an IDF far better prepared in 2008 than it was in 2006 had much to do with the outcome. Americans in November 2004 Fallujah and during other select operations in Iraq have been able to replicate a similar concentration of capabilities. They come with their own challenges, e.g., airspace coordination in the face of a third dimension thick with aircraft. But the size of the theater is only one variable the student must keep in mind during a study of Gaza. The quality of the foe is a second.

A third is differences in approach. Some will argue about the appropriate label for operations in Gaza during the period December 2008 to January 2009. Were there counterinsurgency implications of some form, a stifling of a Hamas seeking to eventually replace the PA as Palestine's government? Was Operation Cast Lead instead little more than a raid? Such arguments offer little of value. Better to consider what characteristics the contingency demonstrated with similarity to those the United States will confront, thus providing a means of beginning the tailoring of lessons essential to effectively applying them. These characteristics include many found in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and other forms of irregular warfare (or, if one prefers, stability operations). They encompass a considerable number of the same challenges the United States and its coalition partners have experienced in recent years. It is therefore important to note the considerable differences between the Israeli approach to counterinsurgency and that of the United States. (One reviewer of this study suggested that the Israelis conduct counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency operations. However, I suggest that there are sufficient similarities to advise U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine even if one argues the actions in Gaza were not COIN.) Israel showed restraint in the application of its firepower. It did not, however, put the Gazan citizen at the center of its operation, as would be suggested by current U.S. doctrine and practice. The very limited IDF provision of aid and a concern with post-hostility capacity building are derivative of this difference. That is not to pass judgment on the Israeli policies or imply similarities between Gaza and the situations in Iraq or Afghanistan, but it does offer a caution against presuming likeness where dissimilarity is instead predominant.

This difference in approach is related to a fourth variance. Though Clausewitz's dictum regarding war being an extension of policy applies to both the United States and Israel,

the level of intimacy between Israeli policy and practice in the field exceeds that of any major U.S. undertaking in recent decades. As General Avidor points out, “political involvement is very high, more so than during operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Thus some military actions even at the tactical level are driven by political decision makers’ directives.”¹⁷⁶ Caution must therefore be exercised in analyzing lessons taken from Israeli operations from a purely or even predominantly military perspective. The actions taken may not only be counter to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine as discussed in the previous paragraph. They may be less supportive of good military practice than would be the case were political involvement less pronounced.

The direct influence of political authority on tactical operations is in part reflective of the unique strategic environment that constitutes a fifth major difference between U.S. and Israeli operational conditions. Gaza and the West Bank are within the borders of the Israeli nation state. Though de facto more or less autonomous with regard to political authority, internal security, economic policy, and other government-related functions, the Palestinian territories remain an internal problem for the IDF, albeit one with constraints unlike any the U.S. military has ever confronted in its history (the Civil War notwithstanding). This already complex situation is further complicated by Israel’s not recognizing Hamas as a legitimate representative of those residing in Gaza. These factors combine to make adaptation of lessons taken from military activities in the West Bank or Gaza an act requiring considerable analysis of factors in the political, diplomatic, economic, social, and other realms in addition to those primarily military.

A sixth variance is the two countries’ perspectives on victory and successful end states. Amidror’s “sufficient victory” is not an outcome characteristic in definitions of U.S. desired end states. Suppressing antipathies sufficiently to purchase a respite prior to a rekindling of fighting commits the victor to repeated returns to address future slippage back into war. The United States instead tends to seek an end state serving to resolve whatever causes of a conflict still exist in the aftermath of combat. Thus the Marshall Plan in Europe, the rebuilding and introduction of a new form of government in Japan, and the continued presence of thousands of Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan after original stunning tactical victories. Such a commitment to a better end may not preclude having to return to sustain progress or correct a setback. Australia has on

¹⁷⁶ BG Gideon Avidor (IDF, ret.) review notes forwarded to Dr. Russell W. Glenn, February 13, 2010.

several occasions had to redeploy capabilities into Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) and Solomon Islands after completing initial operations to stabilize both nations. But the long-range objectives in both cases are far different from holding a lid on a simmering and occasionally boiling pot, as implied by sufficient victory.

Aware of the need to consider the above and other differences between conditions as found in Gaza and those the United States confronts and might face in the future, we now turn to recommendations drawn from the events, lessons, and post-operation occurrences to see what they offer of potential value for the United States and its partner nations. The remainder of this final chapter—barring its brief concluding remarks—sets forth 12 such recommendations. Many are relevant to a broader spectrum of contingencies in addition to addressing counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. The recommendations are not rank-ordered, nor does the length of a particular discussion imply it merits greater attention than others whose descriptions are more concise.

Recommendation 1: Do Not Over-focus on the Enemy of Today

The very brief history of Hamas provided in Chapter 2 might cause a reader to wonder why so visible a group, one with ties to a parent with a history of confrontation with neighboring Egypt, would be allowed to build its strength within Israel. The answer lies in recognizing that a very different form of threat dominated Israel's security apparatus in the late 1980s. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a secular movement whose past included a number of high-profile terrorist events, had driven Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982, a country it would continue to occupy until 2000. Apparently religious groups, like Hamas seemed to be at the time, failed to arouse sufficient concern given the more immediate challenges posed by the PLO. Hamas was therefore able to proceed through the initial phase of insurgency—building capacity while avoiding confrontation—with very little interference. The lesson is clear: Defeat today's threat, but keep the other eye on those over the horizon...or directly under one's nose.¹⁷⁷ Doing so could allow interdiction of an embryonic insurgency that will otherwise have the time to become a legitimate challenge to a nation state's security forces.

¹⁷⁷ Though the situation was considerably different from many perspectives—to include the United States actively arming and otherwise supporting *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan during the 1980s—this lesson has obvious application to the later emergence of the Taliban in that Central Asian country.

