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E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

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N# 10-177

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FIELD ORDER

NO. ONE

DECLASSIFIED

1. FIELD ORDER NUMBER ONE (1)
2. ANNEX NO. 1 to FIELD ORDER NO. 1 (Opns Maps).
3. ANNEX #2 to FIELD ORDER NO. 1 (Intel Annex)
4. ENCLOSURE NO. 1 to ANNEX #2 (Intel)
5. ANNEX #3 to FO NO. 1 (Alternate Plans)
6. ANNEX #4 to FO NO. 1 (Supply)
7. ANNEX #5 (Signal Communications)
8. ANNEX #6 (Boat Employment Plan) NOT INCLUDED
9. Annex #7 (Naval Gunfire Support)
10. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER #1 to FO #1
11. ANNEX #1 to ADM O NO. 1 (QM Supplies)
12. INCL #1 to ANNEX #1 to ADM O #1 (Supply Requirements)
13. ANNEX #2 to ADM O NO. 1 (Medical)(4 Inclosures)
14. ANNEX #3 to ADM O #1 (Water Supply Plan)
15. ANNEX #4 to ADM O #1(Purchasing Supplies & Services)
16. Special Instructions- 3D RCN TROOP - CO L 7th INF
17. Special Instructions- CO L RLG 30 (REINF)
18. Special Instructions- BN LT 2 RLG 30
19. Special Instructions- BLT 1, RLG 7
20. Special Instructions- BLT 2, RLG 7 & BLT 1 RLG 30
21. INFORMATION PHAMPHLET - FR MOROCCO (10 Parts) SECT I
22. INFORMATION PHAMPHLET - FR MOROCCO (13Parts) SECT II
23. INFORMATION PHAMPHLET - FR MOROCCO (6 Parts) SECT III

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E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY
Casablanca French Morocco

19 November 1942

BRIEF RESUME OF THE ACTION OF RLG - 7
ON THE 8TH, 9TH, 10TH, AND 11TH OF NOVEMBER, 1942

SECTION I

OPERATIONS ON THE 8TH

1. Plan of action:

a. RLG 7 was to land at 0400 on beaches east of FEDALA with the 1st and 2nd LT's abreast, LT 1 was to take the town of FEDALA, and LT 2 three crossings over the WADI MELIAH south of FEDALA. Company "L", in conjunction with the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop was to land about one mile southwest of FEDALA AND assist LT 2 in the capture of the crossings over the WADI MELIAH.

b. Upon capture of these objectives, LT 3 on the right and LT 2 on the left were to advance toward CASABLANCA to a line approximately 4 miles southwest of the crossings over the WADI MELIAH, prepared for further advance on the 9th in conjunction with the 15th Infantry on the left. The remaining elements of RLG 7 were to land as small boats became available on successive trips. See operations Map.

2. Action:

a. LT 1 landed beginning at approximately 0500 on the beach and reefs approximately 1 mile east of FEDALA under fire from artillery and machine guns at FEDALA and POINT BLONDIN. It entered the town of FEDALA shortly thereafter and succeeded in silencing the last battery on the extremity of POINT BEDALA by 1500.

b. LT 2 began landing shortly after daylight with the leading waves on beaches and reefs approximately 5 miles northeast of FEDALA. This was three miles northeast of the prescribed beach. It overcame the last resistance of the battery at POINT BLONDIN, and moved to its objective which was taken by the leading elements about 1500.

c. Headquarters RLG 7 (forward echelon) landed behind LT 1 at 0815, and established a command post southeast of the railroad station in FEDALA. Anti-tank Company, Headquarters Company, Cannon Company, Service Company, Medical Detachment, Platoons of Company "A", 443d CA (AA), Company "A", 756th Tank Battalion (-), 1st Battalion, 36th Engineers, 10th Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery "A", 9th Field Artillery Battalion continued to land throughout the 8th and 9th, and were assembled in the vicinity of the command post of RLG 7.

d. LT 3 began landing about 0930 and went into an assembly area southeast of FEDALA near the CP of RLG 7.

e. Company "L" was landed about five miles northeast of FEDALA at about 1200 and joined LT 3 in its assembly area.

f. At 1600, orders were received to continue the advance toward CASABLANCA to a line 2 miles southwest of the crossing over the WADI MELIAH, from which an advance was to be made beginning at 0730 on the 9th. LT 3 was moved abreast and to the right of LT 2, and the advance was made to the line designated. LT 2 had secured the crossing of HIGHWAY NO. 1 over the WADI MELIAH, and turned it over to the 15th Infantry prior to the advance. LT 1 was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 20th Engineers in FEDALA, and was assembled in RLG reserve about 1 mile southeast of the crossing of ROUTE 110 over the WADI MELIAH. The RLG 7 command post was moved up close behind the assault battalion. Separate units of RLG 7 displaced forward to the vicinity of the command post of RLG 7. Tanks were detached from LT's and assembled in RLG 7 reserve near the CP. Nine tanks from RLG 30 were attached by Division order. During this period no radio equipment was operating except one SCR 284, which was in contact with Division. There was practically no wire, very few vehicles, and communications were dependent upon foot messengers.

g. The 1st Battalion, 36th Engineers established and organized for supply purposes the Regimental Beach at the inner harbor of FEDALA.

SECTION II

OPERATIONS OF THE 9TH

3. Plan of Action:

a. The Division was to advance with the 7th and 15th RLG's abreast, RLG 7 on the right. Beginning at 0700, RLG 7 was to advance in its zone of action, with the LT 3 and LT 2 abreast, LT 3 on the right, to a line on the outskirts of CASABLANCA. The 15th Infantry was to advance on the left. For zone of action and phase lines, see Operations Map.

