

American Effort in France

REPORT OF THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FRENCH ARMIES
OF THE NORTH AND NORTH-EAST
ON THE
OPERATIONS IN 1918.

THE OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN
(18th July---11th November)

III Part.

MONTDIDIER-NOYON OFFENSIVE
AND
THE ADVANCE TOWARD THE
HINDENBERG POSITION
(1st August---15th September)

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NOTE

CONCERNING THE DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE ENEMY ARMIES

Matters concerning the enemy armies will be found:

1st In the maps on "The General Situation", joined to the present IIIrd Part, Nos. 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, showing the disposition of the enemy first lines facing our attacking armies on the 30th of July, the 6th, 12th, 18th, 24th and 30th of August, and the 6th and 12th of September---(disposition such as it was presumed to be on these dates).

2nd. In the annexes: a) Nos. 168, 210, 240, 268, showing the disposition of the German divisions on the Western Front on the 10th, 20th, and 31st of August, and the 10th of September---(distribution such as it was presumed to be on these dates);
 --b) No. 225, table, as of the date of the 26th of August, showing the enemy divisions engaged in the operations of July and August;
 --c) No. 249, a note, dated September 4th, on the morale of the German army;--d) No. 272, a note, dated 14th of September, on the situation of the German army on the 1st of September.

CHAPTER VII

PREPARATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE TOWARD THE REGION OF
MONTDIDIER

PROJECT FOR THE EXTENSION OF THIS OFFENSIVE TOWARD
THE REGION OF NOYON.

(21st July-----8th August)

I

Retrospective view of the projects for an offensive
toward Montdidier (April--May)

Summary of the evolution and the extension of these
projects (21st July--8th August)

II

Organization of the attacks of the 1st army, and
concentration of the effectives and matériel
(21st July--7th August)

III

Organization of the attack of the IIIrd army
(5th--9th August)

IV

First dispositions in view of an attack by the
Xth army (8th August)

I

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE PROJECTS FOR AN OFFENSIVE TOWARD MONTDIDIER (April--May)

In Chapter II the genesis of the first projects for an offensive toward Montdidier have been outlined: the relief of Amiens and of the Amiens railways was to have been effected by the combined actions of the IIIrd French army, on the one hand, and of the Ist French army and the IVth British army on the other.

In the early consideration of these projects, on the 26th of May(1),

I. See again, in Annexes I--II, General Petain's secret and personal Instruction, No. 32,964, of the 26th of May; and, in the maps joined to the Ist Part, map No. 2.

the principal effort was to fall upon the IIIrd army, charged with enveloping Montdidier from the east, by first occupying the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif; the Ist army, although disposing of less numerous forces, was also to develop an important attack and, starting from the front of la Luce, was to advance toward the plateaux of Santerre in order to envelop Montdidier from the north.

The British were to have the mission of prolonging the action of the Ist army by occupying the plateaux to the east and south-east of Villers-Bretonneux.

Summing up, in the conception of this operation, the principal mass of attack was placed furthest from the enemy mass which, during the months of April and May, had been oriented toward the British front.

But, while the Allied and French High Commands were making these dispositions, the German High Command suddenly displaced the mass of its forces and applied them offensively against the French fronts on the Aisne (27th of May) and the Oise (9th of June).

The project for an offensive toward Montdidier was abandoned for the moment:

---First, because our available resources were absorbed in the defensive battle (27th May--11th June);

---Second, because circumstances enabled us to use all the reserves we were able to get together in a counter-offensive (11th June--18th July).

RESUMPTION OF THE PROJECT OF AN OFFENSIVE
TOWARD MONTDIDIER (11th July---26th July)

(See Maps Nos. 19 and 28)

By the 21st of July, the Chateau-Thierry--Soissons offensive had already obtained considerable results.

The attrition of the enemy was very marked. The American army had landed nearly a million men in France, and these forces were fighting brilliantly by the side of the French army. The British army was *rested* and *reorganized*.

In view of these circumstances, General Foch decided to take up again the project of an offensive toward Montdidier: it would thus be possible to relieve Amiens and the Amiens railways---while the counter-offensive in course of execution between the Aisne and the Marne would result in relieving Chateau-Thierry and the Paris-Nancy-Avrincourt railway.

These are the operations which were imperative in the beginning in order to permit the development of all future large scale offensives.

But, contrary to the projects which had been laid down in April and May, it now appeared advantageous to consider making the principal effort initially to the north of the Montdidier salient.

In effect, one would thus be able:

---To take advantage of the good material and moral condition of the British army.

---To assemble the mass of attack furthest from the enemy mass, which was wholly directed toward the Marne front.

Before committing his intentions to written form, General Foch

ordered the Commander in Chief of the French armies (1) to move

I. General Foch, General Order No. 2257 of the 21st of July; see Part II, Annex No. 84.

some of the reserves toward the left and the centre of the Group of Armies of the Reserve. (G. A. R.)

This measure rested upon considerations of a defensive nature-- but the Commanders-in-Chief of the French and British Allied forces were already in agreement as to the principle of the matter: it was a question of preparing for the coming British offensive, of placing again at the disposition of Marshal Haig, for the purpose of this offensive, ~~all~~ all the forces which he had detached in the French zone and of rendering possible the collaboration, in the offensive, of the 1st French army.

The General-in-Chief, in consequence, ordered the movement toward the left of the Group of Armies of the Reserve (G. A. R.) of Divisions ^{to be} ~~being~~ withdrawn from the battle of Chateau Thierry (2).

2. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), telegram No. III5--III6 of the 21st of July: See Part II, Annex No. 85.

Then, having received from General Foch the Memorandum setting forth the offensive plans in detail (3), the General-in-Chief

3. General Foch, letter No. 2374, of the 24th of July, enclosing copy of the memorandum read at the meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the 24th of July. See Annex No. 124.

confirmed in writing that he was in agreement concerning the following projects:

---Continuation of the offensive now going on to the north of the Marne;

--Combined action, as soon as possible, between the British and French armies to the east of Amiens;

---Finally, an American attack (with collaboration of French troops) to reduce the Saint Mihiel salient, and a British attack to reduce the Armentières salient.

SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION AND OF THE EXTENSION OF THE PROJECT
(27th July--8th August) (See Maps Nos. 19 and 28).

General Debeney, placed under the orders of Marshal Haig, arranged, starting from the 28th of July, the details of the operations which he was to undertake toward the north of Montdidier for the purpose of relieving Amiens.

From the 1st of August, the XXXVth Corps--the Corps on the left of the IIIrd army--was attached to the 1st army.

General Debeney, despite the scarcity, in total, of the means at his disposition, decided then to undertake a more complete operation intended to overlap Montdidier not only from the north, but also from the south: the latter mission was intrusted to the XXXVth corps.

On the 5th of August, General Fayolle---foreseeing the effects that would follow upon the Franco-British offensive--prepared for the intervention of the IIIrd army to the right of the 1st, for the purpose of bringing about the capture of the whole of Little Switzerland (la petite Suisse), to the south of Noyon, by counter-coup. (3)

I. General Fayolle, Order No. 3729, of the 1st of August.

Finally, on the 8th of August, the General-in-Chief ordered that the Xth army should place itself in readiness to prolong the offensive of the IIIrd and 1st, so as to occupy the plateaux to the south of the Oise and the Ailette, thus obliging the enemy to evacuate his lines of the Aisne and of the Vesle.

Thus, the French High Command--each echelon following its own initiative and within the limits of its means--saw on a larger and larger scale, and was progressively more minded to prepare, a manoeuvre of exploitation common to the two offensives of Chateau-Thierry--Soissons and of Montdidier--Noyon.

In the following pages will be set forth in detail the preparation of these three Army attacks: however, with respect

to the 1st army--which was acting under the British command until the 16th of August--the account will be limited to such matters as bear upon the entirety of the French manoeuvre, the origin of which has just been indicated.

II

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACKS OF THE 1st ARMY

(End of July--7th August) (See Maps Nos. 19 and 28)

After the offensive projects of April and May, General Debeney never lost sight of the eventuality of an attack by the 1st army on the plateaux of Santerre to the north-east of Montdidier. His idea of manoeuvre was ^{the} ~~the~~ following: the day on which the attack was to be begun, ^{the army} ~~it~~ should start from the front of la Luce, attaining as its first objective the plateaux between Moreuil and Villers-aux-Erables and, thus, bring about the fall of the defences of the Avre at the level of Moreuil.

For the purpose of preparing for this manoeuvre, the Commander of the Army proposed at first:

---to throw back as far as the Avre the enemy troops which, since the end of March, had been clinging to the plateaux of Mailly-Raineval, Aubvillers, Cantigny;

---to push forward his artillery as close as possible to the Avre, in order to be able to direct heavy fire against the plateaux of the right bank and to strike in the rear, or to enfilade the enemy elements which resist our attack developing from la Luce.

All the detailed actions engaged in by the 1st army since the month of April were the progressive realization of these preliminary measures, as follows:

---recapture of Senecat wood by the 18th Division (Zone of the XXXIst Army Corps), on the 18th of April;

---~~Capture~~ capture of Parc de Grivesnes by the 152nd. Division (Zone of the IXth ~~Army~~ Corps) on the 9th of May;

---taking of Cantigny by the 1st American Infantry Division (Zone of the Xth Army Corps) on the 28th of May;

---Occupation of Castel, of the Gros-Hêtre Woods and of the Anchin Farm, to the north-west and west of Moreuil, by the 66th Infantry Division and the 15th Colonial Infantry Division (Zone of

the IXth Army Corps), on the 12th of July.

On the 23rd of July, foreseeing the imminence of the offensive due to be carried out by the 1st Army, General Debeney had the 15th Colonial Infantry Division, the 3rd Infantry Division and the 152nd Infantry Division (Zones of the IXth and Xth Army Corps) execute a more important operation: our troops took the villages and plateaux of Mailly-Raineval, Sauvillers and Aubvillers, capturing more than 1,800 prisoners, many cannon and considerable matériel.

The enemy, as a result of this attack, got ready to evacuate the left bank of the Avre: he drew back from the 3rd to the 5th of August, only retaining a few advanced points to the west of Montdidier.

On the 29th of July, the 1st army received from Marshal Haig the sketch of a joint-action plan for the Franco-British offensive:

---to relieve Amiens and the Amiens railway;

---to attain, first, the line Mericourt--Harbonnières--Caix--Quesnel--Hangest-en-Santerre;

---to push forward the IVth British army, with its left resting on the Somme, in the general direction of Chaulnes;

---to push forward the 1st French army, supporting its right on the Avre, in the general direction of Roye.

General Debeney gave his orders on the 31st of July to the XXXIst, IXth and Xth Army Corps (1), and on the 3rd of August to the XXXVth Army Corps (2), which he relieved from his command as of August 1st (3).

1. General Debeney, Instructions Nos. 520 to 524, of the 31st of July, for the XXXIst, IXth and Xth Army Corps. See annexes Nos. 127 to 131.

2. General Debeney, Instruction No. 540, of the 3rd of August, for the XXXVth Army Corps. See Annex No. 134.

3. The XXXVth Corps (with the 169th and 133rd Infantry Divisions) had been reattached to the 1st Army by General Order No. 3729 of the 1st of August, from the Commanding General of the G.A.R., because an alteration in the group of boundaries between the armies of the G.A.R.

A summary of these orders is given below, for the purpose of showing how, by progressive extension, the preparation for the Franco-British attack gave origin to the preparation for the French attack:

a) To the north, the XXXIth Army Corps, departing from the base of la Luce, will capture the heights between Moreuil and Villers-aux-Erables, and will develop its attack, as quickly as possible, in the direction of Hangest-en-Santerre, and later, of Arvillers and of Roye.

b) In the Center, the IXth Army Corps will force the crossings of the Avre toward Braches and will form, to the east of Braches, a bridge-head for the purpose of assuring the deployment of the Xth Army Corps.

c) To the south (that is to say, immediately to the north of Montdidier) the Xth Army Corps will deploy on the right bank of the Avre toward Pierrepont and to the north, by utilizing on its left the bridge-head of the IXth Army Corps, then it will pass through the IXth Army Corps; it will directly join the XXIst Army Corps in the direction of the plateau of Hangest and will have the mission of constantly covering the right of the XXXIst Army Corps.

The IXth Corps will pass into reserve as soon as the Xth Corps shall have passed through it.

d) These operations will be supported by artillery placed, before the attack, as far forward as possible, but which, in order not to attract the attention of the enemy, will not take up positions except during the nights from the 5th to the 8th of August.

Two groupements of ^{Army} heavy artillery (north and south) will be respectively at the disposition of the XXXIst and IXth Corps.

The IXth and the Xth Army Corps should each hold itself in readiness to support with its heavy artillery the attacks of the Army Corps of the north (the heavy artillery of the IXth Corps the attacks of the XXXIth Corps;---the heavy artillery of the Xth Corps the attacks of the IX Corps.)

In principle, the attacks will be initiated after ## a short

and violent artillery preparation.

e) Finally, the Instruction of the 3rd of August assigns to the XXXVth Army Corps the mission of pushing an attack to the south of Montdidier, in the direction of Assainvillers and Faverolles; it will have been ready to go into action on the day J-plus-I "with at least two regiments and all the artillery it can secure", ---one Artillery Division will be given to it as supplement.

CONCENTRATION OF THE EFFECTIVES OF THE 1st ARMY

(End of July--7th of August) (See Maps Nos. 19 and 20)

On the 21st of July, General Foch perceived the necessity of returning to the disposition of the British High Command the different units which, detached from the British Army, were in the French zone.

As a result, during the final days of July;

---the Army Group of the Center (G.A.C) retired from the front of the Vth Army, and sent on to destination the XXIInd British Army Corps (51st and 62nd Divisions). (1)

---The Group of Armies of the Reserve (G.A.R.) retired from the front of the Xth Army, and sent on to destination, the 15th and 34th British Divisions. (2)

(General Headquarters, Bureau 3),

1. General Petain, /cypher telegram No. 1493, of July 30th.

2. General Petain (General Headquarters, 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 1557, of August 1st.

---the 1st Army knew that, from the arrival of the French units which have been announced to it, it ^{would} ~~###~~ not be able longer to depend upon the IXth British Army Corps (18th and 12th Divisions) which, about the middle of July, had been placed as a reserve of precaution behind its left, in the region Picquigny-Amiens-Conty.

At the same time that it was thus losing the effective or eventual collaboration of six British divisions, the French command was obliged to take care to direct toward the 1st Army

the units which were necessary to it for its operations.

It would be able to depend, in almost their totality, only upon units coming out of battle and not reorganized (only the 56th Infantry Division, previously levied from the Army Group of the East (G. A. E.), being fresh):

---the 1st Moroccan Division arrived in trucks from the Xth Army on the 22nd (1);

---the 153rd Infantry Division arrived in trucks from the Xth Army on the 23rd (2);

---the 47th Infantry Division began to arrive by rail from the Vth Army on the 28th (1);

---the 56th Infantry Division began to arrive by rail from the Army Group of the East on the 1st of August (2);

---the Non-Divisional Elements of the XXXVth Corps began to arrive by rail from the G.A.E. on the 1st of August (3);

---the IIth Cavalry Corps, ~~arrived~~, on the 4th of August, reached by marches the region of Conty--Froissy--Beauvais (4);

---The Aeronautic Division concentrated on the 6th and 7th of August:

P. C. of the Commander of the Aeronautic Division
at Nivillers;

1st Brigade (Squadrons 1 and 12) near Beauvais;

2nd Brigade (Squadrons 2 and 13) near Ermenonville;

---Two Battalions of light tanks (the 9th of the 503rd and the IIth of the 504th) detrained on the 6th of August, coming, the first, from the Vth Army and the second from the Camp de Mailly(5).

1. General Fayolle, cypher telegrams Nos. 108 of the 21st, 113 of the 22nd, and 120 of the 24th of July: already seen in Chapter V.

2. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 1432 of the 28th of July.

3. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 1449 of the 29th of July.

4. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No.

I620 of the 3rd of August.

5. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. I57I and I58I of the 2nd of August.

The 1st Army had at its disposition the above mentioned effectives in accordance with their arrival: however, the 126th Infantry Division replaced after the 2nd of August the 1st Moroccan Division, which passed into the general reserve in the zone of Saint-Just-en-Chaussée, for the purpose of there being reorganized. (I)

I. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No I597 of the 2nd of August.

From the 5th to the 7th, General Debeney decided upon his instructions, and issued them:

a) The withdrawal of the enemy on the Avre ^{does} ~~not~~ not modify the plan of manoeuvre of the Army: the Army Corps will endeavor to hasten and to develop their advance more rapidly along the right bank of the Avre. (2)

b) The XXXVth Corps--reinforced by the 46th Infantry Division and 7 groupements of heavy artillery by order of the Commanding General of the Group of Armies of the Reserve (G.A.R) (3)--- will prepare for the day J-plus-I a more important manoeuvre than the one at first planned for it, and will take as objectives, successively, Assainvillers, Faverolles, Bus, Tilloloy, Beauvraignes, with the mission of covering the right of the Army and of assuring liaison with the IIIrd Army.

2. General Debeney, Instruction No. 550, of the 5th of August, to the XXXIst, IXth, Xth and XXXVth Army Corps. See Annex No. I38.

3. General Debeney, Instruction No. 2995, of the 5th of August, for the XXXVth Corps: further on, the motives which led the Commanding General of the G.A.R. thus to reinforce the right of the 1st Army will be indicated. See Annex No. I39.

c) The attacks will take place on the 8th.

The artillery preparation will begin at H hour.

The XXXIst Corps will attack at H plus 45 minutes.

The IXth Corps will attack at H plus 4 hours.

The Xth as quickly as the progress of the IXth will permit.

The XXXVth, when the Army Commander gives it the order to do so, in all probability^{on}/the 9th (of August).

"The attacks will be pushed and continued until nightfall. It is necessary to make as great an advance as possible from the very first day. I approve in advance of all acts of initiative, whatever may be the result." (I)

d) The cavalry will be prepared to intervene from the moment that communications have been reestablished--its intervention in the early stages of the attack having for object only the discovery whether the enemy had evacuated his positions and ~~##~~^{was} trying to break contact. (2)

I. General Debenay, General Order No. 562, of the 6th of August. See Annex No. I40.

2. General Debeney, Instruction No. 564, of the 7th of August, for the IInd Cavalry Corps. See Annex No. I44.

The 6th Cavalry Division will be assembled to the north, in the region of Guyencourt, in order to profit by the bridges of Castel and Moreuil as soon as they have been repaired.

The main body of the 2nd Cavalry Corps will assemble in the region of Beauvais--Saint-Just in order to be ready to exploit the Montdidier breach as soon as the town has been relieved.

e) The Instructions to the Air Service prescribed:

---that the missions of observation, liaison and close reconnaissance should fall to the escadrilles belonging to the Corps and to the Army, under the protection of the I2th Combat Group (Army Combat Group), of the I6th Combat Group (Combat Group of the G.A.R.) and of one Combat Group to be furnished daily by the Aeronautic Division;

---that distant missions, attacks on the enemy reserves,

and bombardments should be assured by the Aeronautic Division. (I)

I. General Debeney, Instruction No. 3050, of the 7th of August. See Annex No. I46.

During the night of the 7th-8th, the 1st Army

Army Reserves		Army Corps		Various elements of the army Corps	1st Line Divisions	2nd Line Divisions
Various	Divisions					
Corps and Army Troops XXVI th Corps	47 th Inf. Div. 6 th Cav. Div.	XXXI th A.C. (P.C. at Ailly-sur-Noye).		69 batteries of field artillery 48 batteries of short range heavy artillery 37 batteries of long range heavy artillery 3 Escadrilles 3 balloons	126 153 (and 2 battalions of light tanks).	42 37 66
Corps and Army Troops II nd Cav. Corps	56 th Inf. Div.	IX th Corps (P.C. at La Faloise).		8 batteries of trench artillery 45 batteries of field artillery 24 batteries of short range heavy artillery 39 batteries of long range heavy artillery 4 Escadrilles 3 balloons		15 th Colonial Infantry Division 3 rd
Two 340 mm. Guns 3 Reconnaissance Escadrilles	2 nd Cav. Div.	X th Corps (P.C. at Breteuil).		27 batteries of field artillery 16 batteries of short range heavy artillery 13 batteries of long range heavy artillery 3 Escadrilles 2 balloons		152 166 60
3 Escadrilles of heavy artillery Escadrille of large calibre heavy artillery	4 th Cav. Div.	XXXV th Corps (P.C. at Ansouvillers).		54 batteries of field artillery 16 batteries of short range heavy artillery 16 batteries of long range heavy artillery 5 Escadrilles 3 balloons	46	169 133
Combat Group 12 Combat Group 16 Bombardment Group 8 Bombardment Group 10 Aeronautic Division						

III

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACK OF THE IIIrd ARMY (5th--8th August) (See maps Nos. 20 and 28)

At the beginning of August, the IIIrd Army comprised, in its territory, only divisions which had been serving in the front lines for a considerable period, or divisions which had just drawn out of battle:

G.A.R. RESERVES or G.H.Q. RESERVES	ARMY RESERVES	ARMY CORPS	DIVISIONS IN LINE
58th Inf. Div	I Inf. Div.	XXXIVth	129th 165th 6th 121st
5th Inf. Div.			
46th Inf. Div.		XVth	74th 123rd 67th
70th. Inf. Div.		XVIIIth (I) (E. bank of the Oise)	38th 15th

General Fayolle was of the opinion that this Army ought to place itself in readiness to enter upon active operations, since the

I. The XVIIIth Corps had been reattached to the IIIrd Army by General Order No. 3729 of the 1st of August, from the Commanding General of the G.A.R.--an order which relieved from the IIIrd Army the XXVth Corps and transferred it to the 1st Army.

Franco-British offensive might result in giving to the battle, in the French field, a considerably greater extension, destined to:

- "1st, Cause the fall of the Avre line;
- "2nd, Reoccupy Montdidier;
- "3rd, Cause the fall of la Petite Suisse by manoeuvring toward the north, or at least to prepare ^{the way} for this

manoeuvre by the occupation of the Rollot-Roye line." (1)

In order to prepare for such an extension of the battle toward the French front, General Fayolle ordered:

---the Commanding General of the Ist Army to extend his front of attack as much as possible to the right, by arranging to reinforce the XXXVth Corps by the 46th Inf. Div., drawn from the G.A.R. Reserves;

---the Commanding General of the IIIrd Army to concentrate on his left a mass of Heavy Artillery, whose fire was to be directed against the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif, and to be ready to execute, in liaison with the action of the XXXVth Corps, a bold and extensive stroke capable of being exploited in the direction of the heights to the south of Reims-sur-Matz.

