

Running Head: THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER IN COMBAT

The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

SGM Larson-Chairperson

SGM McRae

SGM Rosario

SGM Talley

SGM Weimer

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

Class 59

CSM(R) Williams

4 May 2009

Abstract

The United States is represents the tip of the spear in fighting the Global War on Terrorism, with the Army shouldering the majority of the burden. Sustained combat operations have strained the active force to a breaking point and required Army leaders to look for ways of relieving the burden on the active component. In response, the role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve transformed from a strategic force to an operational force. In the current Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), the Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active forces dwell time. The reserve forces have performed admirably and met the initial objectives of senior leaders in the COE. However, the complexity and demands of an asymmetrical battlefield have exposed limitations on the employment of reserve forces. The Citizen Soldier's versatility will continue to have a place in the national defense of the United States. The Citizen Soldier is no longer the "weekend warrior", but a vital component of today's operational force.

The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

Thesis: In the current Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) the citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active duty forces dwell time.

	Page
I. Introduction	3
II. Evolution of the United States Ground Forces and National Defense	4
III. Designated Roles of Today's Reserve Forces	5
IV. Battlespace	6
a. Afghanistan	6
b. Iraq	7
V. Other Missions	7
a. Peacekeeping operations	7
b. Homeland security	8
VI. Length of Deployments	8
a. Past Ratio for deployments	8
b. Current/Future Ratio for deployments	9
VII. Dwell Time	9
VIII. Resetting the Active Force	10
a. Shoot, Move, and Communicate	10
b. Military Schooling/Core Competency	11
IX. Opposing View- Battlespace	12
a. Command and Control	12
b. Manning the Force	12
X. Total Force	13
XI. Dwell Time	14
a. Dwell Time Policy	14

b. Managing Dwell Time	15
XII. Specialized/Critical Skills Value	16
a. Medical Skills and Value	16
b. Judicial Skills and Value	17
c. Combat Service Support/Combat Support and Value	18
XIII. Opposing View- US Reserve forces in OIF and OEF	20
a. US Reserve Forces in OIF and OEF	20
b. Challenges of the Current COE and Asymmetrical Threats	22
XIV. Conclusion	23
XV. References	26

The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

Citizen Soldiers are doing more today than ever before on behalf of our nation.

Throughout history, the United States has relied heavily on these “activate in case of emergency” patriots. Since the Revolutionary War, through two World Wars, the First Desert War, peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, our national reserve forces have been an integral component in the overall success of these campaigns. The National Guard and the Army Reserve exist as a strategic reserve called on as a last resort (Miles, 2009). However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 leading to the invasion of Afghanistan, followed by the subsequent decision to attack Iraq in 2003 changed everything. In the current Contemporary Operation Environment Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active duty forces dwell time.

Today’s National Guardsmen and Army Reserves play a critical role in shouldering the considerable combined loads of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The role of the Citizen Soldiers was forced to evolve into an “operational reserve” that deploys regularly in support of active forces in the war on terrorism.

Approximately 186,000 Citizen Soldiers have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since the attacks on September 11th (Musheno & Ross, 2008). This fact is made more amazing since our military is an all-volunteer military force. As the United States heads into its eighth year in the war against terrorism, the operational tempo is placing extreme stress on both the active and reserve components. Senior leaders have, out of necessity, made reflexive decisions to fill the gap. Accordingly, the present constructs of the national defense forces are unsuitable. Our senior military leaders must now weigh strengths of active and reserve components, and accordingly re-

organize, and reconstruct them. To understand how best to re-align today's reserve forces it is important to understand the historical perspective and evolution of our national defense force.

Evolution of the United States Ground Forces and National Defense

The organization of our present professional active duty military has only existed since the end of World War I. In all the conflicts prior to the first "Great War", our national defense plans depended on an under-organized and often uneasy conglomeration of regional and state militias. This design was the resultant construct of our founding fathers' distrust of "standing armies". In all the previous European models, large professional military forces (most often sooner than later) turned against their citizenry and legitimate governments. While American presidents varied in their support or opposition in forming a professional military, congress steadfastly dissolved our armed forces following every major American conflict. Then in times of war, congress would draft resolutions to expand the military in response to national threats. As an example, the United States Army was shrunk to less than 27,000 troops during the era preceding World War I (Stewart, 2005, Vol. I). The year before the United States entered the first World War, President Wilson requested congress bolster national forces to protect our Southern continental border in reaction to Pancho Villa's 1916 attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Congress responded by "federalizing" approximately 75,000 National Guardsmen (Stewart, 2005, Vol. II). These disparities in numbers exemplify the radical shift in how the United States now organizes the national defense effort. Current manning levels for regular Army and the total national ground force reserves are relatively equal with roughly 512,000 active duty US Army to 555,000 total combined National Guard and US Army Reserves (Personnel End Strength, FY2005).

