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SIGNAL COMMUNICATION FOR
BEACH OPERATIONS

JOSLIN, WILL D.
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Signal communications for beach operations,
by Lt Col W. D. Joslin. CGSC. 1947-48.

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Lt Col Will D. Joslin

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
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DIRECTIVE FOR ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBJECT

9 October 1947
(date)

6-4
(subject no.)

SUBJECT: Signal Communication for Beach Operations.

PURPOSE: To appraise the problem and determine whether or not need exists for special signal unit for this purpose.

SCOPE: a. Brief history of events leading to formation of Joint Assault Signal Companies.

b. Analyze the operation of these companies.

(1) The Mediterranean, 1942-43.
(2) France, 1944.
(3) Pacific area.

c. Summary of results.

d. Conclusions.

e. Recommendations.

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ANALYTICAL STUDY

6-4

N-2128, 119

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR

BEACH OPERATIONS

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

SCHOOL OF LOGISTICS

LTCOL W E JOSLIN

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Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
28 April 1948

SUBJECT: Signal Communication for Beach Operations.

1. PROBLEM.— To determine whether or not need exists for a special signal unit for this purpose.

2. DISCUSSION.

a. Amphibious operations have been used in warfare throughout history.

The first US amphibious landing of appreciable size was at Vera Cruz in the Mexican War. Small landing parties could be controlled by use of sound and visual signals. Dispersion and increase in size of force required communications over distances for command control. Beach logistical support added to communication problems (Annex 1).

(1) British Combined Operations grew from small raids to Dieppe operation, which proved the necessity for constant air-ground and ship-shore communications. British "Brick" type signal units facilitated tailored units and maximum flexibility (Annex 1).

(2) US Joint Operations in 1941 proved that the signal company of the assault division could not provide adequate communications during early phase of landing. The addition of special Engineer shore elements for beach logistical support added to the communication demand made on the division signal company (Annex 1).

(a) A Signal Company Special was activated in 1942 to reinforce the assault division. After two changes, increasing its strength and including Army, Air Corps and Naval personnel, it was standardized under T/O & E 11-517 S, C-2, until reorganized as a JASCO in late 1943, and participated in 1942-43 landings (Annex 1).

(b) The Joint Assault Signal Company, or JASCO, T/O & E 11-147 OS, C-1, 10 Sept 1945, is an outgrowth of the wartime JASCO and Signal Company Special. Its strength, assigned and attached, is 52 Officers and 475 enlisted men, including Army, Air Force and Naval personnel. It has a threefold mission in the assault; to provide each battalion landing team with a means for the

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control and direct supporting Naval gunfire, to provide Air liaison for close support of ground units, and to provide beach communication teams during the initial phases of the amphibious assault(Annex 1).

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b.(1) Signal Companies, Special, participated in four amphibious operations in the Mediterranean Theater during 1942-43. The original landing was marked by an almost complete breakdown of communications due to tactical inexperience. With each succeeding operation, communications improved due to experience and revision of doctrine.(Annex 2).

(2) Two JASCOs, less air-ground liaison parties and Naval shore fire control parties, furnished communications in the Normandy landing for the engineer shore units. One JASCO was used in the invasion of Southern France and provided satisfactory communications in conjunction with normal signal units.(Annex 2).

(3) JASCOs were used extensively in the Pacific area, with as many as four companies being attached to one task force. However in many of these operations only a very small part of the company was efficiently used, one example where only 26 percent of the officers and 46 percent of the enlisted were performing their normal mission. Overall communications were satisfactory but personnel and equipment were often idle.(Annex 2).

c. The wartime organizations furnished satisfactory communications, although not organized along sound tactical and efficient administrative lines. Each amphibious operation differs, therefore a T/O unit will not correspond to the mission. Service differences preclude smooth operations. The demand for increased beach communication can be more efficiently solved. The need for a special signal unit does not exist as a reinforcing unit for an assault division.(Annex 2).

3. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

- a. That the Joint Assault Signal Company be deleted from future troop lists.
- b. That the Secretary of the Army forward the attached letter, Annex 3, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with information copies being sent to the

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Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, Chief,
Army Field Forces and the Chief Signal Officer, United States
Army.

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Will D. Joslin
WILL D. JOSLIN
Lt Col, Sig C
School of Logistics.

- Annexes: 1-History of Events Leading to the Formation of Joint Assault Signal
Companies.
- 2-Operations of Joint Assault Signal Companies and Conclusions
Therefrom.
- 3-Letter to the Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Annex 1 to Analytical Study 6-4, History of Events Leading to the Formation
of Joint Assault Signal Companies.

