

LIBRARY
USA CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN

OCT 1 1963

ACCESSION NO RR
PO REGISTER 920468

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. ARMY EXPANSION, 1961 - 62 (U)

16436.99-2

JUN 13 1967

*page
70 of 85*

Prepared by

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C., 1963

CLASSIFIED BY *off of ch of mil history*
SUBJECT TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, DE 1962
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31/1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED
BY AUTHORITY OF *REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS*
BY *J. A. Sorenson*
ON *4 APR 68*

~~DOWNGRADED AND 2 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DIR 5200.2~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCMH, S C No: 96324


~~SECRET~~

Copy 42 of 143 copies.

Foreword

The attached historical monograph is a revised version of the earlier "U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, 1961 - 1962," which was distributed to the Department of the Army staff agencies in September 1962. The original version was prepared at the direction of the Chief of Staff by four historians of this office: Dr. Robert W. Coakley, Mr. Walter G. Hermes, Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel, and Dr. Earl F. Ziemke. The draft monograph received an intensive internal review in OCMH and many valuable comments were received from DA staff reviewing agencies. These comments, suggestions, and criticisms have been taken into consideration in the inclosed revision, prepared by Mr. Walter G. Hermes. In addition, some material and information that was unavailable in September has been incorporated. The Office of the Chief of Military History would welcome further critical comment in the event that errors are still found in the manuscript.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL


96324

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Contents

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
I	THE BACKGROUND	1
	The International Situation	3
	The New Approach to National Defense	9
	The State of the Army, Mid-1961	20
II	DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPANSION PROGRAM TO MEET THE BERLIN CRISIS	29
	DOD-JCS Proposals, the President's Decisions, and Congressional Action	29
	The Army's Initial Program and the OSD Control Policy	36
	The Pace of Decision: 2 August - 31 October 1961	46
	Decisions on the Allocation of Spaces, 2 - 15 August 1961	46
	The New Sense of Urgency	52
	Decisions on Reinforcement of USAREUR	60
	Decision to Call Up Two Reserve Component Division Forces	68
	The Expansion of the Navy and Air Force	81
III	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMY EXPANSION PROGRAM	84
	The Build-up of the Strategic Reserve	84
	Expansion of the Training Base	86
	The Mobilization of Reserves -- Initial Increments	89
	The Mobilization of the Two-Division RC Force	90
	The Mechanization of the Three Infantry Divisions in Europe	100
	The Provision of Fillers and Support Units for USAREUR	102
	The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	106
	Caretaker and Maintenance Detachments	107
	The 26th and 28th Infantry Divisions	109
	Prepositioning of Equipment	113
	Build-up of Special Warfare Forces	118
IV	THE ACTIVATION OF THE 1ST ARMORED AND 5TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS	124
	Early Plans	124
	The Organization and Training of the New Divisions	135

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
V	THE RELEASE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS	158
	The Problem of Timing	158
	Preparations for Release	177
VI	THE DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY STRENGTH: JANUARY - AUGUST 1962	187
	USAREUR	187
	STRAF/STRAC	202
VII	LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE BUILD-UP	212
	Policies and Priorities	214
	Allocation and Redistribution	229
	The Rebuild and Overhaul Program	244
	Procurement	249
	Modernization	256
VIII	THE COMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF FINANCING	268
	The OMA Fund Shortage	270
	Military Personnel, Army	300
	Military Construction, Army	302
	Deficiency Funding for the Two RC Division Forces	304
IX	PERSONNEL PROBLEMS	324
	The Reserve Components	324
	The Active Army	353
	Implementation of the Initial Personnel Actions	355
	Repercussions	359
	The Ban on Dependent Travel to Europe	362
	Plans for the Release of Involuntary Extendees	365
	Civilian Personnel	367
X	RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT	371
	Congressional Criticism of the Call-up	372
	Remedial Measures	374
	Reorganization of the Army	385
	Conclusion	388

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chapter I

The Background (S)

The accession to office of President John F. Kennedy in January 1961 took place in a setting of world-wide tensions from which neither respite nor a conclusive solution appeared likely. The wary maneuvering for advantage that had characterized U.S.-Soviet relations since the end of World War II continued. Throughout the decade and a half preceding 1961, Soviet bloc challenge and Western response had kept the international scene in a dangerous state of turmoil.

The United States, by virtue of its affluence, industrial potential, and atomic capability, had with some reluctance and some lost motion accepted the leadership of the "free nations" in opposing serious efforts toward world domination, the avowed goal of international Communism led by the Soviet Union. United States policy, basically one of hoping to anticipate and then to counter Communist moves at all levels, had met with spotty success.

The United States had possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons until the Russians exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949. After that date, the United States still had an apparent superiority in nuclear weapons and means to deliver them, a condition that produced some curious effects. It impelled U.S. policy makers into reasoning that, with nuclear superiority, the United States could economize on conventional forces. On the other hand, while this advantage deterred the Soviet Union from the unrestrained use of its overwhelming superiority in ground forces, it did not prevent the Russians from sponsoring a series of lesser aggressions. The knowledge that the Western Powers were deficient in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

conventional forces and the well-founded assumption that the United States would not employ its nuclear capability against low-level aggressions encouraged the Communists in their ventures.

The successful explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1953 indicated clearly that the U.S. lead in nuclear capability had narrowed appreciably. The launching of the first earth satellites by the Russians and increasing evidence that their scientific competence and industrial effort would soon place them in a position of atomic parity with the United States pointed up the necessity for a change in U.S. defense policy. By 1960 a change in the direction of U.S. strategic thinking was clearly in the wind.

In some areas and under some conditions the United States had succeeded -- in Greece, Turkey, and, to an extent, in Korea -- in stemming Communist aggrandizement. In Western Europe, the formation of NATO (established in 1949) with U.S. prompting and support, had prevented the Communists from taking full advantage of the comparative weakness and disunity of nations in that area during the 1950's. In other areas, notably those under actual Communist control -- Poland, East Germany, and Hungary -- the United States had been unwilling to respond at a level calculated to attain real success.

In his inaugural address on 20 January 1961, Mr. Kennedy promised all nations that the United States would "bear any burden, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty and pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny." The lines between Soviet

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ambition and U.S. determination to resist were more clearly drawn than ever.

The challenges were not long in coming in several areas. The new areas of contention lay in widely separated locales, most of them in underdeveloped countries. In Latin America, in Southeast Asia, and in Africa the Communists contrived and promoted new crises that threatened the peace of the entire world. In these areas Western influence appeared on the wane and the Communists pressed their advantages to the limit.

The International Situation

Virtually within sight of U.S. mainland, one very dangerous situation had been developing. In early January 1961 just before President Kennedy took office, the United States severed diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba in retaliation for unilateral and unfriendly actions taken by its revolutionary government. During the ensuing months the Communist orientation of Premier Fidel Castro's government became increasingly obvious. In the official U.S. view the revolutionary movement, which had originally been conceived as a movement to establish greater democracy and freedom, had "been perverted . . . into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by international communism of a base and a bridgehead in the Americas, and for the disruption of the inter-American system."¹

1

Dept of State Study, Highlights of U.S. Foreign Policy Development, 1961, p. 23.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

On 19 April 1961 a force of Cuban exiles, supported by U.S. agencies, launched a confused and disastrous invasion of the island at the Bay of Pigs. The failure of this expedition, widely interpreted as a U.S.-sponsored effort to overthrow the established government of Cuba, damaged U.S. prestige world-wide. Premier Khrushchev, in a standard show of righteous indignation, declared that the Soviet Union would send the Cuban people all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack and hinted darkly at Soviet missile power. President Kennedy retaliated by stating that in the event of any military intervention by outside force, the United States would "immediately honor our obligations to protect this hemisphere from external aggression."² In the aftermath

2

Ibid. (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, 22 Jan 62, prepared by Coord Gp, COORD GP Files.

of the abortive invasion, Castro, at a May Day rally in Havana, proclaimed a "socialist regime" and proudly accepted the Soviet Union's Lenin Peace Prize. Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented at this time that Cuba had become a "declared member of the Sino-Soviet bloc."

More remote than Cuba, but possibly more explosive at that time, was the situation in Southeast Asia where the Communists, taking advantage of the weaknesses of the incumbent governments in Laos and in the Republic of Vietnam, were engaging in insurgency movements aimed at bringing the entire area under the Communist thumb. Laos, which had been the scene of active fighting between government and Communist-supported rebel forces, was the subject of a Presidential statement on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 March that pointed out to the world that there should be no doubt about U.S. resolution to preserve Laos' neutrality and independence. He called for constructive negotiations -- among the nations concerned and the leaders of Laos -- to bring Laos back to the pathway of independence and genuine neutrality. In April the Soviet Union agreed to support a cease-fire as a prelude to an international conference on the Laotian problem. The Royal Lao Government agreed to a cease-fire on 25 April; pro-Communist rebel forces agreed on 3 May 1961. The international conference designed to bring about the neutrality of Laos convened at Geneva on 16 May 1961, but negotiations moved slowly and showed little promise of real success in view of the true Communist objectives.

A somewhat different situation existed in the neighboring Republic of Vietnam, where organized Communist guerrillas threatened the overthrow of the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem and, using terror and force, sought to paralyze normal government and compel the support of the people. The United States developed countermeasures to meet this increased Communist threat and gave increasing support in equipment and advisor teams to the established government.

In Africa, nationalist elements sought to overthrow incumbent governments and set up tailor-made situations for Communist entry. In the Congo and in Algeria, "wars of liberation" were in full swing and represented danger of the first order to world peace.

The potentially greatest world trouble spot, however, lay not in an undeveloped or unimportant locale, but in the very heart of Western Europe -- Berlin. In that divided city, controlled by Russia, Great Britain, France, and the United States since World War II, a direct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

confrontation of Communist and Western nations had long existed. For a number of reasons, not the least of which was the stark contrast between the flourishing prosperity of the western sectors of the city and the drab, prison-like atmosphere of the impoverished Soviet zone, the Russians had sought to eliminate Western influence in Berlin.

The Berlin Airlift in 1948 had provided the people of Western Europe and, just as important, Soviet leaders, with adequate proof of U.S. determination to defend and maintain the rights of the West, including the right to maintain military garrisons, in that city. With the passage of time and the development of what Soviet leaders may have interpreted as dissension among the three Western nations involved, the Communists made another strong bid to force the West out. In November 1958 Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded that Berlin be made a "free city" and that Western troops be withdrawn. He threatened that unless this was done within six months, the Soviet Union would conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The United States rejected the Soviet proposal, announcing that it would continue to hold the USSR "directly responsible for the discharge of its obligations undertaken with respect to Berlin under existing agreements."³

3

Dept of State Study, Highlights of U.S. Foreign Policy Development, 1961, p. 3.

A fleeting era of "good will" between the two major representatives of the Soviet and Western blocs resulted in a lifting of Khrushchev's six-month limit and an observation by him that the six-month limit had

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

been "flexible."⁴ The breathing spell continued through the first

⁴
Ibid.

months of the Kennedy administration. Khrushchev's attitude in these early months was "friendly" as evidenced by a letter of congratulations to the new President. Other conciliatory gestures were the release of American flyers shot down over the Barents Sea and the abolition of visa requirements for West Berliners desiring to visit East Berlin. In March a series of talks between United States and Soviet leaders were reported to be amicable and, although unproductive, at least gave cause for cautious optimism.

On 3 and 4 June President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev met in Vienna to discuss outstanding differences between their two nations. The attitude of the Soviet Premier at these meetings reflected a complete about face. He was adamant on the question of Berlin and referred to the problem as a "bone in the throat of the Russian people." At the conclusion of the Vienna meetings the USSR presented the United States an aide memoire demanding that the Western Powers accept the Soviet Union's position, which was, briefly, that unless the Allies agreed to Soviet views and demands Russia would obtain its ends in Berlin by unilateral action. Mr. Kennedy, returning from Vienna, described the state of U.S.-Soviet relations as "somber." Mr. Khrushchev, for his part, renewed his threats and stated them in plain, strong terms on 21 June. The USSR would, he declared, sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year and added, ". . . as regards those who try to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

threaten us with war if we sign a peace treaty . . . they will bear the entire responsibilities for their actions."

Responding, President Kennedy announced to the world that the crisis over Berlin was "Soviet-manufactured" and charged that the Russians would make a grave mistake "if they suppose that Allied unity and determination can be undermined by threat of fresh aggressive acts." Referring to the renewed Soviet movements to force the Allies out of Berlin, Mr. Kennedy noted that the Russians had demanded that the United States sign a peace treaty with the government they had created in East Germany. He declared that the obvious purpose was not to bring about a peaceful settlement, but to permanently partition Germany.⁵

⁵

Ibid.

A more tangible manifestation of Soviet intent took place on 8 July when Khrushchev disclosed that his government had decided to suspend a previously announced reduction of 1,200,000 men in its armed forces and proclaimed a 33 percent increase in the defense budget of the Soviet Union.

With pressures on both Soviet and U.S. leaders mounting, the Berlin situation became more ominous day by day. The flow of refugees from the Soviet zone to the western sector increased, underscoring the urgency of the developing crisis. During June about 19,000 East Germans fled to West Berlin. Despite ever-tightening border controls, July saw a marked increase in the flights with more than 30,000 refugees escaping their Communist homeland for the West. The United States meanwhile, after consultation with its allies on Berlin, maintained its completely

~~SECRET~~

inflexible attitude on any withdrawal from Berlin. The allies were in Berlin as a matter of right and intended to stay. In commenting on the Soviet aide memoire, Mr. Kennedy described it as a "document which speaks of peace but threatens to disturb it." He said, "It speaks of ending the abnormal situation in Germany but insists on making permanent its abnormal division. It refers to the Four-Power alliance of World War II but seeks the unilateral abrogation of the rights of the other Three Powers. It calls for new international agreements while preparing to violate existing ones. . . ."

6

Ibid.

The New Approach to National Defense

The heightened international tensions, mounting specifically to a crisis over the Berlin issue, broke in upon the careful evaluations of national defense needs that the new leadership in the Department of Defense was making. Immediately upon assuming office, President Kennedy directed the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, to undertake a thorough reappraisal of strategic plans, force levels, and military programs with a view to determining their adequacy to fulfill commitments then and in the future. The President instructed the Secretary of Defense to develop a force structure necessary to U.S. military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings and, having determined that force structure, to procure and operate it at the lowest possible cost.

7

~~SECRET~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1) (S) House of Representatives, Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before Cmte on Armed Svces on the Matter of Military Posture, Exec Sess, 26 Jan 62, p. 12, Mr. McNamara's Statement.

(2) (U) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1961,
p. 3.

Secretary McNamara's approach was to subject all problem areas to intensive study and analysis as a basis for determining weapons systems, force levels, and new organizational patterns and procedures. Over a hundred such problem areas were identified, and study groups -- composed of both military and civilian personnel drawn from all elements of the Department of Defense -- were designated to analyze them and make appropriate recommendations.

Both the President and Mr. McNamara indicated strong beliefs that the future American force structure should be designed to provide strong limited as well as general war forces and that, in particular, the nation's capability to wage nonnuclear war and to counter Communist tactics of seizing control of revolutionary movements in underdeveloped countries should be enhanced. On the other hand, the administration clearly did not wish substantially to modify the military structure it had inherited from the previous administration without careful study and appraisal. Particularly was this true insofar as any sizeable addition in forces designed for limited war was concerned. One reason was, as Secretary McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee early in 1962, that the requirements for such forces were, in contrast to




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

those for strategic retaliation, "difficult to determine with any degree of precision." ⁸ Mr. McNamara explained that this was occasioned by the

8

(S) House of Representatives, Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the Cmte on Armed Services on the Matter of Military Posture, Exec Sess, 26 Jan 62, p. 269.

great diversity of units and capabilities included in these forces and their weapons, equipment, and supplies, the relationship between them and the forces of allies, the wide variety of possible contingencies they must be prepared to meet, and the important role played by Reserve Components.

In this situation, the modifications the President initially requested in the FY 1962 budget, which had been submitted to Congress by President Eisenhower in January 1961, were intended to cover only the most urgent and important problem areas identified as a result of preliminary studies. ⁹ On 28 March 1961 President Kennedy forwarded a

9

See statement of Mr. McNamara in Hearings, DOD Approps for 1962, Senate, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1961, p. 3.

special message to Congress on the Department of Defense budget, requesting an increase of \$2.2 billion over the original Eisenhower budget estimates. For the most part, the President stressed the development of a sure second-strike capacity for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and the major increases requested in the budget were for this purpose. However, he also placed a marked emphasis on the need for flexibility in the Military Establishment and the development of forces capable of handling the entire spectrum of limited war with particular

~~SECRET~~

stress on the need for developing a capacity to engage in guerrilla and counter guerrilla activities. Limited war forces, Mr. McNamara told a Senate subcommittee, "should be properly trained, equipped, deployed to deal with the entire spectrum from guerrilla war to full-scale limited war."¹⁰ The specific budget requests for this purpose, however, were

¹⁰
(1) Hearings, DOD Approps for 1962, Senate, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1961, p. 25. (2) The President's special budget message is printed in the Hearings, pp. 57ff.

aimed primarily at increasing the pace of modernization of these forces, augmenting airlift and sealift for them, and creating additional capacity for guerrilla warfare rather than increasing numbers substantially. Specific increases requested for the Army were limited to \$265 million: \$109 million for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA); \$75 million for Research, Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E); \$65 million for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA); and \$15 million for Military Personnel, Army (MPA), the last to permit an increase in authorized Army strength from 870,000 to 875,000. This small increase in Army strength was to provide 3,000 additional spaces for the Special Warfare Forces and 2,000 to fill obvious gaps in the Pacific and Caribbean commands.

On 25 May 1961, the President presented another message to Congress requesting small further increases in the DOD budget for FY 1962 totaling \$237 million. Of principal note, as far as the Army was concerned, was a request for a further increase of \$100 million in PEMA funds for Army modernization.¹¹

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11

Annual Report of Secretary of Defense, FY 1961, p. 1 and

Table 36.

The two Presidential requests in March and in May, which were substantially met by the Congress and became known as the First and Second Amendments to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, FY 1962, reflected the estimate of the administration as to what should be done in the ensuing fiscal year, assuming no new developments in the international situation. In terms of improving readiness of the Army, they were mainly significant in the proposed increase of PEMA funds (\$209 million) and the emphasis on the Special Warfare Forces (3,000 increase). The PEMA augmentation brought the total funds for procurement of equipment in FY 1962 to \$2.012 billion, a sizeable increase from the FY 1961 level, but still considerably short of the \$2.5 billion the Army had several years earlier postulated as the necessary PEMA expenditure annually over a period of years to meet desired modernization objectives. Though small numerically, the increase in the Special Warfare Forces was highly significant in that it indicated the direction of administration policy in this field. It called attention to the need for an increased military effort and participation in an area variously called "the Cold War," "the sublimated war," "paramilitary operations," and "wars of liberation and subversion," terms that, in the aggregate, embraced that wide area of conflict between the Communist powers and the Free World in which operations of regular military forces of both sides were not involved, mainly in the underdeveloped areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Communist

13-

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

success in exploiting to their own ends the ferment in these areas clearly called for the American development of appropriate techniques to counter such exploitation. President Kennedy placed increased emphasis on the development of the techniques in numerous statements and actions, among which the increase of the Special Warfare Forces in the Army was of considerable significance. The increased emphasis set in train both an expansion of these forces within the Army and a generally increased activity in plans and training and in the operation of the Army's MAAG's and missions. The new emphasis on paramilitary operations marked the military response to the Soviet challenge in the underdeveloped areas, which in early 1961 loomed particularly large in Southeast Asia.

