



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ALPHA COMPANY, U. S. ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
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MEMORANDUM FOR Faculty Advisor, Group Room L08, Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

SUBJECT: U.S. Coast Guard's effectiveness on the war on drugs coming into United States

1. Thesis Statement. U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering the U.S. because of its mission, available resources, and interagency coordination.
2. Discussion. As the debate continues throughout our country, we reviewed the arguments for and against the U.S. Coast Guard's effectiveness in the war on drugs coming into our country.
3. Conclusion. We recognize the U.S. Coast Guard's accomplishments in the fight on the war on drugs entering our country. We determined that the U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering our country and can not be the lead agency in this war.
4. Counterpoints. The U.S. Coast Guard's effectiveness has been proven by the outcome of their efforts. Great amounts of illegal drugs have been confiscated and seized by this agency and it has been documented. Their success in this fight is recognized by our leaders and effects can be seen by the status of the supply and demand of illegal drugs on our city streets.
5. Haines Award. We (do/do not) request that the Haines Award Selection Board consider this paper for the General Haines Award for Excellence in Research. USASMA American Psychological Association (APA) Style Handbook, USASMA American Psychological Association (APA) Style Reference Handbook, USSMA American Psychological Association (APA) Writing Style Handbook, Writing Research Papers, 11th Edition by James D. Lester, are the guides used in the preparation of this research paper.

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Running Head: U.S. COAST GUARD IS NOT A DETERRENT IN WAR ON DRUGS

U.S. Coast Guard Is Not a Deterrent in War on Drugs

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
Introduction.....	3
Chapter 1 Mission	
U.S. Coast Guard Ineffective in Drug Interdiction.....	4
Funding and Manpower Inadequate for Drug Interdiction.....	5
Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard Role Perfect for Counterdrug Interdiction.....	6
Opposing Argument: Funding.....	7
Chapter 2 Resources	
U.S. Coast Guard Manning Ineffective for Drug Interdiction.....	8
Lack of Qualifications for the U.S. Coast Guard.....	10
Opposing Argument: Personnel Available Adequate for Drug Interdiction.....	12
Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard's Equipment Suitable for Drug Interdiction..	14
Chapter 3 Interagency Coordination	
Too Many Agencies Involved in the War on Drugs.....	16
Conflict in Jurisdiction with International Incidents.....	17
Opposing Argument: Information Sharing and Technology Effective.....	17
Opposing Argument: Jurisdiction with International Incidents.....	19
Conclusion.....	20
References.....	22

Abstract

The United States war on drugs has been ongoing for over three decades with little success. The U.S. Coast Guard is an asset to the war on drugs entering the U.S.; however it cannot be the main effort. The U.S. Coast Guard has had success in the war on drugs, but is not an effective deterrent as the service lacks the appropriate mission, resources, and interagency coordination to combat drug smuggling. The U.S. Coast Guard is a deterrent for water-bound drug trafficking, but does not possess the appropriate manning or equipment to counter smuggling through the air and land. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard does not coordinate well enough with other agencies to accomplish counterdrug missions or have adequate technology to keep up with drug smugglers. These issues are difficult to fix, therefore the U.S. Coast Guard cannot be an effective deterrent in the war on drugs.

U.S. Coast Guard Is Not a Deterrent in War on Drugs

The United States war on drugs is an on-going effort lasting decades. This war is waged on the streets of the U.S., and in the schools and businesses. There are two objectives in this war, reducing the demand of drugs in America and reducing the supply of drugs entering U.S. borders. Law enforcement handles the majority of operations in the first objective, however, the coordination required to succeed in reducing the supply of drugs is much more challenging. Many agencies and organizations stand guard over the skies, land and seas of the U.S. to prevent drugs from entering its borders. One of these assets in the U.S. effort to keep drugs out of America is the U.S. Coast Guard.