Recommendation 2: Consider Asymmetry in More than a Military Context

If asymmetric warfare were only about military weakness, there would be little of interest in it, not least for the insurgent; as the weaker opponent he would quickly be destroyed and defeated.¹⁷⁸

Paul Cornish

“The United States and counterinsurgency”

Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin outlined the initial development of his organization in terms of four steps. The first involved creation of charity and social organizations and initial recruiting. Step two consisted of actions to build the group’s reputation as a champion of resistance against Israel. Only in the third step did armed attacks begin. The fourth step saw Hamas seeking to establish links with other Muslim nations to bolster its international status¹⁷⁹ (and, likely, ensure sources of funding).

The above appears to support insurgency theories positing that development takes place via several phases. Counterinsurgency theory strongly advises interdicting an insurgency in phase one when a group is weak. Barring intelligence focused on intent rather than acts of violence, Israeli intelligence would have found it virtually impossible to detect insurgent characteristics in Hamas until it had developed a base of both support and sympathy in the community most important to it. Hezbollah similarly gave precedence to aid and other activities key to gaining influence in Lebanon’s Shiite community. The two examples suggest a need to tailor counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other relevant intelligence processes to grant other-than-military aspects of group dynamics a priority at least equivalent to potential insurgents’ building armed capacity.¹⁸⁰ Though violence or the threat of violence is inherent in most definitions of insurgency, the case of Hamas demonstrates that force need not be the preeminent means brought to bear as an insurgent seeks to accomplish its ultimate ends. Detection of an insurgency in its initial phase may be all but impossible if only military or other force-related factors are monitored. Insurgents may choose—or be forced—to compete primarily if not entirely in social, economic, political, or other areas during much of their lifespan. Here, as in so many aspects of counterinsurgency

¹⁷⁸ Paul Cornish, “The United States and counterinsurgency: ‘political first, political last, political always,’” *International Affairs* 85 (2009): p. 65.

¹⁷⁹ Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*, NY: Nation, 2008, p. 19.

¹⁸⁰ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, pp. 10 and 52.

operations, thus-far elusive interagency cooperation—to include synchronized interagency intelligence operations—would go far in enhancing intelligence operational effectiveness. U.S. intelligence systems must therefore look well beyond threat capabilities and intentions in the military realm to instead consider present and emerging foes as systems capable of employing economic, aid, propaganda, and other tools in addition to (or in lieu of) military implements. Detection alone will be insufficient; the United States must additionally be sufficiently adept at employing a comprehensive approach in addressing these composite challenges to interrupt their development or otherwise neutralize them.

Recommendation 3: Focus on the Money...but Don't Forget Other Forms of Aid

This third recommendation is a validation of an already accepted process for dealing with insurgent, terrorist, or other irregular warfare threats. It has long been recognized as one of the ways to learn more about and—potentially—undermine a criminal threat when other methods fail. Its application to situations such as that in Gaza should be unsurprising, given the similarity between insurgent and criminal approaches to operations. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), Al Qaeda, and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka all relied (or continue to rely) on external sources of funding. Many such groups obtain considerable financial support via charitable donations. Hamas's *dawa* (social welfare branch) uses charitable contributions to support its military operations. This includes diversion of donations to support terrorist recruiting, day-to-day military administration, and directly providing funds for attacks. A 2003 FBI estimate put the annual Hamas budget at \$50 million. The *dawa* is thought to provide between \$25 million and \$30 million of that amount.¹⁸¹ Though financial dealings are notoriously difficult to detect and track, especially given some countries' and cultures' banking practices, financial forensics and related practices have proven valuable complements to other forms of intelligence collection. Continued development in this arena may allow for expanded effectiveness in using finance-related dealings as a means of coercing, prohibiting, or otherwise influencing threat behaviors in ways beneficial to friendly nations' objectives.

¹⁸¹ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, p. 61.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency* manual states, “It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent.”¹⁸² Most think in terms of the population when considering that advice; historically insurgents have relied on the population—the sea in which the insurgent fish swims—for food, shelter, and other forms of support. Today much if not most of what the insurgent, terrorist, criminal, or other threat representative needs can be purchased if he or she has sufficient funds. Not denying an enemy its funding provides the enemy a fiscal safe haven no less crucial to continued operations than a neighboring country into which the counterinsurgent cannot attack.

However, a counterinsurgent should not overlook other forms of aid that can present even more dangerous threats than financial resources. Much of the “aid” received by Hezbollah and Hamas comes in the form of hardware, to include weapons, warheads, other ammunition, or explosives. An enemy can additionally benefit from training, advisor postings, on-site technical assistance, or information (e.g., expertise regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction). “Following the money” could therefore leave a country unwittingly exposed to grievous harm in the absence of a broader approach to detecting, monitoring, and interdicting assistance provided to antipathetic groups.

A final observation in this regard: financial situations will evolve. The Irish Republican Army went from an organization for which U.S. and other charitable donations were a significant source of funding to one for which criminal enterprises became a fiscal resource dwarfing income from allegedly charitable organizations. A counterinsurgent must be ever ready to adapt to evolutions in realms other than those involving the application of force just as it has to be in terms of combat operations.

¹⁸² *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 2006, pp. 1–23.

Recommendation 4: Expand Current Conceptualizations of Centers of Gravity and Decisive Point

The previous recommendation suggests that centers of gravity (“sources of power that provide moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act”) and decisive points (“geographic places, specific key events, critical factors, or functions that, when acted upon, allow commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success”) may need to be viewed more broadly than is now the norm.¹⁸³ Conceptualizing threats in terms of networks has grown in popularity in recent years. Previous instruction has at times intimately linked centers of gravity (COG) and decisive points, the latter being viewed as providing ways to unbalance COGs much as would removing the abutments supporting a wall cause its weakening or collapse (an effective perspective not clear in the above definition). Modeling COGs and decision points as components of a network could enhance understanding of such vital relationships in addition to showing where redundancies exist that might allow reestablishment of key nodes or relationships disrupted by friendly force action.