12

On the Army's activities in this field up to 26 January 1962, see (S) U.S. Army Cold War Activities, 1 January 1961 to 26 January 1962, prepared by Coord Gp, OCS, with the assistance of OCMH and other Army staff agencies.

Meanwhile, the whole problem of the desirable level of forces designed for conventional war had been subjected to intensive study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense study groups. The ultimate vehicle for decision, it soon became clear, would be the program package system, which had been developed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Mr. Charles D. Hitch. The program package system was designed to provide the Secretary of Defense with a means for determining the balance between the various elements in the military structure once a national security policy had

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

been agreed upon. The basic idea of the system was that the various functions and activities of the Department of Defense should be broken down into a series of program packages without regard to individual service responsibilities, each package designed to embrace all those elements within the entire Military Establishment contributing to the performance of a given task. ¹³ Each package was in turn divided into

¹³
Fundamentally this was the system General Maxwell D. Taylor had advocated when he was Chief of Staff.

program elements such as long-range missiles, Army divisions, and naval ships, each with the necessary supporting and control paraphernalia. ¹⁴
The ten Program Packages initially established were:

- I. Central War Offensive Forces
- II. Central War Defensive Forces
- III. General Purpose Forces
- IV. Sea and Airlift Forces
- V. Reserve and National Guard Forces
- VI. Research and Development
- VII. Service-wide Support
- VIII. Military Assistance Program
- IX. Classified Projects
- X. Department of Defense

¹⁴
(FOUO) Memo, Charles J. Hitch, ASD (Comp), for ASA (FM), ASN (FM), ASAF (FM), 13 May 61, CS 320 Programs, case 15. Package VIII, Military Assistance Program, was later eliminated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Program Package I embraced all forces having a strategic retaliatory mission such as Air Force ICBM units and Navy fleet ballistic missile submarines. Program Package II included all units and activities associated with the air defense of the continental United States such as Air Force fighter-interceptor units and early warning systems, Navy picket boats, and Army Air Defense Command units. All active Army combat forces fell into Package III, General Purpose Forces, except for air defense forces in Package II. The back-up forces for the Army -- the Army Reserve and Army National Guard -- fell into Package V. Most research and development activities, except those involving NIKE-ZEUS, were included in Package VI. The Army also had a fundamental interest in Program Package IV, Sea and Airlift Forces, though it was not responsible for budgeting, procurement, or operation of either. A sizeable part of the Army's support establishment went into Package VII and certain miscellaneous activities into the others.

On 13 May 1961, Mr. Hitch issued the first of a series of instructions to the services for the preparation of program package estimates. ¹⁵

15

Ibid.

In essence these instructions provided that each service provide for each program package the requirements it deemed necessary to meet basic national security objectives for the five-year period covering fiscal years 1963 - 67, accompanied by estimates of cost, with force projections but not cost estimates extended to FY 1970. They were also to convert their FY 1962 budget allocations into terms of program packages for comparative purposes. The services were to develop their estimates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

without regard to dollar limitations on the budget and to submit such alternative forces and programs as they felt desirable. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the JCS, would then review the various submissions, make his choices of alternatives, eliminate duplications, and render preliminary decisions on a balanced program to meet national security objectives. In terms of these decisions on the program packages, the service departments would then draw up their budget estimates for FY 1963, they would convert the policy guidance given in program package decisions into the conventional categories of military appropriations and indicate in the process issues requiring further coordination. The five-year projections, as modified in the interim, would remain as long-term program and budget guidance to the service concerned. The target dates for submission of the program package estimates by the services varied but all were to be completed and submitted by the end of August, so that the Secretary of Defense could render his decisions and the FY 1963 budget could be prepared in the normal fashion during the September - December period.

The program package system was expected to provide a vehicle through which the Secretary of Defense could make intelligent program decisions that would automatically be translated into budget decisions. It also provided means through which he could give meaningful guidance to the services for a five-year period. In placing no dollar or manpower ceilings on initial presentations, Secretary of Defense left each department free to present programs that it felt would add to national defense capabilities. These features were markedly different from the approach taken in the past, when the dollar and manpower ceilings were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the determining features of the programming and budget process.

16

See analysis of program packages in (S) presentation by Col. William M. Lynn, Jr., Chf Progress and Analysis Gp, OCS, at Army Cmdrs Conf, 30 Nov 61, pp. 36 - 56.

Despite these many advantages, the program package approach was a difficult one to implement within the time limits proposed. In the case of the Army, it cut across the normal processes of programming and budgeting in terms of appropriation categories and required what was in effect a double budgeting process. Fitting program elements into their proper places within the structure proved extremely difficult and the development of really satisfactory cost estimates for the five-year projection practically impossible.

17

Ibid.

Procedural difficulties notwithstanding, the Secretary of Defense intended to use the program package system as a means for determining force and budget levels to meet long-term military goals and objectives. What went into the program packages, particularly Package III -- General Purpose Forces, would largely determine the future strength and program of the Army. In June and July, as the Berlin Crisis mounted to a white hot point, the Army staff was engaged in making the necessary calculations for the program packages. The vehicle chosen was known as the Army Program Estimate (APE). Until the middle of July, the approach in developing the Army Program Estimate was relatively conservative, conditioned to no small degree by the cautious approach the administration

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

seemed to be taking toward any marked increase in the size of the Army despite the new emphasis on adequate limited war forces. The criterion adopted was that of "reasonable attainability," assuming no major changes in national policy. The force projection visualized an increase to 16 divisions and 1,002,000 men only by FY 1970. Guidelines established for developing the Army Program Estimate also established a goal of \$3.5 billion per year funding level for PEMA, completion of ROAD re-organization of the active Army by the end of FY 1963 and of the Reserve Components by the end of FY 1964, realignment of Reserve Components to increase operational readiness, activation of four Cold War task forces (FLAGS) to increase the Army's sublimited war capabilities, deployment by FY 1970 of a 70-battery NIKE-ZEUS system, and an increase in research and development funds and a reduction of lead time in that field. The cost estimate for FY 1963 amounted to \$14.4 billion in contrast to the \$10.9 billion currently anticipated for FY 1962.¹⁸ This was generally

18

(1) (S) Ibid. (2) (S) Fact Sheet, Col W. H. Lynn, Jr., Chf Progress and Analysis Gp, OCS, for Sec Army, 5 Jul 61, sub: Major Diffs Between the STARS-70 Study and the Program Proposed in the APE, FY 1962 - 70. (3) (S) ODCSOPS Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1961, p. H-5.

the situation when, in July, the Kennedy administration decided that a more immediate augmentation of forces designed for conventional war was necessary to meet the Berlin Crisis. This action broke into the orderly preparation of long-range plans, which the initiation of the


program package system represented.

The State of the Army, Mid-1961

After the cessation of hostilities in Korea in July 1953, there had been a changing emphasis in national defense policies, involving new weapons systems, concepts, and strategic plans, combined with an effort to reduce military expenditures. The acceptance of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" based upon a nuclear striking force was largely dependent upon strategic airpower and tended to reduce the importance of land forces. Despite advances in weaponry on the drawing boards, shortages in manpower and funds rendered the U.S. Army far less combat ready and far less capable of fast expansion in 1961 than it had been in 1953.

Army strength had declined from a peak of over 1,500,000 men in 1953 to approximately 1,025,000 at the end of FY 1956 and had slipped further to 870,000 by the time President Kennedy took office in January 1961. On 30 June 1956 the Army had 18 divisions, 10 separate regimental combat teams, 133 antiaircraft battalions, and numerous smaller combat and combat supporting units. The divisions were widely deployed: 5 in Europe, 3 in the Far East, 1 in Hawaii, 1 in Alaska, and the remainder in the United States. The incurred obligations of \$9.7 billion¹⁹ during FY 1956.

¹⁹

Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 1 to June 30, 1956, pp. 2, 86-87, 154.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Five years later on 30 June 1961, the Army maintained an actual active strength of 858,622 men. This strength was organized into 14 divisions, an armored combat command, 2 brigades, 14 regiments and battle groups, 4 missile commands, 3 Redstone missile groups, 77 $\frac{1}{4}$ air defense battalions, and 97 separate combat battalions. Despite the reduction in Army strength, the available divisions were still widely deployed: 5 in Europe, 2 in the Far East, 1 in Hawaii, and the remainder in the United States. The tasks of the Army had remained constant during the five year period - to support national policy by maintaining forces overseas capable of deterring or defeating aggression; to maintain highly mobile, combat ready strategic reserve forces in the United States that could reinforce deployed units or meet new threats; to assist Allied or other Free World forces; to provide forces for the air defense of the United States; and to maintain strong, combat ready Reserve forces and related facilities for rapid mobilization. Only the capability to perform these tasks had been lessened.

Yet the Army budget for FY 1961 reached almost \$9.9 billion, an increase over that of FY 1956. The general inflationary trend during the period, the need for more elaborate and expensive equipment, and increased costs for the Reserves, however, produced a situation in which the FY 1961 budget supported a considerably smaller force - over 150,000 fewer men -- than had the FY 1956 funds.

The five U.S. Army divisions -- 3 infantry and 2 armored -- deployed in Europe were an element of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), under General Lauris Norstad (CINCEUR). In addition, 3 armored cavalry

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

regiments, 2 battle groups in West Berlin, surface-to-surface missile battalions, and other supporting units bolstered U.S. defensive strength in Europe. With the exception of the troops in Berlin, all of these units were part of the U.S. Seventh Army. General Bruce C. Clarke was in command of all U.S. Army forces in Europe (USAREUR).

Of the 3 U.S. Army divisions assigned to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), 2 were in Korea under the U.S. Eighth Army and the third was in Hawaii. Approximately 1,000 Korean soldiers were assigned to each of the divisions in Korea. An airborne battle group was stationed in Okinawa.

In the Canal Zone, Panama, 2 battle groups and an air defense battalion were assigned to U.S. Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB). In Alaska 2 battle groups and 2 NIKE-HERCULES air defense battalions were assigned to U.S. Army, Alaska (USARAL).

The remaining major combat units were located in the continental United States (CONUS). Three of the 6 divisions that formed the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) in CONUS were in a reduced status of strength and lacked essential combat support; their main function in mid-1961 was training recruits. The other 3 divisions of STRAF - 1 infantry and 2 airborne - were maintained in a high state of combat readiness and were organized as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), and contained about 115,000 men on 30 June 1961.

The purpose of STRAC was to provide a force that would permit the Army greater flexibility in dealing with several situations simultaneously in widely separated areas. It could meet early deployment requirements in general or limited war in any part of the globe and could later be augmented by other units as the situation demanded. Yet even in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20

The foregoing is based on (1) (U) Sec Army Annual Report, FY 1961, passim; (2) (S) Memo, ODCSOPS /OT OR 3, Lt. Col Brett, 11 Jul 62, sub: History and Concept of STRAC and Its Relationship with STRAF.

STRAC there was a shortage of essential skilled personnel and of supporting units. Most Army combat and combat support units were being kept at less than their authorized TOE strength because of personnel shortages. The essential combat support forces needed to provide the staying power for a field army were also far short of the numbers required. Thus, the Army faced a calculated risk that STRAC might become ineffective if deployed against a strong enemy.

Army equipment, for the most part, was adequate for the type of war fought in Korea. In the postwar period the Army had made plans to introduce more modern equipment, including improved versions of transportation, communications, and weapons systems, but progress had been limited by the availability of funds. Levels of supply were generally sufficient, but major items of equipment were lacking in the numbers an emergency would demand. Procurement was running far behind requirements and the gap was widening. The Army system for logistic support was in operation, but the pump needed priming.

The active Army was backed up by Reserve Components (RC) -- the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). In mid-1961 the Army National Guard consisted of 4,367 federally recognized units of company and detachment size, organized in 21 infantry and 6 armored divisions, 11 separate infantry battle groups, 7 armored cavalry

-3- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

regiments, 11 armor (medium tank) battalions, 91 missile and air defense artillery battalions, 57 field artillery battalions, and several hundred additional combat support and service units. ²¹ The Army Reserve had 10

21

(S) Comments, CNGB to OCMH, 13 Dec 62, sub: Review of "U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, 1961-1962," in OCMH files.

infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, 2 maneuver area commands, and about 4,350 smaller units. The authorized paid drill strength of the Army National Guard was set at 400,000 and that of the Army Reserve at 300,000. Supplementing this force was the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool (RRMRP) of about 724,000 personnel who could be called to active duty as individuals. Considerable variation existed in the paid drill strength, state of training, and equipment status of the various organized units of both the Army National Guard and the USAR.

For purposes of allocating equipment and establishing manning levels, the Reserve Component troop structure was divided into three categories of priority to meet planned mobilization and deployment schedules. In Priority I were placed those units and individuals designated to round out the active Army, to augment the air defense of the United States, to initiate the expansion of the mobilization base, and to carry out other missions in the early stages of mobilization. Priority II units and individuals were designated to provide seven Reserve Component division forces (Ready Reserve STRAF) to support continued expansion of the mobilization base. In Priority III was included the remainder of the Reserve structure "necessary to accomplish the subsequent steps in the phased mobilization and expansion of the Army," including a Reserve

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Component Contingency Force that would receive priority of materiel support in order to reconstitute a Ready Reserve STRAF when Priority II forces had been mobilized.

22

Study, Mobilization of a Two Division National Guard Force, 1961, OCMH, DA (Draft), pp. 3-4.

The priority system notwithstanding, personnel and equipment of the Reserve Components were dispersed among too many units and over too wide an area. Only a few of the units could be called up without reinforcement from the Ready Reserve pool and none could be immediately mobilized and deployed without a shake down and training period of several months. The exact status of equipment possessed by the various units was not immediately determinable, but few, if any, had their full TOE authorization. Mobilized units of the Reserves, if required to be deployed, would possess only obsolescent equipment and ammunition of World War II and Korean vintage, and these in insufficient quantities.

23

On 30 June 1961, the total actual strength of the Reserve Components of the Army numbered about 2,287,500. This included 393,800 in Army National Guard units in paid drill status; 301,800 in U.S. Army Reserve units in paid drill status; 726,400 individuals in the Ready Reserve; and 865,000 individuals in the Standby and Retired Reserve. These figures, which vary slightly from the authorized strengths given above, are derived from the Sec Army Annual Rpt, FY 1961, p. 82.

-25-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

The initial enthusiasm that had greeted the conversion of the old triangular World War II and Korean War U.S. Army divisions to the streamlined Pentomic divisions in the late 1950's became increasingly less frequent as field tests of the new organization in Europe and elsewhere revealed weaknesses. The Pentomic organization of U.S. Army divisions in effect in 1961 had been designed to meet conditions of atomic warfare as a planning objective. It formed the basis for research and development and for modification through study, field tests, and war games. It had been intended as an interim five-year organization.

Consequently, Army planners, in close coordination with experienced field commanders, evolved another form of division structure popularly known as ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Division), which is replacing the Pentomic structure. The flexibility that would be demanded of Army combat elements, particularly in an atomic war, was believed to be better met by the ROAD concept than by the Pentomic structure.

Under the Pentomic concept divisions were fixed TOE organizations. All infantry divisions were alike and all armored divisions were alike. There were differences in the manner in which existing divisions were organized for combat. Infantry divisions had a fixed concept of a battle group of combat and combat support units with limited flexibility in forming separate task organizations. The armored division retained the flexible World War II concept of assigning maneuver units to combat commands as required by the mission. Opposed to this, the ROAD concept provides a basis for tailoring each division to meet the particular strategic or tactical missions it might face. In addition, ROAD includes a mechanized infantry division. By varying the number and ratio of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

maneuver elements (infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor battalions), divisions can be tailored to meet the Army's requirements anywhere it might be expected to fight. It was claimed that the use of the "building block" principle in ROAD divisions would provide an economical and militarily sound organization to meet these complex combat conditions, with improved capabilities for sustained combat as compared to the Pentomic organization.

The ROAD division base has the following elements: division headquarters and headquarters company, MP company, aviation battalion, division artillery, reconnaissance squadron, engineer battalion, signal battalion, division support command, and three brigade headquarters and headquarters companies.

24



General information of ROAD-65 concept furnished by Mr. John Wike, Organization and Honors Branch, OCMH, DA.

In the ROAD divisions the brigade headquarters would control the battalion-sized maneuver elements of infantry and armor. The three

25

Normal combat support is provided by the division except for independent task forces.

brigade headquarters can control from two to five of the infantry and armor battalions of the up to fifteen maneuver elements available in the division. While combinations available to the division commander are reduced from five in the Pentomic to three under ROAD, many more



variations can be developed with the addition of a control headquarters²⁶
at the brigade level between the division and the maneuver elements.

26

Fact Sheet, ROAD-65, Questions and Answers, OCMH, DA files.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chapter II

Development of an Expansion Program To Meet the Berlin Crisis (S)

DOD-JCS Proposals, the President's Decisions,
and Congressional Action

By late June 1961, pressures were mounting for some improvements in the military capabilities of both the United States and NATO as a collective body to wage conventional war in Europe. If, as was generally accepted, no short-term program could enhance these capabilities to the point where Berlin could be defended entirely by conventional means, such improvements could be made that would lessen the need for a nuclear response and initiation of general war. The improvements also might serve to re-establish in the minds of the Russian leaders U.S. determination to actually use the nuclear deterrent in defense of rights in Berlin if the Soviet Union took any overt action to breach them.

On 27 June 1961 the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the JCS, requested that a study be prepared to determine improvements in the force structure of the services under conditions of partial mobilization in order to increase the flexibility of military response. The Joint Chiefs set forth the following guidelines: (1) the over-all increase in strength of the services would be on the order of 500,000 personnel; (2) improvements in the mobilization production base would emphasize the accelerated production of long lead-time items and conventional munitions; and (3) emphasis would initially be placed on the use of Ready Reserve and other Reserve units.

Thus the JCS on 6 July recommended to the Secretary of Defense the

~~SECRET~~

declaration of a national emergency and the mobilization of 559,000 men under a program estimated to cost \$13.9 billion in FY 1962 and \$17 billion in FY 1963. The Army staff contribution to the study proposed three alternative levels of mobilization for the Army: (1) the addition of approximately 250,000 men including 3 division forces, (2) 300,000 including four division forces, and (3) 350,000 men including five division forces. The Army program was intended to provide, in addition to the division force mobilization, (1) the rounding out of existing forces by filling selected active Army units to TOE strength, (2) mobilization of units already designated in mobilization plans to provide combat support and logistic backup for selected forces in being, and (3) mobilization of other units to reduce the individual training mission of STRAF divisions. The JCS chose the plan to mobilize four additional divisions, and recommended to the Secretary of Defense an additional 286,623 military spaces for the Army and the hiring of 18,000 additional civilians. The costs of this Army program were estimated at an additional \$5.9 billion for FY 1962 and \$6.6 billion for FY 1963. More than half these funds were for procurement -- \$3 billion in FY 1962 and \$4.8 billion in FY 1963 -- to provide the equipment required both to fill shortages in existing forces and to equip the additional units to be mobilized.