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1. GENERAL.

a. The history of warfare is replete with amphibious operations, such as the Siege of Troy 1183 B.C., the Persian Greek War 490 B.C., the crossing of the English Channel in 55 B.C. by Julius Caesar and in 1066 A.D. by William the Conqueror. Shore to shore operations were conducted by United States forces during the Revolution, the War of 1812 and operations at Vera Cruz during the Mexican War. These operations being small in size, simple in tactical plan and requiring little logistical support, did not require the close coordination and subsequent complex communications now required. The commander was in close proximity to his troops and exercised control by sound and visual signals. As the size and complexity of operations ashore increased and the logistical support required by each soldier increased rapidly with the introduction of greater firepower and mechanized equipment, more flexible and faster channels of control were required. The addition of mechanized equipment required the establishment of service areas and maintenance areas ashore with the accompanying service troops requiring logistical support and control. As the magnitude of these operations increased to the present concept, the broken lateral dispersion of troops, often over widely separated beaches, and the addition of Naval Gunfire support and close air support added to the commander's problem of control. The complex phasing of supplies and followup troops ashore, coupled with beach medical facilities and evacuation, increased the need for instantaneous communications with the ships afloat, the troops afloat and ashore and the incoming craft.

(1) British Combined Operations.

The British technique of Combined Operations, as their amphibious operations are named, originated in 1922 and studies were made in their service Staff colleges until 1938, but with little or no equipment available, no practical application of the plans was possible. The doctrine developed

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by these studies envisaged the landing of troops ashore from destroyers and cruisers, utilizing the ship's whale boats and other small boats. However, as late as 1937, the British felt that the growing strength of air power had made amphibious warfare a very dubious venture, despite the use by the Japanese of 6 Infantry Landing Ships and 400 minor landing craft on the Tientsin river against the Chinese. In 1938 the Inter-Service Technical Developments Committee was formed, consisting of an Army Colonel, a Naval Commander and a Royal Air Force Wing Commander. This committee was soon dominated by naval influence and was later headed by a naval Captain. This group made several recommendations that later proved sound, as to the design of assault craft, amphibious vehicles, underwater demolitions, supply of amphibious forces and other related matters. Again the shortage of funds precluded any action being taken. In 1939 the British had 12 Landing Craft Assault, 11 Landing Craft Medium, 10 of which were obsolete, and 1 Landing Craft Support. In their first amphibious operation of World War II in the Runjbak fjord in Norway, 10 of these craft were lost. Shortly after the evacuation of Dunkirk a Director of Combined Operations was appointed, marking the beginning of the present concept of combined operations. In 1941 Admiral Mountbatten was appointed Chief of Combined Operations with the mission of carrying out as many raids as possible on the coast of France. The purpose of these raids was to gain experience, destroy selected military targets, capture German landing craft and to determine the soundness of doctrine then in force. (Journal Royal United Service Institution, Great Britain, November 1946). The more noteworthy raids were Bruneval, St. Nazaire and Dieppe, the later forcibly proving that many preconceived techniques were unsound and required modification prior to undertaking major landings.

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This raid was controlled from a small destroyer fitted out as a combined headquarters ship. Naval communications and communications with the Airforce commander in England were adequate and effective, but ship-shore communications were ineffective due to equipment becoming water soaked and damaged in landing and a shortage of personnel and equipment. The ability of the enemy to send fake messages which resulted in great confusion, indicated that more positive identification procedures must be employed. Air force officers, aboard each ship and with certain ground units, maintained air-ground liaison by radio. This method provided some close support for ground forces and assisted in directing the friendly fighters to enemy bombers resulting in the destruction of many enemy planes, but indicated that more extensive communications were required. (Conference on Landing Assaults, May-June 1943, ETOUSA). In this operation, the Signal formations were made up of " Brick " type units, which is similar teams to the U. S. 11-500 T/O and E. The British system was adopted from the German army and was far superior in flexibility to standard T/O units. Any desired unit could be tailored to fit an operation by simply assigning a headquarters team with the desired operational teams to the operation, eliminating the wastage of highly trained specialists that would not be needed for the task. (Personal experience),

(2) U. S. Joint Operations.