It is also fashionable to consider “the population” as a center of gravity during counterinsurgencies. The choice is overly simplistic; it is akin to declaring “the army” as the enemy or one’s own center of gravity. Such a general definition of so key an implement for planning helps little. Far more valuable—and demanding considerably more analysis—is determining what individuals, groups, relationships, or other components of the environment are COGs, what relationships establish that status, and which are vital to recognizing decisive points, vulnerabilities, or other key elements. The previous section establishes that funding and other forms of aid are likely to be among those elements, possibly comprising decisive points or center of gravity. It takes but a small step further to recognize the possibility of COGs or decisive points lying distant from a physical operational area, e.g., the states or other entities providing aid, entities potentially including charity groups, members of diasporas, criminal organizations, or seemingly legitimate business enterprises. Akin to our recommendation on the consideration of asymmetry in more than a military sense

¹⁸³ The definitions for center of gravity are adapted from *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 as amended through June 13, 2007, pp. 80 and 140 respectively.

alone, it may be valuable for U.S. strategists and planners to conceive of “economic theaters of war,” “information areas of operation,” or similar constructs to abet thinking in broader than merely geographic or terrain-oriented terms.

This call for broadening is not meant to imply an increase in the number of centers of gravity pertinent to a given campaign or operation. It rather suggests planners must look beyond centers of gravity taken only from the conventional operations realm. In so doing, they may find that what would appropriately be designated as a COG during conventional operations instead assumes the character of a decisive point, another element of planning, or has little significance to the campaign, operation, or phase under consideration.

Recommendation 5: Maintain the Moral High Ground Without Crippling Friendly Force Efforts

Western morality can be an operational handicap. Choosing not to engage noncombatants used as human screens, avoiding actions leading to widespread civilian suffering, assisting in a population’s recovery after war’s destruction, and concern for one’s own injured all work to the disadvantage of moral nations. It is a self-inflicted wound, one readily accepted as essential despite any drawbacks.

It is important to avoid allowing self-restraint to influence operations beyond just bounds, however. Overconcern with friendly force casualties cannot be allowed to deny mission accomplishment, as the IDF reminded itself in the months after the Second Lebanon War and demonstrated in practice during Operation Cast Lead. Nor should the inherent cruelties of war be permitted to shortchange U.S. soldiers’ training. The foe sees compassion for the innocent as a vulnerability. Hamas’s positioning of women and children on the rooftops of potential target buildings in Gaza or using them to shield defensive positions is merely a form of enemy tactics too familiar to U.S. and coalition marines and soldiers with Iraq and Afghanistan experience. There is no reason to believe this aspect of warfare will not evolve as does any other. Children were employed as booby trap carriers in Vietnam; their use by militias and gangs in Africa has achieved notoriety. Israelis have seen the same during intifadas, just as their ancestors

did in the decade before independence.¹⁸⁴ Hamas youth education glorifies suicide. The IAF's use of small bomb "knocks on the roof" demonstrate understanding that such tactics demand foresight in developing procedures to deal with them, to reduce deaths of those who should have no place in war. The positive impact on friendly forces of not having to kill children, women, animals, the elderly, or other groups whose deaths are more likely to cause long-lasting psychological consequences is an additional benefit. Training for U.S. personnel should include instances in which they will confront already-demonstrated tactics of this type and others likely to develop, e.g., increased use of child warriors, use of infants as cover for IED attacks, and the like. Some argue there is a fine line in training that when crossed instills inordinate fears of combat. The author knows of no study questioning whether causing ground combatants to engage mockups of children with weapons or women cradling a child while wearing a suicide vest crosses the line or serves both to better ready men or women for combat while also perhaps reducing the negative psychological consequences of an actual such engagement. Current concerns about the psychological health of soldiers during and after deployments demonstrate that the question is one better answered before actions in the field reveal the consequences of ignoring it.

Training U.S. military personnel is a necessary but insufficient condition in this regard. The behaviors of other coalition member armed forces, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and commercial enterprises are all grouped into the common behavior attributed to "the others" by most in a developing nation's population. Behaviors that kill or maim are particularly damaging to the legitimacy of a coalition. It is a given that military forces must demonstrate restraint in the application of force so as to not unduly endanger noncombatants. Increasingly understood: governments and others hiring private security companies must likewise ensure that these armed personnel do not unnecessarily alienate innocents, thereby compromising weeks and months of good work by those military and civilian organizations demonstrating greater professionalism in their counterinsurgency approaches.

¹⁸⁴ Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, NY: Palgrave, 2008, pp. 51 and 56.

Recommendation 6: Influence Is More than Information. Plan the Influence Campaign Accordingly

Hamas and Hezbollah demonstrated mastery of media during their respective conflicts. The efforts were successful due more to the legitimacy established through the groups' actions as aid providers, educators, and champions of their causes than words that otherwise would have rung hollow. Their success also validates the need to treat influence as a constant campaign, to be conducted before, during, and after any operations involving target audiences or particular enemies. The example of Australia's constant reinforcement of commitment to the welfare of Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands links verbal promises of staying the course to actions reinforcing the words. An Institute for National Security Studies report strengthens arguments for an influence campaign continuing in the period following hostilities:

Though the public diplomacy machine ran smoothly before and during the operation, the shocking post-war situation in Gaza was largely ignored by those responsible for Israel's public diplomacy. Whereas during the campaign Israel's relationship with the media was tightly controlled, on the morning after, when reporters from all over the world converged on the Gaza rubble, Israel had no convincing message that could explain the dimensions of the devastation, and no acceptable rationale for what the world perceived to be an excessive use of force and disregard for international convention... Whereas during the campaign messages to the media were clear-cut, well documented, and prepared in advance, subsequent charges that Israel was guilty of war crimes were not met with a strong, focused, defense... A country's public diplomacy is judged by the end result.¹⁸⁵

Hamas, reeling on its tactical heels for most of the fighting, tried to retain its status as champion of the Palestinian people by landing blows it failed to deliver on the battlefield in the realm of influence and information. Israel's not providing humanitarian aid during Operation Cast Lead and its decision not to facilitate post-operation rebuilding made preempting or countering these efforts virtually impossible. The same is true of the insufficient funding for the Palestinian Authority in the days immediately following the ceasefire if Israel, the United States, or other states desired to rebuild the PA's damaged reputation in Gaza.