4. Action:

a. The advance jumped off as scheduled, and continued with little opposition until about 1400, when orders from Division arrested the advance on a line approximately 5½ miles southwest of the WADI MELIAH pending arrival of additional supplies from the transports. This line was organized in readiness to continue the attack. The 1st Battalion was moved to a point about 1½ miles northeast of the center of the line held. The Regimental CP was advanced close in rear of the assault battalions. This position was held until midnight. During the late afternoon hostile batteries shelled the forward elements of LT 3, and the CP of RLG 7. Throughout the day reconnaissance was pushed well to the front. The artillery followed the advance closely but was not employed because of the absence of suitable targets. Had targets been available its effectiveness would have been doubtful due to the lack of proper communications. While contact was gained with the CP of the 15th Infantry, the front line elements of the LT 2 on the left had no contact with the leading elements of the 15th.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS OF THE 10TH

5. Plan of Action:

a. The advance on CASABLANCA was to contiue at midnight 9-10, and was to reach a coordinating line on the outskirts of CASABLANCA at 0700. Air and Naval bombardment was to be available on call. RLG 7 was to advance with the 3rd and 2nd Battalions in assault, LT 3 on the right, and LT 1 in reserve. The Artillery was to give close support to the assault battalions, and, due to the absence of wire, was directed to employ direct laying when opportunity afforded. See Operations Map.

6. Action:

a. The shelling which had started during the afternoon of the 9th was intensified beginning at midnight, and was continuous throughout the day. As LT 2 approached the coordinating line it received artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire. Some hostile naval gunfire was received on the flank from a destroyer or cruiser lying off shore. The closeness of the targets to our own front lines made our own Naval fire support impracticable, while lack of communications prevented timely calls for air support. LT 3 was held up on the coordinating line. LT 2, on the left, advanced more rapidly during the approach march than LT 3, and moved approximately a company into the zone of action of LT 3. Just prior to daylight LT 2 met heavy artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire, and in an endeavor to move to the left into its proper zone, and to envelop the hostile resistance, the LT Commander lost control of some elements of his unit which filtered to the rear and were reformed in the vicinity of the LT CP. That part of the LT which moved to the left was further disorganized by enemy machine gun and mortar fire, and by the death of one, and the incapacitation by wounds of a second company commander. It reorganized on a ridge to the rear and to the left of the LT zone of action at 1000. The men of the LT, having landed well to the north on the 8th, and having made a very long march carrying all equipment and ammunition, were exhausted, and were not effective for the remainder of the day. The group that reformed in the vicinity of the LT CP joined the remainder of the LT during the late afternoon and evening.

b. As soon as the situation was clarified, LT 1, supported by all tanks and available artillery, was directed to attack in the previous zone of action of LT 2, and capture the military barracks area on the outskirts of CASABLANCA. LT 1 jumped off about 1200, and at darkness held a line immediately in front of the barracks area. This line was held during the night. The artillery consisting of the 10th Field artillery Battalion, and the 105 howitzer platoon of the Cannon Co, reconnoitered its positions just in rear of the coordinating line early in the night, and, because of its superior mobility, placed some guns in position before the arrival of the assault elements. The forward position of one battery was found, just prior to daylight, to be so exposed to hostile artillery and sniper fire, as to necessitate its withdrawal to a position approximately 500 yds to the rear. Estimated casualties to date — approximately 5%. Heaviest losses in "E" and "F" Companies.

c. Before dawn on the 10th, word was received that the 15th Infantry had been held up, and it did not gain contact with us during the day.

d. The CP of RLG 7, together with the separate units, displaced forward behind LT 2 commencing at 0200.

e. At approximately 1700, request was made to Division for dive bombing on a hostile battery of heavy claiber that had been doing considerable damage throughout the day. The dive bombing attack silenced the battery.

SECTION IV

OPERATIONS OF THE 11TH

7. Plan of Action:

a. The Division was to continue the attack at 0730, with RLG 7 on the right and RLG 15 on the left, attacking in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment. RLG 7 was to attack with battalions abreast in order from right to left, LT 2, LT 1, LT 3, making its main effort on the left, with the tanks in reserve. See Operations Map.

8. Action:

a. At approximately 0400, the officer commanding a French battalion opposing us, together with his company commanders, arrived at the CP of RLG 7, and stated that he had orders from his higher commander to cease firing. He was told that we had orders to enter CASABLANCA at 0730, and that it would be necessary for him to assemble his forces, stack his arms, and turn over his ammunition to our advancing troops. He asked permission to assemble his forces in their barracks. This request was granted. He sent a message directing his forces to act in accord with this plan, and was taken to the Divisiion CP, where confirmation of an Armistice was determined, and the order given to cease firing. RLG 7 marched into CASABLANCA and took the Division objectives.

HEADQUARTERS 39TH FIELD ARTILLERY BN
Casablanca, French Morocco.

24 November 1942

SUBJECT: Resume of Operations of the 39th Field Artillery Bn, and attached units, November 8, 1942 to November 11, 1942

TO : Historian, 3rd Division.

ANNEX : Overlay Map, Casablanca-Fedala, scale 1/50,000

The Battalion Commanding Officer landed at Fedala at 1530, November 8, accompanying the Commanding Officer of RLG 15. He met the Commanding Officer of "A" Battery on the beach and learned that the battery was in firing position. The Battalion Commanding Officer proceeded with the Regimental Commanding Officer to the Regimental Command Post. He later returned and led "A" Battery forward to a new position five kilometers inland. For the remainder of the operation he supervised functioning of the Battalion and assisted by the battalion staff, made reconnaissance.

At 0630 November 11, the Battalion Commanding Officer was on reconnaissance for advanced battery positions and at 0800 ordered one battery to displace forward. The morning of November 11, found the battery occupying an area immediately south of Casablanca, with guh batteries dug in and prepared to fire to the south.

At liaison officer was maintained with the infantry outpost to facilitate prompt delivery of fire in any emergency.

The Battalion Fire Direction Center took over control of batteries at dusk November 10 and prepared the battalion to fire the H hour concentration on the Regimental objective.

Headquarters battery was completely assembled by dawn November 9 and proceeded inland to the initial Battalion Command Post. Successive Command Post's were established and by night of November 10 all installations were completed to enable the Fire Direction Center to centralize the battalion fire.

The battalion survey section fujctioned from the initial landing on November 8. The situation advanced so rapidly that no advantage could be taken of surveyed data until the night of November 10 when a complete position area survey enabled the Fire Direction Center to prepare the battalion concentration for H hour on November 11. "B" Battery's adjustment of the base point prior to H hour November 11 tied the eleven pieces of the battalion together and furnished direction for the position area survey.