As the only armed force assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard provides the expertise and experience necessary to conduct counterdrug interdiction. However, the U.S. Coast Guard is too small and ill-equipped to make a significant impact in the war on drugs entering America. The U.S. Coast Guard is the smallest of the five armed forces and has other priority missions that take precedence over drug interdiction. In fact, the monies provided by the Department of Homeland Security are meant for counterterrorism missions, not counterdrug missions. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the capability to adequately communicate with other agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard is not technologically advanced and is under-funded; therefore it cannot keep up with the advances of the drug traffickers. Since 2001, shortly after the Department of Homeland Security stood up, the U.S. Coast Guard has made contributions to the U.S. efforts in the war on drugs. These successes are not enough though; too many drug traffickers still make their way into the U.S. nullifying any U.S. Coast Guard successes. The U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering the U.S. because of its mission, available resources, and interagency coordination.

Mission

U.S. Coast Guard Ineffective in Drug Interdiction

The U.S. Coast Guard tries to successfully ensure that both security and non-security missions are balanced. The U.S. Coast Guard allocates 46 percent of its mission's resources toward non-security, or traditional, missions and 54 percent to security missions (U.S. House of Congress, Mission, 2006). The U.S. Coast Guard was appointed to the drug interdiction mission because it is a military organization that deals with both military and civilian functions. It is the key player in combating illegal drugs entering the United States via maritime channels.

According to James Inciardi in his book, The War on Drugs II, "there are over 95,000 miles of land border and coastline in addition to the many internal ports of arrival for international air cargo and travelers" (Inciardi, 1992, p. 268). In attempting to meet this coverage goal, the U.S. Coast Guard must work closely with other federal agencies. One of those agencies is the Department of Defense (DoD). Over the past decade the military has withdrawn many resources it committed to the war on drugs because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This created a domino effect which has stretched the U.S. Coast Guard manning thin.

The U.S. Coast Guard developed a high operations tempo since becoming the lead drug trafficking organization. This tempo stretched thin its personnel and added additional wear and tear to its own equipment and resources. Even with the additional man hours spent on drug interdiction and equipment used, it is estimated that about 1,000 metric tons of illegal drugs enter the U.S. each year (Meyers, 2007). In an article written by Josh Meyers, he writes even when the U.S. Coast Guard did detect suspected smuggling vessels it had to let one in every five go because the U.S. Coast Guard lacked the resources to chase drug smugglers (Meyers, 2007). Lately, semisubmersibles have been the vehicle of choice to bring illegal drugs into the U.S.. If

they are spotted, the semisubmersible is sunk by its own crew. This turns the mission from one of drug interdiction to one of rescue. The drug traffickers do this because they know without any evidence they cannot be punished for the crime. This has frustrated the U.S. Coast Guard leadership immensely. New laws must be enacted, but until then, this cycle will continue.

Funding and Manpower Inadequate for Drug Interdiction

Information management contributes to organization effectiveness. Outside agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are reluctant to share their information with the U.S. Coast Guard unless they are certain that a vessel contains drugs. The majority of seizures the U.S. Coast Guard makes are from tips that they have received from outside agencies (Anonymous, personal communication, September 20, 2008). Additionally, another challenge facing the U.S. Coast Guard is that its communication platforms still do not flow laterally across the Department of Homeland Security. This hinders the U.S. Coast Guard from being an effective tool on drug interdiction because it must rely on outside sources for information.

Within each region under U.S. Coast Guard control, the amount of time the U.S. Coast Guard spends on each mission fluctuates. However, it is evident, drug interdiction missions are substantially below the level of execution existing prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. The U.S. Coast Guard expended nearly 34,000 resource hours on drug enforcement from 1996 to 1999. The resource hours declined to almost 14,000 hours, which was a reduction of nearly two-thirds from 2000 to 2003 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). This decrease points to the higher priority given to security of the ports and inland waterways. Seasonal activity also produces a spike in certain regions where the U.S. Coast Guard mission focus must switch from drug interdiction to those of more importance. Those missions include fishery enforcement, ice breaking, and vessel aid, such as navigation repair and replacement. Also the U.S. Coast Guard

mission partners with the Environmental Protective Agency (EPA) on a regular basis. This mission focuses on looking for and cleaning up pollutants in waterways and oil spills. The search and rescue mission of the U.S. Coast Guard, along with the EPA mission, are required missions. These missions must take precedence over drug interdiction.