¹⁸⁵ Hirsh Goodman, "Israel's Public Diplomacy in Operation Cast Lead," The Institute for National Security Studies 11 (February 2009), <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2633> (accessed January 23, 2010).

While some might denigrate the importance of such after-conflict initiatives, consideration of what could be considered a center of gravity for Hamas argues otherwise. Hamas made its name by proselytizing the righteousness of its agendas and bolstering those words with social services the Palestinian Authority failed to provide with equal effectiveness. There was a sense of anxiety in the words of Hamas representatives meeting in 1994 Philadelphia when they “feared that American and Israeli investment in Palestinian territories would undercut ‘the Palestinian anger, desperation, [and] revolution by raising the standards of living of the Palestinians’ and hoped ‘the failure of the self rule administration to solve the problems of the Palestinian population and providing the needed services to them will be detrimental to the peace accord.’ Therefore, they concluded, ‘to defeat the [Oslo] accord [Hamas] should [continue to] make services available to the population.’”¹⁸⁶ The patience of the British government in Northern Ireland paid off after decades of commitment to improving the economic welfare of Catholics in the province (in conjunction with other initiatives, to include those educational, political, military, and involving law enforcement). There is evidence that the same effect may be gaining a toehold in the West Bank, where “a [Palestinian Authority] presidential adviser explained, “People didn’t want another uprising in the West Bank because they know what they currently have is of more value.”¹⁸⁷

The United States is not without its failures when it comes to self-inflicted wounds undermining the effectiveness of its influence efforts in the Middle East. The previously noted refusal to work with the democratically elected government in Gaza after years of championing international democracy is perhaps the foremost of recent events in this regard. (Part of a revised U.S. influence campaign could be reinitiating contact with Hamas while making it known that maintaining channels for interaction does not constitute validation of activities counter to those in keeping with American policy and morality.) The keys to building trust differ little from those essential in a business or personal relationship; inconsistency and a demonstrated lack of sincerity are ingredients for failure.

¹⁸⁶ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the service of Jihad*, New Haven, CT: Yale, 2006, pp. 248–249.

¹⁸⁷ “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” International Crisis Group Middle East Report number 85, April 23, 2009, pp. 14–15.

Education joins information and action as fundamental elements in a long-term influence campaign. An individual's background and personal experiences provide obstacles that efforts to influence must overcome if they are to be successful. Education may be the only means of casting those barriers aside. The task will be more difficult—it may be impossible—when the recipient has cultural or social beliefs at odds with influence campaign objectives. Two passages demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge and hint at the frustrations any attempting to overcome entrenched ignorance will confront. The first draws on experiences from the Vietnam era, the second a reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks:

A Pathet Lao noncom pulled a knife out of his belt and tried repeatedly to stick it into the armor of a parked Lao army tank, insisting that the tank was made of paper. Then he asked whether it ran and if it did, where the American driver was. A Lao soldier proceeded to drive the tank around as a demonstration. The Pathet Lao noncom stared arguing with the driver in Lao, insisting that the latter was an American. The driver replied, 'I am talking to you in Lao; how can I be an American?' The Pathet Lao said heatedly he couldn't be Lao, the Americans ran everything in Laos. His indoctrination was so complete that he could not be convinced otherwise.¹⁸⁸

"The towers?" exclaimed the proprietor, who now looked at us with a bit of smugness. "But everyone knows it was the Israelis who caused it! Four thousand Jews stayed home from work that day. How did they know? Tell me: How...did...they...know!?" At this, both Faraj and I said in unison that we'd seen Bin Laden take credit for it. "He said it on television," Faraj repeated in a patient voice. "If it was on television then it was faked," the proprietor said matter-of-factly. "They can fake all kinds of things, you know."¹⁸⁹

Intelligence will play a fundamental role in successfully conducting an influence campaign. Determining what individuals and groups retain a sufficiently open mind to listen and in turn further disseminate desired messages will make significant nontraditional demands on intelligence systems. Choosing what means to employ when communicating information should be a more straightforward task. In Gaza, for example, cell phones outnumber landline users. Knowledge of this aided the IDF both in knowing how better to communicate with the public and in identifying enemy vulnerabilities (e.g., that Hamas communications were exposed to eavesdropping,

¹⁸⁸ Rufus Philips, *Why Vietnam Matters, An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 330.

¹⁸⁹ Stephanie Gutman, *The Other War: Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle for Media Supremacy*, San Francisco, CA: Encounter, 2005, p. 225.

jamming, and direct contact, the last also providing an opportunity for deception).¹⁹⁰ Awareness that 70% of Gazans have access to television and radio (when electrical power is available) and 20% own a computer (with over 300,000 of the population using the internet) likewise advises influence campaign planners.¹⁹¹ Reflecting preliminary research and planning for other potential future contingencies, a retired member of Israel's security cabinet revealed, "We came to the conclusion that, for our purposes, a key Iranian vulnerability is in its on-line information.... We have acted accordingly."¹⁹²

Recall that Israel's primary audience was domestic Israelis. The corresponding campaign was very successful in maintaining support for Operation Cast Lead but less so in affecting international—and in particular regional Muslim—perspectives on the war. The lesson for the United States is clear. Procedures for identifying all relevant audiences need to be established during preparation for any operation. An overarching coordinating mechanism must be in place to ensure that messages and actions are appropriate, consistent, and reinforcing.¹⁹³ They must be so across all audiences and over time. This demands an influence operations level of effort and extent of coordination heretofore unseen.

Given the importance of waging a coherent and consistent influence campaign integrated at all echelons, the wisdom of the United States in employing surrogates in this regard merits reconsideration. Insistence on giving the indigenous government credit for U.S.-funded projects may seem right-headed during a counterinsurgency, but members of the population then see American forces as nothing other than purveyors of violence. The situation is further clouded when U.S. funding or other aid becomes a tool of those in office for reinforcing their political status at the expense of other candidates, especially if those so situated are corrupt or otherwise undermine an indigenous government's legitimacy. There are other factors admittedly at work in many such

¹⁹⁰ Penny L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 56.