"A" Battery landed minus one gun section. At about 1600 November 8, The Battalion Commander assisted "A" Battery's Commanding Officer in placing the guns in position near the beach and preparing them for fire. The Battalion Commander later led the battery to a new position five kilometers inland. "A" Battery had four guns and about 450 rounds of ammunition by morning of November 9. By the use of one Jeep and a civilian truck "A" Battery displaced forward at 1400 November 9 and remained at the new position for the night November 9-10. On the morning of November 10 our Infantry encountered Cavalry near the road junction of Tit Millil. "A" Battery immediately placed fire on the enemy and aided in destroying the resistance. Shortly thereafter "A" battery, adjusted by a liaison officer neutralized enemy Cavalry firing from a building in the fields.

Several rounds of counter battery fire fell on the battery while in this sectiion of action.

On the evening of November 10 "A" Battery displaced into a position covering the final assault on Casablanca.

"B" Battery landed about 1430 November 9 and bivouaced near Fedala. It occupied a gun position and was ready to fire by 0900 November 10. The battery was then brought forward to a new position near "A" Battery to support the action at Tit Millil. The Enemy withdrew and the battery was moved forward to a position southwest of Tit Millil. While on the march to a new position behind Hill 93 (see annex) our infantry was suddenly shelled by enemy artillery fire. "B" Battery made a hasty occupation of position on the exposed right flank and dug in, prepared to deliver fire. Exact location of the enemy could not be obtained, however, and the battery was displaced to the Regimental area. Here it occupied a position, was tied by survey to "A" Battery and was prepared to deliver fire for the final assault. "B" Battery accomplished the base point registration at dawn of November 11 prior to the scheduled deliver of the battalion concentration on the Regimental Objective.

"C" Battery's third gun section, with an Anti-tank gun attached, landed at 1100 November 10. These were immediately attached to "B" battery and were placed in position. At 2000 November 10, two more sections landed and were quickly attached to "A" Battery and placed in position. These three sections were prepared for the battalion concentration at H hour November 11, By 1000, November 10 the fourth piece had joined the battery and it was functioning as a unit.

Service Battery functioned in three units, one with each gun battery. An ammunition train was organized at Fedala on the afternoon of November 9. There was no transportation available but battery personell repaired four civilian trucks which were in turn commandeered by higher headquarters. A civilian truck was hired and it hauled ammunition and rations and displaced "A" Battery November 9.

At 0200 November 10, Service Battery borrowed and brought forward four half-tracks belonging to the 443d CAAA units. These were employed immediately as prime movers and were never idle. By the morning of November 11, 1459 rounds of ammunition were available at the battery positions. All available civilian and government vehicles were used, superior cooperation was rendered by S-4 and Service Company 15th Infantry

"B" Battery 9th Field Artillery leading elements landed at the beach of Fedala at 2120 November 8. They remained at the beach doing salvage work until 0420 November 11, when two self-propelled 105 mm Howitzers were landed. These were manned and dispatched to the front immediately and were in firing position at 0800 November 11. A third gun joined the battery eventually but the fourth was lost in the surf at Fedala.

Liaison between the 39th Field Artillery Battalion and it's combat team, the 15th Infantry was accomplished by maintaining a lisison section with each infantry battalion.

Because of lack of transportation, the liaison sections were entirely by radio.

Communication was constant with Liaison Section 1, while sections and 3 had some difficulties.

J.U. LAKOTA
1st Lt 39th FA Bn
S-2.

BRUSHWOOD CASUALTIES

	Nov 8		Nov 9		Nov 10		Nov 11		Nov 12		TOTAL		
	K	W	K	W	K	W	K	W	K	W	K	W	MIA
3d Div Hq & Hq Co		1										1	
3d Signal Co		1				2						3	
3d Recn Tr													
7th Infantry	9	38	4	21	27	72	6	19		6	46	156	17
15th Infantry	3	13		7		11		3			3	34	
30th Infantry	8	23		4	1	4		2			9	33	
9th FA Bn		3		1	1	1					1	5	
10th FA Bn		5		2	2	6		3			2	16	
39th FA Bn		1										1	
41st FA Bn		5		2		2						9	
3d Medical Bn	1	4		2		3					1	9	3
3d QM Bn													
10th Engr Bn	1	13		4		4					1	21	1
756th Tk Bn			1								1		1
36th Engr Bn	1	5		1		1		3		14	1	27	
2d Bn, 30th Engrs		3		1								4	
436th CA Bn (AA)	2	7		1	2	4					4	12	12
443d CA Bn (AA)	4	3			2						6	3	
2nd Armd Bde	1	3			1						2	3	2
204th MP Co			4	9							4	9	6
* XII A S C			4	1							4	1	
TOTALS	20	128	13	56	36	113	6	30		20	85	347	42
UNIDENTIFIED											23		

* Accurate figures not available at time of preparation of report.

15. On November 14th, G-4, 3d Division, arranged for a special hospital train for evacuation of casualties from Fedala to ship at Casablanca; 172 more were thus evacuated. Army litters would not fit racks on train, so all patients had to be transferred from Army litters to train litters at Fedala, and again from train litters to Navy litters at pier in Casablanca. The only objection to this process was the labor and time involved. It dit not jeopardize the patient's chance of recovery.

16. On November 17th, all casualties in a convalescence expectancy of 30 days or less were returned ashore by the Navy and were placed in the clearing stations at Casablanca and Fedala.

17. Both Clearing Stations are still in operation, pending establishment of evacuation hospital at Casablanca.

18. Observation:

a. The 1 officer and 19 enlisted men from the collecting company who were placed in the Infantry Battalion Service and Supply Section should be attached to the Battalion Medical Section and should take no equipment except individual medical kits and two wheel litters. The Battalion Surgeon should then be made responsible for evacuation from front line to beach in initial phase of amphibious operations. The 1 officer and 19 enlisted men in this operation carried over the side, in waterproof bags, equipment and supplies equivalent to another battalion aid station. The Navy beach parties had an abundance of equipment and the primary job of the reinforcing group from the collecting company is evacuation from aid station to beach.

b. Each Battalion and each Regimental Surgeon should take two jeeps ashore instead of one, and these should not be pooled but remain under exclusive control of the surgeon for use in evacuation to beach.

c. Clearing Company trucks should be given a higher priority and should be loaded so that they can be taken ashore as early as conditions will permit, and should be landed at the same time that the clearing company personnel are landed .