The re-organization and shift to create a professional national military was a significant turning point for the Nation and the United States Army. The technologies which dominated World War I radically changed the dynamics of the battlefield. Ground combat leadership decisions down to the lowest levels became necessary. A small innocuous peacetime army serving as corps cadre for a larger wartime army composed of conscripted civilians became insufficient. This new evolving battlefield required knowledgeable and savvy career Soldiers. Over time, the old four or five to one ratio of conscripts to regulars shifted more to a parity of numbers between reserve forces and active duty. This idea was nothing new; almost all of America's preeminent historical military leaders including a few presidents have espoused the benefits of regular soldiers (Busch, 2006). From the Revolutionary War through World War II, the insufficient numbers of regular troops were always spread too thin throughout the force. This dilution negated the veterans' practical experience. In all of these early conflicts, American suffered bloody initial (and often needless) losses until the new troopers and officers gained actual combat experience.

Designated Roles of Today's Reserve Forces

During the draw down of all military forces in the 1990s, the Army Reserves disbanded all of its combat military occupational specialty (MOS) troops and shifted exclusively towards combat support (O'Hanlon, 1997). While senior decision makers also streamlined the National Guard during this timeframe, these "state militias" retained the majority of their ground combat MOS units. It is important to preserve this state sponsored ground combat capability, for both the check and balance of military power to the federal government and the increasing number of Homeland Security missions. The security and law enforcement missions during Hurricane

Katrina provide an excellent example for this skill set. These missions would be unlawful for federal troops to execute under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

Battlespace

Since the war on terrorism started in 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq, the United States Army is out of balance (Leipold, 2009). The American military is calling on the Citizen Soldiers to assist and ease the burden and bring a fresh perspective to the current conflicts. After several Active Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) deployed several times to theater of operations the Reserve Component deployed several National Guard BCTs to perform full spectrum operations to assist the war effort for the weary active duty forces.

Afghanistan

In October of 2001, the United States initialized its assault on terror attacking the Taliban government of Afghanistan for their part of the September 11th attacks on America. The Taliban government permitted the terrorists to plan and execute their missions from within Afghanistan's borders. Once again, the Army calls upon the Citizen Soldier in the campaign on terrorism. The Army has focused on two BCTs in Afghanistan from 2001 thru 2008. The President decided that he will commit more BCTs to Afghanistan based on the request of General McKiernan, the ISAF Commander (The Briefing Room, 2009). Today the 33rd BCT based out of Illinois is on their second deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Their main task is training the Afghan security Forces. With the current numbers of active BCTs deployed to Iraq, the Citizen Soldier is taking a larger role in Afghanistan. As the focus of the new administration shifts priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan, so will the role of the Citizen Soldier.

Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom has been our focus on the war on terror since 2003. The U.S. Army has assigned the majority of their BCTs to this Operation. Currently there are 14 BCTs assigned to this mission that consist of both active and reserve components. The Citizen Soldier assists the force in maintaining battlespace. Currently in Iraq we have the 50th, 29th, and 56th BCTs of the National Guard providing security and responsible for freedom of movement. Two of the other BCTs currently deployed, the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team, are conducting full spectrum operations. According to Musial (2007) approximately forty percent of the current BCTs now operating in Iraq are from the Army National Guard. The Citizen Soldier is occupying more battlespace throughout the world in providing forward deployed roles.

*Other Missions**Peacekeeping operations*

Currently the Citizen Soldier is occupying more battlespace in other regions of the world. The peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Sinai were traditionally active duty roles. The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan there are no active duty forces to complete these missions. The Citizen Soldier is vital to accomplishing America's foreign policy and strategic goals. The Army Reserve provides most of the Combat support and combat service support units mostly needed for these missions. The Army National Guard provides the maneuver, fires, and effects for the reserve forces. There are approximately 3,800 reserve forces operating daily in the European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility.

Homeland security

The reserve forces still have the largest portion in the defense of American homeland. According to Spencer and Wortzel (2002) National Guard units are in all states, they are centrally located and are the first U.S armed forces to react to an attack on the homeland. National Guard units have the structure, capabilities, and legal authority to respond to attacks on the homeland. The Guard connects local communities to the federal government by law and tradition. D. Wood (personal communication, March 11, 2009) describes how the Air National Guard operates the North American Continental Command for U.S. Northern Command and without the Guard or Reserve U.S Northern Command cannot execute any of its missions today. The Army National Guard must balance not only its homeland defense role; also, it must meet the state missions required by their Governors as well as federal operations. While accomplishing all of their assigned missions the Citizen Soldiers length of activation is longer, enabling the active force to reset and get some much needed dwell time.

Length of Deployments

Past Ratio for deployments

The length of deployments has shifted today from what they were in the past. The Citizen Soldier has always helped when called upon dating back since the birth of our great nation. It has been a long time since the active Army forces have been at a large-scale war that has gone on for a long duration of time. The last major war the United States had to call upon active duty forces and Citizen Soldiers for a long duration was the Korean War. During the time of the Korean War, the past ideal ratio for active duty forces deployment is a 3:1 ratio (Krepinevich, 2004). This ideal ratio for deployment dwell time means, that for every one active duty unit deployed, there would be three active duty units ready if needed for combat and

peacekeeping missions (Pena, 2006). This means that units would deploy for a year and be back for three years. The active duty forces have continued this ratio until OEF in 2001 and OIF in 2003. These two combat operational wars stretched active duty forces to their limits, and needed the Citizen Soldier to shoulder more of the responsibilities. This would change the ratio in how much dwell time that active duty forces would have in between deployments.