¹⁹¹ Penny L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, p. 56.

¹⁹² Dan Williams, "Analysis – Wary of naked force, Israelis eye cyberwar on Iran," Reuters, July 7, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Iran/idUSTRE5663EC20090707> (accessed July 8, 2009).

¹⁹³ Any such processes will have to incorporate restrictions regarding interactions with the American public, which can be informed but is not to be subjected to U.S. propaganda.

situations, e.g., local contractors or others affiliated with projects known to be U.S.-financed may be exposed to insurgent violence. Yet unilaterally sacrificing all influence benefits is a flawed default policy. Each situation requires individual evaluation not only theater-wide but also within theaters. Conditions can differ greatly even within a given area of operations.

It would be erroneous for the United States to consider influence targeting only in terms of enemies and the population in a theater of operation. The task of identifying and establishing how best to address relevant audiences bridges current staff section and nonmilitary agency responsibilities. The potential for mistakes is high. The demand for a cross-bureaucratic approach also complicates the maintenance of consistency in the design and execution of influence activities. Initiative in this area is made more complex by the same deficiency that hinders formation and execution of effective interagency operations: there exists no entity below the National Security Council (NSC) with either the responsibility or authority to set and enforce policy capable of coordinating the activities across the entirety of the federal government. Not even the NSC is structured, manned, or—apparently—powerful enough to enforce its dictates were its members to seriously attempt to establish cross-government interagency policy. It seems both the formal and informal structures within the U.S. government deny this authority to anything other than the President himself.

The lack of an organization with comprehensive interagency authority means that uniformity in a U.S. influence campaign is virtually impossible to attain. The shortfall is a potentially fatal one for the country's efforts to interdict or defeat an insurgency or preserve counterinsurgency successes. Failing to conduct a consistent influence campaign that continues throughout and in the aftermath of operations is thus akin to "losing the peace" due to a faulty post-war strategy following a brilliantly successful combat operation. Israel has twice seen a tactically defeated adversary effectively compete for strategic victory via a well-conducted influence campaign—first in 2006 Lebanon and then as a consequence of Operation Cast Lead. The United States must recognize the necessity for continuous influence operations—to include activities extending beyond the end of combat or the departure of U.S. forces from a theater.

Recommendation 7: Treat the Media as a (Difficult) Coalition Partner

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies—and that is fighting without them.¹⁹⁴

Winston Churchill

as quoted in David Irving, *The War Between the Generals*

Israel's decision to bar media from Gaza unquestionably seems to be a policy the country's leadership should consider revisiting. Military men tend to look on correspondents with a jaundiced eye. Media representatives can demand much, put soldiers in danger, pose an operations security risk, and then release information unfavorable to their hosts. However, they also provide a source of material to their audiences independent of the combatants (other than when they allow themselves to be co-opted in their pursuit for news, as many did in accepting the strict controls imposed on them by Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War). By barring media presence, a military risks having its own press releases questioned if not outright rejected. The post-conflict telling of the story is left to those with incomplete or suspect information. The negative consequences of the Goldstone Report, the more embarrassing because of the lead investigator's religion, extended the costs of a policy of denial as members of the United Nations committee conducting the evaluation had few unbiased representatives able to substantiate Israeli statements on controversial issues.

The United States learned a similar, if somewhat less internationally embarrassing, lesson after Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in 1983. Efforts to ban media failed in part when correspondents made their way to the island through private arrangements. The end result was criticism similar to that experienced by Israel after Operation Cast Lead. A further cost: later accounts of the operation, which might have had some value for military professionals desiring to enhance their understanding of war, were very few. The United States learned from its earlier missteps; the recommendation here serves to reinforce perpetuating and adapting its current approach as conditions demand rather than suggesting that another is necessary.

Recommendation 8: Formalize Successful Procedures

¹⁹⁴ Jay M. Shafritz, *Words on War: Military Quotations from Ancient Times to the Present*, NY: Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 14.

All the IAF was committed to this very limited operation. It had no other missions like strategic attack on other fronts.... We were overpowered with airplanes—fixed-wing, helicopters—UAVs, everything...and the air force was fighting in only one front. Usually you find the IAF fighting on more than one front.... The main challenge is how to take the lessons of Cast Lead and make them doctrine.¹⁹⁵

BG (IAF, reserves) Asaf Agmon

General Agmon's concern permeates military operations. The role of personality has nearly attained the status of unwritten principle: "Good personal relationships in war are key to success." Unfortunately, the axiom has an inverse: "Personalities in conflict breed failures and unnecessary casualties." Despite these recognized "truths," or perhaps because of them, many advances in procedures and tactics are lost, never making their way into lessons learned compilations or doctrine.

The United States has experienced many similar cases in recent years. Cooperation between special operations and regular forces—the exchange of intelligence, sharing of firepower resources, "informal" task organizations (i.e., those not formally dictated in an operations order), and other mutual assistance—has benefited parties on no few occasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Failures to capture the procedures and tactics established in instances of cooperation are attributable to many factors: the pace of operations, a belief that there is nothing special to record, or the apparent uniqueness of the situation among them. These tactical excuses have more heinous counterparts once the successes butt against bureaucracy. General Agmon continued the remarks quoted at the head of this section with a concern unfortunately only all too familiar within any armed services when it comes to competition for funds: "The main challenge is how to take the lessons of Cast Lead and make them doctrine. This is something that is still a challenge, and remains a point of disagreement between the air force and the army.... I think that the blame lies primarily with [one of those services because] they think if they support this as doctrine that they are supporting the [other] in the budget battle."¹⁹⁶ Agmon goes on to emphasize that militaries need not only to capture vital lessons in doctrine, but also to use them to inform training, plans, and future operations in the service of solving what otherwise might prove intractable problems. U.S. and coalition

¹⁹⁵ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Asaf Agmon (BG, IAF reserves); Chief Executive Officer, The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies; interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Herzliya, Israel, October 13, 2009.

partner higher-echelon commanders, staff officers, or others spotting these successes should take steps to facilitate that capture, whether through having key persons summarize their approaches or dispatching lessons learned collectors to these ore-rich mines from which future doctrine can be extracted. Likewise, efforts to expand the exchange of such lessons and insights into potentially helpful procedures between international partners are called for. Initiatives in this regard would include creation of formal speaker exchange programs within coalitions, periodic creation of multinational brainstorming sessions with recent veterans of operational theaters, publication of relevant articles from other nations' military journals, and similar exchanges between governmental agencies other than defense departments/ministries.