d. The accurate preparation of the EMT by Battalion Medical Sections in combat, under fire, and at nights without light is impossible and therefore its value as a source of information for casualty reports is nil.

e. The only accurate source of information upon which to base casualty reports is the Clearing Station record of admissions and evacuations. It is a matter of utmost importance that clearing stations reports reach the Division Surgeon daily. After the battle, the Division Surgeon must turn over all clearing station records to the AGO, who breaks them down to units for use in preparation of their casualty reports. This information is of utmost importance in determining those entitled to the Purple Heart and in the submission of Report of change cards. It was our experience that units who were not moving rapidly and who had few casualties were able to submit casualty reports based upon EMT's prepared by their Surgeon. However units such as RLG 7 who fought all day and moved all night to new positions and who had considerable casualties besides, had to depend on clearing station records for information upon which to base their reports of casualties.

f. The new MD Form 53, Clearing Station Tag, proved its usefulness 100 times over. It greatly simplifies and facilitates the keeping of clearing station records. It should be made immediately available in large quantities.

g. Summary of Casualties and Survivors Treated at Division Clearing Stations:

(1) Grand total——760
(2) Survivors, Navy, requiring coffee and blankets but not admitted to clearing station as patients—— 200
(3) Navy, burns and severe wounds—— 65
(4) Army, Killed in action—— 105
(5) Army, Injured and Wounded in Action—— 390
(6) Totals Casualties, Sub-Task Force——
(a) Brushwood (390 plus 105)—— 495 or 2.5%
Of this action 2.5%, 21% (105) were killed in Action, and 79% (390) were wounded and injured in action.
(b) Of the 495 casualties, approximately 90 (wounded of injured in action) were the result of the 4 sinkings.

19. Note. The observations in paragraph 18 above, are the personel opinions of the Undersigned, and not representing the view of the Commanding General, 3d Inf Div.

RESUME OF OPERATIONS OF CLEARING COMPANY
3d Medical Battalion During operations
November 8 - 11

The second platoon and company headquarters of the clearing company disembarked about 2300 November 8 with seven officers and 59 enlisted men and landed on beach Red 2 at about 0300 November 9. The only equipment with the platoon was the full field equipment of the men. The platoon bivouacked on the beach near the naval evacuation station. At about 0800 the group was bombed but there was no casualties, and at 1100 was moved to a bivouac area near the casino. A clearing station was opened in the casino in Fedala at 1400 with one borrowed No. 2 chest and dressings and medicines borrowed from the Navy and taken from the field kits of enlisted men. About 40 casualties were brought in immediately and more continued to come in during the afternoon and night.

At 2300 November 10 the first platoon landed at the docks in Fedala. The transportation and equipment for one platoon were unloaded at 0300 November 11. The first platoon with that equipment set up a clearing station at a farm house 6 miles from Fedala on the Casablanca road and started receiving casualties at 0700. Both stations were in operation from that time on.

The evenin of Nov. 11 the transport Hewes was torpedoed. About 50 casualties were received at the Casino clearing station, mostly suffering from exposure, cuts and bruises. Up until Thursday evening the clearing stations continued to receive Army casualties, wounded native and French civilians, including several severe injuries which involved amputation. Among them were cases of natives who had picked up hand grenades and removed the firing pins.

At about 1730 November 12, the Scott, Bliss, and Rutlege were torpedoed, and between 1800 and 2000 about 400 casualties were received in the clearing station at the casino. Sub-units of the one platoon were set up at the French Schoo, the Catholic school, the English school, at the Hotel Mirimar, in tents outside the units and detachment, including those of attached troops. Regiments and attached units sent doctors and dentists, as did the navy. The Navy also assisted with supplies. Approximately 20 extra doctors and 150 extra enlisted men were obtained in this manner. At about 2200 the surgeon general of French Morocco, a Dr. de la Maire, and his aide, who had both been in an automobile accident, were brought in. Dr. de la Maire died at 0500 Friday of a fractured skull. Incidentally, equipment for one complete clearing platoon was lost when the Bliss was torpedoed.

Wounded were cared for at the clearing station through the evening of November 13. The following morning the patients were prepared for evacuation to the Navy in Casablanca. About 150 patients were put on a special train and sent to Casablanca, and the remainder were returned to duty or taken to the Miramar hotel were the clearing platoon consolidated all its patients under one roof. The same day the other clearing platoon moved into one wing of the French Military hotpiaal in Casablanca. There are now approximately 200 patients at both locations.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY SIXTH ENGINEERS (C)
Fedala, N W Africa

SUBJECT : Extract of Regimental Diary.

22 OCTOBER
The Regiment less 200 officers and elisted men and most of its transportation left Camp Pickett for Port of Embarkation, Norfolk, Virginia.

23 OCTOBER
Arrived at the Port of Embarkation and embarked.

24 OCTOBER
Convoy sailed for French Morocco.

25 OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 7
Usual shipboard duties, schools, etc.

8 NOVEMBER

D-Day, landed on beaches east of Fedala, French Morocco, shortly before dawn. There was little enemy opposition initially but during the day enemy artillery shelled the beaches with great accuracy and the beaches were strafed and bombed several times. Forutnately our losses were relatively light considering the intensity of the enmy fire. After landing the companies organised their beaches and carried on normal shore party functions. The surf became very heavy during the day causing the wrecking of many landing craft which strewed the beaches.

There was many cases of meritorious personal action on the beach of which the following were outstanding:

Captin James O. Gibbons, I Company, stationed himself in a position of great personal danger where he could see the gun flashes of the French battery firing on the beach, and with the aid of a public address system controlled the movement of oncoming men across the beach thereby minimizing the losses from shelling.

Lieutenant Barili, A Company, braved the surf and strafing to release a stunned driver from an amphibina tractor and was able to salvage most of the supplies aboard the tractor.

Staff Sgt. Celli, A Company, after being wounded by shrapnel aided groups of men off their boats and getting them under cover until ordered to submit to medical aid.

Private Joseph D. Day, I Company, constantly exposed himself to heavy shell fire by entering the target area and carrying back wounded five separate times.

There were many other acts noted for a great devotion to duty.

The weather was fine, warm and clear and high morale maintained.

