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A SINGLE LOGISTICS COMMAND IN
THE UNIFIED NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Jack F Hudson
Lt. Col. QMC

Date submitted: 24 May 1949

A single logistical command in the unified
national military establishment, by Lt
Col J. F. Hudson. CGSC. 1948-49.

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Department of Logistics
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

4021

3 December 1948

~~1949~~

STUDENT-RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER 8-6

STUDENT Hudson, Jack F Lt. Col. OMC
(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR Lt. Col. O'Brien 242 7135
(Name) (Room No.) (Tele. No.)

SUBJECT A Single Logistics Command in the Unified National
Military Establishment.

PURPOSE: To determine the feasibility of a single Logistics Command for logistical support to the three departments in the National Military Establishment.

SCOPE: (Brief outline of subject coverage)

1. Study the logistical organizations and functions in the United States Armed Forces during and after World War II.
2. Study the logistical organization and functions as presently set up in the National Military Establishment.
3. From the above develop a logistical organization under a single Logistics Command, with assignment of responsibilities, chain of command and major functions of logistical support to the major subdivisions of that organization, required for logistical support of the three departments in the National Military Establishment.
4. Evaluate the capabilities and limitations of such organization and make definite recommendations concerning the feasibility and desirability of its adoption.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:

1. The scope suggested above is intended as a guide only and is not to be construed as a limitation on the students perusal of the subject. The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as he may find necessary to outline and define the specific problem he visualizes and proposes to develop in his research study.

(over)

2c The references below are furnished to give the student enough material with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will make use of other available sources in order to give adequate scope to his subject, and to include latest developments pertaining to the subject.

REFERENCES:

N 15403.....Theater Supply, Armed Forces, Staff College.
S 13560.....The Infantry Conference, Report on Committee on
Equipment and Supplies, June 1946 - E 6 and E 7.
R 15272.....History and Organization Joint Logistics Plans Committee.
C 150830.....Nations Security Program.
.....National Security Act of 1947 Congress of US P.L. 253
80th Congress.
FM 100-10.....Field Service Regulations Administration.
FM 101-5.....General Staff Officers Manual.
TM 38-205.....Army Supply Procedure.
TM 38-403.....Station Supply Procedure.
AR 10-15.....Par. 10, Responsibilities Supply Div. WD General Staff.
R 12766N.....History of the Planning Div ASF, Volume 8.
R 12978.....Changes in Supply Procedure and Supply Levels. Military
Review 1947 July.

COORDINATION: (Confer with the authors of these subjects for pertinent information and coordination)

8-7
8-8
8-9

REMARKS:

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FT. LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Logistics Specialized Course
Regular Class 1948-1949

A SINGLE LOGISTICAL COMMAND IN
THE UNIFIED NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Jack F Hudson
Lt. Col. QMC

Date submitted: 24 May 1949

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Department of Logistics
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

24 May 1949

File No. 8-6

SUBJECT: A Single Logistics Command in the Unified National
Military Establishment.


TO: Director, Department of Logistics, C&GSC

1. PROBLEM.-- To determine the feasibility of a single logistics command for logistical support of the three departments in the National Military Establishment.
2. ASSUMPTIONS.-- That it is the intent of Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the most economical logistical support of the National Military Establishment within the capabilities of this Nation.
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.--
 - a. The organization for logistical support in all services required complete reorganization during World War II. (Annex 3)
 - b. Logistical planning in World War II was done concurrently with the war effort. (Annex 3)
 - c. The National Security Act of 1947 provides an adequate foundation for an economical logistical organization of the future.
4. DISCUSSION.--
 - a. In World War II, the Armed Forces experienced waste, duplication of effort and lack of logistical plans. To eliminate these faults, a single logistical command is a feasible solution that will provide logistical support for the Armed Forces. The national economy (of the Nation) must be considered by the Armed Forces and the National Security Act of 1947 provides a legal basis to bring all logistical agencies under a single command to achieve the needed control.
 - b. Experienced personnel must be trained to conduct the business of the Armed Forces within the limits of the national economy. Personnel engaged in such a broad field must be on

a career basis. Business men spend their lifetime in their chosen pursuit and a similiar career plan can be accomplished for the Armed Forces by establishing a single logistics command.