The paring down of the cost estimates began almost immediately. The Secretary of Defense and the JCS agreed, in discussions on 10 July, that though the personnel estimates should simply be subjected to refinement, procurement estimates should be limited to those covering items that could be delivered by 30 June 1962 and thus effect the Berlin

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

contingency. This new concept left the planning of a long-term build-up as a separate question, and reduced the current consideration to measures that might be expected to effect the situation in Berlin and to amendments that might be made in the FY 1962 military budget.

Thus, the revised JCS recommendations on 12 July 1961 still provided for mobilization of approximately 559,000 military personnel, but cost estimates for FY 1962 were reduced from \$13 billion to \$6.8 billion. The Army program still provided for mobilization of the four division forces within a total augmentation of 287,000, and for hire of 18,000 additional civilians. But by applying the new formula of direct relation to the Berlin Crisis, Army procurement funds for FY 1962 were reduced from \$3 billion to \$698 million and the total Army program from \$5.9 billion to \$2.8 billion.

Before presenting his recommendations to the President on 15 July, the Secretary of Defense further reduced the total estimate to \$4.3 billion, and the Army share of it to \$2.4 billion, including a reduction in the Army equipment and missiles estimate to \$552 million. The personnel mobilization figures were reduced slightly to 285,500. The National Security Council, in reviewing the Defense recommendations, recommended that the Army be increased by only 133,000, a figure not including mobilization of any division forces. Funds for this purpose, totaling \$592 million, were deleted from the program, and as a result of further reduction of cost estimates on such items as costs of deployment to Europe, preparation of facilities in Europe, and the expansion of the training and logistical bases, the total estimate for the Army was reduced to \$1.3 billion -- \$495 million MPA, \$394 million OMA, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

\$552 million PEMA -- within a total estimate for all three services of \$3.2 billion exclusive of the requirements for civil defense.

The 19 July decisions of the President and his advisors provided for a limited mobilization, which would proceed without the declaration of a national emergency and be funded on a modest budget. The basis of planning was to be that six Army divisions with appropriate air support should be ready for deployment to Europe any time after 1 January 1962 and that, in the meantime, existing forces in Europe should be strengthened by filling out depleted units and adding combat and service support units to round out the five division forces there. The 19 July decisions seemed to be based on the premise that basic reliance would be on augmentation of the active Army through increased draft calls and recruiting and that mobilization of the Reserves would be held to a minimum. In deleting the provision for mobilization of four Reserve Component division forces, the President and his advisors left unanswered the question of what would be done to reconstitute the central ground force reserve if divisions were deployed to Europe. The requirement for contingency planning for mobilization of these four division forces remained, but no funds were to be specifically requested for the purpose.

1

The above sketch of the decisions in the June - July period elaborates somewhat on the material contained in (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, 22 Jan 62, prepared by Coord Gp, OCS, pp. I-6-8, which is the basic source used. It has been supplemented by consultation of selected JCS material.

-22-

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Expansion Proposals for the U.S. Army, July 1961

	<u>JCS Proposal</u> <u>10 July 61</u>	<u>Sec/Def Proposal</u> <u>15 July 61</u>	<u>Presidential/NSC</u> <u>Decision, 19 July 61</u>
Personnel -	4 divisions 286,623 military 18,000 civilians	4 divisions 285,500 military 18,000 civilians	133,000 military
Costs -	\$5.9 billion	\$2.4 billion	\$1.3 billion

On 25 July the President made an appeal to the nation for support of the increases in the armed forces and the spending associated there-
² with, and on the following day sent letters to Congress requesting

2

New York Times, 26 Jul 61.

authority to order to active duty Ready Reserve units and individuals for one year up to a total of 250,000, and to extend terms of service of military personnel already on active duty. The request for an additional \$3.4 billion in the DOD budget for FY 1962 (including \$207.6 million for civil defense) was presented to Congressional committees by Mr. McNamara in the days following. The Secretary of Defense asked for inclusion of provisions in the amended budget that would permit the President to call additional Reserve personnel, up to a total of 250,000, to be funded on a deficiency basis, and for authority to effect transfers of up to 5 percent between appropriation categories to give him more flexibility in carrying out the expansion program.
³

3

Hearings, DOD Approps for 1962, Senate, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1961, pp. 1626 - 60.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Congress responded quickly to the President's requests. On 1 August the President signed a Congressional joint resolution providing that:

SEC. 1. . . . notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than two hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before July 1, 1962, for not more than twelve months.⁴

⁴

PL 87-117, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1 Aug 61.

Congress also agreed to the requested additional funding with certain changes before passing the DOD Appropriations Act, FY 1962, signed by the President on 17 August 1961. The net result was to provide the Army with a total FY 1962 budget of \$12.3 billion in new obligational authority (including military construction funds appropriated separately), of which \$1.3 billion was specifically included in the Third Amendment for expansion incident to the Berlin Crisis.⁵ In passing

⁵

(1) Ibid. (2) For a convenient tabulation, see Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for FY 1961, Table 36, p. 404.

the appropriations act, Congress included the section authorizing the funding of the call-up of additional Reserves on a deficiency basis as

requested by Secretary McNamara:

Upon determination by the President that it is necessary to increase the number of military personnel on active duty beyond the number for which funds are provided in this Act, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide for the cost of such increased military personnel, as an excepted expense, in accordance with the provisions of Revised Statutes 3732 (41 U.S. C 11).⁶

⁶

See 612 (c), PL 87-144, 17 Aug 61.

Congress also granted the Secretary of Defense authority to transfer funds between appropriation categories up to a limit of 3 percent (instead of the 5 percent requested) in order to give him some flexibility in administering the expansion program.⁷

⁷


Sec 533, PL 87-144, 17 Aug 61.

To establish procedures to be used in ordering up Reserves and in extending tours of duty within the limits of the authority granted, the President issued an Executive Order on 10 August 1961. It empowered the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, when designated by the Secretary of Defense, to exercise this authority subject to a proviso that no units or individuals from the Ready Reserve were to be ordered to active duty (other than active duty for training) without the approval of the President.⁸

⁸

Executive Order No. 10957, 10 Aug 61, 26 Fed Register 7541.

The actions of the President and the Congress established the outlines of an expansion program in response to the Soviet provocation in Berlin and elsewhere. Secretary McNamara explained to Congress the



rationale behind the program as follows:

This is the basic short-term objective of the measures we now propose -- to attain a greater range of military options together with the related deterrent and political effects which would go with them. The purpose is twofold: to deter the Soviets from pressing a Berlin crisis to the point of conflict, and to become better able to deal with any conflict which might nevertheless occur. We expect that our European allies will wish to make corresponding increases in their own strength, so that our united efforts can have full effect and so that the solidarity of the Alliance can be demonstrated. . . .


Although Berlin is now the focus of attention, these measures are also directed at the larger problem of Communist threats and pressures all around the globe. We have not lost sight of the dangerous situation which confronts us in Southeast Asia or the possibility of a sudden outbreak of trouble in other areas of the world. What we are seeking to achieve, and achieve quickly, is a peak readiness of our military establishment to respond promptly with appropriate forces, and in adequate strength, to any kind of armed Communist aggression anywhere in the world; and to maintain that posture until we can see more clearly what lies ahead. Because we cannot foresee with certainty how events may develop over the coming months, we cannot say at this time whether the strength increases we now propose will necessarily be permanent.⁹

9

Copy (S) of Statement of Secretary McNamara before Subcmte on DOD Approps of House Cmte on Approps, 31 Jul 61, in CS 111 FY 62 (31 Jul 61).

The Army's Initial Program and the OSD Control Policy

The 19 July decisions, on which the requests to Congress for additional authority and funds were based, established the general goals for Army expansion. Broadly speaking, these goals were first to strengthen and round out the existing 5 division forces in Europe and second to have 6 CONUS divisions combat ready, four of them ready for deployment, by 1 January 1962. Meeting these goals involved a


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

breakdown into subsidiary tasks, each with its own personnel and financial requirements. To strengthen and round out the USAREUR forces, existing units must be brought full TOE strength, and support units to round out the division forces must be added. To make six divisions combat ready involved: (1) relief of the three STRAF divisions not included in STRAC from training functions; (2) bringing STRAF units to full TOE strength; (3) addition of support units to STRAF; and (4) expansion of the training base capacity. Involved also were such logistical matters as acceleration of the procurement and rebuild programs to provide equipment for forces to be deployed, expansion of the logistical base, preparations for deployment of division forces, and preparation of facilities in Europe for reception of these forces should they be deployed.

10

Hearings, DOD Approps for 1962, Senate, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1961, pp. 1628 - 33.

In addition to the program for which funds were requested, there remained in the background the possibility that other division forces would be mobilized from the Reserves in accordance with the initial plans formulated by the JCS. The Section 612(c) provision of the Defense Appropriations Act providing for deficiency funding of additional Reserve forces ordered to active duty was intended to cover this contingency. The question of whether such additional division forces would be called depended upon the decisions yet to be made with regard to the deployment of any or all of the six division forces that were to be


made combat ready by the end of the year. This, in turn, depended in no small measure on the actual course the Soviet Union pursued as well as on the best judgment of the U.S. Government as to the effect such deployments would have in acting as a brake on Soviet provocation.

The immediate problem during the latter part of July, in any case, was to plan the expansion of the Army within the framework of the 133,000 personnel increase and the \$1.3 billion additional funding approved by Congress to meet the goals established. The calculation of specific requirements to meet these goals had necessarily been hasty and somewhat inexact. Initial Army plans, embodied in the JCS studies, provided in round figures for 69,500 men for the various tasks in the United States and 64,000 in Europe, with an additional 152,000 for the 4 division forces, making the total of 285,500 presented by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council. By deleting the 4 division forces, the 133,000 figure (initially 133,500) had resulted. The assumption on which the plans had been drawn was that the entire force increase would come from the Reserve Components.

The 19 July decisions of the President in effect established a new basis for planning, a more restricted one than that applicable in the initial stages. Cost estimates had to be cut to the bone and Reserve call-ups reduced to a minimum. The Army was requested to prepare budget submissions according to the following guidelines:

- (1) significantly increase military strength by 1 January 1962;
- (2) increase nonnuclear military capacity so as to add flexibility in dealing with the Berlin situation;
- (3) create a sustaining posture in Army strength that would provide a capability to meet continuing

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

crises of a limited nature with minimum resort to Reserve Components;
(4) accomplish the above with a minimum increase in strength and funding, accepting certain risks.

On 25 July 1961 Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., presented the Secretary of Defense a detailed plan based on these premises. 11

11

(S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 25 Jul 61, sub: Re-exam of the FY 1962 Army Force Increase, CS 111 FY 1962 (25 Jul 61), w/ accompanying book containing seven schedules.

The plan envisioned the increase in the Strategic Army Forces from 3 to 6 combat ready divisions supported by "minimum essential combat and service units," by converting the 3 STRAF divisions to combat ready status, and a minimum round out of USAREUR forces accepting "certain risks by not including sufficient combat and service units to provide . . . the staying power required for sustained and prolonged combat operations against a determined enemy."

The 6 divisions in STRAF were to be grouped in 3 separate elements. The first was to consist of 2 Army divisions and supporting units. The second would combine 2 Army divisions and 2 Marine division air wing teams to form a 4-division force. These were to provide the 6-division force for deployment to Europe, the first 2 divisions to be ready by 1 December 1961, the second 4 by 1 January 1962. The third increment was to contain the Army's 2 airborne divisions and supporting forces, to be maintained in the United States ready to respond to possible military contingencies anywhere in the world. The personnel requirements for creating the 6-division STRAF were reduced to 55,622 and the

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

requirements for rounding out the USAREUR force much more drastically to 38,063, this figure including a minimum Army requirement of 8,479 men in support of the 2 Marine divisions should they be deployed in Europe. This total of 93,685 left within the 133,000 allocation an additional 39,815 personnel, and the Army now proposed that they should be used to add 2 combat divisions to the Army's structure with only minimum support units, these divisions to be combat ready by the end of FY 1962.

Of the total personnel to be added to the Army, the plan provided that 45,906 should come initially from the Reserve Components -- 21,074 in units designated to provide the supporting structure for STRAF, and 24,832 in similar supporting units for USAREUR. The use of these Reservists, the Secretary stated, would be necessary to permit the build-up to be completed on time.

To achieve materiel readiness, the Army plan contained a list of equipment that could be delivered by the end of FY 1962 if certain measures were immediately taken to accelerate procurement. There were two schedules: the first covered the proposed \$552 million of additional funds for PEMA, and the second was a supplemental list with a total cost set at \$165 million. The plan also proposed that equipment having an acquisition value of \$245 million could be added to the useable inventory through the use of \$35 million included in the request to Congress for operations and maintenance funds. "The proposed procurement and rebuild programs," the Secretary stipulated, "are dependent on the accomplishment of a decision by 1 August 1961 on the program itself, the funds to support it, and authority for the use of special procurement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


procedures." The preliminary actions specifically requested included proposals that Congress amend the current joint resolution on FY 1962 appropriations to provide the \$552 million PEMA funds immediately, that restrictions on procurement practices be relaxed under existing authority and that authorization for additional civilian personnel to accomplish the increased workload in rebuild and procurement be granted.

Moreover, the Secretary protested vigorously that the proposed allocation of \$394 million in operations and maintenance funds would not be "sufficient to provide for proper support of this strength increase," that the factors used in OSD in reducing the original Army estimates were far too low and "did not recognize that an expanding program creates additional requirements in the training, logistical and administrative areas, as compared to those that exist in a stable program."¹²

¹²
All quotes from (S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 25 Jul 61, sub: Re-exam of the FY 1962 Army Force Increase, CS 111 FY 1962 (25 Jul 61), w/accompanying book containing seven schedules.

The seven supporting schedules to the Army plan provided a detailed analysis and justification of the requests for additional PEMA and OMA funds. Moreover, they stressed the necessity for early decisions on each aspect of the program if it were to be achieved in time. The decision date set in almost every case was 1 August 1962.

The Army soon learned that the Secretary of Defense intended to act upon the individual portions of the Army program as the occasion demanded. On 25 July, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric,


in a meeting with General Clyde D. Eddleman, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, characterized the Army paper as a "fine submission," and tentatively approved the Army's use of 93,685 personnel for the purpose indicated. At the same time he said that the total Reserve call-up should not exceed 20,000 - 25,000 and he did not approve the activation of 2 new Army divisions. He said he felt that the sustaining strength of the Armed Services should be recommended to the Secretary of Defense by the JCS. Secretary Gilpatric further ruled that OSD would not seek any change in procurement legislation at that time and that administrative measures should be used to accelerate procurement. The reaction to the additional \$165 million PEMA request was "not good," and the general policy of OSD was to stand on both that and the OMA estimates
13
already developed.

13
(S) MR, Maj Gen J. L. Throckmorton, SGS, 27 Jul 61, sub:
Actions on 25 July 1961 Relating to FY 62 Army Program Revisions,
Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, Incl. 13.

The Gilpatric decisions immediately changed the bases of Army planning, and the Army staff began preparation of new schedules based on the alternate premises that 20,000 - 25,000 Reservists should be called up and that no Reservists at all should be called. The general conclusion in this planning was that the rapidity with which the desired readiness status could be achieved varied inversely with the number of Ready Reserves that were called up, and particularly that the provision of adequately trained supporting units for both STRAF and USAREUR would be delayed beyond initial target dates if no Reserves



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at all were called. And in either case, the need for an early decision in order to begin the expansion of the training base, to step up recruiting, and to increase draft calls was all the greater.¹⁴

¹⁴
(S) See Draft Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 31 Jul 61, sub:
Plng Basis for FY 62 Army Program Revision, Coord Gp Files.

Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara had presented the proposed budget increases to Congress as they had been initially drawn. The Congressional temper seemed to favor expansion of the active Army forces rather than any extensive mobilization of Reserves. In the hearings before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Russell of Georgia expressed the view that to the maximum extent possible men with previous military experience should be used, and Secretary McNamara promised that the priority of sources of increased personnel would be: (1) volunteer re-enlistment, (2) volunteer recruitment, (3) draft, and (4) Reserve call-up. The members of Congress generally indicated that, in any calls for individual Reservists, six-months Reserve Forces Act (RFA) trainees should be given first priority.¹⁵

¹⁵
(U) Hearings, DOD Approps for 1962, Senate, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 1961, pp. 1657 - 92.

In a Secretariat meeting on 27 July, Mr. McNamara heavily stressed this order of personnel priority and also indicated that he had many doubts about specific parts of the Army program. As the meeting was reported by Mr. W. F. Schaub, Assistant Secretary of the Army

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Financial Management), in part:

He (McNamara) said he wanted it understood that up to now no actions have been fully approved, but that the mechanism to get the actions approved should be developed quickly and acted on quickly. This included personnel policies and other over-all policies that are required. Each segment, he indicated, would have to be approved in writing by the service secretary and Mr. McNamara or Mr. Gilpatric. . . . He wants a specific piece of paper for each approved action. And he wanted along with this piece of paper what action was necessary to carry it out; i.e. if it involved any other types of action. . . .¹⁶

16

(S) Debriefing by Mr. Schaub of Conf with Sec McNamara, Dep Sec Gilpatric, Sec Connally, ASD Morris, ASD Hatch, ASD Runge, ASD Vance, Sec Zuckert, 27 Jul 61, Coord Gp Files.

The following day, moreover, Mr. McNamara issued specific instructions to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) that new procurement actions should be initiated only after approval by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense upon recommendations of the service secretary concerned, that every effort should be made to avoid emergency procurement actions, and that there would be no extension of emergency negotiation authority for the present.¹⁷

17

Memo, Sec Def for ASD (I&L), 28 Jul 61, sub: Guidance Applicable to Procurement Items Covered in Budget Increment Requested 26 Jul 61, Production Div, DCSLOG file FY 62 3d Amendment. See below, Ch. VII, for fuller development of the implications of this action.

The Secretary of Defense's intention to maintain close control over the detailed implementation of the increased readiness program

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

was further emphasized by later directives. On 29 July 1961, Mr. Carlisle P. Runge, Assistant Secretary of Defense (MP), issued instructions that no announcements would be made of any Reserve Component units or personnel to be ordered to active duty until approved by the Secretary of Defense.¹⁸ Pursuant to the President's Executive Order of

18

(U) Memo, ASD (MP) for USecs Army, Navy, and AF, 29 Jul 61, sub: Control of the Ordering to Active Duty of Reserve Components, CS 326 (29 Jul 61).

10 August, on 17 August 1961 the Secretary of Defense instructed the Secretaries of the military departments to submit for his prior approval and for forwarding to the President all plans for calling Reserve units and individuals to active duty, as well as all detailed plans for extending tours of duty. Once these plans were approved, the Secretary of Defense would delegate to the respective Secretaries of the military departments the authority to carry them out.¹⁹ Finally, on 18

19

(U) Memo, Dep Sec Def for Secs Army, Navy, AF, 17 Aug 61, CS 326 (17 Aug 61).