9 NOVEMBER

Activities of the previous day continued through the 9th. All through the night the shore party aided the Naval beach party in the salvaging of boats. During the morning the beaches were consolidated into two main beaches and the consolidation of the dumps was progressing rapidly when orders were received to move from the beach area to the Port of Fedala and take over the operation of the docks. The balance of the day was used in the moving of the men and equipment to the new bivouac area and taking over our new job. The beaches were bombed and strafed for the last time causing very little damage but delayed the movement of the men and supplies.

The morale was very high and the weather was fine.

10 TO 12 NOVEMBER

Unloading supplies from Convoy in Port of Fedala. Tremendous amounts of supplies landed. Great difficulty encountered in moving supplies because of lack of transportation which necessitated the use of the surviving amphibian tractors and all manner of trucks, wagons and sleds. Men did splendid jobs working long hours under extremely difficult conditions. Unloading of supplies interrupted on evening of 11 November while survivors of torpedoed USS Howed were picked up and again on evening of 12 November while survivors of the USS Rutledge, Scott & Bliss were rescued. Men of the 36th Engrs together with those of the other units gave practically all the blankets and clothing they had to survivors.

12 - 17 NOVEMBER

Unloading ships and moving supplies to dumps. Also general engineer duties in Fedala Area and coordinating system of AA defenses for port.

18 NOVEMBER

Continued operations of 12th to 17th. First Bn received commendation from 30th Infantry with whom they served during landing operations. I Company moved to Army Ordnance Dump to organzie and operate same.

19 - 21 NOVEMBER

Continued Port and Dump Operations.

22 NOVEMBER

I Company relieved by Ordnance Bn at Army Ordnance Dump at 1800. Continuted Port, Dump and General Engineer work in Fedala Area.

23 - 27 NOVEMBER

Continued duties of 22nd. On 26th I Company moved back to Army Ordnance Dump and started work on railroad spur.

28 NOVEMBER

Continued duties of 22nd. 36th Engrs received commendation from General G. S. Patton for work done in Port Area.

HEADQUARTERS
ARMORED BATTALION LANDING TEAM #2
CASABLANCA, FRENCH MOROCCO

20 November 1942.

SUBJECT : Action of Armored Battalion Team #2 at Casablanca.

TO : Commanding General, 3d Inf Div, Casablanca, French Morocco.

1. This unit landed one platoon of tanks from Co A, 67th AR, at Fedala the night of 8 November 1942. This platoon immediately proceeded to the high ground south of the railroad station at Fedala. As the other elements of this unit were unloaded, they were assembled in the general area stated above. Due to the swell and lack of tank lighters, unloading of the Arcturus and the Biddle was slow, but most of the vehicles were unloaded by 1900, 9 November 1942.

2. At 0300, 10 November 1942, this landing team made a night march to a staging area two miles east of the junction of Route No. 1 and Route No. 7, arriving at this area at 0430, with the loss of one vehicle, due to the slippery condition of the road. From this area, one platoon from Co A, 67th AR, was sent to reconnoiter toward Mediouna and to establish contact with the 15th Infantry, and to act as a flank guard for the 15th Infantry.

3. Orders were then received for this unit to attack twelve (12) 75mm guns, well protected by machine-gun fire, and to over-run the position. These guns were located in the area (coordinates 97 - 80 on 1/50,000 map). A night march was made to a staging area on Route No. 7, three miles southeast of Casablanca. At 0700, 11 November 1942, this unit moved to its line of departure, which was the road junction of Route no. 7 and improved road (coordinates 95.8 - 77.4). The mortar and assault platoons of Hq Co, 1st Bn, 67th AR, opened fire on the gun position. Battery A, 73th FA, took the enemy position under fire and then orders were given to cease all action. Co, 67th AR, was immediately sent to take over the airport at Casablanca, one platoon of Co B, 67th AR, was sent into Casablanca to patrol, and the remainder of the Armored Battalion Landing Team was assembled to await orders.

(Signed) W. P. RING,
Major, 67th AR,
S - 3.

THIRD SIGNAL COMPANY
CASABLANCA, FRENCH MOROCCO

24 November 1942

OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD SIGNAL COMPANY
IN THE CASABLANCA OPERATION

On 8 November 1942 the company was alerted for action prior to the amphibious landing of the Third Infantry Division at Fedala, French Morocco. At 0600 November 8 the Division Radio Officer went ashore with a small detachment of men to establish radio communication from shore to the USS Leonard Wood, the Division CP afloat. This channel functioned continuously throughout the entire operations. The Division Signal Officer went ashore about 0915 with three enlisted assistants. At 1030 the remainder of the officers and men on the Leonard Wood, less vehicles and equipment, came ashore in assault boats. All the officers and men in these first waves were under fire from aerial bombing and strafing during their landing, but came through without any casualties although several of their assault boats were wrecked. An advance CP had been established just off of the beach about 3 miles north of Fedala.

The CP was moved into a schoolhouse in Fedala at about 0900 the next day at which point radio, wire, and messenger communication to subordinate units was estabp lished. Prior to this time radio and runner were the only available means of communication.

On the afternoon of 9 November 1942 the officers and men from aboard the USS Anson came ashore and during the nights of 9-10 November and 10-11 November vehicles and equipment of the company were landed.

During the entire period from 0600, 8 November to about 2100, 9 November the only signal equipment available to the company to provide communications for the division was one ¼-ton command car, three SCR 284 radio sets carried over in assault boats by the men, and such wire and telephones as could be packed by the men in addition to their own equipment. At no time were vehicles larger than 1/2 ton available and 1/4 ton command cars were used exclusively for construction of wire lines, and transportation of radio and message center equipment.

Maximum use was made of existing wire facilities, such as open wire lines and switchboards. This was essential due to the relatively limited amount of our own equipment but presented many serious problems. One of the major ones were the badly destroyed open wire lines, as a result of shell fire, which had to be repaired quickly with no open wire tools. Another was the wire, switchboards, and telephone circuits of foreign equipment which were strange to everyone and in most cases had no circuit diagrams with them. These were traced out and utilized as rapidly as possible.