c. Certain services within the Armed Forces are identical for each ^{Department} component and they can all be provided for under a single logistics command. Peacetime organization for this purpose will give experience that will be invaluable in war. Plans for organizational structure can be studied and plans made for an immediate orderly expansion into a wartime organization.

5. CONCLUSIONS.-- a. That a single logistical command is feasible for the logistical support of the Armed Forces. (Annex 4)
- b. That a single logistical command provides a basis for a logistical career in the Armed Forces. (Annex 4)
- c. That a single logistical command can be implemented now for services common to all and plans implemented for the gradual absorbtion of all logistical functions.
6. ACTION RECOMMENDED: a. That plans be implemented for a single logistical command.
- b. That this study be approved and forwarded to the Director, Logistics Division, GSUSA, for consideration and action.
- (Annex 1 & 2)


JACK F HUDSON
Lt. Col. QMC

ANNEXES:

1. Draft Memorandum to the Commandant, C&GSC
2. Draft Letter of Transmittal to Director of Logistics, GSUSA
3. World War II logistical organization
4. Single logistical command organization
5. Bibliography

Concurrence.-- Omitted

Nonconcurrence.-- Omitted

Consideration of nonconcurrence.-- Omitted

Annexes added.-- Omitted


APPROVED:

_____ May 1949

F. A. HENNING
Colonel, FA
Director

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: A Single Logistics Command in the Unified Military Establishment
(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHED.)

TO	SUBJECT MATTER	FROM DATE AND INITIAL
Commandant C&GSC	<p>1. I concur in the recommendation of the attached research study.</p> <p>2. Request that this study be transmitted to the Director of Logistics, GSUSA, by means of a letter (Annex 2) which has been prepared for your signature.</p>	 <p>F. A. HENNING Colonel, FA Director, Dept of Logistics</p> <p>4</p>

D R A F T

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS


**SUBJECT: A Single Logistics Command in the Unified
National Military Establishment.**

**TO: The Director,
Logistics Division, GSUSA
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.**

1. The attached staff study, A Single Logistics Command in the Unified National Military Establishment, is transmitted to you for consideration and appropriate action.

2. The research study was prepared by a student in this College and concurred in by the Director, Department of Logistics. The recommendations made for consideration and implementation of plans for a single logistical command appear to have considerable merit.


**M. S. EDDY
Lt General, USA
Commandant**



ANNEX 3

WORLD WAR II LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION.

I.	ARMY LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION	Page 1
II.	NAVY LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION	Page 2
III.	AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION	Page 2



I. ARMY LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION

Pearl Harbor found the logistical organization of the Army poorly prepared to do a wartime job. Organization and procedure within and between the services was almost non-existent. The technical services within the Army were independent, competitive and concerned only with their own requirements. Under this method of operation, waste and duplication of effort was not recognized. Plans for logistical operations were not in existence. In short this method of operation was an operation in a "Land of Plenty" and the only limitation was the amount of money that was available.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the procurement agencies of the Army were completely overhauled. The procurement program became a major activity because of the great demands set up by an Army of unprecedented size.

Within the War Department there were eight self contained procurement and supply agencies that actually were in competition with each other. This had an adverse effect on industrial mobilization and in particular upon the supply of combat forces. With the lack of organization to do the job and a lack of logistical plans, it became necessary to reorganize and to prepare plans concurrently with the war effort.

In the later part of World War II logistical organization within and between the military forces were still far from perfect. General Lutes states that coordination and logistic planning must be accomplished in peacetime-- it is too late to attempt it in war.

