

INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH

TRANSLATION

of

REPORT OF GENERAL

PETAIN

PART VI

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPAGNE

(30 June - 18 July)
1918.

by

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION

<u>French</u>	<u>English</u>
A. C.	Corps Artillery.
A. G.	Outpost or Advance Guard.
A. L. G.	Heavy Corps Artillery.
C. A.	Army Corps.
C. A. C.	Colonial Army Corps.
C. A. I.	Italian Army Corps.
C. A. W.	British Army Corps.
C. C.	Cavalry Corps.
C. I. D.	Center of Instruction, Infantry Division.
C. M. P.	
D. Ae.	Aerial Division.
D. A. N.	Detachment of the Army of the North.
D. C. P.	Dismounted Cavalry Division.
D. I.	Infantry Division.
D. I. C.	Colonial Infantry Division.
D. I. U. S.	United States Infantry Division.
D. I. W.	British Infantry Division.
D. S. A.	Chief of Motor Transport Service.
D. A.	Chief of Service of the Rear.
D. T. M. A.	Chief of Military Transportation in the Army.
E. N. E.	Corps Troops (non-divisional units.)
G. A. C.	Group of Armies of the Center.
G. A. E.	Group of Armies of the East.
G. A. N.	Group of Armies of the North.
G. A. R.	Reserve Army Group.
G. Q. G.	General Headquarters.
G. Q. G. A.	Army Headquarters.
G. A. P.	Group of Armies under General PUTZ.
I. G. A.	Chief of Army Artillery.
S. I. A.	Inter-allied Council.

SIXTH PART

The Battle of Champagne

(June 30 - July 18, 1918)

I

The First Information on the German Attack in Champagne (1)

(June 30 - July 6, 1918)

The information received during the second fortnight of June had procured some valuable indication on the plans of the enemy. First, we acquired the certainty that the German command was by no means renouncing the continuation of its offensive operations; the serious difficulties of effectives, which they found themselves up against seemed even to constitute in their eyes only another reason to obtain the decision of the war in the course of a new and last battle. The number of large units which the enemy could render available for that supreme offensive was, moreover, considerable; on June 30, we counted that 75 divisions were placed in reserve. The reorganization, the recompletion, the instruction of the units were pursued ardently; already 55 of them could be considered ready for battle. We were meanwhile persuaded that the effort of the enemy for final operations of the reserves would be pursued for some time and that we would not be attacked before July 14. (1)

A serious question still remained to be completely cleared up. Which part of the front would the enemy attack be against? In that regard our intelligence bureaux of all kinds had been powerless, up to the end of the month, to furnish us with satisfactory and accurate information. It was equally impossible to reach any valid conclusion concerning the arrangement of the German reserves; their mass seemed always divided

(1) See Chart No. 1, Schematic chart showing situation of Allies and the presumed situations of German Armies, July 6, 1918. See also in Report of Marshal (Defensive campaign, V part) Chart No. 4 showing situation of Allies and presumed situation of the enemy June 20, 1918.

almost uniformly between the groups of the armies of the two Crown Princes, in an arrangement appropriate for a rapid concentration toward any zone on the front between the sea on the North and the Argonne.

On July 1, the uncertainty concerning the objective at which the German attack aimed was still so great that the High Command of the Allies found himself obliged by lack of certain information to attribute to the enemy the plan which logically seemed best adapted to their situation; so it was that on some purely hypothetical plans of the adversary that it was necessary to base the division of our forces. On the subject the General commander-in-chief of the Allies wrote:

"Today, July 1, the enemy is stopped at:

30	kilometers	from	Dunkerque;
60	"	"	Calais;
70	"	"	Boulogne;
60	"	"	Abbeville;
60	"	"	Paris;
25	"	"	Chalons.

An advance of forty kilometers toward Abbeville would cut off the communications with the north of France, would separate the English armies from the French, a military result of considerable importance for the outcome of the war.

An advance -- even very slight -- toward Paris, even if that advance could not definitely influence military operations, and by that, induce a decision, would provoke the evacuation of the capital menaced by the bombardment, would trouble doubtlessly the governmental action indispensable to the control of the war.

The progress of the enemy on the other objectives herewith enumerated could not furnish them any comparable result.

In the defensive attitude which we are still maintaining to-day, July 1, it is then Paris - Abbeville which it is necessary that we cover especially. It is the advance of the enemy which at all price we have to stop as soon as possible in these two directions.

Without speaking of the diversions which they could moreover undertake to divert the attention, their front being equipped from Ypres to Verdun, the enemy, to operate against Paris or Abbeville is obliged to leave from the front Chateau-Thierry, Lens.

It is, then, facing this front Chateau-Thierry to Lens and on all the length possible, that we must concentrate our activity to realize or prepare the arrangement which the defensive war allows, aiming at the defensive step by step.

Finally, without mentioning the reserves of precaution destined to ward off the possible diversions of the enemy in Flanders and in Champagne, especially, it is to reply to the attacks in the direction of Paris and Abbeville that the most rapid reunion of the strongest reserves should be realized or foreseen.

It remains understood moreover that the use of these reserves could be extended, in fact, beyond the front behind which they were prepared.

The Allied reserves will go into battle there, where it will fight. (1)"

(1) General Foch. General command No. 4, 1749, July 1, 1918. Correspondence General Foch. ~~XXXX~~ annexe No. 7.

The Commanding General did not completely share the same point of view thus developed by General Foch; he had disclosed it to him, one could see, a few days after the battle of Matz; he persevered in that opinion still on July 1. For him, the enemy would no longer make their principal effort against the English front; they would make it in the direction of Paris; and, indeed, it seemed logical to believe that in this phase of the war, the German High Command would consider that the taking of the French capital was the only military event by which they could still obtain that decision which they needed on short notice. Perhaps, moreover, the General had equally presented this consideration to General Foch, that the enemy would precede the attack on Paris by a previous operation against the front between Reims and the Marne inclusive, in order to secure the left wing of his army in his final offensive. (2)

The German attack between Reims and the Marne remained, for the General, a secondary operation, a simple diversion; no information permitted him to see whether it was really the intention of the German command; finally, it was certain that the arrangement of the German reserves made easier than toward another zone, their concentration on the front from Lens to Chateau-Thierry, indicated by General Foch. In these conditions, it was especially in the direction of Paris that the General ~~Commanding~~ expected to unite the mass of the reserves, so long as he could not know any more precisely the plans of the enemy. The necessary measures were then taken to assemble in reserve, before July 10, from the Marne to the Somme, astride the valley of the Oise, 21 divisions (3 American) with a cavalry corps of 3 divisions. They would

(2) ~~See~~ Report of the Marshall. Defensive campaign. 5th Part, p. 34, etc.

stay behind the front from the Marne to the Argonne, to oppose the eventual attack in Champagne, with 5 divisions supported by a cavalry corps. Of course, the General had prepared at the same time the rapid concentration of the units thus arranged toward the zone where the battle would break out; from that time, thanks to the combined use of all the means of transport, we could depend on the possibility of bringing quickly to the support of the English armies, 8 divisions and a cavalry corps; 10 divisions and a cavalry corps at Champagne; it was easy to get just as quickly to the aid of the G.A.E. between Argonne and Meuse, with five divisions and a cavalry Corps. (1)

By the evening of July 1, the High Command of the Allies begins to penetrate somewhat the plans of his adversary; first, he finds out that the enemy is preparing a great operation in Champagne soon. The information received permits him to be sure that the Germans will surely take the offensive east of Reims, between the Suippe and Argonne; from a sure source we learn at the same time that the enemy will attempt the crossing of the Marne; soon, some precise information of the highest interest is furnished us, in this respect, through the capture of an officer of the 24th Battalion of Engineers. We thus learn that our enemy intends to cross the river on a front of 15 kilometers, in the region of Dormans; the necessary material for the building of bridges and foot bridges, pontoons, is already assembled for the most part in the woods on the north bank. (2)

The first information still allowed some uncertainties to exist, it did not notably indicate, if the enemy's attack would be effected also against the salient of Reims, from the Marne to the Suippe; it did

- (1) Letter to General Foch, 540, July 1, 1918. Register of orders 104. ~~annexe~~ annexe No. 8.
- (2) The Headquarters (2d Bureau). Report given of information 1473, June 30. Note relative to capture of an engineer officer, 8195/2, June 30. IV Army. Instruction 6459/3 July 2, 1918.

not define any more clearly how far the German offensive would extend, from the east to the west. It was, moreover, necessary to be certain on these two points.

Thanks to the activity of the intelligence bureau, and to the energy of our troops who multiplied the surprise attacks in order to have some prisoners, the indispensable completion of information was arriving rapidly. We know that the front from the Marne to Reims would be in all likelihood, engulfed in the German attack; and that probably even the salient of Reims would constitute a passive zone from one part of the city to another; and to assault the Mountain of Reims; we arrived at the same time at the conclusion that it was prudent to consider that the wings of the offensive would extend on one side toward Chateau-Thierry, on the other, to Argonne; thus the G.A.C. almost entirely with its three armies, 6th, Vth and IVth, and perhaps the G.A.E. by its left wing, the second Army, would be prepared for battle. (3)

The data on the extent of the attack were finally completed by a series of bits of information relative to the date of the defensive of the enemy. If this information were exact, we could expect to be attacked sooner than we had calculated, about the 9th or 10th of July, perhaps.

On July 6, the High Command of the Allies then has a collection of important information which leads us to believe that the enemy is preparing a formidable effort in Champagne; since on March 21, the German army had attacked on the front of 64 kilometers, it seems to want to double this time its base of departure which reached 120 kilometers.

(3) Headquarters. (2d Bureau). Information report 1477, 1478, 1479, July 4, 5, 6. Note 8961/2. July 6, 1918. Vth Army. Letter to Comdr in ch., 1034/3 to Gen. Comdr of Vth C.A., 1028/3. Inf. report to G.A.N., 174/3 8:00, July 5, 1918.

Undertaken on a front of such extent, the offensive necessitates at least, the intervention of a first line of 40 or 50 divisions; with the reserves immediately necessary to aid in battle, it then will absorb mostly all the German forces available; thus it seems impossible that the enemy can attempt, at the same time, a maneuver of any importance on another part of the front, either on the English front or in the direction of Paris.

In reality, it would indeed be imprudent at that time to draw such a conclusion from the information, received up to July 6, on the attack in Champagne. It is a fact that there came to us also, during that period, numerous bits of information on the preparation by the enemy for a large offensive in Flanders, from Arras to Ypres. Would this attack take place at the same time as that in Champagne? It was improbable, being given the extent of the previous effort foreseen from this side, and the number of the German reserves. As a set-off, it was impossible to affirm yet that the attack on Flanders would not be made before that of Champagne. It seemed even more improbable since the German commander in chief did not seem yet to have taken over any reserves from the Bavarian Crown Prince for the Imperial Crown Prince; the number of the divisions, placed in reserve, in this latter group of armies, from the Somme to the sea, seemed even more superior to that of the reserves, distributed between the Somme and the Argonne. (1)

The Allied High Command thus had his attention attracted to the wings of his arrangement between the sea and the Argonne, without being able to discern where the next maneuver of the enemy would strike; he could not even turn aside completely the eventuality of an attack in the

(1) Headquarters. (2d Bureau). Report of information 1471 to 1479.
June 28 to July 6.

direction of Paris, by one or the other bank of the Oise. At any rate, moreover, the Command^{er}/in Chief had some serious thoughts of changing all the way around the general arrangement of the French reserves which he had stopped, on July 1, in view of covering above all, the front of Lens, - Chateau-Thierry.

Nevertheless, up to July 4, the Commander in Chief did not consider that the information received on the attack in Champagne was yet of such a nature to justify a considerable change in the previous arrangement of our reserves; we did not know for sure if the attack would extend from Marne to the Sulppe; we had no reason to believe that it would be made any time before July 14, a date before which, according to our calculations, the enemy could not be in condition to commence operations. So the Command~~er~~^{ing} General is taking only a few measures of precaution, destined to support better, from the edge of Reims to Argonne, our front at Champagne, in case we are forced to maintain still further the mass of our reserves. To this effect, a new division (1st D.C.P.) joins the IVth Army in sector between the Sulppe and Argonne, whereas the two divisions, reserved of Headquarters, are pressed toward the second position; likewise the Vth Army, the 45th Divisions comes to reinforce the front to the east of Reims. Further back, the 1st Corps of Cavalry concentrates on the Marne, in the region of Vertus, Chalons. At the same time, the General de Castelnau, commanding the G.A.E., is invited to establish in reserve, behind the junction of the second and fourth armies, two divisions, (127 and 25) which would therefore be well placed to intervene, in case the enemy's offensive would extend, toward the east, up to the side of the Argonne. (1)

(1) Telegram to G.A.N. 1761/M, July 1, to G.A.N. 197/M, 12:35, July 2, 1918. Register of Orders 104. Annexes Nos. 9 & 11.

From this moment, the Commander in Chief made it a formal rule, that all movements of concentration in view of the next battle would be made at night, so that the more rigorous precautions should be taken to conceal from the enemy the stationing of the troops behind the front. It was essential to conceal from the opposing commander that his plans had been discovered and that he was going to attack a forewarned adversary.

The information received from July 4 to 6, on the imminence of the German offensive, the information that the attack would carry on also on our front from the Marne to Reims, should naturally determine the taking of measures indeed important, this time, for the preparation of the battle in Champagne. The enemy's consent was too great in this region, too near also perhaps, to allow us to delay then the joining of our main forces. Of common accord, General Foch and the Commander in Chief decided that the moment had come to transport into Champagne a large part of the French forces maintained up to that time in the north of the Oise, to cover Paris or to support eventually the English Army.

From the 5th to 8th of July, four divisions (2) were then taken from the G.A.R. and put in the reserve of the Headquarters in the region of Chalons, Epernay; they were joined there by the 7th Division which arrived from D.A.N. These five divisions and the 1st Corps of cavalry are placed under the command of the Commander of the 9th Army whose headquarters are moved to Fere-Champenoise; two of them, the 10th D.I.C. and the 20th D.I. are grouped in an army corps under the command of the General of the 14th Army Corps. (3)

(2) 10th D.I.C., 20th, 71st, 77th divisions.

(3) Letter to General Foch, 5353. Telegram to G.A.N. & D.A.N., 344/M, 5:25 P.M., to G.A.N. & G.A.R., 348/M, 5:40 P.M. to G.A.R. 363/M, 10:50 P.M., July 5, 1918. Letter to General Foch, 6835, July 6, 1918. Register of orders, 104. Annexes, Nos. 15, 19, 20, 21, 23.

The commander of the G.A.C. and his army commanders on their side, draw their own reserves neared in the position where they should be at the opening of the battle. The sixth army pushes toward its front, on the south of the Marne the 73d Division and two brigades of infantry of the American 28th Division; to the IVth Army, four divisions (4) to the Vth Army, two divisions, (5) pressing toward the second position. The II Army, according to the order received from the Commander in Chief put in place behind the left wing, two reserve divisions.

With that concentration of large units, equipment of all kinds follows, heavy artillery, tanks, planes. On July 5, the Commander in Chief gave the order to send half of the aerial division into Champagne; on the sixth, the first brigade of aviation (180 pursuit planes, 135 bombardment planes) was transported into the region of Saint-Dizier. Most of the division remained at G.A.R. (1)

The possibility of an attack against the English front did not permit us, for the time being, to take many of our reserves from between Oise and the Somme; the already sensible lessening of our forces in that region should even indicate that we should perfect again the measures stopped by our intervention in the English zone. The Commander in Chief organized, to this effect, to the southwest of Amiens, a grouping of three divisions (2) which he reserved to place under the command of the first commander of the Army Corps from which it was possible to free the headquarters and the E.N.E. (corps troops); he brought nearer from another part, from Beauvais, the second corps of cavalry. Thus these first units were very rapidly placed behind the British front; all was prearranged to give them as support in less than six days, five other divisions. (2a)

(4) From east to west, 63d D.I., the 46th D.I., the 42d D.I.U.S., the 27th D.I.

(5) 120th, 7th Divisions.

(1) Hdqrs. (Aerial Div). Personal order 1632, July 5, 1918. ~~Annex~~ annex No.17

(2a) Note for Commander of C.A.R., 6846, July 6, Letter to General Foch, 8241, July 7, 1918. Reg. of order 104. P.". No. 2427.

(2) 71, 9, 10.

The indecision which remained in regard to the plans of the enemy did not at all permit the Commander in Chief to give to his commanders of the groups of armies, for the leading of the next battle, the precise information which he would have been able to send them had he known at that time, that the German attack would be effected on the only theater of Champagne; some information was, however, immediately indispensable to the General de Castelnau, commander of the G.A.E. and especially General Maistre, commanding the G.A.C. (3); these were given to them by a series of instructions and telegrams, dispatched from the third to the fifth of July.

First, the Commander in Chief indicated that their forces, already united in Champagne, would suffice to lead the battle, there, so that the enemy's effort should retain the character of a simple diversion. General Maistre should prepare his three armies; if it were necessary, he would have to use the IXth army, either between the V and VI Armies, to push back the enemy from the Marne, who by that time would have accomplished the crossing of the river; or between the IVth and Vth Armies, to establish the junction and to take the Mountain of Reims, from the adversary who would have taken possession of it; in this last hypothesis, the Corps of Cavalry, the first one, placed at the first to the north of Chalons, would cover on the other side of the Marne, the point of arrival of the IXth Army; in all events, it would thus assure the guarding of the bridges below Chalons, from the beginning of the battle. (4)

If, however, the battle of Champagne became extensive, the Commander in Chief announced that he would immediately lead into the regions of Dormans, Montmirail, Chalons, a first echelon of five divisions.

(3) The G.A.N. takes name of G.A.C. on July 6, midnight, at same time that the D.A.N. becomes IXth Army. (Order 37646 of June 30, 1918.) Reg. of orders No. 105.

(4) Instruction for Commanders of army groups and D.A.N., 3915. Just for G.A.N., 2701, July 3. Personal instructions for G.A.E. and G.A.N., 5358, July 5. Telegram, 407/M, 6:15, July 6, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexes Nos. 12, 13, 16, 24.

These forces would be supported immediately by three divisions, taken from the reserves of the left wing of the G.A.E. in case that group of armies would not be implicated in the German attack. Meanwhile, General Maistre should study the use of the reserves of all sorts that could be sent for his disposal, in view,

"either to support the wings in the arrangement of battle (Mt. of Reims to the west, Argonne to the east);

or to reinforce the resistance in the zone menaced or on the points whose conservation is necessary to the outcome of the battle;

or to pass to the counteroffensive on the flank of the arrangement of attack of the enemy." (1)

II

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN THE DAYS

FROM JULY 7 to 9, 1918. (2)

The information which we received July 7, 8, and 9, is only to verify that already gathered on the enemy's attack at Champagne. Moreover, since during the three or four days which preceded the battle of Matz, the enemy seemed to cease to observe the precautions which it has observed up to the present to conceal the last preparation for its offensive. Our observatories on the Mt. of Reims, those of the Monts, those of the heights more to the east also signal during the day, an unusual circulation of unattached soldiers, of small detachments, of

- (1) Personal instruction for the G.A.E. & G.A.N., 5358, July 5. Telegram to G.A.E., 339/M, July 5, 1918. Reg. of orders 104 P.A. 16 & 18.
(2) ~~See~~ Map No. 1. Schematic map showing situation of Allies and presumed position of German Armies, July 6, 1918. Map No. 2. Schematic map showing position of Allies & presumed one of Germans, July 9, 1918.

convoys, at night, our air force verifies the abnormal illumination of the stations, and of the railways, and of the numerous movements on the roads. The statements of the prisoners that were taken by our sudden attacks, those also of French escaped prisoners, who succeeded in getting back into our lines, are agreed; the German offensive is imminent; already, facing our Vth Army, the enemy troops should be in place, assembled in the woods, between Fismes and Dormans. (3)

Is this German maneuver a simple diversion, as we have believed up to the present? The hypothesis becomes more and more improbable. All the bits of information show the power of the attack which is prepared against our front at Champagne. The High Command of the enemy aims to attain as soon as possible Chalons, by way of Reims, and Epernay, by way of the two rivers of the Marne. So he hopes to cause a great shaking of our positions in Champagne, and more to the east, after which he will be able to take up, almost with a sure blow this time, his march in the direction of Paris.

For this gigantic assault, the enemy has on July 9 seventy-eight reserve divisions; admitting then that he maintains 18 divisions in reserve behind the assembly on the front, there still remain for him 62 divisions to engage in battle. It is a number quite sufficient to permit the launching of a powerful attack on the front all the way from Argonne to the borders east of Chateau-Thierry. We figure, however, that with the divisions in sector which he has already arranged, the Imperial Crown Prince, if he receives only 46 of the reserve divisions, can immediately enter into operations.

(3) Hdqrt. (2 Bureau). Information report given 1480 to 1482, July 7, 1918. Note 8961/2, July 6, 1918. P.A. No. 25.

It is also certain that the German endeavour will not be uniformly on the entire front; it will be exercised more particularly on certain parts of the attack zone; as a set-off, it is confirmed that there will be, on either side of Reims, a passive sector concerning the extent of which we are still very uncertain. According to all probabilities, the greatest attack will take place astride the Marne, in the direction of Epernay, from Jaulgonne to Vrigny; we think that 28 divisions will at first be able to operate in that region. To the east of Reims, the enemy seems too wise to concentrate its action on the front extending from the Suippe and the Main de Massiges, where it would line up with a force of 16 divisions. (2) In a general manner, meanwhile, we have the impression that the attack of the Germans to the east of Reims will have the character of a clever diversion.

In this mass of given specifications, which we now possess, we lack still that which is indispensable for us to be definitely clear on the plans of the enemy. Indeed, on July 9, our information service still has no recent indications on the situation of the reserves of the Bavarian Crown Prince; it indicates that the 38 divisions of this group of armies are still placed facing the English front, between the sea and the Somme. Finally, from numerous bits of information, of British source for the most part, the attack on the English front, especially Flanders, should equally be considered imminent. So great is our uncertainty in this respect, and in spite of all the probabilities, that the enemy may not attack elsewhere than in Champagne, it is improbable that they would remove their reserves either on the English front or on the French front, all the way from Oise to the Somme.

(2) Telegram to General Commander of G.A.E., G.A.C., 494/M, 6:55 P.M., July 8. Report given General Foch, 10625, July 9, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexes No. 32, 35.

There is not, then, in this period of 3 days, any appreciable change in the general arrangement of our reserves; the commander in chief is content to have studied the measure which would permit us to lead, immediately, all our forces into Champagne, either when we have definite information after the beginning of the battle, when we shall be certain of the extent of the effort that the enemy will have made. The immediate removal of the two divisions (5th and 168th) stationed at the time in back of the G.A.R. is foreseen; General de Castelnau, is warned that he will eventually be asked, not only for the 2 divisions which he has disposed in the rear of his left wing, but also a third division which he should then take from the 2d Army.(2) From this time, nevertheless, the Commander in Chief judges the situation sufficiently clear to transfer to the G.A.C. all the aerial divisions; the order is given on July 7; on July 9, the division leaves in two large groupings, one toward Saint Dizier, the other toward Esternay. Thus arranged, it is ready to operate from Chateau-Thierry to Argonne; it takes all the necessary precautions not to betray its presence. (3)

The commander of the G.A.C. and his commanders of the army have not taken into account, naturally, the grave uncertainties which still weigh on the decisions of the Commander in Chief; sure of being attacked, and very probably on short notice, they could have no preoccupations other than those of arranging their forces to ward off the German attack such as was expected; they were actively employed in this. Since July 8, General Maistre extends up to Marne the right of the 6th Army; he inserts in this wing a new staff or army corps. (4) (3d Army Corps).

- (2) Telegram to General Commander of G.A.E., G.A.C., 494/M, 6:55 P.M., July 8. Report given General Foch, 10625, July 9, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexes No. 32, 35.
- (3) Telegram to G.A.R., G.A.C., G.A.E., 463/M, 11:00 P.M., July 7, 1918. Hdars. (Aerial Div.) Instruction for Brigades 1797, July 9, 1918. Annexes No. 29, 36.
- (4) G.A.C. Telegrams to VI, V, IX Armies 5894/B, 3:45 P.M., July 8, 1918. Annexes No. 32.

The measure will have the advantage of entrusting to the same commander the initial management of operations against the enemy, which will have crossed the river; it will oblige the commander of the Vith Army to arrive there with proper forces.

At the same time, the commander of the G.A.C. enlarged the number of reserve divisions already at the disposal of the commander of the army; he assures the methodic distribution of these units on the front. To the IVth Army, the heads of the 4 divisions of the second line now are formed in second position; the Vth Army is reinforced by two divisions (7th and 10th DIC) and puts them in their reserve positions; the Vith Army, finally, comes up nearer the menaced part of its front, to the south of the Marne, the 73d Division, while it regroups in this same zone, the 28th Division of Americans, up to then divided between the French 39th and 125th Divisions. (1)

On his part, without wishing to give up the expectant attitude which he is still constrained to, the Commander in Chief judges indispensable meanwhile the necessity of making known to his subordinates the plan of maneuver which he stopped, from the first of the month, after the approbation of General Foch on the management of operations; by the end of the day July 7, he communicated to the commanders the large lineups of the army groupings. These essential arrangements will undergo some modifications, from the 7th to the 14th of July, so that the new information will make more certain the plans of the adversary; the fundamental conception will meanwhile persist and will effectively direct the development of our operations during the whole battle of Champagne.

(1) G.A.C. Telegram to Xith Army. 5886/13, 3:00 P.M., July 7. V Army. 5883/13, 2:30, July 8. VI Army. Personal order 1835/3, 6:15 P.M., July 8.

The German offensive, launched from Chateau-Thierry to Argonne, will be stopped by the Group of Armies in the center under the command of General Maistre, to whom the General in Chief gives, toward this end, some detailed and accurate tactical instructions. (2) Just as he has already been advised, General Maistre will place in line three armies of his group of armies, IVth, General Couraud; Vth General Berthelot; VIth General Degoutte and eventually the IXth Army, General de Mitry. The efforts of General Maistre, should have to attempt to check as quickly as possible especially the progress of the enemy; particularly, it will seek to stop as soon as possible the German attack, to the east of Reims, on the front of the IVth Army, in order to be able to transfer rapidly its reserves between Reims and Chateau-Thierry; it is this region, in fact, that the enemy's advance would easily produce the most serious danger. It is plain that if the G.A.C. succeeds in blocking the German offensive on the front of the Vth and VIth Armies, General Maistre at least would not have to turn over immediately the reserves of his right wing; he should put them then at the disposal of the Commander in Chief. (3)

The control of the battle thus regulated, the Commander in Chief considered the recovery of the offensive; with General Foch, in fact, he thinks now that the moment has come for us to take up the initiative in the operations. The month of respite, which has passed since the battle of Matz has permitted us to instruct and to rest our reserve divisions; the English Army has not been engaged for two months and a half; it has then had a long time to reorganize;

(2) The importance of these instructions lead to a further study of them in a special chapter.

(3) Telegram to G.A.C. 407/M. 6:15 P.M., July 6, 444/M, 7:25 P.M., July 7. Register of orders 104 P.A. Nos. 26 and 28.

finally, the ~~American~~ effectives are increasing rapidly. Materially our superiority has become undeniable; we have sufficient means in artillery in munitions; we can count on our tanks, and especially on our light artillery against an adversary unprovided with similiar engines; our aviation dominated uncontestably that of the enemy. It is on the G.A.R. that the mission of taking again the offensive rests; the attack will be effected by the IXth Army to the south of Aisne, in the direction of the plateaux to the southwest of Soisson, according to the plan which the General Mangin received order to prepare, since the end of the month of June; it will allow the starting of action of main forces, 13 divisions of infantry; five of these divisions and three of the 2d Corps of cavalry will be taken from our general reserves. As soon as the initial objectives will be attained, the exploitation will continue in the direction of the southwest, toward Oulchy-le-Chateau, in order to place in a dangerous situation the enemy's forces engaged in the pocket which the front deepens from Soissons to Reims by Chateau-Thierry.