An advanced CP was established at a farmhouse on the Casablanca-Rabat road, 19 Kilometers north of Casablanca, on the morning of November 10 which remained in operation until the city of Casablanca had been taken on November 11. A CP was then established in the Villa Mas in Casablanca with the rear echelon remaining at Fedala.

s/ DANIEL K. CHINLUND,
t/ DANIEL K. CHINLUND,
Captain, D Sig. Co.,
Commanding.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION CHAPLAIN

26 November 1942.

Resume of Chaplains activities during recent North - African engagement.

1. Aboard Ship.

This night before battle, Chaplins in addition to holding Religious Services, visited all troop spaces on the ships - gave General Absolution, and offered special prayers with the men. This had the effect of relieving any possible tension.

2. Chaplains went ashore with their units. Attaching themselves to Battalion Aid Stations they ministered spiritually and physically to the wounded as they were brought in. In many cases they helped with the collecting of the wounded. One Chaplain was killed on the beach reputedly doing this, 1st Lt Clement Falter, 7th Infantry.

At the Collecting Stations, the Chaplains continued this work on a larger scale. This was particularly true when casualties were brought in from torpedoed ships. They assisted in the care of the wounded, got clothing for those who had lost everything, secured Red Cross Comfort Kits for patients as well as candy, cigarettes and magazines, and ministtered to the dying.

3. Burial and Graves Registration.

At Fedala, Chaplians negotiated with Civil Authorities for a plot in the Christian Cemetery. Arranged for the digging of graves, secured trucks and laborers, collected the dead from the morgues and beaches where some had been temporarily buried and supervised all burials initially. When this Service was set up and functioning in Fedala the same thing was accomplished at Casablanca with the exception that the Cemetery had already been arranged for by the American Consul.

All personal effects of the deceased were taken from the bodies, put in envelopes or small boxes, catalogued and listed and turned over to the Div. Quartermaster for shipment to the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. They conducted grave-side services.

4. Besides these activities, Chaplains conducted regular Religious Services on Sundays and at other appropriate times, and definitely were a morale factor of importance with the troops.

5. The Chaplains of the Third Division, without exception, measured up to the highest traditions of the Chaplains Corps of the United States Army. Their energy, resourcefulness, judgement and calmness in difficult circumstances left nothing to be desired in their conduct.

s/ Patrick J. Ryan
t/ Patrick J. Ryan
Chaplian (Lt Col) U.S.A.
Division Chaplain.

NOTES ON ORDNANCE OPERATIONS

1. The Ordnance section, 2 Officers and 6 men, was ordered to debark at H + 0090 w/all office equipment.

2. Landing was effected at about H + 0415 under shell fire. All personnel landed safely, all office equipment carried was lost by shell fire.

3. The succeding 24 hours offered no opportunity for the section to function as an ammunition controlling unit. Activities during this period consisted of reconnaissance of all beaches and the selection of an off-the-beach location for ammunition.

4. At H + 16 this ammunition site was manned by Ordnance personnel to serve as guides, but no transportation was available to move ammunition to this location.

5. A reconnaissance of the beaches at this time indicated that beach personnel were not able to cope with what small quantities of supplies were being landed. The bulk of such ammunition as was landed, however, was cleared of the beach to the high ground just beyond. The 36th Engineers concentrated this in two dumps, one small arms, one artillery, about 100 yards off beach Red 2. They estimated that these contained some 20 tons of small arms and a lesser quantity of artillery as of 1100, 8 November. These quantities are insignificant.

Landing at the Fedala "Fish Wharf" began on the morning of 9 November. By nightfall ammunition was already piling up in the limited warehouse area. The Ordnance Section was split in two parts, one to supervise landing of ammunition, one to move forward for purposes of controlling supply.

6. A Division dump was selected 6 miles forward of Fedala to serve the 7th and 15th Infantry. On the night of 9 November the objective was to establish two units of fire for the two regimental teams at this dump.

7. By this time ammunition congestion at Fedala had reached a critical stage through inability to clear ammunition from the port area. Trucks in necessary quantity were not available.

8. Efforts to clear ammunition from the port continued through 10 November. About 70 tons were loaded on railroad cars, but no motive power became available. About 150 tons were moved to the dump by the morning of 11 November. This constituted 25% of the desired 2 units of Fire, and about two per cent of the ammunition carried by the Force.

9. During the evening of 10 November, vehicular traffic at the Fedala Port was further congested by the arrival of unit vehicles for ammunition. These units in some cases infantry battalions and in some cases artillery batteries did not know that the division dump (which had then been in operation more than 24 hours and which was 6 miles closer to them) was in operation. They were able % in every case, however, to obtain the ammunition desired and returned loaded.

10. By the morning of 11 November a balanced (but insufficient) supply of ammunition existed at the division dumps. Dangerous congestion still prevailed at the Fedala Port. Unit SA's stated they had what ammunition they desired, but in view of their limited carrying capacity, it is doubtful if this amounted to a unit of fire. * Less than 5% of all ammunition carried was ashore. The ammunition officer and one enlisted man were working with the engineer shore party at Fedala, supervising loading and stating loading priorities, the Ordnance Officer and five enlisted men were at the dump, operating same.

11. In my opinion the logistics of amphibious ammunition supply were grossly underestimated at every step.

Signed/ SNOWDEN

* This quantity should be almost the same as that now in the hands of units and obtainable from ammunition situation reports now being submitted to the Ord Off, Fwd Ech.

COPY

the Chief Clerk of the ODQM, a clerk, and a driver, established his forward headquarters at the Hotel Anfa, said headquarters having been selected on the 16th and employed by the Colonel throughout this period. Motor pool established.

On the 21st the 3rd Quartermaster Battalion is still continuing to function as both a "Force" and a "Division" Quartermaster Battalion; this when our total strength is scare by that of a company, to wit 10 officers, 1 WO and 144 EM. Throughout the entire Casablanca operation no casualties have been suffered by this battalion, either killed or wonded, although many of our drivers have been shot at by snipers. Soon, we hope, a force railhead will be established which will facilitate and make possible a rapid segregation of division dumps, relieving them from the present task of supplying other than divisional units.

2. The following comments are given on lessons learned from this operation solely with a constructive point of view and with the hope that future operations of this kind will profit therefrom from the standpoint of supply.

a. In the initial stages of the operation, the shortage in cargo trucks was acute. As a result, supplies were landed much faster than they could be handled by the Shore Party, which was forced to employ such unwieldly devices as as amphibious tractors for the purpose of moving rations by sledge.