Current/Future Ratio for deployments

Today's active duty is deploying at a ratio of one-year deployment in combat and one deployment back at home station. Without the Citizen Soldier who knows, what the ratio would be or how long our active duty unit's deployments in combat would last. "The Citizen Soldier has mobilized almost more in 2003 with approximately 230,000 compared to all of World War II's 300,000" (Segal D. & Segal M., 2005, p. 2). When the President ordered the surge of combat forces in 2007, those units that filled the surge were five brigades from the active forces (Wikipedia, 2009). State Senator Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat from California, says that our active forces are stressed too thin and the Citizen Soldier is spread as far as they can to support the active forces (Maze, 2009). To alleviate some of the stress for active duty the future ratio needs to be a 2:1 ratio for active duty forces and for the Citizen Soldier a 7:1 ratio (Gilmore, 2007). This future ratio will help the active force move closer to more dwell time back at home station than in comparison to combat. This dwell time back will allow the active force even more dwell time to reset there units. In order to establish more dwell time, the military needs to implement a policy that addresses the deployment rotations.

Dwell Time

The Army came out with the Individual Time (IDT) Deployment Policy (ALARACT 253, 2007) on November 7, 2007. The IDT was to lower the current 15-month deployment

rotations to 12-month deployments. Senior leadership knew that the active duty forces would not be able to reset if they did not have adequate dwell time. The active duty forces units would be combat ineffective if the dwell time was less than 12 months or less at home station. The Army decided after the surge of forces into Iraq that the 15-month deployments were causing problems within the units and their families. Active duty forces have had a difficult time keeping forces to be able to have dwell time when the Soldiers return home from combat. The IDT will allow active forces this much needed dwell time. The IDT is just the beginning for even more dwell time for active duty forces. The Citizen Soldier will continue to deploy even as active duty forces withdraw from Iraq. General Casey said, "Dwell time is expected to increase from 18 months in 2009 to 24 months in 2011", (Melancon, 2008, p. 1). This will not have an immediate effect on the Citizen Soldier, but will allow active duty forces the ability to have more dwell time and to reset their equipment while at home station.

Resetting the Active Force

Shoot, Move, and Communicate

The active duty forces and Citizen Soldiers badly need their equipment reset for future deployments. The Army uses the Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM) which started in 1940, but the name TACOM took affect in 1994 with the combining of three other Army Organizations (ACALA- Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity, ARDEC- Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center, and BRDEC- Belvoir, Research, Development and Engineering Center) (TACOM, 2006). The military has had a reset program for quite some time, but it has not been until recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that the military needed more time to reset active and Citizen Soldier equipment. This is where TACOM resets active force units with all of their

equipment within 180 days from the time a unit deploys back from combat (Coryell and Lenaers, 2006). During the reset program equipment will be replaced, recapitalize, reset, and reconstitution. Our military's two war campaigns have decreased the life span on many of our military systems. The repairing of equipment is five times the norm, due to the continuous use that the equipment is enduring (Casey and Geren, 2008). The replacement of equipment has increased due to damages and wear and tear. The deployment of Citizen Soldier has allowed active duty forces more time to get back to home station and put their equipment into the military's reset program.

Military Schooling/Core Competency

The two wars have caused the active force a huge backlog in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and have caused many seats to go vacant in military schools. This also goes with other Army schools such as Air Assault, Ranger, and Combat Life Saver to name a few. These seats would not normally go vacant if it were not for the Citizen Soldier. The Citizen Soldier allows the active force to continue to catch up on NCOES and military schooling that have been set back during the two wars.

The war has caused many junior and senior noncommissioned officer (NCO)s in numerous MOS to lose some of their core competency and lack knowledge (Keveles, 2008). The mark of the Infantryman is the Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB). The EIB test happens, but only once a year for Soldiers to earn the coveted badge. Due to deployments and dwell time units have been able to only test once every other year or longer. The 82nd 2/325th Airborne Battalion tested for their EIB in September 2008 for their EIB (Pryor, 2008). It was the first time since 2006 that the unit was able to test for their EIB (Pryor, 2008). The Citizen Soldiers' role of being more active in combat allows infantryman and other MOSs to perform certain testing skills

that will promote professional development. Although the Citizen Soldier has helped the active duty forces, there are debates on the effectiveness in battlespace and dwell time management.

Opposing View- Battlespace

Command and Control

Since the end of the Koran War, senior leadership have given only one National Guard unit (42nd Infantry Division) battlespace to command and control in combat above the battalion level. Despite the fact that reserve forces have commands teams with past combat experience, but are not given the opportunity to lead in OIF or OEF.