The U. S. concept of Joint Operations, as such, did not come into being until 1941 when the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division practiced landing operations along the Atlantic Coast. Since the basic mission of the Marine division is the amphibious assault, training in the use of water borne transport had been a basic principle. Large scale operations involving Army and Marine divisions in

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amphibious assault had not been visualized and little thought had been given by the Army to ship to shore operations, consequently no joint technique had been developed. The then existing U. S. concept of joint operations differed from the British combined operations in that the British Chief of Combined Operations had an equal status with the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air, while U.S. joint operations were under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subdivided under the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. The Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet was composed of Army and Naval personnel while the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet was composed of Marine Corps and Naval personnel. There was little liaison and exchange of information between these two forces until March 1943 when representatives of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Corps evolved a Joint U. S.-Air Amphibian Doctrine that eliminated many differences in the communication procedures then employed by the various services. However, differences in equipment and procedure still existed that required the communications personnel to receive joint training and the presence of all services in the communications unit. Wire had been the primary means in the Army but early landing rehearsals proved that radio would have to be employed initially due to beach traffic, and replaced by wire as soon as possible. Visual signals had heretofore played a very minor role in Army units and messenger boats were virtually unheard of, yet in amphibious warfare their importance was soon discovered. More care had to be taken in loading signal equipment for debarkation and availability, also waterproofing was of paramount importance. (Conference on Landing Assaults, May-June 1943, ETOUSA).

(a) During the first joint landing maneuvers, tactical

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units were used to handle supplies across the beaches and perform other logistical functions. Communications for the beach installations as well as the tactical communications were furnished by the assault division's signal company. In these short maneuvers where no forward displacement of the command post was made, the addition of the beach communications responsibility exceeded the capability of the signal company. In January 1942, and Engineer Shore Regiment, Special, was attached to the assault division and furnished beach parties to relieve the tactical unit of any beach logistical functions. The addition of this unit further exerted the signal company and the possibility of Engineer Special Brigades and Brigade Groups for larger operations would increase the problem then facing the signal unit. (Conference on Landing Assaults, May-June 1943, ETOUSA).

- (b) As landing rehearsals progressed and Naval gunfire support and close air support were included, inadequate communications were furnished. In the limited movements that took place ashore, which did not involve movement of the division command post or progress further inland, the provisional communication teams from the division signal company could not cope with the existing problem of providing communications to the tactical units and the logistical support on the beach. (Conference on Landing Assaults, May-June 1943, ETOUSA)
- (c) Early in 1942, a Signal Company, Composite, was formed to take part in landings by the joint amphibious forces. This unit was later designated as a Signal Company, Special, and after 2 changes, was

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organized under T/O and E 11-517 S. The original organization provided for 6 beach teams, one for each assault battalion in the assault regiments, with no provision for the reserve regiment. This was later changed to provide for 9 teams, 1 for each infantry battalion, giving maximum flexibility. An authorized strength of 11 officers and 214 enlisted men was broken down into a headquarters platoon and 9 beach teams, each team consisting of 1 officer and 19 men, trained and equipped to furnish wire, radio and message center facilities. Eight naval ratings, visual signalmen and radio operators, were attached to each beach team from the inception of joint training and this joint team trained and operated as a unit. Although the shore fire control parties were trained in the same school, they were not considered attached to the Signal Company, Special. The Air support parties were trained at the amphibious force school and were normally assigned on the basis of 1 team for each infantry regiment, the team consisting of 2 air officers, 1 Army and 1 Naval, and 2 radio operators, one Army and one Naval enlisted. Training for all the communications personnel in these various teams was conducted under a well integrated and progressive schedule, with emphasis on joint procedure. Basic training included waterproofing of equipment, loading and debarkation and other amphibious technique. Team training followed with the engineer shore units in landing maneuvers, and when time and facilities permitted, final rehearsals were conducted with the division. The mission of the Signal Company, Special, was to provide beach communications and relieve the div-

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ision signal company of all communication res-
possibilities other than those normally encount-
ered, that is, normal tactical communications.
This type unit was first used in the North African
landings and despite the almost complete breakdown
of communications, the soundness of the organizat-
ion was proven forcibly. (Conference on Landing
Assaults, May-June 1943, ETOUSA and Signal Comm-
unications in TORCH).