(1) The dock became overcrowded as a result.

(2) Supplies were scattered thoroughly intermingled, and dumped everywhere in an effort to get the ships unloaded.

(3) The segregation of supplies for transportation to division dumps was a long and tedious process, since nothing resembling an orderly shore party dump could be found from which to haul.

(4) The docks became crowded with personnel who had no business there.

(5) Had our opposition been less friendly, terrific damage by bombing could have been done to practically all supplies, it being impossible in the early stages to move any sizeable portions of them away from the beach.

b. The 3rd Quartermaster Battalion was not sufficient in strength to cope efficiently with the difficult problem of supply at hand. Our men worked without sleep for several days at a time. Graves registration, the conversion of our unit 2nd Echelon Shop into a division ordnance shop, the necessity of running all of our trucks day and night without adequate relief drivers, the necessity of functioning as a base and division quartermaster at the same time - these are but a few of the duties which were encountered for which adequate personnel had not been given. An ordnance motor maintenance company was sorely needed.

c. Although the impetus of supply should be from the rear it was in most senses of the word from the front in this operation, beginning with pilferage by the individual soldier of rations on the beach, and followed by the establishment of base dumps, by the Division for the Task Force for issue to the Division.

d. It is again stated that in an extended amphibious operation against hostile opposition with aircraft in numbers, such congestion as was predominant on the beach at Fedala and the docks of Casablanca will most assuredly be disastrous and may result in the economic defeat of our force during the early stages of its operation.

For the Battalion Commander:

s/ T. H. Scott
t/ T. H. Scott
Capt., Q.M.C.
Adjutant.

23 November 1942

Narrative of Activities of Divisional Medical Service during landing at Fedala and Subsequent operations ashore.

I
Distribution of Elements of Medical Battalion

1. Collecting Companies:

a. One officer and 19 enlisted men attached to Service and Supply Group of all battalions of the 7th Infantry, 30th Infantry and to one battalion of the 15th Infantry.

b. One "Amphibous" Collecting Company, consisting of 2 officers, and 27 enlised men and four 1/2 ton trucks loaded with organizational equipment, attached to the 7th Infantry and to the 30th Infantry.

c. One "Amphibious" Collecting Company consisting of 4 officers, 65 enlisted men and four 1/2 ton trucks loaded with organizational equipment under division control.

2. Clearing Company (under Division Control)

a. First Clearing Platoon, consisting of 7 officers, 64 enlisted men, 1 jeep and four 2-1/2 ton trucks loaded with organic equipment loaded on one transport.

b. Second Clearing Platoon, consisting of 7 officers and 64 men on one transport. With them 1 jeep and four 2-1/2 ton trucks loaded with organic equipment on another ship.

3. Headquarters and Headquarters detachment, 3d Medical Battalion, plus all organic transportation other than that listedabove, remained behind at Camp Pickett in Group 3.

II

Distribution of Elements of Division Surgeons' Office

1. The personnel and office equipment of the Medical section of Division Headquarters was divided into two groups, loaded on two ships, as follows:

a. Group A, with the Commanding General: The Division Surgeon, the Chief Clerk (M/Sgt) and two clerks.

b. Group B, with the Assistant Commanding General: The Division Medical Inspector, the Division Veterinian, the sergeant, Meat and Dairy, and two clerks.

c. Remaining at Camp Pickett (Group 3): The Division dental officer, the M.A.C. Officer and Warrant Officer.

III

Elements of Attached Medical Units

1. Battalion and regimental medical sections accompanied their units ashore, with one jeep and one trailer per section, and with them equipment packed in specially designed waterproof containers which obviated the necessity of carrying medical chests through the surf.

IV

Special Notes:

1. The details involved in amphisioubly equipping, organizing, training and combat loading all elements of divisional medical service had been worked out during a period of 6 months proceeding the operation and are covered in various training memo, special equipment tables, loading tables and SOP, 3d Inf Div.

2. It requires 24 transports to properly carry an Infantry Division combat loaded. Only 15 transports were used to transport a division plus many task force elements. Accordingly, space was very limited and only elements of the Medical Battalion Absolutely essential were taken. Hence the entire Headquarters and headquarters detachment with its personnel section, Hq Section, motor maintenance section and supply section had to remain behind.

V

Summary of Events

1. Group A, Division Surgeon's Office, landed on beach Red 2 at 10:30 AM on D day, november 8th, and set up at Division Headquarters near beach. Division Surgeon visited all aid stations and all beaches and picked a site for the Clearing Station on the Casino grounds in Fedala.

2. Bulk of casualties behind 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry (Beach Red 2) were picked up and brought to the beach expeditously, using the two wheel litters in the Battalion Medical Section, the two wheel litters in the medical section of the service and supply group (1 officer and 10 enlisted men from Collecting Company), commandeered native mule carts and empty vehicles returning to the beach for ammunition (not many of these). Approximately 60 casualties from the 1st Bn, 7th Infantry, were brought to the beach on D day and all were evacuated to ships from the beach by the Navy, which is considered a good job..

3. About 50 casualties occured (excluding those drowned) on beaches Red 3, Blue and Blue 2, but due to heavy surf and broaching of boats, no casualties were evacuated by the Navy from those beaches.

4. During the night of November 8 and morning of November 9 casualties from beaches Red 3, Blue 1 and Blue 2 were brought down to beach Red 2 by hand, wheel litter and commandeered coal burning trucks which got stuck in the sand frequently and had to be pulled, pushed and coaxed along. The dead were also hauled down to the beach Red 2 in this manner by medical department personnel of Naval beach party and Army service and supply sections.

5. Before daylight on the 9th Company B, (Collecting) 4 officers and 65 enlisted men and 2 of their 4-1/2 ton trucks of equipment landed, under Division control. They were guided to the Casion grounds, previously obtained for clearing station site by Division Surgeon where they set up a temporary clearing station at 9:00AM. At about this time the Naval medical section received orders to consolidate and evacuate only from the pier in Fedala which was now available to us. So, using the 2 half-ton trucks from Company B (Collecting) casualties were removed from beach Red 2 to the fish house on the pier at Fedala, where the Navy set up a consolidated beach party. Wounded from the front were now all taken to the clearing station established by the Collecting Company B on the Casino grounds, where they were sorted, treated and then taken to the pier from which the Navy resumed evacuation..