For this purpose, the IIIrd Army will be reinforced by 3 Divisional Artilleries, 2 regiments of Heavy Artillery, short range (the 213th and 214th, drawn from the IVth Army), 1 regiment of tractor-drawn long range Heavy Artillery (the 82nd, drawn from the IVth Army), and 1 battalion of light tanks (2): General Humbert placed these reinforcements at the disposition of the XXXIVth Corps (3) and ordered the transfer of some of the artillery of his right (XVIIIth Corps) for the benefit of the XVth Corps--- the XXXIVth and XVth Corps being those whose mission it was to extend to the right, as far as the Oise, the offensive of the Ist Army.

In order to make his dispositions complete, General Fayolle brought up to 4 the reserve divisions behind the XXXIVth, and XVth Corps of the IIIrd Army;

---this was to be effected by moving the 70th Inf. Div. from the right to the left of the IIIrd Army, toward Lieuvilliers (4);

---and by ordering the 2nd Moroccan Division--coming from the Group of Armies of the Center and placed at his disposition-- to detrain in the valley of the Oise near Pont-Sainte-Maxence. (5)

1. General Fayolle, Note No. 4309 of the 5th of August, for the Ist and IIIrd Armies. See Annex No. 137.

2. General Fayolle, Note No. 4314 of the 5th of August: the

battalion of tanks was the 10th of the 504th, which the Commanding General of the G.A.R. transferred from the Xth Army.

3. General Humbert, Special Orders Nos. 38II and 38I6 of the 5th of August.

4. General Fayolle, cypher telegram No. 4484 of the 6th of Aug.

5. General Fayolle, cypher telegram No. 4449 of the 6th of August; the 4 Inf. Divs. in reserve behind the XXXIVth and XVth Corps were thus, the 70th, 58th, 2nd Moroccan, and 5th. Besides, the IIIrd Army already had one Inf. Div. in reserve, the 1st.

From the 6th to the 8th, General Humbert arranged, with the Commanders of the XXXIVth and XVth Corps, the main lines of the manoeuvre to be executed, for the purpose of assuring "an extensive exploitation of a success" following upon the attack by these two Corps already prescribed for the 10th. (2)

These dispositions, put in writing on the 9th, may thus be summarized:

General idea of the manoeuvre: to turn from the east the l'Ecouvillon massif.

The XXXIVth Corps, making liaison on its left with the 1st Army, will advance in the general direction of Boulogne-la-Grasse, Conchy-les-Pots and Canny.

The XVth Corps, making liaison on its left with the XXXIVth Corps and pivoting to the right on the 67th, will march in the general direction of Lassigny.

Finally, the XVth Corps and the XVIII Corps~~#~~ will be able to seize the opportunity of a common action on the two banks of the Oise, destined to bring about the fall of Noyon.

1. General Fayolle, Note No. 4638 of the 7th of August. See Annex No. I43.

2. General Humbert, personal and secret Instruction No. 93 O.P., of the 9th of August.

IV

FIRST DISPOSITIONS IN VIEW OF AN ATTACK

BY THE 1st ARMY (8th August)

(See maps Nos. 20 and 28)

On the 8th of August, the counter-offensive toward the north of the Marne was terminating victoriously and the offensive to the south of the Somme was going forward under favorable auspices, as will be detailed further on.

The enemy front, scarcely reorganized behind the streams of the Vesle and the Aisne, from Rheims to Soissons, was likely soon to find itself menaced by a serious flank movement from the west.

The General-in-Chief therefore ordered at once, starting from the 8th, (I), that the right of the Group of Armies of the Reserve (G.A.R.) and the left of the Group of Armies of the Center (G.A.C.) should go ahead and prepare for a resumption of the movement in advance:

---by the VIth Army making the principal effort, directed toward the plateau between the Vesle and the Aisne, to the north of Braine;

---by covering actions on the part of the Xth and Vth Armies, on the one hand, and by the VIth on the other;

---finally, by the combined effort of the three Armies to push forward to the north as far as the Aisne, and to reoccupy, to the north-west of Rheims, the Chateau-Thierry massif.

"This result may otherwise be obtained by another manoeuvre...

"The Commanding General of the G. A. R. will study a plan for an offensive action having for object:

"1st, In the beginning, to throw the enemy back on the right bank of the Oise between the present front and the mouth of the

I. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau), Personal and Secret Instruction No. 13668 of the 8th of August. See Annex No. 147.

Ailette, and beyond the Ailette, from the Oise to the road from Chauny to Soissons.

"2nd. Following this, to conquer by an attack from west to east, in the direction of Braye-en-Laonnais and by a covering movement on the Ailette, the plateaux between the Aisne and the Canal ~~##~~ ^{from} the Oise to the Aisne, in order to oblige the enemy to abandon the lines ~~from~~ ^{of} the Vesle and the Aisne.

"The 2nd operation ought to follow the 1st with the shortest possible delay, in order not to allow the enemy time to recover." (I)

Thus, at the moment of undertaking the Franco-British offensive, the extension of operations "in the French field" was already being planned out to as far forward as Soissons.

In the succeeding sections, the following will be considered in their order:

1st, The Battle of Montdidier (8th--17th August), where the Franco-British offensive was developed, and the action fought by the IIIrd Army, prolonging the offensive as far as the Oise.

2nd, The Battle of Noyon (17th--29th August), in which the Xth Army pushed back the enemy on the Oise and the Ailette, and thus permitted the IIIrd Army to retake Noyon, and, by counter-coup, permitted the 1st Army to advance as far as the Canal of the North (Canal du Nord) and the Somme.

3rd. The thrust toward the Hindenburg position (30th August--11th September), which was the manoeuvre of exploitation common to the whole of the attacks carried on after the 18th of July, from the Marne to the Somme.

On the following page is given a table showing, in summary, the Superior Units engaged in the battles of Montdidier and Noyon, and the results which were obtained by these battles.

I. General Fayolle issued these Instructions to the Xth Army on the 9th of August, under the number 4821: General Mangin had already foreseen their realization, for on the 8th, he addressed a telegram to General Fayolle, informing him that he intended to reinforce the VIIth Corps, on his left, in order to be prepared to manoeuvre toward the north of the Aisne in case the enemy were thrown back. See Annex No. 152.

TABLE SHOWING IN SUMMARY THE SUPERIOR UNITS ENGAGED

IN THE BATTLES OF MONTDIDIER AND NOYON

(8th August and 20th August), and the results which
had been won by the 15th of September.

(A) Superior Units engaged (not including reserves of G.A.R and G.H.Q)	Ist Army	IIInd Army	Xth Army	Total
Front of departure	35 kil.	25 kil.	50 kil. (army front) 30 kil. (front of attack)	110 kil.
8th--9th August	15 Inf. Div. 3 Cav. Div.			
10th August		II Inf. Div.		43 Inf Div. (1) 3 Cav. Div.
20th August			16 Inf. Div.	
(B) Results won by 15th September	Ist Army	IIInd Army	IIIrd Army	Total
Front of arrival	20 kil.	15 kil.	30 kil	65 kil.
Maximum depth of advance	60 kil.	55 kil.	25 kil.	60 kil.
Prisoners taken	163 Off- icers. 12,340 men (2)	101 off- icers. 5401 men	356 Off- icers. 17,909 men.	650 Off icers. 35650 men. (2).
Cannon captured	327	170	440	937

1. In final summary, there came into battle:

--2 Inf. Div. ~~of~~ the Ist Army (the 34th and 35th)

--12 Inf. Div ~~of~~ the Xth Army (the 64th, 5th, Ist, Mor., 66th,
59th, 32nd, U.S.A, 41st, 33rd, 32nd, 29th, 31st, 36th).

or, 14 infantry divisions in total.

2. In addition, the Ist Army made about 2000 prisoners from the
23rd of July to the 7th of August, in the course of preliminary
actions.

CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF MONTDIDIER AND PREPARATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE TOWARD THE REGION OF NOYON (5th---16th August)

I.

MANOEUVRE OF THE AVRE (8th--9th August)

II

RECAPTURE OF MONTDIDIER AND ADVANCE TOWARD ROYE--LASSIGNY (10th---16th August)

III

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACKS BY THE Xth ARMY IN COMBINATION WITH THE ATTACKS BY THE IIIrd ARMY AND THE 1st ARMY (10th--16th August)

I

MANOEUVRE FROM THE AVRE TO THE NORTH OF MONTDIDIER

(8th--9th August) (See Map No. 21)

The attack of the Ivth British Army started on the 8th of August at 4 hrs. 20 min, without artillery preparation, but with the support of a large group of assault tanks; from the beginning, it achieved a deep advance into the enemy positions.

The Ist Army began at 4 hrs. 20 min. its artillery preparation, in which the XXXIst, IXth, and Xth Corps participated. The XXXVth Corps also took part, but did not reveal more than its known and already located batteries---firing in such a fashion as not to give the impression that it had been reinforced, and that it would be ~~able~~ ^{called on} to participate effectively in the attack.

The XXXIst Corps began its advance at 5 hrs. 05 min. from the front of la Luce toward the plateaux between Villers-aux-Erables and Moreuil, in the general direction north-west---south-east.

The Ist line Infantry Divisions (the 42nd on the left and the 37th on the right) advanced with ease, capturing almost all the enemy defending troops--who were completely surprised--and their artillery; at 9 hrs. 30 min, they were occupying the woods to the north-east of Moreuil, Villers-aux-Erables, and were continuing their advance toward Maizières.

The Infantry Division on the Avre front (the 66th), relieved by the occupation of the plateaux, itself occupied Morisel and Moreuil at noon.

The 2nd wave Infantry Divisions followed the Ist wave without difficulties; the I26th followed in the track of the 42nd;--the I53rd, with its two battallions of light tanks, interposing itself, beginning at 15 hrs., between the 42nd and 37th, facilitated thus the taking of Maizières by the 42nd, but was later slowed down by enemy resistance on the plateau of Plessier--Rozainvillers.

The Commanding General of the XXXIst Corps carried out a further artillery preparation directed against Plessier--Rozainvillers and

against Fresnoy-en-Chaussée: these villages were taken at the end of the day by the 42nd, 153rd and 37th Divisions, with the aid of the tanks belonging to the 153rd Division.

The IXth Corps kept up its artillery preparation for four hours, as had previously been planned, and then attacked at 8 hrs. 20 min.

The 15th Colonial Infantry Division (to the north) and the 3rd Infantry Division (to the south) were retarded by enemy machine gun fire at the crossing of the Avre, and in their advance toward the Grenonville and Saint-Hubert Woods; thanks to the progress of the XXXIst Corps, they were able to establish several battalions on the right bank.

The Xth Corps, which was slated to exploit, on its right, the success of the IXth, was retarded in consequence: the 152nd Division (to the north) was not able to do more, by the end of the day, than push a few of its elements to the north of Pierrepont.

General Debeney intervened during the course of the day:

---to order the XXXIst Corps to develop its success by pushing as soon as possible against Arvillers and Erches (Order No. 573);

---to utilize, for the benefit of the attacks toward the south, the heavy artillery that the XXXIst could not, at the moment, employ--that is: 3 groups of short range heavy artillery, which ~~was~~ ^{were} to start off immediately en route to the Xth Corps, and 3 groups of short range heavy artillery to the XVth Corps (Orders Nos. 571);

---to order the main body of the 2nd Cavalry Division to press forward toward Saint-Just (Order No. 574), and the 47th and 55th Infantry Divisions toward the plateaux to the east of Noye (Orders Nos. 575 and 576);

---to regulate the continuation of the attacks to the north of Montdidier, by ~~the 9th~~ ^{the 9th} reordering the XXXVth Corps to hold itself in readiness to intervene in its turn to the south of Montdidier (General Order No. 532).

On the morning of the 9th, the attacks were again pushed with success on the whole front to the north of Montdidier.

The Canadians (right of the IVth British Army) advanced on the plateaux of Queanel and Beaufort.

The XXXIst Corps--with the I26th Division (which had passed beyond the 42nd), the I53rd and the 37th in the 1st line---took Hangest at II hrs, and breaking down, during the afternoon, the resistance of the enemy along the railway to the south-east of Hangest, occupied Arvillers at the end of the day.

The IXth Corps accomplished its mission by capturing the Saint-Hubert Woods, thus assuring the advance of the Xth; it then regrouped its units and placed its artillery at the disposition of the Xth.

The Xth progressed on its left (I52nd Div.) in liaison with the XXXIst Corps, and advanced beyond Contoire; on its right (I66th Div.), it began to cross the Avre at Gratibus.

The aerial activities were especially important during the combats of the 9th (bad weather having held it up on the 8th); the planes were employed en masse to bombard the railway stations and road junctions, and to attack the enemy reserves on the surface.

The enemy aviation was completely unable to operate.

EXTENSION OF THE MANOEUVRE TOWARD THE SOUTH OF MONTDIDIER

(9th August) (See Map No. 28)

As soon as the Commanding General of the Army learned of the capture of Hangest, he went to join the Commanding General of the XXXVth Corps, in order to direct him to intensify his artillery preparation and to attack that very afternoon at 16 hrs. (General Order No. 586); this attack began at the ordered hour, without the enemy's having been able to carry out any/counter preparation; the I69th (on the left) and the I33rd (on the right) reached the Assainvillers road at Rollet, and passed beyond it at nightfall.

The IInd Cavalry Corps received the order to push forward to the south of Montdidier, in order to be ready to exploit the success of the XXXVth Corps (Order No. 586): it began its movement during the afternoon.

The fall of Montdidier was imminent (I).---The Commanding

I. Some patrols of the 60th Div. penetrated into the ruins of the town during the night of the 9th-10th.

General of the Army, in consequence, gave instructions that, on the following morning, the manoeuvre should be developed rapidly to the east of the town, in the general direction of Roye (General Order No. 592):

---The XXXIst Corps, having at its disposition the I26th, I53rd, 56th and 47th Infantry Divisions, should continue its attacks, toward Andechy and Roye, in liaison with the Canadians;

--- the Xth, with the I52nd, I66th and 60th Divisions, should advance on the plateaux to the east of Montdidier, its left on the Avre;

---the XXXVth Corps, with the I69th, I33rd and 46th Divisions, and closely followed by the IIInd Cavalry Corps, should make contact beyond Montdidier with the right of the Xth Corps, should cover the right of the Army, and should link it up with the IIIrd Army;

---the IXth Corps and the XXXVIth Corps, the 42nd, 3rd, 37th, 66th Divisions, and the I5th Colonial Infantry Division, and the Ist Moroccan Division, should reassemble and reorganize themselves into Army Reserves.

On the other hand, General Fayolle believed that the moment had come to extend the field of action as far as the Oise, by effecting the entry of the IIIrd Army into the operation; and he believed it opportune to consider the intervention of the left of the Xth Army (I).

n

I. General Fayolle, Instruction No. 4827 of the 9th of August. See Annex No. I53).

"The IIIrd Army will execute tomorrow morning, I0th of August, the previously planned operation, by pushing forward as far as possible. The 70th Division, from this moment, is placed at its disposition to assist. The whole of the Army will be in readiness to follow up the advance movement.

"The IIIrd and Xth Armies should, from this moment, foresee the probability that the enemy, obliged to evacuate la Petite Suisse, will retire behind the Canal of the North. The XVIIth and VIIth Corps should, in case this occurs, hurl themselves forward,

rolling up the enemy as far as the Oise, in such a manner as to menace from the rear the mountainous massif that extends to the north of the river ~~between~~ Noyon and Chauny."

II

CAPTURE OF MONTDIDIER

ADVANCE TOWARD ROYE AND LASSIGNY

(10th--15th August) (See maps Nos. 23 and 28)

During the early hours of the 10th, the 1st Army developed its manoeuvre: the advance was very rapid, since the enemy had left the field clear during the night of the 9th-10th.

In the center, the Xth and XXXVth Corps succeeded in encircling Montdidier, making their junction toward Etelfay. The 60th Division occupied Montdidier at 10 hours.

To the north, the XXXIst Corps attacked at 5 hours, after half an hour of artillery preparation. It took, then passed beyond Erches and Waray first, and later Andechy.---That afternoon, and during the whole of the following day, the Army encountered strong resistance from the enemy, who was utilizing the old organizations to the west of Roye.

The IIIrd Army attacked at 4 hours 20 min. It advanced on its whole front, and pushed its left forward in such a fashion as to overlap la Petite Suisse from the west and the north.

The enemy, who had withdrawn a part of his main body during the night of the 9th--10th, lost, nevertheless, numerous prisoners (2,000 during the two days, the 10th and 11th), some artillery and considerable matériel. He did not offer a serious resistance until the 11th--in front of the XXXIVth Corps to the west of Canny, and in front of the XVth Corps on the plateau of the Saint-Claude Farm.

The Aeronautic Division (I), during the two days of the 10th

I. A telegram from General Fayolle--No. 4791 of the 9th of August--ordered the Aeronautic Division to extend its action for the benefit of the IIIrd Army. See Annex No. 151.

hh

and the 11th, was able to go out in force, as soon as the morning mists were dissipated: it continued to dominate the battle field, and to cooperate with the operations of the surface troops.

Beginning the 11th of August, the two Armies encountered organized positions, to which the enemy clung with tenacious resistance. The combats became more costly.

The High Command intervened--as will be studied in detail later--to coordinate the operations and to give them a new impulse.

But, without waiting for these instructions, the commanders of the Armies continued their operations, reorganizing their fronts, regrouping their artillery and their reserves, and preparing for further efforts.

The Commanding General of the 1st Army ordered:

---that the ensemble attacks against the fortified front to the west of Roye should be resumed on the 13th and that, in the meanwhile, the Corps commanders should regulate their artillery so that it should produce the necessary breaches and destructions; (1)

---that the IIInd Cavalry Corps should take up an echeloned position in the valleys of the Avre and of the 3.-Doms, between Warsy, Montdidier and Ayencourt, in readiness to intervene;

---that, as a consequence of the ensemble dispositions made by the High Command, the ensemble attack should be postponed to the 15th, and that it should now have as its mission to bring about the fall of Roye by enveloping from the north (XXXIth Corps) and from the south (Xth and XXXVth Corps); (2)

---that this attack should not take place until a later date.(3)

1. General Debeney, General Order No. 606 of the 11th of August. See annex No. 165.

2. General Debeney, General Order No. 617 of the 12th of August. See annex No. 172.

3. General Debeney, General Order No. 626 of the 15th of August: this postponement to a later date corresponds to the return of the 1st Army to the orders of the French High Command, and to instructions concerning ensemble operations. See Annex No. 183.

The orders to the IIIrd Army were:

---that the XXXIVth Corps should sieze Gury on the 12th and 13th;

---that the XVth Corps, reinforced by the 70th Division (4),

4. General Humbert, Special Order No. 1587 and General Order No. 613, of the 12th of August. See Annex No. 173.

making its main effort on its left, took l'Ecouvillon and Attiche Farm after hard fighting; it reoccupied Ribécourt with its right (67th Div.)

---then, the Army was to mark time while waiting, like the 1st Army, for the ensemble attack being prepared for (I); it was to reorganize its artillery resources and rest its reserves (the 58th and the 1st Divs.)

I. General Humbert, Order No. II3 of the 15th of August. See Annex No. 185.

III

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACKS BY THE Xth ARMY IN COMBINATION WITH THE ATTACKS OF THE IIIrd and Ist ARMIES

(10th--14th August) (See maps Nos. 22 and 28)

The importance of the results obtained during the first three days caused the High Command to intervene, beginning on the 10th, to give the battle a wider extension.

Marshal Foch indicated (1) the general missions which were to be sought by the Allied Armies: (2)

---to the north of the Somme, an action by the IIIrd British Army in the general direction of Bapaume--Peronne, "to strike the enemy front a hard blow and to exploit without delay any sign of giving way";

---toward the Oise, exploitation by the IIIrd French Army of the advance of the Ist Army, for the purpose of "cleaning up the region of Mon&ddier and, later, the region of Noyon".

On their side, the General-in-Chief and General Fayolle were in agreement to prolong the action of the IIIrd Army by the Xth Army, by carrying out "in a very brief time and without using for the purpose very large forces", the operation prescribed in Instruction No. 13,668 of the General-in-Chief of the 8th of August.(3)

To this effect;

---the General-in-Chief ordered that the 2nd Moroccan Division should pass in G.H.Q. Reserve, from the right of the IIIrd Army to the left of the Xth;

1. General Foch had been elevated to the dignity of Marshal of France on the 7th of August.

2. Marshal Foch, General Directive No. 2 of the 10th of August. See Annex No. 156.

3. This Instruction has been analysed in Sec. IV of Chapter VII; General Fayolle telegraphed to General Mangin in the afternoon of the 10th (under the number 4945) that he should start preparing for the application of it as quickly as possible--and the General-in-Chief telegraphed General Fayolle (under the number 1868) that he approved this intention. See Annex No. 157.

---General Fayolle replaced the XVIIIth Corps under the orders of the Commanding General of the Xth Army, who was ordered to make his dispositions to follow, by his left, to the south of the Oise, the progress of the IIIrd Army on the right bank; (I)

On the morning of the IIth, General Fayolle issued his ensemble plan, in view of the next manoeuvre, which could be carried out without much difficulty:

---as soon as the enemy shall be driven back on the Divette, he will be in a precarious situation in the forests of Ourscamps and Carlepont, and that will be the moment for the left of the Xth Army to make its action felt;

---the Xth Army ought, therefore, to manoeuvre toward the east of the Carlepont forest, along the ^{axis} Quennèvieres--Cuts, covering itself on the left in the forest, and keeping its right linked up with the present front;

---it will thus be able to march as far as the Oise without using up large resources, "and thus prepare for a later offensive between the Ailette and the Aisne by the occupation of a line sensibly oriented from north to south".

1. General Fayolle, cypher telegram No. 4943 of the 10th of August. See Annex No. 158.

2. General Fayolle, Note No. 5048 of the 11th of August for the Xth and IIIrd Armies. See Annex No. 162.

During these same days, the 10th and 11th, General Mangin established his first propositions, and later his orders, for the execution of the offensive which was entrusted to the Xth Army.

The first propositions suggested on the 10th, stressed the great need for large resources (29 Divisions in all) and for artillery and tanks (3), by reason of the necessity of capturing by main force

1. General Mangin, Letters to General Fayolle Nos. 936, 954, and 957 of the 10th of August. See Annex No. 161.

some very old organized positions on the plateaux constituting the pivot of the enemy manoeuvre, and which were sure to be defended with great tenacity.