With an attack thus conceived, prepared in the greatest possible secrecy, executed with the most forceful means, one could expect important results; the Commander in Chief firmly expected them; on July 8, he wrote to General Fayolle:

"Doubtlessly, this operation not only presents the best chances for success, but also may prove to be a fruitful exploitation; moreover, it will produce the most efficient showing to the imminent German offensive." (1)

(1) Letter to Commander of G.A.R., 9732, July 8, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexe No. 31.

At what moment would it pass to the offensive? Certainly it was not doubtful that the better solution consisted in launching the Tenth Army in the attack, immediately after we had stopped the enemy, from Chateau-Thierry to Argonne, in the course of the defensive battle. Thus, the adversary would be taken on the flank and on the back by our counteroffensive, while it would be deeply engaged in the pocket of the Marne, completely directed toward Epernay, in the direction of the southwest. Only the execution of this maneuver in such favorable conditions necessitated the being very certain, and several days in advance, concerning the date of the German assault; we needed in fact 3 or 4 days at least to put in proper place the means of attack necessary for the Xth Army. Our information concerning the date of the German offensive did not reach such a degree of exactness; we could not hope that they would ever reach it. In fact, it was equally necessary to foresee the event, rather improbable, it is true, possible, however, in which the High Command delays too long his attack. In this hypothesis also, should we wait for the wish of the adversary? Would it not be more advantageous on the contrary for us to precede the enemy's attack by first passing to the offensive? In these conditions, the Commander in Chief simply asked the commander of the G.A.R. to hurry as much as possible the preparations of his attack; he told him, particularly, to make the necessary arrangements to be in a place to effect, in the shortest possible time, the concentration of the large units. This movement should be able to commence from July 15, if the order is given for it. (2) So, in all events, the Tenth Army could be in a position to attack, July 18, if the moment appeared opportune.

(2) Letter to commander of G.A.R., 9732, July 8, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexe No. 31.

The Commander in Chief was not blind to the several disadvantages of this plan of operation, however, the most serious was, undoubtedly, that the G.A.C. might be insufficiently armed before the next German offensive. To the ensemble of 70 divisions perhaps which the Imperial Crown Prince will use, if the 18 divisions already in line on the front of attack are reinforced by some fifty of the German reserve divisions, General Maistre will scarcely be able to oppose at the beginning more than 30 divisions, placed in behind the 18 or 19 divisions, in sector on the presumed front of the enemy offensive, we were able to lead in fact only 12 divisions, placed in reserve of all descriptions. There is, first, the natural consequence of uncertainty which still hangs on the conditions of the German attack and obliges us to maintain some important reserves between Oise and the sea; it is then the result of the hypothesis agreed by us on the ensemble of our available forces in favor of the offensive of the G.A.R. The inferiority of the G.A.C. is then remediless for the moment; to guard there, it would be necessary for us either to take from our reserves to the north of the Oise, or to weaken the forces given to the G.A.R. for the offensive. The General in Chief considers the solutions, and particularly the second as impossible; he then accepts the risk of the situation, being confident moreover of the precautions which he took to send rapidly to the G.A.C. some supplementary forces, since he had need of them.

III

CONCENTRATION FOR THE BATTLE IN CHAMPAGNE (1)

The uncertainty which weighed so heavily on the decisions of the High Command of the Allies at the beginning of the month of July, vanished in the three days from the tenth to the twelfth; furthermore, we read clearly into the game of the adversary. First, it becomes more and more certain that the attack expected in Champagne is an operation of great extent; in the mind of the German Commander, it is to be decisive, to accomplish the ruin of the French Army; it is the Friedensturm, the prisoners say, after which there will be peace, the peace "Pleine d'honneur", the German peace. The Imperial Crown Prince directs the operation; he will attack from Jaulgonne (10 kilometers from Chateau-Thierry) up to the Main de Massiges, with two armies side by side, to the west, the army, to the east the Third Army. (2)

This information not only confirms what we already possess, but also brings now some information which is entirely new. Successively we learn that the German attack, prepared in Flanders, is not imminent, then, on the twelfth of July, that it is postponed, that the enemy decidedly is carrying all its efforts into Champagne, and will attempt nothing on the rest of the front. At the same time, we finally obtain the important information that we have been seeking for such a long time; moreover, it is sure that the reserves, the artillery, are slowly going from the two groups of armies nearby toward the group of armies of the German Crown Prince; this movement has already been

- (1) *See*. Schematic chart showing situation of Allies and presumed one of Germans, July 9. Chart 4. Schematic chart showing situation of Allies and presumed one of Germans, July 14. Chart 5. Situation of front of G.A.R. and G.A.C., July 15, A.M.
- (2) In reality, as we will find out in the course of battle, 3 German armies will attack. July 5, the III Army from Main-de-Massiges to Suippe, the I Army from Suippe to Frigny, the VII Army from Frigny to Jaulgonne.

continued for some time, probably since June 25. These indications on the removal of the enemy's reserves behind the front, permit us to verify the conjectures that we have already made, in which the date of the German offensive is concerned. If one remembers in fact that the German concentration for the battle of March 21 was pursued from the first to the 18th of March; or for 18 days, and admits the analogous extent of time for the next battle, it is well toward the 14th of July that we may expect to be attacked. (3) Moreover, all the prisoners, captured in this period, declare also that the attack is quite near, for the 13th or 14th of July.

Some information of a more secondary character completes that fortunately, which we have previously received. We are also learning that the attack will extend to the east of Reims, not only from the Main de Massiges to the Suippe, but even toward the fort of La Pompelle; it is confirmed, at the same time that from the fort up to Vrigny, the salient of Reims will constitute a passive zone on which the enemy expects the conquest by a mere act of its progress by the east and by the southwest. (1)

Before a collection of information so precise, all uncertainty disappears from the mind of the Allied High Command; he can place without mental reservation, the French Reserves, and the English ones, maintained up to then between the sea and the Oise, in order to stop the enemy's attack, either in Flanders, or even toward Paris by Compiègne and Montdidier; their afflux into Champagne went to show us the forces indispensable to stop rapidly the formidable offensive of the enemy.

- (3) Hdqrs. (2 Bureau). Note on movements on rail, 9076/2, July 11.
Annexe No. 40.
- (1) Hdqrs. (2 Bureau). Information report 1483 to 1487. July 10 to 14. Note relative to rail movements. 9076/2, July 11, letter from Maistre to Commander in Chief 5098, July 12, 1918 P.A.
Nos. 40 and 50.

Also on July 11, after the arrival of the first bits of information, setting aside the eventuality of an attack in Flanders, General Foch gives to the Commander in Chief the free disposition of some of the French divisions, which he has kept up to now, in the north of the Oise, to intervene in case of need in the English zone; he writes:

"As time passes, the German offensive in preparation in Champagne can develop further. It is, moreover, what the information obtained during the last several days seems to indicate. The offensive of diversion, foreseen in the order No. 4 of July 1, can also become an offensive of great extent.

The extension of the preparations of the attack in Champagne has, consequently, the removal of the probability of the German attack to the north of Somme or the diminishing of the possible importance of that attack.

In these conditions, it is worthwhile, it seems, to take some measure to be able to unite rapidly, behind our front of Champagne, reserves sufficient to stop, in a short notice, a powerful offensive of the enemy.

Besides the forces already united for this, it seems necessary to increase by some units the number of the divisions, available for intervening immediately in the battle, particularly in the region of Argonne. These units could be taken without inconvenience from those united, at present, in view of working eventually into the English zone." (2)

(2) General Foch to Commander in Chief, 1979, July 11, 1918. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4. Annexe No. 39.

The Commander in Chief profited soon by the authority which was given him, immediately, he distributed the reserves of his left wing, sent to his disposition, five divisions and the second corps of cavalry. Of the 12, two of these divisions (9th and 10th), a staff of army corps (16th C.A.) were transported by rail, to the G.A.C. to participate in the defensive battle; two divisions (5th and 168th), an American division (1st D.I.U.S.), an American staff of army corps, and the 2d Corps of cavalry ~~of~~ three divisions were sent at the same time, toward the region between Oise and Marne, to pass to the disposition of General Fayolle who employed all these units for the offensive operation in preparation for the G.A.R. (1) Still, after these movements will be effected, and especially, from the time when the concentration of the forces, destined for the offensive will commence to act for the G.A.R., there will remain no reserve between Oise and Somme; in signaling to General Foch the danger of this situation, the Commander in Chief added:

"In case you would agree to the projects of the offensive in preparation, I have the honor of asking you for a more complete participation of the British Army to the charges which have been resting on my armies for 3 months and a half, either by sending immediately three divisions, at least, in the triangle Beauvais, Clermont, Froissy, or by an attack produced, before July 18, on an interesting part of its front, if you think it wise." (2)

General Foch immediately approved the proposition, he wrote then to Marshall Haig to expose to him the repercussions on the French

(1) Telegram to G.A.C. and G.A.R., 617/M 7:25 P.M. - 615/M, 7:45 P.M. - 633/M 11:30 P.M. - 637/M, 11:45 P.M., July 11 - 689/M, 12:15 A.M., July 12. Letter to G.A.C., 14543, July 12, 1918. Register of orders 105. ~~pc~~ Annexes Nos. 41, 42, 44 and 47.

(2) Letter to General Foch, 14545, July 12, 1918. Register of orders 105. ~~annexe~~ annexe No. 48.

front, of the measure already taken by us, in view of stopping the attack in Champagne, then he added:

"1. There are no longer sufficient reserves behind the point, always sensible, of the juncture of the British and French armies and I ask you to try from now on to guard against this disadvantage while taking to the south of the Somme two of your divisions in general reserve; one of them would be advantageously placed in the region of Conty, to aid eventually the 1st French Army. These two divisions would not be used without a new order on my part.

2. On the other hand, we have to foresee the situation, in which, if the battle should absorb all the French reserves, I should be obliged to appeal to the English reinforcements. The first use that I see for these would be the transport into the region of Clermont, Froissy, Conty, of three divisions to replace there the French reserves all thrown into battle. This movement would follow on my command the movement of two divisions which I asked you previously to execute; from now on, it seems possible that it could be done successfully by roads. I ask you to prepare for it.

3. Finally, if the attack on the French front takes on an extension capable of absorbing the major part of the German reserves, the German command will have to renounce, at least for some time, the whole plan of a serious attack on the British front, it will be to our interest to take advantage of the situation. Moreover, the operations offensive in detail, led during the last weeks on the front of the Allies, have permitted us to ascertain that the Germans are maintaining in line, tired troops, incomplete or of bad material in order to establish a mass of manoeuvre with the choice troops, trained and well

provided for. It is a weakness of which it is necessary to profit, without delay, to undertake by surprise, some important offensives.

What seems to me, on the British front, should be freed first, is the offensive leaving from the front Festubert, Robecq, aiming at the release of the mines of Bruay and the suspension of the knot of communication from Estires, less costly, and which, even more advantageously, will have the advantage of suppressing or pushing back the menace of the German attack on the mountains.

This operation has already been indicated in my general order No. 3 of May 20." (1)

After the next day, July 13, the importance of the information received on the 12th, makes the Commander in Chief of the Allies determined to modify greatly the conception of the battle which he has up to now considered, which he explained just the day before to Marshall Haig. Furthermore, completely decided on the imminence the importance of the enemy's offensive which was prepared on the French front, assured that the adversary will not attempt at the same time any other operation, he accepts the battle in Champagne, on the very ground where the German High Command wished to deliver it, we also now wish that operation to be decisive, formidable; we shall go into it with all the forces disengaged for the coalition which we are going to mass between Oise and Argonne; then when we shall have to let the enemy be engaged fully, from Chateau-Thierry to Argonne, when their attack will be shattered before our positions, in our turn, we shall pass to the offensive, by surprise, brutally, with the powerful forces which this time we are able to use.

(1) General Foch to Marshall Haig, 2021, July 12, 1918. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4. ~~XXXX~~ annexe No. 48.

The decision of leading the battle in Champagne, all the forces united, necessitated forcefully some important modifications to the conditions in which the English Army had been asked first to intervene in the fight; it was necessary to renounce the offensive asked of our Allies in the direction of Estaires, but, on the other hand, from that time, largely to count on the support of the English divisions, either to the G.A.C. or to the G.A.R. General Foch decided then to provide for a first selection of ten divisions from the reserves of Marshall Haig. Four divisions with a staff would be moved immediately by rail in order to land in the region of Revigny, Vitry-le-Francois, after July 15. previously, four other divisions would take up the continuation of the routine of transport of the first four, if the interest of the battle demanded it, Marshall Haig would have to send across to the south of the Somme, according to this request which was addressed him today before in regard to this, two divisions destined to support the left of the G.A.R. (2)

At the same time, General Foch judged the moment come to take without mental reservation the last French reserves, still disengaged between the Oise and the Somme; he estimated that they could, without touching the large units destined to participate in the offensive of the G.A.R., to lead three new French divisions from the region to the northeast of Paris toward the G.A.C. (3)

- (2) General Foch's Telegram to Marshall Haig, 709/M, July 13, 1918, Correspondence of General Foch No. 5. REDACTED annexe No. 53.
- (3) General Foch. Letter to General in Chief 2053. July 13, 1918. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4 P.A. No. 52.

The reinforcement of forces destined to the offensive being thus assured, the Commander in Chief of the Allies was preoccupied with necessary measures to take again the offensive. Since July 9 he had considered, in this order of ideas, the possibility of giving more amplitude to the attack prepared by the G.A.R. if the enemy postponed again their offensive projects in Champagne; he had then exposed to the Commander in Chief all the advantages of making our offensive participate against the pocket of the Chateau-Thierry, not only the 10th Army, but also the Vth Army, to the north of the Marne and between the Marne and Reims, the Vth Army. (1) On July 13, before the imminence of the German attack, it was evidently necessary to renounce the offensive of the Vth Army, to the north of the Marne, even if the right wing of that army was found violently engaged, as all seemed to him to be foreboding, to the south of the river in the defensive battle. Above all, General Foch estimated that the offensive of the G.A.R. should now, where we were a little less certain of the date of the German assault, be transformed into a counter-offensive, powerful repartee, from which one could expect the greatest results.

This conception of the battle of Champagne, at the same time defensive and offensive, was then formulated in a short order, a simple confirmation written, in accordance with the views fully realized by the Commander in Chief.

"Because of the greatness of the preparations of the enemy in Champagne, the Allied Armies, should be ready to sustain the battle with the ~~Annexes~~ of their disengaged units. The operations

(1) General Foch. Note for General in Chief 1940, July 9, 1918. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4, Annexe No. 34.

considered will permit for us a defensive and counteroffensive battle.

The defensive battle should aim at stopping the enemy's thrust; this arrest is to be complete. It is actually being prepared for the starting to work of a certain number of French units. These forces may be insufficient; it is therefore necessary to increase the reserves.

The supplement to use to this end is to take:

- (a) The disengaged French forces;
- (b) The British reserves.

The counteroffensive, that is to say, the offensive that you propose to carry out between Aisne and Marne, to the east, constitutes besides its own advantages, a defensive means which can be of greater use. It is in a position to neutralize the German offensive to the west of Reims, to permit us, consequently, to use all our forces in the region of Chalons to the defensive, to the east of Reims. This operation, conducive to great results, is then to increase in all its details, to be able to be turned loose at the proper time, with all possibility.

To this end, there should be placed in reserve as many as possible of the forces destined to the offensive of the 10th and Vith Armies.

The ~~whole~~ of these measures, if executed with desired rapidity, seems to me to reply to the necessities foreseen at this time." (2)

(2) General Foch to General in Chief 2053, July 13, 1918. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4. Annexe No. 52.

The Commander in Chief shared fully these views in the conduct of the battle; he had had frequent communications since the beginning of the month with General Foch, so that the agreement of ideas was rapidly and soon completely realized. It had been possible then for him, as one could see, to inform little by little his three commanders of army groups on the role that he gave them, there remained to him then to give his last directions for the battle, and at first to regulate the initial divisions of the forces at his disposal.

Altogether, with the reserves of the left wing, put in movement, after July 11, toward the region to the east of Oise, with 4 first divisions of the British whose arrival is announced to him, surely the Commander in Chief is going to place a reserve mass, strengthened by 38 Allied divisions (1) and 6 divisions of cavalry, of these divisions he designated 24 with 3 cavalry divisions to the defensive battle which the G.A.C. will engage. Thus, counting the 20 divisions in sector between Argonne and Chateau-Thierry, 44 Allied divisions (2) will receive the German assault. Although, after our provisions, we should count on seeing the enemy engaged an effective very notably superior, 60 or perhaps 70 divisions (3), the number of the units to be used in the defensive seems sufficient. Our reserve divisions are in good condition; their morale is excellent; the month of rest which the adversary has been constrained to give us has permitted us to rearrange, to rest, to instruct our units.

As it was sensible, in the expectancy of an attack on which we had precise information, a large part of the units destined to the

(1) 4 English divisions of them, 5 American divisions.

(2) 2 Italian of them, 4 English, 5 American, 33 French.

(3) Headquarters (2 Bureau). Note on the available German forces for an offensive action, 9056/2. July 10, 1918. ~~Annexe~~ Annexe No.38.

defensive, 31 divisions were properly moved to the G.A.C. or to its armies; there remained, in general reserve, 13 divisions (4) and 3 divisions of cavalry, a rather considerable mass and repartee sufficiently near the front to permit the Commander in Chief to make his action felt in battle powerfully and rapidly. On July 14, the general reserves form three large groupings; to the east, 4 divisions taken from the G.A.E. are united from one part and another of Argonne, behind the junction of the II and IV Armies, under the orders of the Commander of the 16th Army Corps. (General Corvisart); behind the center of the G.A.C. astride the Marne, between Chalons and the region west of Epernay, a grouping of 4 divisions equally (9,10,14,77) is gathered, under the command of the Commander of the 14th Army Corps (General Marjoulet); three divisions are already in place, the last (14th) is going to commence its disembarkments July 15; finally, the 1st Cavalry Corps (with three divisions), the 22d Corps of British army, whose two divisions will arrive, from July 16, and the 18th Division, form a third mass of maneuver. Headquarters of the IXth Army, still located at Fere-Champenoise, remains an organ of command reserved to the disposal of the Commander in Chief. (5)

The growth of the reserves behind our front of Champagne, thanks to the reinforcements that are arriving, as many from the left wing as from the British Army lead the Commander in Chief after July 12 to modify sensibly his first conception of the defensive battle; he estimated, in fact, that the G.A.C. was after that time sufficiently reinforced that they could be asked not only to resist the German

- (4) Considering that the 22d English Corps will arrive at Champenoise as it is expected before the battle to the number of 4 divisions.
- (5) Telegram to G.A.E., 635/M, 11:45 P.M., July 11, Letter to G.A.C. 14543, July 12. Telegram to G.A.E. 705/M, 12:45 A.M. to G.A.R. 740/M, 11:00 P.M., July 13. Instruction on organization of zone of command of G.A.C., 17736, July 14, 1918. Register of orders 105. Annexes Nos. 43, 47, 56, 59.

assault, but even to pass as soon as possible to the counteroffensive to that their action to reinforce that of the G.A.R. could be realized. From then, July 12, the Commander in Chief addresses the General Maistre an instruction destined to indicate clearly to the G.A.C. the importance of passing to the counteroffensive as soon as possible, after the attack of the enemy will be produced on their front.

First, the Commander in Chief defines the two phases essential to the battle to be led by the G.A.C.

"The expected offensive of the enemy will interest without a doubt, the same time the front of the IVth and Vth Armies, and on the Marne the right of the VI Army.

The present instruction has for an object accustoming you to the conditions in which you will have to conduct the battle.

The first end to attain will always be to reestablish the contact and the stability of the front, if the enemy succeeds in breaking it.

This result attained, it will be urgent to pass to the counteroffensive, with all the available forces ..." (1)

The instruction rests on three cases then. In the most unfavorable, that in which the "enemy, provisorily victorious, has succeeded in creating a considerable pocket on our front, after that spread out", the IXth Army will have to be inserted, either between the VI or V Armies, or between the V and IV ones. But "a counter-offensive cannot be counted on previously, its execution depending on the new front realized and the forces at the disposal at the time..."

(1) Personal and secret instruction for General of G.A.C., 14542, July 12. Note for General of G.A.C., 14543. July 12, 1918. Register of orders 105. Annexes Nos. 46 and 47.

The second case examined considers the hypothesis in which the enemy would not succeed in progressing only to the front of one army. Then after having, first of all, embanked the enemy's offensive, General Maistre would raise, with all the reserves available, a counteroffensive in which he would engage the use of the IXth Army. The operation would be executed:

"Either to the south of the Marne to reject the enemy which would have succeeded in crossing the river;

or on the front of the V Army, in view of establishing again the front, then by the action concordant of the V and X Armies, of reducing the pocket of the Chateau-Thierry;

or in Champagne"

For that counterattack in Champagne, the Commander in Chief foresaw that the grouping, placed under the orders of the Commander of the 16th Army Corps, would be able to be sent to the disposal of the Commander of the G.A.C.; he would then be employed:

Either to support the front of the IV Army, to the east of the Suippe;

or to counterattack on the left flank of the enemy's attack, in case that one would have succeeded in realizing an advance to the east of the Suippe;

or to take part, as a right element, in a combined counter-offensive in Champagne, after the immobilization of the enemy on our position of resistance or our position of barrage (*reserve*)

In the last case, evidently the most likely, that one in which the attack of the enemy would be stopped quickly, the instruction prescribed to General Maistre:

"In this hypothesis, you would have to group as rapidly as possible, all your reserves to pass to the counteroffensive in the direction of Arcis-le-Ponsart, in combination with an offensive of the 10th Army, to the south of the Aisne..."

Finally in order to place well in relief the importance which he attached henceforth to seeing the G.A.C. pass as rapidly as possible to the counteroffensive, the General in Chief concluded in these terms:

"In resume, except in the case of a rupture of the front on an extension considerable, which would absorb all your troops at your disposal, the use of your reserves should be based on the intention of passing as soon as possible to the counteroffensive.

There depends on it the fact that if the enemy's attack were not produced, all your means could be in use for an offensive of the Vth Army, which together with the action of the Xth Army, would have as an end the redeeming of the pocket of Chateau-Thierry."

By regulating thus the conditions of the defensive battle to be waged by the G.A.C., the General, Commander in Chief succeeded equally, this same day, July 12, in giving his last instructions for the offensive against the pocket of Chateau-Thierry; in this respect, also he was fully in accord with General Foch, on the advisability of giving to this operation all the extent possible.

In what concerned the operation of the G.A.R., between Aisne and the Marne, from this time, it was stopped in all its details; in all fashions it would be executed on short notice.

General Fayolle had the direction of it; he would dispose, to that effect, the Xth Army (General Mangin) and the VI Army (General Degoutte), but, for that latter, in what concerned only the use of the means of setting to work to the north of the Marne. Altogether, the Commander in Chief attributed to the G.A.R. for their defense, 15 divisions, taken from our reserves of all kinds, and the 2d Corps of cavalry ~~of~~ 3 divisions; 7 of the divisions of infantry would be furnished by the reserves of the Headquarters, the other 8 by the divisions of reserve for the G.A.R. or of the armies.

The Xth Army, charged with the principal effort, would engage in first line ten divisions, six divisions in the second line; the VI the Army would place only six divisions, already in sector on their front, and only two divisions in the second line. Thus, the offensive between Marne and Aisne would be led by a mass of 24 divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry; our troops would be accompanied by two regiments of light artillery (6 battalions), three groupings of chars Schneider, 4 groups of chars Saint-Chamond; they would be supported by a powerful artillery of all calibers. (1)

In what conditions would the G.A.C. be able to participate to the offensive of the G.A.R.? It was difficult to give, in this respect, valid indications for the eventualities so different which could present themselves, from that in which the enemy, postponing its attack, would lead us to pass to the offensive ourselves, to the most unfavorable case, that in which the defensive battle would absorb all the available men which we had hoped to use for it. At all event, nevertheless, it was with the Vth Army, attacking by the two banks of

(1) Letter to General Foch, 17088, July 14, 1918. Register of orders 104. Annexe No. 58.

the Ardre, that the Commander in Chief expected to see the intervention of the G.A.C. produced in the operation against the pocket of Chateau-Thierry. If we took, the first one, the offensive, in that region, General Berthelot would first prepare ten divisions of infantry, three divisions for the 1st Corps of cavalry, a grouping of light tanks; and two groups of tanks Schneider; five of the ten divisions would be those already in the sector on the front of the attack of course, these means would be sensibly reduced, if the G.A.C. should pass to the counter-offensive, after having delivered, at the beginning, a severe defensive battle in which it would have largely consumed its reserves.

The Commander in Chief defined then in these terms the goal and the conditions of the offensive combined with the G.A.C. and the G.A.R.:

"The forces actually united to the G.A.R. and the G.A.C. in view of the defensive battle, permit an offensive action to rise rapidly against the salient of Chateau-Thierry with the Xth and the Vth Armies on one side, the Vth Army on the other.

The attacks will be prepared from now on by the G.A.R. and by the G.A.C. on the following bases:

1. The operation has for its purpose taking the pocket of Chateau-Thierry by making two lateral thrusts toward the plateaux situated to the north of Fere-en-Tardenois.

It should, as the minimum benefit to be derived, take away from the enemy the free disposition of the net of communication from Soissons, and the better the outline of our front between Reims and the Marne (the redeeming of Reims).

These results will be obtained:

1. By breaking the front of the enemy, on one side, to the side of the Aisne, in the general direction of Oulchy-le-Chateau by the Xth Army, of the plateau south of Breny, Armentieres, by the VI Army, on the other side, to the south of the Vesle, in the general direction of Arcis-le-Ponsart (V Army).

2. By exploiting, with the maximum of rapidity, the rupture produced on each flank of the pocket so as to realize the junction of the G.A.R. and the G.A.C. in the region of Fere-en-Tardenois.

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The characteristics of the operation will be as follows:

the departure of the infantry on the very day after a short and violent preparation.

assembled in place the divisions of attack in the night from J-1 to J. The order of forewarning will be given by the Commander in Chief before J-4, midnight, and as soon as possible, at the end of the current July 14.

The hour H will be fixed by the Commander in Chief. The preparations will immediately be begun, and pursued in the greatest secrecy, with all the procedure of camouflage necessary to safeguard the effect of surprise." (1)

The next day, July 13, the Commander in Chief could again make accurate his conception of the offensive battle; he was learning in fact, that all the German effort was being carried on in Champagne and that the attack was imminent, if it did not take place on the 13th it would be effected on the 14th, at the latest, the 15th. It was for us, an enormous advantage that he be so certain on the date of the enemy's

(1) Instruction personal and secret for Commanders of G.A.R. and C.A.C. 14546. July 12, 1918. Register of orders 105. Annexe No. 49.

offensive; it was essential to use it profitably. In these conditions, the Commander in Chief conceived immediately, like General Foch, all the interest of transforming into a counteroffensive the operation of the G.A.R., the enemy stopped before us, from Chateau-Thierry to Main de Massiges, deprived of a large part of the reserves spent in its attack, was going to be found taken, all of a sudden by the powerful counterattack of General Fayolle, to which General Maistre would contribute also in the measure of the forces which would remain to him. The order was immediately given; the Commander in Chief telegraphed to the G.A.R.:

"I. Attacks 6 and X Armies, warned by my instruction 34, 546 of July 12, should be able to be made on July 18 in the morning.

II. Hour H will be fixed later.

III. I call forcefully your attention to the necessity of absolute secrecy." (2)

All is ready, in fact, at this date, July 13, for this formidable battle, from the beginning of which 68 divisions of the Allies are going to intervene. (3) The French Army plays the part thoroughly; on July 13, behind the front of Argonne to the Suisse, held by simple outposts, there does not remain one division in reserve; at the hour in which the counteroffensive of the G.A.R. will depart, between Oise and the Somme, on this theater of operations covering Paris directly, we shall have for all reserves only one English division.

(2) Telegram to G.A.R., G.A.C., 714/M, 3:00 P.M., July 13, 1918.
Register of orders 102. Annexe No. 55.

