

ETHICS IN COMBAT  
*Preparing Soldiers for Moral Decisions in Combat,*  
*A Project Study*

by

The Reverend Sean Wead  
Chaplain (Major), United States Army

A Dissertation  
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Doctorate of Ministry in Ministry Development

The Institute for Christian Formation and Leadership  
Virginia Theological Seminary  
May, 2010

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is about soldiers of the United States Army. Their dedication and selfless service not only puts them at physical risk but challenges their morality. Their willingness to participate and eagerness to learn gave energy to the class and the study. The many efforts of leaders within the Army, from the formation of military codes of ethics to the defining of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and everything in between, laid the foundation of this study. The testimony of veteran soldiers from World War I to the present gave crucial insight into this training. Special thanks go to the soldiers of the 41<sup>st</sup> Signal Battalion, the 10<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade. Many soldiers willingly shared moral challenges from combat with the knowledge that their experiences would be published. For their courage on and off the battlefield, I am very grateful.

The Army as an institution contributed to this study. Without the Army's liberal support and encouragement for furthering education, this study would not be possible. Special thanks go to my Commanders; Colonel Darin Talkington, Colonel Kevin Foster, Lieutenant Colonel Michael DeRaddo, and Lieutenant Colonel Tarn Warren who actively supported this doctoral program with leaves of absence, participation of their soldiers, and encouragement.

A number of people deserve thanks for encouraging me in this undertaking. The Rev. Dr. Barney Hawkins of Virginia Theological Seminary suggested this program when I came to him asking for a way to keep connection to the Episcopal Church while immersed in ministry as a Chaplain in the United States Army. I was skeptical at first that this program would meet my needs. He was right, of course, and I am very thankful for his guidance. I am very thankful to The Rev. Dr. Margaret Ann Faith, Dr. Tim Sedgwick, The Right Reverend George Packard and, most of all, Mary Achor, my editor. They gave insightful guidance and posed questions that made me look deeper into the questions that came out of this study. Their guidance helped organize my thoughts and present my findings.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family who sacrificed their limited time with me in support of this endeavor. This study took place between two combat deployments and combat duty in Iraq. Time with family has been limited but Kim, Taylor Ann, and Colton encouraged me to completion. They are my inspiration. Finally, I would like to thank God for His presence and ministry in my life and with the soldiers He has called to serve.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                     |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1. INTRODUCTION.....                                | 1  |
| <i>The Nature of the Problem</i>                    |    |
| 2. THE STATE, ETHICS, AND WAR.....                  | 7  |
| <i>The Might of Right</i>                           |    |
| War Defined.....                                    | 9  |
| War, A Human Condition.....                         | 12 |
| Pacifism.....                                       | 13 |
| Realism.....                                        | 20 |
| Just War.....                                       | 23 |
| Conclusion.....                                     | 29 |
| 3. ETHICS, the INDIVIDUAL, and the BATTLEFIELD..... | 31 |
| <i>Black Soul Disease</i>                           |    |
| Victory through Ethics.....                         | 33 |
| Survivability through Ethics.....                   | 35 |
| Combat, Ethics, and the Team.....                   | 36 |
| Ethical Failure in Combat.....                      | 38 |
| Emotion Overriding Morality.....                    | 39 |
| Victory over Virtue.....                            | 40 |
| Death or Dishonor.....                              | 41 |
| Collapse of Character and Insanity.....             | 42 |
| Conclusion.....                                     | 44 |

|                                                               |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 4. IMPACTION CHARACTER.....                                   | 46 |
| <i>Practice &amp; Solution</i>                                |    |
| Challenge of Ethics in Transition.....                        | 46 |
| Identifying the Problem.....                                  | 48 |
| Army Values.....                                              | 51 |
| Warrior Ethos.....                                            | 53 |
| Warrior Codes, Caution Required.....                          | 55 |
| Current Training is not Enough.....                           | 58 |
| Engaging Ethics for the Combat Soldier (Thesis).....          | 60 |
| 5. TEACHING ETHICS to SOLDIERS.....                           | 62 |
| <i>Practice &amp; Transformation</i>                          |    |
| Officer Training in Ethics.....                               | 62 |
| Annual Ethics Training for Soldiers.....                      | 64 |
| Ethical Proving Grounds.....                                  | 66 |
| The Commander's Program.....                                  | 67 |
| A Proposal for Improving Training in Ethics.....              | 69 |
| Social Cognitive Theory as Applied to Training in Ethics..... | 71 |
| Modeling.....                                                 | 72 |
| Authority to Train.....                                       | 74 |
| A Change of Venue.....                                        | 75 |
| Audience Size.....                                            | 77 |
| The Setting for Training.....                                 | 77 |
| Section One, Introduction.....                                | 79 |
| Section Two, My Lai.....                                      | 81 |

|                                                  |     |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Massacre Scenario.....                           | 83  |
| Section Three, Ethical Constructs.....           | 85  |
| Section 4, The Room-mate Scenario.....           | 87  |
| Section Five, WW II Scenarios.....               | 88  |
| “Take no Prisoners!” Scenario.....               | 89  |
| Hostage Scenario.....                            | 90  |
| Summary.....                                     | 92  |
| 6. RESULTS of TRAINING and REFLECTION.....       | 92  |
| <i>The Seminar: Evaluation</i>                   |     |
| In Review.....                                   | 93  |
| The Thesis Restated.....                         | 94  |
| Presentation of Data.....                        | 94  |
| Assessment of Outcome.....                       | 98  |
| Viewed in Context of Army’s Ethics Training..... | 98  |
| Improving the Project.....                       | 100 |
| Theological Reflections.....                     | 103 |
| 7. CONCLUSION.....                               | 105 |
| <i>Last Thoughts</i>                             |     |
| From Beginning to End.....                       | 105 |
| Problem Solved?.....                             | 105 |
| Effects .....                                    | 106 |
| Implications for the Future .....                | 107 |

|                                                                     |         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| APPENDECIES.....                                                    | 108     |
| Appendix A: Rules of Engagement, IRAQ.....                          | 108     |
| Appendix B: Rules of Engagement, KUWAIT.....                        | 109     |
| Appendix C: Army Values.....                                        | 110     |
| Appendix D: Officer/NCO Evaluation Reports.....                     | 111     |
| Appendix E: Warrior Ethos & Soldier Combat Skills (FM 3-21.75)..... | 113     |
| Appendix F: Warrior Creeds.....                                     | 119     |
| Appendix G: Power Point Presentation (Ethics in Combat).....        | 123     |
| Appendix H: Scenarios.....                                          | 143     |
| Appendix I : Survey.....                                            | 146     |
| Appendix J: Survey Results, Improving Training.....                 | 150     |
| Appendix K: Survey Results, Overall.....                            | 151     |
| <br>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....                                              | <br>152 |
| <br>Table 1.....                                                    | <br>96  |

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### *The Nature of the Problem*

The creation of the seminar, "Ethics in Combat," evolved naturally; springing from my responsibility to the soldiers I serve as a chaplain in the United States Army, as well as from my own reflections on war. Soldiers had started bringing their trauma of battle into my office; moral dilemmas were the core of the problems distressing the men and women who sought me out, and I knew I had to do something to assist my fellow soldiers.

The seminar was shaped by what I already knew about ethics and combat. My knowledge of both was more than that of a lay person, but it in no way qualified me as an expert. As a priest of the Episcopal Church in the United States, I had all the ethical theory any graduate of their seminaries would be equipped with.

Over the years, I had gained experience. Before becoming a priest, I had spent my youth first as an infantry soldier in the United States Army and then as a metropolitan police officer. Both experiences exposed me to difficult and trying circumstances that involved quick decisions having great consequences. Even though death and injury played a large part in my experiences, it was never at the level or impact that I would eventually experience in war. It was a mere glimpse of battle, but with enough distance to protect me emotionally and spiritually.

My years as chaplain and Army officer gave me a firsthand look at the effects of war, as did a visit to Bosnia in 1996 and later deployment in 2001. Nevertheless, I was not a combat veteran when I first designed and implemented this training. Since then, I

have spent 15 months in combat in Iraq. Who I am has changed. My views of this training are now vastly different than when I originally administered it.

Soldiers serving in the United States Army today are trained and then quickly deployed to combat zones like Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to other asymmetric battlefields like the Philippines. They are equipped with the latest technology in navigation, protective armor, and weapons.

In addition, the military is equipped with a system of guidelines for conducting combat that addresses ethical and legal concerns. These guidelines include the Uniform Code of Military Justice; rules of engagement for initiation the use of deadly force; the law of land warfare; 'Army Values,' and other formal and informal norms that guide ethical conduct. Obviously, however, it is impossible to give guidance for every situation. Young soldiers, officers, and non-commissioned officers may have received some guidelines, but are often left on their own to make difficult moral decisions in combat. Almost everyone has something to draw from, but there are those who simply do not engage their moral senses. They slide through their combat actions in a moral daze, oblivious to the consequences of their actions to themselves or others. These costs involve more than the individual soldier; they have far-reaching implications for the military and the nation.

War is fought on a political stage of world opinion. Governments are human institutions where the will of people steer the policy of the state. The importance of the perceptions and judgments of the populace or those who rule cannot be overstated. In any conflict, the moral high ground is a tactical position of superiority. Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military strategist who may have written the oldest treatise on war,

states that one of his five fundamental factors before undertaking war is securing the morality of the populace—setting out the ‘just’ position of the sovereign before going to war. His people, then convinced of the moral high ground, willingly follow their sovereigns into war.<sup>1</sup> America’s experience in Vietnam certainly confirms this fundamental truth about warfare.

Why we fight and how we fight are intrinsic to morale and, in many cases, to victory on the battlefield. These are questions of ethics. The effects of morally questionable incidents in combat are extensive—touching both soldiers and civilians on the battlefield, and affecting the fortitude to prosecute a war from both sides of a conflict. Ethical failures in war can demoralize our own soldiers while rejuvenating our enemy’s.

In my experience, many deploying Army leaders fail to give proper attention to the implications or consequences of decision-making in combat simply because they are focused on other training or preparations. There are both strategic and tactical penalties for a lack of knowledge, preparation, and foresight in decision-making. Soldiers are more apt to make decisions against their own ethical beliefs simply because they have not actualized or defined concretely what they believe. The outcome is that many ethical decisions made on the battlefield are discovered by the individual—after the fact—to be against what he or she believes is right. In addition, soldiers exposed to traumatic events, either by deliberate malicious acts or accidental disaster, may lack a fully developed ethical framework to process and deal with the events. Both actions can potentially lead to instances of Post Traumatic Stress

---

<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 63.

Disorder.<sup>2</sup> The individual soldier may bear the brunt of this training oversight, suffering emotionally and spiritually in silence decades after the event.

Many combat veterans I have ministered to in military and VA hospitals often engage me in discussion regarding some act they committed during the stress of combat. For years, they have been haunted by a choice made in combat. The act went against some ethical standard or belief they held at the time or is in opposition to what they believe now. Some choices were made in instantaneous reaction to life-and-death situations. Other choices were thought through before the act, but now survive as perpetual guilt in the conscience of the warrior. Thereafter, the soldier spends a lifetime revisiting the event and the choices made.

Due consideration of the consequences of actions is not usually thought through until decisions have been made and action taken. This failure of moral engagement harms not only the soldier, but the entire war effort. The actions of a few lower enlisted soldiers in their abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib Prison is a prime example. Those actions hurt not only prisoners, guards, and our nation, but it perpetuated hostilities and ultimately led (and will lead) to the deaths of ever more people. Such is war.

War and the horrors revealed by it assault the soul of those who, by chance or deliberate action, enter into it. The punishing environment of war tests the character of all. William Tecumseh Sherman said it this way, "War is Hell!"<sup>3</sup> In the midst of and in the wake of such an environment, Christ is present. And where Christ leads, His servants follow. It is a place where the sacramental rites of reconciliation and unction are perpetually applied. This project is an extension of that grace, designed to enlighten our

---

<sup>2</sup> Glenn R. Schiraldi, Ph.D., *The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Sourcebook: A Guide to Healing, Recovery, and Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000) 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> As quoted from accounts by Dr. Charles O. Brown in the Battle Creek *Enquirer and News* (18 November 1933)

minds, stir our hearts and strengthen our wills.<sup>4</sup> That is what makes the undertaking of this thesis grounded in the Christian tradition.

There are many voices in the military putting forth their understanding of “right action” in war. The Church and in a wider sense other communities of faith through the role of Chaplains has a voice in this discussion and a responsibility to help. One of the duties of the Chaplain is to develop Moral Leadership Training, the purpose of which is to address some of the moral concerns that are common to a profession of arms and the conduct of war.<sup>5</sup> These classes are meant to assist the soldier with clarity of insight so they may conduct war in accordance to the norms and moral imperatives of our nation. This project, which I call “Ethics in Combat” was conceived in part to meet that intent. Yet, the application of training does not merely seek to reinforce those norms, but to go further.

Ultimately, the point of my thesis and the training I created is to awaken a soldier’s moral sense. Soldiers’ self-regulation of moral conduct must be activated. No amount of training in the law of land warfare or the rules of engagement will be effective if soldiers do not engage their conscience.<sup>6</sup> My hoped-for outcome is that this method of teaching, ‘social cognitive theory’ will cause considered thought, leading soldiers to the conclusion that moral engagement is critical to functioning on the battlefield. Therefore, maturity of character and a moral sense is a must.

The means to such a transformation depend on application of social cognitive theory. The theory espouses that personality is learned and strongly influenced by

---

<sup>4</sup> The Book of Common Prayer, (New York: Church Publishing Incorporated, 1979), p. 858.

<sup>5</sup> *Chaplain Activities in the United States Army*, Army Regulation 165-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 March 2004) 21-22.

<sup>6</sup> Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 1, 193-209.

environment, experience, and cognition. These factors affect personality and moral behavior.<sup>7</sup> With proper attention and focus on ethics, soldiers can become aware of the values they have already developed through life and begin a process of actualizing ethical principles that can guide their conduct on the battlefield.

Keeping in mind that environment plays a key role in cognitive engagement, the power of war and the battlefield must be understood.

---

<sup>7</sup> John W. Santock, *Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behavior* (Dubuque, IA Wm. C. Brown Publishing, 1991) 453–458.

## 2. THE STATE, ETHICS, AND WAR

### *The Might of Right*

*Battle, therefore, is essentially a moral conflict. It requires, if it is to take place, a mutual and sustained act of will by two contending parties, and if it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse of one of them.*<sup>8</sup>

Military historian Sir John Keegan echoes the belief of famed French general and military theorist, Ferdinand Foch. They both hold to a fundamental understanding that pierces the ages from as long as humankind has written about war. If we accept this thought on face value, then any understanding of the conflicts of battle and war should be understood as a deeply-rooted moral or ethical conflict between opposing forces. This moral conflict of war gives rise to the decisions considered in this study and this project.

An understanding of the situation we call war is essential to the consideration of ethics in combat. In cognitive theory, war is not a single determinate influencing the human being to act outside of one's moral code. Yet, in war, conditions do interplay with both social and psychological factors to impact the decision-making process of an individual.<sup>9</sup> People will take actions never contemplated or acted on outside of this arena. If my concern in this thesis and project is truly to awaken a soldier's moral sense, then the context of *where* those decisions are made must be considered.

As the Church is in the world, war has been constantly at its side. Over time, a number of reactions to it developed. At first, the church cloistered its self from such actions. The early Church forbade service in the military as a worldly affair. Even today,

---

<sup>8</sup> John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1986) 301-302.

<sup>9</sup> Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 208.

the Church is a strong proponent of the peace movement. Later, theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas questioned the morality of doing nothing when a belligerent attacked the innocent. They set out principles for just actions in war and gave parameters that outlined the actions of participants and nations. Many of those guidelines have been codified and can be found in the law of land warfare which is mandatory training for armies across the world. In my opinion, these reactions of the Church were attempts to address the issues of moral decisions in warfare.

The importance of theological discourses and political perspectives of war are not merely theoretical. These perspectives move the thoughts of those who guide the state and command armies. In the two world wars and numerous smaller conflicts of the last century, these positions have guided the conduct of armies. Whatever philosophy a state adheres to, Realist or Just War, trickles down to the lowest echelons of combat forces. What a soldier can or will do under a Just War perspective, as opposed to a Realist position, is vast. The “rules of engagement” are derivatives of these theories. Just War theory specifically addresses reasons for war and the treatment of those in it. A Realist perspective pushes such ethical concerns to a secondary position.

Therefore, an understanding of war, as well as the theories that have been heavily influenced by theologians to guide our actions, is paramount. To influence ethics in combat, we must fully understand the theories that shape the moral landscape of acceptable norms in war in today’s world. It is this frame of reference that gives this discussion its beginning point.

## War Defined

What, then, is war? How are we to understand it other than as the extension of opposing wills until the spirit of one surrenders? A definition of war is paramount to understanding ethics in combat, because it can frame the entire discourse and outline the rules of engagement. The countless answers are complex and frequently changing, since one point of view or emphasis can skew its meaning one way or another. This problem of definition is evident especially in today's headlines, as governments face new threats.

For instance, there are questions as to whether a nation can be at war against a group like Al-Qaeda. They are different from all terrorists that have preceded them. Al-Qaeda is not a national liberation or a revolutionary party. There is no state affiliation, heretofore seen as a basic element in defining war. It is a movement that is ideologically, theologically and culturally based,<sup>10</sup> but does not belong to a state, nation, or a political party. It exists through a network of associations that are not defined by political boundaries. Its members have citizenship in many different countries, including nations with whom Al-Qaeda is at war.

Since the classical definition of war does not fit the conflict we are in, our understanding of the status of the enemy becomes even more confusing. If this is not war as classically defined, then how can Al-Qaeda be prisoners of war? Once Al-Qaeda or affiliate terrorists groups are captured on the battlefield, how are they to be categorized? Are they merely the bandits of a modern century, with our military involved in a large scale police action? They are not combatants by contemporary definitions of

---

<sup>10</sup> Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 130-132.

the law of land warfare. Are they prisoners of war or detained persons? Should their status fall under international law, or the laws of their citizenship, or military law, or the criminal law of the nation that took them prisoner? Since there is no state affiliation, whom do we release our enemies to?

What constitutes victory over an organization like Al-Qaeda? How and when could such a war end? These contemporary questions are the focus and confusion over the War on Terror. The answers are not yet defined.

Thus, the very status of one's enemy or adversary is found in the understanding of the meaning of war. Today, globalization is changing the nature of conflict on the international scene. Tools like cell phones and the internet have created a new form of political or cultural resistance. It can connect small groups of like-minded people into organizations that can wreak havoc on cities, influence weak countries, and topple governments on a global scale. With this changing world in mind and with the understanding that our society has not quite caught up with these changes in warfare, we will attempt a functional definition of war.

War is what happens when the peaceful process of deciding who gets what breaks down. The central point of war is about governance. War is a violent way to decide who possesses territory, resources, and wealth. It settles who decides on taxes, laws, education, or any other multiple ideas that guide a state or nation.<sup>11</sup> One of the most influential thinkers on war, Carl von Clausewitz, theorized that war "is the continuation of policy by other means." In other words, war is an extension of politics.

---

<sup>11</sup> Brian Orend, "War", *Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  
<<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/>>

Michael Gelven describes “war as an actual, widespread and deliberate armed conflict between political communities, motivated by a sharp disagreement over governance.”

War, however, is enacted on the field of human experience, not in the pages of textbooks. Such sterile definitions, therefore, do not express the experience of war. It is the unnamed experience of war that interacts with the soul, body, and mind, causing choices of lasting consequence. Thus, it is the Frankish-German root of the word “war” that gives better insight into its meaning: *verra* – confusion, discord, and strife. This is how the clash of states and nations translates at the battle front and at war’s base level. It is only by holding to principles and ethical standards that most individuals caught up in war maintain a sense of self and minimal disorder to their lives and others’. Without a moral boundary evaluating and ordering the chaos, war expands into the psyche of many combatants and rages unchecked for years after the conflict has ended. Even clarity of principles, values, and standards sometimes diminish the flames of war in the warrior, but may not completely extinguish the embers. Finding the flashpoint and fuel for war becomes paramount to understanding it.

Fortunately, there is agreement between theologians, theorists, and philosophers on the cause of and the fuel to the firestorm we call war. Confucius put it cynically when he stated, “There is deceit and cunning and from these wars arise.” Simply stated, the spark igniting war is seated in the human condition. Without humanity, war does not exist. Unlike animals’ spontaneous assaults, people sustain an organized, thoughtful, and systematic conflict morally weighted by societies and cultures. Humanity is the moral agent that feeds war. Disagreement, want, pride, stupidity, and a sense of justice

are just a few examples of human will that are the antecedents to the movement within a political organization that gives birth to war.<sup>12</sup>

## War, a Human Condition

This willful nature is at the heart of theological argument about war. Traditional Christian interpretations of the antecedents of war from Augustine to the present understand it as being the product of original sin. Original sin is the Christian doctrine that because of humanity's fall from grace, all are estranged from God and do not have the capacity within themselves to do what is right. It is only by God's action that humanity can be liberated from its error.

One notable exception from the common belief that war stems from the unreasonable nature of humanity is worth mentioning. Jean Rousseau postulated that humanity in its natural condition was neither good nor evil, but neutral. He hypothesized that society and its solidarity to the political system of the state defines humanity in its morality. Essentially, if the state is evil, then its individuals will also be evil. Beyond this, the states, or more precisely, statesmen, are influenced and acted upon by the international political system. In short, the major antecedents of war can be found within humanity, the structure of the state, and within the international systems of the state or, more accurately, the world.<sup>13</sup> Rousseau's postulations did not find a depraved soul at the heart of war, but a depraved society. There is no denying that he has a point. Nevertheless, the pressures from the state and world political system are merely reflections of our individual or corporate moral condition.

---

<sup>12</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) 16.

<sup>13</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 120-123.

The majority of thinkers look to the individual as a starting point. While Rousseau is correct about the moral pressure of the state and the international community, he failed to factor in the influence and action of powerful personalities. Actions by formidable leaders like Bismarck, Stalin, and Adolf Hitler and their followers overpowered and shaped their state and influenced the world political framework. This was all done by the power of their will. Today, in many countries across the world the same spirit lives and will continue to live unless confronted or confounded. As stated before, globalization gives the individual a stage and access to others that was not possible in the past. Thus, a charismatic individual has the tools to access, influence, and convert others on levels never seen before.

Given these new, deadly changes in the world's dynamics, a vital issue is how a human being should react to war. There are many opinions, but three dominate the discussion. They cast a larger shadow on current thoughts of war. They are the theories of Pacifism, Realism, and Just War.

## Pacifism

Adherents of pacifism hold that war is never the answer. Pacifism is rooted in a deontological and consequential view of ethics, which expressly states that war is always morally wrong and the cost of war never outweighs gains.<sup>14</sup> Pacifism adherents span the gamut from absolute to conditional application.

Indeed, it is right to ask about the morality of a conflict that involves the mass use of violence by the state. Morality does have a place and must be discussed in the

---

<sup>14</sup> Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War*, 13.

politics of the nation state. Nevertheless, within pacifism, the *only* moral option must be found in peaceful compromise. This position holds that there are always alternatives to war. War is never seen as worth the cost.

Christianity, as well as Buddhism and many other religions, holds a strong tradition of pacifism. Service in the U.S. Military can be deferred based on pacifist beliefs by classification as a conscientious objector. Mennonites, Quakers, Brethren, and other Anabaptist Christians across the United States are exempt from military service based on their biblical belief in pacifism.

One of pacifism's greatest influences comes from the Christian tradition. More specially, it is rooted in the interpretation of the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. There is consensus that the Sermon on the Mount espouses a personal pacifism that rejects force or retaliation. Verses like "Blessed are the peace makers for they will be called sons of God" (MT 5:9), or "Do not resist an evil person" (MT 5:39), and "Love your enemies..." (MT 5:44) all reinforce a pacifist view. In addition, many interpret Christ's command to his followers not to fight at his arrest at Gethsemane, and his subsequent explanation to the Roman governor, as precluding participation in the political system of the world. Christ's description of an alternate kingdom and Christian membership in it seems to exclude participation in politics and its extension, war.

My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jews. But now my kingdom is from another place.

*-John 18:36*

In keeping with Christ's words, many early Christians radically separated themselves from ancient societies that mixed cultic practices with civic participation. These pagan practices, along with pacifist beliefs, led many Christians away from military service to the state. Theologians like Tatian and Tertullian championed this view of separation.<sup>15</sup> Tertullian famously summed up this belief,

What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? What does the Academy have to do with the Church?

*-Prescriptions against Heretics I.7*

Later, this statement would be complicated by the conversion of Constantine on the Milvian Bridge. With the Emperor of Rome now a Christian, 4<sup>th</sup> Century Christians entered into an awkward relationship with the state. Tertullian's arguments, as outlined in his book, "On the Soldier's Crown", were based almost entirely on the idolatry involved in government service.<sup>16</sup> That was now removed.

In addition, other sections of the New Testament seem to make exceptions for the use of force. Jesus physically overthrows the money changers in the temple (MT 21:12-13), and in Luke 22:35-38, he instructs his disciples to sell their cloaks and buy a sword if they don't have one. These examples of the use of violence in support of justice and self-defense contrasted the understanding of the Sermon on the Mount.

---

<sup>15</sup> Justo Gonzalez, *The Story of the Christianity: The Early Church Down to the Reformation* (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publisher, 1985) 53-54.

<sup>16</sup> *Early Latin Theology* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006) S.L. Greenslade (ed.) 79-82.

Theologians like Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose, Augustine and Eusebius believed scripture taught more than pacifism. These theologians would lay the foundations of the Just War theory. They rejected the notion that the Sermon on the Mount embodied the “ideal” for Christian behavior. Instead, they argued that Jesus taught restraint of personal vengeance, but never intended to restrain the *just* use of political force. They pointed to scripture like Romans 13:1-7, which described the state as an agent both of God’s wrath and love.<sup>17</sup>

These theologians interpreted Christ as a continuation and clarification of the Old Testament. These scriptures included warriors like Joshua, Samson, Gideon, and David. Such warriors used violence as divine mandates by God. Yet, they were honored and set apart as people of God. Scripture quotes God’s assessment of King David as, “A man of my own heart.” Early Just War proponents would use these and other scriptures like Ecclesiastes 3:8 to support the view that sometimes Christians must physically oppose evil by force: “To everything there is a season...A time for war and a time for peace.”