Recommendation 9: Commit Resources to the Study of Non-state Deterrence

Though deterrence is a complex posture, it is relatively simpler when applied against states than when applied against sub-state organizations. The cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations differs from that of sovereign states, and overall, deterrence against these organizations is quite difficult, though not entirely impossible. In the two campaigns that Israel launched in the past thirty months, the adversaries were not pure sub-state organizations. Both Hizbollah and Hamas are first of all political organizations.... Israel did succeed in establishing stable deterrence against Hizbollah. This was amply demonstrated during Operation Cast Lead, in which Hizbollah was deterred from resorting to military activity in solidarity with its allies in Gaza.... the semi-state of Gaza.¹⁹⁷

Yair Evron

"Deterrence: The Campaign against Hamas"

The above quote immediately grabs one's attention when it posits that deterrence of non-state actors is fundamentally different from what would work when the target is a nation state. The passage also contains questionable suppositions. First, is state-on-state deterrence really "relatively simpler" than when one or more parties is a non-state actor, or is the assumed simplicity more a matter of inexperience with cases involving the latter? Second, is the inherent assumption that state-on-state deterrence is essentially unlike its counterpart true, or are there basic elements of deterrence that apply regardless of the actors involved? Third, did Israel actually "succeed in

¹⁹⁷ Yair Evron, "Deterrence: The Campaign against Hamas," The Institute for National Security Studies *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 11, No. 4, February 2009.

establishing stable deterrence against Hezbollah...as demonstrated during Operation Cast Lead,” or were other factors previously mentioned in this study also at play, factors more or less related to the Second Lebanon War?

The above passage might additionally stir other questions in readers’ minds. The specific queries are less important than the reality underlying them. Deterring non-state organizations at the strategic and tactical levels is an undertaking approached with little more than personal experience and best guesses. Developing this arm of deterrence theory will be a significant commitment (if indeed another arm is called for). All nations are to some extent bound by rules of international intercourse, which if violated risk a consolidation of opposition. Saddam Hussein, for example, discovered one of those lines when he violated the sovereign borders of neighbor Kuwait without reasonable cause in 1990. On the other hand, international guidance regarding how to respond to perpetrations by non-state actors is relatively scarce. Determining how nation states should respond must be one part of any study seeking to develop a theory to guide non-state actor deterrence. It is a study that should be undertaken, however, since progress in this area will give both national leaders, diplomats, and commanders in the field a firmer foundation on which to base their policies.

Israel’s repeated clashes with Hezbollah and Hamas cast light on the importance of incorporating more than force alone when attempting to deter non-state actors. A nation state’s application of force may purchase temporary respite from attack; these will likely be no more than lulls in a perpetual cycle of violence given a non-state actor’s belief that survival is itself a form of victory.¹⁹⁸ In Northern Ireland, British military clashes with resistance elements were only the most visible component of the struggle to bring peace and stability to the province. The current extended period of tranquility has its roots in far more than just armed engagements. Initiatives to improve the lot of the economically disadvantaged, insistence on establishing and maintaining the rule of law, refusal to buckle politically in light of terrorist attacks on either of the islands, and commitment to making all parties understand the benefits of peace versus the costs of continued conflict were among the keys to the success witnessed today. British armed

¹⁹⁸ The author thanks Mr. Paul Smith for his observations on the cycle of violence and the potential for deriving lessons from Northern Ireland in this regard. Paul Smith review comments provided to Dr. Russell W. Glenn, February 11, 2010.

forces therefore served a purpose not unlike that of the IDF today by doing what they could to contain the violence perpetrated by non-state foes. The British government realized that reliance on force alone would only fuel further hostilities, keeping alive the antagonisms underlying factional differences. Patient application of other means sought to, and succeeded in, disrupting the cycle of violence. Deterrent efforts worked at two levels: the tactical (use of military force to contain violence) and strategic (orchestration of other national resources and diplomacy to eliminate the causes of conflict). The tactical efforts contained the problem; strategic elements broke the cycle of violence, potentially bringing the conflict to an end. Similar patience, comprehensive efforts, and strategic insight will be called for if the United States is to succeed in its various international counterinsurgency and other nation building efforts.

Recommendation 10: Assign Liaison Officers to Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations

The brushes with death and delays in providing medical attention associated with NGO operations during Operation Cast Lead highlight the need to incorporate these and other relevant non-state actors into planning processes, daily coordination, and operational activities. (The growing influence of commercial representatives in areas of operation suggests that commanders should also not overlook these groups in this regard.) Sheer numbers dictate that such organizations should consolidate and/or cooperate to the extent necessary to reduce LNO requirements; many NGOs already voluntarily associate themselves with blanket oversight mechanisms to capitalize on the benefits of sharing resources. Early integration of NGO representatives during U.S. and coalition operations planning (and during routine training between commitments) will facilitate identification of LNO requirements prior to deployment, as it will other outstanding needs essential to maximizing the benefits of in-theater cooperation for all parties involved. Assigning military LNOs to NGO, IGO, and commercial parties¹⁹⁹ willing to cooperate will not only help to reduce incidents of fratricide (something current civil affairs coordination centers abet by collecting information such as the grid coordinates

¹⁹⁹ Though this section addresses only cases of armed forces organizations providing liaison officers to NGOs or other relevant nonmilitary groups, there is no reason that similar guidance could not apply to cases in which such groups supply liaison personnel to the military, another NGO, indigenous government agencies, or similar entities.