(3) Of which 2 Italian, 5 American, 57 French.

IV.

THE TACTICAL PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE

Never before has the French army awaited an attack with more confidence, with, in the heart, a great hope of conquering. Each with the impression that the fortune, which seemed passed, since spring, in the camp of the enemy, is ready to return to us, no one is ignorant of the fact that the plans of the High Command of the Germans are discovered; to prove what precautions are taken, on our side, to conceal our reinforcement, the accumulation of the troops and material forces, we firmly hope that the enemy is going to fall headlong into the snare which is prepared for them. From the rear to the front, the noise is spread of the formidable concentration which is going on; the certainty of being immediately strengthened, powerfully, increases the morale of the troops in the first lines; the conscience of their mass gives to our reserves full assurance in their force. Above all, the secret will be guarded; of some men who will have the misfortune to fall, at this time, into the hands of the enemy, not one of them, will give a useful bit of information concerning our preparations of battle.

For the first time, also, since the beginning of the campaign of 1918, the French Army, quite entire, is going to apply a uniform defense doctrine which has been agreed, in which it has an absolute faith; for the battle which is prepared for the commander of the army down to the watchmen of the first line, each knows his mission and understands the use of it. There has been needed time and desire to obtain this result.

Since December 1917, the Commander in Chief had formulated officially the defensive conception which the power and the tactics of the enemy imposed on us from that time; (1) these ideas, he had developed then, from the beginning of 1918, to the present in a series of complementary instructions, then in his visits to the armies; (2) he had insisted on their importance, their inevitable necessity; in spite of all his efforts nevertheless, in March, at the time when the offensive of the Germans burst forth, a number of the highest rank officers had not been able to adjust themselves, without mental reservations, into these new channels. The prescriptions of the Commander in Chief struck against the mentality created in the army since 1914. At the time of the stabilization of the front, General Joffre had prohibited all recoil, all abandon of the ground; then, they would have been in the most disadvantageous positions, often to the price of heavy losses, continual ones; but also, to this hard school the army had been put; the morale, the energy had been exalted; the sufferings of 1914 and 1915 had also prepared the infantry of Verdun which was forced to be killed on the place, but could not recoil. The time had elapsed; the instructions of 1914, which answered completely to the necessity of the time, were no longer applicable in 1918; it was now necessary to get some new order.

The successive experiences, made at the beginning of March, 1918, had nevertheless demonstrated how slowly the army comprehended the importance of the doctrine formulated in December 1917 by the Commander in Chief. On May 21, the battle of Chemin des Dames witnessed that

- (1) ~~Sec.~~ Report of Marshall. Defensive campaign. 1st part, p. 17, and in this same part, Order No. 4 for groups of armies and armies, 22759, of Dec. 22, 1917. ~~Annexe~~ Annexe No. 26.
- (2) ~~Sec.~~ Report of Marshall, Defensive campaign. 1st part, p. 18, cf. also in same part. Instruction for application of order No. 4, 26510, Jan. 24, 1918. ~~Annexe~~ Annexe No. 42 and note for large units. Battle of Riga, 1571, Feb. 2, 1918. ~~Annexe~~ annexe No. 52.

the commander of our groups of armies, and of armies could allow the sacrifices of ground, if occasionally hard, it is true, which were imposed on the defense; a little later, June 9, at the battle of Matz, one agreed, that if the superior commander convinced himself better of the value of new principles, he had not been able to obtain still all the combattants, not the same conviction, especially the indispensable skill to apply conveniently a defensive tactic, moreover, delicate.

At the end of June still he was not longer permitted to keep the least doubt; experience, acquired on Matz, was to be regarded as conclusive. The Commander in Chief was firmly decided to obtain a strict application of a uniformity of his orders on the conduct of the battle; from this time, in the course of this visit to the armies, he multiplied then, on this subject, the communications with the commanders of army groups, and armies, the commanders of army corps and divisions, the commanders of large groups of artillery, he provoked the discussion, went beyond the objections, so as not to leave any hesitation in the minds of the chiefs. Indeed, he was no more concerned with leading into our staff the conviction of the value of our defensive doctrine; at the first of July, this result was acquired; on the other hand, it was important to wipe out in the application of the doctrine, all the hesitations, the divergences of ideas, and really, they were still relatively numerous and important; some existed even in the High Command.

In the presence of the results obtained by the German attacks since March 21, the Commander in Chief of the Allies had been naturally led to seek new proceedings capable to permitting to the defense an

effective resistance; on June 13, in a note addressed to the different commanders in chief, he made known his ideas on the subject. First, General Foch saw the value of the importance of examination of information, so as to discover the plans of the adversary, and from it, to remove the benefit of surprise; he placed then, at the first, for the defense thus given notice of, and since the first menaces of attack, the obligation of having occupied, simultaneously and in advance, the first and second positions by sufficient numbers. The enemy would not then be able to pronounce in our arrangement a terrible rupture, like that of March 21, or that of May 27. (1) Of course, the General Foch did not expect that it was useful, and above all, possible to occupy the second position as solidly as at first; on the contrary, he judged indispensable to keep, to the advance, the principal points of it, to be able to constitute a covering which would assure the arrival of the most important reserves.

Indeed, the Commander in Chief comprehended perfectly the advantage of reinforcing, before all attacks, a front menaced and to occupy at the very first, with sufficient forces, the second position. It seemed to him on the contrary inopportune to make this doctrine descend down to the subordinate echelons, when they were not sure of being able to give them the means to apply them. Was it possible to affirm that there would be information in time and of a sufficient type precise enough to prepare, in advance a part an important one, of our reserves? Admitting then even that we succeeded in obtaining, in the desired time, the complete knowledge of the plans of the adversary, did we have the means, at the end of the month of June, to increase in a quite con-

(1) General Foch. Note 1454, June 16. Correspondence of General Foch No. 4. ██████ Annexe No. 1.

siderable manner, all the army which seemed menaced? The Commander in Chief believed that he should formulate these objections to General Foch, he wrote to him:

"Personally, it seems to me, in the present situation of our disengaged forces, it is excessively dangerous to grant the principle which the commander has the obligation, since one attack is foreseen, to appropriate to the menaced sector such forces that the first and second position can be occupied simultaneously before the attack by sufficient numbers.

Before May 27, the attack could be foreseen on one or on the two of the Ist, Vith or IVth Armies. I was quite far from being able to realize for these four armies the conditions whose note made an obligation for the commander. And even if before May 6, the foreknowledge of attack had been limited in a certain manner to only the Vith Army, I was not ready to give to that army the double play of divisions, with a front force of 4 or 5 kilometers, which seemed to me to reply to the 'sufficient numbers' which you ask." (1)

In fact, the precision of the information which we obtained, in the first days of July, on the plans of the enemy in Champagne, permitted us to prepare and lead our defensive battle following the conceptions developed by General Foch in his letter of June 16. Thus there disappeared quickly a divergence of ideas, which, formerly, had always been slight, since it had been provoked, less by an indifference of conception, relative to the conduct of the defensive battle than by the system of knowing if it were opportune to recommend

(1) Letter to General Foch, 20654, June 17. Register of Orders 102.
~~Annexe~~ annexe No. 2.

to the executants a system which they were not sure could be put into practice. On the contrary, the trouble was more grave to the armies.

The agreement was a little less unanimous concerning the obligation of reporting the defense on a position chosen at some distance behind the first lines, it was also on the necessity of arranging into echelons, in back of this position, the forces of the defense. The confusion commenced with the application of these principles. How should the battle position be chosen? What was the force of the outposts to maintain between this position and first line? At the moment of attack, what conduct should the outposts have? The occupation of the battle position should be made in a continuous fashion, on the contrary, did it have to adopt an arrangement by centers of resistance, largely separated, flanking reciprocally their intervals? How should the occupation of the second position be realized? All these questions, as well as others still, stirred up discussion and received the most diverse solutions. It was essential to put back in the minds uniformity in the application of the doctrine; finally, it was necessary to hasten in order to avoid, at the last moment, these troublesome changing of arrangements, to which we had been constrained, on the eve of the battle of Metz. Some questions, so indispute, carried certain general solutions applicable in all eventualities; the Commander in Chief indicated them rapidly to his subordinates in some directions as brief as possible. But he was also presented with some concrete cases, each of which required a particular examination; for them, the Commander in Chief was made to submit them in the course of his visits to the armies, and stopped the part he had just taken.

After June 24, the first written indications were given by a note to the groups of armies and armies; this document was destined to recall the simple rudiments, found henceforth, at the base of our defensive tactic, so as to cause to vanish first the principal differences of ideas. The Commander in Chief expressed himself in these terms:

"I. The main battle position chosen by the commander of the army is that on which he wishes to stop and fight the enemy.

It is then for the preservation of this position that he will effect the largest part of his forces of all kinds; the infantry, field artillery, and heavy trench artillery.

In front of this position, there are placed some outposts in strength sufficient to survey the enemy and stop the attempts of little importance.

In back of the main battle position, the existing organizations help the large units who are arriving for reinforcement, to cling to their terrain and they constitute thus, in case of a break in the position of resistance, first a barrier then a base of departure for the retaking of the lost terrain. This second battle position will utilize advantageously a natural entrenchment of the terrain.

II. The attention of the command of the army should, consequently, be centered, especially, on the solidity of his main battle position, since it is for the possession of this position that he will deliver the battle.

The choice of this position will be dictated by the following considerations:

1. The main battle position, to play the role, should be found sheltered from the dense part of the firing of the enemy's preparation, in particular, the action of the minenwerfer, or at 2,000 meters at least from the enemy's front.

2. The main battle position should be made of the joining of points of support naturally powerful and to offer a continued defense to avoid infiltrations; but it is important that the exact layout of this position escape the observation of the enemy, that the visible parts be confused in a network of very apparent works.

III. The division and duties of the units comes from the part of the diverse positions thus defined:

On the main battle position the mass, the infantry and artillery, that is to say, the two-thirds or three-quarters of the numbers; to hold on to the extreme to counterattack, to retake the lost terrain, not to abandon the fight under any pretext;

On the position of the outposts, the minimum of forces, which are necessary strictly to assure the surveillance at all times, to stop the attempts or partial attacks, to weaken and break up the larger attacks, to the benefit of the position of resistance; the unique role, chosen for each of the elements of the outposts (falling back or resistance), should be fixed with precision in a written consignment, of which the commander of the division is responsible;

On the second battle position, to place the ^{reserve} division^r and the reserve artillery if the army has possession of ^{it}~~it~~; lacking it, to call upon the available elements of the army, territorial battalions, C.M.P. (Reserve machine gun groups), C.I.D. (Division train^mCenter), batteries in reserve, so as to keep at least the points crossing and the essential observation until the arrival of the reserves.

These precepts apply to the established fronts.

On these fronts it is able to foresee some sectors where it is impossible to allow a definite abandonment of the points of support occupied by the outposts. Even then, it is not a reason to accumulate troops, these would be destroyed, they would lose both troops and terrain. In this case, it is necessary to place his forces further back, in view of counterattacking and to retake the position if it comes close to being lost.

In the sectors where the front is a result of a quite recent battle, as long as the enemy is not reorganized for a new massive attack, it cannot be a question of yielding again the terrain. The arrangement can be different.

Each should be penetrated on these principles which have inspired the instruction of January 24, 1918, for the application of the Order No. 4.

Concerning the counterattack, it is certainly the best means of action against the enemy, but it should not be hasty, unconnected or rushed into. It would have all its effect only if it is executed in a perfectly defined purpose, to conserve, or take again a determined line, with a support of firing, always, with the support of the artillery every time possible." (1)

Nevertheless, the Commander in Chief ascertained in his visits to the armies, during the last days of June, a troublesome tendency to scatter the forces on all the field of battle, under the pretext of forming troops in echelons; he addressed then, on July 2, to the commanders of groups of armies and armies, a new order, destined to

(1) Note for Army groups and armies, 29473, June 24, 1918. Register of orders 102. Annex No. 3.

complete and make more clear that of June 24, on this essential point of the initial division of the defense troops. He wrote:

"The bits of information taken from recent battles have shown that the organization of a 'field of battle of an army equipped on all its extent', such as it is defined in the note of April 20, 1918, No. 21356, has given place in application to a dissemination of forces against which it is urgent to react.

Consequently the note No. 21356, of April 20, 1918, is annulled.

Henceforth it is understood:

That the forces should not be scattered out over the field of battle of the army;

That their mass infantry, and artillery, should unite to the defense to the end, of the main battle position;

That this main battle position should offer a continued defense.

The organization of a continued defense of the main battle position is important. It alone, indeed, can reply efficiently to the use of smoke projectiles, thanks to which the enemy's infantry hides their approach and succeeded, in the zones where they sought a rapid progression, to reduce considerably the value of the flanking fire which our groups of combat reciprocally assured. But this idea of continuity by no means implies the return to the previous 'du combat en ligne deployee dans un simple tranchee.' (Of combat in line in one trench).

The formation into echelons of the combattants, by groups of specialists in the sense of the size and extent (1) is the result

(1) Instruction for organization of terrain (Aug. 22, 1917) 1st part, Chap. III p. 26.

of the link of forces on the different parallels of the main battle position. There is a question only:

Of linking the resistance to an organization continue'
du terrain (i.e. the obstacle and the cover);

Of distributing the means of fire in such a manner that all the existing intervals being especially diminished that the terrain is better covered ~~and~~ more favorable to the movements of infiltration." (2)

The application to the artillery of the principles of defense, placed by the General in Chief, was envisioned in a special note of June 27; it demanded, in the point of view of the deployment of the batteries, their arrangement into echelons, their concealment, some simple rules;

"The normal place for the artillery is behind the main battle position.

The field artillery and the heavy short artillery of old model should be able to execute the firing of counter-preparation which developes upon them on the eventual zone of union, and of the discharge of the attacks, i.e. up to 1,500 to 2,000 meters beyond our line of outpost;

The heavy long-artillery of all models, the short modern heavy artillery should be placed in a manner to be useful in counter-battery;

The heavy artillery of great power should watch the possibility of executing the firing of interdiction on the communications of

(2) Note for the groups of armies and armies, July 2, 1918. Register of orders 102. Annexe No. 10.

the enemy and the harassing on their important establishments ... The echelonment should be realized in the artillery of all calibers, in view of crossing the plan of neutralization of the enemy, in scattering their firing, and on the other hand, to assure the continuity of the execution of the missions ...

The arrangement of the artillery should be hidden from the enemy, in order to throw off their units of observation and of ranging and consequently, of restraining the efficiency of their shots of counter-battery.

This result will be obtained by camouflaging carefully the positions, by giving to the batteries the defilade consistent with their duty and especially by resorting to the measure of precaution exposed the following:

1. To maintain silently, except in case of necessity, the barrage batteries in position...

2. To execute most of the daily firing of the Corps artillery and the modern heavy Corps artillery from the temporary emplacements which the batteries will occupy only momentarily...

The security of the artillery results principally from the fact that all the batteries are placed behind the main battle position.

The arrangements for the defense drawn nearer are nevertheless taken in all the batteries." (1)

An instruction on the utilization of the cavalry in the defensive battle completed the series of directions given by the General in Chief;

(1) Note for armies, 33545 June 27, 1918. Register of orders 102.
Annexe No. 6.

it is recalled that the necessity of conserving united, before the battle, the cavalry divisions, of drawing near the front from the beginning of the attack, of engaging them reunited and thoroughly, if the enemy succeeded in breaking our arrangement. The Commander in Chief ordered at the same time the use ~~mounted~~ of the divisional squadrons and cavalry corps, each time that the operation took on the character of a battle of movement. (2)

The principles thus neatly formulated, there remained to realize from them the application in the armies; it was easy for the IVth Army. From the beginning of the year, in fact, and in particular since the first of April, soon after the battle of March 21, General Gouraud endeavoured to convince his troops of the doctrine, recommended by order of December 22, 1917; he had had, then, from the month of April to the month of July, time quite necessary to regulate the details of application and to take the precautions that demanded delicate tactics. The terrain occupied by his army was marvellously ready for the starting of the execution of new defensive proceedings; we were established there since the last of 1915, and except in 1917, for the conquest of the Massif of Moronvilliers, it was no longer surrendered to important combats; they had then been able to draw away, to multiply and especially to perfect its positions. In these conditions, it was relatively easy, on the front of the IVth Army, to arrange that the resistance be carried out systematically, before the attack on the ~~positions~~ intermediary positions; (3) this, established at a mean distance of 3 kilometers from our first line, logically seated on the terrain,

(2) Note for armies, 29686, June 24, 1918. Register of orders.
Annexe No. 4.

(3) ~~See~~ Chart No. 4. Situation of armies of G.A.C. and G.A.R., July 15, A.M., the position of resistance is shown there by a green line.

solid, supported with all the organs of defense necessary, sheltered, of posts of command, was itself superior to the first position, where we were set, for the combat, for our offensive of September 1915.

Only the IVth Corps showed a veritable repugnance at abandoning voluntarily to the enemy, this massif of the Monts, bought dearly in 1917, and from which one has dominion, as from a turret of all the plain of Champagne up to Vesle and the Marne; the Commander in Chief was to give the formal order that the Monts should be evacuated, before the attack, like all the other points of our first position; there, as everywhere, they would maintain on position only the outposts on some determined points.

To the VI Army, one could ^{not} expect, in spite of the value of the obstacle made by the Marne, to install the position of resistance on the ~~same~~ ^{very} bank of the river; ^{it would have} ~~it has~~ been permitted to the enemy to crush surely, under its preparatory shooting, the infantry of the defense; a mistake had also been made by not taking advantage of the difficult situation of the assailant, obliged first to cross over the Marne, then to gain rapidly the terrain necessary for their first deployment. The main battle position was then transferred to one or two kilometers only, to the south of the river, which some single outposts would watch; thus, our infantry, established on the buttresses of the valley, would be able to fight effectively ^{and only} unless the points of crossing that the enemy should choose, ^{had} ~~at least~~ the zone in which these units would ^{have to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~united~~, then to deploy, after having worked their passage. The artillery again sought the position from which it would be able to carry out a powerful action on the same course of the river. In spite of the fact that the Commander in Chief has succeeded in con-

vincing the commander of the 3rd Army Corps of the necessity of adopting this defensive attitude, the commander whose first intention was to resist on the ^{west} same bank of the river, the measures of execution taken to take back the resistance on the heights to the south of the Marne, were to remain still finally insufficient.

The Vth Army was found in a situation more delicate than our two wing armies, since, according to all probabilities, it would have precisely to support, between Reims and the Marne, the principal effort of the adversary, stabilized since the middle of June only after some hard combats of Aisne; it had disposed since then only those numbers too limited to be able to push forward rapidly its defensive organization. To the left, immediately to the north of the Marne, the Vth Corps was in line with the two same divisions, since the end of May, to the right wing, the 1st Corps of the Colonial divisions, had for a long time still the salient of Reims; only, the 2nd Italian Corps, with its two divisions, was entered in sector at a more recent date. Thus, the commander of the Army, General Buat (1) would consider, at the end of the month of June, that the prescriptions of the Commander in Chief for the conduct of the defensive battle, would not apply to his front, that it would not be considered as stabilized; he transmitted then to his subordinates the note of June 24 of the Commander in Chief, by making it follow these instructions:

"The note made clear the reference that it applied only to the definitely stabilized fronts.

When the moment will come, the plan of defense of the army will indicate the position of resistance; for the time being, there is not an inch of terrain to be lost.

(1) General Buat, named on July 5 the Major General of French Armies of North and Northeast, was to be replaced, at this very date, by General Berthelot.

The Army Corps not being able, on the other hand, to try to guard against an offensive of great outflanking, an undefined stretch of terrain, they will be considered responsible for the portion of terrain up to position, Reuil, Pourcy, Chamery, Villers-Allerand, Rilly, Verzenay, on which they are beyond having to have garrisons of safety until the arrival of the divisions of reinforcement." (2)

A consideration of another order intervened also, and more forceful yet, so that the Commander of the Vth Army could not consider without some repugnance the deliberate abandon of its first lines before the menaces of the German attack, after June 8, in fact, they saw that the Vth Army had received order to keep prepared to take rapidly the offensive in the direction of Fismes; since then, it had remained continually oriented, not only in a defensive sense, but also toward the crossing to the offensive; until the time for the battle, it will stay in the same situation. In these conditions, General Buat, first, then Berthelot, his successor, then, did not consider without regrets the loss of certain points of their first line whose maintenance in our hands would have facilitated our eventual attack.

General Maistre, commanding the G.A.C. did not share their idea; he considered indispensable the matter of giving the step at this time to the necessary defensives; also, on July 3, he ordered the revision of the plan of the defense of the Vth Army, in sense of the order of June 24, and he ended his instruction in these terms:

"... The differences of application, which concerned the fronts resulting from a quite recent battle, apply no more to the front of the Vth Army, stabilized in fact for a month, It is not

(2) Vth Army. Note 736/ , June 25, 1918. Annexe No. 5.

possible to expect to lay out a plan of defense in a firm fashion, the modifications which the plans considered for the attack will bring to the present front, by reason of the uncertainty of the dates which will be able to be fixed for the execution of these plans." (1)

Two days later he renewed these same orders to General Berthelot, asking him to hasten as much as possible the executions. (2)

Following the orders of General Maistre, at the beginning of July 7, some important modifications were brought forward for the plan of defense of the Vth Army; the line of resistance was carried back, on an intermediary position; it was maintained in front only by some ordinary outposts. (3) Nevertheless, there escaped neither the Commander in Chief nor General Maistre, the fact that there remained some traces, in the different echelons of the commander of the Vth Army of some successive modifications supported by the plan of defense. General Berthelot furthermore persisted in considering that the best solution, in case of attack on their front, remained still to pass as soon as possible to the offensive, and he arranged his army corps in this direction. Finally, the Commander in Chief and General Maistre, assured that their orders for the conduct of the defensive battle would be applied in throughout, made some concessions; they thought then that certain centers, situated in front of the position of resistance, such as Bois de Rarrey, the Bois des Eclisses, the Hill 240, and whose position was judged by General Berthelot, important to conserve in view of the offensive, would be "defended to the end", and their garrison reinforced; the turnings, taken by the battle of the Vth Army, should have shown soon that this modification of rules to our defensive tactic presented in fact, only inconveniences.

(1) G.A.N. Gen. Maistre to Comdr. Vth Army, 4280, July 3, 1918. Annexe No. 14.

(2) G.A.N. Gen. Maistre to Gen. Comdr. Vth Army. 4456, July 5, 1914.
Annexe No. 22.

(3) ~~See~~ Chart No. 4, 200,000th, the outline of the position.

Toward the 12th of July, the Commander in Chief had acquired the certainty that the battle of the G.A.C. was to be led, in a general manner, by his subordinates in a fashion strictly conforming to his directions. On the spot and personally, he was assured that his orders were conceived even in the ranks of the troop and would be applied without difficulty, without hesitation; by the end of the month of June, each army was executing their alarm drilling in which all the elements, troops and services took simultaneously the arrangements that had been prescribed for them, in case of attack, for the plan of defense; the units were carried on the emplacements which they were to occupy in reality, and remained there generally 24 hours. The measures, taken in the armies, from July 6 to 9, in a period in which they had thought at one time that the attack of the enemy imminent, showed equally as well that all was to point of view of battle.

To the different echelons of the command, as in the troops, all strived with spirit in these last preparations. To the Vth Army notably, where the organization of the terrain was ready, they multiplied in the zone of the outposts the traps set for the enemy to lure them under the machine guns of the light detachments, maintained before the position of resistance; they prepared the infection by "yperite of the shelters", which we were going to abandon. (1) Everywhere on the front of the group of Armies, they executed some raids, to take some prisoners and procure for us some information. From July 6, our artillery effected every night some violent harassing, firing on the communications of the enemy; they accumulated the munition near the batteries, and especially, near those destined to defend the passage of the Marne, the poison shells, in particular those charged with yperite, with which they had just been supplied.

(1) IV Army. Note. 6793/3 July 12, 1918. Annexe No. 51.

THE BATTLE

On July 15, 1918 (1)

The information procured by the armies of the G.A.C. in the day-time on July 13, confirms correctly that which we received previously; they lead us to believe that the German attack will be produced, a little nearer, certainly, on the night of the 13th or 14th at the latest on the 14th or 15th. The observation posts, the outposts, the air service, signal a marked increase in the circulation on the trails, routes, railways. In the evening, the three armies take their arrangement of combat; the outposts are only maintained on the first position; the mass of the infantry occupies the position of resistance, the reserves are established on the second position. To the 4th Army, they are applying minutely the arrangements foreseen for the plan of defense; they are destroying most of the shelters and the tunnels of the first position; those which remain intact are infected with the yperite; they are maintaining in the first line only the watchmen, charged with signaling the advance of the enemy's infantry; the mass even of the outposts is drawn back on the parallel with the keeps of the first position. (2)

The night of the 13th to 14th, passed without marked incidents; but on the 14th, the indications for the attack still accentuated; at the close of the day, before the front of the Vth Army, the observers signalled a veritable swarming of the enemy's infantry; at the beginning of the evening then we were completely fixed. In fact, at 8:00 on the front of the 4th Army Corps, a detachment of 366 of the Regiment of the infantry, in the course of a surprise attack, very rapidly led, made 27

- (1) See Chart 4, Situation of G.A.C. & G.A.R. July 15, 1918 in morning.
 (2) IV Army, Report of operations of July 15, 7076/8, July 18, 1918.
 Vth Army report, 339. VI Army Journal of March July 15, 1918.

prisoners. The questioning of these men revealed that the attack of the Germans will be produced in the course of the night; the preparation for the artillery will commence at midnight, 12:10 and will last 3 or 4 hours. (3) The information is soon transmitted to all the armies; between 11 and 11:40 on the whole front of the G.A.C., the French artillery enters into action counter-battering the adverse batteries, ruining the first lines where the German infantry is assembled. The enemy, preceded in the beginning of the firing, stupefied by the numbers of our batteries of which most were disclosed for the first times, could not doubt that their attack had been discovered.

Nevertheless, at the hour indicated by the prisoners, 12:10, the German artillery entered action in their turn, they bombarded violently the first positions, more feebly the second ones, they executed some harassing shots sustained on the parts best chosen of our rear zone, routes, crossroad, bridges. At 1:00 the preparation of the enemy took on all its intensity, to the fire of the artillery was now joined that of the minenwerfer of all calibers.

We were very rapidly fixed on the exact settling of the limits of the front which the German bombardment was fighting. From midnight, 12:40, the commander of the IVth Army, signaled that the enemy's firing extended neither to the east of the Main de Massiges, nor to the west of the Pompelle. To the Vth Army, the salient of Reims was not taken to task; on the contrary, on the Mountain of Reims, the sectors held by the 2d Italian Army Corps and our Vth Corps were violently beaten. To the north of the Marne, the German preparation reached to Chateau-Thierry. (4)

- (3) V Army. Message telephoned to GAC 1318bis/3, 11:00 P.M. July 14, 4th C.A.C. Message telephoned to IVth Army July 14, 1918. 132 Div. Report 1504/3, July 17, 1918. Annexe No. 61.
- (4) IV Army. Message telephoned to Hqrs. and G.A.C., 6878/3 1240 Vth Army message telephoned to G.A.C. 1:10, VI Army July 15, 1918. Annexes 83 & 87.

Between 4 and 5:30 on the enormous front of 90 kilometers which the artillery had thoroughly covered with projectiles, the German infantry was dashing to the assault.

As to the 4th Army, the enemy ran up against from the beginning of its movements, some serious difficulties. Informed by the signals of our signalmen, left in the first line, our artillery had curtailed rapidly their firing; his shells accompanied without check the German infantrymen whom the destruction and poisoning of the shelters required them to come out, exposed in full view, or huddled in the boyaux (connecting trenches) and the trenches to our counter-preparation; our tactical groups, replied from the first position, obstructed thus considerably the march of the enemy by the fire furnished by their numerous machine guns. At 5:25, one hour and ten minutes after their departure to the attack, the German infantry was still stopped before the redoubts of our first position energetically defended by the ~~Mass~~ of our position of resistance; at their left wing, they had not been able to succeed in casting us from the Main de Massiges. Most of our elements of outposts, although dissolute and encircled, continued to operate violently by their firing, they placed thus in a very difficult situation the assailing infantry.