Funding has increased each year since 2001 for the U.S. Coast Guard. Even with an increase in funding, the addition of new missions has placed a strain on its existing resources. Evidence of this is noted in a November 2002 Coast Guard internal communication to cut back on homeland non-security missions in order “to further compensate for the increased demands of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Homeland Security Mission” (U.S. House of Congress, 2003).

Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard Role Perfect for Counterdrug Interdiction

One of the most difficult missions the U.S. Coast Guard undertakes is stopping the trafficking of illegal drugs being smuggled into the U.S. Over the years the trials and tribulations of these important missions and events are what shaped the U.S. Coast Guard into one of the leading agencies in the war on drugs entering the U.S.

The U.S. Coast Guard is capable of handling the drug war in the U.S. because of its experience with drug interdiction and the capabilities gained by coordinating with other agencies using advanced modern technology. The U.S. Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency and serves as a member of the intelligence community. In the post-September 11, 2001 national security environment, the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime homeland security operation was characterized as a leading federal agency role, one of the highest priority missions today (Collins, 2002).

As the Nation’s principal maritime law enforcement agency for over 200 years, the U.S. Coast Guard is the only federal agency with jurisdiction on and over water adjacent to principal

sources, transit countries and in U.S. coastal and territorial waters. The law enforcement mission became a top priority of the U.S. Coast Guard with the increase of illegal drugs bound for the U.S. The U.S. Coast Guard cutters, planes, boats, and helicopters all conduct routine drug patrols and special operations throughout the maritime arena. The program emphasis was the interdicting of aircraft and vessels smuggling illegal drug such as marijuana and cocaine into the United States (Krietemeyer, 2000).

Opposing Argument: Funding

Due to the U.S. Coast Guard's multi-mission nature, almost every operational unit is involved in law enforcement to some degree. In the U.S. Coast Guard's budget, the law enforcement mission reflects over one-third of all operating expenses going towards the large drug seizures made by Coast Guard cutters in the waters off the southeastern United States (Stanton, 2001). Sufficient annual budgets for the U.S. Coast Guard and other organizations deny accessible funding sources for terrorism, crimes and other illegal activities. For example, in 2008 22 percent of cocaine bound for the U.S. was seized on noncommercial conveyance, such as yachts and leisure vessels, and over 90 percent of cocaine was seized on commercial vessels and aircraft (Skinner, 2008).

Over the past five years, the U.S. Coast Guard continued to receive budget increases allowing it to conduct more effective counterdrug interdiction. From FY 2004 through FY 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard budget increased over 30 percent totaling \$1.6 billion (Skinner, 2008). This significant increase in funding netted over 850,000 pounds of cocaine captured and almost two million pounds of marijuana seized (Skinner, 2008). The budget increases provided to the U.S. Coast Guard ensure that over a period of time drug trafficking will become less profitable for the drug smugglers.

The funding for the U.S. Coast Guard is more than adequate to combat drug trafficking. In FY 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard received a seven percent increase in its operating budget bringing the budget to \$41.1 billion. In that FY alone, the U.S. Coast Guard seized 355,000 pounds of cocaine with a street value of \$4.7 billion (Skinner, 2008). This example of drugs seized equates to over three times the counterdrug budget of \$1.6 billion for the U.S. in 2008 (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). If the U.S. Coast Guard sustains this pressure on drug traffickers, then the U.S. government does not have to allocate as much funding to the war on drugs entering the U.S.

Resources

U.S. Coast Guard Manning Ineffective for Drug Interdiction

The U.S. Coast Guard is the smallest armed force of the five branches of service. According to the U.S. Coast Guards Careers Web site, there are only 38,000 seamen in the Coast Guard with another 35,000 seamen serving in an auxiliary role (U.S. Coast Guard Careers, 2008). The total number of Coast Guardsmen is only a fraction when compared to the next smallest service, the U.S. Marine Corps. In addition, the auxiliary seamen operate strictly in a non-law enforcement role (U.S. Coast Guard Careers, 2008). The U.S. Coast Guard is instrumental in blocking the entry of drugs into the U.S. through water bound drug interdiction; however its personnel do not possess the appropriate skill sets for drug interdiction as a primary responsibility.