The absence of the reserve force in both the Vietnam and Desert Storm Wars, has called into question if they can handle the responsibility of commanding in combat. The no-show from combat in Vietnam led to the Reserves being dubbed “weekend warriors” (Musheno, and Ross, 2008, p. 4).

Reserve forces leaders have commanded at the battalion and below level in the COE; however, they are missing at brigade and above level. Reserve forces Officers serve in duty positions on higher staffs at corps and theater level receiving valuable experience that will prepare them for command. Now in the eighth year of combat senior military leaders are not affording the opportunity to the reserve forces leaders to command and control battlespace in OIF or OEF.

Manning the Force

The reserve forces have provided reinforcement in relieving the stress placed on active duty Soldiers. However, as an institution they have historically preformed at lower levels of than active component troops in the COE. The complexities of war have exposed weakness in the preparation of the reserve forces for combat operations. Their failures have created conversation

in Congress about reconsidering combat roles for the National Guard in Iraq. Many of the intended purposes for the Total Force Policy have been mishandled to date.

Total Force

Reserve Forces have made significant contributions during first three major wars of the twentieth century. They have not had a massive or sustained mobilization since the Koran War, however, the War on Terrorism changed that. During the Vietnam War, President Johnson refused to send the reserve forces into the war against the behest of the Joint Chiefs of the military. This flawed mistake was fueled by politics. Military leaders did not gain valuable lessons learned in the use of reserve forces in combat.

Senior military leaders at the end of the Vietnam War decided the United States would never again go to war without using all of its assets. In 1973, the Total Force Policy was introduced as doctrine in the employment of the reserve force. This gave the Senior Leaders doctrine on how to employ reserve forces in future operations. Total Force Policy issues guidance that reserve forces would be equipped and trained equally as the active forces for operational missions. General Abrams Army Chief of Staff (1973) stated.

Our arrangement was that we would have one Army with certain things in the active force, other in the National Guard, and yet other in the Army Reserve. And if the unfortunate circumstance should occur that...we'd have to use the Army [then we would] use the active, the National Guard and the Reserve together (Musheno & Ross 2008, p. 20).

The reserve forces as an institution have failed to meet training standard and readiness as a whole since the policy took effect. Desert Storm was a great opportunity for the reserve force and Army leaders to revamp and modify the Total Force Policy. For more than 50 years, the reserve forces collectively on a large scale had not seen combat. The learning curve proved to be very steep for combat action in the War on Terrorism.

Dwell Time

The War on Terrorism has placed a large strain on the active components. The high operational tempo caused the senior leadership to look for options. The senior leadership of the Army implemented the dwell time policy. Dwell time is the time a Soldier spends at home station after returning from: combat deployment, operational deployment (non-combat), and dependent-restricted tours (ALARACT 253/2007, 2007). Senator Kennedy (2007) stated “The Department of Defense itself has set a goal of two years at home for every year deployed, ... It gives service members time to be with their families, and re-establish the bonds that we all take for granted.”(para. 3).

Dwell Time Policy

The active forces were redeploying with no guaranteed time at home station. The Dwell Time Policy became a necessary evil to slow Soldiers' frequent re-deployments. The Dwell Time Policy places constraints on unit commanders for manning. It is a benefit to the Soldiers by controlling frequency of deployments. There is no transparent policy for dwell time between active or reserve forces. Each respected component established its own policy on the calculations of deployment/mobilization time. With the current system there are imbalances with the ratio of deployed/mobilized time to dwell time. The Army has a one year of deployment ratio to one year of dwell time policy. (ALARACT 253/2007, 2007). However, the Army wants to achieve a 1 year of deployment to 2years of dwell time. (Davis and Polich, 2005). The reserve forces would like a one year of deployment and mobilization ratio to six years of dwell time policy (CBO 2007). Neither component is able to achieve the ideal policy of dwell time as it would like. The Army is at 1:1, while the Army Reserve is at 1:4.3 as compared to the deployment/mobilization policy.

The Army calculates deployment time at boots on ground (BOG). Dwell time calculation are determined from this factor. Mobilization begins either from the day that individual starts training for deployment. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve can be mobilized within the United States and this qualifies for dwell time. The reserve forces substituting for the Army will not greatly aid in the dwell policy. "Time at home for active-duty heavy-medium brigades remains substantially below two years no matter how hard the reserves are pushed" (Davis and Polich, 2005, para. 18). The Army's transformation to a modularized more fluid Army that is capable of deploying in smaller autonomous fashion can achieve the dwell policy.

Managing Dwell Time

The challenges to manage dwell time in the reserve forces present a slight of hand trick. The Army and the reserve forces are in a constant struggle to balance their dwell time. The reserve forces has had more slots that it could ever fill, creates the manning struggles. The National Guard is pre-war was only at approximately manned at 88 percent (CBO, 2007).