of NGO warehouses and other facilities).²⁰⁰ It would also potentially increase the responsiveness of American and other friendly force military capabilities to assist these groups' efforts when an LNO identifies opportunities, just as the military LNO could reduce reaction times of the organizations to which they are assigned in responding to a population's requirements. Ties with NGO, IGO, and other organizations will also provide access to information otherwise difficult to come by.²⁰¹ These groups often have better understanding of local conditions than does an arriving unit; their input can advise aid, capacity building, and similar operations as well as help prevent errors such as striking inappropriate targets. Finally, operations security will be served, as military liaison officers can give timely guidance on routes to take or other needs via secure communications not available to nonmilitary groups. Given the lack of experience in employing LNOs in this manner, determination of doctrinal guidelines on the echelon to which these officers ought to be assigned remains an outstanding requirement. Allocation will remain situation dependent even after creation of such guidance.

The closer relations developed in establishing these ties will have peripheral benefits. At least one aid provider's representatives met with the IDF after Operation Cast Lead to provide feedback on the Israeli military's activities during the war.²⁰² Aid organizations desiring to maintain neutrality while also serving the best interests of the noncombatants they hope to aid can be very discreet and valuable sources of external input for leaders willing to listen.

The potential benefits of incorporating aid provider capabilities in stability operations are considerable for the United States, coalition partners, and noncombatants. Their numbers, desire to remain varying degrees of autonomy, lack of communications capabilities and use of uniforms or characteristic vehicle marking, and other factors point to this incorporation being a continued challenge. It remains a problem demanding attention by all relevant parties.

Recommendation 11: Continue to Refine Technologies of Value in Urban Environments, in Particular Precision-guided Munitions and Anti-fratricide Capabilities

²⁰⁰ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

²⁰¹ Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

²⁰² Anonymous interview with Dr. Russell W. Glenn.

Drawing technology lessons from Israeli experiences has always demanded a bit of care. The *Merkava* tank is a prime example; the fielding of the *Namer* armored personnel carrier provides another. These very heavy, purpose-built systems are an exceptional fit to IDF requirements but would be unsuitable to a force such as that of the United States that must deploy its equipment worldwide, at times very quickly.

Operation Cast Lead nonetheless offers several potential lessons of value in the technology realm despite differences in strategic mobility and other requirements. The first is the always-valuable reminder to not rely too greatly on technology in the first place. Some brigade-level commanders' fixation with command and control systems fielded before the Second Lebanon War was among the problems identified after the 2006 fighting. Adjustments made in the period before Operation Cast Lead saw technologies resume an appropriate place in the Israeli warrior's approach to operations. Continued refinement of UAV employment, introduction of low-level information aids like the Bull Island, 360° tactical camera, and innovative deployment of smaller air-delivered munitions to reduce noncombatant casualties are all worthy of consideration for employment by U.S. forces. U.S.-Israeli cooperation in developing anti-rocket and other indirect-fire-defeating capabilities may provide both armed forces with valuable resources in the near future, as might familiarity with other emerging or adaptive Israeli technologies. The successful use of canine teams reinforces the wisdom of drawing on previously proven capabilities when technologies are not up to meeting operational demands.

Two primary technological developments stand out as particularly important when looking back at the fighting in Gaza. In truth, the first—avoidance of fratricide in built-up areas—is as much a command and control, training, intelligence, and leadership challenge as a technological one. The simple truth is that fighting in densely populated, “close” terrain is extraordinarily difficult. Despite the wise policy of avoiding Qassam urban fields of fire and booby-trapped buildings to the extent possible, the IDF suffered multiple fratricide incidents, a testament to the complexity of demands placed on leaders and led alike. Anti-fratricide remains an area calling for improvements in all relevant areas, technology among them.

Second, there is no reason to believe future threats will not demonstrate the same lack of humanitarianism that Hamas did in using human shields. The extent of worldwide urbanization only increases the likelihood of these enemies putting critical facilities or other resources beneath and in close proximity to civilian structures or population concentrations. The post-Vietnam War era has witnessed phenomenal progress in the development of precision weapons and munitions capable of meeting a wide range of tactical demands. Those advances are crucial to military successes, especially in an era when a single bomb drop can constitute an event of strategic consequence. There remains a need for yet further refinements to allow for extremely precise, limited-effect engagements capable of neutralizing underground targets in intimate proximity—even directly beneath—people or places better left unharmed.

Cautioning against too great a reliance on technology has almost achieved cliché status in U.S. and partner counterinsurgency writings. It is nonetheless worth mentioning here, given fears among some that overreliance on unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence and other purposes is potentially interfering with more comprehensive approaches to problem solving. That Hezbollah and Hamas are masters at neutralizing technological advantages comes as no surprise to those who are more than cursorily familiar with recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Insurgents have long managed to avoid nation state militaries' strengths. There is little reason to believe that it would be unwise to expect too much of technology in combating such enemies in the future.

Recommendation 12: Organize and Conduct Counterinsurgency and Other Irregular Warfare Operations Like a Conductor Does an Orchestra

The apparent inability of U.S. government agencies to collaborate or even cooperate in the approach to the 2003 intervention in Iraq has acquired almost paradigmatic status as the way *not* to conduct a counterinsurgency.²⁰³

Paul Cornish

“The United States and Counterinsurgency”

Were counterinsurgency operations an orchestra, Israel’s percussion section would dwarf the strings, horns, and all others. U.S. doctrine would insist on more balanced music, the drums and cymbals of guns and bombs at times in crescendo while in other instances they would fall silent or provide only restrained support for the establishment of law and order, construction of infrastructure, or provision of aid. It has become a tenet of counterinsurgency that the military cannot persevere alone. That is only in part true. Barring its overwhelming use in an act of virtual annihilation, *military force* alone will be insufficient to attaining lasting security, stability, or achieving other desired ends. Unfortunately, the military will find itself all but alone when it initiates many operations. Even thereafter, support from other governmental agencies is rarely sufficient for the tasks at hand. Nor can nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations fill all requirements, as relief efforts in the weeks after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti made starkly evident. Counterinsurgencies, irregular warfare, stability operations—regardless of the title, the foundation on which successful operations are built is not a continuous one. Success is instead built on a collection of pillars, each of which must bear its share of weight. The whole cannot hold together if too many of those pillars—security, humanitarian aid, capacity building, law and order, economics, or others—are insufficient to support their portion of requirements. Despite a few limited and often reluctant steps forward, U.S. interagency cooperation remains more myth than reality. The irregular warfare/counterinsurgency orchestra is peopled primarily with military personnel; a considerable number play an instrument other than a lethal weapon.