Our war effort actually developed into a policy of doing what ever was called for as quickly as possible, regardless of the cost. This was wasteful with both materials and dollars. General Lutes again remarks that too much of our success was accomplished by inefficient practices.

II. Navy Logistical Organization

Pearl Harbor found eight self contained logistical agencies in the Navy Department, all ill-prepared to operate on a wartime basis. The Navy found it necessary to overhaul their procurement and supply agencies for a wartime job. Again logistical planning for war was lacking. Duplication of effort and competition was common within the Navy as well as with other services. This, however had been recognized to some extent and some work had been accomplished through the medium of the Joint Army-Navy Specifications Board.

Competition developed between the services and as the war progressed difficulty was encountered in getting actual supplies needed for the combat forces. The Navy well recognizes the meaning of operational effectiveness and has taken steps to accomplish it.

III. Air Force Organization.


The Air Force at the time of Pearl Harbor was an organization of growing importance as a combat arm. The War Department saw fit to recognize the Air Force as a separate command but at the same time logistical support was to come from the Army Service Forces. Since all this occurred after World War II was under way, there was no time for detailed plans of logistical support. The Air Force organized the Air Materiel Command for supply of Air Force items and common items were supplied by the Army Service Forces.

Common supply to the Air Force offered no particular difficulty. Supplies were delivered into the supply pipeline of the Air Force for items common to all. Only recently have some difficulties made their appearance. These difficulties concern accounting and costs and apply to the economy of operation of a peacetime establishment.

ANNEX 4

SINGLE LOGISTICS COMMAND ORGANIZATION

I.	INTENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947	Page 3
II.	OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947	Page 4
III.	ORGANIZATION OF A SINGLE LOGISTICS COMMAND	Page 5
IV.	PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF LOGISTICS CHART A	Page 8
V.	FLOW OF REQUIREMENTS CHART B	Page 8
VI.	SERVICE CHART C	Page 9
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VIII.	LOGISTICS IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES	Page 10
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XI.	LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL	Page 14
XII.	STANDARDIZATION AND CATALOGUING	Page 16
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I. INTENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

ACT OF 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 provides a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States. This means that Congress intends and expects the Armed Services, under the authority of this act, to integrate their policies and procedures into an efficient and economical system for the defense of the United States. In so doing it must be based on the economy of the country. It is not possible for the United States to again support a war based on the "unlimited" resources of this country.

The necessity of the act was set forth for "the coordination of the activities" of other Government agencies. Conservation of our national resources is a necessity. Coordination of requirements within the National Military Establishment is the only means by which requirements will fit into the economy of the Nation. In addition to our military requirements, the needs of our Allies must be considered and these need must be considered with the needs of the Nation as a whole.

The National Security Act implies the elimination of waste and duplication of effort within the Armed Services. The Armed Services must operate on a good solid business foundation. This means that our total requirements and distribution of supplies must be based on the capabilities of the economy of the Nation to produce and deliver supplies in wartime.

II. OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 brought forth the present organization of the Armed Forces. Within the declaration of policy the act states the following:

"To provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security".

This gives the necessary authority for coordination and cooperation within the Armed Services on a scale never before known.

The National Security Act of 1947 establishes on a national level, the National Security Council whose function is " To advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security".

The National Security Resources Board is at the national level and advises the President concerning "policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials and products".

The Secretary of Defense is at the national level and is the head of the National Military Establishment. Under the Secretary of Defense is the Munitions Board whose functions are logistical. The Munitions Board is the link between the military and the economy of the Nation. Military requirements are presented to the National Security Resources Board by the Munitions Board who act as claimants for the military against the economic resources of the Nation.

The Munitions Board assigns and adjusts requirements between the three departments and assigns purchase responsibility. It is at this point that single purchase responsibility may be assigned for common items within the three departments. It is at this point where it is recognized that standardization and cataloging is of primary importance in the logistical support of the three departments.