The reserve force use a method called cross leveling to get a deploying unit to one hundred percent. This creates a problem for non-deploying units creating more shortages to an already undermanned unit. The non-deployed unit has to borrow Soldiers to fill its shortages for a deployment. Do to Global War on Terrorism commitment the reserve forces are not capable of fulfilling their first responsibility which is support of homeland missions. For the first time ever, the US military is deploying an active duty regular Army combat unit for fulltime use inside the United States to deal with national emergencies, including terrorism, natural disasters and civil unrest.

Specialized/Critical Skills Value and Civilian Perspective Brings New Ideas

Medical Skills and Value

I cannot think of anything more important than medical care for Soldiers in combat. Medical personnel save lives and they continue to improve the survival rate of Soldiers with their enhanced skills and medical technology such as bandages. When our nation is at war or prolonged conflicts involving combat there is a need for more medical professionals to treat combat injuries. Due to combat injuries, many more medical review boards decide Soldiers' career direction. The review boards require more doctors. After the Spanish-American War in 1908, a few hundred US Army Reserve doctors received commissions. This is where the US Army Reserve began, by filling the need of medical personnel shortages seen during the Spanish-American War (Crossland and Currie, 1997). Now approximately 70 percent of the US Army's medical units are in the US Army Reserves (*US Army*, n.d.). When our nation is not engaged in conflict, there is significantly less need for medical personnel than would be needed to treat combat injuries.

Many of these Reserve Army medical caregivers are professional doctors, nurses, and psychologists that work as civilians. They are practicing their professions each workday without distractions that the military brings, distractions like formations and training other than medical skill specific. The time that they are engaged using medical skills in their civilian job versus their counterparts on active duty causes their experience to rise quicker. A plastic surgeon at a major civilian trauma center for example, would have many more surgeries than an active duty plastic surgeon at an Army post hospital.

Innovations in techniques increase with number of people working on the issue. In addition, the Army has standard operating procedures to streamline proficiency. Fresh eyes

coming in from the large civil work force and dealing with Army issues brings innovations. The more contacts we have, the better chance we can find a solution to a problem. Reservists bring innovations in themselves and from those that they know outside the military to whom they can seek solutions for Army problems. This also works in reverse as the Citizen Soldier returns to their civilian work place and discusses problems encountered during their military tour. This lends itself to more minds working to solve problems and coming up with new ideas. Now that we have seen the vital importance the medical skilled Citizen Soldiers fill in the Army, let us look at the critical need the Army has in filling position in the judicial skills.

Judicial Skills and Value

Civilian law and military law are certainly different in many aspects, however, so are the laws from state to state. There is one thing they all have in common and that is their design to seek true justice. Even though a Reserve Soldier works daily with civilian law, the principals are the same and they must justify reasons to laws or articles. The US Army Reserve has nearly 81 percent of the Army's Judge Advocate General Units (*US Army*, n.d.).

The vital need for more personnel with judicial skills increases immensely as we have Soldiers deploying into long-term combat. Leaders do not need their Soldiers worrying about legal issues while deployed. Many Soldiers that have issues that do not want to deploy will act out in a negative way. Some Soldiers will have hardship issues requiring chapters that do not show up until they face a long deployment. Every Soldier is pushed through processing to update their will and power of attorney that requires our Judge Advocate General (JAG) a large increase in their workload. Then there are Soldiers that have issues due to deployment such as guardianship, civilian law cases, and work discrimination that need assistance to postpone civilian court dates and their right to return to their civilian jobs. An area that is extremely

important, that increases due to combat injuries, is medical review boards. Soldiers need counsel on their rights during review and appeals of medical findings.

Another area in the judicial system that increases is in civilian law as part of the COE the military is involved in nation building and rebuilding infrastructure. The Army's JAG helps in the rebuilding by working with local judicial agencies to improve their laws and ensure our military works with respect to the laws that they put in place during the rebuilding phase. With the reserve JAG personnel coming from the civilian work force, they have experience in civil law that active duty JAG personnel do not have. In addition, they have seen issues with civil law that enables them to bring new ideas to prevent those same issues in the nation that they build during deployment that their active military counterparts cannot.

With that need to provide vital skills in the judicial system for Soldiers and nation building, the Army brings in the reserves. Many working as lawyers, judges, and legal assistant in their civilian jobs, just as with the medical personnel, they work daily in their profession without other training distracters that their military counterparts have. The experience they bring is immense and compounded by the years of focused work in law (*Today's U.S., n.d.*). We have now looked at the vital areas in medical and judicial skills with one other area to look at that fills specialized/critical skills in the area of Combat Service Support (CSS) and Combat Support (CS).

Combat Service Support/Combat Support and Value

Combat Service Support and Combat Support are areas that the names directly link them to combat. The units that fall under these areas support units during combat operations. They are vital to the success of combat missions and the critical skills in many of the occupational

positions are high. Some of those areas in CSS and CS are in the Engineers, Chemical, Civil Affairs, and Transportation.