The orders issued on the 11th, on the contrary, prescribed a rapidly executed action, using the means immediately at hand: (I)

I. General Mangin, Order No. 384 of the 11th of August. See Annex No. 167.

---the Xth Army will attack, on the 15th of August, between the Aisne and the Oise," in cooperation with the IIIrd Army, the mission of the two Armies being to carry their front to the level of Noyon, on one hand, and of the Oise, on the other;"

--the special objective of the Xth Army will be to reach the Mont-de-Choisy, in order to be able to encircle the Carlepont Forest from the north; "

---prescribed arrangement:

38 15 2nd D.M.	48 55	2 128	11 162 72 69
I32	I7	I27	
XVIII Corps	VII Corps	XXX Corps	Ist Corps

---the principal effort will be made by the right of the XVIIIth Corps (whose left will have the mission of cleaning up the Carlepont Forest);

---the VIIth and XXXth Corps will cover the XVIIIth on the right by occupying the plateau to the north-west of Audagnicourt;

---the Ist Corps will prolong the covering action as far as the Aisne by occupying the plateau of Nauvon-Vingré.

These dispositions were confirmed by a new directive from Marshal Foch, dated the 12th of August, ⁽²⁾ which draws the attention of the Commanders-in-Chief:

---to the necessity of not pushing the attacks uniformly on the fronts of the IVth British Army, the Ist and IIIrd French Armies, and of executing concentrations directed toward certain well chosen points (especially, the knot of communications at Roye);

---to the desirability of initiating as soon as possible the action of the IIIrd British Army to the north of the Somme, and of the Xth French Army to the east of the Oise.

The General-in-Chief,---"in the spirit of the Directive No. 8/P.C. of Marshal Foch"---informed General Fayolle, on the 14th, 2. Marshal Foch, Directive No. 8/P.C. of the 12th of August, See annex no. 169

that he approved: (1)

---his Instructions of the 11th to the Xth and IIIrd Armies;

---the order No. 384 of General Mangin, "it being understood that the exploitation of the initial success in the direction of Chauny and of the Chauny--Soissons road shall be at once undertaken, if the condition of the forces of the Xth Army and the advance of the IIIrd Army on Noyon will permit."

On the other hand, an ensemble report was addressed to Marshal Foch to inform him on what date, in what conditions and with what means the Xth army will be in condition to prolong the actions of the IIIrd and 1st:

---the combined attacks of the three Armies to begin about the 16th;

---the 1st Army will aim to take Roye, by overlapping it from the north (direction Goyencourt--Carrépuis) and from the south (direction Laucourt--Roiglise):

2 battallions of light tanks.	XXXIst Corps	47, 56, 126, 153
I Groupement of medium tanks.	Xth Corps	152, 166, 60
	XXXVth Corps	46, 169 133

---the IIIrd Army will continue its manoeuvre to bring about the fall of la Petite Suisse, and to march toward the Bussey-Noyon front:

I battallion of light tanks (to be reorganized)	XXXIVth Corps	165, 6, 11, 129
and the 58th Inf. Division are at the disposition of the IIIrd Army.	XVth Corps	74, 70, 123, 77

---the Xth Army will attack in conformity with the mission

F. General Petain (3rd Bureau), No. 22332 of the 14th of August. See Annex No. 178.

and with the general disposition of elements which have already
been reported to it:

Reinforcements provided for the Xth Army	I <u>Groupe</u> of 15 Schneider tanks. I <u>Groupement de marche</u> of 30 St-Chamont tanks I Battalion of light tanks 45 batteries of Field Art. 30 batteries of Heavy Art. temporarily,--these batteries being destined to be used in the American operation at Woevre.
--	---

CONCENTRATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE Xth ARMY
AND
THE FINAL DISPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE COMBINED ATTACKS
OF THE Xth, IIIrd AND Ist ARMIES (10th--16th August)
(See Maps Nos. 22 and 28)

On the 10th of August, General Mangin began to transfer troops from his right for the benefit of the left of his Army:

- withdrawal of the XXXth Corps (to the right of the XXth);
- placing in reserve the 14th and 127th Inf. Div., 3 Regts. 75 mm. portés, and 10 groups of heavy artillery.

On the 11th, the XXXth Corps received the order to go into line between the VIIth and the 1st Corps (Order No. 379), and several movements were prescribed for the reserve Divisions in preparation for their regroupment preparatory to the attacks regulated by Order No. 384 of that day.

These regroupments ~~show~~, as of the 12th, the situation schematized in the following table:

ARMY CORPS	38 15 XVIII	55 VII	128 XXX	162 72 69 II I	12 25 XX
ARMY RESERVES	48 17 127				
G.A.R RESERVES	2 132				
G.H.Q. RESERVES	2nd. Mor. Div. IIIrd Army Corps (with the 87, 41, 33, 64)				

From the 13th to the 14th, the units--while taking great care to keep themselves hidden from aerial observation--entered the rear of the zones of the Army Corps to which they were attached by order No. 384 of the 11th of July. (1).

I. Thus in the text. Undoubtedly an error for 11th of August. --Note by translator.

On the 15th, General Mangin issued all the details of the attack: (1)

I. General Mangin, Orders Nos. 398 and 399, and Instruction annexed to Order No. 398, of the 15th of August. See Annex No. 186.

---the attack will be executed in two phases: one, to occupy the enemy's covering zone (zone de couverture); the other, to capture ~~his~~ center of resistance, pass beyond it, and to push as far forward as possible;

---the XVIIIth Corps will push as far as the Oise and the confluence of the Ailette (it will have at its disposition the 132nd Inf. Div. and ~~the~~ groupement de marche of Saint-Chamont tanks).

---the VIIth Corps as far as the Ailette (it will have at its disposition the 5th battalion of light tanks, and will be followed by the (Army Reserve) 17th Inf. Div.);

---the XXXth Corps as far as Crécy-Juvigny (it will be followed by the (Army Reserve) 127th Inf. Div.);

---the Ist Corps as far as the northern edge of the Juvigny ravine (it will have the group of Schneider tanks at its disposition);

---the attention of the Corps Commanders is called to the enemy's situation, disposed as was our IVth Army on the 15th of July, and, in consequence, to the necessity of executing their artillery preparation on the enemy's centre of resistance.

All was ready for the 2nd phase of the battle, including, as far as the French Armies were concerned, the combined attacks of the Xth, IIIrd and Ist Armies, with the principal effort by the Xth Army.

As a consequence, the Ist Army came again under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies (2), on the 15th of August at 12 hours.

2. Marshal Foch, cypher telegram No. 18 P/C of the 15th of August: this telegram makes known at the same time that the British Command declined, for the moment, to make an effort on the Roye-Chaulnes front, and that it was willing to extend its offensive from the Ancre to the Scarpe, for the purpose of overlapping the movement of withdrawal which the enemy had just commenced in front of the IIIrd British Army. See annex No. 181

The General-in-Chief recapitulated, on the 16th, the missions

of the three Armies, which should develop their operations toward their first objectives "beginning August 13th, and even sooner, if the enemy draws back: (10)

"Later actions have in view the relief of the region of Roye and of Noyon by the capture of the Plateau of Champien (Ist Army), the heights of la Poterie and of Flessis-Cacheleux, then of Lagny and of the Forest of la Reserve (IIIrd Army), and finally, the operation of the Xth Army in the direction of the Chauny--Soissons road. These actions will follow as soon as possible."

h

I. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Personal and Secret Instruction No. 24995 of the 16th of August. See Annex No. 188.

CHAPTER IX

BATTLE OF NOYON

(17th---29th August)

I

ATTACKS BY THE Xth ARMY ON THE PLATEAUX
TO THE NORTH OF THE AISNE

LOCAL ACTIONS BY THE IIIRD AND 1st ARMIES AND THE
RELIEF OF THE BRITISH RIGHT
(17th--23rd August)

II

ORGANIZATION OF THE MANOEUVRE OF EXPLOITATION BY
THE Xth ARMY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE EAST
(23rd--25th August)

III

CAPTURE OF NOYON
(26th--29th August)

I

PRELIMINARY ACTIONS

DISPOSITIONS MADE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE BRITISH

RIGHT BY THE 1st ARMY (17th--19th August)

(See Maps Nos. 23 and 28)

Between the Somme and the Oise, the heights of Noyonnais form the advance bastion to which the enemy resistance clung. The troops defending it had as their principal communication the Valley of the Oise, with its excellent road and its railway.

The orders which are now about to be studied had in view the hurling of the Xth Army against this line of communication, so vital to the enemy: who, as soon as he should have nothing in his rear except the desert of the Somme would soon be compelled to execute an important withdrawing movement.

There will, therefore, be successively brought out:

from

---the principal action, carried out ~~##~~ the 17th to the 27th by the Xth Army, and the repercussion of this action on the local operations of the IIIrd and Ist Armies;

---the exploitation of the success of the Xth Army, by the forward movement of the IIIrd and Ist Armies as far as the Canal of the North.

The days of the 17th to the 19th constitute the prelude to these new attacks.

On the 17th, the Xth Army--in a local action decided upon on the evening before (Order No. 400 of the 16th, from General Mangin),--made a surprise attack toward Autrèches, with the VIIth and XXXth Corps; the object was to pass beyond the ravine of Autrèches and Hautebraye, in order to make the conditions for the start of the attack somewhat easier.---All objectives were attained and the enemy lost about 250 prisoners.

Once this result was achieved, General Mangin assembled his

Corps Commanders, in the Chateau de Montauban, and decided that the 1st phase of the attack--having for object the occupation of the enemy's covering position---would take place the following morning with the following Divisions in line: (1)

38--15	55	128	162
XVIIIth Corps	VIIth Corps	XXXth Corps	Ist Corps

The Divisions charged with the attack on the center of resistance should approach, during the evening of the 18th, in such a fashion that the formation for the attack could be carried out during the nights of the 18th-19th and the 19th-20th.

The Aeronautic Division would support the attack. (2)

On the morning of the 18th, a rapid and violent artillery preparation was carried out, to which the enemy replied with poison gas shells. (3) The attack, however, was developed very successfully. The greater part of the objectives was attained. The Army captured more than 2,000 prisoners and, on the 19th, achieved the occupation of its objectives (Audignicourt and Morsains).

The Army Commander ordered that the attack on the center of resistance should take place on the morning of the 20th: the day of the 19th was employed in artillery preparation.

1. General Mangin, Order No. 405 of the 17th of August. See Annex No. 197.

2. General Fayolle, cypher telegram No. 5621 of the 17th of August. See Annex No. 195.

3. The 55th Division (VIIth Corps) had to evacuate nearly 600 gassed men.

On their side, the IIIrd and Ist Armies, by carrying out violent combats, reached the immediate outskirts of Lassigny (IIIrd Army), penetrated into Beuvraignes and progressed toward Laucourt, to the south-west of Roye (Ist Army).

An important decision of the High Command threw upon the Ist Army an important responsibility, which diminished its offensive capacity for several days: the relief, on its left, of the Canadian Corps.

This decision was motivated by the pursuit of collective objectives decided upon by the Commanders-in-Chief several weeks

before: the British Command was obliged to replace at the disposition of the American Command the American Divisions in the British zone; on the other hand, the British themselves had the mission of continuing their effort to the north of the Somme.

As a consequence, Marshal Foch decided: (1)

---that the 1st French Army should relieve the Canadian Corps;

---that the British Commander should leave his heavy artillery, on the front just ceded, for the use of the French, so that the latter might have the maximum of artillery to put at the disposition of the American Commander in the east (2).

All dispositions in detail were also issued by the General-in-Chief: (3)

---the G. A. R., in order to extend its front as far as Lihons, would have at its disposition the ^{Corps + Army Troops} XXXVI, the 66th Inf. Div. (located at Conty), the 64th (located at Verberie), the 34th and 35th (which would arrive to the south of Amiens beginning on the 20th;

---the G.A.R. will receive, in addition, the 59th Inf. Div., the 32nd, and about three more Divisions by the end of the month;(4)

---and, in exchange for these reinforcements, it was to regroup in G.H.Q. reserve the 1st Mor. Div (near Saint-Just), the 153rd Div. (near Pontoise), the 11th Cav. Corps (near Beauvais), the ^{Corps} and Army Troops IX (near Marseille-le-Petit). (5)

1. Marshal Foch, cypher telegram No. 3035 of the 17th of August. See Annex No. 193.

2. All these measures have reference to the preparation for the American offensive of Saint-Mihiel, which will be described in the IVth Part.

3. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Order No. 27,250 of the 17th of August. See Annex No. 194.

4. General Petain (3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 2202 of the 19th, and 2240 of the 20th of August.

5. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Note No. 29,105 of the 18th of August.

The Commanding General of the 1st Army, who was ordered to relieve the Canadians at once, ordered the XXXIst Corps to begin the relief immediately as far as La Chavatte, with its own

resources (126th, 47th and 56th Inf. Divs) and by extension; the XXXVith Corps should complete the operation before the 27th. (1)

In spite of having to carry out this relief, the Army continued its attacks for the purpose of causing the fall of Roye. (2)

1. General Debeney, Orders Nos. 658 of the 18th, and 663 of the 19th of August. See Annexes Nos. 199 and 201.

2. General Debeney, Order No. 662 of the 19th of August. See Annex No. 200.

OCCUPATION OF THE PLATEAUX TO THE NORTH OF THE AISNE
AND THE ADVANCE AS FAR AS THE OISE (20th--23rd August)

(See Map No. 3)

The Xth Army began to advance on the 20th, at 7 hours 10 minutes, in the battle order indicated in Chapter VIII (section III): it won the most complete success along its entire front, over-ran the whole of the center of resistance, which for a long time the enemy had been powerfully fortifying; it took the plateaux of Nampcel, Audignicourt and Nouvon-Vingré, and captured 3,000 prisoners and 100 cannon.

The advance was continued during the night of the 20th-21st, and the days of the 21st and 22nd:

---on the 21st, the right of the XVIIIth Corps took Caisnes, the Mont-de-Choisy and Cuts; it pushed on toward the Oise, which it reached on the 22nd; while its left cleaned up the woods and made liaison with the IIIrd Army near Sempigny;

---on the 22nd, the VIIth Corps took Blérancourt and reached the Manicamps woods;

---the right of the XXth Corps and the Ist Corps encountered violent enemy resistance, beginning on the 21st, and kept contact with the former front by a north-south line, from Mont-de-Cury to the western outskirts of Pommiers;

The previously decided upon dispositions for exploiting and extending the success toward the east were immediately confirmed by orders given to the different echelons and by the entry of the reserves into the line.

General Fayolle ordered the Xth Army to move the larger part of its elements to its right and to make an effort toward the east, along the heights immediately to the south of the Ailette, in such fashion as to menace the plateau of Iaffaux. (I)

I. General Fayolle, cypher telegrams Nos. 6159 and 6232 of the 22nd of August. See Annexes Nos. 206 and 212.

General Mangin used his reserves, after the 20th, for the benefit of the XXXth (17th Inf. Div.) and the 1st Corps (127th Inf. Div.), and brought up, toward Attichy, the 64th Inf. Div., which the G.A.R. had put under his orders. (1) On the 22nd, he ordered the XXXth Corps to go into action toward the east, its left on the Ailette; and ordered the 1st Corps to make an attack on Villers-la-fosse and Vauxrezis (2), while the two Corps on the left, extending their front to the right, would finally border the Oise and the Ailette.

But the troops had carried out a considerable effort, and the day of the 23rd did not give any results of importance; the XXXth Corps, however, got a foot-hold on the plateau of the Orme and of the Montécouvé Farm.

The Armies of the left, during this time, were combatting an enemy who was energetically defending his positions.

At their junction they managed to occupy Beuvraignes, after three days of violent combats; and the XXXIVth Corps took, then passed beyond, Lassigny.

On the 22nd, the XVth Corps, on the right of the IIIrd Army, progressed in liaison with the Xth and succeeded in bordering the Divette.

On the 23rd, the 1st Army received orders to hold itself in readiness to extend the action of the British (3), if the latter obtained any successes in the attacks that they planned to carry out to the north of Lihons with their IVth and IIIrd Armies.

But the Army was in the midst of reorganization and was making every effort to hasten the relief of the Canadian Corps. On its right, it depleted its front in order to reorganize its elements and to enable the Divisions (133rd, 169th, 60th, 152nd) which had been fighting without stopping for 15 days to get some rest.

1. General Mangin, Orders Nos. 413, 414, 415 of the 20th of August. See Annex No. 205.

2. General Mangin, Order No. 419 of the 22nd of August.

3. General Fayolle, cypher telegram No. 6285 of the 23rd of August.

On its left, it succeeded in getting into line, beginning on the evening of the 24th, the 34th and 35th Inf. Divs., which occupied their new front, so that the General commanding the XXXVith Corps was able to take over, on the morning of the 25th, the command of the la Chavatte--Lihons front. His order of battle, which had been planned on the 20th (I) was, now, as follows:

XXXVith Corps.....	34
---	35
XXXIith Corps.....	126
---	47
---	56
Xth Corps.....	152 60 166
XXXVth Corps.....	169 133 46

I. By order No. 682 of the 21st of August, of General Debensy. See Annex No. 207.

II

ORGANIZATION OF THE MANOEUVRE OF EXPLOITATION BY THE Xth ARMY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE EAST (23rd--25th August) (See Maps Nos. 24 and 28)

All the Instructions had been given on the assumption that the Xth Army would not be allowed to reach the Oise. This result having, however, been achieved, the withdrawal of the enemy to the north of the Oise became very probable.

What would this withdrawal be?---A movement toward the Hindenberg position, which was, according to all evidence, the front for the reorganization and resting of the German Armies that had been in battle.

It was to our advantage to direct our efforts toward this position, departing from the portions of the new front which were nearest to it---that is to say, the front of the Xth Army--and to threaten thus with a double menace:

---one toward the north, susceptible of hastening the enemy's retreat on the right bank of the Oise, because of the fear he would have of our being able to reach, within a short time, the Massif of Saint-Gobain, from which we should be able to make such a withdrawal impossible;

---the other toward the south, on the rear of the front of the Aisne and the Vesle, would have the effect of making very difficult the enemy's retreat toward the Chemin des Dames and toward the Ailette.

The French Command prepared the way for this manoeuvre on the part of the Xth Army:

---which, on one hand, would end the battle of Noyon by forcing the enemy to yield the terrain in front of our IIIrd and Ist Armies;

---and which, on the other hand, would permit us to gather the fruits of the battle of Chateau-Thierry--Soissons, by relieving the Valley of the Vesle.

The obstinacy with which the enemy defended the plateaux to the north-east of Soissons, pivot of his entire withdrawal manoeuvre, will be evident in what follows.

On the evening of the 22nd, upon learning of the importance of the successes of the Xth Army, the General-in-Chief gave his Directives to the G.A.R. (1):

---the Xth Army should exploit its successes toward the east, as was previously ordered, and in accordance with the measures which General Fayolle and General Mangin have, in fact, already taken to accomplish;

---the Vth Army should hold itself in readiness to act from north to south, in such fashion as to be able to link up its left to the Xth, and to be able to advance toward the north of the Vesle;

---the Xth Army, charged with so important a mission, will be furnished with numerous reinforcements by the G. A. R.:

the 32nd, 33rd, 41st, 1st Mor. Div, drawn from the general reserves;

the 29th, 31st, 36th Divs., which it would receive without fail by the end of the month;

the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 503rd Tank Regiment, coming from Survillers, and which should be transported by rail toward Vic-sur-Aisne (2);

---the 9th Battalion of the same Regiment, which should be entrained at Moreuil and sent to the same destination (3);

---finally, the G. A. R. would retain until further orders all the artillery regiments which were to have been placed at the disposition of the General-in-Chief (intended for use in the American attacks in the east).

These reinforcements would be completed on the 25th by the attachment to the G.A.R. of three new battalions of Tanks;

---the 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 502nd, and the 1st Battalion of the 504th Tank Regiments, which would entrain on the 25th to the 27th at Camp de Mailly for Vic-sur-Aisne.

The operation "should aim to bring about the fall of the lines of the Vesle, the Aisne and the Ailette"; it was set forth in detail on the 24th by General Fayolle (4):

2. General Petain (3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 2314 of the 22nd of August.

3. General Petain (3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 2272 of the 21st of August.

4. General Fayolle, Personal and Secret Instruction No. 6459 of the 24th of August. See Annex No. 217.

---the Xth Army will debouch by its center, between the Forest of Coucy and the Aisne, toward Laffaux and Vauxaillon, in such a fashion as to open the crossings of the Aisne to the XXth Corps;

---then, it will direct its march upon Laon, covering its left in the edges of the Coucy and Saint-Gobain Forests.

General Mangin completed his detailed dispositions on the 25th and 26th (I).

In order to carry out the mission that was assigned to it--to break the enemy front between the Aisne and the Saint-Gobain Forest and to advance along the principal axis Torny--Sorny--Laon--the Army placed itself in the following battle order:

38--15	48--33-2	2nd Mor. Div.--17-	54-41-	12-25-29
		64--128--2--66--	69-5	
		32nd. U.S.	32	
XVIII	VII	XXX (with the	I	XX
		502nd Tanks).	(With the	
			503rd Tanks)	

The VIIth Corps would cover the left of the Army toward the Forest of Saint-Gobain, would cross the Canal and throw the enemy back to the edges of the forest between Barisis and Brancourt.

The XXXth Corps would take the plateau of Torny--Sorny, then would march along the two banks of the Ailette toward Anizy and the ^(arbo) tree of Montbavin.

The Ist Corps should first take possession of Moulin de Laffaux and then proceed toward La Malmaison, Montbavin and Monampteuil.

The XXth Corps should cross the Aisne down the river from Condé--while regulating its movement on the progress of the right of the Ist Corps--and should have the ultimate mission of relieving the Chemin des Dames in liaison with the VIth Army.

I. General Mangin, Order No. 443 of the 25th of August, and Instruction No. 1086 of the 26th of August. See Annexes Nos.

The Corps should prepare foot-bridges in order to make surprise crossings of the Ailette and the Aisne, leaving for later the construction of bridges for the passage of traffic.

In a Secret Instruction, of which a large number of copies were prepared, the Commander of the Army informed everyone that it was imperative to win the battle, and, for this reason, to advance at all costs, to progress without pause. The Infantry Divisions of the 1st line should carry the attack over at least a dozen kilometers of depth. The Divisions of the 2nd line should follow the first line at 3 or 4 kilometers, and should pass through the latter, advancing constantly, without allowing the attack to be arrested. ... "Nothing is done while it yet remains to be done... Victory is the end of effort!"