III. ORGANIZATION OF A SINGLE LOGISTICS COMMAND

A single logistics command must be organized along simple, efficient business line. The organization must follow that set up by large corporations who are primarily interested in profit. A single logistics command is interested in a profit in the form of economy to the Armed Services and the conservation of the resources of the Nation.

The Munitions Board is the agency which takes the requirements of the Armed Services to the national level. At this level the needs of the Armed Services are considered with the civilian needs and of the ability of the Nation to produce. Logistical capabilities are balanced against strategic plans based on national economy.

The single logistics command is the representative of the three departments and would receive the approved requirements from the Munitions Board. This would place the requirements of the three departments on an approved national level and would by a single agency place that demand on the industry of the nation.

In the operation of a single logistics command, service is the primary mission to the three departments. The three departments are responsible for their requirements. These are turned over to the single logistics command for national allocation. Then requirements are delivered to the requisitioning service by the single logistics command.

Procurement under a single logistics command would bring under one head, the resources of the nation, to satisfy the requirements of the Armed Forces. To accomplish a procurement mission, a single logistics command would be in a position to standardize all forms and procedures. This alone is vital to industry. It has been stated that industry maintained separate branches within their organizations to cope with the variety of methods of procurement in use in World War II.

The single logistics command would be responsible for the procurement of requirements of the three departments and would deliver the finished product to the supply system of the user. at such points as the user designates. Complete inspection and acceptance of the item would be made in accordance with the specifications set up by the user.

To centralized procurement in a single logistics command ties in the needs of the Armed Services to the economic resources of the Nation. Further it makes possible the decentralization of the procurement operation to the field. This places procurement personnel in the backyard of industry.

Such a procurement agency would act only to satisfy the requirements of the three departments and would deliver those requirements into the various supply systems. With a nationwide network of procurement superimposed on the industrial network of the nation, supplies would enter the storage and distribution system of the requisitioning service at any point called for in the United States at the least possible cost to the Government. Transportation cost would be greatly lowered and a good procurement system can materially lower the quantities of supplies in the pipeline.

A single logistics command would operate a stock control system for the purpose of the three departments indicating stocks on hand. Hoarding of supplies cannot be justified. Changing conditions in peace and war cause fluctuations in stocks and stock control methods would balance stock between departments.

Services which are common to all three departments can come under a single logistics command. Common services lend themselves readily to unification and again bring service under one head. All individual members of the Armed Services require the common services of hospitalization, transportation, finance, signal communication and construction. Under a single logistics command this could all be provided on a equitable basis and within the economy of the Nation. With a central head for such common service waste and duplication of effort would be eliminated. In considering the Nation from an economic viewpoint the use of transportation is of vital importance. There are limitations to the capabilities of the transportation system. Hospitalization again offers great economies and when administered from a central point, provides for the maximum utilization of hospital beds for patients that are being evacuated to the Zone of the Interior. Finance is a matter of standardization of forms and methods. Signal communication is a matter of supplying the desired service to the user based on the availability of the Nation to support such service. Construction is so closely related to materials available that it must be controlled under a single head.

In each department of the Armed Services are many items that are not common to all. Basically these items still use common items as far as the national economy is concerned. Steel, copper, rubber and other strategic materials have a common relationship to the services but the end items might not be the same. However, the same principle of control is necessary and this can be provided by a single logistics command. The inclusion of these items would be subject to logistical planning for the future but considering the element of time, these items could be included.

IV. PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF LOGISTICS




CHART A

V. FLOW OF REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF LOGISTICS




CHART B

VI. SERVICE FROM PROPOSED DEPARTMENT
OF LOGISTICS TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS




CHART C

VII. SUPPLY BY PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF
LOGISTICS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS




CHART D

VIII. LOGISTICS IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

The German Armed Forces Law of 21 May 1935 integrated the Army, Navy and Air Force into one command under a Commander in Chief. In the Armed Forces High Command common administrative functions were assigned. Main divisions included offices of Chief of Transport, Chief of Medical Service, Legal Affairs, Motor Transport, Casualties, Welfare, Prisoners of War, Manpower, Signal, and Field Economics. Under these main divisions an attempt was made to unify the three services.