In the book, The War on Drugs II, Inciardi argues that Coast Guardsmen just do not have the appropriate training or force structure to protect the U.S. from drug traffickers. Inciardi states border control is a significant issue as there are over 95,000 miles of coastline and landmass border with numerous ports of entry to survey (Inciardi, 1992). An area this large is

impossible for a force of 38,000 to effectively patrol. Additionally, the amount of people and equipment to search is mind-boggling. In 1991, 309 million travelers, 50,000 vessels, 13 million tons of cargo, and tens of thousands of small vessels and aircraft legally entered the U.S. through a registered port of entry (Inciardi, 1992). This does not include the many man hours wasted by Coast Guardsmen searching for people illegally entering the U.S. or drug traffickers. Inciardi points out this futility in a 1989 report stating that the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard sailed for a combined 2,347 ship days and seized a total of seven ships arresting 40 smugglers at a cost of over \$33 million (Inciardi, 1992). A look at the more recent statistics on the amount of drugs interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard does not further the cause for those looking to champion the U.S. Coast Guard as an effective deterrent in the war on drugs. Coast Guard Admiral Terry Cross stated in a May 2001 article that the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 11 percent of the total amount of cocaine entering the U.S. in 2000, which equates to approximately 60 metric tons (Stanton, 2001). Although Cross attempts to make this number sound like a success, there is no getting past the fact that almost 90 percent of the cocaine smuggled in the U.S. makes it onto the streets to be sold. This interdiction rate cannot be quantified as a success by anyone.

Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard is not set up to combat drug trafficking. According to the U.S. Coast Guard Missions Web site, the U.S. Coast Guard has five primary missions and drug interdiction is just a portion of one of those missions (U.S. Coast Guard Missions, 2008). The Web site states that drug interdiction falls under the purview of maritime security. However, the U.S. Coast Guard must train its personnel to properly react and perform in all five of its missions. Mike Krause wrote in a 2006 article on the affect the drug war has on other Coast Guard missions that the drug war is impeding the Coast Guard's mission of port security. Krause stated the U.S. Coast Guard spent more money in 2005 on drug interdiction than the total

amount of money spent on port security in four years (Krause, 2006). If the U.S. Coast Guard spends this much time and effort on drug interdiction, it should spend the same amount of time and effort on training its 38,000-strong force on drug interdiction techniques and increase the priority of drug interdiction as a mission of the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the U.S. Coast Guard cannot afford to take such drastic action because of its charter to protect and defend the U.S. maritime interests.

Lack of Qualifications for the U.S. Coast Guard

The equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses to combat drug smugglers in this war on drugs entering America is not adequate for the drug interdiction mission either. According to a briefing given by the Joint Task Force-North senior enlisted advisor to the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class 59, the U.S. counterdrug budget for all agencies and organizations fighting the war on drugs is \$1.6 billion (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). This amount seems sufficient until it is compared against just a fraction of the drug trade budget worldwide. Shaw stated that the Mexican drug trade in 2008 equates to \$60 billion of the \$300 billion spent worldwide in the drug trade (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). This number is as staggering as it is mocking of the U.S. efforts to combat drugs. Essentially, the U.S. uses a fly swatter to kill an elephant with the tiny amount of money it is throwing against its enemies in the drug war.

The \$1.6 billion the U.S. government uses to combat drugs is portioned and pared down by agency and organization until the amount of money budgeted to the U.S. Coast Guard makes it almost impossible for the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict any drugs. John Stanton, in his 2001 article in *National Defense Magazine*, uses comments from former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to state how the drug war's budget should be portioned. "My preference would be

for the Coast Guard to have primary responsibility for drug interdiction and ... cooperate with military elements. But I do think one-half of our funds should go to supply reduction and one-half to demand reduction" (Stanton, 2001, para. 9). Weinberger's comments would give the U.S. Coast Guard the primary responsibility to combat drugs, but only a portion of the \$800 million (using the 2008 fiscal year budget to combat drugs) to interdict drugs. Weinberger would have one believe that \$800 million would be more than enough to combat the supply of drugs entering the U.S. until one figured in the cost of equipment into the equation.