III

TAKING OF NOYON

(26th--28th August) (See Maps. Nos. 24 and 28)

While the threat of the Xth Army was being prepared and the details worked out on the right, the Ist Army, on the left, finished the reorganization of its front and completed the relief of the Canadians.

On the morning of the 26th, General Debeney had the attacks on Roye resumed.

The XXXIst Corps, which had been studying and preparing for this operation for several days, obtained important results during the day by capturing, by hand to hand fighting, the strong organizations which covered Roye on the west:

---at 7 hrs., the I26th Division took Fresnoy-les-Roye;

---at 13 hrs., the I26th and 47th Divs. penetrated into the woods to the east of Goyencourt;

---at 16 hrs., the 56th Div. occupied and passed beyond Saint-Mard.

More than 1,100 prisoners were captured.

On the morning of the 27th, the Army reaped the fruits of this attack: pressed from the front on the battle field of the Somme, menaced with a flanking movement to the north by the British Armies and to the south by the Xth Army, the enemy retreated.---We occupied Roye at 10 hrs.

The IIIrd Army got ready to resume the advance. General Humbert ordered his Corps Commanders to have offensive reconnaissances made on their entire fronts (I), for the purpose of testing the resistance of the enemy's rear-guards, to pierce his front if possible, and to resume the pursuit.

On the 28th, the enemy retreat extended itself, in effect, as far as the Cise, the Ist and IIIrd Armies closely pursuing the rear-guards, and marching:

---the Ist Army, in the general direction of Ham;

---the IIIrd, in the general direction of Guiscard.

During the evening, the following objectives were assigned to them by General Fayolle (2), who restated, at the same time, the detailed orders:

---to pursue the enemy with light advance-guards, supported
field
by their/artillery;

---to manoeuvre against and overlap the centers of resistance;

---to keep the main body and the heavy artillery prepared to intervene in order to break up resistances which can not be turned.

1. (From p. 54) General Humbert, Personal and Secret Instruction No. 94 O.P. of the 27th of August. See Annex No. 229.

2. General Fayolle, Note for the 1st and IIIrd Armies, No. 6779 of the 27th of August. See Annex No. 226.

In less than 48 hours, the left of the 1st Army advanced nearly 15 kilometers.

It found that it got along better as it progressively lightened itself of the 10 brigades of British heavy artillery,--which had been momentarily left at its disposition, and which Marshal Foch had just ordered to return to the British lines. (3)

With the artillery, although considerably diminished, that remained to it, General Debenev prepared to force the Canal of the North, if the enemy resisted there: the principal action should aim at height 77, 400 metres to the east of Nesle--a height which would advantageously be subjected to concentrated fire (4); the XXXVth Corps would flank it from the north-west toward the south-east in the general direction Rouy--le-Petit--Voyennes; the XXXIst Corps from west to east; while further to the south, the Xth Corps would make a demonstration toward the south of Ercheu and Libermont.

3. Order which had been transmitted to the G.A.R. by cypher telegram from G.H.Q., No. 2396 of the 24th of August; the progressive withdrawal of the British heavy artillery was to be completed during the first few days of September.

4. General Debenev, General Order No. 729 of the 28th of August. See Annex No. 230.

On the 29th, the enemy offered a strong resistance:

---on the one hand, to the efforts of the 1st Army, which
do more than
did not manage to/occupy the banks of the Canal;

---on the other hand, to the heavy attack which the Xth Army
carried out toward the plateaux to the north of Soissons (I).

But he yielded in the centre.

On the evening of the 28th, the XVIIIth Corps and the XVth
Corps had made contact with each other toward Pont-L'Évêque and
la Rue d'Orroire.

On the morning of the 29th, they achieved the encirclement of
Noyon by the two wings, and the XVth Corps occupied the ruins of
the town.

Heavy artillery fire was concentrated on Mont Saint-Simeón,
where the enemy resistance was localized.

After that of Montdidier, the battle of Noyon was won: there
remained the organization of the advance toward the Hindenberg
Position, since the continuance of the enemy's retreat now appeared
to be unavoidable.

I. The Xth Army was able to do no more than relieve Juvigny,
Pusly and the immediate environs of Soissons.

CHAPTER X

GENERAL ADVANCE TOWARD THE HINDENBERG POSITION
(30th August--15th September)

I

CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACKS OF THE Xth ARMY
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLOITATION OF
THE SUCCESS FROM THE VESLE TO THE SOMME
(30th August--4th September)

II

ECONOMY OF FORCES UNDER THE G. A. R.,
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
(2nd--8th September)

III

MAKING CONTACT WITH THE HINDENBERG POSITION
(4th--15th September)

I

CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACKS OF THE Xth ARMY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLOITATION OF THE SUCCESS FROM THE VESLE TO THE SOMME (30th August--4th September) (See Maps Nos. 25 and 28)

The 3rd phase of the Montdidier--Noyon offensive was marked by the general advance toward the Hindenberg Position:

---with strenuous attacks by the Xth Army, which was trying to reach this position ahead of the enemy, in order to prevent his establishing himself there;

---with a progressively thinned-out order of battle on the part of the IIIrd and Ist Armies, whose only mission was to pursue the enemy, and who were under the necessity of reorganizing their resources in proportion as opportunity to do so was offered by the gradual narrowing of their fronts.

On the 29th and 30th of August, General Fayolle ordered:
the Ist Army

--to continue its undertakings having in view the capture of the bridge-head of Rouy--Voyennes (I), while at the same time increasing the echelonment in depth of its reserves, and putting two divisions in the G. A. R. reserves (I);

I. General Fayolle, Instructions Nos. 7039 and 7140 of the 29th and 30th of August, respectively. See Annexes Nos. 231 and 234.

---the IIIrd Army to take as its objective the salient of Chevilly (2) on the east bank of the Canal, and to thin-out its

2. General Fayolle, Instructions Nos. 7039 and 7139 of the 29th of August. See Annexes Nos. 231 and 232.

front to the south, in such a fashion as to be able to place 3 or 4 Divisions in the G.A.R. reserves---the XVIIIth Corps being placed again under the orders of the Commanding General of

the IIIrd Army, which, as a consequence, would be able to manoeuvre on both banks of the Oise;

---the Xth Army to initiate an ensemble operation aimed against the plateaux of Laffaux and an exploitation in the direction of Laon.

On the 30th and 31st of August and the 1st of September, heavy fighting took place, whose results, while not great in extent, nevertheless prepared the way for the resumption of the advance movement.

The XXXVIth and XXXIst Corps succeeded in establishing a bridge-head to the west of Voyennes, and reached the near border of ^{Hill} ~~point~~ 77.

The XVth Corps occupied Mont-Simon.

The ensemble attacks of the Xth Army were resumed on the 31st, in conformity with the instruction given by General Fayolle and the Orders of General Mangin. (1)

The XXXth and Ist Corps--from the moment they began to advance, on the 31st, at 16 hrs.--again encountered a very strong resistance. However, their Divisions succeeded in advancing, to the north, toward Coucy-le-Chateau, and, in the center, in penetrating into Terny-Sorny (^{32nd} ~~Inf.~~ Inf. Div., U.S).--These local successes were enlarged on the 1st of September: the Army now had a solidly established bridge-head on the right bank of the Ailette, from Champs to the Nogentel Farm, and, from the Terny-Sorny plateau, was able to concentrate a powerful fire toward the Moulin de Laffaux, its principal objective.

General Mangin ordered that the general attack be resumed on the 2nd (2), but at the same time, he reported to General Fayolle (3) the especially difficult conditions of this battle and showed the necessity of ordering fresh units to join the Xth Army.

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1. General Mangin, Order No. 471 of the 31st of August.
 2. General Mangin, Order No. 476 of the 1st of September.
 3. General Mangin, Letter No. II24 of the 1st of September.
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On the 2nd of September, at 14 hrs., there was a further attack by the XXXth and 1st Corps, which this time obtained a very appreciable success, reaching as far as Loeuilly and the Mont de Loeuilly, relieving Soissons by the occupation of Clamecy and Crouy, and making about 1,000 prisoners.

On the 3rd, these gains were increased, and 1,000 more prisoners were taken.

The Xth Army touched the Hindenberg position.

Undoubtedly, it had not reached the position "with all possible speed"--as General Mangin's orders of the 25th and 26th had urged upon those charged with executing them---but the Army had been so inspired by the offensive spirit contained in those orders that it had not once ceased its attacks, even though it were suffering heavy losses, and undergoing tremendous hardships.

From the 4th of September, the results that had been sought--that is to say, the double exploitation of the battles of Chateau-Thierry--Soissons and Montdidier--Noyon--began to be achieved: the enemy was drawing back from Fismes to Nesle, from the Vesle to the Somme.

II

ECONOMY OF FORCES UNDER THE G.A.R.,
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
(2nd--8th September)
(See Maps Nos. 26 and 28)

On the 3rd of September, General Fayolle urged the General-in-Chief to reinforce the Xth Army, whose losses had been very great. (I)

But the moment had not arrived for acceding to this request--in fact, a contrary condition existed.

In truth, the battle from now on went beyond the field of action of the G. A. R. The situation of the enemy was such that it became possible to aim not only at keeping him from establishing himself in the Hindenberg position, but at pressing him still further back, on the wings of the ensemble of his strategic order of battle, with a view of forcing him, progressively, into the trap of the massif of the Ardennes.

On the 30th of August, Marshal Foch (2) caused the offensive to enter upon its decisive period, by developing in this sense *the plan* which had been adopted at the meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief on the 24th of July.

The essential role placed responsibility:

---On the British Armies "supported by the left of the French Armies", for an action in the general direction of Cambrai--Saint-Quentin;

---on the right of the French Armies and on the American Army for an action in the general direction of Mézières.

1. General Fayolle, Letter No. 7571 of the 3rd of September.

2. This new orientation will be more completely explained at the beginning of the IVth Part of this Report, but it was necessary to indicate it here, in order to make clear the new mission of the G.A.R. and the relief of its forces which became necessary for the completion of the new projects.

In consequence, a succession of Instructions and Telegrammes rapidly depleted the forces of the G.A.R., to the advantage

---on one hand, of the 1st American Army, which was due to carry out, about the middle of September, an attack against the Saint-Mihiel salient;

---on the other hand, of the right of the French Armies and of the American Army, for their operations in the direction of Mézières;

---finally, of the extreme left of the field of battle, on the shores of the North Sea, where French forces were going to be called on to cooperate in the offensive of the Belgian Army.

On the 1st of September, the General-in-Chief decided to withdraw the VIth Army from the front. (1)

On the 2nd, General Fayolle ^{was} ## notified that he should place the Aeronautic Division at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible, and that one brigade should immediately set out for the east. (2)

From the 1st to the 3rd, orders were given to pass four Divisions into G.H.Q. Reserve: the 74th (transported toward the east), the 2nd Moroccan and the 48th Inf. Div. (transported in automobiles toward La Ferté-Gaucher and Coulommiers), and the 68th Inf. Div.

On the 4th, an order was issued to free, before the 17th, the following artillery organizations: (3)

12 regiments of 75's ~~portés~~;

the 81st, 84th, 87th, and 89th Regiments of heavy artillery;

the 286th, 288th, 289th, 313th, 320th, 416th, 418th and

452nd Regiments of heavy artillery.

On the 7th, an ensemble Instruction (4) informed the G.A.R. that the number of great units assigned to it would soon be reduced,

I. General Petain (G.Q.G., D.A.), Order No. 1501 and cypher telegram No. 2688 of the 1st of September: the VIth Army took up quarters at Chateau-Thierry, with the exception of General Degoutte and those of his ~~#####~~ staff officers who were given a special mission (preparation of the Belgian operations). See Annex No. 237.

2. General Petain (3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 270I of the 2nd of September. See Annex No. 24I.

3. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Note No. 4787 of the 4th of September. See Annex No. 245.

4. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Instruction No. 9299 of the 7th of September. See Annex No. 256.

and that, "from the point of view of the offensive, the situation of the Xth Army was most important, since the right wing of this Army can manoeuvre in such a way as to cause the fall of the defenses of the Chemin des Dames and of the Ailette."

But even for the Xth Army, it is only a question of "manoeuvre"--that is to say, of results to be sought by the general disposition of the advance movement--and not of new attacks.

On the 8th, a telegram (1) ordered the regrouping and the entraining for their centres all the Xth Army's organizations of Tanks;

---the whole of the 502nd;

---two battalions of the 503rd;

---one battalion of the 504th.

Furthermore, and for the purpose of preparing for important concentrations for later offensives, the General-in-Chief took into account the probability that the enemy would attempt to withdraw by a great and rapid movement in retreat.

A Note to the groups of Armies (2) ordered the complete working out of plans for an instant movement, designed to insure the rapid forward advance of all the resources of the Army in case the enemy should thus withdraw.

1. General Petain (3rd Bureau), cypher telegram No. 2942 of the 8th of September. See Annex No. 263.

2. General Petain (G.H.Q., 3rd Bureau) No. 540I of the 4th of September. See Annex No. 246.

In this Note, the G.A.R. received the indication of its general axis of pursuit in the direction of the north-east--its left toward Saint-Quentin, its right toward Rozoy-sur-Serre, Le Cerleau and Maubert-Fontaine.

To economize forces, even those of the Xth Army, to echelon them

in depth in such a fashion as to be able to "hold out" and to "advance easily", such was the ^{new} mission of the G.A.R.

General Fayolle issued the detailed orders concerning this mission to his Armies--therein confirming the earlier dispositions given to the 1st and IIIrd Armies--as a new disposition for the Xth Army.

He especially called General Mangin's attention to the necessity of diminishing the density of his front and of economizing his Divisions (I):

"Maximum of artillery, minimum of infantry, disposition in depth, as rapid a reorganization of the reserves as possible, such is the rule to be followed."

An Instruction given to the three Armies (4) Ordered them not to approach the Hindenberg Position without great precautions, and to carry out reconnaissances with great care, so that the Commander might decide the best conditions for advancing toward it: the Armies, while advancing toward this position should continue to reduce the density of their battle order and to organize their reserves, only the Xth Army holding itself in readiness to pursue its action toward the Moulin de Laffaux and the Plateau of la Malmaison.

1. General Fayolle, Note No. 7941 of the 6th of September, for the Xth Army. See Annex No. 253.

2. General Fayolle, Instruction No. 8123 of the 7th of September. See Annex No. 258.

III

MAKING CONTACT WITH THE HINDENBERG POSITION

(4th--15th September)

(See Maps Nos. 27 and 28)

From the 4th to the 8th of September the advance became general along the whole of the front.

The enemy rear-guards did not offer notable resistance except:

--on the 7th, toward Fluquières; on the 7th and 8th, toward Saint-Simon and the Canal of Crozat, in front of the 1st Army;

---on the 5th, toward Maucourt, in front of the IIIrd Army;

---after the 7th, from Vauxaillon to the Moulin de Laffaux and to Celles-sur-Aisne, in front of the Xth Army.

From the 8th^{to the 12th}, the advance-guards entered little by little into the zone of fire, and were obliged to become more cautious in their advance; furthermore, they realized that along the whole of the front, the enemy was occupying his old organizations in force: one could not dream of forcing them for the moment.

On the 11th, the General-in-Chief decided to retire the IIrd Army (I), in conformity with prepared dispositions.

General Fayolle decided that, after the 14th, the sector of the IIIrd Army should be absorbed by the 1st Army. (2).

He instructed the Commanders of the 1st and IIIrd Armies (3) concerning the conditions under which their forces should be organized, as soon as all the transfers planned by the General-in-Chief should have been completed.

This reorganization should bring about a regrouping of the Army Corps with their organic Divisions on the following theoretic bases:

a)--The 1st Army would have 5 Army Corps and 12 Inf. Dives.

1. General Petain (3rd Bureau), Order No. 14942 of the 11th of September. See Annex No. 267.

2. General Fayolle, Note No. 8669 of the 12th of September. See Annex No. 271.

3. General Fayolle, Note No. 8603 for the 1st Army and 8604 for the Xth Army, of the 12th of September. See Annexes Nos. 269 and 270.

These would be, in principle, the XXXVith, XXXIst, XVth, XXXIVth and VIIIth, with their organic Infantry Divisions, plus one isolated Infantry Division.

b)---The Xth Army would keep only 5 Army Corps and 15 Infantry Divisions, which would be, in principle, the XXXth, XXXVth, XVth, XVIIIth and XIIth, with their organic Infantry Divisions, and 4 isolated Infantry Divisions.

In fact, during the weeks that followed, this regrouping was begun, but it could not be completely carried out--on account of the necessity of sustaining, with all disposable resources, the battles of Champagne and of Flanders.

The 1st Army established itself methodically in contact with the Hindenberg position, in such a manner as to avoid all unnecessary losses and to reserve itself for actions which it would soon have to develop in liaison with the British right.

General Debeney, on the 7th of September, thus stated the mission of the Army Corps: (I)

"Before attacking the Hindenberg position the Army will take up the following disposition:

"---2 Inf. Divs. each in the 1st line of the XXXVith and XXXIst Corps;

"---I Inf. Div. in the 1st line of the Xth Army Corps.

"The main bodies of the 1st line Infantry Divisions will not pass beyond the line Vaux-Fluquières-Happencourt-Artemps-Avesne,-- west bank of the Crozat Canal: this line will be the Army's line of resistance in case of a German counter-offensive; under its protection, the heavy artillery should be brought up without delay.

I. General Debeney, General Order No. 782 of the 7th of September. See Annex No. 259.

"Each Infantry Division will post in front of this line an

advance-guard comprising the divisional cavalry, one regiment of infantry and a group of artillery.

"This advance-guard will keep in close contact with the enemy, will throw him back into his old positions, and will furnish the advanced posts."

It was in this echeloned formation that the Army advanced from the 8th to the 12th, carrying out without great difficulty, as it progressed, several rather heavy combats and occupying the important points of the advanced defences west of Saint-Quentin:

---on the 9th, Roupy, Grand-Séraucourt, Clastres, Montescourt, Remigny;

---on the 10th, Gibercourt, and Hinacourt;

---on the 12th, Savy.

The development of the operations beyond these points will be studied in the Vth Part, together with the battle of Saint-Quentin.

The Xth Army, after the 8th, also made contact with the Hindenberg position, to the north of the Aisne, while thinning out its dispositions.

It was also holding itself in readiness to exert a new effort toward the Moulin de Laffaux.

This operation was initiated at day-break on the 14th of September and obtained a complete success: the Army occupied Vauxaillon, the Mont-des-Singes, the Moulin de Laffaux, Allement, the Mennejean Farm, and captured 2,500 prisoners.

At the end of 25 days of battle, in the course of which it overcame the most difficult resistences and endured great hardships, the Xth Army menaced, from the flank, the Chemin des Dames.

But all the Instructions that it received and all the dispositions that it made had the purpose of making it look further than this narrow field of battle: its next objective would be Laon.

ANNEXES

VII-VIII-IX-X

COPIES

OF THE PRINCIPAL ORDERS, DIRECTIVES,
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(Reduction of density of front).

Annex No. 253. Page 283

6th September--General Debeney--General Order No. 777 (Pursuit).
Annex No. 254. Page 284

7th September--General Petain--Cypher telegram to the G.A.R., No. 2,911 (Franco-British boundary).

Annex No. 255. Page 285

7th September--General Petain--Letter to the G.A.R., No. 9,299
(Withdrawals from the G.A.R.)

Annex No. 256. Page 286

7th September--General Petain--Cypher telegram No. 2,917.
(Withdrawal of the Vth Army).

Annex No. 257. Page 288

7th September--General Fayolle--Instruction for the Armies, No. 8,123 (Pursuit).

Annex No. 258. Page 289

7th September--General Debeney--General Order No. 782 (Echelonment in depth during the pursuit).

Annex No. 259. Page 291

7th September--General Mangin--General Order No. 521 (New attacks by the Xth Army)

Annex No. 260. Page 293

7th September--General Mangin--General Order No. 524 (Postponement of these attacks).

Annex No. 261. Page 294

7th September--General Mangin--Instruction for the Army Corps, No. I.160. (Complementary to 524)

Annex No. 262. Page 295

8th September--General Petain--Cypher telegram No. 2,942, for the G.A.R. (Withdrawal of Tanks)

Annex No. 263. Page 296

8th September--General Fayolle--Note for the Armies, No. 8,200.
(Reduction of density of front).

Annex No. 264. Page 297

8th September--General Petain--Letter to the G.A.C., No. II,956.
(Withdrawal of the VIth Army).

Annex No. 265. Page 298

10th September--General Petain--Letter to the G.A.R., No. 13,760.
(New constitution of the G.A.R.)

Annex No. 266. Page 299

11th September--General Petain--Order No. 14,942 (Withdrawal of the
IIIrd Army).

Annex No. 267. Page 302

11th September--G.H.Q. (2nd Bureau)--Distribution of German Infantry
Divisions as of September 10th.

Annex No. 268. Page 305

12th September--General Fayolle--Letter to the Commanding General
of the Xth Army, No. 8,604. (Composition of Army).

Annex No. 269. Page 307

12th September--General Fayolle--Letter to the Commanding General
of the Ist Army, No. 8,603 (Composition of Army).

Annex No. 270. Page 309

12th September--General Fayolle--Note No. 8,669 (Transfer of the
sector of the IIIrd Army to the Ist and Xth Armies).

Annex No. 271. Page 311

14th September--G.H.Q. (2nd Bureau)--Note on the situation of the
German Army on the 1st of September.

Annex No. 272. Page 315

15th September--General Fayolle--Instruction for the Armies, No.
8,961. (Missions of the Armies and reconstitution of Units).

Annex No. 273. Page 317

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ANNEX NO. I24.

OFFICE OF THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the
ALLIED ARMIES

24 July 1918.

GENERAL STAFF
1st Section
3rd Bureau
No. 2374


General Foch
Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies, to M. the
Commanding General-in-Chief
of the Armies of the North and
North-East.

I have the honor of sending you herewith the memorandum on the present military situation and the coming operations for which plans are to be made, which was made known to you at the meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief on the 24th of July,. You have already had the kindness to express yourself as being in agreement with me in regard to the programme to be followed in the said operations.

I request that you be good enough to make known to me without delay any observations that may occur to you after having carefully studied this programme.

There is also included the questionnaire which you heard read at the meeting: it would be advantageous if the information called for came to me before the next conference, in which I shall ask you to take part, about a month from now.

FOCH

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THE GENERAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

Headquarters, 24 July 1918.