Additionally, the Gospel in no way disparages military service. To the contrary, the New Testament seems to hold up the military profession as an honorable one. John the Baptist, when asked by soldiers what they should do after being baptized, did not tell them to leave the service. Indeed, John did not condemn military service at all, only the common unethical practices associated with it. Soldiers were admonished to refrain from extortion and false accusation, and to be content with their pay (Luke 3:14).

---

<sup>17</sup> Keith Pavlischek, “Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism, and Just War Theory: A Critique” *Christianity and Power Politics* ed by Eric D. Patterson (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008) 57-58.

Like John, Jesus also seems to favor the soldier. Jesus identifies the man who had more faith than any one he had met in Jerusalem to be a centurion, a commander in the Roman Legion. That soldier's faith seems to be a by-product of, and not in spite of, his military discipline and practice (LK 7:1-10). In the book of Mark, it is another centurion who is the first to acknowledge that Jesus was the Son of God (MK 15:39). Lastly, in the book of Acts, it is a centurion who is the first gentile to be baptized in the Holy Spirit (ACTS 10:44).

Despite this seemingly positive view of soldiers and lack of condemnation for their life, pacifism strongly influenced theologians for more than two thousand years. In the 16<sup>th</sup> Century, theologian and father of humanism, Desiderius Erasmus, along with other friends such as Thomas More, continued to put forth a pacifist alternative to war. Erasmus wrote with wit and satire in a number of his published works against war (*The Praise of Folly* -1509, *War Is Sweet to Those Who Do Not Know It* -1515, and *The Complaint of Peace* -1517). He worked hard to counter works like *The Prince* by Nicolo Machiavelli, who is seen by many to be the father of modern realism.

Later in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, pacifism moved into a form of internationalism. Adherents and ethicists like Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill espoused free trade as an alternative to war. Mill even commented, "Commerce rendered war obsolete."

In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, pacifism was a strong force on both social institutions and governments. Both Mohandas Gandhi and the Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. successfully used pacifist actions and tactics in their justice movements against ruling

powers of a British-controlled India and a racially-segregated United States. Peaceful protests in opposition to the Vietnam War contributed to bringing peace to that conflict. Often the action of peace was paid in blood (as with the martyred Salvadoran Bishop Oscar Romero) that shamed the opposition into reflection and action.

Pacifism draws strong support from Christian Churches. Most have pacifist organizations within them. In the Catholic Church, organizations like the Catholic Workers Union and *Pax Christi*, along with theologians like Thomas Merton, Henri Nouwen, Dorothy Day and the last four popes, have helped move the Church to a more pacifist policy. The Eastern Orthodox Church and most Protestant denominations have similar organizations working ecumenically to support peace. Methodist theologian and ethicist Stanley Hauerwas of Duke Divinity has gained some notoriety in his candid support of pacifism.

The Anglican Church also has a strong tradition of pacifism. Groups like the Peace Pledge Union and the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship have greatly influenced church policy statements. Although many Anglicans may not see themselves as pacifists, the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship successfully lobbied two successive Lambeth Conferences to adopt pacifist positions. Desmond Tutu is perhaps the most well-known Anglican pacifist for his work in South Africa, although the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has led the Anglican Church of England in opposition to the current Iraq War, and Anglicans under the leadership of Bishop Peter Camley have opposed Australian participation in the war.

While pacifism has proven an effective means of political action as part of a civic movement or individuals within a nation, its ability to act on an outside bellicose state

has met little success. Pacifism in opposition to an invading belligerent force as a national strategy has almost no examples in history, although I did find one notable exception.

On the Chatham Islands, some 500 miles to the east of New Zealand, a peaceful people known as the Moriori were completely wiped out. In December of 1835, two ships full of islanders known as the Maori, close cousins to the Moriori, arrived, bent on conquest. The Maori were outnumbered by the Moriori more than two to one. However, the Moriori practiced complete pacifism as a moral imperative. Instead of resisting force, they offered friendship and a division of all that they had. This offer was met over the next few days with horrific murder, rape, and cannibalism. The Moriori were informed that they were slaves and were wantonly killed off in the following years. The last full descendent of this people died in 1935.<sup>18</sup>

Pacifism's success in changing political will within a nation depends on the assumption that the power it is facing has a similar moral understanding and will be moved to compassion by pacifist opposition. While this is true of most Western democracies, it is not consistent around the world. Pacifism for many presupposes a natural good in humanity. It depends on that goodness to be effective.

Unfortunately, this goodness is not universal. Some nations simply control the media and commence brutal repression that unfortunately has been very successful in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Stalin in the Soviet Union, Hitler in Germany, military repression in Myanmar, and China's invasion and suppression of Tibet are all examples of brutal

---

<sup>18</sup> Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: Norton & Company, 1999) 54-59.

oppressors who have had no problem crushing peaceful dissent. Hitler's second in command, Hermann Goering, said the following about moving a nation to war:

"All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country."

## Realism

In contrast to the pacifist view seeded in the goodness of humanity, realism, like the Just War theory, presupposes humanity in a fallen state. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the architects of Christian Realism, asserted that man is by the nature of his creation sinful; at the height of man's perfection there is always the possibility of evil. In opposition to painless optimism, he asserted that life is unavoidably tragic. Says Niebuhr: "Mankind is living in a Lenten age."<sup>19</sup>

My experience in combat leads me to believe that humanity has fallen from God's intention. The crucible of combat can release unreasonable and destructive behavior that, if unchecked, can exceed all bounds of moral conduct.

The theory of realism begins with a similar understanding of human nature that drives the state. Realists like Reinhold Niebuhr and John Bennett believed that the sin in every person and every act makes holding to the idealist concepts of Just War or Pacifism impossible. Sometimes, they believe, we must choose the lesser of two evils. It is God's grace in forgiveness that frees us to act responsibly in such dilemmas.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> "Religion: Faith for a Lenten Age," *Time*, March 8, 1948.

<sup>20</sup> James F. Childress, "Realism", *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986) James F. Childress and John MacQuarrie (eds) 527-528.

Realism makes no attempt to redeem or address war within a moral framework. Realism is utilitarian and consequentialist in understanding the modalities of war. Morality is shunned in fear of hypocrisy.<sup>21</sup> No, it says, it is better to “let loose the dogs of war.” Hell unleashed will lead to a natural resolution.

Realists take a sober look at the political necessities of the state. They attempt to separate themselves from any ethical implications of justice or other moral constructs, which they believe should never be used to describe or direct state behavior on the international scene. In this system, the wellbeing of the state is paramount. It emphasizes security and economic advantage in the turmoil of world politics. Survival of the state is the ultimate goal. Relations with other countries are always practical in approach, with the self-interest of the state as the dominant prime mover. There are no overarching principles governing relations with other nations. Realism is founded on the principle that all mankind is self-centered and competitive at its core. The state is merely an extension of this and will dominate others unless acted upon by other states.

Realists believe that war is a natural outcome of the politically volatile system of the world. If war is to take place, the state must use all means to gain victory. There are no rules and boundaries when it comes to winning war. If international law or rules of warfare get in the way, they should be set aside in favor of securing power, security and economic growth. Classical realists include such thinkers as Nicolo Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Hobbes. Modern realists include George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Thomas Kennedy, “Can War be Just” *From Christ to the World* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994) Wayne Boulton, Thomas Kennedy, and Allen Verhey (Eds) 436-438.

<sup>22</sup> Brian Orend, *The Morality of War* (Broadview, 2006) 223-224.

A theory based in part on Machiavellian thought has the problem of boundaries. The theory recognizes total depravity and uses this as an excuse to abandon any moral guidelines except a utilitarian self interest of the state. Where do the desires of the state end? It seems feasible that a powerful state would be justified by this ethic to invade smaller countries to sustain or control resources. All that is needed is a justification for security or economic interests. It seems animalistic in its “survival of fittest” mentality. In an age of destructive power that could devastate the earth, a realist policy leaves too much to chance. Moral limitations on our actions at the international level and within war remind us of our faults and limitations. To set this aside leads only to a fuller and more complete descent into the hellish state of war.

A state ruled by realist views would certainly be feared and suspiciously monitored by allies and enemies alike. Both the Vietnam War and the current Iraq War, which were undertaken by officials who confessed realist thought, seem to have created the same for us.

Realism was a dominant theory of policymakers in the Bush administration; it explains some of the moves the United States has made during the Iraq War and the War on Terror.<sup>23</sup> This would include actions like the 2003 preemptive invasion of Iraq for reasons of security, and techniques of interrogation that are questionable at best. Justification in both cases is the security of the United States. This is classical realist thought.

It should be noted that there are “Just War” arguments made for both actions. Nevertheless, I believe these arguments to be influenced by a realist perspective and fall flat when analyzed. While Just War theory does say you can preemptively attack,

---

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Ricks, *FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (Penguin: New York, 2006) 30.

Iraq did not meet the requirement. As Michael Walzer said in the *New York Times*, “We don’t have to wait to be attacked; that’s true. But you do have to wait until you are about to be attacked.”<sup>24</sup>

Contrast the 2003 invasion of Iraq with the first Gulf War in 1991 when the White House took pains to argue the morality of liberating Kuwait.<sup>25</sup> It was a simple case of bad guys invading a peaceful nation. We had every just right to drive them out. Yet, today the application to Iraq seems much more complex. Just War theory, or at least the words associated with it, has become frequent in political discussion. But its application seems disingenuous or half hearted. This could be the conflicted views of our political leaders or just the staggering complexity of war in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

## Just War

Whether or not realism has a greater influence on Washington, there is no denying the supremacy of Just War theory in modern warfare. The U.S. military and many other Western States direct the moral conduct of their armed forces by the dictates of Just War Theory. The Law of Land Warfare, taught to all U.S. military personnel, is a direct derivative of the theory of Just War.

Just War Theory developed as a Christian doctrine of conduct of war<sup>26</sup> with strong Greco-Roman influences. In its beginnings, notable philosophers and theologians set out fundamental parameters. Aristotle, Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas and Grotius are just a few of the architects who worked out the foundations of this theory. Just War Theory has been erected as a buttress against the onslaught of

---

<sup>24</sup> David E. Sanger, “Beating Them to Prewar,” *New York Times*, September 28, 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War*. 85.

<sup>26</sup> Fr. Alexander Webster, *The Virtue of War*, (Salisbury: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004) 122.

modern World Wars. The Geneva and Hague Conventions, the establishment of the United Nations, and the Nuremburg trials have all shaped and molded this living theory, as has the continuation of war. Modern theorists like Michael Walzer and others continue to add structure to the theory.

Just War Theory is based on the premise that even though war is morally repugnant, there are times when it is necessary and right. Just War gives the criteria for morally justifiable engagements in warfare, *jus ad bellum*. It further defines how wars are to be morally fought, *jus in bello*. In recent times, even the moral responsibility for ending a war is defined, *jus post bellum*. Just War Theory is ultimately about taming war or containing the consequence and horror so that peace and justice can ultimately be achieved.

Altruism, or more properly selfless service for others, is at the heart of Just War theory. According to Augustine, acting for others over self is the highest of virtues. Augustine, in his synthesis of this theory, put Christian charity at the heart. Augustine saw humanitarian crises like genocide or oppression as just causes for war. But how is it 'just' for those who fight for others' freedoms in obedience to their own nation? How do we measure the cost in lives or personal sacrifice to build and stabilize other countries like Somalia, Bosnia, or Kosovo? How long and how much blood must we spend to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan? U.S. servicemen are not fighting for their country's freedom, but for the safety of other peoples.<sup>27</sup>

Just War is subjective in its application. One country's justification for war may be more or less than another country's justification. How do we define "just"?

---

<sup>27</sup> Yaron Brook and Alex Epstein, "Just War Theory vs. American Self-Defense", *The Objective Standard* (Spring 2006) Vol. 1, no. 1 Craig Biddle (ed.) <<http://www.theobjectivestandard.com>>

Classically defined in the West, thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine expressed justice in a single phrase, *sum cuique* or “to each his own.” According to Justinian in one of the oldest compendiums of civil law known as the *Juris Civilis*, that phrase means, “Justice is the habit whereby a man renders to each one his due with constant and perpetual will.”

Yet, such definitions for St. Augustine, the father of Just War Theory, are but a shadow of true justice. In his book, *The City of God*, Augustine described earthly justice as a compromise between different peoples to obtain peace, which is certainly not a common definition of justice. Peace and order in what Augustine describes as the “Earthly City” is kept by governments, using force against other human beings. The use of such violence was surely not God’s intent. Nevertheless, Augustine contends that the use of such force against transgressors is justified if it restrains the wickedness of human beings. In the same way, Just War theory at its best is an unholy affair. If our definition of justice is imperfect, it is certainly understandable that defining a Just War can be baffling.

Culturally, the idea of Just War is based mostly on Western thought. The United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, do not seem to provide an objective, impartial view as to which wars are just or not. Politics and the self interests of member states rob them of any credibility or legitimate authority. Defining a Just War, like war itself, becomes a political battle of nations and states.

For a soldier like me, Just War provides a divine lifeline in the hellish turmoil of war. When suffering, pain, and emotions like revenge or rage seem to be overpowering the conscience, a reminder of what is right and good can sear through to the soul. It is a

reminder of our values and our standards. It is a reflection of faith in the fight, demonstrating the presence of God's love in a place where all else dies. Soldiers need these reminders to stay sane and to keep their souls from too much damage. They need to be reminded of what is good, holy, and of God.

The principles of Just War follow.

### *Jus ad bellum*

*Jus ad bellum*, which is Latin for "Justice to War," is a set of principles for leaders of nations or states to refer to before conducting a war. Conducting a war that does not meet these principles means a leader of a state may be found criminally responsible for war by post war courts like the Nuremberg trials of World War II. Any justified war must meet all six requirements of Just War Theory.

1. Just Cause. Just Cause makes reference to: self-defense of a legitimate state from external attack; the defense of others from external attack; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrong-doing which remains uncorrected. In 1993 the US Catholic Conference elaborated on just cause: *"Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations."* Both the integrity of the state and the individual citizens are protected.

A legitimate state is defined by international law as meeting three conditions. One, it is seen as legitimate by its people and the international community. Two, the state does not violate the rights of other legitimate states. Three, the state responsibly

looks out for the human rights of their citizens. States that do not meet these criteria have no right to govern or go to war.

2. Right Intention. The state must fight only for the just cause of the war. No other secondary objectives can be present, like revenge or economic gain. The 1991 liberation of Kuwait and expulsion of Iraqi forces is a good example. The United States did not continue with an invasion of Iraq, nor did they seize their oil wells. Their goal was to push the Iraqis out and they stopped soon after that goal was completed.

3. Legitimate Authority. A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the proper authorities. Legitimate process of the government must be met. The declaration of war must be made to its own citizens and to the enemy state or states.

4. Last Resort. War is a last resort only after all other peaceful alternatives have been exhausted.

5. Probability of Success. War should not be taken if there is no reasonable chance for success. Using mass violence when there is no hope of victory does not serve the people of the weaker state. International law omits this requirement because it is seen as prejudicial to weaker states.

6. Macro-Proportionality. Prior to war, a state must assess the expected results of good to evil that will transpire. If the universal good, like removal of a malevolent

regime, does not outweigh the universal evil, like the loss of life that a war would bring, then war should not be undertaken.<sup>28</sup>

### *Jus in bello*

*Jus in bello*, which is Latin for *justice in war*, refers to actions of combatants in the midst of war. Here, the commanders, officers and soldiers of the state take responsibility for their actions in war. Any breach of the laws of war for combatants falls upon the soldiers and those who lead them. Soldiers who violate these laws can expect to be prosecuted by their own military or perhaps the newly-formed international criminal courts. *Jus in bello* can be subdivided into the three principles of discrimination, proportionality, and double effect in reference to specific conduct within war.

1. Discrimination. Non-combatants in a just war should not be targeted and should remain immune to attack. Combatants in Just War have a responsibility to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Civilian targets like churches, mosques, and hospitals should not be targeted unless the enemy occupies such structures. Intentional targeting of civilian areas like those against London by the Germans or the bombing of Dresden by the Allies during WW II is prohibited.

2. Proportionality. In this definition proportionality is applied to a specific act, event, or campaign within war, as opposed to before the war takes place as it is defined

---

Orend, Brian, "War", *Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  
<<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/>>

in *Jus ad bellum*. Weight is given to the amount of good which should be greater than the evil caused by such actions or event. If the act outweighs the expected good, then it is prohibited. The use of weapons of mass destruction is usually cited as an example of a weapon out of proportion to the tactical value sought.

3. Double Effect. This principle applies to the inevitable collateral damage to property and death or injury of non-combatants on the battlefield. The unintentional death of civilians and other non-combatants, as well as the destruction of protected areas, is wrong, but excusable if it is the unintentional secondary effect of destroying enemy targets.

This is not an exhaustive list of the Just War doctrine, since it is a constantly evolving standard that grows as wars continue to be fought in our world. Different individuals have different interpretations depending on situation and purpose. It is only guidance to decisions made in combat.<sup>2930</sup>

## Conclusion

In conclusion, war is an extension of the will of the human spirit. Any study of the ethics of combat must be framed in the context of war. Traditional definitions of war are being tested by new modalities of terrorism in this century. This modern terrorism without state affiliation is in part due to globalization. War is both a definition of status between states and a reality of being for those who have experienced it. Not only is

---

Duane L. Cady. "Just War", *An Encyclopedia of War and Ethics* (1996), Donald A. Wells (ed.)  
Duane L. Cady. "Just War", *An Encyclopedia of War and Ethics* (1996), Donald A. Wells (ed.)

humanity affected by war, it is also from humanity that war springs. Pacifism, Realism, and Just War are all modalities we use to understand war. Of the three, Just War has emerged as dominant, although the others hold power in the minds of many. Just War has the greatest influence over the U.S. military and most states in the world. It is the guiding ethical standard for soldiers in combat and a guide to decisions made in combat.

### 3. ETHICS, the INDIVIDUAL, and the BATTLEFIELD *Black Soul Disease*

Just War theory, political calculus or any number of intellectual reasons that send soldiers into battle are of little consequence to a those receiving enemy small arms fire or rocket attack. What is important is much more immediate, survival or death. Here are just a few such decisions.

On a lonely Forward Operating Base in Iraq, an 18-year-old private, who five months before worried only about whom he might take to the prom, listens carefully to his Commanding Officers as if his life depends on it. It does. The soldier's mission is to deliver critical supplies to units spread across his region of Iraq. The Commander orders him not to stop on the road for anything—even children blocking the road. The enemy uses them to obstruct the road, hoping the soldiers' moral sense will cause them to stop their vehicles, leaving the convoy open for attack. If he should meet any children in the road, he is ordered to run them down if they refuse to get out of the way.<sup>31</sup>

Four SEAL Commandos drop into an isolated village in Afghanistan to identify the location of a Taliban commander. Their operation is exposed when they are discovered by a young shepherd boy. They agonize over whether they should kill the boy and continue the mission, or let him go; he will undoubtedly alert others to their presence, and bring probable death and mission failure.<sup>32</sup>

Four insurgents kneel blindfolded before the squad of soldiers who captured them. The night before, these same insurgents had killed four soldiers with a command detonated improvised explosive device—those killed were squad mates of these American soldiers. After conferring with the Battalion Commander, the Platoon Sergeant moves deliberately to a position behind the kneeling insurgents. He takes out his M-9 Berretta pistol and coolly fires a bullet through the head of each prisoner.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> First Sergeant Alan Vivyan, Retired (57<sup>th</sup> Transportation Company, 548<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Battalion, US Army) in discussion with the author, October 2006, Ft. Drum, NY.

<sup>32</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "The Cursed One," *Army Times* (25 June 2007) 18.

<sup>33</sup> Major Larry Armanda (85<sup>th</sup> Medical Detachment, Combat Stress Control Team, US Army) in discussion with author, December 2007, Forward Operating Base Warrior, Kirkuk, Iraq.

These are the moral quandaries of combat that many of our young men and women serving in the War on Terror are confronting. In some cases, our own sense of morality is used by the enemy as an instrument of warfare. Other times, soldiers struggle internally, weighing the expediency of mission completion and the cost of victory against what they believe to be morally right. Almost all struggle against powerful emotions to take revenge on those who kill, maim, or attack them. Our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen wrestle daily with these questions of conscience that impact the life and death of those around them. Often, the parameters and rules of engagement set out by U.S. forces are inadequate guidance for dilemmas set before our troops. The young soldier must ultimately decide the ethical decisions that will mark his or her life, the safety of the unit, the safety of non-combatants and the life of an enemy combatant—and which ultimately will affect the outcome of the war.

The ethical struggles of life and death are nothing new to war. Sometimes we pretend that *our* soldiers are immune to or seldom struggle with these dilemmas. Any honest look at war finds that morality is often clouded or disengaged and many actions taken by all sides are deplorable. This is not to say that some armies and units haven't conducted themselves with superior ethical conduct on the battlefield.

Not only is outright cruelty a by-product of war, so too are acts of incredible courage and generosity. During the invasion of Normandy in World War II, German and American soldiers often found themselves being treated side by side for wounds by opposing forces at battlefield aid stations across the area of operation. An American chaplain witnessed a badly-wounded German soldier crawl to a wounded American who had slipped off his litter onto the hard ground. The German soldier, in obvious pain,

gently repositioned the critically-wounded American into a more comfortable position. This would be the German soldier's last act of kindness. He died later that night.<sup>34</sup>

Courage or cowardice, mercy or cruelty; can an Army shape an individual to act on only the former? Should we train our soldiers in such away? I believe the answer is definitely, 'yes' to both questions. First, both victory in combat as well as the sake of the individual are dependent on an ethical framework. Second, this project proposal is a means to engage the individual soldier's moral sense to the challenges of combat.

## Victory through Ethics

Ethical behavior in war has positive consequences for victory and survivability. During the First World War, U.S. soldiers had such a reputation of humane conduct that many Germans advised their young relatives entering into service in World War II, "Be brave, join the infantry, and surrender to the first American you see." The American reputation for good treatment had survived from one generation to the next.<sup>35</sup> Once Germany neared defeat in World War II, units fighting the Soviet Army would move out of sector in order to surrender to American troops. Needless bloodshed was averted because they expected, and were given, good treatment.

Attitudes were far different on the Russian Front. Both sides were swept into a cycles of atrocity against both military and civilian personnel. By the end of the war, Germans and Soviet soldiers were fighting each other to the last man, seldom taking prisoners. Soviet soldiers were told that they were not accountable for civil crimes

---

<sup>34</sup> Donald Crosby, *Battlefield Chaplains* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1994) 133.

<sup>35</sup> Dave Grossman, *On Killing* (New York: Back Bay Books 1995) 205.

committed on German soil, and that property and women were theirs by right and were the spoils of war. This vengeful policy was a reaction to German atrocities committed in the Soviet Union during invasion and occupation by German troops.<sup>36</sup>

Not only does good moral conduct and the reputation of 'fair play' give beneficial results on the battlefield, but it is essential in Counterinsurgency Warfare. Morality played a strategic role in the guerilla warfare of Vietnam, as it does in the War in Iraq today. While insurgents often use terrorist tactics (like the effective campaign of assassination by the Vietcong against South Vietnamese,) counterinsurgency forces are limited in their actions. Insurgents are judged by promises, but counter insurgents are judged by what they do, and are tied to their responsibility as well as their past. If they lie or cheat, their short term gains will be overturned, and they will be discredited forever.<sup>37</sup> The prize in this sort of warfare is the heart and minds of the people. It is the center of gravity of battle.

Today in Iraq, much of our success against Al-Qaeda is a by-product of their brutality against the Iraqi people. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other insurgent groups have used kidnapping, murder, and intimidation to gain support. This tactic has turned civilians against their cause.

In contrast and for the most part, U.S. soldiers have proved themselves partners with the Iraqi people. Local politicians, some of which are known insurgents, have been courted as allies. This has meant extending trust, which in war can mean exposing yourself to your enemy. In turn, many Iraqis have met coalition troops half way. The beginning of this turn around is known as the "Anbar Awakening" or *Sahawa*, in Arabic.

---

<sup>36</sup> Dave Grossman, *On Killing*. 211.

<sup>37</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger Security International 1964) 9.

It has extended into a program spanning the entire country. Former Iraqi insurgents now work for Iraq and maintain check points that provide security against foreign fighters.

Nevertheless, this position is precarious. If undone, the military could quickly lose the gains it has made. Soldiers and other supporting agency must act with discipline and moral restraint, or risk extending the war indefinitely. In June of 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appointed investigators to look into the killing of civilians in Haditha by U.S. Marines. Maliki has spoken on many occasions on “the practice” of occupying forces’ disregard for civilians. After a cabinet meeting, he told reporters, “They run them over and leave them, or kill anyone suspicious.”<sup>38</sup>

Again in 2007, another massacre of Iraqi civilians took place in Baghdad. This one was perpetrated by a U.S. State Department private contractor known as Blackwater. Seventeen Iraqi civilians were cut down when Blackwater employees panicked after being engaged by insurgents. They responded with the indiscriminate shooting of anyone they saw.

## Survivability through Ethics

How do we equip a soldier to not only survive war in a physical sense, but to survive war in a spiritual sense with soul intact?

For the individual, a strong ethical framework has been understood to be an asset in combat. This assumption has persisted into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Today as in the past, a morally-formed and disciplined soldier is seen as an imperative to an effective fighting

---

<sup>38</sup> Ellen Knickmeyer and Nelson Hernandez, “Iraq Plans Probe; Ethics Training Set for Troops,” *The Washington Post* (June 2, 2006) A16

force. In World War I, considered by many to be the first modern war, the soldier and morality were weighed as one component of endurance in battle.

The key to survival for the English soldier in the trenches was believed to be a morality born out of Christian belief. This reflected the Victorian system of elite public education which included compulsory Christian education and worship. At both Oxford and Cambridge members of the university were obliged to officially subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England.<sup>39</sup> The product of this educational system became the officer corps of the mobilized British populace. These officers instilled virtues like temperance, loyalty, and candor in their soldiers. Most British officers believed this model of Cambridge Christian bred virtues resilient in the stress of combat and provided a better chance of survival. One officer wrote,<sup>40</sup>

...every battalion had its own little core of officers around which the battalion clung. Wounds or sickness might get them, but sure enough they'd return...Revolving around this nucleus was an endless changeover of officers. Death claimed many, but of the survivors only the good gravitated towards the center. The rest...couldn't stick it, and among them almost invariably were the hard drinkers and persistent womanizers –the very men, in fact, whose conduct showed their lack of inner discipline. Here in the trenches your sins found you out.