Today's drug smugglers are innovative and continually strive to improve upon their techniques to ensure the maximum quantity of drugs reaches America. The U.S. Coast Guard must measure its missions and funding, which it receives from the Department of Homeland Security, to acquire the appropriate mix of equipment for its counterterrorism mission, its maritime security mission, and drug interdiction. However, the U.S. Coast Guard finds this balance increasingly difficult to maintain as it finds itself dealing with better and better drug smuggling equipment. In a 2008 Cable News Network article, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen describes the latest piece of equipment the U.S. Coast Guard must defeat in the war on drugs. Allen talks about the drug smugglers dependence on semi-submersible vessels. "They cost up to a million dollars to produce. Sometimes they are put together in pieces and reassembled in other locations. They're very difficult to locate" (Meserve & Ahlers, 2008, para. 3). The U.S. Coast Guard Commandant states this new technology is hard to combat and the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the equipment to properly defeat this threat at this time and will eventually have to adapt to meet this threat (Meserve & Ahlers, 2008). However, it will be difficult for the U.S. Coast Guard to justify using its counterterrorism funding to requisition equipment capable of defeating drug traffickers.

Opposing Argument: Personnel Available Adequate for Drug Interdiction

A U.S. Coast Guardsman is a unique member of the military. He or she must be a sailor, a policeman, a medic, and a rescuer. However, the Guardsman's training must be unique due to his or her missions. His or her initial training is five weeks long. It is there the proud maritime guardians learn occupational skills and how to live by the Coast Guard's core values: Honor, Respect and Devotion to Duty. The Guardsmen receive weapons training, to include sniper, boarding vessel search and procedure, and law enforcement training (U.S. Coast Guard Missions, 2008).

These skills and knowledge are critical to their profession, especially during drug interdiction missions. In past years, the use of snipers has been especially effective. This is one of the U.S. Coast Guard's adaptive solutions in disabling fast moving boats carrying drugs (Kerr, 2002). These types of boats are called "go fast." Additionally, the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard are trained in law enforcement protocol and procedure. It is the Guardsmen's awareness of law enforcement that often prevents mishaps during prosecution. Personnel are also highly-trained in maritime and aerial radar. This allows the U.S. Coast Guard to identify aircraft and vessels coming into the United States. By identifying the type of carrier, the Guardsmen are able to interdict or distribute information to other agencies. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to cross communicate with other agencies has proven to be beneficial. In 1982, a small team Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET), deployed with a U.S. Navy (USN) ship in the Pacific Ocean, in support of counterdrug law enforcement. Initially, LEDET only boarded U.S. Navy ships enroute to more opportunistic areas, often areas used by drugs runners; this is no longer the case. Operations are now planned, coordinated and executed in conjunction with the USN and other agencies, to include the U.S. Coast Guard.

Due to the success of the LEDET, the U.S. Coast Guard had established three other Tactical Law Enforcement Teams to guard a larger area. One of these teams is the Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement, who in 1995 was responsible for confiscating over 60 tons of cocaine, six tons of marijuana and 17 tons of hashish (Coast Guard, n.d.).

Additional forms of training include education. Not only are the Guardsmen educated themselves, they bring about awareness. The U.S. Coast Guard conveys awareness to American citizens, as well as awareness to other countries. In FY 1996, the U.S. Coast Guard implemented a Mobile Training Team and trained over 2,100 people throughout 45 countries on ways to fight the war against drugs (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2008). This not only brought about a first-class working relationship with these countries, it bolstered their interdiction capabilities and established another source of intelligence. The U.S. Coast Guard's ability to work with, and utilize all available resources to include external assets has resulted in the confiscation of numerous metric tons of drugs coming into the U.S.