The Army Reserve transformed after Desert Storm to its current state that is in a CSS and CS role with other supporting realms that are outside the CSS and CS roles. The Army Reserve structure design is to support units primarily, not as combat units, and is part of the operational force (GAO, 2006). The Army Reserve has nearly 100 percent of the Army's Training & Exercise Divisions, Railway Units, and Enemy Prisoner of War BDEs; 97 percent of the Civil Affairs Units; 85 percent of the Psychological Operations Units; 80 percent of the Transportation Commands; 75 percent of the Chemical Brigades; 64 percent of the Chemical Battalions; and 50 percent of the Transportation Groups (*US Army*, n.d.).

The skills in the Army Reserve fill a vital role that supports the COE with an enormous amount of experience. Look at their Civil Affairs units; many of these Soldiers are civil support professionals in their civilian jobs, serving in positions building their own communities as county counsel members, city mayors, and education counsels. The experience they bring is vast. They solve and work through issues daily in their civilian jobs building their communities that translate to nation building as military civil affairs personnel. This gives them insight to short term and long-term issues. Look at transportation experience of civilian truck drivers and delivery personnel. Many of the reserve personnel do those jobs every day driving thousands of miles every year and delivering thousands of goods. Postal workers from the US Post Office bringing their experience to the US Army postal units. All of these skills directly translate into military jobs that are vital to support our troops.

The Army National Guard has long been the primary source for reserve combat forces (Doubler, 2001). As they have been restructuring through the 1990s and continuing that

transformation today as a combat force, they are taking on more of a role in the CSS and CS areas. The National Guard just as the Army Reserves is now part of the operational force. The National Guard's structure has nearly 52 percent of their force still as combat, 22 percent in CSS, and 17 percent in CS (*Army National*, n.d.).

The Army Engineers is the area that jumps out at me from the National Guard. Many of these Soldiers work in the civilian construction fields and bring dynamic experience with them to the COE. Many of these Soldiers work every day building homes, grading roads, laying pipes for water and sewer systems, etc... in their civilian jobs. Their experience compared to their military counterparts with the same years of experiences is not equal. The National Guard Soldiers do not have the training distracters in their civilian jobs. They work in their skill day in and day out gaining critical skill and solving problems in their skill field. These skills are vital to the Army's mission success during reconstruction in the COE. We have now reviewed specialized/critical skills in the medical, judicial, and combat service support/combat support areas that Citizen Soldiers are vital in filling in the COE. There is always a different perspective as to what constitutes critical skills. Some Soldiers would argue ground combat MOS skills are the most critical skill set and are best filled by active duty forces.

Opposing View- US Reserve Forces in OIF and OEF

US Reserve Forces in OIF and OEF

It is not the intention of this author to besmirch or tarnish the reputation of any reserve units. To report a list of specific failures of any national military component would be criminally unfair. Professional Soldiers do not judge another's actions under fire; violating this rule is volatile at best, as there are precious few times it yields a positive outcome. Since combat never waits for a recorder to tally and grade all the participants' actions, the only definitive and

objective information are the names of the friendly casualties. During 2004, arguably one of the bloodier years in Iraq, National Guard troops suffered a casualty rate over a full third higher when compared to their active duty counterparts (Moniz, 2004). To those who would consider this an overly harsh use of statistics, consider the meaning of dismissing these facts. Does a lower casualty rate mean active duty troops are simply “luckier?” I would argue an assumption of chance or fortuity is a very harsh denigration of the active duty ground combat MOSs. The present decisions and future planning for our national ground combat forces illustrated this insulting hypothesis. Instead of acknowledging the absolute necessity of career professional men-at-arms, senior military leaders have simply extended National Guard activations an additional three months (Associated Press, 2009). Arguably, this action is a positive change in short term policy to allow more train up time for our reserve forces, however, this would appear to be the long-range solution as well. Essentially, this initiative reinforces a pervasive false premise that part time training is somehow commensurate years of leadership and combat experience. Especially dangerous is the underestimation of complexity involved in today’s battlefield operations and its relation to effective mission accomplishment. Our most senior military leaders seem singularly focused on increasing Soldier survivability. True, a higher mortality rate is indeed an indication of inadequate training. However, properly planned and executed operations are the best avenue to avoid unnecessary casualties. Multiple ineffective operations increase the risk and exposure. Effective operations, which achieve true second and third long-term effects, are the definitive answer. Quite simply, we must rely on the constant professional experience of our active duty troops, rather than hope and the intermittent training of the reserves.