## Combat, Ethics, and the Team

Personal survival on the battlefield is a group effort. Individual ethics are important, but they are played out within the context of a society made up by the group. A soldier belongs to concentric circles of groups, from team, squad, platoon, and company to battalion, brigade, and division. The group dynamic is paramount to

---

<sup>39</sup> Gerald Parsons, James Moore, and John Wolfe, *Religion in Victoria Britain* (Manchester University Press, 1988) 223-224.

<sup>40</sup> John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. 279-281.

survival, and soldiers fight in the smallest of these groups. They are not equal within the group. Some hold status because of rank, technical skill, or strong personality.

Nevertheless, the fear of losing reputation in these groups because of moral lapses or lack of courage or ineptitude during the fight is a stronger motivator than losing one's life.<sup>41</sup> The term, "Death before dishonor!" has real meaning in the close bonds formed in combat. These thoughts are echoed by Albert Bandura in his social cognitive theory where he states:

People do not operate as autonomous moral agents impervious to the social realities in which they are immersed. Moral agency is socially situated and exercised in particularized ways depending on the life conditions under which people transact their affairs.<sup>42</sup>

Sadly, the society of the group can also lead to extreme violations of ethical standards. The group and leaders within the group can emphasize immoral behavior that leads to disengagement of the moral sense.<sup>43</sup> One soldier who participated in the massacre of My Lai during the Vietnam War described his actions like this:

You didn't have to look for people to kill, they were just there. I cut their throats, cut off their hands, cut out their tongues, and scalped them. I did it. A lot of people were doing it, and I just followed. I just lost all sense of direction.<sup>44</sup>

The reality is that many soldiers die spiritually in combat. One only needs to look through the ranks of veterans to find the highest suicide rates, drug abuse, and

---

<sup>41</sup> John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. 72.

<sup>42</sup> Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 208.

<sup>43</sup> I. L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascos*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972)

<sup>44</sup> David L Anderson, *Facing My Lai, Moving Beyond the Massacre* (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1998).

alcoholism among Americans. The soul can die before the body; it only takes longer for physical collapse. Such veterans become like the living dead, the joy of life vanishing on the day of battle. They return home as shadows of their former selves, casualties of conscious.

## Ethical Failure in Combat

For many, base and cruel natures hidden in the depths of the human soul surface during the stress of combat, surprising many who believed such natures did not exist in them. Some acts of cruelty are deliberate and a product of character flaws, while others are a side effect of the state's mechanized brutality intrinsic to war.

Yet, all caught in the struggle of war are affected by the daily desecration of what God has created. The weight of this ruin crushes the human soul and unhinges the psyche. An average human being can survive only 60 days of unrelenting combat before he or she unravels spiritually and mentally.<sup>45</sup>

We should not fall into the delusion that our American soldiers have any superiority in moral conduct during war. Like any person on this earth, they may suffer from lapses in character when tested by the extremes of combat. Even those soldiers from our so-called "Greatest Generation" committed war crimes. During the liberation of St. Lo in France, after the horrors of the hedgerow campaign ended, U.S. forces fanned out in bands of soldiers gathering up surrendering German troops, summarily shooting them as they were taken into custody. Several chaplains witnessed these brutal actions and were appalled. One of the American soldiers went through the pockets of his

---

<sup>45</sup> Swank and Marchand. "Combat Neuroses," *American Journal of Sociology* (1946) 51, 465-478.

German victim and found a picture of the soldier's wife and baby. Out of guilt, he sought the chaplain and tried to justify his action by reasoning, "It was either him or me." The chaplain angrily pointed out that such was hardly the case, since the German bore no weapons and had his hands up in surrender when the soldier murdered him.<sup>46</sup>

## Emotion Overriding Morality

Emotions like revenge can trigger an overpowering rage in combatants who watch as life is violently ripped away in front of their eyes. Morality slips to the back of the mind—disengaged—and becomes a reluctant witness to atrocity. Once the passion of vengeance passes, the conscience will fight its way back and begin a separate battle for peace of the soul. Often, dominating vengeful emotions focus on the enemy, but, in later psychoses, may push an individual to attack innocents. Dr. Shay in his book, *Achilles in Vietnam*, postulates that revenge in war is often linked to deep psychological and cultural need to resurrect fallen comrades. One veteran recalled:

Every fucking one that died, I say, "\_\_\_\_, here's one for you, baby. I'll take this motherfucker out and I'm going to cut his fucking heart out for you."

Interestingly, the soldier was talking to his comrade as if he were alive and present. Not only are the dead brought back to life through this sacrificial act of blood-letting, but feelings of helplessness and fear are banished. Keeping faith with their friends' ghosts who haunt the battlefield in the survivor's mind affirms a sense of justice in the insanity of war, even if it is vengeance.<sup>47</sup> Soldiers like this man see themselves as

---

<sup>46</sup> Donald Crosby, *Battlefield Chaplains*. 135.

<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Scribner, 1997) 90.

spiritually dead, victims of war. They populate the programs of our veterans' hospitals, wander our streets, and contend with life in silent suffering.

## Victory over Virtue

Practical concerns for victory drive some soldiers to put their consciences aside. In offensive maneuvers, speed and superiority of fire power can mean the difference between victory and defeat, and the management of prisoners hinders a unit's effectiveness. Sending soldiers to secure prisoners' transfers to the rear leaves combat units weaker and more vulnerable to counter-attack. And, diverting vital offensive personnel simply to secure prisoners who had killed or maimed their own buddies moments before is a risk some are unwilling to take. If defeated, they could never be sure that their own lives would be spared by the enemy to which they surrendered.<sup>48</sup>

Many times the calculus of victory wins out over honor or any other concern. One study shows that most people favor self-interest over principled reasoning.<sup>49</sup> If you believe in victory or death, then nothing is sacred or off-limits. The laws of war, along with the values of the nation or religious faith, are set aside for victory. Truly, some will trade their souls to gain the world.<sup>50</sup>

One of the most famous instances of victory over honor can be seen by the actions of Henry V at the historic battle of Agincourt in 1415. Beset by a superior force of French knights on French soil, Henry V broke with chivalric code in medieval warfare to secure victory. After surviving two waves of French attackers, Henry felt certain a

---

<sup>48</sup> John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. 196.

<sup>49</sup> W. E. Sobesky. "The Effects of Situational Factors on Moral Judgment," *Child Development*, 54, (1983) 575-584.

<sup>50</sup> Mt 16:26 (The New International Version).

third assault would break his defenses. Fearing an uprising from the multitude of prisoners he had captured from the first two waves, he ordered his knights to kill the prisoners.

His nobles refused. To take the life of a knight or other combatant who had surrendered was considered murder. A knight would lose his honor if he did not protect a surrendering noble and his men. Henry's order broke the chivalric code, defying social and religious ethical behavior.

Thwarted by his noblemen and men-at-arms, Henry turned to his archers, who stood outside chivalric system. More than 200 of his archers carried out Henry's order and began killing the prisoners. Once the French attack did not materialize, the King rescinded his directive.

Morality was set aside to secure the practical goal of victory. Henry, a Christian king, took Holy Communion more than three times before the battle took place. He was well aware that such actions were considered murder, but his actions were calculated to win the day. In the scale of world opinion and history, his choice did not hurt him. The glory of victory was immortalized by Shakespeare, and the moral lapse in his behavior disappeared before the glorification and romanticizing of battle.<sup>51</sup>

## Death or Dishonor

Combat is a physically and spiritually turbulent environment where emotional extremes climb and fall unexpectedly. The reality of death and violence drives the human condition to its limits. In this atmosphere, physical survival can dominate, driving

---

<sup>51</sup> John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*. 108-112.

all other concerns to a secondary position. Notions of victory, honor, or obedience to law recede while baser natures of “kill or be killed” emerge. In Maslow’s Theory of Hierarchy of Motives, deficiency in safety turns the need to survive into the prime impulse. Often, soldiers have told me that they would do whatever necessary to survive, and ask for forgiveness later. The scripture from Ecclesiastes 9:4 seems to convey this feeling: “Better a live dog than a dead lion.”

## Collapse of Character and Insanity

War, by its very nature, causes innocents to suffer and die. Nations at war make mistakes, and the cost is paid in lives. There are times when the orders established to protect the whole bring about unintended death of civilians. Although they may be excused by the law of land warfare as a case of double effect, they still cause anguish in the human heart. Many soldiers I have spoken with describe similar experiences. Private First Class Coffey describes one such incident where a civilian vehicle failed to stop and was interpreted as a threat.

I saw an Abrams (tank) fire a super sabot round right through a pickup truck, and the woman who got out begged us to kill her while she watched her husband and her children burn to death. In perfect English, she said, “Why? Why are you doing this? We’re Christians!”<sup>52</sup>

The ruin of the soul caused by the unraveling of moral character in the face of continued combat and traumatic experiences<sup>53</sup> is termed acute stress disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, or stress illness, when symptoms persist. During the American Civil War it was called ‘Soldier’s Heart.’ In World War I, it was called ‘Shell

---

<sup>52</sup> Billy Cox, “The Spoils of War,” *Army Times* (7 July 2008) 15.

<sup>53</sup> Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* 31-32.

Shock.’ In World War II, it was termed ‘Combat fatigue.’ Later, in Vietnam it would be called Combat Stress Reaction. Combat Operational Stress affects all soldiers who participate in war. Most symptoms subside over time. However, prolonged combat or particularly traumatic experiences can leave soldiers affected for life.

The Pentagon reports that all soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan will feel some level of stress. Of these, 70% will return to a normal state, while 20% will suffer from temporary stress injuries. Another 10% will be affected with what is now termed “stress illness.” The percentage of those affected by stress illness increases to more than 30% for those on their third tour.<sup>54</sup>

Dr. Shay, in his book, *Achilles in Vietnam*, describes one type of an acute reaction to combat stress as the ‘Berserker State.’ The word comes from the ancient Norse warriors who fought in mad, uncontrolled states during combat. Shay describes the berserker as feeling both beneath humanity as an animal and above it as a god. In any event, the person is cut off from all human community. He or she answers to no one. The soldier’s actions are those of an animal, vicious and without thought. Yet, many in this state later described it as being god-like. Virtues are meaningless to a god who does not need courage, because he cannot be killed; he does not need to be generous because a god never wants. All moral trappings are abandoned. Socially, the individual is detached from humanity.

One soldier from Vietnam could not remember a single person he served with in two years while in this berserker state. When this condition advances to an all-consuming force, soldiers are known to have killed friend and foe alike.<sup>55</sup> Thus, the

---

<sup>54</sup> Mark Thompson, “America’s Medicated Army,” *TIME* (16 June 2008) 40-41.

<sup>55</sup> Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. 88.

individual disappears into the uncontrolled insanity of total war that moves from the battlefield into the spirit of the human being, until all is consumed by Hell on earth.

## Conclusion

The effects of ethical decisions in combat are far-reaching and echo in ongoing consequences later in life; they may be the most significant force on a soldier's life and in the lives of other actors on the battlefield. While the results of ethical decisions may lead to victory or defeat, morality seems to war within the spirit of the warrior, even as battle wages around him or her. Strong emotions batter the warrior, combining with extreme stress and unspeakable desecrations to push soldiers to their spiritual and psychological limits. This is why it is imperative that the Army prepares soldiers for the moral ambiguities of combat.

Solid faith and moral grounding seem to anchor an individual to peace of mind and spirit despite the turbulence of the battlefield.<sup>56</sup> Social cognitive theory refers to a similar process, where individuals adopt standards of conduct that provide deterrents to bad behavior through self-respect and self-demands of ethical conduct.<sup>57</sup>

Social Cognitive Theory seems to provide a ready vehicle for combining ethical norms to learning in a way that will awaken and engage moral conscience of our military personnel. Soldiers understand the rules; they simply do not engage them. Something in their mind turns off the conscience.

Albert Bandura described disengagement of the moral self-regulatory system as psychological maneuver designed to circumvent our own conscience. When our

---

<sup>56</sup> Bridget Cantrell and Chuck Dean, *Down Range to Iraq and Back* (Seattle: Word Smith Publishing, 2005) 65-66.

<sup>57</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986) 491.

conscience is working properly we engage our personal standard by using self-sanctions, self-reflection, and proactive measures. These measures prevent some of the catastrophic behavior we described.<sup>58</sup>

Hopefully, this project will engage the mind to such a point that mental pathways will be so used that disengaging them will be impossible. With the mind engaged, body and soul will follow. Hopefully, the soldier will engage their moral sense. Otherwise, turmoil will continue within the ranks of the military on ever expanding scale as deployments mount up combat stress upon already weary warriors.

When that faith fails, soldiers may slip into post traumatic stress disorder. One soldier who fought in both Central America and Grenada, killing a number of enemy combatants, lost much of his ability to cope when he came to the conclusion that his actions had betrayed his Christian upbringing which had taught him to respect life. This is why it is imperative that soldiers be trained to develop an ethical self that can sustain the onslaught of moral quandaries in battle.

In many armies, these kinds of problems are addressed by a warrior code. Moral strength and ethical character can protect the human psyche battered by the turbulent sea of war. These developed virtues—like courage, discipline, and sacrifice—translate to mental toughness, and help an individual to resist opposition, danger, hardship, and temptation. It is a bulwark against loss of self, a governor for the warrior and, in most cases, a necessity for victory. This life line is nothing new. Almost every army has found the necessity of a moral code, specifically tailored to the warrior.<sup>59</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 205.

<sup>59</sup> Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, xiii.

## 4. Impacting Character *Practice and Solution*

### Challenge of Ethics in Transition

Despite the best efforts of commanders at all levels of Army leadership, ethical training does not present easy solutions to complex scenarios. War and combat will always expose weakness in preparation and training. The Iraq war, globalization, and instant media have exposed weakness in the ethical formation of soldiers. Abu Ghraib and the attendant misconduct of soldiers, along with the failure of their leadership and training, is a prime example of those failures. To blame the military as the primary actor for these shortcomings is incomplete. Our society and the way we form our youth is a significant contributing factor. The Army reflects only the ethic of the nation that it serves.

Part of the problem we face in today's Army is exacerbated by recruits entering into the service with little to no formal moral training. The reasons for this shift are complex and the product of social change within our society. Declining church attendance, issues of separation of church and state, post modern thought, the information age, and a breakdown of the nuclear family have all contributed to a generation confused about societal norms of ethical behavior.

Traditional venues for developing character are criticized and their mode of operation is under attack. For example, the Boy Scouts of America, who require belief in God and exclude membership to homosexuals, are defending themselves from numerous discrimination lawsuits. They have been forced out of many public school systems and government agencies. Increased pressures from the ACLU and atheist

groups have obliged them to define themselves as a “religious” organization in order to maintain their core beliefs. Incrementally, they are being marginalized and pushed from the public arena. One of their primary missions of the Boy scouts is the development of character in young men and boys of America. Yet, they are attacked by reactionary groups because of differing norms.

In keeping with this trend, governmental agencies who in the past may have reflected the dominant morality of the community typically born out of a religious faith are turning away from any hint of religious entanglement. Other institutions like schools, required by Supreme Court decisions, strictly adhere to secular policies that resist notions of religion or faith which in the past were a source for developing moral character.<sup>60</sup>

Part of this current trend is due to changing thought and perceptions. Postmodernist thinking, emphasizing relativism and anti-foundationalism, has contributed to segmentation of both thought and institution. Its rejection of universal, normative ethical judgments adds to the confusion of defining ‘right’ behavior.

In addition to this transformation of thought, the world has become more interactive. A multiple of perspectives and moral viewpoints have exploded onto the scene, impacting our norms and social standards. Enhanced speed of communications and travel has made the world a smaller place. In a mere day or two a person can be almost anywhere on Earth. Communication through the internet and satellites is instantaneous.

---

<sup>60</sup> Stephen Mansfield. *The Faith of the American Soldier*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2005) 11.

Even the family unit, which can be argued as the primary social cell for formation of ethics,<sup>61</sup> is undergoing massive change. Today, one-fourth to one-third of all those born between 1977 and 1998 live in single parent families.<sup>62</sup> This age group makes up our current Army. Parents or the parent do not have the same amount of time to train or support development of their children's character. This generation shows more interest in spirituality, yet less interest in organized religion. Their spirituality and ethical formation is far more eclectic<sup>63</sup> and perhaps even confused.

The challenge of universal values and common ethical understanding becomes more important today because many have no commonality or unity of belief. Although, many of this generation (Millennials) claim religious affiliation, only a small number have ever attended religious services on a regular basis.<sup>64</sup> Many of our young soldiers are open-minded when it comes to faith or the formation of a moral frame of reference. They simply need to be convinced of the benefit. Usually life itself proves the point. Unfortunately, their need is now and the long life to develop this character will come after they need it the most.

## Identifying the Problem

As an Army Chaplain, time and time again soldiers come to me with incredible stories of moral choices made in combat. Many have no frame of reference to deal with the complexity of decisions executed in battle. Living on in their memories, some decisions haunt the soldiers, tainting the texture of their lives for years to come. The

---

<sup>61</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 491-492.

<sup>62</sup> Chris Roberts, "Numbering Single-Parent Families Increases 42%," *Columbia (SC) State*, May 23, 2001, A-1.

<sup>63</sup> Stephen Mansfield. *The Faith of the American Soldier*, 34-39.

<sup>64</sup> Stephen Mansfield. *The Faith of the American Soldier*, 36.

following is example of an interaction I had with a captain on his second deployment, dealing with problems from his first deployment that emerged because of the death of a comrade:

On one occasion, we had to chase down a car full of insurgents who were indiscriminately gunning down civilians in Baghdad in a suicidal 'drive-by.' We chased the vehicle down a main street in front of a school playground and stared in shock as the gunmen took the opportunity to mow down a dozen elementary children with their automatic weapons. We disabled their vehicle, and I got out and came face to face with a wounded insurgent who refused surrender. Bleeding to death and high on drugs, he continued to reach for an AK-47. Looking him in the eyes, I unloaded my 9mm pistol into his chest, killing him.

I keep replaying the event in my head over and over again. I know the insurgent's actions were reprehensible, and I was left with no option but to kill them. Yet, I am haunted by the guilt of taking this man's life. Chaplain, my parents are both atheists, and I was raised in believing only what I can see. I don't know how to deal with this guilt, and at times it is debilitating. I don't have a spirituality. I don't have anything to pull from or refer to that helps me with this.<sup>65</sup>

The Army did not send our soldiers into the War on Terror fully equipped. Keen to provide armor, weapons, and training, the Army allocated very little for the preparation of soldiers' psyches for the moral decisions of combat. True, they have identified a continuing need for ethics training and have instituted programs to address it. However, their efforts are usually reactionary and not always integrated. Like most institutions, they address problems in the 'now' and focus on overall moral failings only when brought to light by public attention. In the past, the Army has had no strategic vision or oversight that knits these many separate programs together. This makes the efforts uneven and, in most cases, reactionary instead of proactive.

---

<sup>65</sup> Name withheld by mutual agreement (1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, US Army) in discussion with author, March 2008, Forward Operating Base Warrior, Kirkuk, Iraq.

This oversight caused problems during our current fight in the War on Terror. The press has reported on failings of our soldiers in incidents like Abu Ghraib. A 'Google' search on the internet will reveal numerous articles about soldiers and marines admitting to atrocities or questionable killings of civilians. Not only were moral failings of our soldiers apparent to the press, but the Pentagon also recognized a problem.

In June of 2006, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, the Commander of Multinational Corp in Iraq, ordered all US servicemen in theatre to complete additional military ethical training. This training would focus on "professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat."<sup>66</sup>

In addition and in reaction to the need for more ethical training, the biggest overhaul of soldiers' initial entry training in the last 40 years was instituted in the spring of 2007. Basic training as it has been known in the past is transforming into outcome-based training, with much greater emphasis on Army Values and the Warrior Ethos.<sup>67</sup> This new beginning is institution of an Army Warrior Code.

## Development of the Army's Warrior Code

Rules of combat, like the law of land warfare, do not give enough guidance for all the decisions that must be made in combat. These guidelines are reinforced by rules of engagement, which are special orders specifying the use of deadly force in specific zones of combat (See Appendix B, for example). Even though more specific guidance is given in the rules of engagement, they still fall short because of the multitude of

---

<sup>66</sup> BBC News, "Ethics Lessons for US Iraq Troops," 1 June 2006, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5036686.stm>>.

<sup>67</sup> Jim Tice, "From Ground Up," *Army Times* (7 April 2008) 14-16.

situations that can and do arise in combat. Mark Osiel recognized these deficiencies in his book, *Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War*.

Osiel emphasized a warrior code that is an added layer to the rules of land warfare. It in no way takes away from the memorization of and adherence to the 'rules'. Instead, it reinforces additional ethical motivation to do what is right. Osiel emphasizes Aristotelian ethics, like courage, loyalty, and discipline. In addition, he emphasizes role models that stress these traits.<sup>68</sup>

## Army Values

The Army leadership, both by design and accident, developed the Army Values Program, a plan much like the one that Mark Osiel recommends. The current Army Values program, which stresses seven virtues—Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage (See Appendix C)—began in 1986 with a white paper distributed by General John Wickham, then Chief of Staff of the Army. The policy letter outlined a historical perspective on National Values that informed Army values, which were presented as a component of leadership.<sup>69</sup> This 'white paper' was transformed into the Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-68, entitled "The Bedrock of our Profession."<sup>70</sup>

In the late 1990's, the importance of this white paper would be emphasized in answer to a scandal within the Army. A number of drill sergeants were using their positions of authority as instructors of female recruits to coerce sexual favor. In reaction,

---

<sup>68</sup> Mark Osiel, *Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999) 32-37.

<sup>69</sup> Brenda Williams, Command Policy & Programs Division, e-mail message 4 AUG 2008.

<sup>70</sup> *The Bedrock of our Profession*, White Paper 1986, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-68 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986) 1.

an Army panel found that part of the problem centered on a lack of leadership and emphasis on Army values. A major campaign was enacted by the Adjutant General of the United States Army. Ethical behavior was again emphasized as a function of leadership, all the way down the chain of command to the lowest ranking soldier and newest recruit.<sup>71</sup>

Despite the appalling (and non-combat) reason for the campaign, the Army Values Program successfully incorporated the corps principles into the social fabric of the U.S. Army. Officers and NCOs are now evaluated annually on ethical behavior as an aspect of leadership (See Appendix D). A failure in even one of the Army Values in this evaluation would indicate a severe ethical breakdown, and would be problematic to a soldier's career.

The ethical component of the annual evaluation works like this. Evaluations include a critique from a rater, who is the direct supervisor of the soldier. The rater speaks of the soldier's performance over the rated period. There is a section on Army Values that is marked with either a 'yes' or 'no' for each value. A 'no' for any value must be explained in a comments section on the back of the form. There is also a further evaluation by the senior rater, who comments on the potential of the officer or NCO for continued service. If there is an ethical failure, the senior rater's assessment on whether this moral flaw can be overcome will factor into reviews for promotion and continued service to the Army. Each officer and non-commissioned officer is rated both annually and whenever there is a change of rater or senior rater.

---

<sup>71</sup> "Findings and Recommendations of Army Panel Studying Harassment," *New York Times* (12 SEP 1997)

## Warrior Ethos

With the advent of the War on Terror, the Army implemented a new program called “Warrior Ethos.” Unveiled in 2003, Warrior Ethos seeks to inculcate key Army values believed to exemplify the successful attributes of combat soldiers of the past. It includes the following; Mission First, Never Quit, Never Accept Defeat, and Never Leave a Fallen Comrade.

Warrior Ethos unites the Army Values Program with a newly-introduced Soldier’s Creed as a foundation for training the combat soldier. This change in emphasis can be seen in the transformation of Army Field Manual 21-75, *Combat Skill of the Soldier* 1984 to Army Field Manual 3-21.75, *Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills* 2008, and specifically in the first chapter (See Appendix E). The implementation of this newly-formed Warrior Code began with initial entry recruits in the spring of 2007 and continues until the present.

Moral attributes of past American soldiers were examined and broken down into values that exemplified successful warriors. This theoretical framework was linked to specific behaviors that when performed in combat represented the concept of Warrior Ethos. In effect, the Warrior Ethos is Army Values in action during combat or other military operations. These desired behaviors were woven into nine warrior battle drills and considered from the standpoint of resistance to their execution. A tentative methodology for training was then proposed.

The nine battle drills represent tasks that combat elements must master and are a key element to team building in initial entry training for recruits. They are:

- React to contact (visual, improvised explosive device, direct fire, to include rocket-propelled grenade)

- Avoid ambush
- React to ambush (blocked and unblocked)
- React to indirect fire
- React to chemical attack
- Break contact
- Dismount a vehicle
- Evacuate injured personnel from vehicle
- Secure at a halt

These Warrior drills put the tasks of the soldiers as well as the team in a suitably rich environment to identify significant consequences of individual behavior. Soldiers either apply or disregard the attributes of Warrior Ethos.

Leaders within these elements, as well as an observer controller, the Army's version of a referee, assess soldiers' implementation of Warrior Ethos during these battle drills. Consequences are discussed within the group, with leadership stressing positive attributes of the Warrior and discouraging alternative choices. The assessment is made during the After Action Review which is a function of military training and operations.<sup>72</sup>

One such training scenario takes place like this: the squad is given a mission to rescue an ambushed convoy. Insurgents have ambushed a two vehicle convoy returning from a mission. The squad must secure the vehicle, treat, and evacuate the wounded. While conducting this mission, the squad is attacked by a small force of insurgents who break contact and retreat into a nearby building. The squad enters and clears the building in an attempt to find and engage the insurgents. As the squad clears the building multiple targets are presented. The targets vary. Some are civilian small children, women, and men. They display different levels of hostility and cooperation. Among these players are the insurgents. Soldiers must differentiate between

---

<sup>72</sup> Gary Riccio and others, *Warrior Ethos: Analysis of the Concept and Initial Development of Applications* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences: The Wexford Group International, 2004) 13.

combatants and non combatants. Each room must be evaluated when clearing as a 'shoot' or 'don't shoot' response. Once the building is cleared, the squad establishes a helicopter landing zone and calls for MEDEVAC, completing the scenario. Performance, tasks, drills, and application of Warrior Ethos are critiqued.<sup>73</sup>

This new emphasis clearly shows the establishment of a warrior code. Shannon French defines such a code: "The code of the warrior not only defines how he should interact with his own warrior comrades, but also how he should treat other members of his society, his enemies, and the people he conquers. The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries on his behavior. It distinguishes honorable acts from shameful acts."<sup>74</sup>

While a warrior code is new to the U.S. Army, warrior creeds have existed in the U.S. Army for many years. Yet, they did so as branch specific or in special units. Most have common ground, but focus on the needs of a specific mission. All emphasize task completion, pride in who they are, obedience to those in authority, and loyalty to nation and comrades. To review some these different creeds, see Appendix F. One common feature to all is an overall goal that supports the mission.