August, after the Appropriations Act for FY 1962 containing the Third Amendment funds had been signed by the President, the Secretary of Defense issued instructions that:

Commitments and obligations are authorized in applicable appropriations for execution of the programs for which funds were requested in the amendment to the FY 1962 budget estimates for military functions submitted to Congress by the President on July 26, 1961, to the extent such programs and the amount of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

related obligational authority are or have been specifically approved in writing by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense since that date.²⁰

20

(S) Quoted in Memo, H.T. LaCrosse, Actg Director of Army Budget, for CofS, USA, 19 Aug 61, sub: Auth for Financing Essential Mil Functions Pending Apportionment of FY 1962 Appropriations, CS 111 FY 1962 (19 Aug 61).

The Pace of Decision: 2 August - 31 October 1961

Decisions on the Allocation of Spaces, 2 - 15 August 1961

By the end of July, revised Army plans based on either no Reserve call-up or a minimum call provided for allocation of the 133,000

21

additional spaces as follows:

Expand Army Strategic Reserve to a six-division combat ready force: 52,247

1. Relieve STRAF divisions of training mission and bring to full TOE strength 18,200
2. Fill STRAC and STRAF nondivisional units to full TOE strength 12,973
3. Create minimum essential nondivisional units to support six-division Continental United States (CONUS) reserve 21,074

Strengthen capabilities for Army Forces in Europe for sustained land combat: 38,063

4. Bring USAREUR units to full TOE strength 13,231
5. Develop additional nondivisional support units 24,832

Expand Army training base to support increase in strength and readiness: 42,690

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Secretary's obvious skepticism about the USAREUR requirement was in part a result of divergent figures on this requirement that had reached him through a number of channels. USAREUR's initial requirement in early July had been for 65,055 men in units and 14,730 fillers to provide full support for its five divisions and other NATO forces. This had been progressively scaled down to the 24,832 men in units and 13,231 fillers in the late July Army plans based on the premise that the "present Berlin crisis requires a condition of improved readiness but less than a war posture," and that U.S. and foreign nationals employed would continue to be available. It would not "provide a full capability for sustained combat operations," and additional augmentation would immediately be required in case of war.

23

(S) Fact Sheet, Dir Strat Pls & Pol, ODCSOPS for DCSOPS,
4 Aug 61, sub: Resolution of Repts to Provide USAREUR With an Improved
Readiness Posture, Coord Gp Files.

The Army plan of 2 August had not, however, been completely reconciled with the figures presented by the U.S. Army Europe staff and by General Norstad to the JCS. This reconciliation was effected by 6 August, and a new figure of over 39,000 was agreed on, which considerably changed the balance between support units and fillers. The new figure provided for 20,000 fillers and more than 19,000 men in nondivisional units. Included in the 20,000 figure was requirement for 3,000 men to mechanize three of USAREUR's infantry divisions; this also generated an additional requirement for armored personnel carriers. Both General

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Norstad and General Bruce C. Clarke, USAREUR commander, stressed the need for advance shipment of a package of service and support organizations for port operations and related functions totaling 5,656 personnel, required to be in position 15 days before the shipment of any division forces.

On 7 August, the Secretary of the Army requested that the Secretary of Defense approve the additional spaces for strengthening USAREUR and allocate the spaces for the port package. ²⁴ Secretary McNamara on the

²⁴

(1) (S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 7 Aug 61, sub: Augmentation of USAREUR to Provide Improved Readiness Posture. (2) (S) Memo, Col N. R. Hoskot, Actg SGS, for U Sec Army, 5 Aug 61, sub: Resolution of Divergent Statements of Repts to Provide USAREUR with an Increased Readiness Posture. Both in Coord Gp Files.

same date approved the addition of the 3,000 spaces (to mechanize three infantry divisions) to the initially approved 18,000 spaces, making a total of 21,000 for USAREUR and specifically authorized shipment of the 3,000 men as soon as the armored personnel carriers could be made available in Europe. He also approved for planning purposes the allocation of more than 19,000 men for the nondivisional units for USAREUR and the port package, with appropriate units to be chosen from the Reserve Components to fill these requirements. Units were to be alerted, filled to TOE strength, their training accelerated, and other appropriate actions taken to improve their readiness for recall to active duty in sufficient time -- in the case of the nondivisional units for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a 15 December shipment readiness date, and of the port package for a 1 December readiness date. The call-up of Reserve Components was, however, to be deferred as long as possible -- and in no event was it to be executed earlier than 1 October.

25

- (1) (S) MR, McNamara, 7 Aug 61, sub: Support for Europe.
- (2) (S) MR, Col W. R. Bennett, Coord Gp, OCS, 8 Aug 61, sub: Plng Data for FY 62 Army Program Revisions. Both in Coord Gp Files.

In a separate action on 7 August, Mr. McNamara also approved the additional 3,700 spaces for the STRAF package of 18,200 on which decision had previously been withheld. Total approvals now came to 95,867 (49,998 for STRAF, 45,869 for USAREUR), with 24,869 to come from the Reserve Components to provide the necessary supporting units for USAREUR. The only part of the proposed 133,000 increase not acted upon involved the package, now totaling 37,133, for expansion of the training base, which the Army desired earmarked for the creation of two additional divisions. It seemed most significant that Mr. McNamara, in making these space allocations, said that he regarded the additions to STRAF as a permanent increase in Army strength and the USAREUR increases as temporary in nature. In this light, the assignment of Reserve Component units to USAREUR and the use of active Army personnel to fill out the six division STRAF was logical.

26

- (S) Memo, SGS for Gen Eddleman, 8 Aug 61, sub: Plng Data for FY 62 Army Program Revisions, Coord Gp Files.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 15 August Mr. Stahr and Mr. McNamara came to an agreement that the 37,133 previously uncommitted spaces should be used initially to create a pool of replacements, the men to be obtained from enlistments and the draft in phase with the ability of the training base to absorb them. Later, if it appeared desirable to organize a fifteenth division, these men would be available for assignment to it. As a result, Mr. McNamara informed the President on the same day, "the Army's plans provide for the utilization of the full increase of 133,000 men²⁷ which you proposed in your 25 July report to the Nation."

27

(1) (S) Memo, Sec Def for President, 15 Aug 61, Incl 11, Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, Coord Gp Files. (2) (S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 15 Aug 61, w/Mr. McNamara's notations, CS 370 (15 Aug 61), case 2.

In terms of these plans for the use of the 133,000 spaces the Secretary of Defense, also on 15 August, approved personnel policies to be used by the Army in carrying out the expansion, based on the plans that called for mobilizing only 24,869 Reserve personnel and filling the rest of the spaces through extension of tours of duty, stepped up recruiting, and increased draft calls. Selected individual Reservists would be involuntarily recalled to active duty only if all other means to satisfy specific requirements were exhausted. To accomodate the greater load of active Army trainees, RFA enlistments starting 1 September 1961 and extending through December 1961 were to be restricted to individuals who had not attained their twentieth birthday. Planned draft calls were expanded from 8,000 to 13,000 in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

August and projected at 25,000 for September and October, and the first steps were taken to activate a new Army Training Center at Fort Carson, Colorado.²⁸

²⁸

(1) See (S) Summary of Key Decisions Made by the Secretary of Defense on Berlin Planning, Incl 9, Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up. (2) (S) Memo, Sec Def for President, 9 Aug 61, cited. (3) The personnel policies are considered in greater detail below, Chapter IX.

Using these decisions, the Chief of Staff issued a planning directive on 17 August, which, except for the question of actual deployments to Europe, gave the first completed guidance on which the expansion of the Army and consequently the preparations for such possible deployment should be based.²⁹ It proved to be just as ephemeral as the earlier

²⁹

(S) Memo, SGS for DCofS et al., 17 Aug 61, sub: Planning Data for FY 62 Program Revisions, CS 320 Programs (17 Aug 61), case 8.

and less complete directives.

The New Sense of Urgency

In early August the stream of refugees from East to West Berlin had turned into a virtual torrent. On 2 August alone, 1,322 refugees were registered at the Marienfeld refugee camp in West Berlin. On 8 August, 1,741 came in. The next day, 1,926 fled to the West. This blow to Communist prestige could not be long endured, and on 13 August the East German government, with Soviet backing, began to erect a wall between the eastern and western sectors of the city 7 feet high and 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[REDACTED]
miles long, constructed of concrete and barbed wire. East Berlin was being converted into a gigantic concentration camp. The reaction of the Western allies was one of indignation, but no positive steps were taken to destroy the wall.

Judging only on the basis of the timing of decisions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the sealing off of the Berlin border on 13 August 1961 to halt the flow of refugees into West Berlin produced a new sense of urgency in military preparations. Until that event, all planning for actual reinforcement of forces in Europe had been contingent except for the 3,000 men earmarked for mechanization of USAREUR divisions, and Secretary McNamara showed considerable hesitation in approving the actual execution of any deployment plans. The plans themselves were based on the beginning of shipments of individual fillers, supporting units, and the port package to Europe no earlier than 1 December 1961, with any major reinforcing units to be sent only after the first of the new year. With the building of the wall, the Secretary of Defense began to push for an acceleration of target dates for deployment to Europe and as a consequence also to accept and approve more definite plans made by the Army for these developments. One effect of this new sense of urgency was to produce a considerable readjustment of the active Army - Reserve Component mix in the plan for Army expansion, a readjustment that in fact resulted in acceptance of essentially the scheme the Army had presented on 25 July 1961. By utilizing a larger proportion of Ready Reserve units, the temporary expansion of the Army toward the goals set up could be accelerated.

On 15 August the Secretary of Defense authorized an alert for
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

possible active duty of the 24,869 Reserve Component personnel making up the combat support and port units for Europe but directed that the units not be told of the possible date of call. He agreed that, upon decision to reinforce Europe, active Army units were to be sent to Europe and replaced in the States by Reserve units. The extent to which this scheme of reinforcement would actually be used had, however, not yet been determined.

30

(S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 15 Aug 61, cited.

Based on Mr. McNamara's 7 August decision that appropriate units from the Reserve Components should be designated to fulfill the supporting unit requirements of USAREUR, the Army staff had by 14 August developed a detailed plan involving a total of 137 units. Of these it was found that 24 units with 1,243 spaces could not be found in the Reserve Component troop basis and would have to be drawn from the active Army. The remaining 113 units -- 23,626 men -- were to be called to active duty in accordance with the amount of training time required to place the particular unit in a combat ready status; this varied from 6 to 13 weeks. Based on a readiness for deployment date of 15 December for the USAREUR supporting units, this meant that some 28 must be recalled by 15 September. The others would be called between 1 October and 1 November. The latter group included 22 units in the port package that would have to meet a 15 November readiness date. Because the mobilization of any units before 1 October violated the deadline established by the Secretary of Defense, the Army staff proposed an

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

alternate plan under which active Army units would be sent instead of these 28 Reserve Component units in the deployment package, the Reserve Component units in turn replacing the active Army units in the United States as soon as they had been trained.

31

(S) Memo, Actg SGS for Sec Army, 14 Aug 61, sub: Plan for Mob of Army RC Units to Reinforce USAREUR, CS 370 (14 Aug 61), case 2.

On 16 August the 113 RC units were alerted for possible call to active duty and authorized additional training periods. On 17 August the final Army plan was formally submitted to the Secretary of Defense. It made no reference to alternatives as such but presented the 113 unit package with mobilization dates stretching from 1 October to 1 November on the premise that "when reinforcement of Europe is authorized, active Army units will be deployed to the extent possible, being replaced by Reserve Component units," and indicated that current plans contemplated earmarking 38 active Army units with a total strength of 5,949 for this purpose.

32

(S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 17 Aug 61, sub: Plan for Reinf of USAREUR w/Non-Div Units, CS 370 (17 Aug 61), case 2.

Then, on 18 August, the Secretary of Defense asked the service Secretaries to determine what could be done to accelerate readiness to permit deployment of six Army divisions by 15 November 1961 instead of the previous date of 1 January 1962. The Army staff reported that in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

addition to such measures as immediate allocation of funds and civilian personnel spaces to accelerate materiel readiness and build-up of operating stocks in Europe, the Reserve call-up should be increased to some 218,816 personnel and be started on 1 September 1961. The call-up would include 66,816 in nondivisional units and as individuals, 6,932 to operate two new training centers at Fort Carson and Fort Polk, respectively, and 152,000 in four division forces to reconstitute the strategic reserve on deployment of the active Army divisions to Europe. ³³

³³
(1) (S) MR, Brig Gen A. W. Oberbeck, Chf Coord Gp, OCS, 18 Aug 61, sub: Measures to Accelerate Readiness for Deployment. (2) Memo, Maj Gen J. L. Throckmorton, SGS, for Sec Army, 19 Aug 61, same sub. Both in CS 370 (19 Aug 61), case 2.

Included in these figures were the nondivisional units to round out the six-division STRAF that the original Army plan had contemplated should come from Reserve Component sources. On 21 August, Secretary McNamara approved the call of 18,825 men in these units to reinforce STRAF "in order to meet required readiness dates." ³⁴ An additional

³⁴
(1) (S) Memo, SGS for Gens Eddleman and Decker, 23 Aug 61, sub: Recall of ARC Units, Coord Gp Files. This memo states that Mr. McNamara made the decision on 21 August, but no specific documentation of the decision was found in the files consulted. (2) (S) See also, Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, I-15.

requirement for reserve units to operate a second Army Training Center

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

at Fort Polk was also apparently discussed at that time, and on 22 August the Secretary of the Army asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the recall to active duty of all 4,396 personnel in the 100th Infantry Division (Training) for this purpose. ³⁵ Mr. McNamara, however,

³⁵
(C) Memo, CofS for Sec Army, 22 Aug 61, sub: Recall of RC Units, CS 326 (22 Aug 61).

asked that a new request be drawn including the entire list of Reserve units the Army now proposed to call. The list was prepared and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense the next day, 23 August. It included a total of 46,519 personnel -- the 23,626 previously approved for reinforcement of Europe, 4,396 for operation of a training center at Fort Polk, and 18,497 for STRAF nondivisional units. The last figure was reached by deleting a corps headquarters and headquarters company -- 328 men -- that could not be readily provided from Reserve sources. The accompanying schedule provided for a phased recall of the units beginning with the package for Fort Polk on 25 September and extending ³⁶ through 15 December 1961.

³⁶
(1) (S) Memo, Actg Sec Army for Sec Def, 23 Aug 61, sub: Recall of ARC Units. (2) Office Memo, SGS for Gens Eddleman and Decker, 23 Aug 61, same sub. Both in CS 326 (22 Aug 61).

The Secretary of Defense obtained Presidential approval and made a public announcement of the entire list on 25 August. Instead of

the phased schedule, he decided that all units should be called up for active duty on 1 October 1961 with the exception of those for operation of the training center at Fort Polk. The latter were ordered to report to home station on 25 September and arrive at mobilization station no later than 1 October; the remaining units were alerted to possible call. On 28 August, the rest of the units were officially notified to report to home stations on 1 October and to arrive at mobilization stations no later than 15 October.

37

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, I-16. For fuller treatment see below, Chapter III.

The decisions between 15 and 28 August adjusted the mix between the active Army and Reserve Components in the approved 133,000-man increase in Army strength. The final results are shown in the following table:

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM FOR ARMY BUILD-UP
(PROGRAM SEGMENTS AND SOURCES OF PERSONNEL)

38

<u>Program Segments</u>	<u>Source of Personnel</u>		<u>Total Increase</u>
	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	
I. <u>SIX-DIVISION STRAF</u>	31,501	18,497	49,998
1. Raise STRAF to STRAC	(18,200)		(18,200)
2. Fill Non-Div Units to TOE	(12,973)		(12,973)
3. Add Non-Div Units ¹	(328)	(18,497)	(18,825)
II. <u>STRENGTHEN USAREUR</u>	22,424	22,961	45,385

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Mechanize 3 Inf Divs	(3,000)	(17,314)	(18,729)
2. Individual Fillers	(18,000)	(5,647)	(5,656)
3. Non-Div Units & Indiv	(1,415)	(4,372)	(32,532)
4. Advance Port Pkg	(9)	(689)	(689)
III. <u>TRAINING BASE</u>	32,556	4,372	36,928
1. Operate Fort Polk ²	(24)	(4,372)	(4,396)
2. Individual Repls	(32,532)		(32,532)
IV. <u>UNALLOCATED</u> ³		689	689
TOTAL	86,481	46,519	133,000

Notes: 1. "Changes from previous figures result from reduction of 484 spaces from USAREUR stated requirements and transfer of 181 spaces from Reserve to active Army sources.

2. "Changes from previous figures result from provision of Cml and Sig Detachments from active Army sources.

3. "Revision of USAREUR requirements and changes in active-reserve balance result in a total of 689 approved Reserve Component spaces being unallocated at present. These will not be utilized for call of Reservists until approved by OCSA. If not required for Reservists these 689 spaces may be utilized as an addition to the 32,532 spaces for provision of individual replacements."

38

(S) Memo, SGS for DCsofS et al., 28 Aug 61, sub: Army Program for Increased Readiness, CS 320 Programs (28 Aug 61), case 18.

While the decisions completed the blueprint for expansion of the Army within the 133,000 additional allocation of spaces, they still left several questions unanswered. Overhanging it all was still the uncertainty about how far the actual reinforcement of USAREUR was to go in terms of fillers, supporting units, and additional division force deployments. And upon this central question hinged the additional one of whether

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reserve Component division forces should be called to active duty to reconstitute the ground force strategic reserve should any or all of the six divisions being readied for deployment be sent to Europe. These questions were the subject of intensive consideration within the Department of Defense during the month of August while the decisions on the allocation of spaces and the active Army - Reserve Component mix in the approved Army expansion program were being settled.

Decisions on Reinforcement of USAREUR

Although the whole plan for expansion of the Army was developed in terms of creating a capacity for reinforcement of USAREUR with combat-ready units, the Secretary of Defense chose to move slowly in approving any actual deployment plans. He had indicated on 27 July that he had some "question as to why we send anyone to Europe."³⁹ The general idea

³⁹

(S) Debrief by Mr. Schaub, 27 Jul 61, cited.

seems to have been to retain options as long as possible and not to commit the United States to any definite scheme of reinforcement of the European Command until both the Russian course of action and the proper Allied response had been determined.

In late August the United States, in a move to reassure the people of West Berlin as well as to test Russian intentions, sent a battle group of about 1,500 men from the 8th Infantry Division along the autobahn into Berlin from West Germany. Neither USSR nor East German forces made a move to stop the convoy, which was greeted by Vice

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Lyndon B. Johnson as it entered Berlin. Mr. Johnson pledged that the United States would continue to defend Berlin's freedom.