The U.S. Coast Guard is able to guard our waterways through the strategic implementation of its vessels and aircraft. Strategic emplacement of stations has also proved to be a contributing factor to its success. Considering drug interdiction was not its primary mission, U.S. Coast Guard stations are often placed in key locations and the U.S. Coast Guard is able to control, deploy units, and interdict at any given time. The U.S. Coast Guard is broken down into 17 districts. District 11, being California, and District 7, which represents Florida, are the two most experienced, and have had the most success with drug interdiction. Their geographical location was taken into consideration when assigning personnel, equipment and conducting tactical missions (D. Kolstedt, personal communication, September 5, 2008).

Another contributing factor to the U.S. Coast Guard's success is its ability to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously. During U.S. Coast Guard routine patrols of America's water ways while enforcing maritime laws, which encompasses boating safety, fishery enforcement, alien migrant interdiction and counterdrug prohibition, it also concentrates on specific laws and remains vigilant for other violations that tax the Guardsmen on a daily basis. Boarding parties often take apparatus capable of detecting minute and minuscule amounts of drugs, even on board the vessels or in sealed containers. These types of tactics are often utilized and yield a substantial amount of illegal drugs.

Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard's Equipment Suitable for Drug Interdiction

The equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses during the majority of its drug interdiction missions are its vessels and aircraft. U.S. Coast Guard water vessels are classified as two separate entities, boats and cutters. Any vessels in length of 65 feet or more are considered cutters, anything less are regarded to as boats. These vessels are a major asset for maritime law enforcement in the interdiction of illegal drugs. (Krietemeyer, 2000).

U.S. Coast Guard aircraft consists of helicopters and fixed wing airplanes (D. Kolstedt, personal communication, September 5, 2008). There are multiple types of aircraft that effectively accomplish the various missions of the U.S. Coast Guard. Four types of aircraft are mission capable and ready to handle the interdiction of drugs on the high seas. These aircraft have the capabilities of targeting out vessels, boats, or semi subs with a medium or high-range surveillance, which detects illegal drug substance aboard (Krietemeyer, 2000).

These boats, cutters and aircraft conduct routine patrols within U.S. waters. They not only patrol these waters, but provide assistance near known drug routes when outside U.S. waters. These missions are often driven from intelligence received from internal or external

informants, such as other U.S. agencies or supplementary foreign law enforcement agencies. Some cutters are able to carry helicopters, which in turn aid them when pursuing a “go fast”. Crews primarily use nonlethal force when warning boats. If necessary, a crew may disable adversaries’ engines by employing their snipers or door gunners of the aircraft. For example, vessel-to-air integration has been very effective along District 7 and 11 waters. In May 2006, the Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron assisted in confiscating almost 270,000 pounds of illegal drugs valued over \$8 billion dollars (Hancock, 2006). Additional devices employed are the utilization of the Deployable Pursuit Boats (DPB). The DPB is essentially an offshore racing boat. The DPB’s primary purpose is to operate as a counter for the growing exploitation of the “go fast” boats. Drug traffickers often use “go fast” boats as a means to move their contraband from source countries to Mexico, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and for further movement into the U.S. Aircraft, such as the HC-130H cargo plane, conduct routine sweeps of international waters and identify “go fast” boats. The U.S. Coast Guard planned to deploy the DPB to disable known traffickers, thus continuing their efforts to fight the war on drugs.

A common misconception about the U.S. Coast Guard’s lack of resources to fight the war on drugs is its effectiveness. What many do not realize is the U.S. Coast Guard has the ability to extract resources from different agencies because it is the lead agency on maritime drug interdiction and the co-lead for air interdiction. During counterdrug operations, the U.S. Coast Guard acquires manpower, ships, aircraft, and sensors to support the counterdrug detection and monitoring efforts from many organizations. These assets not only provide the U.S. Coast Guard greater combined combat multipliers, but it also gives it a wider range, additional expertise and fiscal funding allowing them to fight the battle, thus making it even more successful in the war on drugs entering the U.S.