## Warrior Codes, Caution Required

With the established a warrior code, the question must be asked: 'Does this constitute establishment of a religion which is strictly forbidden by the first amendment of the U. S. Constitution?' The military does have its own quasi-religious ceremonies to honor the dead where religion and the leadership of the chaplain are secondary to

---

<sup>73</sup> Jerry Cashion, "The Warrior Challenge: A Catalyst for Changing the Culture of the BCT," *Infantry Magazine*, NOV to DEC (2004)

<sup>74</sup> Shannon French. *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) xi.

military ceremony and the honor of the state. For example, chaplains only support and advise at memorial and ramp ceremonies (movement of remains from the battlefield onto aircraft heading home). The order and application of the ceremony are supervised and directed by the Command Sergeant Major as the representative of the Commander.<sup>75</sup> They are liturgies of the state where the use and presence of the chaplain institutes enough religious engagement to protect against the establishment clause of the Constitution.

Although there are many instances where religion and the state cooperate in the ceremony of service to both God and Country, the line has not been crossed. At this point, the answer to establishment of religion by the Army is 'no'. Nevertheless, the Chaplain Corps as a representative of both religion and the Constitutional interests of the United States must be engaged in the process of formation of warrior creeds and codes, protecting freedom of religion in the military while resisting establishment of a state religion.<sup>76</sup> History has shown that failure in this area has been catastrophic.

Warrior codes should never be entered into lightly. In general, they reflect the ethic of the nation that the military is drawn from. Nevertheless, that is not always the case. Codes can be a form of psychological and social programming of the basic foundation of all weapon systems—the human being. A minority can seek to influence a greater organization by forming and communicating the ethical components of the organization's code. The Nazi party, before and during WW II, constructed its own warrior code by resurrecting Nordic and German myth. They used Viking codes of racial

---

<sup>75</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, *Religious Support Standard Operating Procedure* (FT Drum, NY: Government Printing, 2003) 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Religious Support*, Field Manuel 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2003) 1-1.

purity that stressed blood lines in a stratified society to advance theories of their own German racial superiority.<sup>77</sup>

Furthermore, codes can emphasize particular character aspects to such a point that certain virtues or doctrines eclipse others, causing an ethical imbalance that leads to perversions of what is considered morally right within a society. The Japanese Army in WW II is a stunning reminder of such a failure as pointed out by Ernest Gordon in his book, *To End All Wars*:

During the four years of their ascendancy the Japanese military violated every civilized code. They murdered prisoners overtly by bayoneting, shooting, drowning, beating or decapitation; they murdered them covertly by working them beyond the limits of human endurance, starving them, torturing them and denying them medical care.

They also had special refinements for those prisoners who did not comply with certain orders. Some were tortured by having their hands crushed in vices; some were filled up with water and jumped on; some were suspended from a tree by their thumbs; some were buried alive in the ground. The statistics tell their own grim story; four percent of prisoners held by the Germans and Italians died, as compared with twenty-seven percent of those in the hands of the Japanese. In the prison camps along the River Kwai the percentage was much higher than this.

It is difficult to keep these atrocities in perspective. They were the result of behavior codes fostered by the military for their own ends, codes such as Hakko Ichiu, Kodo and Bushido. These codes also held that the Emperor was divine, that Japan was a divine country and that both had a divine mission to rule the world. Therefore there could be no compromise; it was victory or death, and any cruelty could be condoned.<sup>78</sup>

Political parties and components of the military can wield great power by forming and implementing military codes. Commanders should never be the sole purveyor of a warrior code. Many commanders share a mindset developed by common training and

---

<sup>77</sup> Shannon French. *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*, 101.

<sup>78</sup> Ernest Gordon. *To End All Wars* (Grand Rapids Michigan: Zondervan, 2002) 48-49.

theory. Some may see moral codes as just another weapon of war. Their military training and practical mindset tend to focus on the utility of a code as a means of victory. All else is secondary. Officers brought up in the multiple training programs like the military academies, Reserve Officer Training Programs and Officer Candidate Schools should be offset by the professional branches of the military, like the Judge Advocate, Medical, and Chaplain Corps.

The officers of the professional branches are usually formed outside the military training regimen before they enter military service. This gives an alternate, independent perspective that helps form views outside the lockstep of military thinking. Most of these officers have some formal training in ethics. Typically, their education provides a wide and informed view of ethical thought. They are expected to implement their expertise into training programs or develop their own. Their training is already recognized by the Army, as they support most of these branches with options in advanced education in ethics. In addition, these personnel hold special access to commanders as members of his or her personal staff at battalion level and higher.<sup>79</sup> The development of a code demands the balanced perspectives of both command and professional or vocational-branched officers.

## Current Training is not Enough

Army Values and Warrior Codes are a start. Regrettably, they are not enough. Warrior codes and memorizing value terms are without moral foundation and in the end are empty in themselves. There is little substance in meaning or actual reference for

---

<sup>79</sup> *Staff Organization And Operations*, Field Manual 101-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997) 4-29 to 4-31.

terms. Each value is selectively comprehended and selectively applied.<sup>80</sup> Even examples of a value in action are selectively interpreted. There must be some common understanding of what these values mean and how they are enacted in different contexts.

Moral framework gives some definition. For most, the development of character demands a lifetime of experiences with active engagement of the foundational truth of reality. But in the end, it is an individual and personal comprehension of the value. Simply putting a term on your lips does not move the heart. In the end, our understanding and application of these values will be selective, based on other determinants that cannot be made uniform. It is not surprising that intelligent people can find ways to serve self-interests under the guise of such values.<sup>81</sup>

Instead of memorizing creeds, we should continue to focus our soldiers' efforts in engaging and exercising their moral sense. The most powerful thoughts that affect people's actions are found in the judgment of their capabilities to deal effectively with different realities.<sup>82</sup> By activating and engaging morality in scenarios like those described in Warrior Ethos we awaken and train soldiers' conscience to face the ethical challenges of combat.

Values training painted on a wall by a projector are ineffectual. Ethics without action has no meaning. Moral agency becomes real in the power of humane or inhumane behavior. Our control of moral conduct, which is a by-product of personal standards and self-sanctions, has absolutely no effect if it is disengaged or

---

<sup>80</sup> R. S. Peters, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism" In T. Michel (Ed.), *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic Press, 1971) 237-267.

<sup>81</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 490.

<sup>82</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 21.

deactivated.<sup>83</sup> Often in war and in peace, people disengage their morality with a number of techniques. The purpose of my thesis project was to enable soldiers to internalize the moral code by applying it to life situations with all the ambiguity that involves. In this way the intent was to enable soldiers to become, or stay, morally engaged and to recognize when they may be disengaging morally from an event.

## Engaging Ethics for the Combat Soldier (Thesis)

My thesis project was an attempt to connect ethical foundations to the challenges of moral engagement in combat. More specifically, my thesis was designed as a training event that would awaken a soldier's moral sense. Soldiers have been taught tactics, weapons, and even the rules of war. But connecting 'why' between right conduct and rules of war has been missing from the ethics training of combat troops. If we want to prepare soldiers for the moral complexities of warfare then we must go beyond the "rules." Instead of telling them to do something, we must explain, demonstrate, and give practical application of why ethics is important in combat. Ordering them to do what is 'right' is not enough. Behavioral, cognitive, environmental, and other personal factors must reciprocally interact<sup>84</sup> to provide the opportunity for growth and learning. My thesis project seminar is designed to explore the complex challenges of conduct in warfare in the context of shared values.

Asking 'why' also means that we must explore the shortcomings of such a theory in combat. Soldiers will inevitably ask the questions of whether an ethic is a combat multiplier or a combat distracter. Does an ethic lead to victory or survival? And if it does

---

<sup>83</sup> Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 193-209.

<sup>84</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 18.

not, is ethics in combat worth the price? These are the questions that soldiers already ask themselves privately. Chaplains, as the conscience of the military,<sup>85</sup> must be a part of this conversation and give the soldier permission to ask the question publicly. To move the soldiers to do what is ethically right in combat is the purpose of my seminar, “Ethics in Combat.”

---

<sup>85</sup> *Religious Support*, Field Manuel 1-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2003) 3-125.

## 5. Teaching Ethics to Soldiers *Practice & Transformation*

The United States is required by treaty to train their military in Law of Land Warfare.<sup>86</sup> Not only is training statutory, but it is key to command and control on the battlefield. In addition, the values required by the Law of Land Warfare are a starting point for understanding internationally and between belligerents when adopted by the opposing force. These international agreements are taught by regulation and inculcated into the emerging warrior code of the U.S. Army known as Warrior Ethos.

Before the emergence of Warrior Ethos, soldiers received a few hours of instruction in a classroom setting during basic training that emphasized Army Values, plus a short course on the Law of Land Warfare. Officers trained in Officer Candidate School (OCS) and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) received little more. The problems with enlisted soldiers and those in OCS were addressed by the Army in 2006 with a complete overhaul of ethical training for new soldiers.<sup>87</sup>

### Officer Training in Ethics

ROTC training in ethics varies from one educational institution and command to the next. Contracts are worked out with the institution, or are provided according to resources and leadership available. Uniformity in training does not exist. An overhaul to its system is needed, as an article by an Ethics Instructor at the University of South

---

<sup>86</sup> *The Law of Land Warfare*, Field Manual 27-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1956) 7-11. -Combines into one document a complete text of the Geneva/Hague Conventions.

<sup>87</sup> Jim Tice, "From Ground Up," *Army Times* (7 April 2008): 14-16.

Florida stated: <sup>88</sup> "...how can we demand a strong moral backbone if we are not committed to giving these officers an adequate background in ethics?"

The United States Military Academy trains its officer more aggressively in ethics with dedicated instructors and required curriculum throughout the four years of academy training. Yet, they are also modifying their programs to meet the challenges of the war on terror.

The Army gives responsibility for training officers in ethics to the different branches that make up the Army. Infantry, Armor, Aviation, the Chaplain's branch, and all the others complete instruction on a number of subjects, including the Law of Land Warfare and Just War Theory. Officers are required to have at least three hours of ethical training. Some branches increase the amount of training required for their officers.

Instructors are provided by the Chaplain Corps. At any one time there are 32 instructors of ethics across the Army. These instructors teach at many levels of officer training, from Officer Basic Courses to the Command and General Staff College. Eight are accessioned as ethics instructors every year. They answer to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Chaplain who is a colonel and direct advisor to TRADOC Commander, a four star general.

Selected chaplains are given the opportunity to complete advanced degrees in ethics or other disciplines at any institution that will accept them, provided they can complete their degree in one year. Usually, this means doubling up on requirements and completing a two year program in one. Many attend Princeton, which has put

---

<sup>88</sup> Carlos Bertha, "Teaching Military Ethics to ROTC Cadets," Military Ethics Training, (13 January, 2008) <<http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE00/Bertha00.html>>

together a program that meets the training requirements in a timely fashion. Most receive a Master's of Theology or a Master's of Sacred Theology, although there is no requirement to what a student majors in as long as a master's level degree is completed.<sup>89</sup>

Continuing education is provided by individual advanced study and an annual conference called the International Symposium for Military Ethics (ISME). This conference was established in 1979 by interested military officers and academic ethicists. It is a non-profit organization sponsored primarily by educators and military officers from military service academies. The conferences are broad enough that even those who do not normally write on war may find it an easy venue in which to present work. Participants include philosophers, ethicists, political scientists, legal scholars, historians, and serving and retired officers.

The organization has five primary goals:

1. Provide a forum for the discussion and exchange of ideas relating to professional military ethics.
2. Foster the rigorous and systematic analysis of military issues of ethical significance.
3. Clarify the ethical norms and related behavioral expectations which should guide and constrain the conduct of military professionals.
4. Enhance the quality of military ethics instruction.
5. Afford service commanders informed, timely analyses of the ethical impact of military service practices.<sup>90</sup>

## Annual Ethics Training for Soldiers

Once soldiers move from training units to their maneuver units, the instruction in ethics changes. The proponent for training ethics moves from the Chaplain Corps to the

---

<sup>89</sup> Charles Fields, CH (MAJ) (1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, US Army) in discussion with author, 20 March 2009, Fort Drum, NY. -Chaplain Fields is a trained ethics instructor for the U.S. Army.

<sup>90</sup> International Society for Military Ethics Home Page, <<http://www.usafa.edu/isme/>>

Judge Advocate General Corps. Priests and ministers are replaced by lawyers. Ethics moves from the more speculative to the solid application of law.

There are some annual requirements for ethical training for all soldiers and government employees. The JAG officer's training usually consists of an hour class in lecture format. It is almost always done by power point. The focus is on executive actions like receiving gifts, conflicting financial interest, impartiality in performing official duties, misuse of position, and engaging in outside activities.<sup>91</sup> All of this is important, but quite useless to a leader in combat.

This annual training is followed by another power point presentation on the 'Law of Land Warfare.' Typically, this is presented as the rules soldiers must follow. The format imparts little information and many soldiers stand in the back of the class room to prevent themselves from falling asleep. Presenters don't share all the blame for the presentation because resources and time allotted are not prioritized by command elements. It is a requirement that is met by check mark for completion.

In general, other ethical training programs in the Army, at least those mandated, take that approach. They are formal and didactic. They do not encourage an exchange or interaction of ideas and thought. Perhaps the Army is more interested in the rules and soldiers' obedience to them. Perhaps it is easier to teach a set program than to engage the passion and interest of the class. For whatever reason, current ethics training hardly motivates the listener to learn.

The didactic method is a poor way to teach. Conditioning theories, popular in military training in the classroom setting, use repetitive, paired exposure of the subject

---

<sup>91</sup> *Army Training and Education*, Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3 August 2007) 14.

matter. It has proven inferior to associative learning that merges paired elements into memorable constructed images.<sup>92</sup> Other theories of learning emphasize the effect of emotion,<sup>93</sup> construction of symbolic code,<sup>94</sup> and cognitive aids<sup>95</sup>. All are components of social cognitive theory and are superior techniques for learning.

## Ethical Proving Grounds

When the Army is out of the class room and in the field practicing combat, their training is closer to an associative learning format. These formats produce some of the successes in training. The Army has worked hard to incorporate effective, realistic training in the use of force and the law of land warfare. Most notably, soldiers have been trained and evaluated in the implementation of these rules at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California, and at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, as well as Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training centers in Germany. Thousands of native Middle Eastern people have been hired to recreate culturally authentic communities in these locations. These actors simulate the environment our soldiers will encounter in the Middle East. Their goal is to train soldiers so well that their worst day in combat will be experienced as a scenario in one of these training environments. All soldiers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan are required to go through one of these proving grounds.

---

<sup>92</sup> Gordon H. Bower, "Mental Imagery and Associative Learning," In L. Gregg (Ed.) *Cognition in Learning and Memory* (New York: Wiley, 1972) 51-88.

<sup>93</sup> G. E. Schwartz, "Cardiac Response to Self Induced Thoughts." *Psychophysiology*, 8 (1971) 462-467.

<sup>94</sup> Albert Bandura, R. W. Jeffery, and D. L. Bachicha, "Analysis of Memory Codes and Cumulative Rehearsal in Observational Learning," *Journal of Research in Personality*, 7, (1974) 295-305.

<sup>95</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 15.

## The Commander's Program

In support of this institutional training, units develop their own training programs. The Army has a systems approach to training, which provides commanders the mechanism to make their own assessment of what training is needed and to implement it immediately. The Army training system is a cooperative effort between the institutional Army, maneuver units, training units, and the leadership of these elements.<sup>96</sup> This gives a great deal of latitude to commanders to react on a unit level to perceived challenges while the Army as an institution catches up.

Some scenario-driven live interactions have been crafted for individual elements and small units. These excellent training scenarios grew out of ideas developed by junior officers and NCOs at the company and battalion levels of the Army. Their use and practice are specifically targeted for use in the field environment. The events are like entering a movie. Scenarios are staged with actors playing the opponents or neutral civilians. Soldiers are the stars of the production as they step through the action. The sights and sounds of war are mimicked. The emotion and stress of the moment become real for the soldier as he or she is confronted by decisions that must be made in simulated combat.

Before our deployment to Iraq, a company commander who was a veteran of the Iraq war implemented his own training combat scenarios. One major aspect of the training centered on determining what level of force should be used for different engagements. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers were tested by these scenarios; soldiers and leaders would react to differing attacks. Some attacks would be

---

<sup>96</sup> *Battle Focused Training*, Field Manual 7-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2003) 1-3 to 1-5.

full scale military assaults, others would be rock throwing, and some were seemingly benign interactions. The natures of the scenarios were moral and cultural decision points that would affect the fight at a tactical level and perhaps have strategic implications.<sup>97</sup>

Unfortunately, most of these scenarios are missing a vital component. These exercises are so far into the physical aspect of the training that often the moment for learning passes, unknown to the actors. The emphasis is strictly on applying the 'rules of engagement' (ROE) to a scenario. Usually, these actions are correct to the ROE, but may sometimes be at odds with the conscience of the moral actor. No time for thought, reflection, or analysis is provided as the training continues on a relentless time schedule. This shortcoming prevents any real learning, as most people change their thinking by experiencing the social effect of their actions.<sup>98</sup>

A review of moral action could take place in the After Action Review (AAR) if proper stress of ethical decisions points were emphasized. Typically, officers and senior NCOs focus almost exclusively on tactics and techniques. The guidance of leaders and opinion of fellow soldiers would help form opinions and foster learning. Without a review and the proper focus by command on what constitutes ethical behavior in combat, the opportunity is lost. As discussed earlier, the Army program, Warrior Ethos in TRADOC, has picked up on this oversight and highlighted a change of focus in this area.

Often in this type training, evaluations of soldiers are fixed, culminating with either a 'go' or 'no go' for pass or fail. The training is focused on a set of actions to set

---

<sup>97</sup> CPT Kyle Moulton. *Lane Training Scenarios* (Alpha Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, US Army) training took place 12 to 16 AUG 2007, Fort Drum, New York.

<sup>98</sup> M. Schleifer and V. I. Douglas, "Effects of Training on the Moral Judgment of young Children. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1973) 62-68.

conditions. The response is automated. This is good, *if* they run into what they have trained for. However, set conditions are seldom experienced in combat. Soldiers must have a developed character and decision-making skills that adjust to morally complex situations, not a script to meet a set form.

Another shortcoming of local training is that it is dependent on the command team at a local level without universal application to the rest of the Army. A universal standard for training implementation of the rules of war as field exercises is not yet a constant.

## A Proposal for Improving Training in Ethics

My seminar spans the gap between the two common trainings seen at the company and battalion level previously discussed. Like the didactic method, it focuses on some of the rules that are applicable to ethical decisions. Yet, a broader theoretical model is presented and described in action. It also incorporates a number of scenarios like those found in field exercises giving opportunity for the soldier to act out new concepts.

Furthermore, there is much more integrated into my training program. For example, the soldier is given the opportunity to cognitively process and explore the ramifications of the decisions that he or she may make in combat. It gives opportunity to explore the question, “Why take that action in combat?” In giving time for reflection, the class becomes a catalyst for a more circumspect analysis of self after the class has ended.

Changing moral reasoning has proven effective through example and exposure to opposing moral views which alter moral judgment. Modeling brings attention to the favored moral construct, which in turn brings attention to the factors the standards embody. This attention gives rise to a reevaluation of factors in making moral decisions.<sup>99</sup> In participation, soldiers find reason to change, modify, or enhance their moral reasoning.

In addition, the participant does not have to be an actor. Most behavior is learned by observation through modeling. Observation is the primary means by which individuals form rules of behavior. Later, these observed rules are implemented as templates to guide action, which is a primary goal of this seminar.<sup>100</sup>

Hopefully, the experience will be new, and stir interest and curiosity about ethics. Perhaps looking at the world from a perspective that is novel to the soldiers will create excitement about the morality that each already possesses but may not consciously engage on a daily basis. In contrast, this class could also stir people to think about ways that they may disengage their conscience, which is a secondary goal of the training.

Ultimately, I wanted to stir these questions before these soldiers are in combat. When I was a police officer, we used a similar technique with new police recruits. We would take them to an autopsy to inoculate them to the trauma of seeing a dead body. The belief was that doing this in a controlled environment increased the chances that the officers would keep control of themselves when seeing a dead body in the street. This is especially important as the officer might, in such a situation, still be in danger.

---

<sup>99</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 493.

<sup>100</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 47.

Any shock or uncontrolled pause to action could be dangerous to the officer and those they are called to serve.

In the same way, I hoped that exploring some of the ethical dilemmas soldiers may face in combat might rehearse and reinforce their moral resolve, allowing for quick and decisive decisions on the day of battle.

## Social Cognitive Theory as Applied to Training in Ethics

Social cognitive theory plays a key role in this training on more than one level. On the surface, it is the strategy for teaching the seminar. Yet, the theory is also applicable to the ethical dilemmas presented in the training, as it postulates that its method of learning applies to our moral understanding and action.

First, social cognitive theory is a superior way to learn. It postulates that a person's actions can be explained by a model of triadic reciprocity. In this model, cognitive, behavioral and personal factors, as well as environmental events, all interact, affecting one another. A person's nature is defined in this model in terms of a number of capabilities.

One capability is the use of '*symbolism*,' which is the ability of a person to process and transform experiences into internal models that serve as guides for behavior. Another is '*forethought*,' which is the ability to analyze likely consequences of certain actions and take measures to form a desired outcome.

'*Vicarious*' capability refers to the ability to learn by watching others and seeing the consequences of their actions. In addition, there is '*self-regulation*,' which is the capability to motivate behavior based on internal standards and self evaluations.

Finally, there is the capability of '*self-reflection.*' This refers to the ability to analyze our own experiences and thought processes. The ability to reflect on our knowledge and experiences provides awareness about one's self and the world around us. In this way, our own thoughts can be analyzed and altered.<sup>101</sup>

This theory forms a set of strategies that lead to a dynamic, interactive way of learning. I've attempted to incorporate some of these techniques into my training with the hope that it will be a better vehicle to meet my goal of moving the soldier's will to doing what is ethically right in combat.

## Modeling

Modeling through observation is the most common way of behavioral learning for human beings.<sup>102</sup> In social cognitive theory, observational learning is a phased process and is the structure of my seminar. This model, while structured into the seminar, occurs in subsets within the training.

Phase one is referred to as the *attentional process*. The intent of this phase is to engage the students in such a way that wins their attention and interest. It regulates exploration and perception of modeled activities.

Once the student is drawn in, Phase two, the *retention process*, commences, with the introduction of basic ethical models like deontological, virtue, and consequential theories. The retention process is the conversion of experience into symbolic ideas that serve as internal models of self correction and standards.

---

<sup>101</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 18-23.

<sup>102</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 47.

Phase three, the *production process*, consists of encouraging soldiers to cognitively engage these models in an ethical construct as well as participating in scenario-driven modeling. In this way, they will be organizing learned sub-skills into new response patterns.

Phase four is the *Motivational process*, which is assimilated by the individual through social and personal incentives provided by the audience in discussion and reflection. This phase determines whether the learned models will be put to use.<sup>103</sup> The entire process is influenced by social pressures exerted on the situation. The class is a group effort by design, because moral reasoning is greatly influenced by social persuasion operating in situations.<sup>104</sup>

Social cognitive theory specifically speaks to the phenomenon of moral disengagement in war and other inhumane actions. Albert Bandura has written about our ability to self-regulate and modify our own behavior through learning. Yet, he points out that social cognitive theory of learning can have no effect on the individual if it is disengaged.<sup>105</sup> People and institutions have ways of separating conscience from action. I incorporate and explore some of these techniques in my training. Although I do not explicitly define the terms to my class, I did use Bandura's explanation of these different forms of disengagement to guide my own understanding of the subject and form some of the training. I will discuss the different forms of disengagement I used in the description of the class (See Appendix G).

---

<sup>103</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 51-53.

<sup>104</sup> A. Higgins, C. Power, & L. Kohlberg. "Student Judgments of Responsibility and the Moral Atmosphere of High Schools: A Comparative Study." In W. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.) *Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development: Basic Issues in Theory and Research* (New York: Wiley, 1984) 74-106.

<sup>105</sup> Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. 193.

## Authority to Train

The first step in establishing this training was to get authority to commence it. After putting together the initial program, I set up a time to present it to my commander. Two weeks before my presentation, I sent a copy of my training proposal with the power point slides attached. The Commander had his adjutant contact me with a time for a training presentation.

We met in the Brigade conference room. I made a formal presentation to both the Brigade Commander and the Brigade Command Sergeant Major (CSM). The Commander represents about 3,500 soldiers and officers of the Brigade. The CSM is the senior non-commissioned officer in the brigade and serves the Brigade Commander as a personal staff officer on enlisted concerns. Using a power point presentation, I summarized different sections of the teaching. Both the Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major arrived with power point slide printouts of the training, with their personal notes written in the margins.

The Command Sergeant Major had serious concerns about the presentation of information that showed American soldiers in negative portrayals. Specifically, she was not in favor of a case study on the My Lai massacre. The free form interaction of soldiers and leaders being trained together also gave her pause. She did want her soldiers to see their leaders fail in front of a group of soldiers. She favored a more traditional approach to training ethics. She wanted to remove the combat aspect and simply spotlight Army Values, focusing on the virtues that the Army high-lighted as positive examples of morals.<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> Command Sergeant Major Finlayson (10<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade, Rear Detachment; 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division) in discussion with the author, November 2006, FT Drum, NY.

The Brigade Commander had no such reservation. He liked the context of the training. He thought it a bad idea to shelter soldiers from some of the heinous abuses that can happen in combat. After all, in less than three months, many of those soldiers would be experiencing combat firsthand. They needed a realistic view of what was out there. It was not the right course of action to shelter our soldiers to the reality of war. If thinking along these lines caused some soldiers some apprehension, it was better to identify it now.<sup>107</sup>

In response to the CSM's concern for leaders failing in front of an audience of soldiers, I explained that it was not a pass or fail training. In this seminar, the learning would happen through the exchange. True, soldiers and leaders might subscribe to actions that are contrary to military doctrine. Soldiers should be aware of how those they work with are likely to confront problems that confront their elements in the battle zone.