- (d) The Joint Assault Signal Company, T/O and E 11-147
OS, C 1, 10 September 1945, or JASCO as it is com-
monly known, reflects in its composition, mission
and organization many of the changes recommended
for this type unit during World War II. During
the latter part of 1943, all Signal Companies,
Special, were reorganized and redesignated as
Joint Assault Signal Companies. The major change
made at that time was the addition of 2 major
sections to the company, the Naval shore fire
control section and the Air liaison section. The
shore fire control teams were previously Army
artillery personnel that had received training at
the amphibious training centers and were attached
to the signal company and the Air liaison parties
had received similar training in joint operations
and were also attached. These two now became org-
anic to the signal company. The Naval complement
was still attached. The authorized strength of
unit finally approved 10 September 1945, is 38
officers, 1 Warrant officer and 367 enlisted men,
assigned, and 13 Naval officers and 108 Naval
ratings attached. The normal organization for
tactical operations is:

1 Headquarters platoon.

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1 Division Shore and Beach Party communications team.

9 Battalion Shore and Beach Party communications teams.

1 Division Naval Gunfire liaison officer team.

3 Regimental Naval Gunfire liaison officer teams.

9 Battalion Naval Gunfire liaison officer teams.

9 Battalion Naval Gunfire Spotting teams.

13 Air liaison parties.

The mission given to JASCOs is threefold; to provide a means to each battalion landing team for the control and direction of supporting Naval gunfire, to provide Air liaison parties to advise infantry commanders on the use of aircraft in close support of ground units and to request that air support, and to provide communications teams for beach communications during the initial phases of the amphibious assault.

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Annex 2 to Analytical Study 6-4, Operations of Joint Assault Signal Companies.

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1. The Signal unit used in the earlier amphibious assaults of World War II was known as a Signal Company, Special. This type unit was redesignated as a Joint Assault Signal Company in the latter months of 1943, therefore due to their similiarity in early organization and operations, both units will be discussed, as well as some operations of Marine Corps Joint Assault Signal Companies.

a. The Mediterranean, 1942-43.

(1) A Signal Company, Special, with attached shore fire control parties, air liaison parties and naval personnel participated in the invasion of North Africa in 1942. In certain instances there was an almost complete breakdown of communications despite the communications personnel being technically competent. The personnel were tactically ignorant, unfamiliar with amphibious operations in general and with the detailed plan for the operation, and had a major foe opposed, these failures would have proven disastrous. The problems encountered in ship to shore and air to ground communications in this major operation were beyond the plans that had been made. The glaring failures were not due to inefficiency of the signal personnel or the variety of signal units available, but by flagrant misuse of the personnel. (Signal Communications in TORCH and Lessons - TORCH). The personnel of this unit were attached to communications units serving various headquarters in French Morocco after the invasion, until the unit was reconstituted for another amphibious operation. (Personal knowledge).

(2) The Signal Company, Special, used in the invasion of Sicily had the advantage of previous experience and an opportunity to correct many of the errors and omissions of the earlier operation. Changes in doctrine that resulted from the North African invasion experience were available for the assault training period. Communications were generally satisfactory

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however more emphasis on keeping tactical radio nets clear of administrative traffic during assault landings was evidenced. (Personal experience and discussion with Signal Officer Seventh Army).

(3) Italian Landings.

(a) The communications furnished in the landings at Salerno were generally satisfactory, considering the extremely heavy traffic load that was handled by the assault signal companies, including a Signal Company, Special. The basic organization proved satisfactory and the general improvement was due chiefly to the employment of more experienced personnel ashore and in participating assault craft. The assignment of adequate communication personnel to the various assault force flagships and the utilization of a ship designed solely as an Amphibious Force flagship improved communications with each succeeding operation. A Basic Communication Plan was distributed to participating units, this permitted the elimination of instructions pertaining to normal Mediterranean communications from the communications annex to the operations plan, thereby permitting larger dissemination of information. The need for a cryptographic system common to all services was evident in this operation. (Action Report Salerno).

(b) One Signal Company, Special, participated in the Anzio landing, and assisted by regular signal units, provided normal communications. There were no reported failures or breakdown of communications. (Signal Communications Anzio Beachhead).

b. France, 1944.

(1) Two Joint Assault Signal Companies landed in Normandy in support of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group on Omaha beach. These companies were substituted for two Engin-

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eer Special Brigade Signal companies that were to be assigned for the Group communications but were not made available.