A little before 8, the enemy continued the vigorous attempts against our position of resistance; they made their principal effort from one part and another, and in the vicinity of the valley of the Suipe, in the direction of Proanes, against the IVth Corps, in the direction of Souain against the 21st Corps; these attacks continued powerless, our two corps of armies maintained entirely their positions and inflicted on their enemy some bloody losses; our artillery took

under their fire some enemy columns which were passing to the Monts, without precaution, as if they had been assured that the infantry of the divisions of attack had already to a large extent progressed across our positions. At 11:00 in the morning, a sensible lull was produced on all the front of the IVth Army; General Gouraud concluded from it that the enemy, disoriented by the conduct of our defense, was preparing itself to the attack of our position of resistance. (1)

On the front of the Vth Army, the German infantry, starting the assault at the same hour as before the IVth Army, was progressing more easily. At 9:00 our intermediary position was attacked from the Aisne to Marne; it was lost to the south of the river; the violence, the largeness of the effort proved clearly that the enemy had not men, in the course of his movement across the zone of outposts of the Vth Army, a disorganization similar to that which it had been given by the IVth Army. A little before 10:00 General Berthelot, in a report to General Maistre, appreciated the situation on his front in these terms:

"... the corps Pelle is rather put to the proof, as well as the left of the Italian Corps. I am taking the 7th Division to the junction of the two corps and I am putting it under the orders of General Pelle, but I fear that this is insufficient. On the other hand, I am worried concerning what is going on south of the Marne. I have no more any reserves to my left, as well as to the north and south of the river. Corps Albert has encountered some serious losses in artillery, I ask from necessity a regiment to be sent me." (2)

- (1) IV Army message telephoned to GAC, 6:10, to Headquarters 8:45.
Telegraph to GAC, 9:00, Message telephoned to 8th, 21st and 4th
Corps, 6906/3, 2:00, July 15, 1918. Annexes Nos. 84 and 85.
(2) V Army message telephoned to GAC 9:50 July 15, 1918. Annex No.90.

At 9:00 the situation of the Vth Army became still worse. Toward noon, to the 2d Italian Corps, except in the north of the Ardre, the position of resistance was completely lost; the Italian infantry, very much tried, was carefully reestablished on the second position, on which the enemy seemed already to prepare to attack; they were signalling from the assault echelons in considerable number between Marfaur and Chaumuzy. The Vth Army Corps maintained itself still on the intermediary position, but they could not hope to be able to maintain for long their resistance; very much menaced on their right by the progress of the enemy, it was also violently attacked on its front; particularly, the 8th Division was found in a difficult situation; reduced to 5 battalions, following the disappearance of the four battalions which it had left at the outposts, it had also lost the support of the artillery, placed initially on the south bank of the Marne. (1)

The events which were happening to the Vth Army were no less preoccupying; here also, the enemy accomplished in the course of the afternoon, some extremely rapid progress. During the night, in the course of preparation effected by its artillery, the German artillery had commenced the crossing of the Marne; their first divisions passed in boats, while most awaited the taking of the bridges and foot-bridges to which numerous units of pioneers were working. The light outposts, left by us on the same bank of the river, crushed under a formidable bombardment of artillery and of minenwerfer, were faced with the impossibility of hindering or even of constraining seriously the passage of the enemy; moreover, they were rapidly driven back by the first German elements, who, after their debarking on the south bank, were

(1) V Army, message telephoned to GAC, 4:45, 6:15, 9:40 No. 1321/3 9:50, 11:30, 13:00, 5th Army Corps. 8th Division. Journals of march July 15, 1918. Annexes Nos. 88, 89, 90.

forcing themselves to gain the terrain necessary and to facilitate the deployment of the units which they were anticipating. Our artillery, on their side, intervened in a fashion reasonable different; to the west, that of the 38th Army Corps well placed to fight, or to enfilade the river, hindered considerably the crossing of the German infantry from Gland to Jaulgonne and Barzy; it prohibited in this region, a little less completely the construction of bridges and foot bridges. To the 3rd Corps of Army, on the contrary, it seems that the action of the artillery is made to feel much less efficient. The enemy succeeded easily their crossing in boats; it led to the construction of bridges and foot bridges from Barzy to Verneuil.

From 5:30 between Fossoy and Vassieux (south of Verneuil), the infantry of the Germans was approaching our positions; the effort was being made particularly forcefully, on the front of the 3rd Corps, there where the crossing had been more easy; the 51st Division and the right of the 125th were rapidly forced back from the position of resistance; more to the left, on the contrary, to the 38th Corps of army, the 3rd American division, kept itself more in its entirety, from Fossoy to Crezany. At 6:00, the enemy pursued energetically the success obtained against the 3rd Corps of Army toward 9, their advanced detachments came into contact, from Comblizy to La Chapelle-Monthodon, and shortly up to Saint-Agnas, with our second position; they knocked up against the 20th Division there, reserved from the 3rd Corps and some very strong elements of the 51st and 125th Division. Happily, to the left of the 3rd Corps, some elements of the 125th Division, clinging energetically to the ground and facing to east on the heights on the right bank of the Surnelin, kept the enemy from increasing the gap

and from coming to take the flank of the 38th Corps. In this army corps the 3rd Division of Americans continued to maintain before its main battle position the German units, rather disunited by the dangerous crossing of the river, which they had just effected. (1) The enemy had carried off from the VI Army no less than a complete success; before 10:00 they had effected, to the south of the Marne, a pocket, 14 kilometers in length, 5 or 6 in depth; moreover, they possessed on the river an approach sufficient for the continuation of their offensive.

From our side meanwhile, in the earliest hours of the morning, General Maistre and 3 commanders of the army commenced to engage methodically their reserves following the needs of the battle. From the first, it had been evident that the fight was taking place from the east of Reims, to the Main de Massiges, according to our former previsions; this impression was confirmed as time went on, the battle of the IVth Army, was fought in good conditions. With the assent of the General Maistre, General Gouraud contented himself then at the beginning of the morning with pressing more closely together, the 52d Division on its head elements; this precaution permitted if it were necessary, to make the division intervene easily, profitably, to the 21st Corps or the IVth Corps. On the other hand, convinced that the German attack would no longer extend toward the east, General ^{Gouraud} took from his right, the 8th Corps, the 63rd Division in its entirety and two regiments of riflemen: these elements would come to form in the region of Somme-Tourbe, Hans, in a reserve group, placed under the orders of General Ecohard, commander of the 63d Division. (2)

(1) VI Army, Message telephoned to G.D.G. and G.A.C., 9:20, 5:00 P.M. Journal (Message Center) of march, July 15 - 3 Army Corps. Report 1387/3 D July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 94 and 95.

(2) IV Army, messages telephoned to 16th Corps, 52d Division, 6890/3; to II Army, 6881/3, 1:10; to 8 Corps 6892/3, July 15, 1918.

The problem was more difficult to the Vth and Vith Army. General Berthelot was to play immediately with their reserves of which he properly arranged to reinforce the parts of its front which were the most menaced; the 7th Division was directed on Cormoyeux, to the disposition of the Vth Corps, so as to permit the General Pelle to stop the progress of the enemy on the north bank of the Marne; the 1st Colonial Corps was invited to intervene on the right of the Italian Corps with all its available reserves. (3). To the Vith Army, General Degoutte switched no less rapidly his army reserves; he gave the order to General de Yontdesir, commander of the 38th Corps, to use the 73d Division to counterattack in the direction of Courthiezy to relieve the 3rd Corps; he approached the ground of the battle with the 4th Division, which was taken in march toward Fontenelle. (4)

At the headquarters Commander in Chief had had very rapidly some knowledge on the reports of the G.A.C. of its first events of battle: at the break of day the aerial division confirmed and completed the information coming from the armies. Between 8:00 and 9:00 already, the Commander in Chief could make thus a sufficient idea of the general physiognomy of the battle on the front of the G.A.C; he distinguished clearly that the IVth Army was fighting in good conditions while to the contrary the Vth and Vith Army found themselves in a bad situation. The violence of the effort of the Germans on the north bank of the Marne, the dimensions of the pocket, so rapidly created to the south of the river, did not cease to be disturbing; they risked seeing the enemy separated one from another the Vth and Vith Armies, as they could continue

(3) V Army, Message telephoned to 1st CAC, 1322/3 10:25 to 2d Italian Corps 1324/3, 11, July 15, 1918.

(4) VI Army Message telephoned 38 Corps 7:35 4th Div. 10:05 July 15, 1918.

in the direction of Epernay, so dangerous for our positions from the Mt. of Reims. Thus, since before 9, in order to permit the General Maistre to come as soon as possible to the aid of General Berthelot and General Degoutte, the Commander in Chief placed at his disposal three divisions and a division of cavalry (77, 18, 131 Divisions, 1st D.C.) (1)

At 9 meanwhile the German attack was pursued violently to the south of the Aisne, it made such progress on the left bank of the Marne, that the General in Chief was led to consider if the defensive battle was not going to necessitate soon a number of divisions much more considerable than they had supposed before it broke out.

It was impossible to borrow, at this time, any important reserves for the right wings of the G.A.C.; without doubt, the battle was taking a good turn for the IVth Army, but it was only beginning and General Gouraud expected to see the enemy attempt soon a vigorous effort against our position of resistance. Already, a division (131st) of the Corvisart Group (16th Corps of the Army) had been given to General Maistre for the Vth Army; a second division (52d) of this same group assembled themselves in the region of Saint-Remy-sur-Bussy, in order to be able to intervene if need be, in favor of the IVth Army who regarded these units as sent for its disposal. In these conditions, the Corvisart Group found itself reduced, before 9:00 to the elements of two divisions (127 and 78); in reality, the 68th Division, in the course of recovering, would not be available before the 18th at the earliest; the 127th could be available only after recovery by another division of its elements still in line. (2) Thus, to the east of the Marne,

(1) Vth Army Message telephoned to the 38th Corps, 7:35, 4th Division, 10:05, July 15, 1918.

(2) Main Headquarters. Message telephoned from Aerial Division, 10:30, July 15. Report of Aerial Division and 2180, 2181, July 16. Message telephoned to G.A.C., 8:15, 9:05, July 15, 1918. Annexes Nos. 64, 65, 101, 102.

and up to the Suisse, there remained as reserves, not engaged in battle, only one division, the 9th and a cavalry division, the 5th; the 22d British Corps, to two divisions, would not commence to ~~arrive~~ until the 16th.

To the west of the Marne and now that he had given to General Maistre the 77th and 18th Divisions (3) the General in Chief had only one reserve division, the 10th, placed at the west of Epernay; he would place on the 18th only, the 14th Division, in the course of debarking, the 15th, in the region to the north of Avize. He could not hope that the other forces would arrive in sufficient time, all the French reserves were already in the battle of the G.A.C., on in the course of concentration for the offensive of the G.A.R. The English divisions which should follow those of the 22d Corps of the English forces had not yet left the British armies; the General in Chief knew that Marshall Haig disliked directing them to the French zone. (4)

In these conditions, would it be better to let the G.A.R. pursue its preparation for the counteroffensive of the 10th and 6th Armies? If this were decided for the solution, it happened not to destroy the inconveniences; the most serious was to place us in the impossibility of taking the mass of the reserves, assembled for the offensive, between the Oise and Marne, some units which could be indispensable to us to close the breach opened by the enemy in the direction of Epernay. Thus, the operation of the G.A.R. not being able to commence before July 18, we left three days to the enemy to continue their progress to the south of the Marne, perhaps to chase us from the Mountain of Reims,

(3) Telegram of the Commander of the G.A.E., 1527-28/C. 11:45,
July 16, 1918.

(4) 18th Division should not debark near Orbais except at night.

and to force the left wing of the IVth Army to a movement of delicate drawing back. In order that the hammer blow of the G.A.R. produce its effect, we were going to have to keep at all price in possession of the anvil constituted by the Mountain of Reims the loss of the massive comprised all the success of our counteroffensive for which we discounted largely, the difficult position of the enemy in the straight salient of Chateau-Thierry.

If we guarded the possibility of placing the reserves destined to the G.A.R., the divisions which could become necessary to the G.A.C., it was possible to raise rapidly a counteroffensive which would keep back the enemy on the north bank of the Marne. The operation was easy, they would give to it the powerful forces; they would attack the enemy divisions, ventured beyond the river, still outside of the situation where they could be supported by the reserves or by sufficient artillery. The success would be important to us, undoubtedly, with the re-establishment of a solid communication between our 5th and 6th Armies, the conservation of the Mountain of Reims, as indispensable to the development of our defensive battle as to that of the counter-offensive of the G.A.R.

Evidently, this second solution presented the disadvantage of obliging us to stop for some time the preparations of the attack in the course of the G.A.R. Still, this retard did not have seemingly any important repercussion on the execution of the counteroffensive between the Marne and the Aisne; it would certainly be very short, by all means, it would not have as an effect the suppressing of the operation by only of reducing it as little as they could. The Commander in Chief thought,

in fact that in the evening already, he would be sufficiently informed by the course of events seen in the battle, to be able to give some definite instructions; he would indicate then to General Fayolle the means which would remain to him personally to pass to the attack. In these conditions, the offensive to the south of the Aisne would be delayed, at the most 24 hours; perhaps even it would yet be carried out on the 18th.

All these considerations weighed, between 9 and 10, General Commander in Chief decided on the provisory suspension of the preparations of the G.A.R.; he telephoned then to General Fayolle:

"Le Boche has made a pocket to the south of the Marne. Suspend the operation of Mangin to permit me to send your reserves to the battle to the south of the Marne. In particular, the artillery of the second D.I.U.S. should be given over to the 2d D.I.U.S." (1)

Of course, the Commander in Chief did expect to take from the G.A.R. only the forces judged strictly indispensable to coming to the aid of the G.A.C.; he contented himself then with taking from General Fayolle the 168th Division, first destined to the Vith Army, for its attack to the north of the Marne, and the second Corps of Cavalry who were to be engaged behind the 10th Army. If this one obtained a success sufficiently complete to justify the intervention of a mass of cavalry, The loan of forces, made to the G.A.R., remained then rather feeble in order to disorganize neither the operation of the 10th Army nor even that of the Vith Army. (2)

- (1) Headquarters. Message telephoned by Commander in Chief to Commander of G.A.R., 10:00, July 15, 1918. Register of order 105. P.A. 67.
(2) Headquarters. Message telephoned to G.A.C., 9:00, 5:00, 9:30, July 15, 1918. Register of order 105. Annexes 65, 66.

Toward noon, the Commander in Chief judged the situation sufficiently cleared, so that he would give to the G.A.C. definite instruction; he addressed then to General Maistre the following telegram:

"1. The first purpose to attain is to stop especially the enemy. The armies have the necessary means to obtain this result.

2. Then it is necessary to unite the forces sent to the disposition of the G.A.C., that is; 77th, 18th, 168th, 14th, 131st, D.I. 1st and 2d C.C. for a counteroffensive on the two flanks of the pocket, formed to the south of the Marne, in view of rejecting completely the enemy to the north of the river.

3. At the same time, once the enemy is stopped, the 4th and 5th Armies will put them out of the points of position of resistance where they had put foot, and they will have to establish everywhere the positions of the outposts." (2)

At the same time, the Commander in Chief modified the orders given previously for the assembling of the 22d Corps of army of the British. In place of coming to debark on one part and another of the Marne, from Soude-Sainte-Croix to Venault-les-Dames by Vitry, the army corps would be united, more to the west, in reserve of the G.Q.G., from Villenauxe to Fere-Champenois by Sezanne; it will thus be found in a position to intervene in favor, either of the 6th or the 5th Army. (3)

From then, certain of the intentions of the Commander in Chief and of the forces placed at his disposition General Maistre could, in his turn, give to the armies, definite instructions which the situation

(2) Telegram to G.A.C. 810/M, 12:15, July 15 Register of orders 105. P.A. 72.

(3) Telegram to G.A.C. 813/M, 12:15, July 15, Register of orders 105. P.A. 71.

necessitated. Without worries on the conditions, in which the battle of the 4th Army would continue, he judged sufficient, for the moment, the attribution to General Gouraud of one division (52d); as a set-off, he considered indispensable to aiding, as soon as possible, General Berthelot in stopping a grave danger which the rapid advance of the enemy by the two banks of the Marne presented. In these conditions, General Maistre gave to the commander of the Vth Army, the staff office of the 1st cavalry corps, the 1st and 3d divisions of cavalry, the 14th Division. General Berthelot would thus dispose an organ of command, the staff of the 1st corps of cavalry, capable to assure the outcome of the operations on the left bank of the Marne; he would be able to intervene in this region, to the support of the 77th Division, the 3d Division of cavalry and lastly the 14th Division, which began to debark between Avize and Dpermay. While determining thus the conduct of the battle to the 4th and 5th Armies, General Maistre employed himself to raising in a forceful and rapid manner, conforming to the instructions of the Commander in Chief, the counteroffensive to the south of the Marne; he effected for it the most of the reserves placed at his disposal, 4 divisions (18th, 77th, 131st, 168th). The operation was confided to General Degoutte who was to execute it on the 16th; it would need, in all seven divisions of which 5 could be employed in the first line, while the two divisions (131st and 168th) would arrive only to be used in the second line. General Degoutte received order to place himself immediately in the post of commander of the 3d Army Corps, where he would be in a better position to direct the attack. (1)

(1) Headquarters Message telephoned to G.A.C., 11:35, July 15, G.A.C. General Maistre to Commander in Chief, 5392, July 15. Confirmation of telephoned message 5389, 11:30, July 15, 1918. Annexes 70, 77, 78.

General Foch, departed in the morning for Mouchy-le-Chatelm where he was to meet the Marshall Haig, learned only on his journey to Noailles, headquarters for the G.A.R. that the General Commander in Chief had given to General Fayolle, the order to suspend provisionally the preparations of the counteroffensive. The solution, dictated to the General Commander in Chief for the insufficiency of the reserves available for the defensive battle, by the possibility of increasing their number without making appeal to the units of the G.A.R. did not seem to impose itself so clearly to the Commander in Chief of the Allies; he had the conviction in fact that he had already obtained from Marshall Haig, not only the 4 divisions whose embarking he had asked, but others also if he needed them. So, assured of placing the necessary reserves, thanks to the support of the British Armies, and fearing that the border sent to General Fayolle had for an effect the delay too long of the operation of the G.A.R., General Foch addressed to the Commander in Chief, the message telephoned thus:

"Of course, and even to the new event which you should like to tell me, there can be no question of any sort, of weakening or stopping the preparation of Mangin.

In case of urgent and absolute need, you should take there the troops absolutely indispensable, letting me know about it as soon as possible." (2)

Yet it was not without care that General Foch decided for Marshall Haig to continue sending British troops into Champagne. In a note written and sent after the beginning of the meeting of Mouchy-le-Chatel,

(2) General Foch Message telephoned to Headquarters Mouchy-le-Chatel, 12:25, July 15, 1918. Annexe No. 62.

to the Commander in Chief of the Allies, the Commander in Chief of the English Army exposed the fact that he judged sufficient the sending to the aid of the French Armies, the 22d British Corps with two divisions, already in the course of being moved; for him, we did not yet have any serious motives for leaving, from the points of view developed by General Foch in his order No. 4 of July 1; the attacks in Champagne and in Flanders would still remain secondary operations; the principal effort of the enemy would be pronounced between Lens and Chateau-Thierry and more probably form the canal from the Bassee to the Somme. The Commander in Chief of the British Army considered then that they had no sufficient reasons yet to move his own reserves and send them to sustain the French Armies. However, after having heard the arguments of General Foch, who reiterated his request of English divisions, Marshall Haig declared himself ready to send us two new divisions. (1)

The order of General Foch, sent from Mouchy-le-Chatel, at 12:25, made the Commander in Chief determined to send immediately to the G.A.C. and the G.A.R. the new instruction reproduced here:

"1. The enemy has made a pocket to the south of the Marne: between the valley of the Surrmelin and Troissy, attaining the approaches of Comblizy and of Nesle-le-Repons.

2. First it is necessary to reject to the north of the Marne the elements which have crossed it and to put to that operation all the necessary forces.

3. Consequently, I have decided to make appeal to the reserves of the left of the Vith Army. Particularly the 168th D.I. is given to the G.A.C. for the counteroffensive to the south of the Marne.

(1) G.Q.G. British. Telegram to G.Q.D. 9171/M 1:10 P.M., July 15, 1918.
Register of English Army No. 15.

4. General Mangin will continue from another part to prepare his attack in the prescribed conditions:

I shall not appeal to the part of his reserves except in case of urgent and absolute need.

5. Continue to maintain the most strenuous secret on this attack by a strong discipline of the staff and services and troops in the frontier and cantonments." (2)

Besides, the 2d Corps of cavalry was given to the G.A.R. (3) The loan, made to the troops destined to the offensive, was thus found reduced to only one division of infantry (168th).

A little time afterwards, the Commander in Chief ~~at~~ Sezanne first, then ~~at~~ Montmort, Headquarters of the Vth Army, where it passed most of the afternoon, found out that the battle was well turning our way according to the provisions of the morning. To the IVth Army the enemy was wasting itself in desultory efforts against the first line of our main battle position; at 5:00 P.M., it was still stopped, powerless, before that position; meanwhile, we learned that the German mass, sent to the assault against our IVth Army was considerable; 13 new divisions had been identified; joining the 7 divisions, preceding in sector on this part of the front, they constituted then a total of 20 divisions at least. Also, the relative lull which was produced on their front, a little after noon, did not seem always to General Couraud a positive sign that the enemy tried by its defeat, abandoned all plan of offensive; he ~~would try one more~~ for the opening of a new effort which would be produced, shortly against our main battle position. The Commander in Chief decided then, in the course of the afternoon, to place definitely at the disposal of

(2) Telegram to G.A.C., CGGA, G.A.R., 843/M 2:20 P.M. July 15, 1918.
Register of orders 105. Annexe No. 73.

General Maistre in view of their use to the IVth Army, two of these reserve divisions (52d and 10th); they would be placed in reserve divisions of G.G.G. by the 63d Division which would come the next day in the region of Bussy-le-Chateau.

(1) The attribution of a reinforcement of 2 divisions to the 4th Army seemed sufficient in order that the General Gouraud could envision, without any anxiety, in all probabilities, the battle on his front. Late in the evening moreover, the enemy had proceeded still to no renewal of their attack from Pompelle to the Main de Massiges.

The situation of the Vth Army continued to look, on the contrary much less satisfactory. Toward 3:00 P.M., the enemy's progression was pursued in an uninterrupted manner; to the south of the Marne, the 77th Division was to occupy, from the west limit of the Army to Leuvrigny, the second position, where it had gathered some parts of the 10th Division of Colonial Infantry and of territorial units; also, from the north of the Marne to the Ardre, to the exception of the 40th Division, which will maintain itself until about 6:00 P.M., on the position of resistance, all our divisions were already drawn back to the second position; the 8th Division and the 2d Italian Corps had undergone some serious losses. To the right wing of the Army, on the other hand, from Ardre to Pompelle, our troops, before which ~~the~~ enemy confined themselves to some demonstrations, have conserved all their sites; the supporting troops of the left wing of the army increased meanwhile, at each instant, the dangers of our position in the salient of Reims.

(1) Message telephoned to G.A.C. 2:00 P.M., 2:30, 6:00 P.M. 6:10 , 6:20 G.A.C. Message telephoned to IVth Army 552/3 3:40 P.M. IVth Army. Report to G.G.G. and G.C. 6:00 P.M. Journals of march of 4, 8, 21 Corps, July 15, 1918. P.A. Nos. 79, 80, 86. (Message center files).

It was impossible to place to the disposal of General Berthelot some new and important reserves; the Commander in Chief had no more in the reserve of the G.Q.G. of this region than the 10th Division, established to the west of Epernay, he judged prudent not to move that unit until the moment in which he could unite the 22d British Corps, whose landing would commence the next day. They could give to the Vth Army only the last division of the Cavalry Corps (5th D.C.) (2) The measure had at least the advantage of establishing the corps of cavalry entirely from one part and another of the valley of the Marne, in the situation of being employed with all its forces to keeping the union of the two armies.

The progress of the enemy, in the course of the afternoon, was much less accentuated before the right wing of the 6th Army; the German fractions, arrived in the morning in contact with our second position, on the front of the 3rd Army Corps, no longer marked great activity. From 10:00 in the morning our air forces intervened vigorously in the battle; between 10:00 and 11:00 the first time, they had worked against the bridges of the Marne, utilized by the enemy or still in the course of construction, a massive bombardment; they renewed it at 4:00. Toward 3:00, also our artillery reduced in the morning to a relative inaction following the destruction of their arrangement by the German advance, entered again into action vigorously on the points of passage, bridges, foot bridges, which our aviators signaled them. From then, an avalanche of projectiles was beaten down on the valley of the Marne; a German pigeon, captured in our lines, carried this

(2) G.A.C. Message telephoned to Vth Army 5:10 P.M. - Vth Army message telephoned to G.A.C., 1336/3, 3:20 P.M., 1345/3 6:15 P.M. Order for 1st C.C. 1343/3 Order General, 1347/3 July 15, 1918
P.A. Nos. 9, 92, 93.

message: "It is a hell just to cross the bridges of the Marne."

At the same time, the vigorous actions of the infantry indicated to the enemy that they were meeting an adversary whom their attack had not disorganized. At the first of the afternoon, on the 38th Corps, our 73d Division attacked in its turn from the heights of the east of Saint-Eugene toward Courthiezy; meeting, from the beginning of the movement a German attack, it did not realize great progress, but at least it moderated quite decidedly all the efforts made by the adversary to increase toward the west the breach produced in the morning on our lines. (1)

It was still too soon to be able to consider that the lull, unexpectedly fallen at noon, before the right wing of the VIth Army, could be considered as a certain sign of the check of the enemy to the south of the Marne. One should rather think that this attitude of expectation was imposed upon our adversary by the imperious necessity of making pass beyond the river their artillery and their reserves, before taking up their attack against our second position; most certainly, our artillery action now forcibly led, against the bridges of crossing, was of a nature to impede considerably the movements from one bank toward the other; no doubt yet that the German Command was decided to accept the necessary sacrifices and to conquer the most grave difficulties to sustain as soon as possible his troops ventured to the south of the river. On our side, it was more and more evident that it was necessary to hurry to carry out the counteroffensive prescribed by General Commander in Chief; thus, we would take advantage of a time in which the enemy was still ill sustained by their artillery, ill supported, probably by insufficient reserves.

(1) GQG (D.Ae.) Message telephoned 2:30 P.M. July 15. VI Army message telephoned to G.A.C. 2042/3 5:00 P.M. 125th Div. Report of days end. 20th Div. report 767, July 15, 1918. Annexe No. 74.

General Degoutte was actively employed, during all the end of the day of the 15th in promoting an operation; it would be directed by General Lebrus, commander of the 3rd Corps, and should be carried out in the morning of the 16th. The objective was determined for it; it was to deal, by leaving our second position, with pushing back the enemy on the Marne, from Vassieux to Courtemont. The 3rd Army Corps would dispose for its attack five divisions (77, 20, 18, 73, 4); nevertheless, three of them (20, 73, 77) were already engaged, more or less seriously, in the daytime; two others arrived only in the evening, the 18th toward Orbais, the 4th toward Fontenelle, this after a very fatiguing day's march.