The Commander specified some format issues, but made no changes. He directed me to train every soldier deploying to combat in the brigade. He further directed me to present progress reports of the training at our weekly command and staff meeting. This is a weekly briefing by staff officers to the Brigade Commander on tasks and operations of each section.

## A Change of Venue

Training began less than two weeks after my Commander's directive. We had a small auditorium that sat 130 people with a small stage in the front. I trained units of no

---

<sup>107</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Michael DeRaddo (10<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade, Rear Detachment; 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division) in discussion with the author, November 2006, FT Drum, NY.

more than 30 soldiers at a time, which provided plenty of room to move around. I used these training sessions to refine my presentation, test the proper size of the audience, and predict audience response.

In actuality, this was a test run and proving ground for a final form of my session that would come later. Before completing my Commander's directive, I found myself transferred to another unit with orders to deploy to Iraq.

My orders reassigned me from the 10<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade, Rear Detachment to the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion. My new unit was across post from my former unit, but the two had little in common. In my former position, most of our unit was deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq in company- and battalion-size elements. My duty was to receive and send forth a continuing stream of small units of no more than 100 soldiers concerned primarily with logistical support of combat units. Now, I was part of a battalion deploying to combat in Iraq. My new unit had specialized companies (100 soldiers per company) that would provide communication, intelligence, support, and route clearance of improvised explosive devices for our brigade of 3,500 soldiers.

Shortly after arriving to my new battalion, I met with the Battalion Commander. He had already heard about my Ethics in Combat Class and wanted me to start training soldiers immediately. Because of a short time schedule before deployment, this was quite a challenge, with little time allocated for units to be trained. This is common in the military. One has to be able to react with changes on short notice and adapt to the situation. Our training schedule was already filled with other priorities in preparation for combat. Nevertheless, we began our training sessions at the earliest opportunity.

## Audience Size

As already noted, the optimum size of the audience was to be no more than 30 people, since the training scenarios required a small audience to allow all to participate. Unfortunately, the companies could not spare the time required for individual platoons to rotate through the training. Instead, I would have one day to train about 400 soldiers. That meant four classes of 100 soldiers. Since it took me about 90 minutes to do one session, it would constitute a long day. Much of the training depended on my leadership, therefore, I needed to be in top form.

## The Setting for Training

A second challenge was the location. The only suitable place we could get for training was the chapel. While it provided a good stage for some of the interactions with soldiers, it would be cramped for the training. Pews could not be moved since they were bolted to the floor. The small chapel seated only 85. A movable wall was collapsed to reveal a parish hall where additional chairs were set up for the overflow. This cramped location meant it would be uncomfortable for the soldiers, not only during training, but afterwards while they filled out post-training surveys, which I thought might affect responses.

The more important challenge to me was the sacredness of the place for the training. Chapels on military post are used for all sorts of worship. Religious symbols are taken down and the space is neutralized between services. In addition, only certain kinds of training are permitted in the chapel. No training for war is permitted unless it is ethically oriented. Typically, classes like moral leadership training and the laws of land

warfare are permitted in the space. Yet, some of my training graphically showed massacre and called for simulated decisions of life and death. In addition, my movie scene from *Saving Private Ryan* used blasphemous language.

The chapel was not the place I wanted to present some of the substance of this seminar. I felt my training might be too profane for this space. From a social cognitive theory perspective, my concern was that the chapel itself was an environmental determinant that would affect learning.

Most of my chaplain colleagues were all reformed and saw no problem with the use of the space. As long as the religious symbols were removed, in their minds the space became neutral. Being a life-long Episcopalian, I felt that the place where Holy Communion is celebrated on a regular basis is set aside as a place for and of God. Unsettled, I prayed.

After reflection, I decided to go with the training in the neutralized chapel. War is placed in the middle of what is God's, and He is present even in the midst of it. Besides, the fact that this building was also used for worship seemed to shape the environmental determinant in an advantageous direction for training. In my mind, soldiers would be more inclined to take this training seriously and resolutely because the environment was a place associated with reverence. After all, the pews were still present and all knew this was a chapel. My perception may have been faulty, but at worst, it would have no effect.<sup>108</sup>

Even so, before the training began, I mentioned the graphic nature of some of the material. If anyone had a problem with using the space, I asked that they come to

---

<sup>108</sup> J. S. Watson, "Perceptions of Contingency as A Determinant of Social Responsiveness," In E. B. Thoman (Ed.) *Origins of the Infant's Social Responsiveness* (New York: Halsted, 1979) Vol. 1, 33-64.

me beforehand. No one expressed any reservation. I also told the soldiers that this training on many levels would be repugnant and ugly, but such is the nature of war.

The first session of about a hundred soldiers began in the morning at 0800 hours. All were seated in the chapel in a lecture format. There was not much room. I was on a small circular raised platform. The altar and all other religious items had been removed. A screen was to my right and the lights were off, but the room was only dim enough for the power point presentation. My chaplain assistant operated a lap-top computer attached to a projector. The seminar was subdivided into five sections. The first section began as light was reflected on the screen (See appendix G for detail power point presentation).

## Section One, Introduction

Section one is the introduction and, to a small extent, part of the attentional phase. The parameters of the class are set and soldiers are doing their own assessment of the training. This moves fast, no more than ten minutes. Title, references, task, and purpose are quickly presented, along with a safety brief. The safety brief is important, as it establishes a common military practice and shows respect for the culture. The main reason for the safety brief is to establish chain of command. I ask the audience to identify the highest ranking person in the room, then ask what responsibility that person would have if there were a fire. The audience quickly defines his or her duties. I then move this theme to decision-making in combat and ask, "Who makes decisions in combat when a group of soldiers are together?" They immediately

recognize that it is the chain of command that has authority to make lawful orders and decisions.

From there, I move into question, “Why should a soldier train in ethics, anyway?” The audience reacted well, with a little encouragement from me, and began to list the many different reasons why ethics is important in combat. Once they finish, we bring to the screen the reasons they postulated.

Remember, these soldiers have had training in rules of war and have some familiarity with the subject. In addition, this first group was made up of military intelligence soldiers. Selection for the intelligence branch is based on a higher intellect and aptitude for problem solving. Typically, they speak a second language and use their ability for collecting and analyzing information. These determinants, along with others, set the motion of the class. (In social cognitive theory, the mental ability of the students, including prior training, would be termed a determinant of the observer. A determinant refers to a definable factor that effects change. Cognitive ability qualifies as a determinant and, as such, predisposes a person to look for some things and not others. These preconceptions guide the observation and discernment of the actor.<sup>109</sup>)

I set out the guidelines for the class, which was for the soldiers just to be honest and not to worry about the ‘right’ answer, as almost any moral conduct can be justified by a number of moral principles.<sup>110</sup> I tell them, “The right answer is an honest one; just be able to explain why.” Since some theorists have argued that it is *intention* that

---

<sup>109</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 53.

<sup>110</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 498.

defines a person's actions as either moral or immoral,<sup>111</sup> the 'why' in morality would express intent.

As the moderator, I leave any judgments to the audience and the social pressure they effect on the group. It has been proven that consistent social feedback can produce lasting changes in moral conduct.<sup>112</sup> In social cognitive theory, it is the reciprocity of influences between thought, conduct, and social pressure that determines our moral conduct. I then ask the class to define ethics. After their explanations, we look at what Socrates had to say.

The point of this invitation of discourse and setting aside judgments was meant to draw the audience into observational learning, founded primarily on modeling. Any mechanism to gain the attention of the audience is an aid to this end. Open ended questions are meant to invite the audience into free discourse. The ability of the audience to interact in a relaxed environment was another determinant I sought to shape in support of the training.<sup>113</sup>

## Section Two, My Lai

Section two continues the attentional phase, and moves the class into a case study of My Lai in Vietnam, introducing the core of the training. This part of the seminar is meant to convey the fundamental engagement of ethical considerations in the reality of war. The section introduces the effects of moral decisions over life, death, and the strategic course of the Vietnam War.

---

<sup>111</sup> L. Kohlberg and D. Candee, "Moral Stages and Moralization" In W. Kurtines & J.L. Gerwitz (Eds.) *Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development* (New York: Wiley Interscience, 1984) 52-73.

<sup>112</sup> M. Schleifer and V. I. Douglas, "Effects of Training on the Moral Judgment of young Children. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1973) 62-68.

<sup>113</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 50-51.

The introduction of this section begins visually with photos. I ask the audience if they recognize the photo of this man or his name, Lieutenant Calley. I also give them hints by mentioning My Lai. To my astonishment, out of some 400 soldiers who completed the training, only one identified the individual and the history of My Lai. Some of the young officers who graduated from the Military Academy at West Point vaguely remembered studying the event.

There is one photo that was particularly emotionally powerful. It was taken moments before those in the photo were murdered, and depicts women and children (Slide #12 in appendix G). The photo was taken by an imbedded photographer not associated with the unit. The use of pictorial and video presentation is intentional. The use of video and other images help observers transcend their immediate environment. In addition, studies have shown that powerful images affect emotion, thought, reflection and behavior. This enhances and focuses the learning process.<sup>114</sup>

For many, the shocking actions of American soldiers struck an emotional chord. Some even verbalized they thought focusing on such failures was disloyal. I seized on the opportunity to discuss with the audience what they thought. The consensus was that we as the Army have to be true to the truth, or we might find ourselves in a similar place.

This discussion took place in all four sessions of the class. It was discussed between the soldiers; I simply moderated. Soldiers stood and stated their opinions and debated one another, reasoning how they saw these actions. Inevitably, the debate would move to Iraq and Afghanistan and the similar challenges seen there.

---

<sup>114</sup> T. L. Rosenthal and Albert Bandura. "Psychological Modeling: Theory and Practice." In S.L. Garfield & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), *Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1978) 621-658.

As moderator, I had to cut short some discussion to push forward in the seminar. But I used my judgment. In one of the sessions, the discourse provided such a good learning opportunity for those debating and those watching that I adjusted the training in other places to compensate.

## Massacre Scenario

My first scenario is introduced in front of the class as an preface to what might be expected of them in war. The power point presentation shows slide # 14 (See appendix G) which depicts a number of villagers dead on a dirt road in My Lai.

I ask for a volunteer. The soldier comes to the stage, and I ask him or her some questions. First, I learn their military occupation, then fashion a scenario in my mind. In front of the class, which adds a little stress, I place the volunteering soldier at My Lai on a separate mission. Then I recruit soldiers to portray members of the units that committed the atrocity.

Then, the scenario commences as he or she witnesses the atrocity. I ask, "What do you do?" The audience at this point is on the edge of their seats. The soldiers picked for the scenario always do quite well in how they react to the situation. Usually, they find a way to report the atrocity while keeping themselves from becoming a victim.

Soldiers of different rank react differently. Almost always, the incident is reported to leaders in their chain of command. Since their chain of command is sitting there with them, I ask, "What would *you* do?" The chain of command always reports it to the next higher rank. I ask, "What would you do if your Commander did not care, what then?" As

the moderator, I allow the class to follow wherever this leads. I then end the scenario, and we applaud those who participated.

The next slide introduces Chief Hugh Thompson. During the massacre, he was flying in a helicopter above the soldiers who committed these atrocities. Once he saw what going on, he heroically landed his helicopter between soldiers and some of the survivors from the village. He drew his pistol and ordered his door-gunner to target the American soldiers who were committing this crime. He ordered the perpetrators to desist or he would open fire. I open up to the audience a discussion on whether anyone would do the same. Is he right or wrong?

At this point, I introduce the consequences of Chief Thompson's actions. For years, he was treated as a 'traitor' by fellow soldiers for reporting the incident, since it showed soldiers in a bad light and led to reactions against the war at home. It was not until the mid-1980's, almost 15 years after the incident, that the Army recognized that Chief Thompson took the correct actions. I also mention to the soldiers that above the battlefield in another helicopter was the Battalion Commander, who took no action and was never charged in the incident. I introduce the concept of doing what is 'right' and suffering because of it.

I am very careful in this discussion. The theory of disinhibitory effects, which refers to increasingly negative behavior based on lack of negative consequence,<sup>115</sup> is what happened on a number of levels in the My Lai massacre. I ask if soldiers could get away with this today. I introduce the phrase, "Death before Dishonor!" We continue in discussion.

---

<sup>115</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 49.

I then introduce the concept of lawful and unlawful orders. All of the soldiers are familiar with this concept, but we go over it again in great detail. This part of the training again emphasizes consequences, and we talk about legal sanctions, as well as self-sanctions worked out in conscience. Combat Stress is introduced as a consequence to decisions made in combat.

For the seminar, I use subtle leadership by guiding and reinforcing positive values in keeping with Army ethics. I do this by shaping the training and giving positive affirmation of selfless, honorable actions. Nevertheless, the social context made up by the class as a majority reinforces the training. In general, selfless ethical behaviors were modeled and reinforced by the actors.

### Section Three, Ethical Constructs

Section three, the retention phase, moves from the lively scenario and discussion to a more cognitive approach. Three ethical models are introduced: utilitarian, or “outcome ethics”; deontological or “rule ethics;” and virtue, or “identity ethics.” I give no explanation of the terms other than that they are three models of ethics that are used to describe different moral ways of thinking.

I tell the audience that I am going to show them a scene from *Saving Private Ryan* and ask them to identify the three ethical types as best they can, based on the little description I have given them. Keep in mind that 95% of these soldiers have never heard these terms before.

The movie, *Saving Private Ryan*, is historical fiction depicting soldiers during the Normandy Invasion of WW II. The scene depicted shows the capture of a German

soldier after one of the American soldiers is killed taking a position. Because of mission requirements, they cannot take the prisoner with them. They must decide what they are going to do. The three ethical arguments mentioned above are espoused by different soldiers in presenting what they believe should be done with the prisoner. Every time I have given this presentation, I have been pleasantly surprised that the soldiers have absolutely no problem matching the ethical constructs to the characters of the scene.

Matching the different soldiers of the scene to the different ethical constructs is done by design. This pairing of the ethical construct with the visual character icon from the scene assists with symbolic matching. Visual imagery has proven to be a significant retention aid.<sup>116</sup>

We discuss the different ethical models and where we see them used in the military. I then ask, “Who is right?” Discussion goes back and forth briskly as people take up different positions. Ultimately, I lead the class to one conclusion. The authority to make decisions in combat belongs to the highest ranking soldier in command. The movie’s Sergeant First Class Horvath is introduced, played by actor Tom Sizemore, with the quotation, “You do what you are told!”

Again, we come back to the point of when one follows orders and when one doesn’t, with close attention to consequences endemic to both. This is a continuation of the discussion we had at the end of the My Lai section.

---

<sup>116</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 57-58.

## Section 4, The Room-mate Scenario

Section four consists of only two slides, but they are important. I use these slides to diagram how ethics are applied by using a diagram. I introduce the first slide (#33 in appendix G).

This section brings a lot of attention because I use an ethical dilemma common to many soldiers. I take a soldier from the audience and put him or her in a scenario where their roommate is taking advantage of girl- or boyfriend by promising marriage, simply to further a sexual conquest. The roommate is planning to leave the person after getting what they want. Most participants state that they would stay out of it because of loyalty or because it is none of their business.

After they answer, I change the scenario by making the girl/boyfriend a sister or brother. There is always a dramatic reversal in attitude because the victimized person now has value to them. I use this to introduce how an ethical perspective like Christianity can affect how some see the world, since a faithful person could see everyone as their brother or sister.

I usually take this opportunity to talk about virtues like "loyalty." I point out that my idea of loyalty may be different. Who are we loyal to? Is it to the soldiers we are with, to our direct supervisor, to the battalion, to the Army? How do we decide what loyalty means and to whom?

At this point I bring out a long piece of metal. Use of objects during training has proven to enhance the attention and the learning process.<sup>117</sup> I ask if anyone knows what

---

<sup>117</sup> E. Abravanel, E. Levan-Goldschmidt, and M. Stevenson. "Action and Imitation: The Early Phase of Intimacy." *Child Development*.(1976) 1032-1044.

it is. They identify it as 're-bar'. I ask what it is used for. They tell me it provides structure. I stand it up, and it falls over. "How does it provide structure?"

Someone in the audience explains that it must be seated in concrete to give it a base. I answer, "Precisely." Virtues like those espoused by the Army are the same way. By themselves they are strong, but unusable. They must be seated in moral cement, giving definition and purpose. That is why soldiers must develop themselves spiritually and morally.

## Section Five, WW II Scenarios

The last section contains scenarios which are an excellent aid for the rehearsal of what has been learned, and is part of the retention process. This increases memory by cognitive rehearsal and modeling of behavior.<sup>118</sup> This section can also be described chiefly as part of the production process where ethical models are put into practice. My hope is to move students through this phase and into the motivational phase where social feedback and reflection will provide a response in the individual. Much of this will take place after the class.

In this section, I walk the soldiers through two actual scenarios from World War II where the deaths of prisoners are involved. The scenarios are reenactments from Patrick O'Donnell's book, *Beyond Valor* (See appendix H).

---

<sup>118</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*, 60.

## “Take no Prisoners!” Scenario

Three soldiers actors are used in the first scenario and present themselves in front of the class. I give them their tasks in the scenario. One is the sergeant leading the Rangers on the raid of the Italian position. The second is a soldier within the sergeant's squad. The last person plays an Italian soldier called Luigi.

I assume the role of commander and order the Ranger sergeant to take no prisoners, and to do away with his own soldiers if they are wounded and cannot be moved. One out of five soldiers simply refuse the order. I kick them out of the Rangers and choose another soldier from the audience who will obey my command in the scenario. About half receive my orders, but have no intention of following my directive. Being their commander, they would not reveal this to me.

In discussion, out of character, they explain that they would make the decision to follow the order to take no prisoner on the operations objective about what they would do. The commander's order is one option. Or, they would lie or omit information to Command about what really took place, feeling justified because the order was not lawful anyway.

Once the soldiers take the objective, I give them the Italian prisoner, who explains that he can keep up and begs to be taken along. Few kill the prisoner at this point. If they do, I take another volunteer from the audience who takes Luigi along. I explain that the Italian is starting to slow them down, which poses a risk to their timetable of reaching the submarine. If they are not on time, they will be left behind.

Ultimately, I change the scenario that to take the prisoner along will mean the death of the Rangers who have completed the raid. They always come to the conclusion that they must kill the prisoner.

Ultimately, the soldier who has been guarding the prisoner is usually asked to “take care of it.” We learn that the soldier guarding Luigi also speaks Italian. I change the scenario once again, telling the guard that he learns Luigi is actually his cousin. I have had only one soldier willing to kill his cousin. One soldier deserted and escaped with his cousin. One fakes that he killed his cousin, who plays dead. Most just take him away from the other soldiers like they are going to kill him, and let him go.

I ask each of the soldiers to express what it was like to play their roles and what played into their decisions. I bring the audience into this and ask if any had alternate ways they would have reacted. This makes for a fairly lively discussion.

## Hostage Scenario

The second scenario includes the entire class. It depicts the heroic stance of two Ranger Battalions in Italy. Outnumbered and low on ammunition, the German enemy used captured American prisoners as hostages to force surrender of the remaining elements. (See appendix H).

I divide the class into a number of elements. I act as the German Commander and moderator, as usual. I pick three soldiers to be my German guards. They are instructed to act out orders as they would in combat. I then choose about 20 soldiers to be my captured American soldiers. The rest of the class is divided into three elements with leaders assigned.

I explain the position of the Rangers and ask them to act out their actions as if they were actually in this situation. As the players defend their positions, I describe how I am parading my captured Americans in front of my attacking Germans. I command the defenders to surrender.

When they refuse to give up, I order my guard to execute a prisoner. Most initially refuse. I then order another guard to kill the guard who refused or I will shoot him myself. Typically, my German guards are now ready to kill other prisoners at my command. In discussion later, most guards do not see an alternative because of the consequences involved. They feel trapped by events. Some have no problem executing prisoners. They only need someone in authority to give them permission.

As I approach the separate elements, I put pressure on the leaders to tell me what they will do. They always try to kill the guards. When they do this I tell them they missed and killed one of their own men taken prisoner. I increase the pressure by making them run out of ammunition. Then, I have them imagine that the prisoners are who they are in real life, and to imagine their friends being executed because they refuse to surrender. I begin killing more of the prisoners to increase the pressure. Inevitable, some elements choose to surrender. Some refuse, and go down fighting.

In the after action review, I have found that combat troops over support troops are more likely to surrender. I attribute this to the strong bonds these units share with one another. When asked why they surrender, most say it would be better to live out the war as a prisoner than to cause their buddy to be executed. Those who hold out express a distrust for the Germans and see the prisoners as already dead once they are taken.

After the scenarios and after actions review, I bring the seminar to an end. Everyone returns to their seats. I then ask if there are any questions or points of clarification from the audience. Usually, there are one or two issues of discussion. Then I end the class and release the soldiers to their First Sergeants.

## Summary

As a behavioral theory, Social Cognitive thinking provides the form for advanced learning in ethical decision-making. It is far superior to the current didactic method of training in the military. Through understanding moral disengagement and modeling by observation, as well as the interplay between cognitive, behavioral, personal factors and environmental events, soldiers are presented with a class that prepares them for the moral quandaries of war.

## 6. Results of Training and Reflection

### *The Seminar: Evaluation*

#### In Review

Soldiers in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are more than trigger pullers. General Charles Krulak calls them 'Strategic Corporals,' referring to critical leadership decisions that are increasingly required to be made at the lowest level to effect victory. Soldiers routinely encounter complex actions in a condensed area where hostiles, neutrals, and enemy forces emerge.<sup>119</sup> This training equips our soldiers by helping them to bring to the surface, contemplate, and define their moral belief.

War is the arena and context of this training. As such, we have explored some of its meaning and some of the philosophies that define the parameters of how modern nations approach war. We took a look at common actions and consequence of dominate ethical decisions on the battlefield in reference to both opposing forces and the individual. We took a look at how the Army has developed oaths, values, and even the beginning of a code in addition to and in support of the law of land warfare, rules of engagement and Army regulations. Finally, we looked at how the Army inculcates these techniques into their soldiers.

While the Army is effective in some areas of training ethics, there is a gap that my training fills. In the classroom, the Judge Advocate General Officers give tedious briefs on the Law of Land Warfare emphasizing rules that are seldom explained. In the field, units train in the application of the rules of engagement. Too often, commanders move the soldiers quickly through combat scenarios, missing key moral decision points

---

<sup>119</sup> Charles C. Krulak. "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War" *Marine Magazine*, January 1999.

in the training, focusing only on tactics and techniques of fire and maneuver. The training program that I put together seeks to bridge this chasm and equip the Strategic Corporal.

## The Thesis Restated

At its core, the bridge I attempt to build is based on appealing to the soldiers in a way that will alert them to the importance of engaging their moral sense to the challenge of combat. This is done by applying Social Cognitive Theory as the learning process, engaging behavioral, cognitive, environmental, and personal factors in reciprocating interaction. The hope is that this mode of training will cause reflection and understanding, leading soldiers to the conclusion that moral engagement is paramount to functioning on the battlefield. Therefore, development of character and a moral sense should be a priority.

My sense is that my training caused an epiphany moment in some of my soldiers, but that has to be quantified. Intuition is not enough to justify the time and effort for this training for both instructor and soldiers. A measure of positive change in the students who took this training could indicate its efficacy.

## Presentation of Data

To find out how effective or ineffective my training had been, I asked myself three questions both before and after the training was administered:

1. Did my students believe that the application of a moral sense is important in combat?

2. Did my presentation have any effect on their opinion?
3. Was my presentation effective for learning?

I used a survey inventory or questionnaire to help answer these questions (See Appendix I). Since I have very little experience in designing and administering a survey, I had to get some help. Dr. Margaret Ann Faeth was extremely helpful in looking over my initial plan and making suggestions in the design and content of the questions. Her advice was augmented by my study of the book, *Designing and Conducting Survey Research* by Louis Ray and Richard Parker.

The survey method of research seemed to be the most appropriate form of measure because it gathered the information from a subpopulation which could be generalized to the larger population of the Army. More surveys would be the best way to increase the validity of my findings. This survey was administered as an In-Person Interview, which is face to face as opposed to a mailer or phone interview. The advantage is accuracy for those taking the survey because it gives opportunity for questions of clarification.

The survey was voluntary. Out of the 350 surveys distributed, 257 were usable for the study. More than 58 of the surveys were unusable because they were incomplete or were not attached to the second part of the survey and therefore could not be properly measured. The remainder of the soldiers chose not to participate.

Overall, there were some interesting trends (See Table 1 and Appendix J). The answer to my first question about the application of moral sense to combat was predictably supported by the majority of respondents. This question was pivotal because it got to the root of moral disengagement. If the student did not believe in the application of the moral sense to combat, it was reasonable to deduce that techniques

of disengagement were already forming in the mind. There were a few who fit this profile before we began. I was concerned to find that 7% of those surveyed before the class believed that a soldier “could not disobey an unlawful order.” Of all the trends, this one showed the most movement. At the same time, it was also a valid test of my second question: *Did my presentation have any effect on their opinion?*




TABLE 1 (Before and After Seminar Results)

The post test analysis showed the following trends. The greatest movement was an overall negative skew of the data to a more central position. Opinions moved from absolutes to open-ended answers. Three interesting trends stood out to me.

First, opinions moved in regard to obedience to unlawful orders. Almost half moved away from the extreme position of *Never* disobeying an unlawful order. I still

have concern for those who did not change their position. According to my survey 4% would always obey unlawful orders. Our role play also confirmed this finding.

On the other end of the scale, 11% moved from *Always* disobeying an unlawful order and showing a 10% increase of *Sometimes* disobeying an unlawful order. The shift away from *Always* does not concern me. Much of the course exposed the class to the complexity of some these moral dilemma. We talked about many instances where the enemy used our moral sense to gain tactical advantage. I believe this shift is more of recognition that what appears to be an unlawful order may be more complex. Here, trust in your leadership is a key factor if you cannot determine all the facts.