Interagency Coordination

Too Many Agencies Involved in the War on Drugs

The interagency coordination between agencies within the Department of Homeland Security and other countries continues to be a work in progress. The Department of Homeland Security is composed of 16 agencies and each agency had a certain way of handling situations prior to September 11, 2001 (Homeland Security, 2008). Currently, the Department of Homeland Security develops policies and regulations throughout the organization. The sharing of information was a huge obstacle because it presented security concerns and a reluctance to provide timely information to other agencies. Not only does the U.S. Coast Guard deal with agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, it also coordinates with other federal agencies. Some of these agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (Henderson, 2005). With so many agencies involved in the war on drugs it can be confusing as to which agency has authority over the other and how will the chain of custody be established.

Additionally, other problems affect interagency coordination. One of these problems the U.S. Coast Guard deals with is corruption within organizations or countries. There have been several reports indicating drug smugglers bribe agents in return for a free pass. The temptation for some to accept the bribes obviously outweighs the moral and legal responsibility which they swore to uphold. Although a detractor to successful drug interdiction, bribery is to be expected when so much money is being invested in the drug business. All of this interagency coordination also conflicts with the primary U.S. Coast Guard missions. In addition to its maritime security mission, the U.S. Coast Guard has four other missions. These missions are maritime safety, maritime mobility, national defense, and protection of natural resources (U.S. Coast Guard

Missions, 2008). All of these missions are important and should be emphasized just as much as the drug interdiction mission.

Conflict in Jurisdiction with International Incidents

Conflict may arise as to what country or what agency has jurisdiction over the other when it comes to drug seizures in international waters. Communication between agencies is vital especially when drug smugglers are being chased and attempting to find refuge in a country where the laws are not as strict as the U.S. In some countries, policies are not enforced and getting the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Senate involved in extradition or prosecution could prove to be more burdensome than beneficial. In the aforementioned case involving semisubmersible ships, once they are identified by law enforcement the ships would dump the drugs and go underneath the water. When these ships are captured there is no evidence of drugs. Since law enforcement cannot hold them, these drug traffickers are released back to their native country. Congress just recently passed a law making it illegal to operate one of these ships if it had not been registered in a home country but the law is waiting on Congressional approval (Kingsbury, 2008). Although the U.S. Coast Guard has made progress in drug interdiction, it cannot compete with the drug smuggler's resources and technology. In order for the U.S. Coast Guard to be an effective deterrent to the war on drugs, the Department of Homeland Security would have to relook its role in drug interdiction.

Opposing Argument: Information Sharing and Technology Effective

The U.S. Coast Guard is effective in its drug interdiction mission because its technological advances allows for more efficient interagency coordination. One of these technological advances is an integrated information network known as the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET). ADNET was developed to help better share information across a range of U.S.

government agencies whose missions involve fighting drug-related crime. This technology cuts all hindrances between government agencies working against illegal drugs. They can now help each other win the war on illegal drugs. Before ADNET was introduced, each agency kept its information to itself and did not share with other agencies. One of the unique features of ADNET is a home page for each of the lead agencies which allows an agency to post its own information so that it can be distributed to other agencies. These agencies include the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as many others. For example in 1996, the U.S. Coast Guard had success when information obtained by ADNET led to the capture of a vessel carrying over \$40 million dollars worth of cocaine, weighing many tons (Case Studies: ADNET, n.d.). The U.S. Coast Guard's participation in this program, as well as others, proves it is an indispensable element in the fight against the war on drugs.

Another technological advance for the U.S. Coast Guard in the war on drugs occurred in 2005. In FY 2005, a \$6.3 billion dollar increase for the U.S. Coast Guard was signed and put into effect by President George W. Bush (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). This funding set the stage for the U.S. Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). Proving that money can make a difference in the war on drugs, the U.S. Coast Guard was able to apply funding into their multi-billion dollar program to modernize and replace its aging ships and aircraft, and to improve command and control and logistics systems. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard requested additional funding to further technology and added land-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and HC-130J aircraft into IDS. In March 2007, the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard's participation in Deepwater Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR) resulted in a record maritime seizure of more than 42,000 pounds of cocaine (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). The U.S. Coast Guard's actions have proven beneficial in the

war on drugs through its actions to better furnish its fleet. Another technological advance pertinent to the success of the U.S. Coast Guard includes incorporating Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET), a secure data network capable of sharing images at a faster rate through satellite communications (SATCOM). Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard advanced technologically by improving its target identification system using the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). The U.S. Coast Guard has proven itself to be effective in the war on drugs entering the U.S. in all aspects of its technological advancements.