In these conditions, General Lebrun organized the counterattack of the 16th, by making intervene, in the first line, only the really available elements, both to the right, from Leuvrigny up to the west of Comblizy, two divisions (77 and 18) and to the left, to the north of Saint-Agnan, one division (73); a detachment mixed of French-Americans (a regiment of the 20th D.I., an American battalion) would bind the two attacks. The 4th Division, pushed forward in the morning of the 16th toward the Woods of Breuil, would aid in the second line of operation. On his side, General Degoutte ordered to unite, behind the 3rd Corps, the two divisions of reserve (168 and 131) which would arrive for it in trucks, one (131) in the morning, the other (168) in the evening of July 16. (2)

The forces, destined to the counteroffensive to the south of the Marne, would they be sufficient to reject completely the enemy on

(2) VI Army, Order for 3d Corps. of Army, 2023/3 12:20. Message telephoned to 168th Division 12:10, 3rd Corps. General order 1196/3 op. 9:30 P.M., July 15, 1918, P.A. No. 95.

the river? Of course, to this question, one could not then reply in the afternoon of the 15th; on the contrary, it was not doubtful that if we had need in this region of supplementary means, we would be able to get them, only those destined to operation of the G.A.R. In fact, the Commander in Chief who now followed closely the events of the battle in the valley of the Marne, was not able to conceal that according to all probabilities he was going to have to reinforce the Vth Army soon; toward 4:00 P.M. this was making itself more and more evident. The solution which was simplest then seemed to transport quickly into the valley of the Marne, to the west of Epernay, the 2d American Division, stationed near La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Without a doubt, the removal of this unit which was to commence, in the same evening, would necessitate an unwedging of the offensive of the G.A.R. but this retardation would be short; it would not exceed 24 hours, time necessary to give General Fayolle the first large fresh unit, of which he could dispose. Moreover, Commander of 10th Army, arranging for his operation, 16 divisions of infantry and 3 divisions of cavalry, could if absolutely necessary attack in the meeting of the American division. The General Degoutte was going to make proof, on July 18, that with 8 divisions, properly used, it was possible to obtain a considerable result. In these conditions about 4:30 P.M., the Commander in Chief exposed the situation to General Foch and asked him the authority to effect the movement of the 2d American Division, if it became indispensable to him. (1)

The point of view of the General in Chief was soon modified, as the information arrived more completely; on the front of the 4th Army the check sustained by the enemy was proving more and more serious;

(1) GQG message telephoned to GQGA 6:45 P.M., July 15, 1918. Register of orders 105. P.A. No. 75.

the lull, maintained since 11:00 in the morning to the south of the Marne, was prolonged toward 5:00, the situation of the Vth Army was preoccupying. Still, if the counteroffensive of General Degoutte was successful to the next morning, one could expect General Berthelot, with reserves already sent to his disposal, would have some sufficient forces to stop the enemy renounced then to all taking from the G.A.R., other than that made in the morning, of the 168th Division; he advised soon General Fayolle that he would hereafter, continue, according to the provisions stopped previously, the concentration in view of his operation. (2)

The operation of the 10th Army was then going to be effected without any diminishing of the forces which had previously been moved, without any modification in time or in execution. The Vth Army only was reduced by one division and remained still in a place to pass to the offensive. At 8:30 P.M., General Fayolle gave an account that the front of attack of this army would be simply diminished; General Degoutte in place of going to the assault, from Ourcq to Clignon, did not extend his right to the south of the Ru d' Allaud. (3)

In the evening, the Commander in Chief could assure General Foch finding him in the G.Q.G. that the battle, on the French front, continued, in its ensemble the course which we had understood him to assign. According to all probabilities, the two days of the 16th and 17th would suffice to G.A.C. to break resistance of adversary; the 18th in the morning, the G.A.R. would pass to the offensive.

(2) Message telephoned to G.A.R. 5:25 P.M., July 15. G.A.R. Telegram to GQG Vth & Xth Armies, 1732, 8:30, July 15, 1918. P.A. Nos. 76 and 82.

(3) G.A.R. Telegram to GQG VI, V, X Armies, 1732, 8:30, July 15, 1918. Annexe No. 82.

VI

THE BATTLE

(On July 16, 1918) (1)

With the night, calm fell on the immense battlefield; it lasted until the early hours of the day, when the fight was resumed on the front.

The enemy renewed its attack on the IVth Army with several renewals in the morning; some bitter fights were carried on, particularly between the Vesle and the Suippe. Yet, the German attempts remained local; the adversary seemed incapable of raising a united operation; nowhere did they gain a result of any importance, whereas in the afternoon our VIIIth Army Corps, pushing forward by its left, reoccupied the reduts of our first position, to the north of the Marson and on the Main de Massiges. At the close of day, General Gouraud judged the situation sufficiently stabilized on our side, so that it was possible to reconquer a position of outposts, to the north of the position of resistance; at 5:00 P.M., he gave the order for it to his commanders of army corps. (2)

On the contrary, for the Vth Army the fight conserved during the day the same character of violence which it had had the day before; the enemy's attacks were developing always forcibly and coordinated. To the south of the Ardre, at the close of the afternoon, the enemy was master of the woods of Courton and had penetrated into Manteuil; they were striking against the energetic defense of the 14th and 120th

(1) Cf. Chart No. 4. Situation of the G.A.C. & G.A.R., July 15, A.M.
Chart No. 5. Situation of the G.A.C. & G.A.R. July 16, A.M.

(2) IVth Army - Messages telephoned to G.A.C., 10:30 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.
Order Army Corps, 6934/3, 5:00 P.M. Journal of Day's progress
for IVth Army, 4th, 8th, 21st Army Corps. July 16, 1918.
Annexes Nos. 111, 112, 113.

divisions, however, in the middle of which still were fighting some very strong fractions of the Italian infantry. More to the south, to the Vth Army Corps, the German success was accentuated also in the same valley of the Marne, where we were to mark, in the evening, a recoil of 2 or 3 kilometers; the 8th Division and the 10th Colonial Division were losing Tincourt, yet the intervention of the 7th Division was making itself felt and the enemy paid dearly for the progress which they were realizing.

The situation of the Vth Army was more difficult still, during the morning, on the south bank of the Marne; apparently in this region, dangerous for use, where the enemy was exercising a particularly violent effort, General Feraud, commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps, did not dispose sufficient forces; since the day before, he had ~~only~~ under his orders only two divisions of cavalry (3rd and 5th), with a regiment of the 10th Colonial Division, and 5 Territorial battalions very tired and weary. Also, toward noon, because of the increase in the German advance, General Maistre considered indispensable the reinforcement, as soon as possible, of the 1st Cavalry Corps; he gave then to General Feraud the 77th Division and sent as reserves, toward Chene-la-Reine, a fresh division, the 131st. (3)

In the evening, moreover, before the front of combat, of the Vth Army, the enemy had marked in the ensemble only a little progress, not very important, 2 or 3 kilometers at the most; to the southeast of Reims, they had failed completely in the attempt on the side 240. Thus, the situation, if one could consider it still as satisfactory,

(3) G.A.C. Order for Vth and Vth Armies 5486 - July 16 - Vth Army Note 1378/3, July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 106, 117.

was not growing worse; a fresh division (9th), from the reserves of Headquarters, was sent to the disposal of General Berthelot and could, on the 17th, support the Vth Army Corps. Moreover, the battle was going well with the Vth Army. (1)

It is for the Vth Army that the situation remains least satisfactory, in the day of the 16th, not that the enemy is succeeding on its side, with only some troublesome progress, but from the fact that we were not yet arriving to keep back in the Marne the enemy forces which had crossed the river to the south. The counterattack produced by General Degoutte did give, indeed, only insufficient results.

After its start, our attack, executed at noon, was striking the adversary, in forces, using numerous machine guns, and favored by a field almost entirely cut up and wooded; to the east of the route of Igny-le-Jard to Dormans, the 77th Division and the right of the 18th were not succeeding in breaking away from their firing positions; to the west, a slight advance was realized by the left of the 18th Division, who attained the Hill 240 and by the mixed Franco-American detachment which rescued Chezy. To the north of Saint-Agnan, finally, on the east bank of Surmelin, the 73rd Division, already weakened by the combats of the day before, was not capable any longer of breaking the resistance offered by the enemy. Of the three divisions reserved (4th, 131st, 168th), to the disposition of either General Degoutte or General Lebrun, commander of the 3rd Corps, none was in a position to intervene; the 131st should have been sent, toward noon, as they thought, to the Vth Army, as a measure of precaution, because of the menacing progress accomplished by the enemy in the valley of the Marne;

- (1) Message telephoned by Comdr. in Chief to Gen. Defieux. Montmort, 4:45 P.M. Order Register 106. G.A.C. message telephoned to Vth Army, 12:00 P.M. Vth Army message telephoned to G.A.C. 1362/8 8:00 P.M., 4:00 P.M. 11:55 P.M. Order for 1st C.C. 1:10 P.M. General Order 1363/3. Private order for Vth Army Corps 1384/3. Journal of progress of Vth Corps. 1st Cav. Corps. - July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 105, 114, 115, 119.

the 4th Division was too tired to be able to enter usefully into line; finally the 168th Division was the only one to debark in the evening, to the south of Pargny-la-Dhuis. In these conditions, General Degoutte prescribed, that night, to take up the attack the next day by engaging, this time, in the center with the 4th Division, and by keeping ready to intervene if necessary, with the ^{163rd} ~~164th~~ Division. (2)

The last events of the evening had no more important influence on the decisions which the Commander made for the conduct of the battle; since the last of the morning, he had considered the general appearance of operations rather drawn, so that it was possible to determine the general attitude and the measures he would have to take. Between 11:00 and noon, in fact, the IVth Army could give no more serious disturbances, though certainly it still carried on some serious combats and received thereby some considerable losses; but it also used all the necessary forces; behind it, two fresh divisions were still found intact (52d and 10th) whose heads only had commenced to occupy the second position.

The preoccupations which had excited us the day before in the Vith Army had diminished; first, we should hope at that time that the counteroffensive of General Degoutte would at least have the effect of reducing considerably the pocket formed by the enemy to the south of the Marne; the passive attitude of the enemy from the afternoon of the 15th, showed also that their situation on the left bank of the river remained singularly precarious; our artillery and air forces, bombarding the crossings ceaselessly, rendered difficult the arrival of reinforcements, munitions or food.

(2) Vith Army. Message telephoned to G.A.C. 2054/3. 7:00. 2065/3
Journal of progress of Vith Army. 3rd Corps. Army general Order.
1208/3 OP., 10:00 P.M., July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 120, 121, 122.

On the morning of the 18th, only the Vth Army gave us any anxiety; it was necessary, at all price, to stop the advance of the enemy in the valley of the Marne and across the summit of the Mountain of Reims; the Commander did not doubt, that this result would be attained shortly.

In these conditions, was it convenient to continue to lead a defensive battle being content with having stopped the enemy's offensive? The Commander in Chief did not think so; from now on he considered it profitable to pass to the offensive more strongly still than we had considered up to this time; we would push into the attack all the French forces engaged on the edges of the pocket of Chateau-Thierry, from Reims to Aisne.

For the G.A.R. the counteroffensive of the Xth Army was in full preparation; it was going to be carried out on the 18th, from Aisne to Ourcq, with strong forces; there was nothing to prevent this. It was necessary on the other hand, to define rapidly to the other armies, at what points they were going to have to attack from Ourcq to Reims.

The Commander in Chief attached some particular importance, in this ensemble to the Vth Army, whose attack, between Ourcq and the Ru d'Alland, prolonged that of the Xth Army, and would increase reasonably the breach created in the enemy's lines, and would exercise finally a retreat at once upon the enemy who had ventured to the south of the Marne. Now, on the eve of leading this offensive, the Commander of the Vth Army was equally charged with the counterattack and destined to keep back the enemy established on the left bank of

the Marne, an operation which would require several days. Evidently the task was too heavy; it was necessary to aid him by discharging him as soon as possible from the operations to the south of the river. The Commander in Chief decided then that, on the 17th, in the morning, General de Mitry, commander of the IXth Army, would take with his headquarters, the command of the 3rd and 38th Corps; foreseeing this eventuality, the P.C. of the IXth Army was taken to Esternay and his headquarters to Villenauxe. General Degoutte would then be able to devote himself entirely to the operations to the north of the Marne. General de Mitry would be able to reject the German forces on the river, if this result were not obtained until the 16th. Between the Marne and Reims, then, the Vth Army would pass as soon as possible to the offensive; they would have to propose, as a minimum objective, the taking back of the positions lost by them, since July 15. (1)

There remained then to give to the armies the necessary reinforcements to pass to the offensive which was prescribed for them.

First, the G.A.C. could come to the aid of the armies to the left, taking largely from the reserves and the artillery of the IVth Army; but also, the General in Chief decided to put into the defensive battle, his own last resources. For the G.A.R. he commanded to engage in the counteroffensive of the Vth Army, to the north of the Marne, a fresh division (63rd) taken from the Group of Corvisar, and whose transport commended, by autos, that same afternoon; he proposed to affect to the Vth Army, a staff of Army Corps (^{14th} ~~4th~~ C.A.), with a

(1) Telegram to G.A.C. 858/M, 10:50, 366/M. 12:50, July 16, G.A.C.
Telegram to Commander in Chief, 6074/B, 5:15 P.M., July 16,
1918. Annexes Nos. 104, 107.

division reserved (9th); finally, if possible, he would give still for their offensive, to each of the Vth and VIth Armies a second division (131st and 168th), if in the day, a rapid success of the counterattack permitted them to withdraw from the region to the south of the Marne two large units. The necessary instructions about this matter to inform the two commanders of groups of armies interest were given at the close of the afternoon. (1)

In the evening, these orders were in the process of execution; General Maistre took the desired arrangements so that the commander of the IXth Army could take, the next morning at 8:00, the command of the 3rd and 38th Corps and assume, thereafter, the conduct of operations to the south of the Marne. (2) For the Vth Army General Berthelot prescribed to the 2d Italian Corps of the Army and the 5th French Corps to profit by the reinforcements sent to their disposition in the day (14th Division to the Italian 2d Corps, 7th Division to the 5th Corps) or which would arrive the next day (9th Division to the 5th Corps), to pass to the offensive, on the 17th, with the purpose of reconquering first their old position of resistance. (3)

They could not hide the sending of all the available men to the offensive battle, which presented some disadvantages; in fact, during the two days, the 17th and 18th, the Commander in Chief would not dispose any reserves; the 22d Corps of British would not be able to be used before the 19th; the C.A.E. which remained on its front, already distended, would give on the 13th, a division (12th) taken from our army of Lorraine, but some delay was necessary to transport this unit into Champagne. (4)

- (1) Letter to Gen. Foch & joint note, 20318. Telegram to GAC & GAR 866/M, 12:50; 869/M. 2:20 PM, 8792/M, 5:45 PM. Message telephoned by Comdr. in Chief to Gen. Dufieux. Montmort, 4:45 PM July 16, 1918. Order Register 105. Report of information (2d Bureau) 1490. July 17, 1918. Annexes Nos. 100, 104, 105.
- (2) GAC confirmation of message telephoned 3576. Telegram to V, VI & IX Armies. 60797/B, 8:15 PM, July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 108, 109.
- (3) Vth Army, Telegram to 2d C.A.I., 1376/3, 3:20; to 5th C.A., 1381/3, 9:05 PM, Order for 5th C.A. 1384/3, July 16, 1918. Annexes Nos. 116, 118.
- (4) Letter to Gen. Foch and joint note, 20318, July 16, 1918, Order Register 105. Annexe No. 100.

To the G.A.C. engaged in a battle which was taking a good direction, disposing considerable forces of which it would play, to the G.A.R. for the Vth Army and Xth Army, behind which the strong concentration of troops for our offensive of the 18th would be effected, the situation of our reserves could not excite grave unrests; there was not even any in what concerned our front to the north of the Oise. In this region, in fact, on the 18th in the morning, we did not place more, at the most, than an infantry of two divisions. (5) (87th and 123d). Still one could foresee, that in a short time, the troops should be engaged in the offensive of the G.A.R. The enemy still was far from having used all its available forces; on the 16th, we had identified in the battle of the G.A.C. only some 20 fresh divisions, since, after our calculations, the mass of the reserves of the Germans, available for the offensive, would attain, at least, a total of 60 divisions thereabouts. In these conditions, the Commander in Chief wrote to General Foch:

"... the enemy seems to stop the ~~mass~~^{mass} of its effort in Champagne, without doubt because of the losses which they have undergone, especially before our IVth Army. The High Command of the Germans doubtlessly is going, if he hasn't already done so, to make a decision to use the reserves of the second line which have not been engaged by July 15. Where could he use them?

On the British front, the prognostics of our Allies remain vague and change almost every day.

(5) Artillery of these divisions is in line on the front.

On our front, the sector of the 3rd Army and the left of the Xth Army are allright, and will be furthermore, on July 18, since all our available forces will be engaged in the offensive of General Mangin.

The enemy's front before the 3rd Army is equipped for a new attack. The enemy can be tempted to realize from that side what we ourselves are endeavouring to realize with the Xth Army; this manoeuver would be extremely dangerous for that army and for the direction of Paris. It is then necessary to guarantee the solidity of our front to the north of the Oise.

I have, consequently, the honor of asking you that the British Divisions, at present to the south of the Somme, be brought nearer the front and placed, on to the south of Amiens, the other toward Breteuil and to the north, and that, on another part, two other British divisions be placed behind our 3rd Army, in the region of Estrees-Saint-Denis, in case where the 15th and 34th Division, whose use you have reserved for yourself, would be engaged in the offensive of the G.A.R." (1)

General Foch replied immediately to this demand by making known that the two English divisions 15th and 34th) destined to remain provisionally in reserve at his disposal, would be embarked in the region of the Oise, thus, to be engaged in the offensive of the G.A.R. or to intervene defensively, in case of an attack against our III Army. (2)

(1) Letter to General Foch, 19641, July 16, 1918. Order Register 105. Annexe No. 99.

(2) General Foch. Letter to Commander in Chief 2111. Note. 2116, July 16, 1918. Annexe No. 97, 98.

VII

THE BATTLE

(During the days of July 17 & 18, 1918) (3)

July 17 - The battle is changing its aspect, on July 17; on the whole of the front of the G.A.C., the enemy is placing itself on the defensive; it maintains no activity except before the Vth Army, where it attacks Nanteuil and Pourcy, but without pushing with much ardour. This inertia of the adversary encourages the IVth Army in its efforts to reconquer, to the north of the position of resistance, a zone sufficient of outposts; our infantry realizes thus some progress, in the course of the afternoon, from the Main de Massiges, to Souain. There are still some detail actions, of which they would not expect important results. Meanwhile, to the south of the Marne, where we are engaged in daytime operations with some serious forces, we are not succeeding at all in gaining enough ground to reduce in a reasonable fashion, the head of the enemy's bridge on the river. The counter-offensive, raised by General Feraud with a fresh division, the 131st, realized only some rather feeble gains; we are occupying the village of Chene-la-Raine, but without being able to progress much toward the north. Just the same, the IXth Army, before the enemy holding energetically to the land, we realized only an insignificant advance; we are learning, however, that the adversary is not at all reinforced in

(3) Cf. Chart No. 5. Situation of Armies of G.A.C. and G.A.R. July 16, 1918, A.M. and chart No. 6, situation of Armies of G.A.C. and G.A.R. July 17, 1918, A.M.

this region; it is a little less certain, notably, that no battle has been able to establish itself on the south bank of the Marne as yet. (1)

At the close of the day, they could only conceal the fact that the G.A.C. was still powerless to pass to the offensive; nowhere, had it obtained any important results. The General in Chief still retained the conviction that the moment had come for this group of armies also, to abandon the defensive; the attitude of the enemy, on the day of the 17th, could be regarded as an indication of a near exhaustion; it was essential that the G.A.C. profit by it to pass to the counteroffensive it thus would favor considerably the operation of the G.A.R. In these conditions, the General in Chief renewed his instructions of the day before to General Maistre, on the necessity of attacking as soon as possible; he even expected to give an even greater extension to this retaking of the offensive.

The IVth Army would not be at all content, moreover, to gain, toward the north, a position of outposts; it should reconquer completely its old first position. The same with the Vth Army, resting on the defensive to the east of Reims, would have to reoccupy all the ground lost by it since the 15th. To the south of the Marne, the direction of ensemble of the attack, destined to reject finally the enemy on the river, was confided to General Pitry who would take under his order, to this effect, the 1st Corps of cavalry, the principal effort would be made to the east of the meridian of Dormans. Finally,

(1) Information report 1491, July 18. IVth Army. Report to Headquarters 9:00, Vth Army. Messages telephoned from 1st C.C. 6:00 P.M. of 5th C.A., 4:25 P.M., of 2d C.A.I., 12:55, 7:45 P.M. - IXth Army Report to Headquarters 8:45 P.M., 3rd Army Corps, Report to IXth, 1398/3, July 17, Journal of progress of 8th, 21st, 4th, 5th, C.A., 1st C.C., July 17, 1918. Annexe No. 135.

the General in Chief insisted still on the obligation of realizing rapidly these instructions, especially for the Vth and IXth Armies.
(2)

The passage to the offensive of the G.A.C. entirely was evidently going to increase the wear and tear which should be foreseen for our large units, at the close of July 18, they could ask nothing of the French Army all of whose available forces had already had their use in the battle outlined; it was then essential to obtain from the English Army a more considerable support than that which had been given up to this time. In the evening, the General in Chief drew then again, as he has done the day before, the attention of General Foch to the insufficiency of our reserves; he ended his letter by saying:

"In order not to lose the benefit of the important effort which is going to be furnished from Vic-sur-Aisne to Argonne, by July 18, I have the honor of asking you now that the second lot of four divisions of the British which has been prepared by Marshall Haig, in the execution of your telegram, 709, 710, 711^{am} of July 13 (29th, 56th, 57th, 61st D.I.W.) follows, without interruption, the course of the 15th and 34th Divisions of the British toward the current battle." (3)

In spite of the new and pressing instruction of General in Chief, the armies of the G.A.C. could scarcely leave their defensive attitude to pass to the offensive. To the Vth Army, General Berthelot was forced to raise an operation of ensemble which gave him, at least, the

(2) Instruction for Commander of G.A.C. 205889 letter to Commander of G.A.C. 20590, July 17, 1918.

(3) Letter to General Foch 20871, July 17, 1918. Register of orders 106. Annexe 125.

position of resistance lost on the 15th; (1) but, his subordinates, with tired troops, diminished and disorganized by three day's of severe combats, marked more hesitation to take the offensive. The Vth Army would show also some uncertainty, because of the decreasing of forces which it had undergone; in the day, indeed, General Maistre had withdrawn from it the 52d Division, put in reserve for the G.A.C., to the west of Chalons, a regiment of 75 porte, a regiment of heavy artillery; (2) in these conditions General Gouraud was content to prescribe, for the 18th, that the corps of the army would attack, in the measure in which they considered it possible, by examining first the interesting points for the security of the position of resistance. (3) On his side General de Mitry defined as he knew the progress of affairs would have on the 18th for the IXth Army:

"The general mission of the IXth Army is to reject on the Marne the troops of the enemy who had set foot on the south bank of the river and to oppose, by all the forces, in straight communication with the Vth Army, the progression of the enemy in the region of Epernay.

.

The army corps will carry all their efforts on the organization of the position on which we are at present fighting, with the firm resolution not to abandon to the enemy an inch of land." (4)

- (1) Vth Army General orders 1425/3, 1427/3, July 17, 1918. Annexe Nos. 132 and 133.
- (2) G.A.C. Letter to Commander of the IVth Army, 5583. Telegram to IVth Army, 6104/B, 2:45 P.M., 6115/B, 7:35 P.M. Message telephoned 543/3, 6:45 P.M., July 17.
- (3) IVth Army, Letter to Commander of G.A.C., 6976/3, 6:35 Order for Army Corps 700/3, July 17. Annexe 130, 131.
- (4) IXth Army, General instruction 1699/3, July 17. Annexe 134.

Thus the battle which was reasonably calmed on the 17th already on the ensemble of the front of the G.A.C., risked being extended a little more nearly completely, on the 18th, by the fact of the exhaustion of the two parties. Once again, the German High Command could believe that we were contenting ourselves with having checked his attack, that we would be powerless, as we had been for four months, to profit by this check; in order, in our turn, to pass to the offensive; he was going to be disillusioned soon.

On the day of July 18. - On July 18, at 4:35, on all the front extending between Nouvron-Vingre (4 kilometers to the north of the Aisne) and the Marne, a formidable cannonade burst forth suddenly; all the powerful artillery of the Vth and Xth Armies came out and entered into action. At the same time, from Aisne to Ourcq, the infantry of the Xth Army, preceded by their assault cars, surrounded by a flock of their airplanes, rushed to the assault, it comprised ten divisions in the first line, six divisions in reserve. At the same hour, also, between Ourcq and the Ru d'Alland, seven divisions of the Vth Army, followed by a reserve division, placed themselves in movement, and by a first outburst, took the position of the outposts from the enemy. Still, since the assault was continuing without interruption for the Xth Army, the artillery of the Vth Army effected a preparation of an hour and a half on the position of the German resistance; about 6 o'clock only, our infantry replied to the assault on this side.

At 5 o'clock, conforming to the orders of the General in Chief (1) the artilleries of the IXth and Vth Armies were equally entered into action, with an extreme violence; for four hours, the IVth Army bombarded also vigorously the German positions. Thus, the battle was returned, and the enemy could fear to see themselves attacked now, from Argonne to the Aisne, on an immense front of 150 kilometers.

By 8 o'clock, the G.A.R. had obtained some considerable results; the manoeuver was developed as it had been expected; already, the Commander of the Xth Army put into movement the 2d Cavalry Corps to make them go beyond the first line. About 10:00 the infantry reached Chaudun, the western border of Vierzy, Villers-Helon, Montron, Monnes, Checillon, Torcy. In the evening, the armies of the General Fayolle were lining up from Pernant to Torcy, by Vierzy, Villers-Helon, the north plateau of Chouy, that to the west of Neuilly-Saint-Front. The prisoners came in great numbers; there were more than 10,000 already; we had seized several hundred cannons; all the information signalled the disorder of the enemy; incontestably, we had carried off a considerable success of which all permitted us to expect the continuation the next day.

In the afternoon, in the presence of the results obtained at this time, General Foch decided to exploit at the beginning the success of our armies, by carrying between Aisne and the Marne all the available forces. He then gave to the Commander in Chief the directive reproduced here:

(1) General Foch, Private direction 2168, July 18, 1918. Annexe 137.

"1) The region to the north of the Marne from Chateau-Thierry seemed the most favorable to a fruitful offensive.

consequently, it has the place of reinforcing there first the action undertaken today by our Vth and Xth Armies and to prepare next the development toward the north of this action.

2) In this double purpose, it is necessary to concentrate there without delay, all the fresh units which are available to the south of the line Chateau-Thierry, Reims, Massiges, which was to become, doubtlessly, our demonstrative field.

3) The units to forewarn are, among others:

22d British C.A., which should go to join again the 15th and 34th D.I. of the British;

42d American Division;

French or American units coming from the east.

4) This new division of forces should in no manner restrain the offensive activity asked of the IXth, Vth and IVth Armies. It is by the reorganization of the forces engaged and not by the introduction of new forces that it will be maintained." (1)

Finally, the General intervened in a pressing manner to Marshall Haig, who, very much preoccupied with menaced of attack on the front of Flanders, expressed, during the day, the desire to take back the four divisions sent to the G.A.R. and to the G.A.C.; (2) he exposed to the Commander in Chief of the British Army that the largeness of the battle, engaged now from Aisne to Massiges, interdicted for the time being all serious German offensives against the English Army, he added:

(1) General Foch, Private direction 2168, July 18, 1918. Annexe 137.

(2) Marshall Haig to General Foch, O.A.D. 897, 8 o'clock, July 18, 1918. Annexe 139.

"If the 22d D.A. of the British, now on the French front, were sent back into the British zone, there would not be any available for the battle, before 6 or 8 o'clock. It would not then furnish resources for this showing, and during the same period of time, it would lose the battle of the Marne. Then this transport would be contrary to the necessities of the present battle and that of the eventual battle." (1)

In the evening, in the presence of decisive results obtained in the daytime, the General Foch telegraphed to Marshall Haig:

"Because of the fortunate development of the battle between Chateau-Thierry and Aisne, and in order to be in a position to exploit the results already obtained, I am giving the order to take on the 19th, the 15th and 34th Divisions of the English into the region of Villers-Cotterets.