GENERAL STAFF
No. 2375


Memorandum read at the meeting of
the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies.

I

The 5th German offensive, obstructed at its start, has been from the beginning a ~~check~~ check.

The offensive taken by the Xth and VIth French Armies has transformed it into a defeat.

This defeat is now ready to be exploited to the fullest extent on the same terrain as that on which the battle was fought: This is the aim which we have before us as we keep up our attacks without pause and with the greatest energy.

But its consequences are extending beyond this single battle.

II

The defeat of the enemy properly conditions the general attitude that the Allied Armies ought to assume.

In effect, today:

Without superiority yet being on our side as far as the number of Infantry Divisions is concerned, we have already attained at least an equality in the number of battalions, and in a more general manner in the number of effectives.

For the first time, as a result of the quantity of Divisions that the Germans have had to throw into battle, we have superiority in the number of reserves; and by reason of the large number of fatigued Divisions that the Germans have been obliged to relieve on the battle front, we shall soon have, also, superiority in the number of fresh reserves.

On the other hand, our information agrees in showing us an enemy reduced to having two Armies: an army of occupation to be sacrificed, without effectives, maintained for a long time on the front; and, manoeuvring behind this fragile facade, a "shock" Army, the object of all the cares of the German High Command, but already considerably damaged.

Furthermore, the Allies undoubtedly have a superiority in material resources: in Aviation, in Tanks, in Artillery, this superiority, slight at present, is destined to increase in proportion to the arrival of the American artillery.

Finally, in the rear ~~####~~ of the Armies: on the side of the Allies, the powerful reserve of forces from America pours 250,000 men each month upon the soil of France; on the side of the enemy, the exceptional measures that he has been obliged to take to meet the crisis in effectives during the month of May are well known; and it is easy to see, in the difficulty that he is encountering now in keeping up the effectives of his units, that a new crisis is beginning for him.

To all these facts indicating the return to our side of the factor of "material force" should be added the moral ascendancy which we have had continuously since the beginning of the battle, by reason of the fact that the enemy, in spite of his unprecedented efforts, has not been able to obtain the decisive results which were essential to him: a moral ascendancy increased today by the victory won by the Allied Armies.

The Allied Armies are now at the turn of the road: in the midst of the pitched battle, they have recovered the initiative; their strength permits them to keep it; the principles of war command them to do so.

The moment has come to abandon the general attitude of the defensive, imposed upon us up to now by our numerical inferiority, and to pass to the offensive.

III

Without seeking a decision, this offensive, in a series of actions to be undertaken from now onward, will aim at the useful following/results:

1.--Useful for the development of future operations.

2.--Useful to the economic life of the country.

---And it will enable the Allies to control the conduct of the battle, since the initiative will be on their side.

These actions should be executed under conditions permitting great rapidity of movement, which will permit us to strike the enemy repeated blows: these conditions necessarily limit the extent of the actions.

This extent of action is also further limited by the reduced number of units which the Allied Armies have at their disposition, for the offensive, after four months of battle.

Inspired by these considerations, the programme of future offensive actions is laid down as follows:

I. Operations designed to relieve the railways indispensable to the future manoeuvres of the Allied Armies:

a) relief of the Paris-Avicourt railway in the region of the Marne;--this is the minimum result to be obtained by the present offensive;

b) relief of the Paris-Amiens railway, by a combined action of the British and French Armies;

c) relief of the Paris-Avicourt railway in the region of Commercy, by the reduction of the Saint-Mihiel salient (I)--an operation to be prepared without delay and to be undertaken by the American Armies as soon as they have at their disposal sufficient means.

2. Operations aimed at the relief of the regions of the mines in the north and at definitely driving the enemy out of the region of Dunkirk and Calais.

These operations will necessitate two attacks, which may be carried out separately or in conjunction with one another.

As has been said above, these actions are to be carried out with short intervals, in such fashion as to trouble the enemy in the manoeuvre of his reserves, and as not to allow him time enough to reorganize his units.

I. This operation, without speaking of the advantageous reduction of front that it would cause, amongst other things, to the two parties, will put us in range of the region of Briey and in a position to act energetically between the Meuse and the Moselle, which latter action may one day become necessary.

These operations are to be abundantly provided with all

necessary means, so as to insure a certain success.

They should, finally, achieve surprise at all costs. Recent operations show that surprise is an indispensable condition to a success.

IV

How far the different operations outlined above will lead us, in time and in space, it is impossible to foresee at the present moment.---However, if the results which they aim at are attained before the season is too far advanced, it is possible to imagine, for the end of the summer or for the autumn, an offensive of importance, of such a nature as to augment our advantages and to give the enemy no rest.

It is yet too soon to be able to speak of this eventuality in a more precise fashion.

V

It is necessary, finally, to consider that in the course of these operations the enemy, in order to escape encirclement or to husband his effectives, may be forced to carry out successive withdrawals to shorter lines prepared in advance.

These manoeuvres should not surprise the Allied Armies.

It therefore is the duty of each Army:

---to determine the possible withdrawals by a study of the map of the enemy's rear organizations;

---to have all necessary actions prepared for, so that ^{the enemy} ~~he~~ will not be able to carry out his manoeuvres at leisure.

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ANNEX NO. 125.

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
OF THE ARMIES OF THE EAST
AND NORTH-EAST.

Headquarters, 26 July 1918.

GENERAL STAFF
3rd Bureau
No. 36,008


The General Commander-in-Chief,
to the General, Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied Armies.

In reply to your letter No. 2,374 of the 24th of July, I have the honor to inform you that I am in agreement with you as to the ensemble of the programme for future operations:

1st, Relief of the Paris-Avrincourt railway in the region of the Marne by the continuation of the present offensive.

2nd, Relief of the Paris-Amiens railway by a combined action by the British and French Armies.

I agree with the Generals commanding the G.A.R. and the 1st Army that the result sought should and can be obtained as quickly as possible in order to profit by the delicate situation in which the action of July 23rd, on the left bank of the Avre, has placed the enemy, and of the fact that his attention is now drawn toward the Soissons-Rheims sector by the battle now going on; beginning the 10th of August, General Debeney will have the necessary means.

3rd. Reduction of the Saint-Mihiel salient with the possible cooperation of French troops, notably the long range, large calibre heavy artillery.

This attack, to be carried out before the season of rains, that is to say, before the 1st of September, will constitute with the operations in the Armentières pocket, the offensive of importance that you have in mind for the end of the summer or in the autumn. It will probably exhaust--but for a useful and complete result--the French resources for the year 1918.

There is every reason, in effect, to reserve the 1919 class for the following spring.

In regard to the operations in the Armentières pocket and, in a general way, to the north of the Somme, it seems to me necessary to admit in principle, at least for the present, that the French forces will not take any part in them, at least in 1918.

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I am having a study made of the possible withdrawals of the enemy and I shall send you, as soon as I have the elements, all the information demanded in the questionnaire inclosed in your letter of the 24th of July.

PETAIN.

ANNEX NO. 126

Headquarters, 31 July 1918.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

GREAT GENERAL STAFF
1st Section
3rd Bureau
No. 2557.

GENERAL FOCH, Commander-in-
Chief of the Allied Armies,
to the General, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armies of the
North and the North-East.

In reply to your letter No. 41,366 of the 31st of July, I have the honor of requesting you to inform me at once what will be the deficiency in effectives in the Moroccan Division, the 153rd and 47th Inf. Divs., as of the date of the 3rd of the coming August, since, in case one of these Divisions is unfit to march, I shall request you to send another one to the 1st Army without any delay.

FOCH.

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ANNEX NO. 127

1st ARMY,
General Staff
3rd Bureau,
No. 2,859/3.

Headquarters of the Army,
31 July, 1918.

[REDACTED] NO. 520,
FOR THE COMMANDERS OF THE 31st, 9th,
and 10th Army Corps.

I. The 31st Corps will carry out an operation on the heights to the east of Monreuil.

This operation will be exploited by the taking of the ravine openings on the right bank of the Avre lying in front of the whole front of the Army.

II. The 31st Corps, starting from the base of la Luce, will capture the high ground of the hill IIO and will pursue its attack on Mezières and the Genonville woods. It will continue its offensive in the direction of Hangeat-en-Santerre.

Moreuil will be reduced by encirclement.

The 9th Corps will clean up the spur of Saint-Rébert; it will capture the Fileschamp farm and Braches. Its mission is to assure the crossings of the Avre at Braches and, further up, to place some troops on the right bank to link-up with the 31st Corps and prepare for the initial advance of the 10th Corps.

These operations will take place on the day J.

III.---On the day J-plus-I, the 31st Corps will continue its advance in the ~~direction~~ of Hangeat, Arvillers.

The 10th Corps, taking advantage^{of the advance} of the 9th Corps, will have the 152nd Division make an attack on Hargicourt, Bouillancourt wood with the mission of capturing the ravine-mouth of Pierrepont and to advance as far as possible on the high ground between the Avre and the Doms brook.

The 152nd Div. will link up, to the north of the Avre, with the right of the 31st Corps by passing through the troops of the 9th Corps.

In proportion as the 31st Corps progresses, the mission of the 10th Corps will continue to be to cover the right of this Army Corps by holding the valley of the Avre and the plateau between the Avre

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and the Doms brook. The I52nd, then the I66th, if there is need of it, will be employed in this mission.

IV.--Once the junction between the IOth Corps and the 31st Corps is assured, the 9th Corps will be retired from the front, with the exception of its artillery, which will provisionally remain in Army reserve.

V. The Commanders of the Army Corps will cause all their preparations to be made in the most complete secrecy, so that a surprise may be obtained.

Each of them will receive a special order setting forth the resources placed at his disposition and necessary indications concerning the particular nature of his operation.

The officers charged with working out the preparation should be designated by name by the Commander of the Army Corps, orders should be written or typed by the officers themselves, the use of the telephone is forbidden. All indiscretions will be the object of the severest penalties.

General DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 128.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF
3rd Bureau,
No. 2,860/3.

Army Headquarters, 31 July, 1918.

[REDACTED] No. 521.

I. The accompanying tables show the distribution of the artillery among the Army Corps for the operation ordered in the Personal and Secret Instruction No. 520 of the Commanding General of the Army.

Furthermore, the Army Corps will lend each other support to the maximum compatible with their missions, as follows:

the 9th Corps will support the 31st Corps;

the 10th Corps will support the 9th Corps.

II. Conditions under which the artillery shall be deployed:

The artillery shall be deployed before the attack as far forward as possible, so as to obtain a very deep penetration of fire into the enemy zone, and to insure to the infantry the maximum fire support ^{from} the initial positions. Furthermore, the necessary displacements during the course of the operation will be planned out in advance.

The additional units attached to the Army Corps are placed at their disposition as of the date of August 3rd, in order that they may carry out their reconnaissances, and prepare for their intervention and their displacement.

The groupements of the heavy artillery (Army of the North) and of heavy artillery (Army of the South) will be respectively at the disposition of the 31st Corps and of the 9th Corps on their new emplacements starting from the day J-plus-I.

The batteries will not be displaced until as late as possible, and will occupy their new emplacements according to the following schedule:

Batteries of heavy artillery, long range, large calibre:

Nights of the 5th-6th and 6th-7th of August;

Batteries of Heavy artillery: Night of the 6th-7th of August;

Batteries of field artillery: Night of the 7th-8th of August.

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The greatest care must be taken to insure secrecy.

No battery movements will be made by day light.

The movements ordered should be brought to the attention of those responsible for making them in the form of a modification of the artillery disposition resulting from tendencies noted among the enemy to withdraw himself on the right bank of the Avre.

The fire preparation shall also be made as completely as possible by map firing. All range-finding and bracketing firing will be prohibited before day J. In particular, the advanced batteries should remain silent until the moment of starting the preparation for the attack.

III. Normal Zones and Eventual Zones:

For this operation, the boundaries of the normal zones of the Corps artillery will remain as they are at present prescribed.

The eventual zones will result from the possibilities of fire and from the extreme range of the pieces. Nevertheless, the 9th Corps will place its artillery in such a manner as to be able to bring into action at least half of its long range heavy artillery upon the zone of the 31st Corps, as far as the line Slope IIO, Fresnoy-en-Chaussée (inclusive). At the same time, the 10th Corps should be able to support the 9th Corps at least with the fire of its long range heavy artillery as far as the line Braches--Hangest-en-Santerre (these two localities exclusive).

IV--The Staff of the 284th Regt. of Heavy Artillery; the 11th and 12th *S.T.M.* of the 284th Regiment of Heavy Artillery, coming from the 10th Corps;

The Staff of the 288th Regt. of Heavy Artillery, coming from the 9th Corps;

The Staff of the 88th Regt. of Heavy Artillery; the 1st *S.T.M.* of the 88th Regt. of Heavy Artillery, coming from the Army (South) Heavy Artillery, are placed at the disposition of the 31st Corps from the present moment.

V. The disposition of aviation units will be fixed later.

(Accompanying ANNEX NO. 128)

ADDITION TO SPECIAL ORDER NO. 521, of the
31st of July 1918.

BOUNDARIES OF THE NORMAL ARTILLERY ZONES BETWEEN
THE ARMY CORPS

During the course of the attack, the initial boundaries of the normal artillery zones between the 31st Corps and the 9th Corps will naturally be displaced in proportion to the advance. The initiative of this displacement pertains to the 31st Corps, whose Commander will take up the matter directly with the 9th Corps.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

	Field Artillery	Trench Artillery	Short Range Heavy Artillery					Long Range Heavy Artillery							Large Calibre Heavy Artillery (Railway Mounted, Naval etc.)										
			155 C.S.	155 ch	155 C	220 T.R	220 A.M	280	94	105	120	145	155 L.S.	155 L. 17	155 L. 77	155 G.R.F.	16 M	240	19	32	274	340			
31 st Corps	Div. art./37-3 Gr.		VII/117	VI/132		I/288		V/288																	
	Div. art./42-3 Gr.		III/306			II/288		VI/289						I/306	II/88										
	Div. art./66-3 Gr.		VII/116			II/289				III/70				III/131	IV/88										
	246 th 2 Gr.		VI/115			II/284				III/71							III/71	I/74							
			VIII/120			I/284											VIII/71								
9 th Corps	Div. art./126-3 Gr.		VIII/131						I/131				III/420	413 th Regt. Heavy Art. Staff and 2 Gr.	I/88										
	Div. art./153-3 Gr.		III/338																						
	Div. art./47-3 Gr.		Staff/ II/313			III/298																			
	60 th 3 Gr., porties.																								
	Total of Batteries		69			48																			
10 th Corps	Div. Art./115-3 Gr.	VII/177	VI/142		I/284	III/289		V/284		I/136	II/120			III/109	V/84	IV/84									
		VIII/177	V/102			IV/288					III/69														
				III/301				VI/284																	
	Div. art./56-3 Gr.					III/287																			
	9 th 3 Gr., porties		VI/106																						
35 th Corps	46 th 3 Gr. porties																								
	Total of Batteries		45			24																			
General total of Batteries	Div. art./60-3 Gr.		VII/110		72 nd /3 Cl.		75		60	I/110	II/110		III/110												
	Div. art./152-3 Gr.		VII/109				76/3		61		III/67														
	Div. art./166-3 Gr.		VIII/106	VI/131	73 rd /3 Cl.				66																
	Total of Batteries		27			16																			
Pieces	Div. art./169-3 Gr.		VIII/108			I/286				I/135					II/89	III/87									
	Div. art./133-3 Gr.		VI/136			II/286									II/89	IV/87									
	Div. art./46-3 Gr.		VII/138			IV/289									IV/89										
	Div. art./M-3 Gr.		VII/112												III/135										
	258 th 7 A. Regt.-3 Gr.																								
Army Elements	Div. art. of the 2 nd Cav. Corps-3 Gr.																								
	Total of Batteries		54			18																22/77			
General total of Batteries	Army Elements																								
	Total of Batteries		195			57	9	4	26	4			3	12	10	3	3	6	26	16	3	14	2	3	1
Pieces																									
	Total of Batteries		700			228	36	20	104	20	24		18	48	56	12	12	24	104	64	6	34	8	4	2

ANNEX NO. 129

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF
3rd Bureau,
No. 2,961/3

Army Headquarters, 31st July 1918.

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 522, for the
General commanding the 31st Army Corps.

I. The mission of the 31st Corps is defined in the Personal and Secret Instruction of the 31st of July, No. 520

The first day's attack will be pushed to the limit in the direction of Hangest, so as to utilize the initial success to the maximum. The points of support will be attacked by overlapping. The numerous reserves which are behind the 31st Corps permit it ^{to be} rapidly safeguarded in the most perilous situations.

II. The attack of the 31st Corps will be preceded by a short and violent artillery preparation. The duration of this preparation as well as the hour of the attack will be fixed by the Commanding General of the Army.

III. In its offensive, the 31st Corps will be flanked:

a) on the left, by the IVth Army W; border between the French and British Armies: ravine between the Dodu Wood and slope IIO,-- dirt road bordering slope IIO,---north edge of the small woods north of Villers-aux-Erables,---north edge of Mézières,---road from Amiens to Roye (to the W).

The method of liaison between the two Armies will be fixed by an understanding on the part of the two neighboring Corps Commanders, as well as the cooperation of British tanks in the attack on Villers-aux-Erables and Mézières.

Furthermore, the artillery of the 31st Corps should be able eventually to bring under its fire the ridge of the Dodu Wood and the country along the Roye road, and should be as alert to support the British right, in case of necessity, as to cover the left flank.

b) On the right, by the attack of the 9th Corps on Saint-Ribert and La Neuville-Sire-Bernard, then by the 10th Corps when the latter shall have passed through the 9th. Limit between the 9th and the 31st Corps on J-day: Ridge 87 and Ridge 86 to the 31st

Corps; the boundary will be the road/^{from}Mailly-Raineval to Moreuil.

Machine guns shall be placed as quickly as possible on Ridge 86 to fire on the roads on the right bank of the Avre bordering Moreuil, and to fire on the flank and rear of the Genonville Wood.

The troops of the 31st Corps operating ~~to~~ the east of the Avre will endeavor to establish liaison with the 9th Corps in the neighborhood of La Neuville-Sire-Bernard.

IV. Means at the disposition of the 31st Corps on J-day:

the 42nd Inf. Div. will bivouac during the night of the 6th-7th of August in the zone of Cottency-Fouencamps, Woods to the west of Paraclet; Command-Post at Paraclet;

the 37th Inf. Div.;

the 66th Inf. Div.;

Artillery (see special order);

Aviation (see special order);

Tanks (Eventually).

Beginning on the evening of J-day, the 31st will have at its disposition two supplementary Inf. Divs.

The 42nd Div. will be relieved by being passed through on the day J-plus-I by one of the reserve Divisions. The other Division will be ready to interpose itself between this Division and the 37th, either on the day J-plus-I, or even during the evening of the day J, in such a fashion as to enable the advance on Hangest to conserve all its vigor.

V. The two reserve Divisions will take their stations, beginning the night of the 6th-7th of August, as follows:

One Inf. Div. in the woods between Estrées, Cottency and Guyencourt; P.-C. at Estrées.

One Inf. Div. between Guyencourt (inclusive), Jumel (inclusive) and Estrées (exclusive); P.-C. at Guyencourt.

VI. The infantry deployments for the attack will be made in the night J-minus-I to J.

VII. P.-C. of the 31st Corps: Ailly-sur-Noye; O. P. toward hill 128.

VIII. The most rigorous measures will be taken to keep the

assembling of all units hidden from aerial observation: by utilization of woods, prohibition of circulation by day light except when under ample cover (sentinels).

IX. In the course of its advance, the 31st Corps should repair the Ailly-Monreuil, Mézières, Hangest, Arvillers, Erches and Flessier-Rozainvillers, Hangest, Hill 102, ravine north west of Saulchoy roads.

The immediate repair of the Castel and Monreuil bridges will be arranged by agreement with the Colonel commanding the Army Engineers.

X. For the purpose of insuring liaison with its neighbor on its left, the 31st will govern its advance by the following considerations:

It will take as first objective the opening of the Moreuil Woods on plateau 104.

The second objective for the Inf. Div. on the left will be Villers-aux-Érables and Mézières; the cooperation of the British tanks by an attack on the rear of these localities will be arranged for by a direct understanding between the two Generals of the Divisions concerned. The third objective is Fresnoy-en-Chaussée.

The second objective for the Inf. Div. on the right will be the Genonville Woods, beyond which liaison will be sought with the 9th Corps. The third objective will be Flessier-Rozainvillers.

The first reserve Division, having advanced without delay on the plateau 104, will follow behind the junction between the two first line Divisions and will interpose itself between them; it will march squarely in the direction Hill 101, Hangest-en-Santerre, passing by the halted Divisions in such a manner as to completely envelop their objectives. The cavalry of the 31st Corps will be placed at its disposition.

The second reserve Division will cross by the Castel bridge and will be placed quickly in the second line to support, if opportunity offers, the attack toward the end of the day.

The rapidity of the advance during the first days is of capital importance; the Generals of Divisions will follow their divisional reserves as closely as possible, in order to be able to make

rapid decisions, and to insure their immediate execution.

The accompanying artillery will be provided with labor troops to assist them to deal rapidly with difficulties encountered in rough terrain.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 130

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau,
No. 2,862/3.

Army Headquarters, 31st July 1918.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 523
for the Commanding General
of the 9th Army Corps.

I. The mission of the 9th Corps is defined in Personal and Secret Instruction No. 520 of the 31st of July.

II. Its attack will be preceded by a short and violent artillery preparation. The duration of this preparation as well as the hour of the attack will be fixed by the Commanding General of the Army.

III. Boundaries of the zone of action of the 9th Corps:

With the 31st Corps: Ridges 87 and 86 to the 31st Corps; the boundary will be the road from Mailly-Raineval to Moreuil.

With the 10th Corps: the attack of the 9th Corps having as its purpose on its right to open the way for a crossing of the Avre by the 10th Corps, the two Corps Commanders will arrange for the division of the terrain in which they will place their troops.

IV. The Corps will establish liaison with the 31st Corps to the east of the Avre at Neuville-Sire-Bernard, and in the directions leading from this locality toward the Genonville Woods and Le Plessier-Rozainvilliers.

From the start of the movement, machine guns will be placed on the ridges to the west of the Avre, to interdict the Moreuil-Montdidier road, the road from La Neuville-Sire-Bernard to Le Plessier-Rozainvilliers, and the ravine between Ridges 95 and 102.