The Chief of Armed Forces Signal Communication was responsible for all means of signal communication between military and civil organizations concerned with defense. In the early stages of this organization not too much thought was given to the Navy. The Army was predominant and figured heavily into Hitler's strategic plans. Therefore the Navy was not well organized under Armed Forces Signal Communication.

The Chief of Transport had liaison with the services and coordinated their needs for transportation on the rail system of Germany. The Armed Forces were dependent on the rail system because of a lack of rubber and gasoline. Supplies of these critical items were only sufficient for actual military operations.

Within the Supreme Headquarters, there was included a Quartermaster Branch which had assigned to it the mission of procuring and allocation of fuels and lubricants to the Armed Services. This Quartermaster Branch never achieved embracing control of procurement and supply for the three services and therefore amounted to only a paper organization. The three services then proceeded to procure for themselves on a competitive basis.

A Field Economics Office existed on the staff of the Armed Forces High Command. This office was set up to supervise procurement operations of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It allotted plant facilities among the Armed Services, received raw material requirements from each of the Armed Services for presentation to the Minister of Economics. The allocations thus received were divided between the three services.

In 1942, the power of this office was transferred to the Albert Speer Ministry of Armament and War Production and this left the Field Economics office primarily responsible for activities outside of Germany only. Mainly these activities were concerned with planning and directing the exploitation of industrial resources in conquered territories and for the supervising of the use of these resources for the direct supply of the Armed Forces. It had little authority concerning the utilization of the German productive resources.

At the time of the German surrender, a common agency had again been established for the three services for procurement. This was late in the war and was not carried out because of the complete collapse of Germany.

There was no connection between strategy and the economic resources of the country and no attention was paid to such matters until the entry of the United States, into the war, made such action mandatory.

In general the Army was the predominant service and many times they were accused of assigning supplies of all kinds to the Army because most of the top General Staff agencies were "two hat organizations" with the chief holding the same relative position in the Army.

A major factor in the breakdown of the logistical organizations in Germany was Goering of the Air Force. He acted as if he were responsible to no one except Hitler himself, thereby embarrassing the Chief of Staff to the extent that the

Air Forces took on an independent attitude. Planning and procurement offices throughout the Army and Navy were infuriated at the lack of control which the organization should have had over the Air Force for the benefit of all. Also to a limited extent, the Army offered some resistance to a level of command above itself because of tradition.

The Germans were prevented from fighting the war after the entry of the United States with an efficient interservice command organization because of tradition, personalities, interservice rivalries, and by the shortness of time.

IX. SINGLE LOGISTICS COMMAND

UNDER ARMY SERVICE FORCES

The Army Service Forces (originally Service of Supply) was organized shortly after Pearl Harbor. The purpose of this organization was to bring under one head, the many organizations that had been reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. This organization brought together six technical services, eight administrative services, nine corps areas (later service commands) six ports of embarkation and nine general depots. All these had been more or less independent operators and were now brought under one head for coordination and planning.

Management was not at its best in the Army at this time and the Army Service Forces made great strides in the improvements of management. Little was it realized that the Army had paid so little attention to good business management until the many improvements were brought into being. Some of the outstanding improvements were the supply control system, publications control, reports control, depot supply procedure, forms standardization and the introduction of machine accounting.

These improvements were only a small part of the many that were introduced. Many improvements were the result of the trial and error method. Most amazing of all was the fact that such improvements were necessary in wartime when we could ill afford the time to study and try out such improvements. Plans must be made in peacetime for wartime use. Business and management in the civilian field must be studied for methods of operation that will improve the efficiency of the Army.