Second, the questions of the importance of faith in combat showed a 7% decrease in *Always* important in combat. The shift on this question confused me a little. In my mind, faith is the foundation or root of all the questions queried. Anyway, I believe this shift is more about the understanding by some of the soldiers that ethics can be seen as separate from faith or religion. For many, this was their first exposure to ethical constructs like utilitarian, deontological, and values ethics. There are some who are opposed to any religious connotation because of personal reasons. This framework provides an avenue to morality without religion.

Lastly, the overall movement of the mode in two areas of the training was caused predominately by a subgroup of the class, combat veterans. Interestingly, the non-combat troops showed little change in their answers from before to after the seminar. Yet, those that effected the most change in the answers were almost entirely made up of combat veterans. Perhaps the training confirmed or illuminated what they had experienced in combat.

Overall, the shift in answers signifies to me a change. This change, in my opinion, is the answer to my third question: *Was the training effective for learning?* Engaging with the content of the seminar caused the soldiers to process new information which shifted opinions a process of Social Cognitive theory.

## Assessment of Outcome

Initially, I identified a problem in training of soldiers for combat. Many seemed to lack a focus on the importance of a moral self engaged for the ethical decisions of combat. True, they had received ethics briefs, Rules of Engagement trainings, and even live decision-making scenarios. Yet, the training lacked the cognitive connection of theory to action. This class served to wake up and put an explanation point on the importance of a morally-engaged soldier as an asset to survivability and victory on the battlefield. The training was and is a success. The training has been recognized by other leaders in the Army and is in demand as required training for troops deploying to both Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Viewed in the Larger Context of Army's Ethics Training

At the beginning of this project, I thought the Army was doing a poor job at training soldiers in making moral decisions in combat. I believed they were not equipping this soldier to that end. My opinion has changed. Through the process of this project and study I have come to the conclusion that Army has a comprehensive program to prepare soldiers for the ethics of combat. That is not to say that there is no

room for improvement. There is still a need for more integration and direction for the Army as a whole.

From my study and experience, I believe this training, Ethics in Combat or one like it, is essential for soldiers deploying and returning from combat. During my unit's (the 173<sup>RD</sup> Airborne Brigade) current train up for deployment to Afghanistan a weakness in our soldiers was revealed.

Our junior leadership, the sergeants and lieutenants who deployed to combat with the unit before, were heavy handed in their treatment of those playing the roles of Afghan civilians at the training center in Grafenwoehr. In an insurgency, the center of gravity is the populous. They are neutrals that are easily swayed. If you treat them with disrespect, they can swing to your enemy's side. Loss of the populous means loss of the war.

Our judge advocate section, lawyers assigned to the brigade, identified the problem as beyond the rules of engagement or laws of land warfare. They stated that our soldiers knew the rules. They simply do not follow them. Knowing of the problem they faced, I offered my training. They presented it to the Commander as a solution, a way to go beyond the rules to the 'why the rules'. My Commander made sure that the 3,500 soldiers of the Brigade were all trained before we deployed.

My hope for the future is that every soldier would receive this training both before deployment and upon return from deployment. The first iteration would set the mind for moral engagement. The second iteration would serve the purpose of decompressing from combat, an application of this study that has not yet been explored.

Ethics in the Army, as well as in the militaries of our allies, is under extensive review. Our current war has highlighted the importance of the moral soldier. To meet these challenges, ethics must be taught so that soldiers learn the right lessons. If poorly presented, ethics training can be counterproductive. Internationally, ethics training has no uniformity. Some question whether such training is needed at all. Since the West, with other allies, almost always fights as a coalition, the lack of uniformity in training is problematic.<sup>120</sup> Major General Patrick Cordingley put it this way after returning from Afghanistan on a fact-finding tour,

“Although rules of engagement for the various coalition forces in that country are similar, they are interpreted in different ways. We need to get together as a coalition and thrash out the ethics behind the rules in order to reach mutual understanding.”<sup>121</sup>

The United States as a leader in the world has the stage to set a vision and standard in ethical training. The United States Army is in a unique position to influence that process. Perhaps small contributions like my own and a willingness to lead in this area will influence a standardization of training in ethics, not only in this country but across the world.

## Improving the Project

There are a number of things that can be done to increase the effectiveness of this training. I received good feedback from the participants of the training. Overall, they liked it, but they had a number of good ideas that I concur with (See Appendix K).

---

<sup>120</sup> Paul Robinson, “Ethics Training and Development in the Military” *Parameters*, Spring 2007. 22-36.

<sup>121</sup> Comment to workshop on “Ethics Training and Development in the Military,” University of Hull, England, 23 June 2006.

First, scenarios were by far seen as the most effective medium of the training by those who responded to the questionnaire. Initially, I saw them as merely supporting the training already presented. After the responses, I realized that it was a primary vehicle of learning.

Second, the part of the training where I defined the different type of ethical models was only helpful to little over half the respondents. Further analysis is needed to find out what segment of my sample was helped by defining ethics. My hunch is that those who have had more education respond better to the definitions because of their familiarity with the didactic method, and not necessarily based on their intelligence. In my next iteration, I will make the section more concise and use the excess time on scenarios.

In addition to the suggestions from the participants, there are a few other changes I would like to make.

One, I want to replace scenarios that date back to WW II with contemporary scenarios from Iraq or Afghanistan. At first I resisted this because so many soldiers in the audience have stress issues due to combat. However, the differences in time between the wars do little to alleviate those stressors so using contemporary scenarios should pose no problems.

Two, the size of my training iterations was far too large. At most, I want to train no more than a platoon-size element at a time. This gives more opportunity for feedback. I also would like to test the idea of breaking the class into smaller groups so more people can participate in the scenarios. This would probably necessitate more instructors.

My survey needs a little work too. My questions were weak. I should have been far more specific about what I wanted to know. For example, a question in reference to specific scenario with response would have revealed more attitudes. I should have maximized my opportunity with the questionnaires.

Another shortcoming of my survey centered on my presence as the administrator. It may have prejudiced outcome of some of the surveys. My status as an officer and/or a Chaplain may have skewed responses. Most of my respondents were junior in rank and age. Since I gave the survey just before and just after the class, I must assume that my presence may have some effect. For future research, I will send questionnaires two week before the training and two weeks after. I would do this as either a web-based survey or mail survey. This would also provide more time for reflection on the training by the participants, which is a component of the learning process in Social Cognitive Theory.

My biggest mistake with the survey taught me the most about this process. It was the use of the pre-test. Originally, my survey instrument was tested on a small group of 23. Any questions on how to fill out the questionnaire were easily explained. However, my actual surveys were administered to populations at least four times larger than my test group. They did not understand how to answer one of my questions and my clarification of the question was not clearly understood. There were just too many people in the class that day and too much noise to overcome. In the end, question number 8 had to go (See Appendix I).

## Final Reflections

The most difficult part of this journey was going to war. During this study, I deployed to Iraq. I got to experience firsthand the carnage, death, sadness, grief, stupidity, boredom, terror, and savage reality of the haphazard arbitrary nature of who dies and who lives.

I had a close call on Holy Saturday and had the opportunity to contemplate my death. A 122mm artillery round missed by a few seconds. If I had been a few seconds earlier, my wife would have been notified that I was killed in action on Easter Sunday.

But what bothers me most are the dead bodies of my friends—young soldiers whom I counseled about their dreams and difficulties. I bless all our dead. I touched holy oil to everyone, in heaps of remains where all that was left were burnt piles of flesh and bone. I looked into the dead eyes of a young boy completely drained of all life, remembering his smile and his lovely fiancé at home waiting for his return. What a beautiful smile he had.

Lastly, I remember the burnt remains of a female medic. She burned to a crisp, but I could still see the distinctive frame of a woman under the black ashy cinder that was once her flesh. I can no longer look at the beauty of a woman, not even my wife, without recalling the horror. I simply mute it, but it is always there. These marks of war, these scars from seeing the abominations of what human beings can do to one another—and understanding that you are capable of such destruction. This knowledge turns you into a shadow of who you were before. Most of the time you can fake it because you remember who you were, but you have changed and you wonder if your old self is dead. Can he be resurrected?

It is these experiences that are the true heart of war. It almost seems as if the notion of ethics in combat is insane, a point that Niebuhr seemed to espouse in his 'Realist' view of war. Is the action so evil that it is irredeemable?

The war rages not only on the battlefield, but in the psyche of the warrior. Have we sent all our soldiers to Hell? Augustine does not think so. He sets out guidance, a reminder of who we are to be in God. His 'Just War Theories' that touch every aspect of conduct on the battlefield is not just about the rules of war. It is a tether that unites us to what is true and real in life. Without reminders like it, most would be lost to the hellish insanity of war. It reminds us that there is more than death and carnage around us. It reminds us of the Divine, even in the ash of death.

As for me, I know that my redeemer lives. In his affirmation, I find healing. In his embrace, I find love. In his grace, I find peace.

## 7. Conclusion

### *Last Thoughts*

#### From Beginning to End

This project was born out of perceived needs of soldiers, both for those who go and return from war. Concern for the soldier and their psyche initiated my interest in developing this project. The process of researching, building, and presenting this seminar made me realize that the application of ethics training for combat affects far more than the individual. Everything from tactics to politics is affected by moral decisions in combat. The end state of this project is for soldiers to engage their moral sense so that they might have an understanding of their character to aid them in decisions they will make in combat. With all my being, I believe that a soldier in touch with what they believe is right can positively contribute to the success on the battlefield as well the personal aftermath of war.

#### Problem Solved?

Did this project cause soldiers to contemplate and engage their moral sense while in combat? I could not measure that for sure. Soldiers did report a change in how they thought about some ethical concepts in combat. Since I spent more than two years with these soldiers, fifteen months of which were in combat, I can say that most of these soldiers were constantly engaging their morality in combat decision-making. This had tactical, strategic, and personal implications.

Overall, I believe the class I presented gave a frame of reference that provoked reflection and change in many of the soldiers. There will still be those who commit

crimes in war or act without forethought to the consequences, both to themselves and their nation. Hopefully, this training will make the number far less.

## Effects

The process involved in putting this project together has taught me a number of things. First, a deliberate process for research, planning, presentation and testing not only assisted me with the project, but has equipped me to plan other seminars and classes in the future. Second, perhaps the most useful tool for me was the use of a survey. This is the first time I have employed a survey. The information I gained was very important to me for analysis. Not only did it give good feedback on how soldiers saw some of ethical instruments of the Army, it also helped me critique the presentation to the class. Finally, my interest in this project networked me to other ethicists within the Army. It has provided opportunities to work further in this field.

One discovery worth mentioning comes from interaction with our soldiers. Overall, they impressed me with their selflessness and conscientious decisions during the role play. There were very few soldiers who gave me pause when it came to decisions they would make during the scenarios. They quickly caught on to new concepts and implemented them into the scenario.

Another take-a-way was the enthusiasm shown by Commanders for this type of training. This was exactly what they were looking for to train their troops, and the chaplain was the agent they trusted to train it. Much training needed in the Army is awaiting the subject matter experts to take the initiative to train. When we as chaplains

see a need of ethical concern, it is up to us to help the commander by taking initiative in presenting solutions.

## Implications for the Future

Does my class produce moral soldiers? No, it is unlikely that a few classes or scenarios will transform the individual alone. Character development requires more than a class on ethics theory. But this conference can be part of a command climate that fosters the importance of the moral self. It sends a message to soldiers that their character is important in the performance of their duty. It joins together and brings to the soldier's attention the different streams of ethical norms in the military, like the Law of Land Warfare, the Rules of Engagement, Army Regulations, Army Values, and Warrior Ethos. It also provides a forum for soldiers to consider and reflect on good and bad ethical conduct of the past as well as to form action for the future. Alone, the effect is limited, but combined with the example and motivation of those in authority it becomes a component of moral leadership. Leaders set the climate for moral behavior. This training only reinforces what is already modeled. Without proper example, it is an empty experience. Combined with good leadership and positive examples of traditional military and national values it can proactively assist the military with the next ethical challenge.

## APPENDIX A: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IRAQ

The rules of engagement (ROE) are carried by all soldiers deployed in combat and they are required to know them. Rules of engagement may change from one theater or sector to the next, depending on the enemy threat. The first set of rules refer to soldiers under the command of Multination National Force Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). The second set of rules applies to soldiers who are under the command of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait.

### Definitions:

IAW – In accordance with.

LOAC – Law of Armed Conflict.

IG – Inspector General

CID – Criminal Investigation Division (Army)

NCIS – Naval Criminal Investigative Service

CF – Coalition Forces

### MNC-I ROE CARD

#### Law of Armed Conflict Principles:

- a. **Use of Force.** Must be necessary and proportional IAW the LOAC.
  - b. **Only Attack Legitimate Military Targets.** Ensure non-combatants and civilian structures are distinguished from proper military targets.
  - c. **Minimize Collateral Damage.** Minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral damage.
  - d. **Do not target or strike** anyone who has surrendered or is out of combat.
  - e. **Do not target or strike** hospitals, mosques, churches, shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, any other historical and cultural sites, civilian populated areas or buildings, Iraqi Infrastructure (public works, commercial communication facilities, dams), Lines of Communication (roads, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways) and Economic Objects (commercial storage facilities, pipelines) **UNLESS** necessary for self-defense or if ordered by your commander. When engaging these objects, do so to disable and disrupt rather than destroy.
  - f. **Treat all civilians and their property with respect and dignity.** Do not seize civilian property unless it presents a security threat. When possible, give a receipt to the property's owner.
- **MNC-I General Order No. 1 is in effect.** Looting and the taking of war trophies are prohibited.
  - **ALL personnel MUST report any suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US, friendly or enemy force.** Notify your chain of command, Judge Advocate, IG, Chaplain, or appropriate service-related investigative branch (e.g. CID, NCIS).

THESE ROE ARE IN EFFECT AS OF 30 MAY 07

### MNC-I ROE CARD

**YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE AND TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AS ORDERED BY YOUR COMMANDER.**

**1. You may engage the following individuals based on their conduct:**

- **Persons who are committing hostile acts.**
- **Persons who are exhibiting hostile intent.**

**\*\*Positive Identification (PID) is required prior to any engagement.** You must be reasonably certain that your target is the source of the threat.

**2. Escalation of Force (EOF).** If time and circumstances permit, use EOF to determine whether hostile act/intent exists. When a hostile act or hostile intent is obvious, you may immediately engage with force to stop the threat.

**3. Warning Shots.** Only use warning shots in situations where deadly force is authorized and in EOF situations.

**4. The use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to protect the following:** (1) yourself, your unit, and other friendly forces; (2) detainees; (3) civilians from crimes that are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (4) personnel or property **designated by the OSC** when necessary to restore order and security.

**5. You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person:** (1) is interfering with CF mission accomplishment; (2) is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest or detention; (3) is or was engaged in criminal activity; or (4) must be detained for imperative reasons of security. **You MUST protect everyone you detain.** You **MUST** fill out a detainee apprehension card for every detainee.

## APPENDIX B: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT KUWAIT



### CFLCC RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

**NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF, YOUR UNIT, AND OTHER US FORCES.**

1. **HOSTILE FORCES:** NO forces have been declared hostile.

2. **HOSTILE ACTORS:** You may engage persons who commit hostile acts or show hostile intent with the minimum force necessary to counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to protect US Forces.

Hostile act: An attack or other use of force against US Forces or a use of force that directly precludes/impedes the mission/duties of US Forces.

Hostile intent: The threat of imminent use of force against US Forces or the threat of force to preclude/impede the mission/duties of US Forces.

3. You may use force, up to and including deadly force, against hostile actors:

- a. In self-defense;
- b. In defense of your unit, or other US Forces;
- c. To prevent the theft, damage, or destruction of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or property designated by your Commander as vital to national security. (Protect other property with less than deadly force.)

UNCLASSIFIED as of 011800Z NOV 03

### CFLCC RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

**NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF, YOUR UNIT, AND OTHER US FORCES.**

4. **ESCALATION OF FORCE:** When possible, use the following degrees of force against hostile actors:

- a. SHOUT: verbal warnings to HALT or "QIF" (pronounced "COUGH").
- b. SHOVE: physically restrain, block access, or detain.
- c. SHOW: your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
- d. SHOOT: to remove the threat of death/serious bodily injury or to protect designated property. IF YOU MUST FIRE:

- (1) Fire only aimed shots. **NO WARNING SHOTS.**
- (2) Fire no more rounds than necessary.
- (3) Fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
- (4) Take reasonable efforts not to destroy property.
- (5) Stop firing as soon as the situation permits.

5. **CROWDS:** Control civilian crowds, mobs, or rioters interfering with US Forces with the minimum necessary force. When circumstances permit, attempt the following steps to control crowds:

- a. Repeated warnings to HALT or "QIF" (pronounced "COUGH").
- b. Show of force, including riot control formation.
- c. Blocking of access, or other reasonable use of force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

6. **DETAINEES:** You may stop, detain, search, and disarm persons as required to protect US Forces. Detainees will be turned over to the Military Police or Kuwait Police ASAP.

7. Treat all persons with respect and dignity.

UNCLASSIFIED as of 011800Z NOV 03

## APPENDIX C: ARMY VALUES

|                                                 |                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>L</b> oyalty                                 | Bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers. |
| <b>D</b> uty                                    | Fulfill your obligations.                                                                    |
| <b>R</b> espect                                 | Treat people with dignity as they should be treated.                                         |
| <b>S</b> elfless Service                        | Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.              |
| <b>H</b> onor                                   | Live up to all the Army Values.                                                              |
| <b>I</b> ntegrity                               | Do what's right, legally and morally.                                                        |
| <b>P</b> ersonal Courage<br>(Physical or Moral) | Face fear, danger, or adversity.                                                             |

## APPENDIX D: OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Note, that in the rater's section under character there is a sub-section titled, "Army Values". A 'no' in any of these blocks requires an explanation in the comments section. In practice, a 'no' by itself in reference to the character trait would not be the end of a career. Nevertheless, it would be scrutinized and the fitness of the officer would be called into question. Most civilian occupational reviews do not rate character traits.

(Front page of OER, back page not included.)

| <b>OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT</b><br><small>For use of this form, see AR 623-105; the proponent agency is DCS, G-1.</small>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  | <small>FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)</small><br><small>Protected by Privacy Act of 1974.</small> |  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| <b>PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |       |                                                                                 |      | b. SSN                                                                                 |     | c. RANK                                                                                                                                        |  | d. DATE OF RANK<br><small>Year    Month    Day</small>  |  | e. BRANCH                                                                                       |  |
| g. UNIT, ORG., STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | h. REASON FOR SUBMISSION                                |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| i. PERIOD COVERED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     | j. RATED MONTH                                                                                                                                 |  | k. NONRATED CODES                                       |  | l. NO. OF ENCL.                                                                                 |  |
| FROM                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |       | THRU                                                                            |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| Year                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Month | Day                                                                             | Year | Month                                                                                  | Day |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | m. RATED OFFICER COPY (Check one and date)              |  | n. PSB INITIAL                                                                                  |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | 2. Forwarded to Officer                                 |  | p. PSB CODE                                                                                     |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| <b>PART II - AUTHENTICATION (Rated officer's signature verifies officer has seen completed OER Parts I-VII and the admin data is correct)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First, MI)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |                                                                                 |      | SSN                                                                                    |     | RANK                                                                                                                                           |  | POSITION                                                |  | SIGNATURE                                                                                       |  |
| b. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE RATER (Last, First, MI)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      | SSN                                                                                    |     | RANK                                                                                                                                           |  | POSITION                                                |  | SIGNATURE                                                                                       |  |
| c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, MI)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       |                                                                                 |      | SSN                                                                                    |     | RANK                                                                                                                                           |  | POSITION                                                |  | SIGNATURE                                                                                       |  |
| SENIOR RATER'S ORGANIZATION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     | BRANCH                                                                                                                                         |  | SENIOR RATER TELEPHONE NUMBER                           |  | E-MAIL ADDRESS                                                                                  |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     | d. This is a referred report, do you wish to make comments?<br><input type="checkbox"/> Yes, comments are attached <input type="checkbox"/> No |  | e. SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER                           |  | DATE                                                                                            |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| <b>PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| a. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | b. POSITION AOC/BR                                      |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| c. SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. REFER TO PART IVa, DA FORM 67-9-1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| <b>PART IV - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - PROFESSIONALISM (Rater)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| <b>CHARACTER</b> Disposition of the leader: combination of values, attributes, and skills affecting leader actions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| a. ARMY VALUES (Comments mandatory for all "NO" entries. Use PART Vb.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| 1. HONOR: Adherence to the Army's publicly declared code of values                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |                                                                                 |      | 2. INTEGRITY: Possesses high personal moral standards; honest in word and deed         |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | 3. COURAGE: Manifests physical and moral bravery        |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| 4. LOYALTY: Bears true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, the unit, and the soldier                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       |                                                                                 |      | 5. RESPECT: Promotes dignity, consideration, fairness, & EO                            |     |                                                                                                                                                |  | 6. SELFLESS-SERVICE: Places Army priorities before self |  |                                                                                                 |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| b. LEADER ATTRIBUTES / SKILLS / ACTIONS: First, mark "YES" or "NO" for each block. Second, choose a total of six that best describe the rated officer. Select one from ATTRIBUTES, two from SKILLS (Competence), and three from ACTIONS (LEADERSHIP). Place an "X" in the appropriate numbered box with optional comments in PART Vb. <b>Comments are mandatory in Part Vb for all "No" entries.</b> |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| b.1. ATTRIBUTES (Select 1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |       | 1. MENTAL                                                                       |      | YES NO                                                                                 |     | 2. PHYSICAL                                                                                                                                    |  | YES NO                                                  |  | 3. EMOTIONAL                                                                                    |  |
| Fundamental qualities and characteristics                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       | Possesses desire, will, initiative, and discipline                              |      |                                                                                        |     | Maintains appropriate level of physical fitness and military bearing                                                                           |  |                                                         |  | Displays self-control; calm under pressure                                                      |  |
| b.2. SKILLS (Competence) (Select 2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |       | 1. CONCEPTUAL                                                                   |      | YES NO                                                                                 |     | 2. INTERPERSONAL                                                                                                                               |  | YES NO                                                  |  | 3. TECHNICAL                                                                                    |  |
| Skill development is part of self-development; prerequisite to action                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |       | Demonstrates sound judgment, critical/creative thinking, moral reasoning        |      |                                                                                        |     | Shows skill with people: coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating and empowering                                                             |  |                                                         |  | Possesses the necessary expertise to accomplish all tasks and functions                         |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       | 4. TACTICAL                                                                     |      | Demonstrates proficiency in required professional knowledge, judgment, and warfighting |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  | YES NO                                                                                          |  |
| b.3. ACTIONS (LEADERSHIP) (Select 3) Major activities leaders perform: influencing, operating, and improving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| INFLUENCING                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |       | 1. COMMUNICATING                                                                |      | YES NO                                                                                 |     | 2. DECISION-MAKING                                                                                                                             |  | YES NO                                                  |  | 3. MOTIVATING                                                                                   |  |
| Method of reaching goals while operating / improving                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |       | Displays good oral, written, and listening skills for individuals / groups      |      |                                                                                        |     | Employs sound judgment, logical reasoning and uses resources wisely                                                                            |  |                                                         |  | Inspires, motivates, and guides others toward mission accomplishment                            |  |
| OPERATING                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       | 4. PLANNING                                                                     |      | YES NO                                                                                 |     | 5. EXECUTING                                                                                                                                   |  | YES NO                                                  |  | 6. ASSESSING                                                                                    |  |
| Short-term mission accomplishment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       | Develops detailed, executable plans that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable |      |                                                                                        |     | Shows tactical proficiency, meets mission standards, and takes care of people/resources                                                        |  |                                                         |  | Uses after-action and evaluation tools to facilitate consistent improvement                     |  |
| IMPROVING                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       | 7. DEVELOPING                                                                   |      | YES NO                                                                                 |     | 8. BUILDING                                                                                                                                    |  | YES NO                                                  |  | 9. LEARNING                                                                                     |  |
| Long-term improvement in the Army its people and organizations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |       | Invests adequate time and effort to develop individual subordinates as leaders  |      |                                                                                        |     | Spends time and resources improving teams, groups and units; fosters ethical climate                                                           |  |                                                         |  | Seeks self-improvement and organizational growth; envisioning, adapting and leading change      |  |
| c. APFT:                      DATE:                      HEIGHT:                      WEIGHT:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| d. OFFICER DEVELOPMENT - MANDATORY YES OR NO ENTRY FOR RATERS OF CPTs, LTs, CW2s, AND WO1s.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |
| WERE DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS RECORDED ON DA FORM 67-9-1a AND QUARTERLY FOLLOW-UP COUNSELINGS CONDUCTED?    YES    NO    NA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |       |                                                                                 |      |                                                                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                |  |                                                         |  |                                                                                                 |  |

DA FORM 67-9, DEC 2004

REPLACES DA FORM 67-9, OCT 97, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

APD PE v1.00

## APPENDIX D: NON COMMISSIONED OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Part IV in this section is 'Army Values' and a negative mark in this area also requires explanation and may affect a Non-commissioned officer's career.

(Front page of NCOER, back page not included.)