These divisions are in reserve for my disposal, still, I authorize General Fayolle to make their leaders acquainted with those matters which he considers useful." (2)

From his side, persuaded like General Foch of the necessity of exploiting most powerfully and as quickly as possible, the success obtained, from the beginning of the afternoon, the Commander in Chief advised General Maistre to keep himself ready to take from the IVth Army the ^{52d}~~50th~~ Division and perhaps the American 42d Division; (3) in the evening, he put effectively to the disposition of the G.A.R., the 52d Division, taken in autos, in the same night of the 18th or 19th, he advised on the other hand, General Fayolle that the 12th

(1) General Foch, Note 2167, July 18, 1918. Annexe 136.

(2) General Foch. Telegram to Mission Militaire Pontreuil, 2178, 6:15 P.M., July 18, 1918. Annexe 138.

(3) Message telephoned to G.A.C., 2:30 P.M., July 18, 1918, Register of orders 106. Annexe No. 140.

Division, coming from Lorraine by rail, would also pass under his orders, after their debarkment. (4)

Yet, as the General in Chief had foreseen, the attitude of the G.A.C., remaining purely defensive, on the 17th, was not modified on the 18th; the IVth and IXth Armies were content with guarding their position, before an adversary installed on their side on the defensive. It was then necessary that the armies of the G.A.C. should take, in their turn, the offensive; particularly, the attack of the Vth Army, from the east to the west, should exercise without any doubt an effect particularly forcible against the adversary, engaged since morning against the G.A.R. Only, if the IXth Army had sufficient forces to keep back from the Marne, an enemy badly installed in the south bank, disposing precarious communications, menaced by the advance of our Vth Army, General Berthelot, whose troops had had to fight under very strenuous conditions; certainly did not dispose any necessary reserves in order to pass to the offensive in good conditions. The Commander in Chief insisted then very forcefully to General Foch that the 22d British Corps with the 51st and 62nd Division, be given to the Vth Army to relieve the 2d Italian Corps; (1) he obtained, in the evening, that authority.

From then, at the close of the day of the 18th, General Maistre could give the orders of ensemble orienting the Vth and IXth Armies in the matter of the offensive, to lead the most vigorously and quickest possible, conforming to the instruction of the Commander in Chief. (2) Thus, on July 18, in the evening, we passed resolutely to the offensive with our two groups of principal armies, the defensive campaign was ended.

(4) Telegram to G.A.R. 988/M, 8:30 P.M., 989/M, July 18, 1918.
Register of orders 106.

(1) Telegram (sent express) to General Foch, without number, 3:00 P.M. July 18, 1918. Register of orders 1-6. Annexe 141.

(2) Instruction for armies of G.A.C. 5667, July 18. Instruction for Vth Army, 5794, July 18. Telegram to armies, 6133/B, 12:45, July 18, 1918. Annexes Nos. 142, 143, 144.

It achieved by a bursting victory, the first of this uninterrupted series of triumphs which went to lead us up to the Rhin. The French Army gathered thus the just recompense of the prodigious effort that it had accomplished during four months.

Since March 21, the only one of the Allied Armies, it had taken part in all the great battles hopelessly waged by the adversary to decide the outcome of the war. It had hastened to the battle of Picardy with 34 divisions; it had sent into Flanders 18 divisions; on the Aisne, it was to engage forty divisions, then seventeen from Montdidier to Royon, some days later. Finally, after July 15, it had delivered in Champagne a huge battle with the total of its available forces, more than 57 divisions; thus, without stop, without rest, in March, in April, May, June and July, it had led the fight.

Its intervention in the battle had not lessened its part of the duties which had developed upon it up till then on the whole of the scene of the French operations; on March 21 it had 530 kilometers of it since our English Allies had no more than 150, and the American Army was still assessed only 75 kilometers.

This colossal effort had not been in vain; to each one of the German blows, the French had put an end. Yet, that which deployed heroism and abnegation, during these terrible days of trial, of which it seemed that the end would never come, only could witness it those who fought in the ranks or who had been called to the honor of the Commander. Never was an army animated with a purer patriotism, a spirit of discipline more profound, a devotion more absolute for their leaders; never a murmur came from the ranks; and even in the

most humble soldier, had learned that the fate of France was at stake, the Fatherland in danger. The losses had been heavy; at least, they had not been in vain.

Furthermore, the French army had broken the charm; it had brought to the Allies the road to victory; in less than four months, now, the Armies, of the Entente were definitely going to triumph and force the capitulation of the adversary.

ALPHABETICAL LIST

of names of persons cited in the Report of the Marshal,
commander of the armies of the north and northeast on
the operations in 1918. The defensive phase.
(March 21 to July 18, 1918)

A

ANTHOINE, general, chief of staff of the French Armies of the
north and northeast.
V:34

B

BELOW (von), general, commander of the 1st German Army.
I:24.

BERTHELOT, general, commander of the 5th Army.
VI:18, 31, 44, 45, 49, 51, 52, 56, 59, 63, 68, 72, 76.

BOEHN (von), general, commander of the 7th German Army.
IV:13. - V:13.

BUAT, general, commander of the 5th Army.
VI:43, 44.

BYNG, general, commander of the 3rd British Army.
II:5, 7, 11.

C

CASTELNAU (de), general, commander of the Group of armies of the
east.
I:12, 13, 23, 31. - II:21, 26, 28. - IV:39, 44. - V:40.
VI:11, 13, 16.

CLEMENCEAU, President of the Consul, Minister of War.
I:14, 15, 20, 21, 29. - II:33. - III:15, 16. V:38.

CORVISART, general, commander of the 16th Army Corps.
VI:28, 30, 53, 68, 69.

D

DEBENEY, general, commander of the 1st Army.
II:13, 27, 31, 32, 36. - III:6. - V:26.

DEGOUTTEE, general, commander of the 21st Army Corps.
IV:15, 17.
commander of the 7th Army.
VI:17, 18, 31, 52, 56, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68.

DUCHENE, general, commander of the 7th Army.
II:7, 10, 50. - IV:6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23,
27, 29, 31, 36, 43, 48.

E

ECOCHARD, general, commander of the 63rd Infantry Division.
VI:51.

F

FAYOLLE, general, commander of the group of reserve armies.

I:31. - II:12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 36, 37, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51. - III:17, 25, 26, 27.
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FEQUANT, major, commander of a groupment of the air division.

I:30. - II:14, 46. - IV:17. - V:9, 17.

FERAUD, general, commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps.

IV:11, 21, 31, 34, 35, 37, 48. - VI:65, 71.

FOCH, general, chief of the general staff.

I:25, 28.

commander of the allied armies.

II:34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52.

III:7, 8, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28.

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FONCLARE (de), general, commander of the 15th Army Corps.

V:21.

FRANCHET D'ESPEREY, general, commander of the group of armies of the north.

I:12, 13, 20, 23, 26. - II:7, 8, 21, 43, 50. - III:17, 28.

IV:8, 11, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 47, 48, 53.

G

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GILLAIN, general, chief of the Belgian general staff.

IV:26.

GORDON, general, commander of the British 9th Army Corps.

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GOUGH, general, commander of the 5th British Army.

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GOURAUD, general, commander of the 4th Army.

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GUILLAUMAT, general, military governor of Paris.

V:40.

H

HAIG, marshal, commander of the British armies in France.

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a pied.
IV:33, 36, 42.

HORNE, general, commander of the 1st British Army.
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HUMBERT, general, commander of the 3rd Army.
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IV:48. - V:10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30.

HUTIER (von), general, commander of the 18th German Army.
I:22. - V:5, 6, 13, 14, 25.

J

JOFFRE, marshal of France.
VI:34.

K

KRONPRINZ OF BAVARIA, commander of a group of the German Army.
II:20. - IV:26, 40. - V:8, 20, 25, 32. - VI:10, 16.

KRONPRINZ, IMPERIAL, commander of a group of the German Army.
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L

LACAPELLE, general, commander of the 1st Army Corps.
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LEBRUN, general, commander of the 3rd Army Corps.
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LE REVEREND, major, commander of the Fequant and Menard groups
of the Air Division.
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LOUCHEUR, minister of armament.
I:27.

M

MAISTRE, general, commander of the 10th Army.
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commander of the army group of the north (became the
army group of the center from July 6th).
V:42. - VI:12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 29, 30, 33, 44, 45, 49,
51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 65, 68, 71, 72, 76.

MANGIN, general, commander of a group of divisions.
V:23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 41.
commander of the 10th Army.
V:42. - VI:19, 31, 57, 58, 62, 70, 74.

MARJOLET, general, commander of the 14th Army Corps.
VI:12, 28.

MARWITZ (von), general, commander of the 2nd German Army.
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MAUD'HUY (de), general, commander of the 2nd Army Corps.
IV:13.

MAZILLIER, general, commander of the 1st Colonial Army Corps.
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MENARD, major, commander of a group of the Air Division.
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MICHELER, general, commander of the 5th Army.
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MITRY (de), general, commander of the detachment of the army
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MONDESIR (de), general, commander of the 38th Army Corps.
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NUDANT, general, commander of the 34th Army Corps.
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PELLE, general, commander of the 5th Army Corps.
II:6, 7, 10. - IV:32, 34, 35, 37. - VI:49, 51.

PERSHING, general, commander of the American Expeditionary
Forces in France.
I:16. - II:15, 26. - III:17, 18. - IV:32. - V:38, 39.

PLUMER, general, commander of the 2nd British Army.
III:5, 9, 11.

PUTOIS, general, commander of the 20th Infantry Division.
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PUTZ, general, senior commander in the north.
II:45.

R

RAWLINSON, general, commander of the 4th British Army.
II:35. - III:6

RENOUARD, general, commander of the 22nd Infantry Division.
IV:35.

ROBILLOT, general, commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps.
II:17, 20. - IV:43.

T

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13 July	743/M	C.G.	G.A.C.	Objectives of aerial bombardment.	Orderly Book No.105	57
14 July	17.088	C.G.	General Foch	Attack of Vith & Xth armies.	Orderly Book No. 105	58

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classification	File Nos.
14 July	17.736	C.G.	G.A.C.	Division of reserves for the battle in Champagne.	Orderly Book no.105	59
14 July	1.292/3	C.G. of Vth army	C.G.'s of army corps.	Battle position	Correspondence Vth army	60
14 July	1.316/3	C.G. of Vth army	C.G.	Attitude of the enemy in front of Vth army	Correspondence Vth army	61
15 July	-----	C.G. of allied armies	C.G.	Order of not lessening the preparations of attack by G.A.R.	Correspondence General Foch	62
15 July	----	C.G. of British armies	General Foch	Inconveniences of sending English units to Champagne	Correspondence General Foch	63
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (8.15 am)	General Maistre (G.A.C.)	C.G. (General Petain)	Reserves placed to the disposal of G.A.C.	Orderly Book no.105	64
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (9.05am)	General Maistre (G.A.C.)	C.G.	Reserves placed to the disposal of G.A.C.	Orderly Book no.105	65
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (9.30 am)	C.G.	G.A.C.	168th Div. placed to disposal of G.A.C.	Orderly Book no.105	66
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (10.00am)	C.G.	G.A.R.	Suspending the operation of Xth army	Orderly Book no.105	67
15 July	807/1	C.G.	G.A.R.	Vth army attack.	Orderly Book no.105	68
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (10.30am)	Aerial Div. (General Duval)	C.G.	Information obtained by aviation.	Orderly Book no.105	69
15 July	Teleph-one mess. (11.35am)	C.G.	G.A.C.	Urgency of re-establishing the position on the south of the Marne.	Orderly Book no.105	70
15 July	813/E	C.G.	G.A.C.	Modification caused by de-training 22nd British Corps.	Orderly Book no.105	71
15 July	810/E	C.G.	G.A.C.	Conduct of the battle.	Orderly Book no.105	72

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classifi- cation	File No.
15 July	834/M	C.G.	G.A.C. & G.A.E.	Conduct of the battle	Orderly Book No.105	73
15 July	Telephone Message (2.30pm)	Aerial Division	C.G.	Information obtained by aviation.	Orderly Book No. 105	74
15 July	Telephone Message (4.45pm)	C.G.	C.G. & allied armies.	Transfer of 2nd American Division to-ward Epernay	Orderly Book No. 105	75
15 July	Telephone message (5.25 pm)	C.G.	G.A.C.	Movement of 2nd American Division	Orderly Book No.105	76
15 July	5.389	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vith Army	Counter-offensive to the south of the warne.	Corres-pondence G.A.C.	77
15 July	5.392	C.G. of G.A.C.	C.G.	Counter-offensiveto the south of the warne.	Corres-pondence G.A.C.	78
15 July	Telephone Message (2.00pm)	C.G. of G.A.C.	C.G.	Request for reinforce-ments forthe IVth army.	Orderly Book No.105	79
15 July	Telephone Message (2.30pm)	C.G. of G.A.C.	C.G.	Request for reinforce-ments for the IVth Army	Orderly Book No.105	80
15 July	1.586	C.G. of G.A.R.	C.G.	Mission of VIth army	Corres-pondence G.A.R.	81
15 July	1.732	C?G. of G.A.R.	G.A.C. & Vith army	Mission of VI th army	Corres-pondence G.A.R.	82
15 July	6.878/3	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Begining of enemy artill-ery prepara-tion.	Corres-pondence IVth army.	83
15 July	Telephone Message (6.10am)	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle.	Corres-pondence IVth army	84
15 July	6.906/3	C.G. of IVth army	C.G.'s of army corps	Conduct of the battle	Corresp-ondence IVtn army	85
15 July	Telephone Message (6.00pm)	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle.	Corres-pondence IVth army	86
15 July	Telephone Message (1.10am)	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle.	Corres-pondence Vth army	87
15 July	Telephone Message (4.45am)					

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classification	File No.
15 July	Telephone message (4.45am)	C.G. of Vth Army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	88
15 July	Telephone message (6.15am)	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	89
15 July	Telephone message (9.50am)	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	90
15 July	1.343/3	C.G. of Vth army	C.G. of the 1st Cav. Corps.	Mission of the 1st Cavalry Corps.	Correspondence Vth army	91
15 July	1.345/3	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	92
15 July	1.347/3	C.G. of Vth army	Corps of the army	Conduct of the battle	Correspondence Vth army	93
15 July	2.020/3	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	94
15 July	2.023/3	C.G. of Vth army	C.G. of 3rd army corps	Order for the counter-offensive on the south of the Marne,	Correspondence Vth army	95
15 July	2.042/3	C.G. of Vth army	Vth, IXth, Xth, armies	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	96
16 July	2.111	C.G. of allied armies	C.G.	Employment of 15th & 34th British Divs.	Correspondence Gen. Foch	97
16 July	2.116	C.G. of allied armies	C.G.	Employment of 22nd British Corps.	Correspondence Gen. Foch.	98
16 July	19.641	C.G.	General Foch	Use of British reserves south of the Somme	Orderly Book No. 106	99
16 July	20.318	C.G.	General Foch	Instructions for the general conduct of the battle	Orderly Book No. 106	100
16 July	2.180	C.G.	-----	Information reported during 15th by aerial Div.	Orderly Book No. 106	101
16 July	2.181	C.G.	-----	Report of operation of aerial Div. on 15th.	Orderly Book No. 106	102

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classification	File No.
16 July	858/M	C.G.	Group of armies & armies.	Functioning of Hq's & C.P. of IXth army.	Orderly Book No.106	103
16 July	866/m	C.G.	G.A.R & G.A.C.	Conduct of the battle	Orderly Book No.106	104
16 July	Telephone Message (4.45pm)	C.G.	General Durieux	Placing of 9th Div. to the disposal of General Bertnelot	Orderly Book No.106	105
16 July	5.486	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth & VIth armies	Reinforcement of 1st Cav. Corps	Correspondence G.A.C.	106
16 July	6.074/B	C.G. of G.A.C.	C.G.	Request of 22nd British Corps for Vth army	Correspondence G.A.C.	107
16 July	6.079/B	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth, VIth, & IXth army	Entry into the line of IXth army.	Correspondence G.A.C.	108
16 July	5.576	C.G. of G.A.C.	IXth army	Counter-offensive to the south of the Marne.	Correspondence G.A.C.	109
16 July	1.803	C.G. of G.A.R.	C.G.	Attack of G.A.R.	Correspondence G.A.C.	110
16 July	Telephone Message (10.30am)	C.G. of IVth Army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle.	Correspondence IVth army	111
16 July	6.938/3	C.G. of IVth Army	Corps of the army	Conduct of the battle.	Correspondence IVth army	112
16 July	Telephone Message	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence IVth army	113
16 July	1.362/3	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	114
16 July	1.363/3	C.G. of Vth army	Corps of the army	Need of making some counter-attacks	Correspondence Vth army	115
16 July	1.373/3	C.G. of Vth army	2nd Italian Corps.	Need of making some counter-attacks.	Correspondence Vth army	116
16 July	1.378/3	C.G. of Vth army	C.G. of 1st Cav. Corps	Reinforcements of 1st Cav. Corps.	Correspondence Vth army	117

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classification	File No.
16 July	1.38./3	C.G. of Vth Army	C.G. of 5th Corps	Necessity of attack on 17th.	Correspondence Vth army	118
16 July	Telephone Message (11.55pm)	C.G. of Vth army	G.A.C.	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	119
16 July	2.054/3	C.G. of Vth army	IXth & Xth armies	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	120
16 July	2.065/2	C.G. of Vth army	IXth & Xth armies	Information on the battle	Correspondence Vth army	121
16 July	1.208/3	C.G. of 3rd Corps	Divisions	Order for the counter-offensive of 17.	Correspondence Vth army	122
17 July	20.589	C.G.	G.A.C.	Missions of G.A.C.	Orderly Book No.106	123
17 July	20.590	C.G.	G.A.C.	Necessity of taking as soon as possible the offensive.	Orderly Book No.106	124
17 July	20.871	C.G.	General Foch	Request for four new British divs.	Orderly Book No.106	125
17 July	440/M	C.G.	G.A.C. & G.A.R.	Order for G.A.C. to take the offensive on the 18th.	Orderly Book No.106	126
17 July	5.582	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth & IXth armies	The counter-offensive to south of Marne not to be delayed.	Correspondence G.A.C.	127
17 July	5.642	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth army	Order for the resumption of the offensive.	Correspondence G.A.C.	128
17 July	5.699	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth, & IXth Armies	Order for the attack to be made on 19th, by 3rd Corps & Groupment Feraud.	Correspondence G.A.C.	129
17 July	6.976/3	C.G. of IVth army	G.A.C.	Objections to weakening to quickly the IVth army	Correspondence IVth army	130
17 July	7.000/3	C.G. of IVth army	Corps of the army	Order for the general attack on the 18th.	Correspondence IVth army	131

Date of Order	Order No.	Origin	Addressee	Subject	Classification	File No.
17 July	1.423/3	C.G. of Vth army	Corps of the army	Order for the general attack on the 18th.	Correspondence Vth army	132
17 July	1.427/3	C.G. of Vth army	Corps of the army	Order for the general attack on the 18th.	Correspondence Vth army	133
17 July	1.699/3	C.G. of IXth army	Corps of the army	Order for the general attack on the 18th.	Correspondence IXth army	134
17 July	Telephone message (3.45pm)	C.G. of IXth army	G.C.G (HQT'S)	Information on the battle.	Orderly Book No.106	135
18 July	2.167	C.G. of allied armies.	Marshall HAIG	Disadvantage of returning to british zone the 22nd brigade.	Correspondence General Foch.	136
18 July	2.168	C.G. of allied armies	C.G.	Directive for the conduct of the battle	Correspondence Gen. Foch	137
18 July	2.178	C.G. of allied armies	Marshall haig	Need of 15th & 34th british Divisions.	Correspondence Gen. Foch	138
18 July	OAD. 7897	C.G. of british armies.	General Foch	Request for return of 22nd british corps to english zone	Correspondence Gen. Foch	139
18 July	Telephone Message (2.30pm)	C.G.	G.A.C.	Selection on G.A.C.	Orderly Book No.106	140
18 July	-----	C.G.	General Foch	Request for 22nd british corps for Vth army	Orderly Book No.106	141
18 July	5.667	C.G. of G.A.C.	IVTH?VTH, Vth, IXth Varmies	Missions of G.A.C.	Correspondence G.A.C.	142
18 July	5.794	C.G. of G.A.C.	Vth army	Attack to be carried out by Vth army on 21st.	Correspondence G.A.C.	143
18 July	6.133/B	C.G. of G.A.C.	IVth, Vth, Vth, IXth armies	Possibility of the enemy falling back on front of G.A.C.	Correspondence G.A.C.	144

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The General Commander in Chief
of the Allied Armies
Staff Office.
No. 1,454.

Headquarters, June 16, 1918.

NOTE

The results obtained by the Germans in their sudden attacks made since March 21 show the necessity of adapting our procedure of defense to this type of attack.

To determine these procedures, it is necessary to recall first the method practiced by the Germans in a more uniform manner in all these attacks.

I. - Attack

The method of German attack is characterised by:
surprise;
violence;
rapidity of execution;
manoeuver;
extent of the penetration desired.

I. The "surprise" is obtained by the brevity of the preparation of the artillery (3 to 4 hours), and by arranging, at the last moment, the units of attack, the marches of approach of these units being carried on at night and by land conveyances.

Up to the night which precedes the attack, nothing is then changed in the usual appearance of the front; calm reigns there; the units in line are the same.

The attack always takes place at the break of day, infantry being preceded by a barrage comprising a large proportion of smoke shells; by the effect of the cloud thus produced, our infantrymen and even our artillery do not perceive the enemy until they are a few meters from them.

II. The violence is realized by the intensity of the bombardment, all sizes and all kinds of shells being employed simultaneously, on an extent of 4 or 5 kilometers, and by the attack en masse of the infantry which, during the preparation of the artillery, is reassembled at 2 or 300 meters from the first line to start.

III. The rapidity of the execution is due to the speed of the march of the infantry.

After it has moved into first position, it forms into echelons on the whole extent, expands, the head units carry out as soon as possible the successive objectives which have been designated to them, not having to be preoccupied either with the protection of their flanks, nor with the clearing of their rear flanks, which are assured by other units.

The designation of successive objectives does not imply any time to waste on these objectives which simply indicate the direction to follow.

During the movement forward, the infantry is protected first by the moving barrage of artillery, then by the artillery and the "minenwerfer" accompanying. Moreover, it takes advantage of its own firing and especially of its light machine guns.

ANNEXE No. I.

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If a unit of infantry runs up against a resistance which it cannot conquer by its own means, it stops and is immediately surpassed by the units which encircle it, these being charged with breaking at the start, the point of support which resists.

IV. The Germans generally send their best units to the central part of the front of attack, so that they can be given all the chances of producing, in this central part, a rapid and extensive progression.

The Manoeuvre then consists in enlarging rapidly the breach made by the attacks on the flanks of this gap.

The attack on the front is further pursued at the same time in which these attacks on the flank are developed.

V. The extent of the penetration is obtained by the rapid and resolute march of the troops on these determined objectives to the advance and placed at great distance. It has for an effect the prompt disorganizing of a defense which is not entirely consisting, by storming it, of these objectives, the essential points of its organization.

Such a method of attack has succeeded when it has met only a resistance feeble by reason of the insufficiency of troops of occupation. It has then obtained some tactic results and important arms.

It has run against some severe losses when it was a matter of energetic troops, sufficiently numerous and conveniently distributed in extent.

In all cases, it is indispensable to prepare to place our forces so that they can stop the enemy's attack, as soon and as economically as possible.

The considerations thereby developed correspond to the characteristics of the attack which have just been exposed.

II. - Defense

I. The surprise can be avoided only by information.

It is then information that must be sought and pursued by all possible means and in all parts of the front.

In spite of the precautions taken by the enemy, certain bits of information can always be revealed on the preparation of an attack; increase in the number of hospitals, munition stations, development of the network of means of communication of all kinds, etc. The air forces operating day and night can reveal this information.

Besides, prisoners, deserters can always give some important information.

The command, if it shows proof of vigilance and demands the activity of the troops in sector, should not be taken unawares.

But, whatever, the knowledge may be that they have on the plans of the enemy, the brevity of the preparation, and the suddenness of the attack prevent the use of the troops who are not at hand, at the opening of the battle. The first position, well reduced by the firing, will not seemingly be able to continue on all their extent, and the second position will be easily taken by the enemy, in its rapid march, if it is not at this moment well held by the troops charged with defending it.

That is to say that the assault should be received by the troops in place, arranged in echelons on the first and second positions, with their immediate reserves.

On the resistance offered by the troops of effective occupation, at the time in which the assault is produced, the outcome of the battle depends, that is to say, its immediate stop or its development.

Besides, the violence of the bombardment is such, that from the beginning, all communication between the command and the troops is impossible, that all decision taken then to begin action of the troops of occupation is impossible to accomplish.

Therefore, there results from the command, the obligation:

(a) Since an attack is foreseen, to assign to the menaced sector, and to advance such forces that the first and second positions can be simultaneously occupied before the attack, by sufficient numbers.

It is more worthwhile to send these numbers in time, that is, before the attack, than to send them later.

(b) Of giving to the troops of occupation the unique mission of resisting on position, no part having the right to retire, even if it is run over by the enemy. These troops are the garrisons charged with defending, up to the last man, the positions which they have.

It is only after having assured the stopping of the enemy before one of our positions, that the counter-attack of ensemble can be executed, and by the troops reserved for that (1).

To this condition alone, having a very clear and simple mission, fixed in advance, each part of the troops will know how, although left to themselves, to carry out its role without hesitation.

These (a and b) will be the bases of the plan of defense.

(c) But whatever the predictions may be, however rational may be the agreed measure to the plans of defense, they constitute only a preparatory measure, a guard operation.

After the attack commences, it is the duty of the command to conduct the battle and at the same time keep himself informed rapidly on its development and putting into action in opportune time the available forces.

(1) It is understood that except in these counter-attacks general, the partial counter-attacks, are quite well indicated to repulse the enemy, having succeeded in penetrating the interior of the position of resistance. (main battle position).

The battle of position is ended when a position is taken; a war of movement then recovers all its rights and all its exigencies; particularly, it imposes the rapidity of the decision as the execution.

It then belongs to the command to foresee the use of the troops which will be sent as reinforcement, in such a manner that his decision on the subject of their use is taken after the first results of the attack will be known to him.

The first desired aim is to engulf the enemy on the flanks of their initial progression; thus one can be in a position to limit at the same time the extent of the attack, since a progression could not be extensive if it is kept narrow.

The most of the available forces should then be designated to support the flanks of the gap, the rest serving to withstand the enemy on the front and stop them (second purpose).

By fixing his decision of the subject from the beginning of the attack and according to a preconceived idea, by communicating this decision without delay to his subordinates by a precise order, now then, in spite of the fluctuations of the combat, by avoiding the dispersion of the forces in all directions the command will be certain of stopping the progress of the enemy before they have produced any serious consequences.

He will be able, then, in the shortest period of time, to proceed to the counter-attack on the flank, principally, which will re-establish the situation, by making a breach-block of all the available troops remaining on one side or the other of the breach.

In short, our command should prepare a defensive battle corresponding to the offensive method practiced by the enemy.

This method aims, above all, to disorganize them, not to leave any time to make judicious arrangements. It will be foiled if our command is certain of the advance of a line of rational leading, if it has stopped a program of rapid execution and as sure as possible, and if it has then the certainty of continuing there, by leading the battle at all times.

This mastership of the command is instantly communicated to the troop; it is the security of the execution by those of the most difficult missions.

F. Foch

Addressees:

General in Chief of Armies of the North and Northeast.
Marshall in Chief of the British Armies.
General in Chief of American Army.
General Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army.
General of the D.A.N. (Detachment of Army of the North).

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The Headquarters
3rd Bureau
20,654.

June 17, 1918.

 To Commanding General of Allied Armies.