The conditions in which the 152nd Inf. Div., on day J-plus-I, will pass through the troops of the 9th Corps will be fixed by an agreement between the Commanding Generals of the 9th and 10th Corps.

V. Means at the disposition of the 9th Corps:

15th Colonial Inf. Div.

3rd Inf. Div.

Artillery (See special order).

Aviation (See special order).

VI. The infantry will deploy for the attack during the night of J-minus-I to J.

The artillery will be put in place according to conditions fixed in a special order.

VII. The conditions in which the 9th Corps will retire, as soon as the junction of the 31st and 10th Corps shall have been realized, will be fixed by the Commanding General of the Army.

VIII. The 9th Corps should have everything prepared in advance to effect the repair, without delay, of the Sauvillers-Brache-La Neuville-Sire-Bernard road, and of the bridge at Braches. The Corps Commander will arrange for this with the Colonel commanding the Engineers of the Army.

IX. Two Inf. Divs. of Army reserve will be stationed on the 8th of August:

One Inf. Div. in the zone Berny, Hameville, Chaussoy, Flers, Bois de Berny; P.-C. at Berny.

One Inf. Div. in the zone Epagny, La Faloise, Hallivillers, l'Horty, Lawarde, Boneuil; P.-C. at La Faloise.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 131.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau,
No. 2,863/3.

Army Headquarters, 31st July 1918.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 524,
for the Commanding General of
the 10th Army Corps.

I. The mission of the 10th Corps is defined in Personal and Secret Instruction No. 520 of the 31st of July.

II. On J day, the 10th Corps will flank the right of the 9th Corps with heavy machine gun fire. The attack of the 9th Corps, having as its purpose on the right to open the way for a crossing of the Avre by the 10th Corps, the two Corps Commanders will arrange for the division of the terrain in which they will place their troops.

III. The attacks which the 10th Corps will execute, beginning with day J-plus-I will be in principle preceded by an artillery preparation, the duration and hour of which will be fixed by the Commanding General of the Army, in conformity with the general progress of the battle.

The attacks will, in principle, be executed by pushing the left forward, in such a manner as to make junction with the 31st Corps, and to open for the Corps the bridges over the Avre and the Doma brook by enveloping them along the right bank.

The conditions in which the 152nd Inf. Div. will pass through the troops of the 9th Corps will be fixed by an agreement between the Commanding Generals of the 9th and 10th Corps.

IV. The entry into line of the 166th Inf. Div., the flanking of this Division by the extension of the 60th, will be fixed from day to day by the Commanding General of the 10th Corps, in conformity with the development of the general advance.

At all times, the 152nd Div. should be in readiness to begin its movement, in case of necessity, during the afternoon of the day J, if a withdrawal of the German line should occur.

The eventual support to be given to the 10th Corps, in defensive position to the west of Montdidier, is planned for elsewhere by the Commanding General of the Army.

V. During the course of its advance, the 10th Corps should repair the following roads:

Coulemelle, Septoutre, Grivesnes, Aubvillers, Pierrepont, Le Hamel, Contoire, Davenescourt and:

Rocquencourt, Coulemelle, Le Plessier, Saint-Aignan, Malpart, Bouillancourt, Boussicourt;

The Corps Commander will arrange for this with the Colonel commanding the Army Engineers.

VI. The P.-C. of the 10th Corps: Le Mesnil-Saint-Firmin.

VII. Means at the disposition of the 10th Corps:

152nd Inf. Div.

166th Inf. Div.

60th Inf. Div.

Artillery (See special order).

Aviation (See special order).

GENERAL DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 132.

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH
AND NORTH EAST.

Great General Headquarters,
2 August 1918.

GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau,
No. 1,626.

[REDACTED]
To the General, Commander-in-Chief
of the Allied Armies.

In reply to your letter No. 2,557 of the 31st of July, I have the honor to inform you that, as of the date of August 3rd, the deficit in effectives in the 1st Moroccan Div., the 153rd and 47th Inf. Divs. will amount to:

1,252 men in the 1st Mor. Div.
1,378 men in the 153rd Div.
2,338 men in the 47th Div.

These figures are to be supplemented by the following observations:

1. The deficit in the 1st Mor. Div. is to be increased by 450 Russians, who belong to the Colonial Inf. Div., but who refuse to fight, declaring that they were engaged as labor troops.

2. I have decided to modify the Chasseur battallions of the 47th Inf. Div, now composed of 5 companies, of which one is a machine gun company, to the type of Chasseur battallions composed of 4 companies, of which one is a machine gun company. This change will be effected on the 5th of August. It will enable us to consider, as of that date, that the 47th Inf. Div. had no deficit.

3. In the estimation of the combat value of the three Divisions on the 3rd of August--especially that of the 1st Mor. Div. and the 153rd Div.--it should be kept in mind that the amalgamation of the reinforcements received will still be insufficiently assured, due to lack of time.

I believe, consequently, that only the 47th Inf. Div. will be in condition to go into battle in good shape on the date that you have designated.

The 153rd Div. will not, in reality, be ready until about the 10th or 12th of August, according to the rapidity in which the reinforcements can be amalgamated. In regard to the 1st Mor. Div., by reason of its special organization, it is not possible for me to

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estimate at present the date on which this great unit will be ready to go into battle, and it is my opinion that it would be better not to use it until considerable time has elapsed.

I shall replace it by the I26th Inf. Div., which has a deficit of I,2I7 men, but whose reinforcements are amalgamated, and which is in place. For the I53rd Div., if you judge that it should also be replaced, I shall send to the Ist Army the I32nd Inf. Div., which has taken part in the battle of the IVth Army, which at the present moment is receiving its replacements, and which can be entrained on the 3rd of August, to go to the Xth Army, with a deficit of I,047 men.

I have no other absolutely fresh Division at my disposition, as I have already indicated to you in my letter No. 41,366 of July 31st.

PETAIN.

ANNEX NO. 133.

G. A. R.,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 3rd August 1918; 20 hrs.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,129.

SITUATION ON THE FRONT OF THE G.A.R

3rd August--19 hrs.

Ist ARMY.

On the front of the Ist Army, the enemy has destroyed the Braches and d'Hargicourt bridges; he has evacuated his front lines in front of Grivesnes; further south, he has abandoned Fontaine-sur-Montdidier and Mesnil-Saint-Georges.

From these facts, it appears that he is retiring to the rear of the line Avre, Ruisseau of the 3 Doms.

The Ist Army is following him, keeping in close contact with his rear guards.

Furthermore, it is necessary to take all measures from this moment to bring up the artillery and to multiply the means of crossing the river.

IIIRD ARMY.

No change during the day,

The Army is observing the attitude of the enemy by intensifying reconnaissance.

Xth ARMY.

The Xth Army has occupied Soissons and also the faubourg Saint-Wast; to the east of the ^{town} ~~village~~, it rests on the Aisne and the Vesle.

VIth ARMY.

The VIth Army is in front of Fismes; it also rests on the Vesle above and below this town.

The two Armies are profiting by the pause which is occurring momentarily in the pursuit to reorganize their units, reconstitute reserves and to bring up, first, the mass of field artillery batteries, and later, the heavy artillery.

The VIth Army is to throw out without losing a moment reconnaissance on the right bank of the Vesle and to prepare for the crossing of the river.

It is essential to discover whether the enemy will hold on the Vesle or continue his retreat as far as the Aisne.

The points for crossing which seem most favorable are:

For the Xth Army:

The bends of the river above and below Braine.

For The Vith Army:

The bend at Bazoches.

A statement indicating the captures^(lost) of the G. A. R. during the month of July (from the 1st to the 31st) has been sent separately.

GENERAL FAYOLLE, COMMANDING THE G.A.R.

Fayolle.

ANNEX NO. 134.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 3rd August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 2,926/3.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 540,
for the Commanding General of
the 35th Army Corps.

Message to the Commanding General of the 35th Corps concerning
Personal and Secret Instruction No. 520 (remitted directly).

I. The 35th Corps will hold itself in readiness to support
the resistance of the 60th Division in the event of a German counter
attack to the west of Montdidier during the movement of the 10th
Corps to the north-west of that town. It will bring under the fire
of its heavy artillery the German batteries to the west and south
of Piennes.

II. As soon as the 10th Corps shall have overlapped Montdidier
on the north, the 35th Corps will be called upon to make an attack
in the direction of Assainvilliers, Faverolles with at least two
regiments and all the artillery it can assemble.

A divisional artillery will be given to it in supplement.

The attack will be prepared for in such a manner as to enable
it to be launched on the day J-plus-I, 8 hours after the Commanding
General of the Army shall have given the order for it; the order
will allow time for a preparation.

III. The Commander of the 35th Corps will keep in mind also
the possibility of a movement on the part of the enemy which will
enable him to straighten his front in the north-south direction.
In this case, Courcelles-Epayelles will be the pivot of the turning-
movement and the 35th Corps will place itself so as to face the
Boulogne-La-Grasse massif.

IV. The studies and preparations required by the present order
should be conducted with the greatest possible secrecy. Only
those indispensable to its execution should be successively informed
as to the special mission which concerns them; orders are to be
written or typed by the officers; use of the telephone is forbidden.

The general routine conduct of the front should not be altered, and the reconnaissances, reduced to a strict minimum, should be carried out with special precautions.

DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 135.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 3rd August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 2,934/3.

NOTE

I. The Army Corps should get themselves ready, from the receipt of the present note, to put into proper condition, with as little delay as possible, the principal roads which will facilitate the crossing of the Avre Valley in the event of an enemy withdrawal ahead of the front of the 1st Army; the principal roads are:

For the 31st Corps: Road from Ailly to Monreuil, and the Moreuil bridge;

For the 9th Corps: Road from la Faloise to Brachès, and the Braches bridge;

For the 10th Corps: Pierrepont road, Gratibus road, and river crossings.

II. The materials necessary for the repair of these roads should be provided in the advance depots; supplies of stone and gravel shall be transported in advance as far forward as possible; some depots of paving materials are established ^{besides} in the valley of the Noye, and reconnaissances made in advance by the Engineering services of the Corps will determine the quarries of paving stone to be utilized close to the roads to be repaired.

III. For each of the principal roads, the Army will place at the disposition of the Army Corps, as additional personnel, a territorial company of Engineers, beginning the 4th of August.

To the 31st Corps: Co. M/I T at Estrées-sur-Noye;

To the 9th Corps: Co. 20/25 T at la Faloise; Co. M 5 T
at Baccouel;

To the 10th Corps: Co. 15/15 T at Tartigny.

IV. The four principal roads to be repaired will be first prepared for the passage of the Field Artillery; then they will be transformed as quickly as possible into roads for the Heavy Artillery and camions; it will therefore be advantageous not to reestablish immediately the road in the axis of the old bridge, but

in preference, to one side, when this is possible without causing delay; in this way, the later construction of bridges on piles for heavy weights will not interrupt the use of the original passage for Field Artillery.

It should constantly be kept in mind that the establishment of passages for the Field Artillery takes precedence over everything else.

V. Independently of the four principal roads, the Army Corps will insure for themselves a number of passages sufficient for the infantry and for the Field Artillery; they will endeavor, first, to utilize the passages organized by the enemy, after a minute examination to make sure that they do not conceal any hidden mines, or other destructive agents.

It may be that, at certain points, there will be a need of portions of bridge materials.

In consequence, the first group of each equipment division will hold itself in readiness to meet any eventuality with its materials already assembled.

VI. The reconditioning of the highways has as much importance as the repair of the bridges: the work should be organized and pushed with such energy that the road and the bridge will be ready at the same time.

GENERAL DEBENKY.

ANNEX NO. 136.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 3rd August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 2,936/3.

INSTRUCTION

I. The Germans have abandoned the left bank of the Avre. Contact will be preserved.

1st, By a continuous aerial and terrestrial observation.

2nd, By the patrols which will endeavor by day to crawl under such cover as the valley offers and, the following night, by strong patrols which will attempt the crossing of the Avre with the support or the engagement of the artillery.

Patrols of cavalry will be in readiness to reestablish contact at the first indication of a more noticeable retirement of the Germans.

Montdidier should be especially observed and occupied at the first opportunity.

II. In the Divisions which will be pushing forward as far as the Avre or the Doms brook, the advance posts shall be made up of a single battalion only, divided into small posts, main guards, and advanced-post reserves; one battery and a fraction of cavalry will be attached to them.

The other troops of the Division will cease all work of defensive organization, and will rest.

III. The Commanding Generals of the Army Corps are urged in the most formal manner to succeed in freeing their General Staffs, services and troops of "sector mentality".

Contact should be maintained, and all preparations made to march forward at the first moment once the word is given.

The orders given during the execution of the present instruction should reach the Commanding General of the Army as morning report on the 4th of August, before 9 hours.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 137.

G. A. R.,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 5 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,309.

NOTE FOR THE 1st and III Armies.

In the battle in preparation, the role of the 1st Army will be, as first consideration, to flank and to cover the right of the British while advancing between the Avre and the Amiens-Roye road; but the very direction of the left of the 1st Army tends to give to the battle, in the French field, a much wider extension, aiming to bring about:

1st, the fall of the line of the Avre;

2nd, the occupation of Montdidier;

3rd, the fall of la Petite-Guisse, by manoeuvring on the north, or at least, the preparation for this manoeuvre by the occupation of the Rollot-Roye line.

It follows from this that the 1st Army ought to be formed in two masses of manoeuvre:

1st, the principal one, which is the one that has been foreseen, starting out between the Avre and Luce, and taking the Avre from the rear;

2nd, the other, secondary, starting out between Montdidier and Rollot.

This latter mass will be formed by the 35th Corps reinforced by one Division, the 46th, placed from this moment at the disposition of the 1st Army and, if the developments which occur between the Vesle and the Avre permit, by a second fresh Division.

It is on the basis of these considerations that the Commander of the 1st Army should extend his front of attack.

In order to facilitate the carrying out of this movement, the IIIrd Army has been requested to assemble on its left a mass of ~~heavy~~ long range heavy artillery, destined to act against the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif, and thus to cover the right of the 35th Corps.

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Furthermore, this Army should carry out, in union with the action of the 35th Corps to the east of Montdidier, an extensive and vigorous action susceptible of exploitation, and having for its first aim the conquest of the long ridge Méry, Lataule, I24, I16, the Porte Farm.

The action between Montdidier and the Boulogne-laGrasse massif will be, in every case, facilitated by this.

The Commanding General of the 1st Army will report as soon as possible on the dispositions adopted which concern the action of the 35th Corps.

FAYOLLE.

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ANNEX NO. 138.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 5 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 2,973/3.

 INSTRUCTION NO. 550,
for the Commanding Generals of the
31st, 9th, 10th and 35th Army Corps.

I. The withdrawal of the Germans on the right bank of the Avre and from the Doms brook does not change in any manner the plan of manoeuvre which was laid down in Instruction 520. It is still a question of making a powerful and violent thrust to the south and along the road from Amiens to Roye. The withdrawal has simply introduced the following modifications:

II. Contact will be maintained under the same conditions as formerly by the 31st Corps.

On the contrary, the 9th, 10th and 35th Corps will initiate aggressive advance post actions for the purpose of attracting the attention of the Germans toward the west and the south.

III. The attack of the 31st Corps to the south-east of the Morsuil-Demuin road will be pushed with the greatest rapidity possible in the direction of Hangest, which it will endeavor to reach during J day.

The preparation will begin at H hour; the infantry attack will be launched at H-plus-45.

IV. The attack of the 9th Corps will aim at a greater penetration; it will have as objectives ridge 95, the ridge to the south-west of Plessier-Rozainvillers and the Saint-Hubert woods. The Genonville woods will be fired on by the artillery of the 9th Corps, but it remains within the zone of attack of the 31st Corps, and the infantry of the 9th Corps will penetrate only the eastern edge of it, if opportunity offers to do so.

The 9th Corps will occupy the Saint-Hubert woods and its eastern approaches, in such a manner as to permit the infantry of the 152nd Division to get into position to attack Contoire and Saint-Riquier.

The action of the artillery of the 9th Corps will begin at H hour; the infantry attack at H-plus-4 hours.

The 10th Corps, now rendered almost entirely disposable, will

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have as its mission the task of covering the right of the 31st Corps while enveloping Montdidier from the north.

The 152nd Div. will drive the enemy away from the Pierrepont bridge by manoeuvring continuously on the north side; it will then take as objective the line Parc de Davenescourt, Fignières wood; ultimate direction: Becquigny.

The 166th, manoeuvring in the same manner, will direct itself toward Etelfay.

The manoeuvre of the 10th Corps ^{will begin} as soon as is possible, the main body of the infantry of the 152nd Div. following as closely as possible the advance of the 9th Corps.

The artillery of the 10th Corps will give its support to the 9th Corps from the morning of J day.

An understanding will be established between the two Army Corps concerning the furnishing of artillery support necessary to the enveloping manoeuvre of the 152nd Div. effected under the ^{protection} ~~direction~~ of the 9th Corps.

The 60th Div. will maintain direct contact before Montdidier and will support the attack of the 35th Corps.

VI. The 35th Corps will prepare an attack on Assainvillers; if sufficiently powerful means are attached to it, it will enlarge the front of its attack toward the north, with ultimate direction toward Faverolles, with the purpose of enveloping Montdidier from the south.

Its right flank will be solidly established facing Rollot and the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif.

VII. In a general manner, the withdrawal of the Germans should permit all the Corps, and especially the 9th and 10th, to push their artillery as far forward as possible.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 139.

Ist ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 2,996/3/

INSTRUCTION for the Commanding General
of the 35th Army Corps.

I. The attack ordered for the 35th Corps in Personal and Secret Instruction 550 of the 5th of August will be carried out on the day J-plus-I. The hour of it will be fixed by the Commanding General of the Army. It will, in principle, be preceded by a preparation.

II. For this operation, the 35th Corps will be reinforced~~#~~ by the following units, placed at its disposition during the day of the 7th of August:

the 46th Inf. Div., in the zone of Maignelay (H.Q.), Sains-Morainvillers, La Herelle, Gannes, Quinquempoix (localities excluded), Plainval (exclusive), Livremont, Montigny-en-Chaussée (localities inclusive).

2 Groups of ~~###~~ 220 T. R.; 2 Groups of 155 Large Calibre "Filloux", from 10th Army: station to be assigned by the 35th Corps.

I Group of 220 T. R.; 2 Groups of 155 Trac., from the VIth Army; station to be assigned by the 35th Corps.

The 35th Corps will be supported on the left by two battalions and one group of Field Artillery of the 60th Inf. Div., which will have the mission of covering it in front of Montdidier, and whose action will be regulated by the Commanding General of the 35th Corps. It will be covered on the right by the Heavy Artillery of the IIIrd Army, firing on the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif.

IV. As soon as Montdidier has fallen, or if the enemy retreats, the Ist Army will thrust in the direction of the east, to the south of Roye. In this case, the 35th Corps will take as its direction Bus, Tilloloy, Beuvraignes, with the mission of covering the right flank of the Army against the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif, and of solidly linking up the Ist Army and the IIIrd.

V. The 2nd Cav. Corps, less the 6th Cav. Div., having arrived before noon on J day in the region of Saint-Just (H. Q. at Saint-Just), will be ready to pass through the 35th, in order to initiate the exploitation, if occasion offers.

VI. The Commanding General of the 35th Corps will immediately make his dispositions and give his orders, assuming that ^{J+1} day is the 9th of August.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 140.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 6 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,013/3.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 562.

I. For the operation in course, day J will be the 8th (eighth) of August.

The hour H will be communicated by ~~secret~~ envelope on the evening of the 7th.

H hour is the hour for opening fire with the artillery. On the whole front of the Army, artillery fire will be begun with variable intensities according to the situation.

For the 31st Corps, H hour will make the beginning of the preparation; the attack will start at H-plus-45 minutes.

For the 9th Corps, H hour will mark the beginning of a programme of fire of diverse nature. The attack will start at H-plus-4 hrs.

For the 10th Corps, beginning of such fire as is judged necessary.

For the 35th Corps, some demonstration firing, in which only batteries already known to the enemy will take part.

In all the Army Corps, counter-battery fire will begin, for neutralization or destruction according to the situation of the Corps.

II. The attacks will be conducted with the sole aim of realizing the greatest speed possible in the waves of advance.

Once the front is broken, units should march on their objectives and in accordance with their directions.

Once an objective is taken, each unit should without delay pass on to attack the next objective.

Points of support are to be attacked by envelopment.

Effort should not be made to preserve alignment and it is forbidden to halt in order to wait for the neighboring Division; liaison is to be established by weak detachments from the 2nd line units.

Artillery movements must be foreseen and prepared for.

The Generals commanding Divisions will closely follow their Division reserve, seeing to it that the regimental reserves and divisional reserves keep linked up, and insisting that they be used

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to reinforce the attack and should not pass through attacking elements.

III. The attacks will be pushed hard and continued until night; it is essential to advance a long distance the first day.

I approve in advance all acts of initiative, whatever be their results.

IV. I recommend that no one enter abandoned boche shelters, and that no one attempt to destroy his munition depots. Such actions are very dangerous.

GENERAL DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 141.

G.A.R.
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 7 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,572.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
for the Aeronautic Division.

I. Until the day fixed for the operation of the 1st Army, the Aeronautic Division will endeavor, before everything else, to keep itself concealed: it will not send any air craft over the lines.

II. On the day of the operation and on the following days, if necessary, the Commanding General of the Aeronautic Division will send into action, under the orders of the Commanding General of the 1st Army, the maximum of forces, to participate in the battle initiated by this Army.

It will later take orders from General DEBENEY.

III. It will keep in mind the possible necessity of acting, with a portion of its forces, beginning the 10th of August, in cooperation with the IIIrd Army, with which it will immediately establish liaison.

By Order: The Chief of Staff,

PAQUETTE.

Annex No. 142.

G.A.R.
GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau.

Headquarters, 9th August 1918

CYPHER TELEGRAM

LA MORLAYE GENERAL STAFF to COMTE
PROVINS.

No. 4,588.

Reply to telegram 3,031/3 of 7 August.

I have just been advised that the 2nd Cav. Corps was placed at the disposition of the G.A.R. I place it from now on under the orders of the Commanding General of the 1st Army.

This Cavalry Corps can not advance between Luce and Avre, nor cross the latter river.

Its entry into the battle field will be through the Montdidier region, notably between Montdidier and the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif, following the 35th Corps.

Zone of action between Roye and Lassigny.

General Direction: Noyon, thus taking in the rear the enemy which is facing the IIIrd Army.

It follows from this that its station ought to be taken in the Saint-Just region, while leaving free the place necessary to the 70th Inf. Div.