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Although organized along lines to work directly with engineer shore units, this was not the normal mission for JASCOs. For this operation the shore fire control parties were attached to two infantry divisions making the assault landing and the air liaison parties were attached to the Ninth Air Support Command. The plan envisaged for this landing was to bring the signal personnel in with the first engineer elements to maintain radio communications with headquarters units still afloat, to contact infantry elements moving inland and establish lateral communications along the beach. However D day operations bore little, if any, resemblance to the plan due to enemy opposition, equipment losses and the majority of the personnel being landed on the wrong beaches at the wrong time. Through D plus 1 much of the signal personnel fought alongside the infantry clearing the beaches. Considerable amounts of equipment was given to infantry units to replace losses in landing. The communications furnished were very good under the conditions as they existed and no Group operations suffered or was delayed by lack of communications. The use of JASCOs for an assignment such as this resulted in the waste of highly trained specialists, inefficient employment of equipment and a relatively small amount of radio and wire traffic being handled during the assault phase. Messengers were employed extensively for the first two days, a means that can be provided without the extensive joint training required of JASCOs.

(Operation Report NEPTUNE).

- (2) One JASCO landed with the assault units in Southern France, and supplemented by regular signal units, furnished adequate communications. The after action report of this landing indicated that the amphibious doctrine was sound and no failures in establishing and maintaining signal communication is indicated.

(Letter from Signal Officer Seventh Army to Sig O AFHQ 28 Jan 45)

c. The Pacific Area.

(1) A Marine Corps JASCO provided beach communications in the invasion of Anguar Island. Communications were generally good but one element of the company, the air liaison parties, failed to maintain dependable lateral communications. This failure coupled with insufficient knowledge of the location of friendly front line troops and the failure to keep the Joint Operations center advised of changes, resulted in losses of personnel due to straffing by friendly planes.

(Action Report--Anguar Island)

(2) The Saipan operation again resulted in the inefficient use of the attached JASCO. While the mission was performed in a very satisfactory manner, only 26 percent of the company's officers and 46 percent of the enlisted personnel were used to perform their normal function. The naval gunfire support was very unsatisfactory due to the method prescribed to obtain it, in contrast to field artillery support. The naval gunfire liaison officer is unable to immediately promise or deny gunfire, whereas the field artillery liaison officer with the battalion of infantry requesting support, can take positive action. The elapsed time between the request for and the delivery of close air support nullified its effectiveness, and resulted in the lack of gunfire support, naval or field artillery, as these fires must be withheld during the air strike. This statement was made by the division air liaison officer, " Air support rendered this division was not dependable and left much to be desired both by the Air Ground Liaison parties and the unit Commanding Officers (Infantry Commanders)." A consensus of opinions by the JASCO commanding officer and the division staff officers was that the organization was not organized along efficient lines and that a general reorganization was necessary. (27th Infantry Division Report of Operations, Saipan).

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(3) Two JASCOs were used in the Leyte operation although neither division made an amphibious landing on a division scale. One division later sent out small landing parties in shore to shore operations utilizing only a fractional element of the signal company. The G-3 of one division stated that the air liaison parties were valueless and a detriment to the infantry units to which attached, as there was no aircraft available to the division. The limited number of naval gunfire support ships obviated the requirement for all the naval gunfire liaison officers and spotting teams. Previous amphibious training and methods normally employed by JASCOs were more or less discarded and local decisions made as to their employment. The required communications were provided in an excellent manner, one company receiving a commendation from the division commander. It is plainly indicated in the action reports of these two units that the T/O and E was not suited for their employment in this type operation, the result being idleness or unrelated assignment for the majority of the personnel and equipment. (Report 593d JASCO, Leyte P.I., 20 Oct 1944, and Operations Summary 77th Division, "Liberation of Leyte " 23 November 1944-10 February 1945).

(4) The participation by a JASCO in the Luzon operation was marked by a general waste of personnel and equipment through inactivity. Communications were furnished in a satisfactory manner and no breakdown of channels was indicated. (593d JASCO, Luzon, P. I., 9 January 1945).

(5) Four JASCOs were used in the Okinawa operation by Tenth Army. Two of the companies landed with assault divisions and provided normal communications in a very satisfactory manner. The remaining two companies were attached to reserve divisions, and did not make amphibious landings on a division scale. In this operation, the two companies landing in the assault, minus their shore fire control parties and air liaison par-

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ties, reverted to Corps control when the Corps shore party commander assumed control of shore party operations. This procedure marked a departure from normal employment, however, it decreased the number of signal personnel necessary to be furnished by corps. (AGF Observer's report-Okinawa).