The reinforcement of Berlin was an intratheater action that did not require forces from the continental United States. Until early September Mr. McNamara had unconditionally approved only the sending of the 3,000 fillers to mechanize three infantry divisions as soon as armored personnel carriers could be made available. All other decisions were simply aimed at preparing the necessary forces so that deployment could be rapidly effected if and when it was decided upon. This principle applied to the fillers and the reinforcing support units for USAREUR as well as to the division forces and the port package that was to be shipped in advance to prepare the way for them. The Secretary of Defense on 15 August stipulated that the 18,000 fillers should be trained and ready for shipment by 1 December 1961; the schedule for

40

(S) Mr. McNamara's penciled notes on Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 15 Aug 61, cited.

the call-up of reserve units for USAREUR reinforcement (19,213) was based on a 15 December readiness date; and the port package (5,656) on a 1 December readiness date. The decision actually to order these units to active duty, made between 21 - 28 August, still carried no positive commitment to ship them to Europe.

The new urgency in the situation that appeared to have developed in August, however, had its effects. On 7 September 1961 the Secretary of Defense requested the Army to study the possibility of accelerating the shipment schedule for nondivisional units and fillers. A hasty

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

study by the Army staff on the night of 7 - 8 September indicated that if an immediate decision were made and both support units and fillers were drawn from active Army sources, including STRAC, all could close in Europe by 1 November. However, this action would involve a temporary lowering of STRAC capabilities pending the completion of training of certain of the Reserve units to be called on 1 October to replace support units sent to Europe and would have a serious impact on posts, camps, and stations when units performing critical maintenance and supply functions were withdrawn. It would also cause personnel problems in all units whence filler personnel would come, including the STRAF divisions in training earmarked for possible deployment to Europe. Accordingly, a new solution was agreed to by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric on 8 September and published as guidance for the Army staff the following day. Between 30,000 and 31,000 personnel were to be shipped to close in Europe by 31 October. The rest, including 7,000 filler personnel and 1,000 - 2,000 men in units, mainly those performing critical logistical functions at posts, camps, and stations in CONUS, would arrive by 15 December. Two thousand of the 7,000 fillers would be for nondivisional units shipped earlier. The port package would be held pending decision on deploying additional forces. This schedule was drawn "with the understanding that the six STRAF divisions and the training base will remain untouched and that the combat effectiveness of the nondivisional units required to support the two STRAC divisions will be maintained."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

(1) (S) Memo, SGS for DCsofS, et al., 9 Sep 61, sub: Reinforcement of Europe, CS 320 Programs (9 Sep 61), case 18. (2) (S) MR, Lt. Col D. P. McAuliffe, Asst SGS, 8 Sep 61, sub: Step-up of Shipments for USAREUR, CS 370 (8 Sep 61), case 2. (3) (S) SS, ODCSOPS, for CofS, 18 Sep 61, OPD OD GO, sub: Step-up of Reinf's to USAREUR, CS 370 (18 Sep 61), case 2.

The following day Mr. McNamara publicly announced that some 40,000 additional troops would be sent to Europe in the immediate future to strengthen U.S. combat and combat support units there and that transportation of dependents to Europe would be suspended effective 9 October 1961 in order that the logistic requirements for those units could be met.

42

(1) (U) DOD News Release 9 Sep 61. (2) (U) Memo, Sec Def for Sec Army, Sec Navy, Sec AF, Chmn JCS, 9 Sep 61, sub: Suspension of Movements of Dependents to Western Europe, Appraisal of 1961 Army Buildup, Incl 15. See also Chapter V, below, for a further discussion of the ban on dependent travel.

After 8 September the major decision remaining to be made involved the deployment of the division forces themselves. However, in the exchanges between the JCS and CINCEUR new requirements were developing that altered the deployment picture somewhat. After the 8th Infantry Division battle group had been deployed to Berlin, General Norstad requested that an additional armored cavalry regiment be sent to Europe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to fill the gap created in his lines by the movement of the battle group to Berlin, to provide additional combat support, particularly tanks, to other U.S. Infantry divisions, and to provide rear-area security for Seventh Army. General Norstad felt that the regiment would be needed regardless of whether the 4th Infantry Division was sent to Europe in October or not. The JCS, therefore, recommended in October that the Secretary of Defense approve the deployment of an armored cavalry regiment to Europe.⁴³

⁴³

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, I-18.

Meanwhile also, the possibility of using a scheduled mobility exercise, LONG THRUST, to partially reinforce European forces had come up for consideration in the JCS. LONG THRUST had originally been proposed by the JCS in September 1960 as an exercise to be conducted in Europe and Turkey in May 1961 to improve the U.S. readiness posture, test current contingency plans, and demonstrate American interest in the exercise area. Under the tentative combined exercise concept, it was proposed that three battle groups would first be deployed from the United States to West Germany by air. One of the companies, augmented by tactical Air Force units, would deploy further to a forward staging area for participation in a five-day exercise involving the seizure and securing of an objective area in Turkey. In February 1961, upon recommendation of the State Department, the Turkish phase was deleted and LONG THRUST planning confined to a strategic mobility exercise aimed at demonstrating American ability and intent to move strategic reserves forces rapidly to the NATO area. In these terms LONG THRUST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

was approved in February for execution 1 - 15 May, but at the end of April the President canceled it because of the tense political situation in Europe and the possible requirement for the United States to provide Army forces to support SEATO interests in Laos. However, General Norstad revived interest in LONG THRUST in July in connection with the Berlin Crisis, pointing out that preparations already made would enable it to serve as a means of demonstrating U.S. ability to respond rapidly in the NATO area. In mid-September he recommended that planning for execution of the exercise be continued but with no fixed date for execution. In the revised plan, the 101st Airborne Division, one of three STRAC divisions, was designated as the implementing force. ⁴⁴

⁴⁴

(1) (S) USAREUR Annual History, pp. 105 - 07. (2) (S)

Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, I-19.

A third area of interest and discussion involved the preshipment of supplies to Europe as a means of advancing the date when any additional major forces sent there would be ready for action against an enemy. As early as 2 August the Secretary of Defense, acting on a suggestion of CINCEUR to the JCS, asked the Secretary of the Army whether it would be wise to preposition the equipment and supplies for two division forces that might be assigned to NATO later in the year. ⁴⁵ The initial

⁴⁵

(1) (S) Memo, Sec Def for Sec Army, 2 Aug 61, Coord Gp Files.

(2) (S) Hqs USAREUR, After Action Rpt on Prepositioning for a Two Div Fce, CS 400, case 21.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Army reaction was negative. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) on 10 August recommended to the Chief of Staff that the Army not preposition the two division forces' equipment, since such a move would create competition with the requirements for forces already approved in the expansion program, for training bases, and for combat reserve stocks. DCSLOG pointed out that USAREUR was already accumulating a considerable amount of excess equipment as a result of the modernization program. These items could be used for the proposed two division forces and so lessen the requirement for shipping heavy equipment. Moreover, as a result of previous contingency planning, approximately 20,000 short tons of TOE equipment was already prestocked in Europe. This would provide initial equipment and supply issues for certain support units in the division forces.⁴⁶

⁴⁶
(S) SS, DCSLOG for CofS, 10 Aug 61, sub: Movmt of Supplies & Equipment for a Two-Div Fce to Europe (C) LOG/Fl-20716, Coord Gp Files.

Despite these objections, the idea of preshipment did not die. The Army's study of 18 August 1961 on measures required to accelerate deployment to Europe pointed up the necessity for shipment of supplies to Europe to build up operating stocks and for preshipment of selected major items for initial issue to division forces to be deployed.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁷
(S) Memo, SGS for Sec Army, 19 Aug 61, sub: Measures to Accelerate Readiness for Deployment, CS 370 (19 Aug 61).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

plans drawn up in August for the deployment of 2, 4, or 6 division forces to Europe showed a time lag of 19 days in the case of the first 2 division forces, 30 days for the second, and 13 days for the third between the arrival of the personnel and that of their equipment and supplies.⁴⁸ Advance shipment of equipment and supplies therefore

⁴⁸
(S) Memo, CofS, USA for Sec Army, 19 Aug 61, sub: Plans for Deploymt of Div Fcs to Europe, Gen Decker "C" File.

seemed to offer a means whereby the preparations for shipment of the division forces could be most effectively advanced. It would also provide for more effective use of merchant shipping in the movement by spreading cargo shipments over a longer period of time.

On 11 October the President rendered decisions on all these issues. He approved specifically:

- a. The deployment to Europe of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment with attached intelligence detachment at an approximate strength of 2800 officers and men.
- b. The preparationing in Europe of the equipment of one armored division and one infantry division
- c. The revision of planning for Exercise LONG THRUST to include elements of the Fourth Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division, and to provide for the rotation of battle groups from the Fourth Infantry Division through a series of such exercises so as to retain indefinitely in Europe two battle groups plus supporting elements.⁴⁹

⁴⁹
(S) Memo, Brig Gen George S. Brown, Mil Asst to Sec Def, for Secs Army, Navy, AF, Chmn JCS, 11 Oct 61, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, Incl 7.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Secretary of Defense directed that the Army manpower requirements for caretaker and maintenance detachments to support these actions be as austere as possible with a total of 3,000 as the goal. On 9 October Mr. McNamara had told the JCS that he thought it would be desirable to preposition equipment for the support elements for the first 2 division forces as well, but there remained some confusion on this point until the end of October when Mr. McNamara authorized the prepositioning of equipment and supplies for 10 selected combat units of the 2 division forces and raised the ceiling on caretaker and maintenance personnel to 3,400 men.

50

(1) (S) Memo, Actg DCSLOG for CofS, 14 Oct 61, sub: Pre-positioning Equipmt in Europe, CS 400 (14 Oct 61), case 30. (2) (S) Memo, Brig Gen George S. Brown, Mil Asst, OSD, for Secs Army, Navy, AF, Chmn JCS, 1 Nov 61, CS 400 (1 Nov 61), case 30.

These October decisions on deployment to Europe were the final word. Though the preparation for sending division forces to Europe continued, the easing of the crisis in the fall of 1961 obviated their deployment. As a consequence, the port package was also never sent.

Decision to Call Up Two Reserve Component Division Forces

Meanwhile, the question of what should be done to replace the Army divisions in the strategic reserve should the divisions be deployed to Europe continued unanswered until 18 September while various plans for increasing the readiness of Reserve Component

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

division forces before possible recall were considered and discarded. Until 15 August, plans were largely conceived in terms of giving such a force additional active duty training. Secretary McNamara's request to Congress for authority to transfer funds between appropriation categories within certain limits was, at least in part, designed to enable him to use some funds to provide for this additional active duty training for Reserves. At the behest of the Secretary of Defense, the Army staff presented a plan on 24 July for two weeks of additional active duty training for selected units of a four-division force, but took the position that the expense and hardships to individual Reservists involved largely outweighed any advantages that might be expected from this course of action.

51

(1) (S) Memo, ACSRS for CofS, 24 Jul 61, sub: Addnl ACDUTRA During FY 62 for Selected Units of Four Div RRSTRAF (C). (2) (S) Memo, VCofS, USA, for ASD (MP), 27 Jul 61, sub: Addnl Two Weeks ACDUTRA for a 4-Div Fce of 110,000 Strength. Both in CS 326 (24 Jul 61).

The initial Army plan for the build-up presented on 25 July contained no reference to increased training for or eventual mobilization of the 4-division force since it was not within the frame of reference under which this plan was prepared. However, Secretary McNamara in his oral instructions of 2 August instructed the Army to prepare plans for substituting 4 ARNG divisions plus limited support for 4 active Army divisions and to give the ARNG units extra training.

52

-69-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR on Debriefing by Mr. Ailes fol Conf, 2 Aug 61, cited.

The Chief of Staff consequently directed the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components (ACSRC) on 3 August to prepare a plan for readying four RC division forces for recall to active duty by 1 December 1961. The plan was to consider "that the four National Guard Divisions and a limited number of supporting units will be designated, filler personnel will be provided, and the units will be given two weeks additional active duty training in sufficient time to permit recall to Federal Service by 1 December 1961. Additional supporting units may be designated and filled to strength, and may participate in additional readiness exercises and training."

(1) (S) Memo, SGS for DCsofS, CA, et al., 3 Aug 61, sub: Plng Data for FY 62 Army Program Revisions, CS 320 Programs (3 Aug 61).

(2) The instructions issued on 8 August, pursuant to the Secretary of Defense's decision of the 7th, were essentially similar but made DCSOPS as well as ACSRC responsible for preparation of the plan. (U) Memo, SGS for DCsofS, CA, et al., 8 Aug 61, sub: Plng Data for FY 62 Army Program Revisions, CS 320 Programs (8 Aug 61).

Assistant Secretary of Defense Runge was briefed on a plan along these lines on 10 August. The plan provided for two weeks of additional active duty training for four National Guard divisions and limited supporting forces to a total of 66,502 men, to be completed by 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 1961, and for additional home station training for the balance of the supporting forces, approximately 60,703. The 24,795 fillers required from the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool would be issued "hip pocket" orders for eventual mobilization with these units but would not be authorized additional training. The plan also provided for the actions necessary to order four National Guard division forces to active duty by 1 December 1961, noting that 31 days advance notice would be marginal in view of the need for administrative preparations. Costs of the two weeks of additional training were estimated at something over \$20 million.

54

- (1) (S) Memo, Maj Gen C. G. Dodge, ACSRC, for CofS, 9 Aug 61, sub: Plans for Readyng Four NG Div Fces, CS 320 Programs (9 Aug 61).
(2) (S) MR, Lt Col James D. Holland, OACSRC, 10 Aug 61, sub: Readyng of Reserve Fce, CS 370 (10 Aug 61).

The National Guard divisions selected were the 28th Infantry Division (Penn.), 32d Infantry Division (Wisc.), 30th Armored Division (Tenn.), and the 49th Armored Division (Texas). The additional training for the four division forces would be carried out at the normal summer training stations - Camps Pickett and A.P. Hill in Virginia for the 28th, Camp McCoy in Wisconsin for the 32d, Fort Stewart in Georgia for the 30th Armored, and Fort Hood in Texas for the 49th Armored. Mobilization stations suggested were Fort Gordon, Georgia, for the 28th, Fort Leonard Wood for the 32d, Fort Stewart for the 30th Armored, and Fort Hood for the 49th Armored. The only change from general mobilization stations for these divisions involved in the plan was a switch

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the 30th Armored from Fort Campbell to Fort Stewart in view of the fact that the 101st Airborne Division, stationed at Campbell, was not scheduled to deploy. An alternate stationing plan, developed at the time to avoid crowded conditions that would result at these camps, placed the 28th at Fort Benning, the 32d at Fort Riley, and the 30th Armored at Fort Polk, the 28th and 32d taking over from divisions that were expected to deploy and the 30th opening an inactive station. ⁵⁵

⁵⁵

(S) Ibid.

Mr. Runge suggested that the Army consider giving all nondivisional combat units of the 152,000-man four-division force additional training. Because it did not appear that two weeks of additional training for the entire 4-division force could be administratively supported, at the direction of the Under Secretary of the Army, Stephen Ailes, four alternative plans were prepared, one providing for 3 additional multiple drills at home stations for all units and the 3 others for an additional 2 weeks of training for forces of 98,000, 68,000, and 35,000, respectively. ⁵⁶

⁵⁶

(S) Memo, ACSRC for USec Army thru CofS, 14 Aug 61, sub: Readyng of Four RC Div Fces, GS 370 (14 Aug 61).

None of these plans seems to have been seriously considered, and the whole idea of two weeks of additional training disappeared in the flurry of planning following the Secretary of Defense's request on 18 August for suggestions on how the whole deployment schedule might be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

speeded up. While any hopes that the deployment readiness schedule for the divisions could in fact be substantially advanced soon faded, as a result of this planning the premise was established that National Guard divisions should be in training for at least 4 to 6 weeks before the deployment of the active Army divisions they would replace, and that at least 4 National Guard divisions should be called if 6 active Army divisions were to be shipped. Based on the more certain premise that deployment of active Army divisions would begin, if at all, on 1 January with the shipment of 2 divisions and that 2 more divisions would follow a month later, the Army adopted for planning purposes a schedule for steps to be taken to recall the 4 National Guard divisions to replace them. Under this schedule the force was broken down into two increments; the first 2-division force was to be alerted on 1 October for possible order to active duty on 8 November, the second was to be alerted on 1 November for possible call to active duty on 8 December. Final decision on the call for each increment would be made on 1 November and 1 December, respectively.

57

(S) Memo, VCofS for Actg Sec Army, 23 Aug 61, sub: Schedules for Actions and Decisions on Army Build-up, CS 370 (23 Aug 61).

Meanwhile, on 21 August 1961, Under Secretary Ailes orally directed ACSRC to prepare a new plan for improving the readiness of a 4-division RC force. The emphasis in the new plan was to be on bringing the designated units in the 4-division force to full personnel strength and on providing additional home station training for them. The plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

was presented to Mr. Ailes on 31 August and was approved by Mr. Gilpatrick on 5 September, subject to the proviso that costs must be kept within the savings to be effected in Reserve funds by ordering the units in the initial 46,519-man package to active duty.⁵⁸ The main features of

58

- (1) (S) Memo, Maj Gen C. G. Dodge, ACSRC, for USec Army thru CofS, 24 Aug 61, sub: Improving Readiness of a Four-Div RC Fce (U).
(2) (S) Memo, USec Army Stephen Ailes for Sec Def, 5 Sep 61, same sub. Both in CS 326 (24 Aug 61).

the new plan, which the United States Continental Army Command was instructed to put into effect on 7 September 1961, were that the units in the four-division Reserve Component force should all commence training in the 13-week Intensified Combat Training Program (ICTP) developed by CONARC, and should fill their TCE vacancies by drawing on the Ready Reserve Reinforcement Mobilization Pool. A selected list of 96 Army National Guard units and 54 Army Reserve units were authorized to conduct 2 additional drills per month over and above their normal weekly drills. CONARC was informed that this was not a mobilization alert but a program intended to improve the training posture of the selected units.⁵⁹

59

(U) Msg, DA 571692 to CGUSCONARC, 7 Sep 61. For details on personnel policies, etc. see below, Chapter III.

CONARC, however, did not consider the Intensified Combat Training Program practicable for units not on active duty. The ICTP usually

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

required outdoor training facilities, which were not available to many units. In addition, most of the RC units concerned did not have sufficient advanced training, or the necessary equipment and personnel strength to use the ICTP to advantage. CONARC, therefore, on 8 September instructed the commanders of the RC units concerned merely to become familiar with the ICTP's in case they had to use them later. In the meantime, the CONARC instructions stated, the RC units would continue to train under their current training program "to insure attainment of maximum mobilization readiness at the earliest possible time."⁶⁰

⁶⁰

(1) (U) Msg, 811787, CGUSCONARC to USARMYONE et al., 8 Sept 61. (2) (C) CONARC Comments on Subject Study, 27 Oct 62. Both in OCMH files.

The 7 September list, unfortunately, had been used in the original planning in early August in connection with the proposal for 2 weeks of additional training and had not been brought up to date or thoroughly coordinated by the staff. By the time it was issued, it was already clear that many changes would have to be made, particularly in the technical service units listed, because of interim changes in information on the units themselves and refinements in the planning for the 4-division force. And while the additional training order did not list mobilization stations since it was not a mobilization alert, many of the mobilization stations that were used in drawing up the plan were also currently being shifted in order to avoid overloading particular stations⁶¹ and for other reasons.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

61

(C) MR, Lt Col Thomas J. Brett, OPS OT OR, sub: Four Div Troop List, in file furnished by Lt Col Brett, O&T, ODCSOPS.