Time is the factor that will be missing in the future. Time cannot again be wasted in reorganization and planning during wartime. We must be prepared with logistical plans for the future and methods to implement those plans.

X. CONSOLIDATIONS

Items and service which are common throughout all three departments lend themselves readily to consolidations. Under a single logistics command these items and services can readily be furnished. Coordination will be required on forms, methods, procedures and operations. This amounts to improvements in management.

Items and service not common to all requires planning. Planning must be accomplished during peacetime in order to have logistical plans on which to support an emergency. Time would again enter the picture of consolidation under one command but adequate plans can bring this into being. All this must be approached from a business angle with the view of profit or economy in the terms of the Armed Forces. Economy is apparent in the elimination of stenographic work, records, filing, reproduction services, communications and many other office services.

XI. LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL

Logistical personnel must be as well trained and as efficient as any fighting man. In a business as large as the Armed Services, it is vital that a logistics officer be of the highest type. He must be thoroughly capable of carrying on the business of the Armed Forces with industry. To gain all this he must have a permanent career in logistics. Training in the field of logistics is important as the Armed Services discovered, to their embarrassment, just after Pearl Harbor. Military personnel can be supplemented with the same type of civilian personnel that now supports the Armed Forces. It is this type of organization that is capable of expanding

overnight for an emergency. A trained procurement officer can procure two carlots as easily as one carlot and his training will teach him where the additional carlot is available within the civilian economy.

Logistical personnel must be business men. For years the Armed Forces have utilized professional men such as doctors, who are trained for their work. Officers must be trained as good business men for logistical work.

Logistics as a career is highly important if the Armed Forces are to keep pace with the big business which they operate. These career men must carry on their education in the business world. They must gain their experience and training in the same field of business that gives training and experience to the successful business man in civilian life.

XII. STANDARDIZATION AND CATALOGUING

The Munitions Board is now actively engaged in standardization and cataloguing with most remarkable results. At the beginning of the past war several Joint Army-Navy groups were formed to work along these lines but were not all inclusive. Their work was good but the field was merely scratched and much remained to be done.

Standard items which vary only slightly in specifications must be brought together under a standard specification. Items such as blankets can well be brought under one specification for the Armed Services. This establishes a method of price control and interchangeability between the three departments.

Cataloguing is of major importance. Duplication of like items within the Armed Forces must be eliminated. It is a tremendous job but in a business the size of the Armed Forces it must be accomplished for efficient and economical management. Cataloguing establishes a common basis for the identification of the many items used by the Armed Forces so that it will become possible to balance stocks between the three departments and thus result in economy.

XIII. MUNITIONS BOARD STANDARDIZATION EXHIBIT

The Munitions Board gathered together several items in use in the three departments. These items were placed in an exhibit in a warehouse in Virginia for comparative purposes. Items are compared in quality, price, minor variations and use. Examples of these various items are:

Blankets

Navy officer's blanket \$ 8.25 (1945)
(Slightly wider than sailors model and has blue "USN" on a white background.)

Sailor's Blanket \$ 7.30 (1945)

Marines blanket \$ 8.00 (1948)
(Green with special stripe which is hard to weave)

Army-Air Force blanket \$ 7.55 (1947) Khaki color.

Navy medical blanket \$ 8.95 (1945) White with blue stripe.

Army medical blanket \$ 7.95 (1946) White with maroon stripe.

Army medical blanket, field \$ 8.04 (1946) Olive drab.

Folding cots

Navy \$ 3.20

Marines \$ 7.50

Army \$ 6.34

(Army cot material is twice weight of Navy and Marine)

Pillows

Army \$ 1.77

Marines \$ 2.50

Tan Shoes

Navy \$ 7.73

Army \$ 5.07


Electrically heated flying suits

Air Force \$ 121.78 (Good down to -65 degrees)

Navy \$ 122.47 (Good down to -20 degrees)

ANNEX 5

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