Opposing Argument: Jurisdiction with International Incidents

The U.S. has close relations with other countries through treaties and agreements to eradicate or minimize the production of cocaine, opium and marijuana entering the U.S. For example, the Hague Convention of 1912 gave power to all signatory nations. In Harry Henderson's book, Drug Abuse, he explains each nation's obligations when agreeing to this treaty. The Hague treaty allows each signatory nation to restrict the domestic manufacture, distribution and use of prohibited drugs (Henderson, 2005). Bottom line, the U.S. Coast Guard cannot accomplish its mission without the cooperation of other nations. The U.S. has established relationships with other nations to help settle international jurisdiction incidents that arise. The Hague Convention of 1912 played an integral role in establishing key international relations and set precedents for future treaties and agreements.

The U.S. also signed an extradition treaty with Colombia on September 14, 1979. In this treaty, Colombia agreed to extradite all persons, to include Columbians if they committed a narcotic offense which is a punishable act in Colombia and the United States (Inciardi, 1992). This includes the export of cocaine and or marijuana into the United States by Colombians visiting or staying in the U.S. Another treaty, the extradition treaty between the United States and

El Salvador does not provide for the extradition of its citizens (Drug Trafficking Report, 2004). However, this treaty was contradicted, and can be nullified, by the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention states narcotics offenses are extraditable crimes (Drug Trafficking Report, 2004). Diplomatic coordination between the U.S. with countries involved in the war on drugs leads to a sizable amount of confiscated illegal drugs by the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies. These treaties and other agreements between countries empower the U.S. Coast Guard in its fight against illicit drugs.

Conclusion

In order for the U.S. Coast Guard to be an effective deterrent in the war on drugs it must develop more capable and reliable assets. The U.S. Coast Guard needs new communication platforms and more interagency cooperation to help support detection and monitoring efforts. New laws would have to be enacted to deter the use of semisubmersibles. More vessels will have to be boarded and searched. It was evident after September 11, 2001 that the U.S. Coast Guard was stretched thin. These new missions added additional wear and tear to the U.S. Coast Guard's already aging equipment and technology. Adding to the difficulty of incorporating new missions was the re-prioritizing of existing missions. The Department of Homeland Security changed the U.S. Coast Guard's mission focus from drug interdiction to port security along our coast and inland waterways.

The U.S. Coast Guard's drug interdiction program has made strides with interagency coordination and the service has upgraded its technology. However, the U.S. Coast Guard is still lagging behind the drug smugglers. As the U.S. government attempts to close the gap on drug traffickers, drug dealers are already thinking ahead for new technological developments. The government needs to do a better job of utilizing the resources and assets it has available. Since

September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard has been fighting both the war on drugs and the war on terror. Both missions are important and deserve an equal amount of time. The U.S. Coast Guard cannot do both effectively. Until the Department of Homeland Security clearly defines the roles of all its agencies and conducts proper coordination with federal agencies and other countries, drug interdiction will continue to be a problem.

The U.S. Coast Guard is an asset to the war on drugs entering the U.S., but cannot be the main effort in the war. The U.S. Coast Guard is well-equipped to protect our borders and conduct routine law enforcement, but becomes stretched too thin when given the primary responsibility to be the U.S. command and control center in the war on drugs. The U.S. Coast Guard is a deterrent for water-bound drug trafficking, but does not possess the appropriate equipment to counter drug trafficking through the air and land. Additionally, the equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses is dated, and drug traffickers spend money faster than the U.S. government can equip the U.S. Coast Guard. Technologically, the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the equipment to stay in contact with the number of agencies involved in the war on drugs. All of these issues are not easily correctable; therefore the U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering America.

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