In any case, ODCSOPS informed the Chief of Staff of a stationing plan for the four-division force on 6 September. There had been one change in the list of divisions in the interim, the 26th Infantry Division (Mass.) having been substituted for the 30th Armored Division, largely on the basis that equipping an infantry division would be easier. The plan provided that the 28th Infantry Division should be stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the 49th Armored at Fort Hood, Texas, the 26th Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 32d Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington. Supporting units were to be distributed at these and other active stations. In drawing up this plan, the general assumption was that active Army installations would be used to the maximum in the general readiness program and that activation of new installations would be kept to a minimum. Where possible, National Guard divisions were to replace active Army divisions on station on a one for one basis with perhaps a 4- to 6-week overlap when both divisions would occupy the same post. Thus, in every case except that of the 49th Armored Division it represented a change in the initial stationing plan drawn up early in August.

62

(S) Memo, Maj Gen John K. Heintges, Dir O&T, ODCSOPS, for CofS, 6 Sep 61, sub: Proposed Stationing Plan for Four NG Divs, CS 323.3 (6 Sep 61).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

On 14 September these plans were changed in response to direction from higher authority. CONARC was instructed that, if a decision was made by 20 September 1961 to call up a 4-division force, the 28th Infantry Division would be stationed at Fort Polk and an Army training center would be opened at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, another inactive installation.⁶³ Such a shift would produce additional changes in

63

(1) (S) DA 902543 to CGUSCONARC, 15 Sep 61. (2) (S) DF, OPS OT TR4, 14 Sep 61, sub: Ft. Polk - Ft. Chaffee.

both the troop lists and the stationing plan for supporting nondivisional units.

Planning within the Army proceeded, meanwhile, on the supposition that the 4 divisions would be called up in 2 increments, basically in accordance with the planning schedule adopted by the Department of the Army. Meanwhile, the whole subject of the desirability and probability of deploying active Army divisions to Europe had been under discussion for some time by the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, General Norstad, and the President. On 7 August 1961, the Secretary of Defense requested that the JCS prepare, as early as practicable, alternative plans for the deployment of 2, 4, and 6 U.S. Army divisions and up to 24 tactical fighter squadrons to Europe by 1 January 1962. USCINCEUR was directed to prepare plans for stationing and employing these forces. Service plans were compiled and considered during August and September, and on 15 September the Joint Chiefs replied to the Secretary of Defense, presenting the 3 alternative deployment plans. JCS emphasized that an

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

early decision was required and stipulated that a decision should be made: (1) on 15 September to mobilize 4 division forces if the 6-division plan were adopted, (2) on 1 October to mobilize the 4 division forces if the 4-division alternative were adopted, and (3) on 15 October to mobilize the 4 divisions if the 2-division alternative were chosen.

In response to questions posed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs finally made the recommendation on 18 September that 2 additional U.S. Army divisions be provided to General Norstad, if and when he wanted them, and that in anticipation of such a request 2 RC division forces be called up on 1 October 1961. This agreement was transmitted to General LeMay, who was representing the JCS in a meeting with the President at the White House. The Secretary of Defense and the President approved this recommendation late on the afternoon of 18 September, and the President set 15 October 1961 as the call-up date.⁶⁴

⁶⁴
(U) Memo, Sec Def for President, 18 Sep 61, sub: Auth to Order to Active Duty Units of Res Comps, approved by John F. Kennedy, CS 326 (18 Sep 61).

The net effect of the 18 September decisions was to increase the authorized mobilization of reserves from 46,519 to over 119,000 and the strength of the Army from the 1,008,000 set in the FY 1962 budget to approximately 1,081,000. The 73,000 increase would have to be financed on a deficiency basis under Section 612 (c) of the Appropriation Act for FY 1962. By 6 October, as a result of adjustments made in the deployment plans for Europe and because of the prospective call-up of

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the two division forces, the allocation of spaces for the various segments of the program as laid down at the end of August had been revised as follows:

65

SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS FOR ARMY BUILD-UP, 6 OCTOBER 1961

Program Segments	Active Army	Reserve Components ²	TOTAL
I. <u>SIX-DIVISION STRAF</u>	31,501	18,488	49,989
1. Raise STRAF to STRAC	(18,200)		(18,200)
2. Fill Non-Div Units to TOE	(12,973)		(12,973)
3. Add Non-Div Units	(328)	(18,488)	(18,816)
II. <u>STRENGTHEN USAREUR</u>	(41,917)	117	42,034
1. Mechanize 3 Inf Divs	(3,000)		(3,000)
2. Individual Fillers	(17,041)		(17,041)
3. Non-Div Units & Indiv	(19,190)		(19,190) ³
4. Advance Port Package	(2,686)	(117)	(2,803) ⁴
III. <u>EXPAND TRAINING BASE</u>	33,491	3,553	37,044
1. Operate Fort Chaffee		(3,553)	(3,553) ⁵
2. Individual Repls	(33,491)		(33,491) ⁶
IV. <u>RECONSTITUTE/INCR STRAF</u>	-20,428	96,766	76,338
1. Replace Units Deployed		(22,844)	(22,844)
2. Addtl STRAF Transferred		-(20,452) ⁹	-(20,452)
3. Operate Fort Polk	(24)	(1,176)	(1,200)
4. Add Two Div Fces		(72,746)	(72,746)
V. UNALLOCATED		698	698 ⁷
TOTAL ⁸	86,481	119,622	206,103

Notes: 1. Changes from previous figures (see above pp. 58-59) result from changes in USAREUR stated requirements, from further adjustments in the call-up of Reserve Components units, and from the designation of active Army units to be deployed to Europe.

2. Change results from deletion of 22 spaces from previous alert, plus addition of one Signal team of 13 spaces.

3. Active Army units being deployed to close in Europe by 31 October 1961 to reinforce present USAREUR force.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Reflects reduction in size of Port Package agreed with USAREUR.

5. 100th Training Division diverted from Fort Polk to Fort Chaffee; also includes U.S. Army garrison of 357 personnel.

6. For accounting purposes only, figure for pool of individual replacements includes 959 authorized as individual fillers for Europe (18,000 minus 17,041) but not used for that purpose.

7. Figure of 9 from Note 1 added to Unallocated Spaces. These will not be utilized for call of additional Reservists until approved by OCSA. If not required for Reservists, the 698 spaces may be utilized as an addition to the 33,491 spaces for provision of individual replacements.

8. Figure of 119,622 includes 46,519 call-up by 1 October, plus 73,103 call-up by 15 October 1961. Figure of 206,103 includes 133,000 increase, plus additional increase of 73,103 for call-up of two Reserve Component divisions.

9. Active Army units with total strengths of 21,876 (19,190 nondivisional units plus 2,886 port package) are being sent to Europe; only 1,424 active Army personnel (1,415 nondivisional units plus 9 port package) were planned for shipment previously; the difference of 20,452 represents the additional STRAF units transferred to Europe above those originally contemplated. These will be replaced by Reserve Component units ordered to active duty on 1 October 1961.

65

Memo, SGS for DCoS, et al., 6 Oct 61, sub: Summary of Army FY 62 Program for Increased Readiness, CS 320 Programs (6 Oct 61), case 18.

This was essentially the final blueprint for the expansion of the Army in FY 1962. The decisions made after 6 October to send to Europe an armored cavalry regiment, caretaker and maintenance detachments in connection with prepositioning, and units of the 4th Infantry Division in exercise LONG THRUST affected in some degree the over-all disposition of Army forces but not the basic expansion plan. The blueprint was one

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for temporary expansion of the Army. The question of a permanent sustaining level remained unsettled.

The Expansion of the Navy and Air Force

While the Army was expanding its capabilities to meet the Berlin Crisis, the Navy and Air Force were also undergoing expansion on a smaller scale to improve their combat posture. The President on 25 July had asked for increases of 29,000 and 63,000 men in active duty strength for the Navy and Air Force, respectively. In addition, he desired to reactivate or retain ships and planes to increase the "tactical air power and . . . sea lift, air lift, and anti-submarine warfare capability and to activate a number of Air Transport squadrons and Air National Guard tactical air squadrons."

66

New York Times, 26 July 1961.

After Congress approved the President's request, the Department of the Navy was given authority to recall 8,000 Reserves to active duty and to extend the tour of duty of 7,000 officers and men. The Navy expanded the fleet in the late summer of 1961 by ordering 40 destroyer-type ships with Reserve crews into active service, reactivating 33 amphibious and support ships from the reserve fleet, and retaining 6 ships previously scheduled for inactivation. The Navy also commissioned the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise, the conventionally-powered carrier Constellation, the first nuclear-powered guided missile carrier Long Beach, and 8 guided missile frigates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and destroyers to bolster the fleet. By the end of FY 1962, the Navy had increased its strength from 627,000 to 666,000 men and from 819 ships (375 warships) to 900 (397 warships). In the meantime, the Marine Corps had been granted an increase of 14,000 men and attained a strength of 191,000 men by December 1961. This increase permitted the Marines to augment the strength of the three division - air wing teams and to establish the nucleus of a fourth team.⁶⁷

⁶⁷
(U) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1961 - 30 June 1962.

The Air Force had built up from 22 to 31 tactical aircraft and missile wings as a result of the Berlin Crisis. In the summer of 1961 the Air Force called to active duty 25 Air National Guard fighter, fighter-interceptor, and reconnaissance squadrons; 6 ANG transport squadrons; and 5 Air Force Reserve troop carrier squadrons, totaling 27,000 men. In September 1961 the Air Force sent 8 regular squadrons of F-100's and F-104's to Europe to strengthen General Norstad's forces; these were followed in November by 11 Air National Guard squadrons. The over-all strength of the Air Force increased from 821,000 on 30 June 1961 to 884,000 a year later.⁶⁸

⁶⁸
Ibid.

Thus, the other services were also considerably stronger and more combat ready as a result of the Berlin Crisis expansion. If conventional

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
or nuclear war were to break out, both the Navy and the Air Force were better prepared at the end of FY 1962 than they had been a year earlier.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Chapter III

Implementation of the Army Expansion Program (S)

Since the President and his advisors wished to retain options as long as possible and to keep the cost of the military build-up to a minimum, their decisions were issued in a piecemeal fashion as the international situation developed. This meant that plans were made, modified, or discarded from week to week over a period of more than two months with inevitable delays and waste motion in the process of implementation. An appraisal of the build-up prepared by the Army staff in January 1962 stated:

Service plans relating to the details of the U.S. force build-up had been developed, and had been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President. These plans led to his decision to allocate 133,000 additional personnel to the Army to accomplish specified build-up actions. During the ensuing period, extending for more than a month, authority to implement the President's decision was issued piecemeal, element by element. Decisions were made only after detailed Army rejustification and re-evaluation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The delays inherent in obtaining approval for implementation, and the planning obstacles created by the resulting uncertainties, had a major impact on the efficiency with which the Presidential decision was executed.¹

1

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, IV-6.

The Build-up of the Strategic Reserve

By the Presidential, - DOD decisions of July and August 1961, 49,998 spaces had been approved to build up STRAF and to relieve it² of its training missions. In the meantime, the Army had begun on

See Chapter II above.

22 July to transfer replacement training from the STRAF divisions to Army Training Centers (ATC). An additional ATC was opened at Fort Carson, Colorado, after the Secretary of Defense approved this action on 2 August. Since the numbers of six-month Reserve Forces Act personnel in training with the STRAF divisions at the time was small, they were permitted to complete their tours of duty as fillers.³

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, II, pp. A-2, A-3.

From the ATC's the three STRAF divisions received an increased number of basically trained men starting in July. Although there was a shortage in some high-skill MOS's and upper-grade combat arms MOS's because of the requirements for Europe and for other CONUS forces, 900 men were moved from schools and from units not involved in the build-up to fill the STRAF divisions. The 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions were filled by 17 October and the 2d Armored Division by 2 November.⁴

(S) Ibid., II, pp. A-3, A-4.

When the nondivisional units to support STRAF were assigned priority for deployment to Europe, the Army began to fill those units. Beginning in October 1961, 12,978 trained personnel were transferred into the nondivisional units despite many difficulties. The principal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

problems stemmed from the over-all shortage of trained personnel.

Although draft calls increased in September and in succeeding months, new recruits could not be completely trained for at least five months. Since the STRAF nondivisional units carried an early deployment readiness requirement, the Army had to redistribute trained personnel from lower priority units rapidly and, in some cases, to defer the fill until trained replacements become available.⁵ Nevertheless, by January

5

(S) Ibid.

1962 over 14,000 men from the active Army had been added to STRAF to create a combat ready, six-division force.⁶ In addition, over 40,000

6

(S) Memo, Coordination Gp, OCS, for Throckmorton, 19 Jan 62, sub: Summary of Army Build-Up (U), OCS Chronological File, No. 9.

of the Reserve Components had been called either to provide additional nondivisional units for STRAF or to replace the active Army units deployed or scheduled for deployment to Europe.⁷

7

See the section on the mobilization of reserves below, this chapter.

Expansion of the Training Base

The expansion of the Army required as a matter of course a corresponding expansion of the training base. On 29 July General Decker established guidelines for his staff planners in this field:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

only two additional training centers would be set up; the training load would be leveled off; and untrained accessions to the Army would be ensured proper training. The Director of Organization and Training, ODCSOPS, therefore, recommended that Forts Carson and Chaffee be used as ATC's, since they could handle 137,740 men a year on the basis of 72 square feet per man. By suspending RFA input from August to December, 47,200 training spaces could be saved for the men inducted through the high draft calls scheduled for the rest of the year. In this way, the director of O&T maintained, the Army could provide the personnel needed for increased readiness in reaching a year-end strength of 1,008,000, and in doing so would suffer the least impact in morale and health. Moreover, the suspension of RFA training during this period would produce a more level training load and require less training personnel. 8

8

(FOUO) Memo, Dir, O&T, ODCSOPS, for DCSOPS, 30 Jul 61, sub: Courses of Action Which Will Achieve Combat Readiness with Least Impact on Training Base, Black Book, Vol. I, Tab O, Coord Gp Files.

After Secretary McNamara's approval on 2 August of the conversion of STRAF to STRAC status and its attendant relief from training functions, the ATC at Fort Carson was activated and placed in operation. Fort Polk, Louisiana, had also been proposed as a possible ATC location, but the Army had turned it down on the grounds that it was a mobilization station for major armored units and inferior in firing ranges and training facilities to other available posts. 9

~~SECRET~~

9

(FOUO) Memo, Ailes for ASD (M), 12 Aug 61, sub: Status of Fort Polk, La., Black Book, Bk I, Coord Gp Files.

However, when Mr. McNamara on 15 August approved over 37,000 spaces to create a pool of trained replacements, the selection of a second ATC became more pressing. Fort Polk was proposed anew as a site, and on 21 August the Secretary of Defense, apparently after consultation with the President, decided to establish the ATC on that post. The Department of the Army issued orders to CONARC to activate the post as of 25 August and to man it with Reserve Component units. The Fort Polk units would be recalled to active duty as of 25 September.

10

1. (C) Memo, SGS for OCoS et al., 21 Aug 61, sub: Establishment of an Army Training Center at Fort Polk, La., Black Book, Tab BB, Coord Gp Files. 2. (S) OPS OP ORI, Comment No. 2, Col. C.A. Anderson for Chief, Training Div, ODCSOPS, no date, sub: Ft Polk, Ft Chaffee, in Col Brett's File.

Before the Fort Polk units reported for duty, the decision to use Fort Polk as the mobilization station for the 49th Armored Division necessitated a change in plans. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, became the site of the ATC and the units alerted to operate Fort Polk were ordered to Fort Chaffee in September. The training facilities at Fort Gordon,

11

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, II, p. A-9.

Georgia, were also expanded during the latter part of 1961 to accommodate

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
the heavier training load.

In the meantime, the short deadlines and the changes in plans during the summer of 1961 had presented a number of problems that the Army had to solve quickly. As personnel from the increased draft calls entered the service, existing ATC's at first had to be overloaded to forestall delays in the beginning of a training cycle. Additional trainer personnel had to be placed on temporary duty at the old ATC's to handle the increased load. To open the newly activated ATC's, which had had little maintenance work done in recent years, required major rehabilitation of barracks and facilities. The provision of trainer personnel, trainees, and proper facilities was but one side of the coin, since they would be largely wasted without adequate equipment for training. To assemble equipment swiftly, especially when it often was in short supply, proved to be a difficult task. ¹² Despite the

¹²

(S) Ibid., II, p. A-8.

problems involved, the ATC's were readied, manned, and placed in operation to handle the expansion during the summer and fall of 1961.

The Mobilization of Reserves -- Initial Increments

The chief problems encountered in the initial call-up also arose from the changing guidance for planning. This led to delays in call-up and readiness of units, as well as a loss of time for essential coordination of plans with field commanders before the issuance of instructions. ¹³

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

13

(S) Ibid., II, p. D-2.

Initially, ACSRC selected the units to be called in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs (CAROTC), and then the list was checked out the CONARC and modified. By the end of August the recall to active duty had gone out to 10,809 National Guardsmen, 21,359 Army Reservists, and 14,351 fillers drawn from the replacement pool.¹⁴ The first RC increments to the Army

14

(U) Testimony of ASD Runge, 16 Apr 62, Hebert Cmte Hearings, p. 11.

15

came into federal service on 25 September and 1 October.

15

Since many of the procedures and problems met in the initial call-up were repeated in the two-division call-up, discussion of these matters will be found in the next section.

The Mobilization of the Two-Division RC Force

Late on the afternoon of 18 September the President signed the necessary order for the call-up of two National Guard divisions on 15 October.¹⁶ Shortly thereafter General Eddleman was summoned to

16

(1) Memo, Sec Def for President, 18 Sep 61, sub: Authority to Order to Active Duty Units of Reserve Components, approved by John F.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Kennedy, CS 326 (18 Sep 61). (2) (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up I, p. 17.

meet with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. Mr. McNamara wanted to know what divisions would be selected and where they would be stationed. After discussing the problem with General Hamlett, DCSOPS, and General Doan, Chief of Staff, CONARC, General Eddleman informed his superiors that he recommended that the 49th Armored Division and the 32d Infantry Division be called up, the former to train at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the latter at Fort Lewis, Washington. Mr. McNamara accepted General Eddleman's proposals. He wanted to know by noon of the following day what other units would be called up in the two-division package. He requested the Army to fashion a plan that listed the units and set forth the alert orders, and that would provide the necessary information to be passed on to the appropriate governors and members of Congress. No announcements would be made of the call-up until he gave his approval. The Secretary of Defense estimated that the package would include about 75,000 personnel and agreed that the men would not be called up until 15 October. Eventually, Mr. McNamara stated, he expected to replace the National Guard divisions with active Army divisions, but he had not yet made that decision. If this happened, he wanted the National Guard divisions to remain at 100 percent strength after demobilization. 17

17
(S) MR, sgd C.D.E., 18 Sep 61, in Appraisal of 1961 Army Build-Up, Incl. 5.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

The decision to send the 49th Armored Division to Fort Polk instead of Fort Hood and the substitution of the 32d Division for the 28th Division at the last moment meant that the Army staff had to work all night preparing the lists, the alert orders, and the notifications to the governors and the members of Congress.