Challenges of the Current COE and Asymmetrical Threats

While regular troops will never eliminate all failures on the battlefield, the historical reliance on reserve forces has been ineffective for many years. As early as the American Civil War, our most talented military leaders recognized the challenges associated with the shift from old massed “linear” tactics to the new “dispersed” model supported by advances in war technologies (Busch, 2006). Suddenly, the individual Soldier became a decision maker. In all of the world’s prior wars, effective commanders massed their troops and directed maneuvers to counter the machinations of the opposing leader. Ground combat elements simply executed orders and were treated as pieces on a great chessboard. Where the bow and arrow had disrupted old massed infantry formations; the new projectile technologies of artillery and machine gun fires ended the reign of linear tactics. The new model of dispersed tactics required initiative from the lowest levels of combatants. New technologies continue to add complexity: unmanned aerial vehicles, air power, smart munitions, personal and satellite communications, digital imagery, computers, night vision and thermal devices, GPS navigation systems, etc. The coordination, integration and the effective use of this myriad of modern warfare technologies requires years of experience to truly master. An asymmetrical enemy further adds to the seeming overload of complications facing our Soldiers and combat leaders today. Our warfighters must be thoroughly versed in counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and urban combat operations, all the while, mitigating the risk of fratricide to American troops as well as our international and host nation partners. These are not simple tasks to be mastered in a twenty week pre-mission train-up.

While the ultimate human cost of unnecessary casualties is the most obvious negative aspect of ineffective operations, consider the longer-term effects to our national will and the will

of the enemy. Historians have characterized armies of the past to the swords of diplomacy or the coarse tools to implement national will when mediation and negotiations have failed. Today's forces need be commensurate with scalpels, surgically removing a dangerous cancer and causing minimal harm to the surrounding healthy issues. Singular military actions, which appear clumsy or haphazard, erode this critical global endorsement essential in accomplishing our strategic goals. Yet this operational mission success is only half the equation. Americans react very strongly to "needless" deaths of Soldiers and civilians alike. Any incidents of avoidable casualties act as poison to the collective popular national will and as fuel for enemy propaganda. In this new information age of international communications and media, it is impossible to hide missteps or failures. As our world continues to grow increasingly "connected", international acceptance or ratification for our national actions becomes more and more important. These complex demands require dedicated professionals.

Conclusion

In America, history has shown us that the patriot Citizen Soldier has answered the call many times for our nation. Each major conflict the Citizen Soldier has proven to be vital to the success of our military. Our leaders today have seen the vital role the Reserve and Guard forces have filled during the recent military history of our country. Due to their success, the nation's leaders have changed the strategic role of the Reserve and Guard to become part of the operational force with continued success. They will continue to mobilize and fill the roles needed during times of conflict with their specialized skills, combat service support, and combat support that brings new ideas for mission accomplishment.

It is undeniable our national reserve forces have played an integral part in securing the nation. However, their overall performance record has never been commensurate to their

“regular” counterparts. As technology and asymmetrical threats continue to add complexity to the lowest levels on the battlefield, experience and dedicated professional men-in-arms become more critical. Specifically, the national defense plans in many opinions should not task reserve forces in filling ground combat MOS positions. Our reserves will continue to provide a valuable supporting role, however, the most critical skills of ground combat MOSs are best filled by active duty units. Senior Military Leadership continues to define and redefine the roles of the reserve forces in the modern era of the operational Army. The failure to fully use the reserve forces to their maximum capability in past and current combat operations has hindered their reputation and confidence in the active component. The Army has failed in establishing one policy for a total force addressing dwell time, management of manning, and senior leaders in battalion level and above are non-existent in command and control of battlespace. The Total Force Doctrine has yet to fully reach its intended purpose in aiding in combat operations; being a strategic multiplier in an operational force.

Without the critical battlespace the Army Reserve and National Guard occupy America would not meet its strategic and operational goals. In every theater of operation, the Citizen Soldier is occupying more positions and terrain typically held by Active duty forces. The Citizen Soldier’s role in combat provides much relief to the active duty forces. This relief in the current COE is where the Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active forces dwell time.

The Citizen Soldier shortens the active duty’s length of deployment and adds to their dwell time. The Citizen Soldier allows the active duty forces the chance to have a better deployment ratio comparing time in combat to time at home station. While the active duty forces are at home station, they will be able to reset and get back into the fight. The Citizen

Soldier enables the active duty forces to have the time to attend NCOES schooling and other military schools that have gone unfilled the last few years. By being able to attend military schooling, active duty forces are able to build core competency that have gone unchallenged during combat. The Citizen Soldier plays an active role in providing this needed dwell time. They will continue to mobilize and fill the roles needed during times of conflict with their specialized skills, combat service support, and combat support that brings new ideas for mission accomplishment. The Citizen Soldier is no longer the “weekend warrior”, but a vital component of today’s operational force.

References

- All Army Activities (ALARACT) 253/2007. (2007). *Individual Dwell Time (IDT) Deployment Policy*. U.S. Government. Washington D.C. Retrieved March 30, 2009, from <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/MILITARYPERSONNEL/Hyperlinks/Adobe%20Files/ALARACT%20253%202007.pdf>.
- Army National Guard* (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2009, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng.htm>
- Associated Press, MSNBC. (2009). *Casey: National Guard under record stress*. Retrieved March 31, 2009, from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20467834/>.
- Busch, B., (2006). *Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite forces and American history*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.
- Casey, G. and Geren, P. (2008). *Army Posture Statement. A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2008. United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 2d Session, 110th Congress*. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.army.mil/aps/08/APS2008.pdf>
- Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2007). *Issues That Affect The Army National Guard and Army Reserve*. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8111/05-16-NationalGuard.pdf>
- Coryell, B. and Lenaers, W. (2006). *Reset: Extending the Life of Army Equipment*. Army Logistician PB 700-06-01 Volume 38, Issue 1. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb06/reset_armyeq.html.
- Crossland, R. and Currie J. (1997). *Twice the Citizen; A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1995*. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C.