- (6) Marine Corps JASCOs were used extensively throughout the Pacific and a discussion of all their operations would be lengthy and repetitious. Also, inasmuch as the basic mission of the Marine division is the amphibious assault, the employment of the Marine JASCO in support of landings is assumed and this study is not concerned with justification of Marine units but rather the requirement in the Army for this type unit. The tendency to use the JASCO for any communication mission at hand, or to divert it to unrelated duties exists in the Marine Corps as well. In both the Palaus Island and Iwo Jima operations, little planning had been done toward the responsibility for establishing the initial administrative base communications. This additional responsibility was given to the tactical units in addition to their normal commitments. (Report on Palaus Operation, III Amphibious Corps and Operations Report, Iwo Jima). An Army construction battalion, trained and equipped as an Army Service Force unit, was used to reinforce the Marine Signal units on Iwo Jima. Despite its lack of amphibious training and rehearsals, this battalion, minus one construction company, performed its mission in a highly satisfactory manner alongside the Marine Corps JASCO. (Discussion with C.O. 49th Signal Cons Bn).

- d. The overall operations of JASCOs has been highly satisfactory if communications under difficult conditions is considered alone. But if consideration is given to the time required to train signal specialists and the cost of his equipment, only to find that both men and equipment are idle over long periods, that the company never functions as a unit under its commander except in training,

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the soundness of its organization is questionable. The overall efficiency of the company has been negated by unwise employment of a group of highly qualified specialists as individual teams rather than a unit. Any failure in communications provided by the many JASCOs during World War II was resultant from being assigned a mission incompatible with its strength and organization or sending out a complete company on an assignment that could have been handled by a few men. Another failure was the unfamiliarity of senior commanders of the proper use of the company. Being a relatively new organization, changing in organization, strength and equipment very rapidly, parts of the company were often misused and others idle over long periods. Idleness among certain signal specialists, such as radio operators and code clerks, reduces their speed and accuracy at a very rapid rate, as well as lowering their morale. It can be seen that the present organization has performed creditably under difficult circumstances amid the confusion that exists during the early stages of an amphibious landing. In many instances equipment was either lost in landing or used to replace similar equipment lost or damaged by the tactical units. Personnel were often assigned to flagship communication duties and were not available for the assault landings. Despite this shortage of equipment and personnel, communications have been generally good. The present organization is an outgrowth of many of the changes recommended during World War II. As each amphibious operation differed in size, scope and available naval gunfire support and air support, problems in communications required arose that had not been considered in previous planning. Consequently expedients were employed, and in many cases, were considered as future doctrine. These additions of personnel from Army, Navy and Air Force coupled with their equipment and subsequent missions has resulted in organization although called a signal company, in reality is a group of specialists of varied and unrelated skills. It is administratively unsound due to the various services assigned,

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and tactically uncontrollable as a unit, inasmuch as its elements are under the control of several commanders and not directed by the commanding officer of the company. As each operation has differed from the previous one, varying numbers of personnel and equipment have been required, resulting in the main with idle components in the early stages of the landing and an increase in unemployed personnel and equipment later. Due to its flat trajectory and high muzzle velocity, certain terrain and targets preclude the use of naval gunfire support. As the troops advance inland beyond the range of naval gunfire, field artillery must be employed. These conditions eliminate the requirement for the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer teams and the Spotting Teams. It is seldom that enough aircraft is available to give each battalion landing team close support, yet there exists thirteen of the Air Liaison parties for each division supported by a JASCO, and these teams often prove a detriment to the troops to which attached. The Shore and Beach Party communication teams normally are efficiently employed during the early period. However, when Corps assumes control of the beach, the communication requirement is beyond the capability of the beach communication teams and the normal Corps signal units would be available. These shore party elements have been utilized in various manners by landing forces in the many amphibious operations. No completely satisfactory plan for their continued employment throughout the operation has been developed. The normal practice of attaching elements of the company to battalion and regimental headquarters prior to an operation has denied control and training to the responsible company commander. Battalion and regimental commanders cannot give adequate consideration to shore party problems, because once on the beach, they must necessarily concern themselves primarily with their tactical mission and not be handicapped by shore party responsibilities. In prosecution of their tactical mission, commanders more frequently than not, absorb or divert their JASCO elements to unrelated duties. The