18

See Intervs with Lt Col James J. Mullen, ACSRC, 14 Feb 62, and Lt Col Richard H. Ward, Jr., NGB, 15 Feb 62. According to the best available information, the decision to have the 49th Armored train at Fort Polk was made at a high political level; the substitution of the 32d Division for the 28th Division appears to have been made on the assumption that the 4th Infantry Division would leave Fort Lewis within several months and the 32d was closer to Fort Lewis than the 28th.

Since the mobilization stations and other assumptions in the earlier planning had been changed, the situation required the construction of a 2-division force list almost de novo. Certain units also had to be added for the operation of Fort Chaffee.

ODCSOPS, in presenting the type units to be called, based its calculations on the needs of CINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR. The planned force for initial deployment included a package of 49,293 men against a stated theater requirement. The units represented by the difference between this and the approximately 73,000-man force called were designed to provide the required augmentation of the 49,293-man force for sustained operations on the continent of Europe. It might be noted that the full 2-division force for this purpose calculated in DCSOPS,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

amounted to about 86,000 men and that the force actually called fell
19 somewhat short of this complete requirement.

19

(S) Memo, OPSOTORI, 28 Nov 61, sub: Mob of Selected RC Units,
in file furnished by Lt Col Brett, O&T, DCSOPS.

Thus, when ODCSOPS learned of the decision on 18 September, it informed the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components of the number of each type unit that would be called up. ACSRC in turn decided by using the Reserve Components Troop Basis whether the National Guard Bureau or the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, should provide the required units. The National Guard Bureau and CARROTC studied the CONARC reports on all units of the same type in order to evaluate the training status of each unit, the equipment that was available to it, and the number of technically trained personnel on its roster. Despite the fact that the CONARC reports were often more than 3 months old and out of date, there was no time to check the selections out carefully with CONARC or the local army or corps headquarters, since the list had to be in Mr. McNamara's office by noon on 19 September. After the units had been chosen, they were broken down by states and, as obvious inequities were spotted, comparable units from other states that had contributed less were substituted. ACSRC combined the NGB and CARROTC lists, DCSOPS prepared the necessary alert orders to the units, and NGB compiled telegrams that were to be sent to the governors and congressmen. By morning the task was finished, and General Eddleman had lists of 279 units with a full TOE strength of 79,456 men.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

The Vice Chief of Staff deleted 29 units reducing the total to 250 units and 72,746 men. Eighty-four of the units were National Guard and the remainder were Army Reserve.

20

20

Intervs with Lt Col Mullen, ACSRC, 14 Feb 62, and Lt Col Ward, NGB, 15 Feb 62. The copy of (S) memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 19 Sep 61, sub: Mobilization of Two Division Forces, CS 326 (19 Sep 61) contains Gen Eddleman's red-lined units in Incl 1.

Secretary Stahr forwarded the lists, along with drafts of alert messages and notification messages for the governors and congressmen to Mr. McNamara before noon. He pointed out that 947 men for a garrison detachment and a general hospital for Fort Chaffee would be ordered to duty on 1 October and would report to Chaffee no later than 9 October. Four other units, totaling 740 men, would report to Chaffee before 17 October to help operate the post. The 100th Division (Training), then assembling at Fort Polk, would be diverted to Chaffee as soon as practicable.

As for the other reserve units being called up, Secretary Stahr informed Secretary McNamara that they would be mobilized at home stations at actual strength, would receive initial processing, and then would proceed to their mobilization stations. Individual fillers from the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool would join assigned units at the mobilization stations. All units should be at full strength about five days after they reached their mobilization stations. The two National Guard divisions, Stahr continued, would be mobilized

-94

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

with 50 percent of their required equipment, brought to 80 percent when they reached company level training, and raised to 100 percent if deployed. This would necessitate accelerating production and deliveries, redistributing CONUS assets and depot stocks, taking equipment from lower priority Reserve Component units, and expediting the rebuilding of presently unserviceable assets.

To provide the additional services required by the expanded Army, 10,913 direct hire civilian employees would be needed, Mr. Stahr told Mr. McNamara, and substantial increases in the MPA, OMA, and PEMA accounts would be necessary.

In view of the desirability of informing the governors and congressmen involved before the press release, Secretary Stahr recommended that public release of the call-up be delayed 24 hours. ²¹ The Secretary of

21

(S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 19 Sep 61, sub: Mobilization of Two Division Forces CS 326, (19 Sep 61).

Defense turned down this recommendation and told Mr. Stahr that he was holding a press conference that day (19 September) at 1400, and that the Army could send out its messages after the conference got underway. Fortunately, the National Guard Bureau had prepared message tapes to be sent to the 33 governors and adjutants general concerned, and at 1400 the Army Communication Center and the Western Union lines began to send the alert messages out. To insure that the state officials would receive the news before the press and wireless news media announced it, 6 officers of the National Guard Bureau phoned the governors and their representatives directly. Some could not be reached and others did not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

receive the messages in time, however, and a number of complaints came back to the Army staff on the failure to give more advance warning on call-up. Many individuals learned about the call-up through public news media and besieged local Army headquarters, the Department of Army staff, and their congressmen with calls to verify the news release. The result was a good deal of confusion and some annoyance and resentment.

22

(1) (U) Memo, Maj Gen R. T. Nelson, Ch Sig Off, for SGS, 6 Nov 61, in DCS OPS O&T, Col Brett's File. (2) Intervs with Lt Col Mullen, ACSRC, 14 Feb 62, and Lt Col Ward, NGB, 15 Feb 62.

The haste with which the lists of units were drawn up and the failure to consult with field agencies in their preparation resulted in the call-up of some inappropriate units and in the misstationing of others. The CONARC report on which the Department of the Army agencies relied in determining the relative readiness of units was an annual

23

USCONARC Rpt, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces (RC), CSGPO-175.

one, but the 1960 report "failed to properly reflect deficiencies of units that came to light subsequent to their mobilization." Thus

24

(C) OPS OT 1, Comment No. 2, Maj Gen John A Heintges, Dir, O&T, DCSOPS, to ACSRC, 4 Jan 62, sub: Rev of Certain Actions Relating to the Expansion of the Army (U), in file furnished by Lt Col Brett, O&T, DCSOPS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
the supporting units mobilized were not always those in the highest state of readiness with regard to personnel strength, equipment, and state of training.

While the orders to active duty of units could not be changed once issued, many changes had to be made in the original list of mobilization stations. In general, the initial station list provided for assignment to mobilization stations envisaged in current Department of the Army mobilization planning, modified in many cases to reduce the expenses of movement. However, between the date of the announcement and the movement dates numerous recommendations for changes were received from CONARC and from the technical services. In assessing these recommendations, the Department of the Army had to consider:

- (1) the availability of facilities remaining after the prior build-up of RC forces and the increased draft training load,
- (2) the space required for mobilization station support forces,
- (3) the number of units at a given station that were scheduled for deployment and required replacement,
- (4) the need for training facilities and supervision, and
- (5) the requirement for stationing divisional support units in locations where they could carry out their functions.

25

(S) See Comments, DCSLOG to OCMH, 17 May 62, sub: Revision of Monograph, Mobilization of a Two Division National Guard Force - 1961, in OCMH files.

The technical services, in particular, had a number of problems in the selection and changing of final mobilization stations for their

~~SECRET~~

personnel. The Surgeon General, for example, presented a number of recommendations for restationing many of the 74 medical units recalled to duty. Since there was a continuing need for economies in Army management of professional medical manpower, he urged successfully that the units be stationed to meet the actual medical service requirements generated by the Army's expansion. These changes sought to insure maximum use of critical medical personnel, avoid unnecessary criticism from civilian sources, and, at the same time, preserve medical treatment capabilities in the CONUS hospital base, civilian and military, until the professional and technical medical skills were actually required for support of military operations.

The Chief of Engineers' desire to have many of his engineer units mobilize at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, could not be fulfilled because of the crowded conditions at that post. Although the station was a traditional engineer post and had excellent facilities for training engineer units and personnel, the increased draft had filled the station to capacity. There was little else that could be done other than divert the RC engineer units to less suitable stations and to promise the Chief of Engineers that if engineer units at Fort Leonard Wood were deployed in the future, the available space would be offered to RC engineer units.

26

(S) Comments, DCSLOG to OCMH, 17 May 62, sub: Revision of Monograph, Mobilization of a Two Division National Guard Force - 1961 in OCMH files.

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

A similar situation developed at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in relation to Signal Corps units. Operational plans for this installation would not allow the desired concentration of signal units there. ²⁷

27

(S) Ibid.

The over-all result of the various combinations of circumstances was that many shifts in the station list for the supporting units of the two-division force took place upon short notice with attendant confusion and loss of efficiency in some instances. ²⁸

28

(S) Draft Memo, DCSOPS for CofS, 16 Jan 62, sub: Rev of Certain Actions Relating to Expansion of the Army (C), in Back-Up File of Lt Col Brett. This memo was not sent.

The CONARC Board for Review of Mobilization Procedures later summed the matter up as follows:

The need for an augmentation force, responsive to the contingencies incident to the cold war or a limited war, has long been recognized. Headquarters USCONARC plan for Emergencies Short of General War has been in existence for several years. However, neither this plan nor the Mobilization plan were responsive to the need for augmentation of the Active Army during late 61. Consequently the mobilization and stationing of units without a prepared plan resulted in some imbalances, mal-stationing, and mobilization of inappropriate units ²⁹

29

(FOUO) Report of the USCONARC Board of Review of Mobilization Procedures, 31 Jan 62, Fact Sheet 3¹. Hereinafter cited as Freeman Board Rpt.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

During the current build-up, units were selected by Department of the Army with limited reference to this headquarters. This list of units to be alerted and proposed mobilization sites changed so often and rapidly that in many instances mobilization orders were issued simultaneously with receipt of proposed lists in this headquarters. As a result, certain units which were needed were not ordered; other units which were not required were mobilized; and units selected, in many instances, were not the most ready units available.³⁰

³⁰

(FOUO) Ibid., Fact Sheet 38.

In terms of the existing and very tentative deployment schedules, the units in the two-division force were expected to complete CONARC's Intensified Combat Training Program in 13 weeks, a compression of the normal 16-week training schedule. If not immediately deployed at the end of this period (1 February 1962), they would at once begin more advanced operational training since the 13-week ICTP was considered the minimum essential for operational readiness.³¹ CONARC was

³¹

(S) Memo, OPSOPORI, 28 Nov 61, sub: Mob of Selected RC Units, in Brett File, O&T, DCSOPS. The readiness date was later moved forward to 15 February to allow Christmas holiday leave time.

instructed to make an early appraisal of the status of personnel,³² equipment, and training of the National Guard divisions.

³²

Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build Up, II-A-10-11.

The Mechanization of the Three Infantry Divisions in Europe

At the beginning of FY 1962, the U.S. Army forces in Europe totaled

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

228,800 men. The first increase to be sent to Europe during the crisis was the 3,000 men for the mechanization of the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions. On 15 August Mr. McNamara directed that they be shipped as soon as possible. By adding 1,000 men and 110 M-113 armored personnel carriers (APC's) to each of the three divisions, the Army hoped to increase the mobility and striking power of General Clarke's forces. 33

33
(1) (S) MR, 7 Aug 61, sub: Support for Europe, Black Book, Vol. II, Tab H, Coord Gp Files. (2) (S) Memo, Sec Army for Sec Def, 15 Aug 61, GS 370, case 2.

There was, however, some difficulty in providing the necessary APC's, since USAREUR estimated that it would require almost 600 to meet current shortages and mechanize the three divisions. The DA planned to send 200 M-113's a month beginning in August, but this would mean that the full complement would not be on hand until November. 34

34
(S) Unsigned Paper, 15 Aug 61, sub: Availability of APC's to Meet USAREUR Requirements, Black Book, Tab HH, Coord Gp Files.

The scarcity of APC's in turn would not permit the 3,000-man addition to become completely effective until after November when the equipment arrived and was issued.

Working on this basis, DCSPER placed a levy on CONUS units on 8 August and made arrangements to send the 30 officers and 2,970 enlisted men to Europe in stages. The first group of 1,000 would be shipped by 15 September, and the entire force would be in Europe by 1 November.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This would be a permanent change ~~in the~~ but the Chief of Staff told DCSPER not to make provision for the movement overseas of the dependents of these men.³⁵ This action foreshadowed the ban on dependent travel

³⁵

1. (C) Fact Sheet, sgd Brig Gen Autrey J. Maroun, ca. 21 Aug 61, sub: Personnel Replacements for Mechanization of USAREUR Inf-Divs, Black Book, Tab PP, Coord Gp Files. 2. (C) Memo, SGS for DCSPER, 21 Aug 61, sub: Shipment of 3,000 Personnel, CS 370, case 2.

³⁶

to Europe imposed by the Secretary of Defense on 9 September.

³⁶

See Chapter II, above, and Chapter IX, below.

At first the Department of the Army had planned to send the 3,000 men by sea, but the sense of urgency in early September led to a consideration of accelerating the schedule. By shipping part of the augmentation by air, the whole group could be in Europe as early as 17 October. The costs of air travel would make the movement more expensive and there was also the possibility that the aircraft used might have to dead-head back from Europe. However, since the APC's would not be on hand, there seemed to be little reason for rushing all of the men to Europe. Some of the troops were taken by air transport, but the bulk of the shipment was sent by sea as originally planned and completed on 26 October.

The Provision of Fillers and Support Units for USAREUR

On 8 September Mr. Gilpatric had agreed to Army proposals for scheduling shipment of the fillers and nondivisional support units to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Europe. Of the 17,041 individual fillers to restore TOE line deletions in USAREUR units, approximately 12,041 were to be sent starting in late September and would arrive in Europe by 31 October; the remainder were expected to close in Europe by 15 December. Of the 19,091 personnel in supporting units, 15,000 - 16,000 would leave CONUS in late September and close in Europe before the end of October; another 1,000 - 2,000 would be scheduled for arrival about 15 December; and the remainder - 2,000 fillers - would go to Europe at the same time as the second
37
contingent.

37 (S) Memo, SGS for DC's of S, et al., 9 Sep 61, sub: Reinforcement of Europe, CS 320 Programs, case 18.

The bulk of the fillers would be drawn from posts, camps, and stations; the rest would come from the Army Air Defense Command, the Combat Developments Experimental Center, and STRAF back-up units. None would be taken from STRAC or the CONUS training base. The support units would also come from the active Army -- 15,370 men from STRAC sources,
38
3,383 from STRAF, and 357 from other sources.

38 (S) MR, Lt Col D. P. McAuliffe, Asst SGS, 8 Sep 61, sub: Step-up of Shipments for USAREUR, CS 370, case 2.

The nondivisional support units would travel by ship with their organizational equipment, but the 2,000 fillers would move by air on or about 1 December. The other individual fillers would journey by sea

-10-
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

and air, with maximum use of ships except where it would cause delays of more than 4 or 5 days in the arrival of the fillers in Europe.

39

DECLASSIFIED

39

(S) Ibid.

The main reason for deferring the shipment of part of the reinforcement force until later in the fall was to lessen the impact of an excessive levy upon CONUS units and functions. If the fillers were taken in September, there would be a number of undesirable results. Many MOS's requisitioned by USAREUR could not be provided nor could the grades requested be supplied, which would lead to the shipping of more overgrades than undergrades. Some soldiers would be removed from divisions in the process of being built up and the future fill of STRAF divisions, such as the 2d Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions, would be delayed. The levy would also affect post, station, and camp activities, would tend to lessen the capability of the training base at a time when draft calls were high, and would serve to slow the readiness preparations of the division forces scheduled for future shipment to Europe. The delay in sending the 2,000 personnel in nondivisional units would permit them to continue performing critical logistical support functions for CONUS units until the RC forces being called up could assume responsibility. Since the units selected to reinforce USAREUR were STRAC and high-priority STRAF units in a high state of readiness, they could be deployed and become operational without added fillers.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

40

(S) Summary Sheet, ODCSOPS for CofS, 18 Sep 61, Sub: Step-up of Reinforcements to USAREUR, CS 570, case 2.


On 11 September the Secretary of Defense questioned the need for deferring the shipment of the 2,000 men in nondivisional units, and the Army staff re-evaluated the situation. The staff concluded that all of these units could be deployed to close in Europe by 1 November. The 89 active Army units, which had been alerted on 9 September, arrived in Europe by 31 October. The individual fillers, except for 300 men with critical skills, moved in increments to Europe beginning ⁴¹ in late September and continuing on into December.

41

1. (S) Ibid. 2. (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, II, pp. A-6 - A-7.

In addition to the problems already mentioned, the shipment of individual fillers and units inflicted some hardships upon those selected because of the very short advance notice given to the men to arrange their personal affairs. The individual levy upon CONUS units, especially upon those not involved in the build-up, resulted in a concomitant lowering of their combat readiness. By taking the non-divisional units from STRAF, the Army was forced to lessen STRAC's capability to support many contingency plans. STRAC lost seventy units, while only 21 STRAF units could be added to STRAC as a partial reconstitution. Complete reconstitution could not be realized until the RC forces were recalled and became combat ready months later. Meanwhile, if elements of the STRAC had had to be deployed to meet a crisis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



elsewhere, not all of their support units would have been available
immediately.⁴²

⁴²

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, II, p. A-7.

The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

On 11 October the President had approved the deployment to Europe of the 3d Armored Cavalry, with a complement of 2,800 officers and men.⁴³ The Department of the Army immediately issued an alert order

⁴³

(S) Ibid., Incl. 7.

and followed it up with a movement directive on 12 October. It also instructed the regiment to turn in its M-41 and M-48A1 tanks for the newer M-48A2c model. The bulk of the replacement tanks would be shipped with the 3d Armored Cavalry to permit orientation enroute. The majority of personnel shortages created by removal of nondeployable individuals were filled from local resources before movement overseas.⁴⁴

⁴⁴

(S) Ibid., II, pp. A-14 - A-15.

The regiment's equipment began to move toward Europe on 24 October and an advance party flew over to prepare for its arrival on 4 November. Personnel began to move on 27 October and disembarked at Bremerhaven on 9 November. By 24 November the regiment had become operational in Kaiserslautern, Germany.⁴⁵




45

1. (S) Ibid. 2. (S) Hq, USAREUR, Annual Historical Report, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1961, p. 15.

To replace the 3d Armored Cavalry in the United States, the Department of the Army on 15 October changed the mobilization station of the 150th Armored Cavalry of the West Virginia Army National Guard from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Meade, Maryland. This was done to take advantage of the barracks left empty by the 3d Armored Cavalry and had the concurrence of the Commanding Officer, 150th Armored Cavalry, and the State Adjutant General of West Virginia. The STRAC mission of the 3d Armored Cavalry was assigned to Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division, until the 150th became combat ready.

46

(S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up, II, p. A-14.

The deployment of the 2,800 men of the 3d Armored Cavalry was accomplished with relative ease and no major problems were encountered in carrying out the move.