At the moment when I received Note No. 1,454, which you addressed to me by letter No. 1,466, June 16, I had just finished the notes copied herewith:

I think, consequently, there would be some disadvantages in sending out some new commands on the conduct of the defensive battle, the instructions and the directions in force containing all the essentials of the doctrine which the four battles of March 21, April 9, May 27, and June 9, has shown to be good. A supplementary text does not obtrude; it is the knowledge and intelligent application of customary texts which it is necessary to enforce. I shall hold to it.

In particular, it seems to me, in the present situation of our available men, excessively dangerous to put down the principle that the command has the obligation "when an attack is foreseen, to assign to the menaced sector and to advance such forces that the first and second positions can be occupied simultaneously before the attack by sufficient numbers."

Before May 27, the attack could be "foreseen" on one or on two of the I, III, VI, or IV Armies. I was quite far from being able to realize for these four armies these conditions of which the note makes it an obligation for the command. And even if before May 26 the predictions of attack had been limited in a certain form only to the VI Army, I was not in a position to give that army the double play of divisions, with a front averaging 4 or 5 kilometers, which seemed to me to correspond to the "sufficient numbers" which you demand.

Then, why make the armies under my command in case of menace of attack know beforehand the necessity of a density of occupation which I could never assure them, this density being reserved only to those armies which are operating to the north of the Somme? That would mean for them beforehand, that their defense would be in vain, it would cause discouragement, at the very least, doubt in the minds of the army commanders. I cannot resolve myself to it.

I have, consequently, the honor of telling you that I do not have the intention of communicating to the armies under my orders Note No. 1,454, of June 16.

PETAIN

ANNEXE No. 2.

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The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.
No. 29,473

The Headquarters, June 24, 1918

Object [REDACTED]
Definition and role of positions of Army.

Addressees:
Group of Armies.
Armies.
D.A.N.

Copies:
General Foch
" Ragueneau
" Belin (C.S.G.)
G.A.P. (Group of Armies under General Putz)
Cabinet.
General Roques.
1st Bureau.

NOTE
for army groups and armies.

Some differences of interpretation has been found in the armies concerning:

the determination of the main battle position;
its mode of occupation and division of the troops between this position and the other positions of the army.

The recalling of some simple ideas then seems necessary.

I. The main battle position chosen by the Commander of the army is that on which he wishes to stop and fight the enemy.

It is then to the conservation of this position that he will give most of his forces of all kinds; infantry, field and heavy artillery, trench artillery.

In front of this position are placed the outposts, of a number strictly sufficient to watch the enemy and stop the attempts of lesser importance.

Behind the main battle position, the existing organizations serve large units, who are arriving as reinforcements, to lay hold to the terrain, and thus constitute, in case of a rupture in the main battle position, first a barrier, then a base of departure for the retaking of the lost ground. This second battle position will use advantageously a natural fold in the land.

II. The attention of the Commander of the army should consequently, be hinged above all on the firmness of his main battle position, since it is by the possession of that position that he will deliver the battle.

The choice of this position will be indicated by the following considerations:

1. The main battle position, to play its role, is to be removed from the dense part of the preparatory firing of the enemy, in particular from the action of the minenwerfer at 2,000 meters, at least, from the enemy's front.

2. The main battle position should consist of a joining of natural strong points of support and to offer a continued defense, to avoid infiltrations; but it is important that the exact outline of this position escape the observation of the enemy, that the visible parts be confused in a network of very apparent work.

III. The divisions and the missions of the units proceed from the part of the different positions thus defined:

on the main battle position, the mass of the infantry and the artillery, that is, two-thirds or three-quarters of the forces; to have to counter-attack in order to take back the lost ground, and not to abandon the fight under any pretext.

on the position of the outposts, the minimum of forces, which must assure the observation at all times, to stop the attempts or partial attacks, to weaken and break up the larger attacks, to the benefit of the position of resistance; the unique role placed on each element of outposts (reply or resistance) is to be sure of a written order of which the commander of the division is responsible;

on the second battle position, to place the divisions and reserve artillery, if the army possesses it; for want of it, to make appeal to the parts of available armies, territorial battalions, machine gun company rear echelons, Division Training Center, batteries in reserve, so as to keep at least the points of crossing and the essential observations, until the arrival of the reserves.

These prescriptions apply to the stabilized fronts.

On these fronts, some sectors can appear where it is impossible to allow a definite abandon of the points of support occupied by the outposts. Even then, it is not reasonable to accumulate there some troops, which would be destroyed; they could lose both troops and terrain. The terms can be different.

Finally, in the very extended sectors, occasionally there is involved, the forcing of a proportion of the troops to the outposts to execute some bits of work, to assure the observation and not to be at the mercy of a slight incident.

Even in this case, it is essential to reduce to the minimum, the wasting of the forces in front of the main battle position. It is the mobility that is then the best solution. Yet if the proportion of the troops given to the outposts in normal time has reduced too much the numbers charged with maintaining the main battle position, one is led to see in case of an imminent massive attack that an alert arrangement must be made on this position to get all that is necessary for a powerful defense.

The change from one arrangement to another should be minutely prepared to be carried out, in such a case, simply and rapidly. The troops should be used there.

Nevertheless, everywhere possible, they will have to make an arrangement which does not necessitate in case of alarm, any movement of troops from the front to the rear.

Each man should be acquainted with these principles, which inspired furthermore, the instruction of January 24, 1918, for the application of the direction No. 4.

Concerning the counterattack, it is certainly the best means of action against the assailant, but it should not be hasty, unguarded, rushed into. It will have all its effect only if it is carried out in a perfectly defined manner, to conserve or take back a determined line, with a support of fire always, with the support of the artillery every time possible.

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THE HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.
No.29,686.

Headquarters, June 24, 1918.

Object

The use of large units of
cavalry and divisionary cavalry
in current operations.

NOTE

for the Armies.

To distribute up to Infantry Divisions
Regiments of cavalry.

Use of cavalry in the battle.

The present note is to recall certain principles relative to
the use of the cavalry in the present defensive battle.

I. CORPS AND DIVISION OF CAVALRY

(a) Before the battle, it is important to conserve the D.C.
(Cavalry Division) groups in a manner to engage for them all the forces
united.

The D.C. presents, in fact, the advantage that they comprise
the only, the mobile elements, which are on the same footing, and which
can, while going rapidly to battle, present themselves complete with
their artillery, their auto-machine guns, their machine guns, and their
munitions.

It is their reason for existing and their characteristics.

Any measure which would tend to disassociate them before
the battle, by detaching their artillery, their auto-machine guns,
their auto-cannons, etc., should be considered as make-shifts, and to
conserve a momentary character.

(b) From the first indication of attack, it is advantageous
to bring the cavalry division near the menaced front; but the rule
should be to reserve as long as possible this mobile force, in order
to be able to stop a surprise rupture on the front.

If this rupture is produced, the command will engage the
cavalry division, all the forces united, and at the main part, but also
with the care of retrieving them when the infantry reserves will be
able to intervene.

It is also indicated that the cavalry division can be used
as reserves of precaution to hold the positions of barriers, behind
the front of combat, until the arrival of the infantry division of
reinforcement.

In all cases, the command will be forced always to engage
the cavalry division in their normal framework, that means under the
command of the cavalry corps to which they belong.

II. Cavalry of Corps and Divisionary Squadrons.

The use which has been made of the squadrons of cavalry in corps
and divisionary cavalry in the last combats has not always been con-
forming to the necessities of the situation.

UNCLASSIFIED

Too often, the cavaliers have been systematically specialized in the police of the surrounding, in the services of order, in the missions of communication by foot.

Each time that the war takes on the character of a war of movement, it is convenient on the contrary to form again on horseback the squadrons of the cavalry in corps or divisional cavalry and to use them by squadrons, or by half-regiments and regiments:

Either to reconnoiter or to cover the infantry with reserve units in their march to battle;

or occasionally, in combat, and while awaiting the engagement of the infantry, to occupy momentarily the points whose possession is important to the command;

or finally to assure the important duties of communication by horse or foot inspection of officers or under-officers, patrols of brigadiers and cavaliers).

III. The Generals commanding a group of an army or of an army might well be inspired by the principle recalled herewith, and to assure, on the other hand, the execution of the command of Note 31,351, December 30, 1918 (Instruction and use of cavalry).

PETAIN

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Vth Army
Staff Office
3d Bureau
No. 736/3

Headquarters, June 25, 1918.

NOTE

Note sent along with Note No. 29,475, from the General Commander in Chief, defining the positions of the army and specifying its role.

The note shows clearly that it applies only to the fronts definitely stabilized.

When the time is come, the plan of defense of the army will indicate the position of resistance; for the moment, there is not an inch of land to lose.

The army corps, on the other hand, not being able to keep guard, as an offensive of great strength, on an indefinite extent of terrain, will be considered as responsible for the portion of land up to the position of Reuil, Pucry, Chamery, Villers-Allerand, Rilly, Verzenay, on which they will besides have to have garrisons of safety until the arrival of the reinforcement divisions.

The Chief of Staff.

Commander of Vth Army:

Official:

BUAT.

Belhague

1st C.A.C. (Colonial Army Corps)
2d C.A.I. (Italian Army Corps)
5th Corps of the Army.
9th C.A.W. (British Army Corps)
1st Cavalry Corps.
Engineers.

ANNEXE No. 5.

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The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.
No. 33545

Headquarters June 27, 1918.

Group of Armies.
Armies.

D.A.N. (Det. of the Army of the North)

I.G.A. (Chief of Artillery)

Italian Army

General Belin (6ex.)

General Foch

Cabinet

S.I.A. (Inter-Allied Council)

NOTE

for the Armies

The note No. 29473 of June 24, 1918, has defined the main battle position on a stabilized front, and specified that the most of the forces of which the command of the army disposes, is to be given to the conservation of this position.

It is useful to examine the consequences resulting from this conception to the point of view of the extension of the artillery.

Again, the study of the recent operations show that certain points are to make clear what concerns the defense approached by the batteries.

The present note shows:

A. The determination of the zone of deployment of the artillery in the defensive;

B. The division into echelons of the arrangement of the troops;

C. Its concealment;

D. The measures concerning the defense approached by the batteries.

A. Determination of the zone of deployment of artillery:

The normal place (1) for the artillery is behind the main battle position. The terrain in front of this position is fought with the maximum of efficiency, the space to a dead angle is reduced as much as possible.

The firing eventually to get into the interior of the zone of the outposts and behind the main battle position, as well as to the support of the foreseen counter-attacks are the object of a minute preparation.

In principle, the tracing of the main battle position should permit the artillery to manage to conserve a sufficiently extensive action on the terrain situated near the outposts.

This action can be characterized as follows:

The field artillery and short heavy artillery and of an old model should be able to carry out the firing of counter-preparation which is their duty on the eventual zone of assembly and of depart from the attacks, that means up to 1,500 to 2,000 meters near our line of outposts;

the long heavy artillery of all models, the short modern artillery should be placed in such a manner as to go easily into counter-battery;

the heavy artillery of great power should take care of the possibility of carrying out the blows of interdiction on the communication of the enemy and the harrassing in its important establishments;

the redivision on the ground to the interior of the zone thus limited is accomplished by taking into account the distance of the objectives assigned to the different types of materials, of the ability and mobility (1) of these materials. The artillery of position, unprovided with means of transport, will take place, in the beginning, behind the position of barrage.

B. Echelonning the Arrangement:

The echelonning is to be realized in the artillery of all calibers, in view of thwarting the plan of neutralization of the enemy, by spreading its fires, and again, by assuring the continuity of the execution of his missions.

The echelonning by battery in the group (which facilitates the communication with the infantry), or the echelonning by group in the regiment (which simplifies the exercise of the command of the artillery) is to recommend following the case.

C. Concealment of the Arrangement:

The arrangement of the artillery should be hidden from the enemy in order to baffle their observation bureaux and, then, to restrain the efficiency of their counter-battery firing.

This result will be obtained by carefully camouflaging the positions, and giving to the batteries the defilade consistent with their duties and especially by appealing to the measures of precaution exposed herewith:

(2)

1. To keep silent, except in case of necessity, the barrage batteries in position. The few rangings indispensable to these batteries will be carefully camouflaged by the firing of other units; they will avoid being made to intervene separately. They will frequently modify the regime of the barrages by concentration and that of counter-preparation, in order that the enemy cannot connect by them their gaps, and adapt to it their formation of attack.

2. To carry out most of the daily firing of the A.C.(Corps Artillery) and the modern A.L.C.(heavy C.A.) (3) on the temporary positions which the batteries will occupy only momentarily.

- (1) It is convenient to maintain as much as possible the first conditions given, permitting a certain distance of safety between the position of resistance, and the heavy batteries hard to use.
- (2) Experience proves that the inactive batteries are hard to repair, even by photography.
- (3) It is indicated to turn these duties over to the batteries used by the echelons behind the arrangement.

These manoeuvres, particularly favorable to the development of the instruction of the troop and its aptitude for the battle of movement, have been commended again and again. (1)

3. To subdivide the counter-batteries, to avoid for them all separate intervention, to put them into action, on the contrary, in concentrations.

D. Measures concerning the defense brought by the batteries:

The security of the artillery results principally from the fact that all the batteries are placed behind the main battle position.

Arrangements for the approaching defense are nevertheless taken in all the batteries, whatever may be the distance of the lines, conforming to the prescriptions of the instruction of December 20, 1917, on the defensive actions and of February 11, 1918, on the organization and construction of the batteries. (2)

The communication is organized with neighboring troops; a service of scouts functions before and on the flanks of the positions.

At the beginning, no displacement of batteries toward the rear should be effected without the order of the command (Army, Corps or Division). The army commanders, those of the Corps or of the Division, can delegate in advance the right of changing the position of the batteries and of inferior authorities, in foreseeing the case or the communications would be broken. The eventual positions of return should have been planned in advance, as well as the itineraries and the new communications.

If the main battle position comes to the point of surrendering, the infantry must hold on to the positions of battery and to contribute to the defense of the cannons. The personnel of a battery which would have been constrained to destroy its material, is joined to a neighboring infantry, combats with it, and partakes of its luck.

PETAIN.

- (1) Order No. 2 again of December 30, 1917.
Note No. 4614 of February 2, 1918.
Note No. 23605 of March 22, 1918.

- (2) Before a near attack, certain displacements of the material can be necessary to exercise an effective action on the edges of the position; these displacements, which are necessary to attach, to reduce to the minimum, are to prepare for the advance.

Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies
Staff Office
No. 1749.

Headquarters, July 1, 1918

General Direction No. 4.

Today, July 1, the enemy is stopped at:

30 kilometers from Dunkerque;		
60	"	" Calais;
70	"	" Boulogne;
60	"	" Abbeville;
60	"	" Paris;
25	"	" Chalons.

An advance of 40 kilometers toward Abbeville would cut the communications with the north of France, separate the English armies from the French armies, a military result of considerable importance for the events of the war.

An advance, even less, toward Paris, without that advance could influence definitely the military operations and by that, lead to a decision, would impress deeply the public opinion, would provoke the evacuation of the capital menaced by the bombardment, would doubtlessly trouble the governmental action, indispensable to the continuance of the war.

The progress of the enemy on the objectives enumerated herewith, cannot furnish them any comparable result.

In the defensive attitude which we are still maintaining today, July 1, it is then Paris, Abbeville, which we must cover above all. It is the advance of the enemy which we must, at all price, stop as soon as possible in two directions.

Without mentioning the diversions, which we can, moreover, undertake, to deceive their attention, their front being equipped from Ypres to Verdun, the enemy, to go against Paris or Abbeville, is obliged to leave from the front of Chateau-Thierry, Lens.

It is the, facing this front, Chateau-Thierry, Lens, and on all the possible extent, that we should concentrate our activity, realize or prepare the arrangements which are necessary to defensive battle, aiming at the defense step by step.

Facing this front:

the defensive organizations should be pressed with the greatest rapidity, repeated without delay, and well linked by the bretelles (switch positions).

the positions of batteries, well established, the firing carefully regulated;

the instructions, given to the troops charged with keeping the first and second positions, or of counter-attack should be clear, precise, well known by those carrying out the directions (regiments, battalions); their executions should in case of need be assured of this by watchful drilling.

After having realized the preliminary arrangements destined to reply first to the sudden attack of the enemy, the command should be convinced that to use best this system of forces, it is necessary for them to act directly themselves with energy and with entire initiative, to take when they can, the administration of the battle, to be on the field themselves.

Finally, without speaking of the reserves of precaution, destined to stop the possible diversions of the enemy, in Flanders and in Champagne especially, it is to reply to the attacks in the direction of Paris and Abbeville that it is necessary to foresee or realize the most rapid reunion of the most powerful reserves;

French reserves behind the French part;

English reserves behind the English part of the front in question.

It remains understood, furthermore, that the use of these reserves could extend, in fact, beyond the front, behind which they are prepared.

The Allied reserves will go to battle, where it will be delivered; the French reserves being engaged to the use of the British Army, if that one is forcefully attacked, and just the same, the English reserves to the use of the French Armies if the enemy concentrates decidedly their masses in the direction of Paris.

In order to facilitate their intervention, just and coordinated, in battle, these reserves should be organized, in the plan, at the very least, in an army corps or army.

F. FOCH

Official:

Weygand
Chief of Staff

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The HEADQUARTERS
3d Bureau
540

July 1, 1918


Commander in Chief of French Armies of
North and Northeast.

to Commander in Chief of Allied Armies.

By letter No. 1704, of June 28, you ask me to let you know of the general economy of my forces on which I can count.

The joining of my reserves which I consider desirable comes from my letter No. 34287 of June 27. I shall realize it in proportion to the possibilities.

In a general manner, I expect to have about July 10:

to the north of the Oise, 8 French divisions, of which two are well worn, 2 American divisions, and a cavalry corps. The mass of these forces being to the northeast of Beauvais.

between Oise and the Marne, 10 French divisions of which two are well worn, and 1 American division (without artillery);

to the south of Marne, 2 French divisions, and a cavalry corps;

between the Mt. of Reims, and the Argonne, 3 French Divisions;

between Argonne and Meuse, 2 worn French divisions.

This arrangement is in accord with the operation on the front of the Vth Army, but not that which is in preparation for the Xth Army. In case that the latter operation should take place, it would reduce from 7 or 8 the number of the reserve divisions between Oise and the Marne.

If an enemy attack were produced before July 10, the number of the reserves reconstituted would be diminished by 1 or 3 divisions in each of the regions mentioned.

As to the use of the reserves thus arranged, it is by no means specialized, and their transport will be foreseen in the different possibilities, as I have always made them.

In case only one of these supposed hypotheses should present itself, this plan of transport would permit the immediate taking:

in the British zone, a first echelon of 6 French divisions, 2 American divisions, a cavalry corps;

between Oise and the Marne, 8 French divisions, 2 American divisions; 2 cavalry corps, in addition to reserves already in place;

in Champagne, 10 French divisions and a cavalry corps;

between Argonne and Meuse, 5 French divisions and a cavalry corps.

PETAIN

ANNEXE No. 8.

UNCLASSIFIED

MAIN HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast.

July 1, 1918

Staff Office

Telegram in cipher (code)

3d Bureau

No. 176/M

177/M

178/M

Commander in Chief

to Staff: Sezanne.

Montmort.

Chalons-Saint-Memmie.

Mirecourt.

Lahuycourt.

Bacon.

Villenauxe.

Operations-Priority.

Copy to D.A. (Chief of Service of the Rear)

" " D.T.M.A. (Chief of Military Transportation)

By reason of the information concerning the next attack of the enemy on the front of the IVth Army, the following arrangements will be taken for the proceedings of the army groups interested:

1. First Dismounted Cavalry Division will be introduced in sector to the right of the 18th Infantry Division and on the front in keeping with the capacity of present combat of this Dismounted Cavalry Division.

2. The 27th and 46th Infantry Divisions will pass from the Detachment of the Army of the North to the Group of Armies of the North while remaining as reserves of the General in Chief. The two Infantry divisions as well as the 63d Infantry Division and 42 U. S. Infantry Division, will be all in a position to take the second position. The conditions of movement of the 27th and 46th Infantry Divisions will be indicated later.

3. 1st Cavalry Corps will be concentrated in the region of Vertus, Chalons-sur-Marne, with a cavalry division on the Marne, Headquarters of the cavalry corps close to the Marne.

4. Group of Armies of the East will hurry by all possible means, the liberation of the 25th and 127th Infantry Divisions. The first available of the two divisions will come, after relief, to again group themselves in the region of Villers-en-Argonne, ready to occupy the second position at the junction of the II and IV Armies. Their arrangement will be stopped by agreement between the Group of Armies of the East and the Group of Armies of the North.

5. All movements or stationings of concentration resulting from the present order should be taken, screened from the aerial investigations of the enemy. At the beginning, movements by cars will take place at night. Give this strict order to the executants and take all precaution.

Official:

M. de Bareswt
Asst. Chief of Staff.

UNCLASSIFIED

The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.
1798.

Headquarters, July 2, 1918.

Note
for groups of Armies and Armies.

The information taken from recent battles have shown that the organization of a "battle-field of an army scattered on all its extent" such as the one defined in the note of April 20, 1918, No. 21356, has given place in application to a scattering of forces against which it is urgent to react.

Consequently, the note No. 21356, from April 20, 1918, is annulled.

Henceforth, it is then understood:

that the forces should not be scattered on the army battlefield;

that their mass of infantry and artillery, should come to the defense to the extreme of the main battle position;

that this main battle position should offer a continued defense.

The organization of a continued defense from the main battle position is important. It alone, in fact, can answer efficiently to the use of the smoke projectiles, thanks to which the enemy's infantry hides its approaches and succeeds, in the zones in which it is seeking a rapid progression, and is able to reduce considerably the flanking by the firing which our combat groups reciprocally furnish.

But this idea of continuity does not imply at all the return to the procedure "of the combat in line deployed in a simple trench."

The echelonning of the combattants by groups of specialists in the matter of length and extent (1) connotes the rule of joining the forces on the different parallels of the main battle position. It is only a question:

of fastening the resistance on an organization which is continue du terrain (that means the obstacle and covering);

of dividing the means of fire in such a manner that all the intervals existing between the centers of resistance and between the point of support are beaten by the flank firing, and also by the firing from the rear (infantry and artillery);

Finally to adapt the dimensions and intervals to the nature of the terrain, the intervals being reduced to conform to the way in which the terrain is best covered or most favorable to the movements of infiltration.

Official:

PETAIN

M. de Bareswt
Asst. Chief of Staff

(1) Instruction on organization of terrain (Aug. 22, 1917) 1st Part.
Chapter III, p. 26.

ANNEXE No. 10.

UNCLASSIFIED

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The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of North and Northeast.

July 2, 1918. 12:35

Staff Office.

3d Bureau.

No. 197/M

198/M

199/M

Telegram in cipher

Commander in Chief
to Staff at Sezanne.

Operations-priority.

I. Following and modifying my telegram 176, 177, 178/M of July 1, I authorize you to introduce on the front of the IVth Army the 42d Infantry Division, U.S., and one of the two divisions 27th and 46th, but it should be understood that this measure will not lead to increasing, even slightly, the density of the troops in front of the position of resistance.

II. The reinforcement of the front of the IVth Army is going to be effected thus two or three days before the date indicated as probable for the enemy's attack. I ask your attention on the difficulties which will result for divisions entering in sector which they do not know. The activity of the command and of the staff officers should level off these difficulties as soon as possible. You will control especially this activity.

III. It is essential that the reinforcement of the front of the IVth and Vth Army escape the enemy. Keep account of the arrangements made to this end.

IV. I am putting at your disposal the Headquarters and the Corps Troops of the 14th Army Corps whose landings I am varying.

V. All arrangements made for the retreat of the divisions newly introduced on the fronts of the IVth and Vth Armies can be carried out on the night after the warning given the preceding morning.

PETAIN

ANNEXE No. 11.

UNCLASSIFIED

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The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of North and Northeast.
Staff Office.
3d Bureau
2701.

MAIN HEADQUARTERS, July 3, 1918.

INSTRUCTION
for Commander of Group of Armies of the
north.

Sequel to telegram 176-177-178/M, of July 1, 1918.

I. In case of an attack of the enemy of great extent on the front of Champagne, the eventual use of the 1st Cavalry Corps will be subordinated to the preliminary authorization of the General in Chief.

This use would then be regulated by the Commander of the Group of Armies of the North conforming to the principles enumerated in Note No. 29686, June 24, 1918, of the General in Chief.

It is then important to hasten, by all possible means, the freeing of the groups of artillery of the 3d and 5th Cavalry Divisions, at present deployed on the front of the Marne.

II. The new stationing of the 1st Cavalry Corps, in the manner defined by paragraph 3 of telegram 176-77-78 from the General in Chief, should permit this corps;

to assure eventually the holding of the bridges of the Marne below Chalons-sur-Marne inclusive;

to continue on the right bank of the Marne in joint arrangement, being ready for a march of approach toward the northeast or north, all forces united, and eventually to assure the leaving from this same river, of the forces led by the General in Chief in the region of Chalons, if there is an occasion.

III. The General of the Army Corps of the North is authorized to have carried out by the staff of the 1st Cavalry Corps the preparatory examination for the use of this unit to the north of the Marne, in view of taking a reserve battle position, or of stopping a rupture on the front.

He will then keep an account of the orders given in carrying out present instructions.

PETAIN

ANNEXE No. 12.

UNCLASSIFIED

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The Headquarters of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.

Main Headquarters, July 3, 1918.


for the commanders of Army Groups and
for the Commander of the D.A.N. (IXth Army)

I. The staff of the D.A.N. (IXth Army) at present available at Villenauxe, should be ready to intervene rapidly in the battle.

It will study this intervention on the base of the information which the commanders of army groups will establish immediately in view of the hypothetical situations defined as follows:

Zone of the G.A.R.

Hypothesis A. - The enemy is carrying on an offensive of great extent aiming at the separation of the French and English armies (in the direction of Amiens, Abbeville).

The D.A.N. (IXth Army) places at the disposal of the Commander of the reserve army group to permit the G.A.R. to keep up the communication with the right wing of the British. (1)

Hypothesis B. - The enemy seeks to break the front of the G.A.R. in the general direction of Paris.

The D.A.N. (IXth Army) enters in line either for the return thrust, or to stop an extension of the front of the G.A.R.

Zone of the G.A.N. (G.A.C.)

Hypothesis C. - The enemy forces by surprise the crossing of the Marne and threatens to separate the Vth and VIth Armies.

The D.A.N. (IXth Army) is put to the disposal of the G.A.N. (G.A.C.) to assure the communication between the Vth and VIth Armies and to keep back the enemy from the Marne.

Hypothesis D. - The enemy tries to break the front at Champagne, and to push in the direction of Chalons-sur-Marne, Vitry-le-Francois.

The D.A.N. (IXth Army) is introduced between the IVth and Vth Armies with the idea of clearing the Mt. of Reims, and the region of Saint-Hilaire-au-Temple, Chalons-sur-Marne.

Zone of the G.A.E.

Hypothesis E. - The enemy attacks on Lorraine, in the general direction of Nancy.

- (1) This result can be desired as a means either of a counteroffensive led by the D.A.N. by moving from the north bank of the Somme to the west of Amiens - or an extension of the front of the G.A.R., made possible by the introduction of the D.A.N. to the left wing or in the central part of the G.A.R.

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The D.A.N. (IXth Army) is put to the disposal of the G.A.E. to take in charge the front from the southern Woevre (old zone of the 1st Army. (2)

II. For each of the cases of intervention defined in the former paragraph, the D.A.N. will be supposed to constitute at first the 5 or 6 divisions, divided into two corps, these forces proceeding either from the local reserves of the army group or from the reserves led by the General in Chief.

III. The commanders of the group of armies will see to it that their information arrives directly to the General of the D.A.N. (IXth Army) at Villenauxe, but at the same time addressing a copy to the Commander in Chief (3d Bureau).

The General of the D.A.N. (IXth Army) will study first the application of the information corresponding to the hypothesis D and A. He will come to an agreement with the commanders of Army Groups to assure the officers of his staff or his department heads all facilities of circulation in the zones of eventual intervention. (1)

IV. The prescribed studies for the present instruction, as well as the changes of stations or reconnaissances of terrain to which these studies of terrain will give place, should be surrounded with the greatest possible secrecy.