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company commander has no control over any element of his unit, other than the headquarters platoon and company administration, thereby not fully utilizing the service and ability on an especially trained officer, normally in grade of Major. Due to the complexity of its makeup, the company is seldom together as a unit except during training and then the Naval elements are not always present. It is the exception rather than the rule to find an operation where the JASCO was efficiently used. In the majority of the reports there has been an excess of personnel of one type or another, while in some there has been a shortage. The following divergent opinions, from commanders or senior staff officers in the same theater of operation, are quoted as an illustration: 77th Infantry Division, G-3 Operation Summary, Liberation of Leyte, " Considerable thought has been given in this division as to the organization of the Joint Assault Signal Company. The JASCO should be materially reduced or, in this theater involving continual amphibious operations, it would be well to place permanently a limited number of communications teams with the division signal company, using part of the reduction of the JASCO to increase the wire construction and telephone platoons within the signal company.-- As now organized, the JASCO has many idle officers and men most of the time. This creates dissatisfaction and is not conducive to efficiency." This report further recommended the elimination of the JASCO, placing the required communication elements in the division signal company and elimination of certain other elements and drastic reductions in those retained, effecting a saving of 34 officers and 242 men. On the other hand, in a letter signed by the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, after the Saipan operation, a recommendation was made that JASCO attached to that division be reorganized as a battalion. This projected reorganization called for a Joint Assault Signal Battalion consisting of a Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters and Service company, and three line companies. This

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Annex 2.

proposed change would result in a personnel increase of 9 Army officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 86 enlisted men with an increase of equipment. It also recommended deletion of 9 Naval officers from the ~~Naval~~ Fire Control section, as the Naval Gunfire Liaison spotting teams were then called. It can be seen from these two examples that the organization was not built to serve each operation, but required changes to satisfy each landing made. It is the opinion of the writer that it is as inconceivable to expect a fixed T/O organization to meet the needs of each amphibious operation as it would be to prescribe a fixed transportation organization to haul supplies for a Corps, regardless of the size of the Corps, the distances to be covered or the highway condition. Inasmuch as amphibious operations are normally planned some time in advance, if cellular teams organized under T/O and E 11-500 and trained in amphibious communication procedures were available, it would be possible to reinforce the division signal company for the operation, eliminating much wasted personnel and equipment. These units, when no longer required by the division, could revert to the next higher unit ashore for use in their communications requirements. Adoption of a joint Army-Navy-Air Force communication procedure would eliminate the requirement for personnel from each service to handle communications, thus eliminating the duplication that has existed in the past. Many of these differences that required personnel from two or more services are petty or are established customs that can be eliminated. The recently approved standardization measures for communications equipment for all services will assist in standardized procedure. Personnel other than communications personnel should be eliminated from the signal companies, excepting the normal administrative personnel required. The basis for assigning or attaching the naval gunfire liaison personnel, the artillery spotting teams and the air liaison teams to the JASCO was twofold, primarily that they used communications extensively in the discharge of their duties and secondarily, that inasmuch as the JASCO was a special organization for amphibious warfare

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and the other personnel, peculiar to the division except for an amphibious assault, having no administrative or parent organization drifted to the JASCO. The release of the Naval officers from the company would increase the overall operating efficiency of the unit. It is not a question of lack of cooperation, but in the service consciousness, appreciable differences in training, different customs, and different regulations. This situation is most difficult during periods between operations when the unit is in training. Naval officers do not as a rule have the same attitude toward responsibilities for their men and equipment that is desired in an Army Officer. They are not covered by Army regulations for such administrative procedure as : pay, discipline, and keeping of records. The duty of liaison officer to a Battalion commander on the subject of naval gunfire can be properly discharged by an Army Field Artillery officer with some additional training. Now that spotting has been standardized by the navy and army, this additional training is very minor in length. These battalion liaison officers merely performed relay duties as the final decision for gunfire support was made at regimental or division level. If Naval officers were attached to the division one month prior to the assault so as to have one with each regiment and one at division level, the demands of naval liaison would be adequately met. This personnel should not considered as part of the signal company, but rather serving in the same capacity at Field Artillery liaison officers do with infantry units, and would revert to the ship to which assigned. The Air Force personnel assigned to the JASCO have received a different type of training than have the Army personnel. Their morale has been low and their prime interest has been to get back to their branch, rather than to become integrated into the units structure. As their communications duties can be performed by signal personnel, the inclusion of the rated officer is the only dictating reason for Air Force personnel. The duties assigned to the Air Liaison parties can be better performed by Tactical Air Control Parties, under Air Force control,