Caretaker and Maintenance Detachments

Although the provision of caretaker and maintenance detachments to watch over and service the equipment prepositioned in Europe was on a temporary rather than a permanent change of station basis, the detachments did form part of USAREUR's reinforcement during the fall of 1961. On 30 October the Secretary of Defense had set the total personnel

107-

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

authorization for these forces at 3,400 men. Since the equipment was to be positioned for the use of the 4th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions and ten support units, 2,700 caretaker and maintenance personnel were drawn from these units.

47

(S) Ibid., II, p. C-6.

In addition, there would be a port package of about 700 men to handle the arrival of the equipment and its transshipment to the locations selected for the prepositioning. Thus, the 3,400-man force was broken down as follows: 800 men from the 4th Infantry Division; 1,500 men from the 2d Armored Division; 400 men from the ten supporting units; and 700 men from the port package.

48

(S) Hq, USAREUR, Annual Historical Report, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1961, pp. 22 - 23.

The Liaison and Maintenance Detachment of the 4th Infantry Division sent an advance party to Europe on 25 October and the remainder of the detachment arrived on 5 November. The 2d Armored Division's advance reached Europe on 29 October and other members of the unit closed on 13 November. The support unit contingents were on hand by the end of November. All of the personnel in the caretaker and maintenance package were on temporary change of station status for a period of 180 days and were to be rotated thereafter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1. (S) Ibid. 2. (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up II, p. C-7.

By the end of December 1961 the bulk of the USAREUR reinforcement was on hand and operational. Nearly 45,000 additional personnel had been shipped during the last four months of the year, and plans had been prepared to send port and divisional units if the situation again became critical.

The following table is a summary of the expansion of USAREUR strength between 30 June 1961 and 1 September 1962.

Reinforcement of Europe

Program strength of 30 June 1961	228,800
Mechanization of three divisions	3,000
Fillers for TOE line deletions	16,900
STRAF nondivisional units	18,700
3d Armored Cavalry	2,800
Caretaker and Maintenance Detachments	3,400
Special Forces	200
	<u>273,800</u>
Miscellaneous losses	- 400
	<u>273,400</u>
Strength, 1 September 1962	

The 26th and 28th Infantry Divisions

Plans and preparations for deploying additional U.S. divisions to Europe "if and when" General Norstad wanted them gained momentum after the 18 September decision. Assuming that the 4th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions would be either in or enroute to Europe by 1 December,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the Army staff prepared for the call-up of the 26th and 28th Infantry Divisions on 15 November to replace them in CONUS.

50

(S) Memo, SGS for DC's of S, et al., 29 Sep 61, sub: Mobilization of Division Forces, CS 370, case 6.

To increase their training readiness, the two RC division forces underwent intensified training and took part in multiple drills during October. If they were mobilized, the 28th would assemble at Fort Hood and the 26th at Fort Stewart. On 20 October DCSOPS informed OSD that, with the exception of certain critical items, the two divisions could be mobilized with 50 percent of their required equipment, but there was no assurance that they could be furnished with 80 percent when they reached the maneuver training level. The demands on equipment for prepositioning in Europe and to continue to provide minimum essential training requirements for units not mobilized made the equipment situation very tight, DCSOPS went on, and it might be necessary to levy on low-priority units to outfit the two RC division forces. Under such circumstances, the low-priority units might not be able to maintain a satisfactory training status.

51

(S) Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. Heintges for OSD, 20 Oct 61, sub: 26th and 28th Inf Div Forces, Lt Col Brett's Backup File.

The deficiencies in equipment led General Powell to recommend in mid-November that the 26th and 28th Divisions not be ordered to active duty. Until sufficient equipment could be provided, the CONARC commander

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
maintained, the two divisions could not train properly. He urged that equipment from other ARNG units not scheduled for active duty be redistributed to the 26th and 28th Divisions.⁵²

⁵²
(S) Ltr, Gen Powell to Gen Eddleman, 16 Nov 61, no sub, CS 370 (16 Nov 61).

Although General Norstad refrained from asking for additional divisions during the fall of 1961, Mr. Ailes informed the Secretary of Defense on 17 November that the six-division reinforcement force could be deployed to Europe during the December 1961 - April 1962 period if it were needed. The 4th Infantry and 2d Armored could be sent in December, the 2d Infantry in January, the 1st Infantry in February, and the 32d Infantry and 49th Armored Divisions in April. No equipment shortages were anticipated for the first two-division force, Mr. Ailes continued, but the second would have some in its supporting units. As far as the RC units were concerned, withdrawals from RC units not mobilized would be necessary before the 32d and 49th Divisions could be deployed.⁵³

⁵³
(S) Memo, Ailes for Sec Def, 17 Nov 61, sub: Data on Army Capability to Deploy Divs to Europe, CS 370, case 10.

As necessity for calling up additional RC forces diminished in December and January, the Army developed plans for activating two active Army divisions, and the need for the 28th and 26th Divisions lessened. On 18 January Mr. Gilpatric told the President that it would not be desirable

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to call up the two additional RC divisions. If the 32d and 49th Divisions were released in October 1962, there would only be a gap of two months between their release and the readiness dates of the reactivated Army divisions. Such a small gap, Mr. Gilpatric felt, would not justify all the dislocations a mobilization of two more RC division forces would produce.⁵⁴

⁵⁴

(S) Memo, Dep Sec Def for President, 18 Jan 62, sub: Release of two NG Divs, CS 322 (15 Jan 62).

On 26 January the President agreed. Unless the international situation grew rapidly worse, the 26th and 28th Divisions would not have to be called up.⁵⁵ Eleven days later, on 6 February, the Secretary

⁵⁵

(S) Memo, Col Francis J. Roberts, Mil Asst, OSD, for CofS, 26 Jan 62, sub: Readiness Dates for New Army Divisions, CS 322 (26 Jan 62).

of Defense informed the Army that the additional drills authorized for the 26th and 28th Divisions would be discontinued, but that no publicity should be given the change in the training program.⁵⁶

⁵⁶

(S) Memo, Office U Sec Army, for CofS, 6 Feb 62, sub: Reserve Units Receiving Additional Drills.

With this move the 26th and 28th Divisions and supporting units resumed their pre-September status in the Reserve forces. Deployment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
plans for the six-division force, however, were still kept up to date in case a new emergency arose.

~~SECRET~~
Prepositioning of Equipment

On 11 October the President had approved the prepositioning of equipment for one armored and one infantry division in Europe. Mr. McNamara had already indicated on the 9th that he wished to preposition equipment for support elements as well, but he did not announce a final decision until 30 October. He authorized on this date the prepositioning of equipment and supplies for ten selected combat support units of a two-division force.⁵⁷

⁵⁷
(1) (S) Memo, Sec Def for Sec Army, SN, SAF, Chmn JCS, 11 Oct 61. (2) (S) Memo, Actg DCSLOG for CofS, 14 Oct 61, sub: Prepositioning Equipment in Europe, CS 400 (14 Oct 61) case 30. (3) (S) Memo, Brig Gen George S. Brown, Mil Asst, OSD, for Secs Svce Depts & Chmn JCS, 1 Nov 61, CS 400 (1 Nov 61) case 30. (3) AAA Rpt on Audit, 26 Feb 62, I-19.

All together, 101 units were needed to support the two divisions -- 45 for the 4th Infantry Division and 56 for the 2d Armored Division. For 91 of those the equipment was not to be prepositioned. They retained full STRAC readiness and would have moved to Europe if the divisions had been deployed. That would have left a time gap, between the time the divisions became operational in Europe and the time they were fully supported, of 24 days for units staging through east coast ports and 37 days for units staging through west coast ports. That

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 58
degree of risk was considered acceptable.

58

Summary Record, Army Commanders Conference, 29 Nov - 1 Dec 61, pp. 101 - 03, CS 337 ACC (9 Jan 62).

The decision to preposition the two division and ten support unit sets of equipment was intended to, and eventually did, create a capability to use the available airlift effectively and to provide CINCEUR with reinforcements quickly. On the other hand, the decision came on the heels of demands to bring STRAF units to full equipment readiness and to complete the equipping of two Reserve Component division forces, and it came before any additional assets had been realized from the expanded procurement and rebuild programs.

To provide the equipment for prepositioning, DCSLOG planned to draw the equipment for one armored division from the total resources available to CINCUSAREUR, including theater reserves but excluding forward depot stocks. CINCUSAREUR was directed to requisition for replenishment to authorized levels for theater stocks depleted by that action. The equipment for the infantry division was to be provided by shipping somewhat over 50 percent of the TOE equipment of the 4th Infantry Division from west coast ports to Europe, specifically that for three battle groups supported by artillery, armor, and combat engineers. The remaining equipment was to be provided from USAREUR resources, including forward depot stocks, and from CONUS depot stocks. The 4th Infantry Division was authorized to requisition replacement equipment up to 80 percent of TOE. Certain items in critical short

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
supply, such as communications equipment, were to be drawn from Reserve Component units. In order of priority the sources of equipment were:

- (1) USAREUR theater stocks, (2) the 4th Infantry Division (for its requirements), (3) CONUS depot stocks, (4) low-priority Reserve units, (5) high-priority Reserve units, (6) active Army units.

59

(1) (S) Memo, Maj Gen Ralph C. Cooper, Actg DCSLOG, for CofS, 10 Oct 61, sub: Sources of Prepositioned Equipment for One Infantry and One Armored Division, CS 400 (10 Oct 61), case 30. (2) (S) AAA Rpt on Audit, 26 Feb 62, App E-4, p. 6. (3) (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, II-C-6.

Shipments from CONUS for the two divisions began on 20 October, and 56 shiploads totaling 48,510 long tons arrived in European ports between 20 November and 1 December. Shipments from CONUS for the support units began on 21 November and were in Europe by 16 December. The

60

(1) (S) Hq USAREUR, After Action Rpt on Prepositioning for a Two Division Force, CS 400, case 21. (2) (S) Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-up, II-C-6.

equipment prepositioned totaled 76,000 short tons -- 27,000 tons for the 4th Infantry Division and 49,000 tons for the 2d Armored Division.

61

(S) Summary Record, Army Commanders Conference, 29 Nov -- 1 Dec 61, p. 101, CS 337 ACC (9 Jan 62).

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 17 October, in connection with the decision to preposition equipment and supplies for a 2-division force, CINCUSAREUR was authorized to submit requisitions for necessary additional ammunition. On 21 October he was authorized to submit requisitions to increase ration reserve stocks from 60 days of supply for a 5-division force to 60 days of supply for a 7-division force.

CINCUSAREUR submitted two requisitions for ammunition, one for 64,000 tons and one for 43,000 tons. The two covered stocks to provide balanced ammunition support for a 7-division force for 120 days. Shipment of the 64,000 tons was completed on 20 November. Shipment of the 43,000 tons was suspended on 30 October in accordance with a decision by the Secretary of Defense to limit ammunition supply for the additional two divisions to 60 days of supply.

Final prepositioning on site in Europe was not completed on 7 December as scheduled. However, by that date CINCUSAREUR considered that he was prepared to accept Exercise LONG THRUST at any time and to support deployment for the two division forces from over-all USAREUR resources should such deployment become necessary before 1 January 1962. After 1 January the prepositioning would be virtually complete, lacking only a few items in short supply.

62

(S) Ibid., II-C-7 and 9.

By mid-April the Army had replaced the first caretaker units with other detachments from the 2d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions. Since the need for prepositioning the equipment had not altered in the

-116-

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

meantime and since LONG THRUST-type air mobility exercises were to be held approximately every 90 days in the foreseeable future, it appeared that the equipment and caretaker units would remain in Europe indefinitely. Under the circumstances, the DA decided in mid-May to constitute the equipment so that it would neither lose its identity nor be offered to allies. Effective on 1 July 1962 CINCUSAREUR was given full responsibility for maintaining the equipment in an operational status. Initially he would organize the caretaker forces from his own resources, but later he would be allowed to retain additional spaces above his programmed strength to carry out the maintenance mission. This action would relieve the Department of the Army of the necessity of rotating units every six months and save \$2 million in TDY funds and transportation costs on each rotation. The detachments from the 2d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions would remain in Europe until LONG THRUST IV was completed and the new USAREUR caretaker units were organized, then they would be returned to CONUS as quickly as possible.

63

- (1) (S) SS, Col Thurston T. Paul, DCSLOG, for CofS, 11 May 62, sub: Disposition of Prepositioned Equipment, CS 400, case 22.
- (2) (S) Msg, DA to CINCUSAREUR and CGCONARC, 15 May 62, CS 400, case 22.

The 4th Infantry Division and the 10 supporting units would be re-equipped to a level permitting STRAC employment. At the same time the Army would retain a capability of reinforcing Europe quickly with two divisions and ten supporting units in an emergency. If the two-division force were deployed to Europe, its equipment could be left

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in CONUS to equip ARNG Army Reserve units that might be called to
64
active duty.

64
(S) SS Col Thurston T. Paul, DCSLOG, for CofS, 11 May 62,
cited above.

The costs for prepositioning the 2 division and 10 combat support unit sets were \$19.3 million for prepositioning all equipment, \$14.2 million for filling the Theater Reserve No. 1 (TR 1 - Europe) to authorized levels for 5 divisions and to provide 60 days of war reserve support for 2 additional divisions, and \$6.9 million for re-equipping the 4th Infantry Division and 10 combat support units to a level
65
permitting STRAC employment.

65
(S) Ibid.

Build-Up of Special Warfare Forces

Mr. Kennedy recognized early that armed insurgency was a major form of politico-military conflict. So did Mr. Khrushchev. Speaking on 6 January 1961, Khrushchev stated that there were three kinds of wars - world wars, local wars, and wars of liberation or popular uprisings. He intimated strongly that henceforth the Communists would forego the first two categories and concentrate on the wars of liberation. "We recognize such wars. We help and will help the people striving for
66
independence."

Unless otherwise cited, the following narrative is based on:

- (1) (S) Study, Compilation of U.S. Army Cold War Activities, 1 January 1961 to 26 January 1962, 2 February 1962, prepared by Coord Gp, OCS;
- (2) (U) Pamphlet, Special Warfare, U.S. Army, undated; (3) (S) U.S. Army Special Warfare Study and Program, FY-63-68, DCSOPS.

To meet this obvious and open challenge, the U.S. Army began early in 1961 to strengthen its special warfare capabilities. The primary wartime mission of the Army Special Warfare Forces is to organize, equip, train, support, and control guerrilla forces and to conduct guerrilla warfare in support of conventional military operations. The men selected for special warfare training are subjected to intensive instruction in language and foreign areas and have to possess specialized military skills. Potentially, one small special warfare detachment could organize, train, and direct a guerrilla or counter guerrilla force many times its own size.

At the beginning of 1961 there were 2,564 men in the U.S. Army Special Warfare Forces assigned to three Special Warfare Forces groups, two psychological warfare battalions, two psychological warfare companies, and the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. The 7th Special Forces Group, the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion, and the 1st Psychological Warfare Company were stationed at Fort Bragg; the 1st Special Forces Group and the 14th Psychological Warfare Battalion were at Okinawa; and the 10th Special Forces Group and the 5th Psychological Warfare Company were located in Germany.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The typical Special Warfare Forces group is organized into operational "A" detachments (2 officers and 10 enlisted men) and command and control detachments (6 officers and 18 enlisted men). The 7th Special Forces Group in mid-1961, for example, had 21 "A" detachments operationally committed, 6 training for commitment, 4 available for commitment, and 17 in the earlier stages of training. Command and control personnel to take care of these detachments were also available.

In presenting his FY 1962 budget to Congress, President Kennedy had asked for \$19 million and 3,000 spaces to expand the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency forces. This action would more than double the Army Special Warfare strength. On 28 March 1961, the 3,000 spaces were approved, of which 1,400 were allocated to STRAF, 1000 to USARPAC, 400 to the Special Warfare Training Center, and 200 to USAREUR. The new spaces were used not only for special warfare and psychological warfare troops, but also for related activities such as intelligence, Army Security Agency, civil affairs, engineer, and training support.

The growing emphasis on special warfare led to gradual increases in the number and strength of the units assigned to the activity. On 21 September 1961, a fourth group - the 5th Special Forces Group - was organized at Fort Bragg and on 15 November the 13th Psychological Warfare Battalion was activated at the same post. The training of the Special Warfare Forces required a relatively long period of time, and a highly publicized campaign to attract volunteers was developed by ODCSOPS and carried out successfully.

Under the Army's concept at the end of 1961, four basic counterinsurgency forces would be developed, each oriented toward a specific

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

area -- Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa south of the Sahara, Europe and the Middle East. Each counterinsurgency force would have a basic strength of 1,588 men and would include a special forces group (1,262), a psychological warfare company (58), an ASA detachment (44), a civil affairs detachment (86), an engineer detachment (25), a military intelligence detachment (47), and a medical detachment (66).

On 19 January 1962 Brig. Gen. William B. Rosson was named Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare Activities. A Directorate of Special Warfare was established in ODCSOPS and the Special Warfare Center was removed from Third Army control and placed directly under CONARC in January, emphasizing the growing importance attached to special warfare developments.

One of General Rosson's first actions was to have a study group assess the future requirements of Special Warfare Forces in terms of men, equipment, and support. The study group concluded that the activities would require greater expansion than had been planned. Instead of 7,683 men at the end of FY 1963, the study group recommended an increase to 9,453 men by that date. ⁶⁷ In the summer of 1962 an

67

(S) Chart, Proposed Phasing of Forces (By Quarter) for FY 62, updated 10 May 62, Counterinsurgency Expansion; (S) Chart, Implementation of New Special Warfare Progra, End FY 63 Posture and Space Authorizations Incl 1 to Incl 1, Activations, Deployment and Buildup, U.S. Army Special Warfare Program, FY 63 - 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

augmentation of 1,300 spaces for Special Warfare Forces was approved⁶⁸ and the authorized strength stood at 6,897 men on 28 August.

68

DCSOPS Comments on subject study, 1 Nov 62, in OCMH files.

The following chart illustrates the strength and location of special warfare and related units at the end of 1961 and in the middle of 1962.

SPECIAL FORCES UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>31 Dec 61 Asgd Str</u>	<u>30 June 62 Auth Str</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st SFG	668	1,223	Okinawa
5th SFG	525	1,019	Fort Bragg
7th SFG	1,111	1,466	Fort Bragg
10th SFG	406	456	Germany
TOTAL	2,710	4,164*	

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>31 Dec 61 Asgd Str</u>	<u>30 June 62 Auth Str</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Psywar Bn (B&L)	298	228	Fort Bragg
13th Psywar Bn (B&L)	52	82	Fort Bragg
14th Psywar Bn (B&L)	104	207	Okinawa
1st Psywar Co (I&L)	91	97	Fort Bragg
5th Psywar Co (I&L)	77	114	Germany
USA B&VA (TD)	115	116	Okinawa
TOTAL	737	844	

~~SECRET~~
-122-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>31 Dec 61 Asgd Str</u>	<u>30 June 62 Auth Str</u>	<u>Location</u>
HHC	234	192	Fort Bragg
Training Group	0	192	Fort Bragg
SW School	<u>119</u>	<u>205</u>	Fort Bragg
TOTAL	<u>353</u>	<u>589</u>	
GRAND TOTAL	<u>3,800</u>	<u>5,597</u>	

*Includes medical, civil affairs, engineer, intelligence, Army Security Agency, and psychological warfare detachments augmented to special forces groups.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~