It devolves upon the Commanding General of the 1st Army to bring up the 2nd Cav. Corps to the battle front in accordance with the development of our advance, and to determine the moment when it should pass through the infantry with sufficient chances for success.

FAYOLLE

By Authority the Chief of Staff

PAQUETTE.

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ANNEX NO. 143.

G.A.R.
GENERAL STAFF.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,638.


NOTE

for the 1st and IIIrd Armies

The intervention of the IIIrd Army in the battle, in accordance with plans formulated, should take place the day following the attack of the 35th Corps, that is to say, in principle, on the morning of the 10th.

But as it may happen that the attack of the 35th Corps will be retarded by one day, the IIIrd Army should make its dispositions in such a manner that its intervention may also be delayed twenty-four hours.

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ANNEX NO. 144.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 7th August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,032/3.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION NO. 564,
for the Commanding General of the 2nd
Cavalry Corps, and
for the Commanding General of the 6th
Cavalry Division.

The 1st Army is about to carry out an attack in the general direction of the south-east, to the south of the Amiens-Roye road. Some British forces will march to the north of this road in the same direction.

Being given the convergent form of the attack and the necessity of establishing communications across the valley of the Avre, the employment of the 2nd Cav. Corps at the beginning of the attack can not be foreseen in detail except in the case that the Germans evacuate their positions and attempt to avoid the battle.

In this case, the 2nd Cav. Corps will be charged with reestablishing contact to the south of the Amiens-Roye-Guiscard road.

For this purpose, the 6th Cav. Div. will be placed in the region of Guyencourt, in order to be able to use the Castel and Moreuil bridges, which will be the first to be repaired, in all events. The main body of the Corps will be located in the region of Beauvais, in order to be able to utilize the break-through at Montdidier as soon as that town shall be relieved.

As soon as the situation becomes fixed, a new instruction will be given to the 2nd Cav. Corps and to the 6th Cav. Div.

The Commanding General of the 6th Cav. Div. is instructed to seek information from the Commanding General of the 31st Army Corps; the Commanding General of the 2nd Cav. Corps will seek information from the Commanding Generals of the 35th and 10th Corps.

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ANNEX NO. 145.

1st Army,
General Staff.

Army Headquarters, 7 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,037/3.

[REDACTED] INSTRUCTION ~~for~~ the
Commanding General of the 35th Army Corps.

Confirmation of verbal instructions given on the 6th of August.

I. To take as successive objectives Assainvillers and Faverolles by more completely utilizing the 46th Inf. Div. in order to extend the front of attack toward the west.

The attack on Piennes will not be contemplated unless it happens that the feeble resistance of the enemy makes immediate exploitation possible.

To have everything ready for the attack ~~by~~ the 9th.

If the advance of the left of the Army is rapid, the resistance of the enemy will have little chance of being very serious, and the artillery at the disposition of the 35th Corps will suffice.

If the development of the battle reveals a serious resistance, the attack will take place on the 10th and, in this case, the 35th Corps will be reinforced on the 9th by one porté artillery unit, transferred from the left of the Army.

The Commanding General of the Army will fix the date of the attack on the evening of the 8th.

III. In all eventualities, to maintain close contact.

In case of an enemy flight, to thrust toward Assainvillers and Piennes while maintaining close liaison with the IIIrd Army and covering the 1st Army facing the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif.

The Commanding General of the 1st Army,

DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 146.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

INSTRUCTION concerning the use of Aerial
Forces during the course of operations.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,050/3.

I. The 1st Army will be able to use as aerial forces for the operations in course:

a) Normal organic: Organic forces of the larger units.

b) Combat Group C G I2 attached to the 1st Army; Combat Group C. G. I6 of the G.A.R. placed at the disposition of the 1st Army; Night Bombardment Squadrons; The Aeronautic Division is placed at the orders of the Commanding General of the 1st Army.

II. The distribution of missions will be regulated as follows:

OBSERVATIONS, LIAISONS, CLOSE RECONNAISSANCES (as far as the Somme): To be carried out under the direction of the Commander of the Army Aviation with organic forces.

CLOSE PATROLS: Carried out under the direction of the Commander of the Army Aviation with the two Combat Groups, C G I2 and C G I6.

These two Combat Groups being insufficient for this mission which should be permanent and should be extended along the entire front of the Army, the Commander of the Aeronautic Division will be requested each day to place at the disposition of the Commander of the Army Aviation a sufficient reinforcement: in principle, one Combat Group working from 11 hrs. 30 min. to 15 hrs. 30 min.

LONG DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCES BY DAY AND BY NIGHT (beyond the Somme):

(Execution of the general program fixed by Note No. 1,278/AB of the Commanding General of the G.A.R.)

Mission assured by the Commander of the Aeronautic Division, using his great aerial unit and the night bombardment squadron of the G.A.R.

BOMBARDMENT (BY DAY AND BY NIGHT): Mission assured by the Commander of the Aeronautic Division, employing two groups of

night bombardment planes.

PRINCIPAL COMBAT OPERATIONS, ATTACKS ON THE DRACHEN:

Mission assured by the Aeronautic Division.

In order to prepare against the possible attack in force by the enemy aviation, the Commander of the Aeronautic Division will keep constantly ready and on the alert two reserve squadrons.

III. The Commander of the Aeronautic Division is under the direct orders of the Commanding General of the Army. He will maintain a permanent liaison with the General Staff of the 1st Army. A direct and reciprocal liaison will be established between the Aeronautic Division and the Commander of the Aviation of the 1st Army.

IV. All reports and information received and gathered by the Aviation will be centralized at the headquarters of the Aviation of the 1st Army, which will assure that they are properly distributed and acted upon. However, specially important information gathered by the Aeronautic Division will be sent direct to the Chief of Staff of the Army at the same time that ^{it is} ~~they are~~ reported to the Aviation Headquarters of the Army.

V. Accompanying the present instruction are: Memorandum relative to operations in course (directives 520, 550); Instruction of the 29th of July concerning specially long range reconnaissances.

VI. A constant understanding and liaison are to be kept up with the British Aviation: The Commander of the Aeronautic Division will find full information concerning this matter at headquarters of the Aviation of the 1st Army.

GENERAL DEBENEY,
Commanding the 1st Army.

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ANNEX NO. I47.

GREAT HEADQUARTERS OF
THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH
AND NORTH-EAST.

Great Headquarters, 8 August 1918.

GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau,
No. 13,668.

[REDACTED] INSTRUCTION
for the Generals Commanding
the G.A.R. and the G.A.C.

I. The battle being fought between the Oise and the Somme does not allow us to carry out at present the strong effort which appears to be necessary in order to drive the enemy from the high ground to the north of the Vesle and oblige him to draw back to the north of the Aisne.

This result, however, may be obtained by a different manoeuvre.

In consequence, the Vth, VIth and Xth Armies will solidly establish themselves from the present moment in their positions to the south of the Vesle defined in my Personal and Secret Instruction No. 5,254 of the 4th of August.

The bridge heads acquired to the north of the Vesle will be held, enlarged and reinforced, not by increase in the effectives in occupation, but by a careful organization of the infantry and artillery fire and by appropriate fortifications.

Furthermore, the advanced posts will preserve contact with the enemy, and will endeavor to make prisoners.

II. This attitude will not prevent an active study and preparation for an aggressive action which may become necessary at any given moment to push back the enemy to the north of the Aisne.

The attack will be led by the VIth Army. Its first objective will be the plateau between the Vesle and the Aisne from the Arbre de Romaine to slope I75 (west of Dhuizel); attack covered on the right by the Vth Army, aimed at the crest to the south of the line Ventelay, Vaux-Varennes; on the left by the Xth Army, which will take the plateau of Brenelle, between slopes I75 and I64.

The second objective will be the Aisne, from Condé to Concevreux (Xth and VIth Armies), while the Vth Army, pushing its front to the high ground of Roucy and Bouffignereux, will develop its action toward the east by successively taking the heights of Saint-Thierry,

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d'Hermenville and Germigny.

III. Finally, the Commanding General of the G.A.R. will study a plan for an offensive action between the Oise and the Aisne, having for object:

1st, To first throw back the enemy on the right bank of the Oise, between the present front and the mouth of the Ailette, and beyond the Ailette, from the Oise to the road from Chauny to Soissons.

2nd, To conquer, next in order, by an attack from west to east, direction Braye-en-Laonnais and by converging on the Ailette, the plateaux between the Aine and the canal from the Oise to the Aisne, in order to force the enemy to abandon the lines of the Aisne and of the Vesle.

The second operation should follow the first with as little delay as possible, in order not to give the enemy time to recover.

The results of this study, to be held absolutely secret, should reach me by the 14th of August at the latest.

PETAIN.

ANNEX NO. 148

1st Army,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters,
8th August 1918, 21hrs. 30 min.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,073/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 582.

I. The attacks carried out today in liaison with the IVth British Army have permitted the 1st Army to push its front forward on the line south of Beaucourt-west of Fresnoy-en-Chaussée--west of Flessier-Rozainvillers, Corne north of the Saint-Hubert Woods.

From the present moment, the town of Amiens and the Amiens railway are relieved. We have made many prisoners and captured important booty.

II. Tomorrow, 9th of August:

a) The 31st Corps, employing the 42nd, 37th, 153rd and 126th Divs. will continue its attacks in the direction of Erches. Successive objectives: Hangest, Arvillers, Erches.

The 10th Corps will continue to thrust by its left in the direction of Davenescourt-Warsy, so as to support the right of the 31st Corps and to envelop the defenses of Montdidier from the north. It will engage the 166th Div. as soon as possible.

Boundary between the 31st and 10th Corps: Frene Woods--Cross Road 82-83, north ends of the Park of Davenescourt--Cross Road of the Gambards Woods.

The 9th Corps continues to be responsible for covering the movement of the 152nd Div. by pushing forward as far as Cross Road 82-83 and by taking the Saint-Hubert Woods.

The attacks will begin at day-break.

b) The 35th Corps will hold itself in readiness to carry out its attack when it received the order.

c) The 47th and 56th Divs., in Army reserves, will hold themselves in readiness to cross the Ayre between Moreuil and Hargicourt.

d) The 2nd Cav. Corps will remain in the region of Saint-Just and in the region of Bonneuil-les-Eaux (6th Cav. Div.); it should be in condition to move immediately upon receipt of orders.

The Commanding General of the 2nd Cav. Corps will place himself in close liaison with the Commanding Generals of the 10th and 35th Corps.

III. The 65th Inf. Div. will be withdrawn under conditions laid down in Special Order No. 578.

The Commanding General of the 1st Army
Debeney.

For Duplication:

The Chief of Staff: Hucher.

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ANNEX NO. I49.

Xth ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 3 August 1918.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE ARMY CORPS.

3rd Bureau,
No. 946/3.



In the present circumstances, it is important, in order to be prepared for any eventuality, to take into account the possibility of a new enemy withdrawal along the front of the Army.

In consequence:

1st, Be vigilant; insure not only the permanence of observation, but also the rapid centralization of all information. Be ready, if withdrawal does occur, to send forward without delay some infantry units with the cavalry which has the mission of making and keeping contact with the enemy.

2nd. The mission of the 7th Corps will be to go into action without delay in the direction of the north-east and to act vigorously against the enemy rear-guards.

The other Corps should be ready:

either to withdraw from their front in the minimum of time at least one Inf. Div. and all or part of their ^{non-divisional elements,} in order that these may be transported on the north bank of the Aisne with a view of acting as reinforcements of the 7th Corps;

or to operate under the same conditions as the 7th Corps, if the enemy withdrawal occurs on their front.

The Inf. Divs. which are resting will be ready to move after a delay of only a few hours.

3. All dispositions will be made to speed up the reconstitution of effectives, not only in the resting Inf. Divs., but also in the Regiments of the 2nd line of the Inf. Divs. which are holding the front.

4. The staffs should study and prepare for taking all measures of detail which are demanded by the organization of the columns in view of a march forward, especially:

proportion of artillery which should follow the infantry ~~to~~

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to support its advance;

Axis along which the liaisons will progressively be pushed forward, notably, relays of couriers, and of posts, to be provided during the time necessary for the construction of new telephonic communications; measures to be taken in order to insure traffic circulation on the roads, notably, diagrams of paths and itineraries of columns marching cross-country on foot; immediate repairs to be made on the roads; reconditioning of permanent works (bridges, culverts, &c); trains which should march immediately behind the troops and emplacements arranged in advance for grouping the vehicles provisionally remaining in the rear.

MANGIN.

Chief of Staff: Helle.

ANNEX No. 150.

G.A.R.,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,845.

NOTE FOR THE ARMIES

In the course of the combats which have developed during the last two weeks of July, the larger units have frequently found themselves face to face with a new situation, entirely different from that which a long period of stabilization in front of fortified positions, of which attacks upon limited objectives, minutely prepared against a defensive system developed to an extreme, have been the problems which our forces have been called upon to solve.

Surprise is now possible; recent events have proved this; it almost always causes a profound disorganization in the first defensive positions of the enemy, which ought to be exploited by successive attacks, pushed without lessening of pressure and forcing the enemy to yield ground rapidly.

In such conditions, these successive attacks do not require a very complete preparation: the infantry should be prepared to push the attack as deeply as possible, without reliefs nor even passings-through of fresher troops from the rear, and without waiting for the displacement of the artillery.

The report of the operation of the 18th of July permits us to make the following observations on the matter:

The Division is engaged by successive Brigades.

1st, The 1st Brigade attains its objective at 7 hrs. in the morning and halts to reorganize itself while the 2nd Brigade passes through and beyond it.

2nd, The 2nd Brigade begins to advance very easily and progresses for two kilometers. If the 1st Brigade had not received an order to halt, it probably would, itself, have been able to push forward as far.

3rd, At 10 hrs. the normal objective of the 2nd Brigade is reached, and this Brigade halts in its turn; the advance realized is more than six kilometers.

4th, at noon, the Artillery is ready to support the resumption of the forward movement. But in order to resume the movement, an order is necessary. This order does not arrive until 13 hrs. 30 min. and its execution does not begin until 15 hrs. 30 min. The order proves to be ineffective, however, since our first line is immediately obliged to halt, taken in the flank by some machine guns which it probably would not have encountered at noon.

CONCLUSIONS:

The dispositions formerly laid down governing the execution of an attack of methodical type, preceded by a long artillery preparation (normal and eventual objectives, passage of lines, passings-through, &c) should not be applied to the letter in an offensive operation based on surprise, since these do not permit the effects of the surprise to be exploited to the maximum.

It is necessary for us to inspire ourselves more completely by the contents of Directive No. 5, and to conceive of the battle as an assault, followed by a pursuit conducted with order, but without truce or repose. Every halt is fatal.

The Command in all its degrees conducts the battle by the engagement of units fresh at the moment, and hurls them in the direction decided upon, by way of reinforcement or destined to pass through the advanced lines, according to the state of fatigue of the troops of the advanced lines, with the order to continue always to go as far forward as possible without losing a moment.

The normal objective of a unit in attack is always the next objective.

The Commanding General of the G.A.R.

FAYOLLE.

For Duplication:

The Chief of Staff: PAQUETTE.

ANNEX NO. 151

G.A.R.
GENERAL STAFF.
3rd Bureau.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918.

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM

General Staff Lamorlay to

General Staff Comy
General Staff Clermont
General Staff Nivillers (Aero-
nautic Division)

Supplement to the Special Instruction to the Aerial Division,
No. 4,572 of the 7th of August.

Beginning the morning of the 10th of August, the Aeronautic
Division will extend its action to include the front of the IIIrd
Army. The Commanding General of the Aeronautic Division will
seek instructions from General Humbert concerning this matter.

By Order: The Chief of Staff,

PAQUETTE.

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ANNEX NO. 152

G.A.R.
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,821.

[REDACTED] INSTRUCTION for the
Commanding General of the Xth Army.

The Commanding General of the Xth Army will ~~###~~ prepare a plan for an offensive action between the Aisne and the Oise, having for aim:

Ist, To throw back the enemy, in the first operation, on the right bank of the Oise, between Pont-l'Évêque and the mouth of the Ailette, and beyond the Ailette, between its mouth and the point where it cuts the road from Chauny to Soissons. The new front thus created will be linked up to the present front by a line running from the region of Crécy-au-Mont to the heights which dominate Soissons from the north.

II. To conquer, by a second operation, from west to east, in the direction of Braye-en-Laonnois, the plateaux between the Aisne and the Ailette, in order to cause the abandonment of the lines of the Vesle and of the Aisne.

This second operation should follow the first with a minimum of delay, in order not to allow the enemy time to recover.

The results of the study ordered above, by which the front of the Xth Army will be supposed to extend itself as far as the Oise, should reach the Commanding General of the G.A.R. not later than the 14th of August. The report should show the main lines of the plan of action in the two operations, and a statistical statement of the means and forces necessary to each of them.

All dispositions should be taken to keep absolutely secret the project that is being studied.

FAYOLLE.

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ANNEX NO. 153

G.A.R.,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918, 20 hrs.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,227.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE IIIRD and Xth Armies,

I. Known situation at 20 hrs.:

The British Army has advanced as far as Rosières-en-Santerre and Folies. On its side, the 1st Army has passed through and beyond Haugest-en-Santerre; it has occupied Contoire and Pierrepont and has attacked Davenescourt.

Further south, the 35th Army Corps is attacking Hubescourt, Le Fretoy, Le Tronquoy and has just captured Assainvillers.

II. Tomorrow morning, the combined Anglo-French attacks should be pushed on in the general direction of Roye.

III. The IIIRD Army will carry out, tomorrow morning, August 10th, the operation planned in advance, and carry it as far forward as possible.

The 70th Inf. Div. is placed at its disposition to assist in carrying out this object.

The whole Army will be in readiness to follow the forward movement.

IV. The IIIRD Army and the Xth Army should from now on take into account the possibility that the enemy, obliged to evacuate la Petite Suisse, will retire behind the Canal du Nord. The 18th and 7th Army Corps should, if this retirement takes place, begin to advance, rolling the enemy back as far as the Oise, in such a fashion as to take in the rear the mountain massif which extends to the north of the river, between Noyon and Chauny.

V. The number of prisoners taken by the 1st Army exceeds 4,000; many cannon fell into its hands.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE G.A.R.,

FAYOLLE.

For Duplication.
The Chief of Staff: PAQUETTE.

1ST ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,082/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 536.

I. Hangeat was taken at 10 hrs. 30 min. and the 9th Corps has opened the way for the advance of the left of the 10th Corps.

Today the 9th of August:

II. The 10th Corps will continue and immediately extend its movement for enveloping Montdidier from the north, and its advance on Etelfay.

The 35th Corps will, at 16 hrs., carry out its attack on Assainvillers and Faverolles.

The 56th Inf. Div. will be placed, this afternoon, to the east of the Avre, at the disposition of the Commanding General of the 31st Corps. (See Special Order No. 5870.

III. The 2nd Cav. Corps (including the 6th Cav. Div.) will come up immediately from the region south of Montdidier.

General Robillot will report in person to the Commander of the 35th Corps and will be prepared to seize, tonight or tomorrow morning, all occasions for moving forward. His mission is to go around the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif and act against the rear of the German troops which are facing the IIIrd Army. General
Direction: Lancourt--Arricourt.

DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. 155.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 9 August 1918, 24 hrs.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,094/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 592.

I. Tomorrow morning, 10th August, continuation from day-break of the attacks in course of execution, following the directives already given, the 31st Corps pushing in the direction Andechy--Roye.

II. As soon as Montdidier shall have been passed through, the 31st, 10th and 35th Corps will energetically pursue the Germans, the 35th keeping up a close liaison with the IIIrd Army.

A) 2nd Cavalry Corps.

Should it happen that immediate contact is broken, the 2nd Cav. Corps will execute its mission of pushing on toward Laucourt--Avricourt--Guiscard, as has been ordered, in such a manner as to go around the Boulogne-la-Grasse massif and take the Germans facing the IIIrd Army in the rear.

B) Boundaries between the Army Corps:

a) Between the British Army and the 31st Corps: Road from Amiens to Roye as far as la Cambuse (to the British Army), Damery (to the British), Goyencourt (to the 1st Army), Gruny (to the British).

b) Between the 31st and 10th Corps: Saulchoy-sur-Davenescourt (31st Corps), Varey (31st Corps), Hill 97, 1500 meters south of Guerbigny, Hill 98, 800 meters south of l'Echelle-Saint-Aurin, Hill 86, 1200 meters south-west of Saint-Mard, Hill 89, on the railway, 2500 metres south-west of Roye (all these points to the 31st Corps).

c) Between the 10th Corps and 35th Corps: Road from Montdidier to ~~Montdidier~~ Roye to the 10th Corps, as far as the fork with the Grivillers-Fescamps road, layon central east-west of the Parc du Tilloloy, church of Tilloloy.

d) The 35th Corps will keep itself linked up with the IIIrd Army in proportion to the movement of this Army.

C) In this movement, the Army Corps will employ the following Divisions:

31st Corps: 153rd; 126th; 47th and 56th Inf. Divs.

10th Corps: 152nd; 166th and 60th Inf. Divs.

35th Corps: 169th; 133rd and 46th Inf. Divs.

D) There will be kept in the second line, in Army reserve:

The 42nd and 3rd Inf. Divs.: Zone Mézières--Villers-aux-Erables, Region of Gratibus (movement to be carried out as soon as the 10th Corps shall have got clear of the terrain by moving forward).

The 37th Inf. Div. in the zone Saint-Hubert Woods, Contoire, Pierrepont (these points exclusive), Bouillancourt (exclusive), Fiescamps Farm, Woods north-east of Fiescamps.

Command Posts to be located by the Generals commanding the Divisions, who will report the locations chosen to the Commanding General of the Army.

The 9th Corps, 66th Inf. Div. and the 15th Colonial Inf. Div. regrouped in the rear zone of the Army under conditions fixed by Special Orders.

35th Corps and Moroccan Division unchanged.

E) ARTILLERY:

The 31st, 10th and 35th Corps will keep, for the time being, the artillery they now have at their disposition.

Later, and under conditions fixed in Special Orders, the organic Artillery of the 9th and 35th Corps, and of the 3rd, 37th, 42nd, 66th Inf. Divs., the 15th Colonial Inf. Div and the Moroccan Div. shall be given back to these large units. When the order to do so is given, all the tractor-drawn artillery (Field Artillery porté and Heavy Artillery) shall rejoin its echelons and will come under the orders of the Commanding General of the Army Artillery.

F) Roads to be repaired by the Army Corps at once:

31st Corps: Hangest, Arvillers, Erches, Andechy, Villers-les-Roye, Roye.