- Davis, L. & Polich, M. (2005). *Army Stretched Thin*. Retrieved March 26, 2009, from <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2005/army.html>
- Doubler, M. (2001). *I Am The Guard*. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C.
- GAO-06-1109T *Reserve Forces Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges* (2006). Retrieved March 21, 2009, from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061109t.pdf>
- Gilmore, J. (2007). *CBO Testimony: Issues That Affect the Readiness of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve*. Congressional Budget Office. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from <http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8111&type=0>.
- Kennedy, E. (2007). *Dwell Time*. Retrieved March 9, 2009, from <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=110-s20070919-10#sMonofilemx003Ammx002Fmmx002Fmmx002Fmhomemx002Fmgovtrackmx002Fmdatamx002Fmusmx002Fm110mx002Fmcrmx002Fms20070919-10.xmlElementm3m0m0m>
- Keveles, D. (2008). *NCOES-restoring NCO core competency*. The Free Library by Farlex. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/NCOES--restoring+NCO+core+competency.-a0190245596>
- Krepinevih, A. (2004). *The Thin Green Line*. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20040814.Grnlne/B.20040814.Grnlne.pdf>

- Leipold, J. (2009). *CSA praises NCOs, says two more tough years ahead*. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/01/15/15826-csa-praises-ncos-says-two-more-tough-years-ahead/>
- Maze, R. (2009). *Bill calls for equal deployment-to-dwell time*. Army Times Publishing Company. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from http://armytimes.com/news/2009/02/military_dwelltime_021209w/
- Melancon, D. (2008). *Chief: Dwell time increase will enable Army to balance*. Army News Article. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from http://www.armywell-being.org/skins/wblo/display.aspx?ModuleID=f6c229ca-03ae-4c81-8d0a-81a5a0c208f9&Action=display_user_object&CategoryID=73a6992e-1fd8-425e-b5de-a137e40c5466&ObjectID=cbebd5f-2dcb-42c3-ad4b-a1b84d1bf881&AllowSSL=true%2cttrue
- Miles, D. (2009). *Army Reserve Iraq Role to continue despite Afghanistan mission, General says*. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/10/17996-army-reserve-iraq-role-to-continue-despite-afghanistan-mission-general-says/>
- Moniz, D. (2004). *Rate of Guard deaths higher*. USA TODAY. Retrieved March 26, 2009, from http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-12-13-guard-deaths_x.htm
- Musheno, M. and Ross, S. (2008). *Deployed, How Reservists Bear the Burden of Iraq*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Musial, A. (2007). *Eight National Guard Units Alerted for Iraqi and Enduring Freedom*. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from <http://www.agd.state.tx.us/36ID/Content/news/36IDNews/stories/BrigadesDeploy/BrigadesDeploy.htm>

- O'Hanlon, M. (1997). *Foreign Policy House Committee on National Security, Subcommittee on Military Personnel*. Brookings. Retrieved March 25, 2009, from http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1997/0729defense_ohanlon.aspx
- Pena, C. (2006). *Will Deployment to Iraq Break the Army?*. The Independent Institute. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1876>
- Personnel End Strength*. (FY2005). GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved March 25, 2009, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/end-strength.htm>
- Pryor, M. (2008). *Paratroopers compete for the Expert Infantry Badge*. 82nd Airborne Division. Retrieved March 30, 2009, from <http://www.army.mil/news/2008/09/24/12648-paratroopers-compete-for-the-expert-infantry-badge/>
- Segal, D. and Segal, M. (2005). *U.S. Military's Reliance on the Reserves*. Population Reference Bureau. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from <http://www.prb.org/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceontheReserves.aspx?p=1>
- Spencer, J. and Wortzel, D. (2002). *The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security*. Retrieved March 29, 2009, from <http://www.heritage.org/research/homelandsecurity/bg1532.cfm>
- Stewart, R. (2005). *American Military History Volume I*. Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C.
- Stewart, R. (2005). *American Military History Volume II*. Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C.

TACOM. (2006). *U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command History*. TACOM

LCMC Public Site. Retrieved March 28, 2009, from

<http://www.tacom.army.mil/main/history.html>.

The Briefing Room. (2009). *A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan*

Retrieved March 29, 2009, from [http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-](http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/)

[Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/)

Today's U.S. Army Reserves: Fast Facts (n.d.). Retrieved March 22, 2009, from

http://www.armyreserve100th.com/fast_facts.php

US Army Reserve. (n.d.). Retrieved March 22, 2009, from

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar.htm>

Wikipedia. (2009). *Iraq War troop surge of 2007*. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War_troop_surge_of_2007.