²⁰³ Paul Cornish, “The United States and counterinsurgency: “political first, political last, political always,” *International Affairs* 85 (2009): pp. 65 and 75.

Improvements to interagency operations will have to address policies and laws falling short of operational demands. The excerpt below addresses both:

The University of Montana had proposed translating Islamic writings from Persian and Arabic into the local Uzbek and Kyrgyz languages. [U.S. Agency for International Development in Kyrgyzstan representative Clifford H.] Brown hoped the translations could have a moderating influence at a time when a conservative Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, was expanding its influence in the region. "Islam has a large body of moderate literature saying, for example, that suicide is a sin against Allah," he later wrote in a paper describing his efforts to fund the initiative. "Not a bad idea, I thought at the time." But USAID lawyers rejected the proposal, saying that using taxpayer funds would violate a provision in the First Amendment barring the government's promotion of religion. The agency also prohibited Brown from publishing the opinion piece, which laid out his case for the proposal, according to Brown and a senior USAID official.... Gary Winter, USAID's legal counsel, said the agency would never fund any program with a religious purpose.... Little USAID funding has gone to Islamic groups in recent years. From 2001 to 2005, more than 98 percent of agency funds for faith-based organizations went to Christian groups, according to figures obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by the Boston Globe newspaper in 2006. Winter said most of the faith-based groups applying for aid have been Christian. He added that the agency is eager to reach out to Islamic moderates.²⁰⁴

Similarly unhelpful policies hinder effective use of funds in the field. Prohibitions on interdepartmental sharing and other restrictions on disbursement create counterproductive situations in the field, e.g., the military being allowed to spend funds to build a road but not to pay for local workers to train on the job, an action that would conceivably give them marketable construction skills.²⁰⁵

The example of Timor-Leste mentioned above suggests a final consideration in this regard. Much as the conductor ensures perfect timing for the entry, departure, and reentry of particular instruments to ensure success during a concert, so too must the counterinsurgent leader orchestrate the arrival and exodus of national or coalition capabilities. The United States tends to view the security phase (by whatever name) of a

²⁰⁴ Colum Lynch, "In Fighting Radical Islam, Tricky Course for U.S. Aid," *The Washington Post* (July 30, 2009), <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/29/AR2009072903515.html> (accessed July 30, 2009).

²⁰⁵ This situation was revealed to the author during research for a project resulting in the following report, which reveals a number of interagency policies requiring improvement: Russell W. Glenn, et al., *Evaluation of USAID's Community Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq: Effectiveness of the SCP Model as a Non-lethal Tool for Counterinsurgency*, study completed for the United States Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 2009, pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN461.pdf (accessed January 24, 2010). For a much more comprehensive discussion of interagency and broader participation during irregular warfare operations, see Russell W. Glenn, *Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? A Military Perspective on Coalition and Alliance Challenges During Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010.

stability operation complete once major military forces withdraw. There is little if any expectation that reintroduction of armed forces personnel will be necessary for other than training or advisory purposes. In contrast, Australia has repeatedly sent combat units back into both Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands to assist in reestablishing stability in times of renewed unrest. It may be worth contemplating a revised approach, one in which immature governments are encouraged to call on the United States for help when situations threaten the progress already gained. U.S. leaders would obviously evaluate the wisdom and desirable extent of any reentry after studying the conditions present in each situation, but incorporating this “right of return” or “right to request return” into cooperative agreements should ensure that U.S. plans and training are in place to support such contingencies. Adoption of this approach has a number of implications meriting further study, among them the possible assumption of greater risk by removing U.S. forces from a given theater earlier than otherwise would be the case.

Concluding Remarks

Even before the conference in Bethlehem Fatah had been enjoying a surge in popular support in the West Bank. This was due partly to the improved economic situation and also to the increased calm on the streets, attributed to the intensive American training of the PA’s security forces. Israel’s massive onslaught on Hamas-controlled Gaza earlier this year also seems to have validated Mr. Abba’s more moderate approach.... Said a young man.... “There are a lot of scary things going on in Gaza. Hamas is crazy. Palestine is Fatahland.”²⁰⁶

“Fresh Faces, Old Hands”
The Economist, August 2009

Palestinian-Israeli relations are not condemned to an eternity of conflict. Close investigation reveals reasons for hope, a number of which have roots in policies and procedures akin to those derivative of the above recommendations. Professionalizing Palestinian security forces, addressing the worst of the Arafat-era corruption, and—less recognized—current Israeli policies tolerant of, even encouraging, economic development in the West Bank are all ongoing positive steps. There is much to be learned from the British success in Northern Ireland. London’s patience and the British military’s restraint after initial setbacks cultivated improved Catholic economic status. Education beat back prejudice and factionalism. Today’s stability in the province took

²⁰⁶ “Fresh faces, old hands,” *The Economist* 392 (August 15, 2009): p. 41. See also Jim Zanotti, et al., “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009),” Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2009, pp. 12–13.

nearly two score years of policy revisions followed by steady good judgment in application to achieve that end. The above quote hints that the same is within the realm of possibility for Israel and Palestine. Despite fundamental differences in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare doctrine more generally, the foregoing pages suggest that the United States military can draw many lessons from Operation Cast Lead and the larger conflict of which it is a part for adaptation to challenges elsewhere today and in the years ahead.

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