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>+</b> <b>NCO EVALUATION REPORT</b><br>For use of this form, see AR 623-205; the proponent agency is ODCSPER                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        | SEE PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT<br>IN AR 623-205, APPENDIX C. <b>+</b> |                 |                                     |                          |
| <b>PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |         |                                                                                                                |                    | b. SSN         |                                        | c. RANK                                                          |                 | d. DATE OF RANK                     | e. PMOSC                 |
| f. UNIT, ORG., STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        | g. REASON FOR SUBMISSION                                         |                 |                                     |                          |
| h. PERIOD COVERED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         | i. RATED MONTHS                                                                                                | j. NON-RATED CODES | k. NO. OF ENCL | l. RATED NCO COPY (Check one and Date) |                                                                  | m. PSC Initials | n. CMD CODE                         | o. PSB CODE              |
| FROM                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | THRU    |                                                                                                                |                    |                | 1. Given to NCO                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| YYYY MM                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | YYYY MM |                                                                                                                |                    |                | 2. Forwarded to NCO                    |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| <b>PART II - AUTHENTICATION</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First, Middle Initial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |         |                                                                                                                |                    | SSN            |                                        | SIGNATURE                                                        |                 |                                     |                          |
| RANK, PMOSC/BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | DATE                                |                          |
| b. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, Middle Initial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |         |                                                                                                                |                    | SSN            |                                        | SIGNATURE                                                        |                 |                                     |                          |
| RANK, PMOSC/BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | DATE                                |                          |
| c. RATED NCO: I understand my signature does not constitute agreement or disagreement with the evaluations of the rater and senior rater. I further understand my signature verifies that the administrative data in Part I, the rating officials in Part II, the duty description to include the counseling dates in Part III, and the APF-I and neighborhood entries in Part IV are correct. I have seen the report completed through Part V, except Parts IId and IIe. I am aware of the appeals process of AR 623-205. |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        | SIGNATURE                                                        |                 | DATE                                |                          |
| d. NAME OF REVIEWER (Last, First, Middle Initial)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         |                                                                                                                |                    | SSN            |                                        | SIGNATURE                                                        |                 |                                     |                          |
| RANK, PMOSC/BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | DATE                                |                          |
| e. <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR WITH RATER AND SENIOR RATER EVALUATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONCONCUR WITH RATER AND/OR SENIOR RATER EVAL (See attached comments)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| <b>PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION (Rater)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| a. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                | b. DUTY MOSC                           |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| c. DAILY DUTIES AND SCOPE (To include, as appropriate, people, equipment, facilities and dollars)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| d. AREAS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| e. APPOINTED DUTIES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| f. COUNSELING DATES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |         |                                                                                                                | INITIAL            | LATER          | LATER                                  | LATER                                                            | LATER           |                                     |                          |
| <b>PART IV - ARMY VALUES/ATTRIBUTES/SKILLS/ACTIONS (Rater)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| a. ARMY VALUES. Check either "YES" or "NO". Comments are mandatory for "No" entries; optional for "Yes" entries.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |         |                                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |
| <b>V<br/>A<br/>L<br/>U<br/>E<br/>S</b><br><br>Loyalty<br>Duty<br>Respect<br>Selfless-Service<br><br>Honor<br>Integrity<br>Personal Courage                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |         | 1. LOYALTY: Bears true faith and allegiance to the U. S. Constitution, the Army, the unit, and other soldiers. |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | YES                                 | NO                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 2. DUTY: Fulfills their obligations.                                                                           |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 3. RESPECT/EO/EEO: Treats people as they should be treated.                                                    |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 4. SELFLESS-SERVICE: Puts the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before their own.              |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 5. HONOR: Lives up to all the Army values.                                                                     |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 6. INTEGRITY: Does what is right - legally and morally.                                                        |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | 7. PERSONAL COURAGE: Faces fear, danger, or adversity (physical and moral).                                    |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |         | Bullet comments                                                                                                |                    |                |                                        |                                                                  |                 |                                     |                          |

## APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75

### Summary of Change

| 2008       | <i>FM 3-21.75<br/>Warrior Ethos and<br/>Soldier Combat Skills</i>                                                                                                                                                              | 1984                                   | <i>FM 21-75<br/>Combat Skills of the Soldier</i>                         |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Chapter 1  | <i>Introduction (new)</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                      | --                                     |                                                                          |
| Chapter 2  | <i>Individual Readiness (new)</i>                                                                                                                                                                                              | --                                     |                                                                          |
| Chapter 3  | Renamed "Combat Care and Preventive Medicine"                                                                                                                                                                                  | Chapter 8                              | <i>First Aid and Personal Hygiene</i>                                    |
| Chapter 4  | <i>Environmental Conditions (new)</i>                                                                                                                                                                                          | --                                     |                                                                          |
| Chapter 5  | <i>Cover, Concealment, and Camouflage</i>                                                                                                                                                                                      | Chapter 1                              | <i>Cover, Concealment, and Camouflage</i>                                |
| Chapter 6  | <i>Fighting Positions</i><br>Includes former Appendix I, <i>Range Cards</i> , and updates the range card                                                                                                                       | Chapter Appendix I                     | <i>Fighting Positions</i><br><i>Range Cards</i>                          |
| Chapter 7  | <i>Movement</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Chapter Appendix E                     | <i>Movement</i><br><i>Tracking</i>                                       |
| Chapter 8  | <i>Urban Areas</i> ; content updated considerably                                                                                                                                                                              | Appendix D                             | <i>Urban Areas</i>                                                       |
| Chapter 9  | "Every Soldier is a Sensor"; incorporates former Chapter 4 ( <i>Observation</i> ) and Chapter 6 ( <i>Combat Intelligence and Counterintelligence</i> ); updates report criteria and limited visibility observation and devices | Chapter 4<br>Chapter 6                 | <i>Observation</i><br><i>Combat Intelligence and Counterintelligence</i> |
| Chapter 10 | <i>Combat Marksmanship</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Appendix G                             | <i>Weapons and Fire Control</i>                                          |
| Chapter 11 | <i>Communications</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Chapter 7                              | <i>Communications</i>                                                    |
| Chapter 12 | <i>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape</i> ; adds <i>Resistance</i>                                                                                                                                                      | Appendix F                             | <i>Survival, Evasion, and Escape</i>                                     |
| Chapter 13 | <i>CBRN Weapons</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Chapter 5                              | <i>NBC Warfare</i>                                                       |
| Chapter 14 | <i>Mines, Demolitions, and Breaching Procedures</i> ; consolidates former Appendixes--<br>A ( <i>Mines</i> ),<br>B ( <i>Demolitions</i> ), and<br>C ( <i>Obstacles</i> )                                                       | Appendix A<br>Appendix B<br>Appendix C | <i>Mines</i><br><i>Demolitions</i><br><i>Obstacles</i>                   |
| Chapter 15 | <i>UXO and IEDs (new)</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                      | ---                                    |                                                                          |
| ---        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Appendix H                             | <i>Field Expedient Antiarmor Devices</i>                                 |

## **APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75**

### **Introduction**

Modern combat is chaotic, intense, and shockingly destructive. In your first battle, you will experience the confusing and often terrifying sights, sounds, smells, and dangers of the battlefield—but you must learn to survive and win despite them.

1. You could face a fierce and relentless enemy.
2. You could be surrounded by destruction and death.
3. Your leaders and fellow soldiers may shout urgent commands and warnings.
4. Rounds might impact near you.
5. The air could be filled with the smell of explosives and propellant.
6. You might hear the screams of a wounded comrade.

However, even in all this confusion and fear, remember that you are not alone. You are part of a well-trained team, backed by the most powerful combined arms force, and the most modern technology in the world. You must keep faith with your fellow Soldiers, remember your training, and do your duty to the best of your ability. If you do, and you uphold your Warrior Ethos, you can win and return home with honor.

This is the Soldier's FM. It tells the Soldier how to perform the combat skills needed to survive on the battlefield. All Soldiers, across all branches and components, must learn these basic skills. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must ensure that their Soldiers receive training on—and know—these vital combat skills.

## **APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75**

### **PART ONE**

## **Warrior Ethos**

What is Warrior Ethos? At first glance, it is just four simple lines embedded in the Soldier's Creed. Yet, it is the spirit represented by these four lines that--

- Compels Soldiers to fight through all adversity, under any circumstances, in order to achieve victory.
- Represents the US Soldier's loyal, tireless, and selfless commitment to his nation, his mission, his unit, and his fellow Soldiers.
- Captures the essence of combat, Army Values, and Warrior Culture.

Sustained and developed through discipline, commitment, and pride, these four lines motivate every Soldier to persevere and, ultimately, to refuse defeat. These lines go beyond mere survival. They speak to forging victory from chaos; to overcoming fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue; and to accomplishing the mission:

### **THE SOLDIER'S CREED**

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team.

I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills.

I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

## **APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75**

### **Chapter 1 Introduction**

Military service is more than a "job." It is a profession with the enduring purpose to win wars and destroy our nation's enemies. The Warrior Ethos demands a dedication to duty that may involve putting your life on the line, even when survival is in question, for a cause greater than yourself. As a Soldier, you must motivate yourself to rise above the worst battle conditions—no matter what it takes, or how long it takes. That is the heart of the Warrior Ethos, which is the foundation for your commitment to victory in times of peace and war. While always exemplifying the four parts of Warrior Ethos, you must have absolute faith in yourself and your team, as they are trained and equipped to destroy the enemy in close combat. Warrior drills are a set of nine battle drills, consisting of individual tasks that develop and manifest the Warrior Ethos in Soldiers.

### **OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

1-1. This complex operational environment offers no relief or rest from contact with the enemy across the spectrum of conflict. No matter what combat conditions you find yourself in, you must turn your personal Warrior Ethos into your commitment to win. In the combat environment of today, unlike conflicts of the past, there is little distinction between the forward and rear areas. Battlefields of the Global War on Terrorism, and battles to be fought in the US Army's future, are and will be asymmetrical, violent, unpredictable, and multidimensional. Today's conflicts are fought throughout the whole spectrum of the battlespace by all Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS). Every Soldier must think as a Warrior first; a professional Soldier, trained, ready, and able to enter combat; ready to fight--and win--against *any* enemy, *any* time, *any* place.

## APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75

### ARMY VALUES

1-2. US Army Values reminds us and displays to the rest of the world—the civilian governments we serve, the nation we protect, other nations, and even our enemies—who we are and what we stand for (Figure 1-1). The trust you have for your fellow Soldiers, and the trust the American people have in you, depends on how well you live up to the Army Values. After all, these values are the fundamental building blocks that enable you to understand right from wrong in any situation. Army Values are consistent and support one another; you cannot follow one value and ignore the others. Figure 1-1 shows the Army Values, which form the acronym LDRSHIP.

|                                                 |                                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>L</b> oyalty                                 | Bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers. |
| <b>D</b> uty                                    | Fulfill your obligations.                                                                    |
| <b>R</b> espect                                 | Treat people with dignity as they should be treated.                                         |
| <b>S</b> elfless Service                        | Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.              |
| <b>H</b> onor                                   | Live up to all the Army Values.                                                              |
| <b>I</b> ntegrity                               | Do what's right, legally and morally.                                                        |
| <b>P</b> ersonal Courage<br>(Physical or Moral) | Face fear, danger, or adversity.                                                             |

Figure 1-1. Army Values.

1-3. Performance in combat, the greatest challenge, requires a basis, such as Army Values, for motivation and will. In these values are rooted the basis for the character and self-discipline that generates the will to succeed and the motivation to persevere. From this motivation derived through tough realistic training and the skills acquired, which will make you successful, a Soldier who "walks the walk."

1-4. Army Values, including policies and procedures, form the foundation on which the Army's institutional culture stands. However, written values are useless unless practiced. You must act correctly with character, complete understanding, and sound motivation. Your trusted leaders will aid you in adopting such values by making sure their core experiences validate them. By this method, strategic leadership imbues Army Values into all Soldiers.

## **APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75**

### **LAW OF LAND WARFARE**

1-5. The conduct of armed hostilities on land is regulated by FM 27-10 and the Law of Land Warfare. Their purpose is to diminish the evils of war by protecting combatants *and* noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and by safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of those who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), detainees, wounded and sick, and civilians. Every Soldier adheres to these laws, and ensures that his subordinates adhere to them as well, during the conduct of their duties. Soldiers must also seek clarification from their superiors of any unclear or apparently illegal order. Soldiers need to understand that the law of land warfare not only applies to states, but also to individuals, particularly all members of the armed forces.

### **WARRIOR CULTURE**

1-6. The Warrior Culture, a shared set of important beliefs, values, and assumptions, is crucial and perishable. Therefore, the Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain it, as it maintains the nation's existence. Its martial ethic connects American warriors of today with those whose previous sacrifices allowed our nation to persevere. You, the individual Soldier, are the foundation for the Warrior Culture. As in larger institutions, the Armed Forces' use culture, in this case Warrior Culture, to let people know they are part of something bigger than just themselves; they have responsibilities not only to the people around them, but also to those who have gone before and to those who will come after them. The Warrior Culture is a part of who you are, and a custom you can take pride in. Personal courage, loyalty to comrades, and dedication to duty are attributes integral to putting your life on the line.

### **BATTLE DRILL**

1-7. A battle drill--

- Is a collective action, executed by a platoon or smaller element, without the application of a deliberate decision-making process. The action is vital to success in combat or critical to preserve life. The drill is initiated on a cue, such as an enemy action or your leader's order, and is a trained response to the that stimulus. It requires minimum leader orders to accomplish, and is standard throughout the Army. A drill has the following advantages:
  - It is based on unit missions and the specific tasks, standards, and performance measures required to support mission proficiency.
  - It builds from simple to complex, but focuses on the basics.
  - It links how-to-train and how-to-fight at small-unit level.
  - It provides an agenda for continuous coaching and analyzing.
  - It develops leaders, and builds teamwork and cohesion under stress.
  - It enhances the chance for individual and unit survival on the battlefield.

### **WARRIOR DRILLS**

1-8. The Warrior drills--

- Are a set of core battle drills for small units from active and reserve component organizations across the Army, regardless of branch.
- Describe a training method for small units. This method requires training individual, leader, and collective tasks before the conduct of critical wartime missions.
- Provide a foundation for the development of specific objectives for combat. The expanded list of Warrior Drills helps place the individual Soldiers' tasks (as well as the team) in sufficient context to identify meaningful consequences of individual behavior.

## APPENDIX E: WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS, FM 3-21.75

- Have individual tasks that develop and manifest the Warrior Ethos. A *barrier*, for example, is an element that impedes a response or behavior. *Barrier control* can focus on points that are most sensitive to the behavior of individuals such as choices, actions, and interactions; and on those with the most serious consequences such as effects on other individuals and success of the mission.
- Create opportunities to develop the Warrior Ethos. The nine drills follow:

1. React to Contact (visual, improvised explosive device [IED], direct fire).
2. React to Ambush (Near).
3. React to Ambush (Far).
4. React to Indirect Fire.
5. React to a Chemical Attack.
6. Break Contact.
7. Dismount a Vehicle.
8. Evacuate Wounded Personnel from Vehicle.
9. Establish Security at the Halt.

Figure 1-2. Warrior drills.

## **APPENDIX F: WARRIOR CREEDS**

### **The Oath of Enlistment**

"I, \_\_\_\_\_, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."

(Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).

### **The Oath of Office**

"I, \_\_\_\_\_ (SSAN), having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States, as indicated above in the grade of \_\_\_\_\_ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God."

(DA Form 71, 1 August 1959, for officers.)

## APPENDIX F: WARRIOR CREEDS

### The Code of Conduct

I.

**I am an American fighting man.** I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II.

**I will never surrender of my own free will.** If in command, I will never surrender my men while I still have the means to resist.

III.

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV.

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V.

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statement disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

VI.

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

## **APPENDIX F: WARRIOR CREEDS**

### **Creed of the Non-Commissioned Officer**

No one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, and leader of soldiers. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps which is known as “The Backbone of the Army.”

I am proud of the Corps of Non-commissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the military Service and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watch-word. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind - accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers. I will strive to remain tactically and technically proficient. I am aware of my role as a Noncommissioned Officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them uninformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine. I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my soldiers. I will be loyal to those with whom I serve; seniors, peers and subordinates alike. I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage. I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

## **APPENDIX F: WARRIOR CREEDS**

### **The Sapper Creed**

I am a Sapper, the cutting edge of my country's sword. I will always endeavor to complete my Sapper mission, regardless of available assets. My flexibility and special training shall provide my task force with a tool to overcome insurmountable odds.

I realize that I will be called upon for my expertise in all aspects of mobility, counter mobility and survivability. The failure to effectively accomplish my mission could cost the lives of others.

I will set the example by keeping myself physically fit and mentally tough. I will strive to sharpen my Sapper skills, and the skills of those I support.

**SAPPERS LEAD THE WAY!!!**

## **APPENDIX F: WARRIOR CREEDS**

### **The Ranger Creed**

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and “esprit de corps” of my Ranger Battalion.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move farther, faster and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight, and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be, one hundred-percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress, and care for equipment shall set the example for others to follow.


Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, through I be the lone survivor.

**RANGERS LEAD THE WAY!**

## APPENDIX G: POWER POINT PRESENTATION


# 1



# 2



# 3



Slide #3 features a dark blue background with a red border. In the top left corner is the Army of Canada crest, and in the top right corner is the Ontario crest. The text is white and organized into three sections: **TASK:** Equip Soldiers with skills to make sound moral decisions in combat. **CONDITIONS:** Give a 1 1/2 hour discussion/instruction in a classroom setting. **STANDARD:** Each soldier will have an understanding of moral decision making and its effect on combat operations. At the bottom left, the text "TEAM IROQUOIS" is displayed.

**TASK:** Equip Soldiers with skills to make sound moral decisions in combat.

**CONDITIONS:** Give a 1 1/2 hour discussion/instruction in a classroom setting.

**STANDARD:** Each soldier will have an understanding of moral decision making and its effect on combat operations.

TEAM IROQUOIS

# 4



Slide #4 features a dark blue background with a red border. In the top left corner is the Army of Canada crest, and in the top right corner is the Ontario crest. The title "Safety Brief" is centered at the top in a large white font. Below the title is a bulleted list: -Chain of Command, -Emergency Procedures, and -Fire. At the bottom left, the text "TEAM IROQUOIS" is displayed.


## Safety Brief

- Chain of Command
- Emergency Procedures
- Fire

TEAM IROQUOIS

Here, I describe actions we would take if there were to be a fire or an attack. There are two reasons to do this. First, a safety brief is part of Army culture. This says that I am playing by the rules everyone else abides by. Second, it establishes the chain of command for the soldiers who are present. This description of authority is very important to establish responsibility for ethical decisions later in the class. The responsibility for the decisions made in combat weighs heavily on those in leadership positions. Authority to make decisions is stressed, although later we will focus on when decision made by authority can be ignored.


# 5



Following points are discussed:

- a. There is evidence that PTSD is linked to a betrayal of “what is right”!<sup>122</sup>
- b. The written rules of conduct do not develop critical virtues such as courage, justice, benevolence, and honor.<sup>123</sup>
- c. Both formal and informal values can be found in the army. (Some are positive and some are negative). Later, we will go into details on slide # 32.
- d. I discuss the ability of United States to wipe all life off the Earth and the insanity of war without limits.
- e. I talk about an incident in Afghanistan where the US called in an Air Strike on a wedding by accident.<sup>124</sup> We talk about how such incidents multiply our enemies.<sup>125</sup>

# 6



<sup>122</sup> Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, 20.

<sup>123</sup> Shannon French, *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*, 14.

<sup>124</sup> Abdul Waheed and John F. Burns, “U.S. Airstrike reported to hit Afghan Wedding” *The New York Times* (8 Oct, 2004).

<sup>125</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 4 - 5.



# 7



## What is Ethics?

-questions to what is right and good  
or how we ought to behave.

TEAM IROQUOIS

# 8




## Socrates is credited as the first to ask:

1. What sort of life is worth living?
2. If I want to be fulfilled and happy,  
what sort of person should I be?


TEAM IROQUOIS

# 9



The first time I gave this presentation, I was shocked to find that few, if any, in the class ever heard of LT Calley or My Lai. I described to the soldiers how 20 years ago this man and his actions were common knowledge.

# 10



These slides are not meant to be read. The paragraphs are here for handouts, should the soldiers want to study them later. At least one soldier in every class asks for a copy of the training. I am familiar enough with the slides to tell the story of My Lai and discuss as needed. Usually, soldiers are silent and intent during the description of the massacre at My Lai. Most of the class was not even born until 1985, and this description is new.

# 11



All these photos were taken from the actual My Lai mission.

#12



This picture was taken by a combat photographer just before these people were gunned down by U.S. soldiers. The audience silence is deep and their attention is unfaltering at this time.

#13



## My Lai



Charlie Company met no resistance; there were no Viet Cong soldiers at My Lai. Calley then ordered the slaughter of the civilians. People were rounded up into ditches and machine-gunned. They lay five feet deep in the ditches; any survivors trying to escape were immediately shot. When Calley spotted a baby crawling away from a ditch, he grabbed her, threw her back into the ditch, and opened fire. Some of the dead were mutilated by having "C Company" carved into their chests; some were disemboweled. One GI would later say, "You didn't have to look for people to kill, they were just there. I cut their throats, cut off their hands, cut out their tongues, scalped them. I did it. A lot of people were doing it and I just followed. I just lost all sense of direction."

TEAM IROQUOIS

In describing this event, some soldiers do not believe it. I assure them that it is true. Telling this story as both a soldier and a chaplain gives a level of credibility needed to introduce such a subject to our soldiers.

#14



## If you saw this, what would you do?



TEAM IROQUOIS


Soldiers are asked what they would do if put in this situation. I bring a few soldiers up one at a time and put them in a scenario where they run into a situation where US soldiers are committing an atrocity. The audience is pulled into the scenario, very intent on the answers. Actors give a number of answers:

- Some would refuse as an unlawful order, but not report the event.
- Some refuse and would report to chain of command or chaplain.
- I had one soldier who stated he would do what he was ordered.

Once the scenario is completed, I question the soldiers on what their reasoning was for their decision. I ask the audience if they would react differently. After discussion of other actions, I ask both the soldier and the audience to consider the consequences of the decision made. What are the good and bad consequences to doing what they consider right or wrong? I'm careful not

to judge any actions. Audience does this to a certain extent. I moderate to keep control of the seminar.

#15



**Moral Leadership**

Flying high above the slaughter was helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson. Sickened by what he was witnessing, Thompson set down his aircraft and began to rescue the Vietnamese survivors. He ordered his machine gunner to open fire on any American soldiers who continued to shoot villagers. In one ditch, Thompson pulled out a three-year-old child, almost smothered in blood, but not injured. After he radioed for help from other helicopters, an enraged Thompson reported to his section leader and in graphic detail told of what he had seen. Soon afterward, Charlie Company was ordered to stop killing civilians.

TEAM IROQUOIS


We talk about what Chief Thompson and what he did to stop the massacre and properly report it. We talk about the cost of such courage. There is a price to pay for such honesty and courage. He was treated poorly in the military after this event as being disloyal in bringing attention to a negative event. He was not properly recognized for his heroism until the 1980s.

I also point out that the Battalion Commander was high above My Lai in a helicopter. Why didn't he intercede? Why wasn't he charged?

We talk about the whistle blower from Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, and the cost he paid for telling the truth. The soldier, a reservist, had to move from his hometown because of death threats.

Chief Thompson is held up as the right answer to such a situation. We discuss the sacrifice or right conduct by considering the term, "Death before dishonor. The lesson that doing what is right has a cost is not lost on the class.

# 16



**What is the Key to Moral Decision Making on the Battlefield?**


A military commission investigating the My Lai massacre found widespread failures of leadership, discipline, and morale among the Army's fighting units. As the war progressed, many "career" soldiers had either been rotated out or retired. Many more had died. In their place were scores of draftees whose fitness for leadership in the field of battle was questionable at best. Military officials blamed inequities in the draft policy for the often slim talent pool from which they were forced to choose leaders. Many maintained that if the educated middle class ("the Harvards," as they were called) had joined in the fight, a man of Lt. William Calley's emotional and intellectual stature would never have been issuing orders.

TEAM IROQUOIS

The discussion focuses on the lessons learned by the Army from this massacre. We talk about leadership and its responsibility in the massacre. We also talk about the responsibility of the


individual soldier. We go into a further discussion of consequences of refusing an order you believe to be unlawful which the next two slides focus on.

# 17



We talk about orders you can refuse. I bring up the subject of the 57th Transportation Company in Afghanistan, and the order they received to run down children who blocked the road. The enemy was using children to block the road. When the trucks stopped, the enemy ambushed them. The Battalion Commander ordered the trucks not to stop even if they had to run down the children.<sup>126</sup> Is this a legal order?

# 18



We also talk about the limitations of this rule by talking about the soldier who refused to deploy because he believed the war in Iraq was unlawful. He was convicted. The point made is you better be right if you are going to refuse an order.

---

<sup>126</sup> First Sergeant Alan Vivyan, Retired (57<sup>th</sup> Transportation Company, 548<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Battalion, US Army) in discussion with the author, October 2006, FT Drum, NY.

# 19



This slide introduces what is to come in the training. I introduce these different constructs in tackling ethical problems. I point out that they are not the only ones, but are good sample of the more popular ones of our day. I tell the audience that in the next film clip we are going to identify and explain the use of these ethical positions by characters in this story.

### ***“SAVING PRIVATE RYAN”***



At this point, we view a scene from ‘Saving Private Ryan’. It depicts a capture of a German POW and what they should do with them. They discuss letting him go or killing him because they are unable to keep him.<sup>127</sup>

# 20



## Private Reiben



- Actor: Ed Burns
- A rebel, threatens to walk out on the mission after the attack on the radar station.

TEAM IROQUOIS

The discussion begins with, “What is his argument for killing the prisoner? What is the cost?”

# 21



## Kill the Prisoner



An added twist with this decision—we later see that the freed soldier returns to fight against them again

TEAM IROQUOIS

Topics of discussion on this slide include:


- A similar event happened in Afghanistan to a Navy SEAL team. I talk about LT Michael Murphy’s decision to let three goat herders go that cost the lives of his team.<sup>128</sup>
- I emphasize that the cost of doing what is right is high. It could cost your life. Some choose survival rather than sticking to their ethical beliefs (The verse from Psalms comes to mind, “Better a live dog than a dead lion”). We talk about the consequences of those actions also.

<sup>127</sup> Spielberg, Steven. *Saving Private Ryan* (A Steven Spielberg Film) 1998.

<sup>128</sup> Sean D. Naylor, “The Cursed One,” *Army Times* (25 June 2007) 18.

I talk to them about ministering to veterans and how they always come to that action that violated their conscience. Some have been haunted for decades.

# 22



**Utilitarian Ethics**  
**(Outcome ethics)**

- Based on doing the most good for the most people (i.e., intrinsic value).
- Producing good consequences, not having good intentions.
- Torture could be justified under this ethic.
- Regulations are a guidelines/ case law.
- i.e. Use of the Atom bomb on Japan.

TEAM IROQUOIS

I lead a discussion on this ethical construct with attention to consequentialism. We talk about the LTC in Iraq who threatened an insurgent by firing his pistol.<sup>129</sup> What was the effect of his action on his men? To himself? Was it the right thing to do? We talk about decision-making in the process seeded in the leader.

We also talk about dropping the Atom bomb. What was the justification? (Calculation of lives, 6 million Japanese civilians, 2 million of our soldiers expected to die in an invasion<sup>130</sup>) or was it National Egoism against the Soviet Union<sup>131</sup>?

I move the discussion to the leader in combat. They calculate lives. Some are given mission that will risk or cost their life in order to give other a chance to survive or to ensure mission success.