V. The Commander of the D.A.N. (IXth Army) will keep periodic account of the state of advancement of his studies.

PETAIN.

Copy: Cabinet

Report: 3d Bureau.

- (2) This introduction of the D.A.N. on the front of the southern Woevre is to foresee also that the II Army would be led to evacuate the salient of Verdun and to manoeuvre by its left to maintain connection with the IVth Army.
- (1) The Commander of the G.A.R. will make the necessary measures concerning the zone of the British (Franco-British junction).

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Group of Armies of the North
Staff Office.
3d Bureau.
No. 4280.

MAIN HEADQUARTERS, July 3, 1918.

Lieutenant General Maistre
Commander of Group of Armies of North

 to Commander of the Vth Army.

The plan of defense of the Vth Army does not clearly define sufficiently the main battle position chosen by the commander of the army in carrying out the note No. 29473, of June 24, from Main Headquarters, a position on which he wished to stop and fight the enemy with the mass of his forces (infantry, light, medium and trench artillery).

This main battle position is not simply a zone or a tract of terrain. It should allow essentially a continued line, which is developed on all the front of the army and which necessitates the prevention of the enemy's crossing it.

Without a doubt; certain points of support in front of this line can be advantageously defended to break the effort of the enemy and to delay the moment in which they will be able to near it. Especially these points of support which thus make a part of the main battle position, should not be too near the first line (or line of the outposts) to be susceptible to the destructive firing of the enemy's efforts.

It is essential that the continuous line defined here be traced by the commander of the army, if only to assure the joining of the nearby army corps to the limits of the sector.

The same necessity is imposed on the reserve battle position .

The note of June 24 formulates some principles to which the plan of defense must conform.

It is necessary to fix particularly the proportion of the units to echelon in front of and behind the second battle position the principal position of resistance to their mission.

The differences of application concerning the fronts resulting from a quite recent battle no longer applies to the front of the Vth Army, stabilized, in fact, for a month. It is not possible to attain, to fix the plan of defense in a firm fashion, the modifications which the plans of attack envisioned will bring to the present front, by reason of the uncertainty of the dates which could be fixed by carrying out these plans.

MAISTRE

ANNEXE No. 14.

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The HEADQUARTERS of Armies
of North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau
5353

Headquarters, July 5, 1918.


COMMANDER IN CHIEF
of French Armies of North and Northeast.

to Commander of Allied Armies.

Account given of the arrangements made in view of a next attack of the enemy on the front of Champagne.

I. The reinforcement of the G.A.R. in large units has been carried out in the following conditions;

1. Introduction of Division on the front;

The front of the IVth Army has been reinforced by 3 Divisions; (1) 45th (zone of the 1st C.A.C. to the junction of Vth and IVth Armies), 1st D.C.P. and 63d (right wing of the 8th C.A.)

The introduction of the 63d D.I. is made by restoring, on the territory of the II Army, the regiment of the left of the 35 D.I. which permits the IVth Army to support better its right wing, at the same time to increase the local reserves of the 13 C.A. in Argonne (II Army).

2. Divisions in second line.

As divisions of intervention - initially charged with furnishing garrisons of safety for the 2d position - the IVth Army places the 27th, 46th D.I., and the 42 D.I.U.S.

Besides, the 1st C.C. is concentrated in the region of Vertus, Chalons-sur-Marne, ready to go over to the north of the Marne, the bridges of which it holds below Chalons.

Behind the Vth Army, the 120th D.I. has the purpose of keeping the Mt. of Reims; the 7th C.I. coming from Flanders, will debark at the close of July 6, midnight, in the region of Avize-Gezanne (variously ordered the evening of July 3.).

3. The eventual transport (rail, autos) toward Champagne, of one part of the reserves placed in the zone of the G.A.R., is prepared on the bases of the simultaneous movement of the 5th D.I., of which:

- 3 D.I. complete (1 by rail, 2 by auto);
- 2 D.I. (infantry in autos, artilleries, by marches).

In all, on the front, which extends from Reims inclusive (meaning the surroundings of Ormes to Argonne inclusive, that is, up to the valley of Aire), the battle can be engaged with:

- (1) Not comprising the 132 D.I. which has reinforced the occupation of the front since last June 25.

ANNEXE No. 15.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 21 Divisions (14 of them in sector);
- 1 Cavalry Corps.

Or, in all, the value of 23 D.I. (1)

II. Situation of the Artillery.

Before the recent information had been discovered on the front of the IVth Army, the G.A.N. had been already the object of artillery reinforcements destined for the attack prepared for the Vth Army.

The G.A.N. found there the first means of reinforcing the IVth Army.

Besides, these have been put to his disposal;

- the 453d and 456th regiment of 105 in formation behind the IV and V Armies (2) (8 groups of 105 in all);
- 2 extensive groups of tractors available to the north of Bar-le-Duc;
- the 421st regiment horse drawn, of 155 long (2 groups), in formation in the same region;
- 1 short group horse drawn, of the 331st regiment, also in same region;
- 1 battery with 3 pieces of 285 Berceau (A.L.V.F.) (railway artillery)

Following these reinforcements, the density of artillery toward the front of the IVth Army today results from:

- 1 field battery to 435 meters of the front;
- 1 heavy battery to 487 meters of the front.

It is not impossible to do otherwise. The front of the G.A.R. should not be too uncovered, the attack on Paris remaining the principal menace and that of Champagne, seeming only a diversion. (3)

Furthermore, it is necessary to give an account of the following elements;

1. A small grouping maintained to the north of Bar-le-Duc, comprising:

- 2 extensive groups of tractors;
- 1 small group of horse drawn.

Following this case, this grouping will be given, either to the G.A.N. or to the G.A.E. in case of a possible German demonstration, to the east of Argonne. It is the only reserve remaining between Champagne and Guisse.

2. The 57th Regiment of 75 porte, arriving from Flanders, in a few days.

3. The field artillery of the 3d D.I.U.S. (4 groups of 75) which arrives on July 3rd.

(1) Counting the 42d DIUS for two French Divs. and 1st CC for one Div.

(2) In the formation of the 453d two groups of 105 enter coming from the D.A.N. and landing July 4.

(3) In this order of ideas, it is understood that if the attack in (Cont'd)

III. Aeronautical.

The IVth Army who normally are arranged as a group of combat, have been reinforced by a second group of combat.

They can count on the immediate aid of a group of combat of the Vth Army.

Besides, all preparations are made to set up and to operate in the zone of the battle:

- in first case of necessity, a pursuit squadron and a bombarding squadron;
- in second case of necessity, a second fighting squadron, and a bombarding squadron.

IV. The general arrangement of the forces on the front menaced corresponds to the intentions of breaking the enemy's effort on the position of resistance.

The mass of the divisions of the 1st line are installed on this position, so as to assure a continuous defense; they are reinforced at the important points, by some battalions detached from the divisions of the second line.

The D.I. of the second line, introducing some elements of different sources (cavaliers, C.I.D., territorials...) furnish the garrisons of safety of the points of principal support of the second position and the troops of counter-attack.

The First Cavalry Corps, as it has been said previously, should have the Marne below Chalons-sur-Marne, inclusive, with the entrances of the bridge on the right bank ready to cross the river to march to battle. Thus placed, they could manage the union of the forces which would be concentrated, if possible, in the region of Epernay, Vertus, Chalons, in view of a counteroffensive having as a basis of departure the zone between Marne and Vesle.

To the east of Champagne, the II Army, if it is not attacked, will be in a position to concentrate rapidly three divisions. (36th, 127th, 131st) in the region south of the Sainte-Menehould, to support, if need be, to disengage for the counterattack, the right wing of the IVth Army.

The headquarters of the D.A.N., with the headquarters and the Corps Troops of the 14th C.A. eventually the headquarters and the E.N.E. of the 3d C.A. (these last relieved by the C.A.U.S.) constituted the available organs of command to face the demands of a battle of great extent, if the expected attack should take this character.

A copy of these instructions given by the General in Chief to the Commander of the G.A.N. will be addressed later.

PETAIN

- (3) cont'd-- Champagne considers the simple character of a strong diversion and is rapidly kept down, the General in Chief will recover without delay the artillery forces for the G.A.N. by putting into play the plans of retreat already established by the IVth and Vth Armies.

UNCLASSIFIED

The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office.
3d Bureau.
5358.

Main Headquarters, July 5, 1918.

Special Instruction For the Commanders of the G.A.N. and G.A.E.

I. The German attack expected in Champagne can have for a purpose:
the withdrawal of our reserves from the region of Paris and the zone of junction of the Franco-British forces;
the causing of the fall of Reims, and taking of the Mt. of Reims;
the placing of the railroad Epernay, Chalons, Revigny, under artillery fire;
the accentuation, by an advance to the west of Argonne of the salient formed by the front of the II^d Army.

The enemy should be kept from accomplishing these things.

The commanders of the army group of the north and the army group of the east will continue, consequently their operations according to the information which follows:

II. From now on, the gathering of the divided forces on the front of Champagne, or concentrated behind the front in order to permit facing the enemy, in form, at least, where the attack is made.

The supreme interest then concerns the Group of Armies of the North and the Group of Armies of the East, that they be put into position to lead the battle in Champagne, and in Argonne, with the forces which they will presently place in a manner to block the manoeuver of diversion which seems to be the intention of the enemy.

This line of conduct implies, on the part of the two groups of armies, a great flexibility in the handling of their reserves, and immediate planning for the eventual constitution of the new available forces (redistribution of forces, plans of transport, plans of rapid retreat, etc.).

III. The enemy's effort should be broken on the main battle position. It is the mission and duty of the front line Infantry Division.

The defense of this position will then be assured in a continuous manner, without the breach of continuity, by the mass of the divisions of the first line, reinforced, if it is necessary, on certain important points, by the detached elements of the divisions of the second line. (1)

(1) It is a question of first constituting a powerful line of fire, on all the extent of the main battle position.

The Divisions of the second line will be arranged hereafter in such a manner;

to furnish, in all cases, the safety garrisons of the second position;

to be able to pass to the counteroffensive, either locally to reestablish the soundness of the main battle position or in counter-attack of the army aiming at the reconquering of the lost terrain, when the mass of the enemy forces will have been stopped by the resistance of the division in first line.

The counteroffensive of the divisions of the second line, made possible by the tenacity of the divisions of the first line should be, after the beginning of the battle, one of the preoccupations of the High Command.

IV. In the case of a battle of great extent, the General in Chief will leave, in the zone of the G.A.N., a first echelon of fire divisions whose zone of first destination will be the region of Dormans, Montmirail, Chalons.

The transport of these 5 divisions would be at the same time and in case of need, and would take place:

for one division by rail;
for four divisions by truck. (1)

The numbers of these divisions and their origin will be indicated in proper time.

The Commander of the G.A.N. will ask the Chief of Service of the rear, all the necessary information concerning the arrival and eventual continuation in the territory of the G.A.N., of the trucks running to bring the G.A.R. He will make all the provisions concerning the stationing of the 5 divisions previously intended for the region of Dormans, Montmirail, and Chalons.

V. The General of the G.A.E. will prepare, in case the battle should not be extended into Argonne, the rapid concentration of the 3 divisions (2) or the detached elements of these divisions, in the region between Sainte-Menehould and Nettancourt.

VI. The use of the reserves of the General in Chief placed to the south of the Marne (region of Dormans, Montmirail, Chalons), that of the reserves of the G.A.E. concentrated between Sainte-Menehould, and Nettancourt will be studied in view:

either of supporting the wings of the arrangement for battle (Mt. of Reims to the west, Argonne to the east);

or of reinforcing the battle position in a menaced zone, or on the points whose observation is necessary to the development of the battle;

or of passing to the counteroffensive in the flank of the arrangement of the enemy's attack.

The role of the 1st Cavalry Corps has been previously defined by the instruction No. 2, 701, July 3, from the Commander in Chief; it is to this corps that the care of covering the concentration of the reserves led by the Commander in Chief in the region of Dormans, Montmirail, Chalons, will eventually fall.

PETAIN.

(1) For 2 of these 4 Divs., DSA will be able to transport the artillery with the infantry.

(2) 36th Div., 127th Div., 131st Div.

UNCLASSIFIED

The HEADQUARTERS
Aerial Division
Staff Office
No. 1632

July 5, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER.

By order of the Commander in Chief, the 1st Brigade will be transported into the region of Saint-Dizier, where it will be installed in the following conditions:

1st Squadron - Area of Rancourt, one Pursuit Flight; Brabant-le-Roi, one pursuit flight; Villiers-en-Lieu, one pursuit flight.

12th Squadron.- Area of Saint-Dizier, one bombardment flight; Behonne, one bombardment flight.

The area for the 3d bombardment flight will be later designated.

II. The movement will take place on the 5th:

1st Echelons flying without landing.

2nd Echelons moving in the two marches.

1st Squadron will bivouac in the evening of the 5th at Lecherolles;

12th Squadron will bivouac on the evening of the 5th Esternay, the others at Fere-Champenois.

III. The present installations in Plessis-Belleville, and the region of Roissy-en-France will be kept and guarded. The units will take only the baggage and the arms strictly necessary to their use.

Only the light echelon of the train will be moved.

Gas, oil and necessary supplies will be available at the places, and furnished by the following units:

- Train No. 5 at Nettancourt;
- Train No. 4 at Sompuis;
- Aerial R.G. at Villers-en-Lieu.

IV. The transportation necessary for the transportation of the men and arms will be furnished by the Chief of ^{motor} Transportation Service division.

The point of destination and the time will be later communicated to the 1st Brigade.

V. At the end of the movement, the arrangements of the units, as well as those of the staff (brigade and squadrons) will be communicated quickly by the courier division; landing at Boran.

VI. The station of command of the division will continue to function at Chatilly until a new order is given.

The first brigade will temporarily be under orders of the IVth Army for employment. It will continue to send its messengers to the divisions, a daily communication by exchange of messengers; aerial courier made at 8:00 A.M., in the area of Boran, and await the message of the brigade.

M. DUVAL.

Addressees: Staff Bacon, Hqrs. 3d Bureau, Hqrs. 2d Bureau, Hqrs. of aerial division, G.A.N., G.A.R., Hqrs. 1st Army, III Army, X Army, 1st Brigade, 2d Brigade, Grouping at Laurene, Groupings of Bloch.

ANNEXE No. 17.

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The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast

July 5, 1918. 4:10 P.M.

Staff Office

3d Bureau

No. 339/M

340/M

341/M

Telegram in cipher

from: Commanding General

to: Staff Wirecourt
Lahey-court

 Special Operations.

You will receive on July 6, the instruction which I am addressing to the G.A.N. and G.A.E., on the subject of conduct to follow in case of an attack of the enemy on the front of Champagne; this instruction prescribes for you:

I. If the left wing of the II Army is engulfed in the battle, lead your operations with your present forces, which implies the agility in the use of your reserves and plans for the eventual constitution of new detached forces by means of retreat, repair, etc.

II. If the left wing of the II Army is not attacked or is feebly attacked, be ready to concentrate rapidly between Sainte-Menehould and Nettancourt, the 127, and the 131 divisions or the detached parts of these divisions in view either of supporting the right of our line of battle in Argonne, or of reinforcing the resistance of the G.A.N. or of passing to the counteroffensive on the flank of the line of attack of the enemy.

It is furthermore understood that they will fight especially for the conservation of the main battle position and that the occupation of your second position in Argonne should be assured from then on.

PETAIN

ANNEXE No. 18.

UNCLASSIFIED

The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Offices.

3d Bureau.

No. 344/M

345/M

July 5, 1918, 5:25 P.M.

Telegram in code.

from: Commanding General
to: Staffs: Sezanne
Villenauxe.

I. Headquarters of the D.A.N. (IXth Army) will be moved tomorrow, July 6, to Fere-Champenois, where it will function at noon.

II. To begin with, the General of the Detachment of the Army of the North will take the command of the forces placed on the Marne; 1st Cannon Corps, 7th Division, 20th Division and 10th Colonial Division. He will receive, in view of his eventual intervention, the instructions from the Commander of the Group of Armies of the North.

III. Headquarters of the 14th Army Corps will be stationed by the order of the G.A.N. so as to assure after tomorrow, July 6, the command of the groupings formed by the 20th Division and the 10th Colonial Division.

IV. All units making the subject of this telegram are in reserve at my disposal.

By order of the Commanding General:

BUAT
Chief of Staff

The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast

July 5, 1918, 5:40 P.M.

Staff Office.

Telegram in code.

3d Bureau.

No. 348/M

from: The Commanding General.

to Staff at: Noailles.
Lamorlaye.
Sezanne.
Montmort.
Bacon.

I. The 10th Colonial Division and 20th Division will be taken in trucks (infantry and artillery) on July 5, 8:00 P.M. Trains will make the trip by night of the 5th - 6th of July.

Point of first destination Lagury for the trucks, Meaux for the trains.

II. The 10th Colonial Division and 20th Division will be bivouaced in reserve at my disposal on the left bank of the Marne, to the south region of Epernay, Chalons, ready to move to the north of the Marne.

III. Movements to be regulated by the G.A.N., after previous agreement with the G.A.R. and the D.S.A. The G.A.N. will report the location made for the 10th Colonial Division and the 20th Division.

By order of the Commanding General;

BUAT.

Copy: D.A. (Chief of Service of the Rear) Chief of Staff
D.S.A. (Chief of Motor Transport)
D.T.M.A. (Chief of Transportation)
1st Bureau.
S.

UNCLASSIFIED

The HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North and Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau.
No. 363/M
364/M

July 5, 1918, 10:50 P.M.

Telegram in code.

to: Commanding General.

to Staff at: Noailles.
Conty.
Clermont.
Lamorlaye.

Special operations.

I. The following units should be able to leave July 6 in the morning, if the order is given for it. The change will take place as follows:

a) - 70th Division, infantry in trucks, artillery by rail or truck, advised 3 hours for the embarkments in trucks, 9 hours for the embarkments by rail.

These last should take place in the region of Ormoy, Nanteuil, density 18/24.

b) - 77th Division by rail, leaving in the region of Pont-Sainte-Maxence, Liancourt, Chantilly, density 24.24, advised 9 hours.

c) - 5th Division by rail, embarking in the region of Saleux, Prouzel, Loeuilly; density 24.24, advised 9 hours.

II. Armies interested will make hereafter necessary arrangements in accord with the D.S.A. and D.T.M.A. Execution of these movements will take place only on my order.

By order of the Commanding General:

BUAT.
Chief of Staff.

Copy: D.A.
D.S.A.
D.T.M.A.
S.

ANNEXE No. 21.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Group of Armies of the North
Staff Office.

3d Bureau.

No. 4456.

Headquarters, July 5, 1918.

from: Lieutenant General Maistre
Commanding the Group of Armies
of the North.

to: The Commanding General of Vth Army.

On July 3, under No. 4280, I have made your predecessor observe that the plan of defense of the Vth Army did not exactly comply with the main battle position which required him to fix in accordance with the instructions of the Commander in Chief.

The plan of defense moreover, does not give any more exact information on the echelonning which would permit the Commander in Chief of the Army to group the most of his forces of infantry on that position; the commanders of the army corps are still uncertain on the position which they should defend at all cost.

You should urgently revise the plan of defense of the Vth Army, so as to give all the necessary precisions to that subject and to send me, at the same time with the report of the changes which you will have prescribed, a schematic outline indicating the division of the troops, after placing the arrangement for defense, that is; by the sub-sector, or the divisions, the number of battalions designated to the outposts and the occupation of the main battle position and the number of the safety garrisons of the reserve battle position (second position, from Reuil to Chamery, 3d position from Chamery to Verzenay).

MAISTRE

ANNEXE No. 22.

UNCLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS of the Armies
of the North & Northeast
Staff Office
3d Bureau
6835

Headquarters, July 6, 1918.

To General Foch (1)

Sent by express July 6
at 2:30 P.M. (1)

Following report No. 5553 of July
relative to arrangements made in
view of an attack near the enemy
on the front of Champagne.

I. They will be assembled in reserve to the disposal of the
Commander in Chief on the left bank of the Marne to the south of
the region of Epernay, Chalons, ready to move to the north of the
Marne:

1st - The 10th Colonial Division and the 20th Division to
leave at noon, July 6th under command of the Commanding General of
the 14th Army Corps (Hqt's to be fixed by the Commander of the Group
of the Armies of the North).

2nd - The 7th Division to leave at 2:00 P.M. 7th July.

II. The Commanding General of the detachment of the Army of
the north (IXth Army Hqt's. at Fere-Champenoise at noon July 6th)
will, to begin with, take command of the forces placed on the Marne:
1st Cavalry Corps; 7th Division; 10th Colonial Division; and 20th
Division.

He will receive, in view of his eventual intervention the
instructions of the General of the Group of Armies of the North.

III. The 70th, 77th, and 5th Divisions are kept ready to leave
in the morning of the 6th. Arrivals could be ended by the 8th in
the evening in the region of Chalons, Epernay.

IV. Artillery - Order has been given to the Reserve Group of
Armies to place as soon as possible to the disposal of the G.A.N.
a regiment of portee 75.

PETAIN.

(1) Written by hand on the original sheet (file HQT').

ANNEXE No. 23.

UNCLASSIFIED

PETAIN'S REPORT

PART VI

The Battle of Champagne.

30 June - 18 July 1918

- - - - -

Translation from the French of pages 131 to 265,
both inclusive.

Translator: Captain Hobart Hewett, C.A.C.

Translator's notes are printed in red and inclosed
in brackets: thus (Note).

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ANNEX NO.24.

General Headquarters of
The Armies of the North and Northeast
3rd Section, General Staff.

6 July 1918.

No.6846

Memorandum: The Commanding General, Reserve Group of Armies.

1. The Commanding General, Reserve Group of Armies, will move the groupment composed of the 9th and 10th Divs. to the vicinity of Poix in proximity to the British zone.

The II Cav. Corps will be moved one days march to the North (i.e. to the north of Beauvais).

A bivouac area between those to be occupied by the 9th and 10th Divs. and the II Cav. Corps will be reserved for the 71st Div. which soon will be moved from Flanders.

2. It is intended that the 9th, 10th, and 71st Divs. will form a groupment under the Commanding General of the III Corps as soon as the headquarters and non-divisional elements of this corps can be withdrawn from the Sixth Army.

3. The above movements are prescribed with a view to placing a force in rear of the left flank of the North Group of Armies capable of prompt intervention at the junction of the French and British Armies.

You will cause appropriate plans to be prepared and provide for the reconnaissance of the ground by the commanders concerned. (see Instructions No. 1915, 3 July 1918)

Copies to:
General Foch.
Cabinet.

PETAIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX NO.25.

General Headquarters of
The Armies of the North and NorthEast,
2nd Section, General Staff.

6 July 1918.

No 8961/2

MEMORANDUM

From the apparently sincere statements of a prisoner captured on 5 July, it is believed that an attack may be expected between Reims and Chateau-Thierry on the 9th or 10th of July.

The troops taking part in this attack will be assembled in the area south and southeast of d'Arcis-le-Posson and in the following woods:

Bois de Reims	Bois d'Aiguizy
Bois le Moine	Bois de Pognac
Bois des 5 Fils	Bois de Vezilly

There will be very few troops in the villages.

Therefore, it is believed important that the woods named should be shelled by artillery and bombed by aviation.

COINTET.

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ANNEX NO.26

General Headquarters of
The Armies of the North and NorthEast
3rd Section, General Staff.

6:15 PM, 6 July 1918.

No.407/M, 408/M

CIPHER TELEGRAM


Operations-Priority.

The Commander in Chief,

To: Headquarters at Sezanne, (CENTER GROUP OF ARMIES)

Reply to letter No.4542, 6 July.

I. The most dangerous maneuver which the enemy may attempt is, not crossing the Marne, but, a vigorous attack on the left of the Fifth Army to the north of the Marne. Therefore:

II. The 20th Div. should not be placed in line. Instead it should be held available and prepared for a counter attack towards Jaulgonne or Dormans.

III. The remaining forces should be prepared to operate in this same direction, towards the Montagne de Reims, or towards the Camp de Chalons. In order to provide for any of these movements, units should be disposed as follows: one division on the Marne from Epernay to Tours-sur-Marne, one division from Avize to Jalone and to the south, and the I Cav. Corps on the Marne in the vicinity of Chalons-sur-Marne with one of its divisions between that city and Vertus.

IV. Inform the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Armies of the plan.

V. Under these conditions, it would be incorrect to place the headquarters of the III Corps on the left of the Fifth Army.

By order of the Com'g Gen.

BUAT

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ANNEX No 27.

General Headquarters of
The Armies of the North and North East, 7 July 1918.
3rd Section, General Staff,
No 8241.

[REDACTED]

The Commander in Chief, French Armies of the North and North East.

To: The Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

With reference to my letter No 540, 1 July, there is submitted herewith, a tabulation summarizing the movements that will be required in case of intervention by French troops in the British zone (vicinity of Doullens or Saint-Omer):-

- Of the 8 divisions (2 American) to be moved:-

- Note 1. { 5 will be moved by rail; 3 routes.
 {
 { 3 will be moved by marching, (all of the
 infantry, and the artillery of one or
 two divisions, to be moved by motor trans-
 port.

These movements should be completed in the times shown:

- a. Approximately 24 hours after movement orders are received, the infantry of 3 divisions, and the artillery of one or possibly two divisions, should arrive in the British zone.
- b. Four days after receipt of the movement orders, six infantry divisions and the II Cav. Corps should complete their concentration in the British zone. The other two infantry divisions should arrive on the 5th and 6th days.

- - - - -

Note 1. 4 by rail and 4 by marching, when the I Corps US, is reassembled in the vicinity of Beauvais.

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In case this concentration should be executed before the transfer of the two divisions which are to come from the old D.A.N. (Detachment of the Army of the North) (later the Ninth Army), these two divisions will be included in the eight to be employed in the British zone.

Therefore the time required to complete this concentration will be approximately four days.

PETAIN.

ANNEX No 28.

General Headquarters of
The Armies of the North and North East,
3rd Section, General Staff,
No. 444/M, 445/M, 446/M.
Operations-Priority.

[REDACTED]

From: The Commander in Chief.

To: Hq. at: Sezanne (Center Group of Armies).
Chalons - Saint-Memmie (Fourth Army).
Montmort (Fifth Army).
Fere-Champenoise (Ninth Army).

I. From the information gathered by our intelligence agencies, it is evident that the impending enemy offensive will have as its objectives Reims, Epernay, and Chalons, thus affecting the entire front of the Fifth Army, the right of the Sixth, and the left of the Fourth. Apparently the attack to the east of the Suippe will be in the nature of a feint.

II. Therefore I have decided to bring up the 71st and 77th Divs. to the Marne to replace the 7th Div. and the 10th Div. Colonial. These latter units will be turned over to the Fifth Army upon the arrival of the 71st and 77th Divs. The Fifth Army will issue instructions to, and cause the necessary reconnaissance to be commenced by, the 7th Div. and the 10th Div. Colonial, even before the relief of these units.

III. The Center Group of Armies will be particularly careful to insure the strength of the position at the boundary between the Fourth and Fifth Armies (on the mole east of La Montagne). Steps will be taken at once, so that, as soon as the attack to the east of the Suippe is stopped, a portion of, or all of, the reserves of the Fourth Army will be avail-

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able for support to the west.

PETAIN.

Copies to:

Chief of the Service of the Rear.
Army Transportation Service.

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ANNEX NO. 29

11:00 PM, 7 July 1918

██████████
463/M

CIPHER TELEGRAM

The Commander in Chief,

To Headquarters at: Sezanne(Center Group of Armies).
Noailles (Reserve Group of Armies).
Mirecourt (East Group of Armies).
Chantilly (?).

The Air Division is placed at the disposal of the Center Group of Armies.

The 2nd Brigade, the Bloch Groupment, and the headquarters of the Air Div. will move without delay to the vicinity of Ferte-Gaucher — Champaubert.

The Center Group of Armies will issue the necessary detailed instructions directly to the Air Div.

By order of the C.G.

M. DUVAL.

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