10th Corps: Davenescourt, Becquigny, Lignieres, La Bossiere, Grivillers, Popincourt and Montdidier-Roye.

35th Corps: Montdidier, Piennes, Ramaugis, Fecamps,
Bus, Tilloloy, and Le Floyron, Le Tronquoy, Le Lundi, Orvillers,
Boulougne-la-Grasse, Conchy-les-Pots.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 1st ARMY,
DEMENTLY.

For Duplication:

Chief of Staff: MCHER.

ANNEX NO. 156.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.
GREAT GENERAL STAFF.

Great General Headquarters,
10 August 1918, 10 hrs 10 min.

1st Section,
3rd Bureau,
No. 2/P.C.

GENERAL DIRECTIVE

I. The action of the IVth British Army and the 1st French Army is to be continued toward the east, in the general direction of Ham, the right of the IVth British Army following the line Gruny--Ham, the left of the 1st French Army to the south of that line.

The IVth British Army aiming to reach the Somme, down the river from Ham, in order to prepare for the crossing of the stream, at the same time continuing its cavalry actions along this river from Bray to Péronne.

The 1st French Army supporting this march while aiming at the Ham-Guisan road.

II. At the present moment, the march of the IIIrd French Army is being made in the direction of Lassigny--Noyon, in order to exploit the advance of the 1st French Army and to clean up the region of Montdidier and, later, the Noyon region.

III. The attention of the Marshal is called to the desirability of preparing, as soon as possible, a series of operations by the IIIrd British Army in the general direction of Rapaume and Péronne, in order to disorganize the enemy front and exploit any withdrawals on his part without delay.

FOCH.

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ANNEX NO. 157.

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF
THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND OF
THE NORTH-EAST.

10 August 1918, 17 hrs. 25 min.

GENERAL STAFF,

COPY OF CYPHER TELEGRAM

3rd Bureau,
No. 1,868/M.

OPERATIONS-----PRIORITY

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
to GENERAL STAFF, LAMORLAYE
BACON.

1st, As you yourself have foreseen, the rapidity of events may enable us to carry out, in a very brief space of time and with the expenditure of relatively small means, the operation suggested in my Instruction, Personal and Secret, No. 13,668 of the 8th August.

2nd, This operation will take on a new form, by reason of the probably withdrawal of the Germans on the Somme and the Saint-Quentin Canal. The left of the attack being supported on the Oise, there need be no uneasiness about that flank; the general direction of the advance is toward the east-north-east, with the road from Chauny to Soissons as the first objective.

3rd, In order to prepare for this action without loss of time, the 2nd Moroccan Division will be moved, during the night of the 10th--11th of August into the region of Compiègne and to the east, where it will remain at my disposition.

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ANNEX NO. 158

G.A.R.,
GENERAL STAFF,

Headquarters, 10th August 1918, 20 hrs.

3rd Bureau,
No. 4,943.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE IIIrd AND Xth ARMIES.

I. Known situation at 20 hrs.

The 1st Army has captured Montdidier; it has advanced as far as the outskirts of Roye.

The left of the IIIrd Army has reached Boulogne-la-Grasse and Conchy-les-Pots.

II. Tomorrow, the 1st Army, after having carried Roye, should direct itself along the Canal du Nord, whose banks it ^{will} ~~##~~ reach and hold between Moyencourt and Bussy.

The IIIrd Army, pressing the enemy with the maximum of energy along the whole of its front, will thrust with its left toward the east, so as to manoeuvre against la Petite Suisse from the north, while linking up with the right of the 1st Army, whose entire march is oriented toward the east.

The 18th Corps is reattached to the Xth Army.

The Commander of the Xth Army will at once make his dispositions ~~for~~ following with his left, to the south of the Oise, the progress of the IIIrd Army on the right bank.

III. The number of prisoners taken by the 1st Army exceeds 8,000, with more than 200 cannon.

On its side, the IIIrd Army has made⁴ about 1,000 prisoners and has taken several batteries.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE G. A. R.

FAYOLLE.

ANNEX NO. 159

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 10 August 1918,
24 hours.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3, III/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 600.

I. Tomorrow, 11th August, continuation of the offensive. The attacks will be launched at day-break. The IIIrd French Army and the IVth British Army will both thrust toward the east.

II. The 2nd Cav. Corps, pursuing its mission, will take advantage of every opportunity to place itself in advance of the infantry.

III. Each Army Corps, operating in the zone of action which is assigned to it, will have two Divisions in the first line and the rest in the second line, ready to intervene rapidly in case of necessity.

The 31st and 35th Corps will respectively assure liaison with the British Army and the IIIrd French Army by special detachments.

The Artillery should be placed and moved forward in such a manner as always to give close support to the Infantry. Should it appear that the German Artillery has been reinforced at any point, the long range Heavy Artillery should be brought forward to do counter-battery work.

IV. Zones of action of the Army Corps.

a) ~~Boundary~~ between the 31st Corps and the IVth British Army: Present boundary prolonged by the line Gruny (exclusive), Marche-Allouarde (inclusive), Buvérchy (inclusive), Ham (exclusive).

b) Between the 31st and 10th Corps: Present boundary prolonged by the line Roiglise, Champien, Solente, Ercheu, l'Hopital Farm, Bonneuil-Chateau--all these points to the 10th Corps.

c) Between the 10th and the 35th Corps: Present boundary as far as Tilloloy, then north edge of the Parc de Tolloloy, Beauvraignes, Amy, Le Pavé, Beaulieu-les-Fontaines, Frétoy-le-Chateau, Chateau de Tirlandcourt, Guiscard--all these points to the 35th Corps.

d) Between the 35th Corps and the IIIrd Army: Orvillers

(IIIrd Army), Cross-road midway between Bus and Boulogne-le-Grasse, Les Loges (IIIrd Army), Candor (IIIrd Army), Catigny (35th Corps), Bussy (IIIrd Army).

V. ARTILLERY:

a) The 10th, 31st and 35th Corps still continuing to make use of the horse-drawn groups of Heavy Artillery not organically belonging to the larger units placed under their orders, will organize their artillery system so as to be able to release quickly, as soon as the order to do so has been received, the groups indicated above.

Meanwhile, the Divisional Artillery of the Moroccan Division will be returned to that Division on the 11th of August.

b) The 35th Corps keeps the 258th Regt. of Field Art.

The 10th Corps keeps the 9th Regt. of Field Art. and the 46th Regt. of Field Art.

c) The groups of 155 tractor-drawn Heavy Artillery (1) which the Corps Commanders believe it possible to keep and to push forward, in view of the state of the roads and ~~of~~ the possibilities of supply, will remain at the disposition of the Corps desiring them. (List of them will be furnished by the Corps to the Army (3rd Bureau) as soon as possible, by messenger).

I. With the exception of the groups already withdrawn from the front, and which were the object of a special order.

2nd, The other (2) units of tractor-drawn Artillery will be assembled at once at their present battery positions, or near them, the echelons rejoining the batteries in small fractions, so as not to obstruct circulation on the roads.

2. (See note I, this page)

These units will be placed on the 11th of August under the orders of the Commanding General of the Army Artillery.

d) The batteries of the 160th and 183rd Regts. of tractor-drawn Artillery will remain until further orders in the battery positions or contonments now occupied, and will be placed

on August 11th under the orders of the Commanding General of the
Army Artillery,

The Commanding General of the 1st Army.

DEBENEY.

ANNEX NO. I60

IIIrd ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 10th August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,885/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 611.

I. At 17 hours, the front reached by the 34th and 15th Corps is as follows:

Boulogne-la-Grasse, Conchy-les-Pots, station of Roye-sur-Matz, le Haut Matz, La Neuville-sur-Ressons, Bourmont, Le Plessier, Elincourt-Sainte-Marguerite, Chevrincourt, Le Matz.

II. The Corps are stationed under the protection of their outposts, in linked-up formations ready to continue tomorrow the operation begun today.

III. The manoeuvre will consist in pushing the advance movement toward the east ~~with~~ the view of reaching the front Noyon--Bussy (inclusive).

The zones of action of the Corps are marked for:

The 34th Corps: Between the line Orvillers (inclusive), Le Cessier (inclusive), Crapeaumesnil (exclusive), Capron Farm (inclusive), Cattigny (inclusive), Chevilly (exclusive), Bussy (inclusive), and the line Bourmont (inclusive), Gury (exclusive), Lassigny (inclusive), Dives (exclusive), Chateau des Essarts (exclusive), Porquericourt (inclusive).

The 15th Corps: Between the above-defined line and the Oise.

IV. By reason of the progressive narrowing of its front, the 34th Corps will send back to the second line one or two Divisions.

V. The 15th Corps will vigorously accentuate the movement of its left wing and will boldly thrust forward with its whole front to keep up with the movement of the left wing.

VI. The 18th Corps will carefully verify the apparent enemy position, in order to begin at once a forward movement in case the latter withdraws.

VII. The resumption of the movement will take place on the

entire front at 5 hours.

VIII. The 1st and 70th Inf. Divs. will hold themselves on the alert to start at the same hour, ready to follow the movement.

IX. The regroupments of Artillery are indicated in a Special Order. (Special Order No. 1,375, Op. of the 10th of August.)

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ANNEX NO. 161.

Xth ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 10 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 957/B.


The GENERAL OF DIVISION, MANGIN,
to the COMMANDING GENERAL of
the G. A. R.

I have the honor of stating below the number of Divisions which, I estimate, I shall find necessary to carry out the project explained in your Instruction No. 4,821 of the 9th of August.

I. Deployment on the Ailette:

Attack led by 16 Inf. Divs., there being 8 in the first line and 8 in the second line.

Arriving on the Ailette in a single bound, the 8 leading Divisions having behind them the same number of Divisions, either not engaged or regrouped after having passed through and beyond in the midst of the march.

TOTAL.....16 Inf. Divisions.

II. Spreading out of the wings:

On the left: Three Divisions ^{transferred} ~~from the~~ from the Divisions of the second line attaining the Oise above Pontoise, and assuring the deployment of the two Divisions starting from the present front of the 18th Corps.

ADDITIONAL..... 2 Inf. Divs.

On the right: Four Divisions transferred from the Divisions of the second line, operating to the North of the Aisne, assuring the deployment of three Divisions coming from the south of the Aisne.

ADDITIONAL..... 3 Inf. Divs.

III. Attack in the direction of the Chemin des Dames.

8 Fresh Divisions.

ADDITIONAL..... 8 Inf. Divs.

GENERAL TOTAL.....29 Inf. Divs.

Twenty-nine Divisions are, therefore, necessary in order to reach the two objectives laid down, namely:

to line the course of the Oise, from Noyon to Chauny;

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to cause the fall of the line of the Aisne by taking in the rear the organizations of the Chemin des Dames.

But it is evident that the progress of the Allied Armies to the left of the Xth Army will enable us to make some economies in the forces estimated as necessary for reaching and bordering the Oise.

IV. The estimation of Artillery needed has already been sent separately, under the number 954 S.

The employment of large groups of effectives between the Aisne and the Oise is justified, since this region will always be the pivot of the manoeuvre.

Since the enemy endeavors to reestablish himself by using the following successive lines:

- line of the Aisne,
- Hindenberg line (Chemin des Dames),
- line of the Ailette,
- or of the Serre,

the hinge of his movement will always be approximately along the axis Soissons--Laon.

It is proper, therefore, to apply in this region the maximum of forces at our disposition, in such a fashion as to break the hinge.

There will thus be provoked, on the two adjacent portions of the hinge, successive withdrawals of increasing importance.

MANGIN.

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ANNEX NO. 162.

G. A. R.,
GENERAL STAFF.

Headquarters, 11 August 1918, 20 hrs.

3rd Bureau,
No. 5,048.

[REDACTED]
NOTE FOR THE Xth AND IIIrd ARMIES.

If, as everything seems to indicate that it will, the progress of the offensive conducted by the 1st Army and the left of the IIIrd Army continues, the enemy will be obliged to evacuate la Petite Suisse.

As soon as he shall have drawn himself back until he rests on the Divette, the situation, on the left bank of the Oise, of the units which occupy the forest of Ourscamps and the Wood of Carlepont will become precarious.

essential,
It is, above all, that the left of the Xth Army should make its action felt from that moment.

An attack through the wooded region of which the village of Carlepont forms the center can not yield anything but slow and unsatisfactory results; it is necessary to manoeuvre along the edges of the wooded mass by taking for axis of march the Quennevières road, Loges Farm, Hill 153, Cuts.

This attack will be covered on the left by the advance within the wooded zone of the two Divisions of the 18th Corps (38th and 15th Corps). But it is especially on the right that it ought to be flanked and linked up with the present front. This necessity will cause the forward movement of several Divisions, notably, the 55th and 128th.

The first objective to be attained is the road from Noyon to Coucy-le-Chateau in the region Mont de Choisy, Cuts, Camelin; the second, after cleaning up the Carlepont Woods, the line of the Oise above Pontoise, so as always to keep linked up ~~the~~ the action of the Xth Army to the progress which the IIIrd Army will have accomplished on the north bank of the Oise above Noyon.

Thus conducted, the operation will be in accord with the spirit of the telegram from Great General Headquarters, No. 1,868/M, of the 10th of August, which desires its realization without the expenditure of large forces, and at the same time preparing for a

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later offensive between the Ailette and the Aisne by the occupation of a line sensibly orientated from north to south.

In view of these conditions, the Commander of the Xth Army is requested to prepare the operation in question, so that it may be carried out ~~within~~ within a brief time.

The plan will be sent to the G. A. R. as soon as it has been completed.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE G. A. R.

FAYOLLE.

ANNEX NO. 163.

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
CYPHERS SECTION.
No. 1,921 M.

Cypher Telegram
from Sarcus, 11 August 1918, 21 hrs.

General Staff Sarcus to General Staff,
PROVINS, General Staff, BACON, Chief
of French Mission, MONTREUIL.

No. 7/P.C. 1st Part.

1st. The Boundary toward the rear between the IVth British
Army and the 1st French Army is fixed as follows:

Gruny (British), Goyencourt (French), Cross-roads, principal
road Amiens, Roye, and Chemin Damery--Andechy (British), Road
Andechy--Erches--Arvillers--Hangest-en-Santerre--Flessier--
Rozainvilliers--Moreuil (to follow)

No. 1,922/M
No. 7/P.C.

2nd Part

From Sarcus, 11 August 1918,
21 hrs. 35 min.

Morisel--Ailly-sur-Noye--Jumel--Oresmaux--Loeilly--Outre l'Eau
(Roads and Localities to the French)--Namps-au-Val (British)--
Courcelles-sous-Moyencourt (British), then without change.

2. The British and French Commanders-in-Chief will agree
directly on the methods of putting into effect.

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ANNEX NO, 164.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 11 August 1918,
19 hrs. 30 min.

3rd Bureau,
No. 3,126/3.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 604.

I. Today, 11th August, we have reached, at 17 hrs. 30 min., the following line: Wood in Z--west of Villers-les-Roye--west of Saint-Aurin--east of Armancourt--west of Dancourt--west of Popincourt-Tilloloy.

The neighboring Armies have advanced to an equal degree.

II. Tomorrow, 12th August, the attacks will continue according to the directives which have been given.

III. The 2nd Cav. Corps will hold its main body in the Valley of the Doms. It will have one Cav. Div. prepared to intervene behind the portion of the front lying between Roye and Tilloloy.

IV. The Corps Commanders have the responsibility of designating the objectives of the Inf. Divs, which should be captured; the combination of these movements will constitute the manoeuvre.

I insist still upon having the artillery follow the infantry very closely, ready to support it; and upon having the heavy artillery pushed forward to take the German batteries under its fire as quickly as possible.

The proper axes for assuring the efficient functioning of the telephone lines should be constantly under observation and verification.

V. During the entire course of the battle, the Corps Commanders will send to the Army a situation report at 6 hrs., one at noon, and one at 18 hrs. Finally, a situation report covering the end of the day will be sent at the hour set by the Corps Commanders.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 1st ARMY,

DEBENEY.

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ANNEX NO. 165.

1st ARMY,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
3rd BUREAU.

Army Headquarters, 11 August 1918,
23 hrs.


GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 606.

The combats today have shown that the Germans occupy in considerable strength the old line to the west and south-west of Roye, where trenches and lines of wire are still to be found.

This organization will be the object of an ensemble attack which will take place day after tomorrow, the 13th.

The Corps Commanders will continue to aim at the objectives which concern them, each in his proper zone; they will organize for tomorrow, the 12th, a powerful artillery action, as well as the *reliefs* replacements which they judge necessary, *in view of* ~~for~~ this attack.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 1st ARMY,

DEBENEY.

For duplication:
The Chief of Staff: HUCHER.

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ANNEX NO. 166.

IIIrd ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF.

Army Headquarters, 11 August 1918.

3rd Bureau.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 612 Op.

I. The enemy resistance has stiffened along the whole of the front. It appears, however, that this resistance is limited to the rear-guards.

At 17 hrs., the front reached is as follows:

^{Summit}
~~Course~~ south of the Allongé Wood, Hill 85, Hill 84, Hill 65, Hill 84, Gury (to the Germans, but slightly overlapped), Saint-Claude Farm, La Cense, Carrières Montigny, Antoval and Béthancourt.

II. Tomorrow it will be necessary to break down the resistance of the enemy rear-guards and roll them back without respite.

III. Same zones of action for the Corps. Same idea of manoeuvre (Personal and Secret Instruction No. 93 Op., of 9 August).

IV. The 15th Corps will, consequently, make its main effort on the left, along the plateau of the Saint-Claude Farm and Gury. It will make an effort, on the other hand, to reach the high ground of l'Ecouvillon and of Attiche, which commands the massif of la Petite Suisse.

It should be recalled that the final objective of the Army is the Noyon--Bussy front.

V. The attack will be resumed at 5 hrs.

From the beginning, it should be pushed forward with great violence.

VI. The 1st and the 70th Inf. Divs. will hold themselves in readiness to start at 7 hrs. under the same conditions as were laid down for them for the day of the 11th of August.

VII. Command Posts: 15th Corps: Venette.

34th Corps: Gournay-sur-Aronde.

HUMBERT.

ANNEX NO. 167.

Xth ARMY,
GENERAL STAFF,

Headquarters, 11 August 1918.

3rd Bureau,
No. 977 S.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 384.

I. The Xth Army will attack beginning on the 13th of August, between the Aisne and the Oise in cooperation with the IIrd Army, the mission of the two Armies being to push their front to the level of Noyon, on the one hand, and on the other, to the level of the Oise.

II. The special objective of the Xth Army will be to reach the Mont de Choisy so as to encircle it from the north, and the Carlepont Woods.

III. The general objective to be reached is defined in the appended sketch.

IV. The forces due to operate on the front of attack are divided into four Army Corps, as follows:

18th Corps: Three Inf. Divs. in the first line: 38th, 15th, 2nd Moroccan Div.; one Inf. Div. in the second line: the 132nd.

7th Corps: Two Inf. Divs. in the first line: 48th, 55th; and one Inf. Div. in the second line: the 17th.

30th Corps: Two Inf. Divs. in the first line: 2nd, 122nd; and one Inf. Div. in the second line: the 127th.

1st Corps: Four Inf. Divs. in the first line: 11th, 162nd to the north of the Aisne, and the 72nd and 69th to the south of the Aisne.

The zones of action of the Corps and the distribution of the Inf. Divs. are shown in the appended sketch.

The distribution of the Artillery resources is shown in a special table.

V. Missions of the Corps:

The 18th Corps is charged with the principal action, strongly supported on the right by the 7th Corps; it will bring forward its Inf. Divs. as quickly as possible to the front Blérancourt (exclusive), Guts, while covering itself in front of the Wood of La Montagne.

The Inf. Divs. of the second line going into action between the

15th and the 2nd Moroccan Divisions will take for its first objective the Mont de Choisy. Later objective, the Pontoise front and Rue-Millon.

The 38th Division will be charged with cleaning up the Carlepont massif.

The 7th and 30th Corps, operating to the north of the ravine of Morsain, Vezaponin, are charged with the conquest of the plateau to the north-west of Audignicourt, the possession of which is indispensable to the security of the operations of the 18th Corps.

The 1st Corps, employing the 11th and 162nd Divisions, will prolong as far as the Aisne the ^{necessary covering} action by siezing the Nouvron-Vingré-Tartiers plateau.

Following these actions, the objectives thus attained will constitute eventually an excellent line of departure for an exploitation later on, the zones of action of which are indicated in the accompanying sketch.

VI. The available tanks and their distribution ~~will~~ later on be modified.

VII. The attack will be preceded by an artillery preparation which should assure, at least, the destruction of the enemy wire. Its duration will be fixed by a Special Order.

VIII. Aviation.

Special Order.

MANGIN.

GREAT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH
AND OF THE NORTH-EAST.

Headquarters, 11 August 1918.

Head Bureau,
No. 133/2.

DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN DIVISIONS ON THE
WESTERN FRONT ON AUGUST 10th, 1918.

Total number of Divisions: 205 (1); 137 on the front, 68
behind the front.

The 137 Divisions on the front are distributed as follows:

6	Divisions from the sea to Ypres,
15	" from Ypres to La Bassée,
15	" from La Bassée to Albert,
32	" from Albert to the Oise,
27	" from the Oise to Rheims,
10	" from Rheims to the Argonne,
32	" from the Argonne to the Swiss border.

182 different Divisions have been engaged since March 21st (2).

The 68 Divisions considered as being behind the front are
distributed in the following manner.

Region of localization or region from which came the Non-located Divisions	Divisions located			Divisions not located.		
	FRESH	REORGAN- IZED	FATIGUED	FRESH	REORGAN- IZED	FATIGUED
From the sea to Ypres } K.B. From Ypres to La Bassée } From La Bassée to the Oise } 21	1 2 2	I		5 1 1	3 3 3	I
From the Oise to Rheims } K.G. From Rheims to Argonne } 42	I	0	2	I	11 2	21 4
Verdun } Lorraine } 5 Alsace }		3		I I		
Total	6	4	2	10	20	26
Fresh Divisions } Reorganized Divs. } 68 Fatigued Divs. }	12			56		

K. B. = Crown Prince of Bavaria

K. G. = Crown Prince Imperial

1. The total number of German Divisions is 243; 38 are on
the Russian front.

2. Among the 182 Divisions engaged:

19	have been in combat	1 time	19
66	----	2	132
67	----	3	201
24	----	4	96

4	have been in combat	5 times	20
2	-----	6 ---	12

480 engagements.
