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The U.S. Military transformations in Operations in Post-Cold War World and Global War on Terrorism

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Thesis: The military transformations during the Operations post-Cold War World and Global War on Terrorism were successful by using technological advances.

I. Introduction

II. The facts need of transformation

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Abstract

The military transformations in Operations post-Cold War World and War on Terrorism were successful by using technological advances. The end of Cold War required U.S. Army to downsize the number of Soldiers and military budget: but new global threats required new challenges to deploy Soldiers in the same time, different places in worldwide. The Army realized that the modern advances of technology would give the possibilities to accomplish this goal by lighter and more nimble forces. NCOs completed main role for leading the small units and supervising new equipments. The operational needs of the Global war on Terrorism reasonably had an effect upon Army Transformation.

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I. Introduction

The military transformations in Operations post-Cold War World and War on Terrorism were successful by using technological advances. The end of Cold War required U.S. Army to downsize the number of Soldiers and military budget: but new global threats required new challenges to deploy Soldiers in the same time, different places in worldwide. The Army realized that the modern advances of technology would give the possibilities to accomplish this goal by lighter and more nimble forces. NCOs completed main role for leading the small units and supervising new equipments. The operational needs of the Global war on Terrorism reasonably had an effect upon Army Transformation. The Global war on Terrorism progressed, digital technology became so popular, pervasive, and mainly used that the theater as a whole became concerned with lack of enough satellite communications bandwidth to accommodate all users.

Once deployed, NCOs performed all of their traditional combat functions, but also obtained more responsibility in the small-unit level of operations other than war.

II. The key factors of need to transform

The U.S. military succeeded a lot in the years of post-Cold War. It fought several conflicts in Southwest Asia, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo and then downsized by a third. High levels of overseas deployment led to increase its expeditionary capabilities to fight the same time in such unknown places. Even reduced budgets and increased multinational operational tempo worldwide, the U.S. Army assumed to transform itself. This transformation predicted taking full advantage of technical development, digitization, PGMs, and other changes of technology.

During the Global War on Terrorism, American Soldiers showed outstanding tactical skill using the latest advances in military technology. After successful campaign against Taliban and Saddam Hussein the military paid more attention toward the technical advantages to achieve national objectives. Expanded operations in Afghanistan and Iraq forced current operations back into top priority toward transformation. The Army was no longer in an interval between wars, and technical advances would be applied as quickly as was practical. Development of the Future Combat System (FCS) would continue, but innovations intended for it would be applied to vintage vehicles as well, when practical.

III. The key policies enacted to effect the desired transformation

Operations in post-Cold War world required the senior Army leadership focus on changing the Army to meet new challenges. The heavy conventional forces were too heavy to get where they may be used rapidly, and the light forces had reduced capability of fighting to a capable adversary. The Army stated several marks on the values on deployability of force: a fully capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a similarly capable division within 5 days, and a corps of five divisions in 30 days.

The senior leaders also focused on some potential technological advances: digitally enabled network-centric warfare and affordable Precision Guided Munitions. If this technological potential could become reality, a lighter and more lethal force was a possibility.

Network-centric warfare was the military version of the digital technology that based on the internet and its capability to move huge masses of data fast and precisely. The most important type of knowledge would be adequately accurate for targeting enemy locations. With digitized communications such information would be developed immediately from the sensor detecting the target to the shooter planned to engage it and would be accessible to other stations on the net

at the same time.

Improved vehicular armor could reduce the weight of vehicles while protecting crew safety. Body armor that could dependably protect against artillery fragments and small arms was now practical for individual Soldiers. Lasers could show as useful in targeting direct-fire weapons as they were in guiding PGMs and might finally directly destroy ballistic missiles and aircraft as well. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) had progressively developed in performance and reliability, and the prospect for using them as weapons platforms as well as for surveillance now seemed practical. Night-vision devices were more sophisticated and more miniaturized, allowing American Soldiers to “rule the night” as never before.

The Army foresaw a Future Combat System (FCS) as coming in several variants: reconnaissance, troop carrying, tank killing, artillery bearing, and like. Technical advances with used to armor and crew protection may close some of the gap with the heavier tank with values to survivability, but even more protection was to be recommended affordable by inconspicuousness and by the lethality of an overall array of sensors, shooters, and digital connectivity that was to destroy the enemy before the enemy could depend on engage.

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Once deployed, NCOs performed all of their traditional combat functions, but also obtained more responsibility in the small-unit level of operations other than war. Most of the routine security, compliance, and reassurance missions took place at the squad level or below, few conditions insisted elements larger than a company at a time. So NCOs were mainly important in multinational situations. As modernization progressed the successful fielding of new equipment depended upon the noncommissioned officers who supervised its maintenance and use. In this period of military history, the Army completed the most impressive development in the automating information systems and for increasingly accurate precision-guided munitions of many types. The new equipment went to not many units at a time, mostly when it was in an experimental status. The role of the NCO as an direct supervisor of men and equipment alike remained unchanged.

As the Army increased in operational pace and technical sophistication required the NCOs kept this pace. Combat is mostly at small-unit level, the difference in success and failure was what individuals and teams were trained through solid training.

An NCO's center of attention, main particularly at platoon and squad levels, was on the training that kept subordinated Soldiers alive in combat. Primary training with the basic structure blocks appropriate to all Soldiers (weapons, physical training, first aid, and chemical) as well as those essential for their duty position went far in that regard. Combat wore Soldiers down; after a short break, training started again with the other lessons learned in combat.

NCOs ensure Soldiers met standards for the individual tasks that contributed to mission success. When mission failed, it was often because leader and individual tasks were not correctly achieved. As the Army fought the Global War on Terrorism and became defined in new ways. A lot of resolutions would be made by Soldiers working in environments away from their

superiors. Training junior leaders would always be a vital part of the senior NCO's duties.

IV. Conclusion

The military transformations in Operations post-Cold War World and War on Terrorism were successful by using technological advances. The end of Cold War required U.S. Army to downsize the number of Soldiers and military budget: but new global threats required new challenges to deploy Soldiers in the same time, different places in worldwide. The Army realized that the modern advances of technology would give the possibilities to accomplish this goal by lighter and more nimble forces. NCOs completed main role for leading the small units and supervising new equipments. The operational needs of the Global war on Terrorism reasonably had an effect upon Army Transformation. The Global war on Terrorism progressed, digital technology became so popular, pervasive, and mainly used that the theater as a whole became concerned with lack of enough satellite communications bandwidth to accommodate all users.

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