# 23

---


<sup>129</sup> Deborah Sontag, "The Struggle for Iraq: Interrogations; How Colonel Risked his Career by Menacing Detainee and Lost," *The New York Times* (27 May 2004) .

<sup>130</sup> John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989) 574 – 575.

<sup>131</sup> Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: The Free Press, 1985) 554 – 559.

## The Utilitarian Calculus

- Math and ethics finally merge: all consequences must be weighed.
- Units of measurement:
  - Hedons: pleasure
  - Dolors: pain



TEAM IROQUOIS

# 24

## Corporal Upham

- **Actor: Jeremy Davies**
- "It's against the rules!"



TEAM IROQUOIS

# 25

## Deontological Ethics (*Rule ethics*)

- Literal means the science of duty.
- Actions and attitudes are based on clear principles and rules.
- Conscientious Objectors often use the "thou shall not kill" from the ten com.
- Regulations are absolute.
- i.e. Prosecution of UCMJ and violation of rules of war.

TEAM IROQUOIS

# 26



## Captain John Miller



- **Actor: Tom Hanks**
- "I've changed some. My wife might not recognize me.... But if it earns me the right to get back to my wife...Every man I kill, the farther away from home I feel."



TEAM IROQUOIS

We also discuss who had the final say in what happens. Leadership and command in ethical decisions of the unit are emphasized. Individual responsibility is also discussed.

# 27



## Ideal Values



- G. E. Moore suggested that we should strive to maximize ideal values such as freedom, knowledge, justice, and beauty.
- What are the Army values?
- What do you mean by your values?

TEAM IROQUOIS

Explain one of the shortcomings of Value system. Define loyalty, and loyalty to whom. Is the greater loyalty to the Army or your squad? Explain how virtues are reinforced by other ethics like religion. Use examples of bone without muscle or rebar without cement. -When we say loyalty, what does that mean to a commander? For example, is loyalty to the Company more important than loyalty to the Battalion or the Army in general? What do you do when virtues collide?

# 28



## Virtues Ethics (*Identity ethics*)

- Based on one's character and not upon what one does or what one decides.
- You decide how to act ethically based on the person you are.
- Army values are an example of this.  
-i.e. The Samurai of Japan who were bound by honor.

TEAM IROQUOIS

Virtue Ethics focuses on the individual instead of the event. Focus: What-sort-of-person-should-I-be? vs. What-action-should-I-take?

# 29



## Sergeant First Class Horvath



- Actor: Tom Sizemore
- "You do what you're told!"

TEAM IROQUOIS

I do what my leader says, no matter what. -Talk about Nuremburg.

# 30

## Disobeying Orders



- Reiben threatens to walk away from the mission

TEAM IROQUOIS

When can we say “no” to an order?

# 31

## Disobeying Orders



- The cost of taking the radar station had been high. Medic Wade had been killed.
- When can you refuse an order?

TEAM IROQUOIS

We talk about the Company Commander of the 57th Transportation Company who refused to follow the theatre’s standing operating procedures when it came to improvised explosives devices. The rules were causing his soldiers to die when checking for IEDs. Once a convoy was hit by an IED, they were required to get out of their armored vehicles to look for a second IED. If they found the second one, it was the last thing they ever did since they had left the protection of their armored vehicle. Instead of leaving the protective vehicle, the company commander instituted new procedures. His soldiers were to look for a secondary IED from the safety of a

roving armored vehicle. His casualty rate immediately went down.<sup>132</sup> Was he disobeying his orders or modifying them?

# 32



## Disobeying Orders



- Can the military legally order one to go on a "suicide mission?" You bet they can.
- In October 2004, the Army announced that they it were investigating up to 19 members of a platoon from the 343rd Quartermaster Company based in Rock Hill, South Carolina, for refusing to transport supplies in a dangerous area of Iraq.
- Some of the troops thought the mission was "too dangerous" because their vehicles were unarmored, and the route they were scheduled to take is one of the most dangerous in Iraq.

TEAM IROQUOIS

# 33



## Disobeying Orders






- **When do you fire on your own fellow soldier?**
- **Helicopter pilot at Mi Lai.**

TEAM IROQUOIS

# 34

---


<sup>132</sup> Briefing by Company Commander (Unclassified), 57<sup>th</sup> Transportation Company, Sustainment Brigade, FT Drum NY at the Commons, Feb 2006.



We discuss ethical construct and how it informs our decisions.

An example we discuss is that your roommate is cad and is stringing along a bunch of women. One is a nice girl who believes he is going to marry her. As the roommate, what do you do? After I get their answer, I change the girl, who is now their sister.

# 35



We focus in on one ethic, a Christian or Islamic one. This is a good example because most soldiers have an idea of what Christians believe and they can extrapolate the concept to Islam. Once opinions are made, I often change the women to be the moral agent's sister. This changes the perspective quite a bit.

After this, we do the hands-on application. I walk the soldiers through two actual scenarios from World War II where the deaths of prisoners are involved [O' Donnell, Patrick K. Beyond Valor (Simon & Schuster: New York) 2001] Pages 33-35, 93 – 94. Soldier must decide what to do (Appendix H).

## APPENDIX H: SCENARIOS

### LESTER KNESS

#### *1st and 4th Ranger Battalions*

On February 10, 1943, A, E, and F companies of the 1st Ranger Battalion were trucked to a position twelve miles away from the Italian outpost of Sened Station, which was garrisoned by the troops from the elite Italian Centauro Division and 10th Bersaglieri Regiment. After concealing themselves under shelter-halves and brush during the day to avoid detection, on the night of February 10–11, the Rangers fixed bayonets and attacked, killing all but eleven men from the garrison and earning the nickname “Black Death” from the Italians. The Rangers’ orders stated that there would be no delaying or waiting after the attack on the outpost. Anyone who could not make the trip back to the base camp would be sacrificed. This order applied to Rangers and prisoners. It was an order that Lester Kness, a first sergeant, had no choice but to obey.

We were supposed to assault for thirty minutes. We had tape on our backs—XYZ for identification. We had Y on E Company, F was X, and A was Z. We didn’t wear helmets; we wore little knit caps without any brims. Our orders were to kill anyone who didn’t have tape on his back, or if they had a brim.

Everybody started running, except the second platoon didn’t move. We had two new officers who were strange. The first platoon was under a sergeant I knew who was a very brave man, and when he hollered, his men knew him. Well, the second platoon stood—it didn’t move. I ran over because I had been their sergeant and I hollered at them, and they started running, and I ran with them over the hill.

There was a battery there that was primarily firing into F Company. F Company was making an assault by squads and the [Rangers] threw a lot of hand grenades in front of them. They were moving pretty good; I could see them on both sides. I could see the flash of the field piece and I would shoot into it. I don’t know if it did any good. One man had his head blown off by the gun. A Company men ran right into their [Italian soldiers’] tents. They were in their tents, coming out, putting on their clothes.

Then we had to pull out. I stayed at the base of this little knob that we assaulted, counting the men and checking to make sure that all the guys got out. I picked up Sergeant Joe Dye and a fellow from F Company. They both had been severely wounded; they couldn’t walk. I shot them both with morphine and I had five men and myself to start back. Everybody had pulled out, and we had these two wounded. I had an Italian prisoner; he had been wounded in the shoulder. Our orders were to leave no prisoners, to leave nobody alive because we didn’t want them to know what direction we were going. This prisoner couldn’t keep up. We went probably a mile and he kept dragging back. One of my men could speak Italian and I told him to tell the prisoner that “he has to keep up or we have to kill him.” One of my men ordered him up and he didn’t come forward. I told him we had to kill him. I told [one of the men], “You’re going to have to kill him.” He said, “I can’t.” I said, “Why?” And he said, “Because I know everything he’s saying!” Which is an awful hard thing to do. For most of these guys it was their first time of drawing blood. It’s hard. And one of the men took care of it.\* [After enduring a harrowing night march that included avoiding enemy planes, the next day Kness’s small group made it back to their lines.]

## CHUCK SHUNSTROM

### *1<sup>st</sup> Ranger Battalion*

The breaking point of the battle occurred when the Germans began using captured Rangers as human shields.<sup>13</sup> The Germans moved the column of Rangers into the shrinking perimeter while a loudspeaker blared a surrender ultimatum in English: "Surrender or we shall shoot the prisoner!" Several prisoners were bayoneted to drive home the message. Captain Chuck Shunstrom, a winner of the Silver Star and then acting commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, describes the battle in this hitherto unpublished after-action report for Colonel Darby, written shortly after Shunstrom's 1944 escape from a German POW camp.

Our casualties were becoming very heavy. There was a great deal of enemy automatic firing coming into our positions. When the enemy had pinned us down with automatic fire, we would hear single shots as they sniped at men in our position. So far both battalions occupied an area of about three hundred yards in diameter. At this time, Captain Saam, executive officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> Ranger Battalion, came back from a patrol. He was on our left flank. He immediately took command of both battalions. Captain Larkin, the executive officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Battalion, had assumed command immediately after the death of his battalion commander, Major Miller. Captain Saam immediately took two companies of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Battalion and sent them to a position about three hundred yards in our rear with a mission of closing the gap in the circle that we had formed and to dig in and hold at all costs. He informed [me] that C and D Companies had been unsuccessful in their enveloping movement to the right flank, and that he had ordered them to dig in and hold the ground that they had. This left four companies of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Battalion in the immediate vicinity of the command post in reserve. He then gave orders that the radio operator call back for reinforcements on the radio. A battalion aid station was set up in a building where the radio was kept about 25 yards from the command post's position. During the fighting which took place for several hours, both battalions had many losses from enemy small arms fire. Meanwhile a report would come back asking for more ammunition as the men were running out. Finally the order was given for all

four companies remaining in reserve to give one-half of the ammunition they were carrying to be sent out to companies on the line. All this time help was being asked for on the radio. Our plan now was to hold what we had until help came. To advance any farther than where we were now would be suicide. We were completely surrounded by the enemy, who had superiority in firepower and who was generally occupying commanding positions over the area that we were in.

At about 1330 hours, a report came back that some prisoners were seen with their hands in the air at a position about two hundred yards to our rear. The report stated that these prisoners looked to be Americans. Captain Saam and [I] immediately left their positions to investigate. An investigation showed that the report was correct. [We] saw about twelve American soldiers with their hands in the air being quickly surrounded by what appeared to be German paratroop infantry supported by two armed personnel carriers. Sporadic small arms fire was heard all during this operation. Two of the German guards were seen to fall. Immediately two more German soldiers bayoneted two American soldiers, who were then prisoners with their hands in the air, in the back, killing them. The Germans formed their ten men into ranks and marched them towards another position that Lieutenant Evans, company commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Battalion, occupied. Lieutenant Evans's Company refused to surrender. Instead his company ambushed the guards killing two more. The Germans retaliated once again by bayoneting two more of our men in the back. Lieutenant Evans's company was very low on ammunition and eventually ran out, being captured. The Germans by now had about 80 American prisoners and formed them into a column of fours and immediately started to march them towards the center of our position, where our command post was. Captain Saam immediately dispersed the four remaining companies that were in reserve and planned an ambush for the oncoming German soldiers who were guarding the American prisoners. Lieutenant Evans was made to lead this column up the road. The Germans kept shouting, "Surrender or we shall shoot the prisoner!" All the time small arms fire was coming into our positions from the enemy to our front and flanks keeping us well pinned down. The oncoming column came to a position about one hundred fifty yards from the command post and halted. The orders for our ambush were not to fire until given the order, but someone fired a shot into the oncoming column and killed one of our own men. This one shot started everybody else in the ambush firing, and the result was that two or three of our own men were killed in the column plus one or two German guards. The Germans immediately backed off and took cover and started to spray our column of prisoners with automatic fire from submachine guns. The men that had set up in ambush immediately ceased firing, and a few of them who were evidently new in combat immediately got hysterical and started to leave their positions and surrender. All attempts to stop this disobedience of orders failed. Even an attempt to stop them by shooting them failed. Eventually, all men surrendered and were taken prisoners by the Germans.

## APPENDIX I: SURVEY

Hello, my name is CH (CPT) Sean Wead. This survey is presented to help the Chaplain Corps focus on how well this training is being presented and received. In addition it will help me in a study I am doing for my Doctoral Program. The training will be modified based on your responses for future presentations. Your input is very important.

The survey is two parts, given before and after the presentation. The two parts of the survey are connected by a number. Please fill out the second section with the corresponding number printed on the upper right hand corner of the first section. Please do not sign your name as the survey is anonymous.

There are no correct or incorrect answers, so please feel free to express your opinion. Your participation is optional. If you do not want to participate, just hand in the forms blank.

1. What is your rank? \_\_\_\_\_.
2. What is your MOS? \_\_\_\_\_.
3. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Are you Male or Female? \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Are you currently married? \_\_\_\_\_.
6. Have you deployed to a combat zone? \_\_\_\_\_.  
(If yes go to question 7, if no go to question 8)
7. Do you believe that you suffer from stress brought on by your tour in combat? \_\_\_\_\_.

(QUESTION 8 WAS EXCLUDED IN ASSESMENT)

8. *Only answer this question if you are experiencing high stress. Otherwise, leave blank. Please rank the source of your stress from 1 (most stressful) to a higher number (less stressful).*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Physical or psychological (mental) injury*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Rethinking moral and ethical decisions*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Marital stress (if married)*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Returning to everyday life*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Problems with anger*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Problems with alcohol or drugs*

\_\_\_\_\_ *Other (Please explain on back of page)*

9. How many years have you been in the Army? \_\_\_\_\_.

10. Do you consider yourself religious or spiritual? \_\_\_\_\_.

11. How much education do you have?

\_\_\_Some high school or less.

\_\_\_High school graduate.

\_\_\_Some college.

\_\_\_Four-year-college graduate.

\_\_\_Postgraduate degree.

The following questions are designed to measure relevance and importance through frequency.  
Please circle one answer for each question.

12. Moral and ethical concerns are important in combat missions?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

13. Soldiers may disobey an order they consider to be unlawful?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

14. Army regulations are important in combat missions?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

15. Rules of engagement are important in combat missions?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

16. Religious faith is important in combat missions?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

17. The law of land warfare (Hague and Geneva Conventions) is important in combat missions?

|       |        |           |       |        |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Never | Seldom | Sometimes | Often | Always |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|

**PART II**

The following questions are designed to measure relevance and importance through frequency. Please circle one answer for each question.

18. Moral and ethical concerns are important in combat missions?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

19. Soldiers may disobey an order they consider to be unlawful?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

20. Army regulations are important in combat missions?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

21. Rules of engagement are important in combat missions?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

22. Religious faith is important in combat missions?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

23. The law of land warfare (Hague and Geneva Conventions) is important in combat missions?

Never                      Seldom                      Sometimes                      Often                      Always

(See reverse side)

24. Which aspects of this training were the most helpful?

25. Which aspects of this training were the least helpful?

26. How could this training be improved?

## APPENDIX J: SURVEY RESULTS, IMPROVING TRAINING

|                                             | HELPFUL    | UN-<br>HELPFUL |
|---------------------------------------------|------------|----------------|
| All                                         | 48         | 2              |
| Scenarios                                   | 47         | 18             |
| Video Clip                                  | 40         | 7              |
| Illustrations(real life/ Historical)        | 31         |                |
| Definitions of Ethical forms (slides)       | 28         | 20             |
| Instructor's Moderation of class            | 17         | 1              |
| Open Discussion                             | 7          | 5              |
| Visual Aids                                 | 7          |                |
| Group work                                  | 7          |                |
| My Lai                                      | 3          |                |
| Nothing, mind made up                       | 2          |                |
| What role does religion play in             | 1          |                |
| Asking ethical question before<br>deploying | 1          |                |
| Army Values                                 | 1          |                |
| Defining lawful and unlawful                | 1          |                |
| Sun coming through windows                  |            | 2              |
| Religious aspects                           |            | 1              |
| Type Print Too Small (Couldn't read)        |            | 1              |
| Wording on questionnaire too broad          |            | 1              |
| <i>TOTAL RESPONSES</i>                      | <i>241</i> | <i>58</i>      |

## APPENDIX J: SURVEY RESULTS, IMPROVING TRAINING

### **How to Improve**

|                               |            |
|-------------------------------|------------|
| More scenarios                | 25         |
| More video                    | 12         |
| Less time allotted            | 12         |
| More time allotted            | 11         |
| More discussion               | 9          |
| Role Playing                  | 6          |
| More explanation              | 6          |
| Smaller groups for training   | 5          |
| More visual aids              | 4          |
| Air conditioning              | 3          |
| Fewer Slides                  | 3          |
| More illustration/ historical | 2          |
| Provide food                  | 2          |
| Stress Importance of training | 1          |
| Wanted Nuremburg examples     | 1          |
| Less Lecture                  | 1          |
| More Biographies              | 1          |
| More Q & A                    | 1          |
| <i>TOTAL RESPONSES</i>        | <i>105</i> |

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abravanel, E. Levan-Goldschmidt, and M. Stevenson. "Action and Imitation: The Early Phase of Intimacy." *Child Development*. 1976.
- Anderson, David L. Facing *My Lai, Moving Beyond the Massacre*. University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1998.
- Area Support Responsibilities*, Army Regulation 5-9, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 October 1998.
- Armanda, Larry. Personal Interview, December 2007.
- Army Command Policy*, Army Regulation 600-20, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993.
- Army Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1999.
- Army Training and Education*, Army Regulation 350-1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3 August 2007.
- Baron De Jomini. *The Art of War*. Translated by CPT G. H. Mendell and LT W. P. Craighill, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1862.
- Bandura, Albert; R. W. Jeffery, and D. L. Bachicha, "Analysis of Memory Codes and Cumulative Rehearsal in Observational Learning," *Journal of Research in Personality*, 7, 1974.
- Bandura, Albert. "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 1999.
- Bandura, Albert. *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986.
- Battle Focused Training*, Field Manual 7-1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2003.
- BBC News, "Ethics Lessons for US Iraq Troops," 1 June 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5036686.stm> .
- Bertha, Carlos. "Teaching Military Ethics to ROTC Cadets," *Military Ethics Training*, January 13, 2008. <<http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE00/Bertha00.html>>
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *A Testament to Freedom: Essential Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*. San Francisco: Harper Collins Pub, 1995.

- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Ethics*. Translated by Neville Smith. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Originally published as *Ethik*. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1949.
- Bower, Gordon. "Mental Imagery and Associative Learning," In Lee Gregg (Ed.) *Cognition in Learning and Memory*. New York: Wiley, 1972.
- Brook, Yaron and Alex Epstein, "Just War Theory vs. American Self-Defense", *The Objective Standard* (Spring 2006), Vol. 1, no. 1 Craig Biddle (ed.) <http://www.theobjectivestandard.com> .
- Calhoun, Laurie. "Michael Walzer on Just War Theory's 'Critical Edge' More Like a Spoon than a Knife." Review of *Arguing about War*, by Michael Walzer. *The Independent Review* vol. X, no. 3, 2005.
- Cantrell, Bridget, Ph. D. and Chuck Dean, *Down Range to Iraq and Back*. Seattle Washington: Word Smith Publishing, 2005.
- Cashion, Jerry. "The Warrior Challenge: A Catalyst for Changing the Culture of the BCT," *Infantry Magazine*, NOV to DEC, 2004.
- Chaplain Activities in the United States Army*, Army Regulation 165-1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 March 2004.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Ed. Anatol Rapoport. Middlesex England: Penguin Books, 1968. Originally published in German as *Vom Kriege*, 1832 and translated in by J.J. Graham in 1908.
- Cook, Martin L. *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military*. Albany: State University Press, 2004.
- Cordingley, Patrick. Comment to workshop on "Ethics Training and Development in the Military." University of Hull, England. 23 June 2006.
- Cox, Billy. "The Spoils of War," *Army Times*. 7 July 2008.
- Crosby, Donald. *Battlefield Chaplains*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994.
- DeRaddo, Michael. Personal Interview. November 2006.
- Diamond, Jared. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: Norton & Company, 1999.
- Early Latin Theology*. S.L. Greenslade (ed.) Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006.

Elmer, Paul. *The Anglican Moral Choice*. Harrisburg PA, Morehouse Publishing, 1983.

Fields, Charles. Personal Interview. 20 March 2009.

"Findings and Recommendations of Army Panel Studying Harassment," *New York Times*. 12 SEP 1997.

Finlayson, Christine. Personal Interview. November 2006.

*Fredrick the Great on the Art of War*. Translated by Jay Luvass New York: The Free Press, 1966.

French, Shannon E. *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. London: Praeger Security International 1964.

Gonzalez, Justo. *The Story of the Christianity: The Early Church Down to the Reformation*. San Francisco: HarperCollins Publisher, 1985.

Gordon, Ernest. *To End All Wars*. Grand Rapids Michigan: Zondervan, 2002.

Grossman, Dave. *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*. New York: Back Bay Books/ Little, Brown and Company, 1996.

Gustafson, James M. *Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Higgins, A., C. Power, & L. Kohlberg. "Student Judgments of Responsibility and the Moral Atmosphere of High Schools: A Comparative Study." In W. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.) *Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development: Basic Issues in Theory and Research*. New York: Wiley, 1984.

International Society for Military Ethics Home Page, May 2008.

<http://www.usafa.edu/isme/> .

Janis, I. L. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascos*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

*Katcoff v. Marsh*, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985)

Keegan, John. *The Face of Battle*. New York: Penguin Books, 1986.

Kennedy, Thomas. "Can War be Just" *From Christ to the World*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994.

- Kohlberg, L. and D. Candee. "Moral Stages and Moralization" In W. Kurtines & J.L. Gerwitz (Eds.) *Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development*. New York: Wiley, 1984.
- Knickmeyer, Ellen and Nelson Hernandez, "Iraq Plans Probe; Ethics Training Set for Troops," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 2006.
- Krulak, Charles C. "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War" *Marine Magazine*, January 1999.
- Mansfield, Stephen. *The Faith of the American Soldier*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
- Maiese, Michelle. "Jus in Bello." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. 2003.  
<[http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/us in bello/](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/us_in_bello/)>.
- Mao Tse-tung. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC Ret. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961. Originally published in Chinese as a pamphlet, *Yu Chi Chan* in 1937.
- Moulton, Kyle. Personal Interview. 16 AUG 2007.
- Naylor, Sean D. "The Cursed One," *Army Times*, 25 June 2007.
- Niebuhr, Richard. *Christ and Culture*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975.
- O' Donnell, Patrick K. *Beyond Valor*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.
- Orend, Brian. *The Morality of War*. Ontario: Broadview, 2006.
- Orend, Brian. "War", *Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/> .
- Osiel, Mark. *Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War* New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction Publishers, 1999.
- Parsons, Gerald, James Moore, and John Wolffe, *Religion in Victoria Britain*. Manchester University Press, 1988.
- Parker, Real. *Designing and Conducting Survey Research*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997.
- Pavlischeck, Keith. "Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism, and Just War Theory: A Critique" *Christianity and Power Politics* ed by Eric D. Patterson. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

- Perry, David L. Review of *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*, by Shannon French. *Parameters* 34, no. 1 (22 March 2004): 140.
- Peters, R. S. "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism" In T. Michel (Ed.), *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*. New York: Academic Press, 1971.
- "Religion: Faith for a Lenten Age," *Time*, March 8, 1948.
- Religious Support*, Field Manuel 1-05 Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2003.
- Riccio, Gary, Randall Sullivan, Gerald Klein, Margaret Salter, and Henry Kinnison and others, *Warrior Ethos: Analysis of the Concept and Initial Development of Applications*. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences: The Wexford Group International, 2004.
- Ricks, Thomas *FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. Penguin: New York, 2006.
- Roberts, Chris. "Numbering of Single-Parent Families Increases 42%." *Columbia (SC) State*. May 23, 2001, sec. A.
- Robinson, Paul. "Ethics Training and Development in the Military" *Parameters*, Spring 2007.
- Rosenthal, T. L. and Albert Bandura. "Psychological Modeling: Theory and Practice." In S.L. Garfield & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), *Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical Analysis*. New York: Wiley, 1978
- Sanger, David E. "Beating Them to Prewar," *New York Times*, September 28, 2002.
- Santock , John W. *Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behavior*. Dubuque, IA Wm. C. Brown Publishing, 1991.
- Schiraldi, Glenn R., Ph.D., *The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Sourcebook: A Guide to Healing, Recovery, and Growth*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000.
- Schleifer, M. and V. I. Douglas, "Effects of Training on the Moral Judgment of Young Children. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1973.
- Schwartz, G. E. "Cardiac Response to Self Induced Thoughts." *Psychophysiology*, 8, 1971.
- Shay, Johnathan, M.D., *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. New York: Scribner, 1997.

- Sobesky, W. E. "The Effects of Situational Factors on Moral Judgment," *Child Development*, 54, 1983.
- Sontag, Deborah. "The Struggle for Iraq: Interrogations; How Colonel Risked his Career by Menacing Detainee and Lost," *The New York Times*, 27 May 2004.
- Staff Organization and Operations*, Field Manual 101-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997.
- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griggith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Swank, R. L., and W. E. Marchand. "Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion," *American Journal of Sociology* 51, 1946.
- The Bedrock of our Profession*, White Paper 1986, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-68, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- The Book of Common Prayer*. New York: Church Publishing Incorporated, 1979.
- The Law of Land Warfare*, Field Manual 27-10. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1956.
- The New International Version*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984.
- Thompson, Mark "America's Medicated Army," *TIME*, June 16, 2008.
- Tice, Jim "From Ground Up," *Army Times*, 7 April 2008.
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. Rev. John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Vivyan, Alan. Personal Interview. October 2006.
- Waheed, Abdul and John F. Burns. "U.S. Air-strike reported to hit Afghan Wedding" *The New York Times*, 8 Oct, 2004.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.
- Walzer, Michael. *Arguing About War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, New York: Basic Books, 1977.

Watson, J. S. "Perceptions of Contingency as A Determinant of Social Responsiveness," In E. B. Thoman (Ed.) *Origins of the Infant's Social Responsiveness*. New York: Halsted, 1979.

Webster, Alexander. *The Virtue of War*. Salisbury: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004.

Williams, Brenda. E-mail Interview. 4 AUG 2008.

Yuzan, Daidoji. *The Code of the Warrior*. San Francisco: Writers Club Press, 2003.

*10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Religious Support Standard Operating Procedure*. FT Drum, NY: Government Printing, 2003.