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and attached to the division on the basis of air support that will be available, rather than under the present method whereby 13 air liaison parties organic to the JASCO are present for the operation. Due to the mission of the Shore and Beach party teams, it is mandatory that they be composed of signal personnel, or personnel trained as communication specialists. This element of the JASCO is the only one that can logically be assigned to a signal company, or attached to the division signal company for the assault. Communications during an amphibious attack are quite complex and are beyond the capability of the presently organized and equipped division signal company. The already overburdened tactical channels cannot be used for logistical communication which do not follow the normal command channels, but are functional in nature. These special communications are necessary for the logistical support of the landing teams and for providing means for exchange of information and orders between the combined force. It is felt that the responsibility for the beach communications should be given to the signal company of the Engineer Special Brigade, inasmuch as that unit is normally charged with logistical responsibility during the early phases of an amphibious assault. As mentioned before, this responsibility cannot be adequately handled by tactical commanders and no troops under their control should be used for this. A reinforcement of the division signal company for amphibious assault and provision of an adequate signal company for the Engineer Special Brigade, or another designated logistical unit, would eliminate much waste and idleness of personnel and the end result would be improved communications throughout the operation. The requirement for assistance to the division signal company and provision of adequate beach communications cannot be denied, but the requirement for the presently organized JASCO or a similar unit has not been justified by previous experience in combat. It was a necessary expedient during World War II, but its future existence under present doctrine in the Department of the Army is not indicated.

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Therefore it is concluded that the Joint Assault Signal Company, or any similiar special signal unit designed for the mission previously performed by the JASCO, is not required for attachment to an assault division for an amphibious landing. The responsibility for shore and beach logistical communications should be the responsibility of the Signal Company, Engineer Special Brigade, T/O & E 11-537 T, 22 January 1946. If that unit is not capable of furnishing the required communications, consideration should be given to changing the T/O & E. If required, the assault division signal company could reinforced for the initial phase of the operation by attachment of teams organized and equipped under T/O & E 11-500 and trained in joint amphibious communications. Another method for reinforcing the signal company is the attachment of teams from the parent Corps' signal battalion. This latter method permit elements of the Corps signal battalion to become familiar with the existing communications net prior to assuming responsibility. It is assumed that the reinforcement for the signal company is for assistance in maintaining the tactical communications which follow command channels and not to become involved in logistical communications which follow functional channels. Air-ground liaison should be provided by attaching Tactical Air Control Parties to the division as required. These parties, trained and equipped by the Air Force, would be better qualified to assist in the close support mission. Naval Gunfire Liaison officers should be attached to the division on the basis of one per regiment and one for division artillery headquarters, eliminating these officers below regimental level. The Naval Gunfire Spotting Teams should be Army artillery personnel trained in naval gunfire spotting and attached to Division artillery for employment as required by the battalion landing teams. All Naval personnel should be furnished by the ships assigned support missions and be ashore only as required for training and operations, reverting to shipboard duty as soon as possible. Naval officers attached to the Army depreciate in value to the Navy because of loss of contact with normal shipboard duties.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Secretary of the Army
Washington, 25, D. C.

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28 April 1948

SUBJECT: Elimination of Joint Assault Signal Company.

TO: Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, 25, D. C.

1. It is recommended that the Joint Assault Signal Company, T/O & E 11-147 OS, C-1, 10 September 1945, be eliminated from the troop unit list.

2. It is believed that in the economy of personnel and equipment, to relieve signal units of non-related duties, and to provide more efficient communications, the mission presently assigned the Joint Assault Signal Company can be accomplished in a more efficient manner by;

a. Charging the responsibility for shore and beach party communications that are purely logistical in nature to the Signal Company, Engineer Special Brigade, T/O & E 11-537 T, 22 January 1946.

b. Reinforcing the assault division signal company for the landing, if required, by teams from the parent Corps Signal Battalion, or by teams organized and equipped under T/O & E 11-500 and trained in joint amphibious operation.

c. Providing air-ground liaison by attaching Tactical Air Control Parties to the assault division. These parties would be staffed, trained and equipped by the Department of the Air Force.

d. Attaching Naval Gunfire Liaison officers to the assault division from the ships furnishing gunfire support on the basis of one (1) officer per regiment and one (1) officer for division artillery headquarters.

e. Naval Gunfire Spotting teams to be composed of Army artillery officers trained in naval gunfire spotting and attached to division artillery to be further attached to battalion landing teams as required.

3. It is further recommended that FM 31-5, Landing on a Hostile Shore, be revised to include the above changes.

KENNETH C. ROYALL
Secretary of the Army

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Copies Furnished:

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Chief, Army Field Forces

Chief Signal Officer, United States Army

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