6. At about 1000 November 9, the 2nd Clearing Platoon (7 officers, 60 enlisted men but no trucks and no equipment) landed, with 1 jeep, and they were sent to the clearing station site to assist B Company. We improvised a clearing station set up in the Casino itself, using equipment and supplies from Company B (Collecting) and also equipment, instruments and supplies turned over to us by the Naval Beach parties. Naval medical officers not needed at beaches because of the consolidation, were used in this clearing station and rendered valuable service.

7. At noon November 9th, Group B, Division Surgeon's office landed on beach Red 2 and joined Group A at the Division CP, now located near Beach Red 1. The Division veterinarian was placed in charge of the medical supply dump formed at the Fedala pier on November 10 when medical maintenance started to come ashore. None of the 20 day maintenance was landed on beaches.

8. Late in the afternoon of the 9th the personnel (1st clearing platoon 7 officers and 60 enlisted men, but no trucks or equipment) landed and were sent to the Clearing Station at the Casino.

9. Company B, collecting with one of its two half-ton trucks and that portion of its equipment which could be spared from the Clearing Station, was pulled out of the Clearing Station and attached to the 15th RLG which was in position about 7 miles from Fedala and needed evacuation.

10. All three RLG's now had a collecting company, with half-ton trucks, attached and casualties continued to flow into the Clearing Station from which, using the other 1/2 ton truck from Company B, they were taken to the medical section of the Naval beach party on the fish pier in Fedala and evacuated by lighter to ships. The whole lighter full was lifted by boom to the level of the well deck, and casualties taken onto the deck.

11. On the morning of the 10th, the front lines were about 8 to 12 miles from Fedala and it was obvious that another clearing station nearer the front lines should be set up. A siet had been picked by the Division Surgeon but no clearing company trucks with equipment had been landed. The Commanding Genera, 3d Infantry Division, sent a special request to the Navy to land at once, on first priority, the 4 two and one-half ton trucks of the 2nd Platoon. (It was known that the four 2-1/2 ton trucks of the 1st Platoon on the USS Bliss were loaded, and the equipment of the Bliss was such, that landing of these trucks expeditiously was impossible). The trucks of the 2nd Platoon were, accordingly, landed at Fedala pier late in the afternoon of the 10th, turned over to the 1st Platoon which moved during the night to the site picked at a winery located at 09.7 - 85.7 (Battle Map, Morocco Sheet, 1/50,000) about 6 miles southwest of Fedala. This station was set up in the large basement garage of the winer, could be easily blacked out, had running water and electric lights, was in very clean surroundings and had its full amphibous equipment. It was ready to receive casualties at 0500 November 11th. It was planned to keep the Fedala Clearing Station in operation to support the 30th Infantry, which was still engaged along the Wadi Nefifik on the extreme northeast flank. But this beautiful setup at the winery received only 8 seriously wounded casualties. Early in the morning of the 11th, before the jump off got under way, Casablanca caputulated. Immediately, and even prior to the surrender, French Red Cross ambulanc s from Casablanca dashed out onto the battle field, picked up French and American wounded and evecuated them forward to the French Military Hospital, Casablanca (about 60 in all). and a few to other inland cities. The great bulk of those casualties were from the 7th RLG. The Surgeon, 7th Infantry, entered Casablanca with his regiment, located his casualties at the Military hospital and took charge of their care and treatment and prepared their EMT's. He remained until the arrivel of the 1st Clearing Platoon.

12 On November 12th the Division Surgeon established the 1st Clearing Platoon on the 2nd floor of one of the buildings in the French Military Hospital. The Surgeon, 7th Infantry went back to his regiment and all casualties were taken out of the Military Hospital proper and placed in the clearing station. The Medecin-Chef of the hospital was most cooperative and heepful, placing all operative X-Ray and laboratory facilities at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the 1st Clearing Platoon.

~~13. On the afternoon and evening of November 12th 355 casualties resulting from the above sinkings were bought to the~~

13. On November 11th, German submarines sank one American Transport and on November 12, 3 more, including the USS Bliss were sunk. All 2-1/2 ton trucks with equipment of the 1st Clearing Platoon, Company D, 3d Medical Battalion, were on the Bliss and were lost.

14. On the afternoon and evening of November 12th, 355 casualties resulting from the above sinking were brought to the Clearing Station at the Casino in Fedala. It will be remembered that this Clearing Platoon had none of its TBA equipment. The Division surgeon was in Casablanca, arranging for the establishment of the clearing station at the Military Hospital at the time the above casualties hit the Fedala Clearing Station. The Task Force Surgeon was at Fedala. He arranged for extra blankets, procured additional medical officers from the Navy, and arranged for the use of various hotels, churches, schools and private houses in Fedala to accomodate the casualties after they had been treated at the clearing station. The Officers and enlisted men of the 2nd Clearing Platoon, assisted by other medical officers of the divison and of the US Navy, did an excellent job and took care of the casualties very thoroughly and expeditiously. Breakdown of the 355 casualties incident to the sinkings is as follows:

a. Navy ———————————— 265
   (1) Exposure, submersion and exhaustion, requiring hot coffee and blankets. 200
   (2) Severe wounds caused by flying missiles, burns, and fractures—— 65

b. Army
   (1) Same as a. (2) above———————— 90

D R A F T D R A F T

SUBJECT: Lessons from Operation TORCH

To : Commanding General, Western Task Force.

1. In future planning and execution of Task Force operations, I believe the following points should be carefully considered:

a. Staff Organization:

(1) Sub-Task Force staffs should be designated and organized at least six weeks prior to the movement to the Port of Embarkation. Sub-Task Force Goal Post Staff was designated and assembled at Fort Bragg, North Carolina between September 29 and October 5, 1942. This left insufficient time prior to sailing to properly organize Staff Sections.

(2) The members of each Staff Section in a Sub-Task Force must be carefully selected and the Commander must have sufficient time to properly orient his Staff in order to save time and money and reduce the chances of serious errors jeopardizing the success of the Task Force mission.

(3) Particular attention should be given the organization of an administrative or G-1 Section for each Sub-Task Force. Though it is not intended that administrative functions be assumed by the Force Commander a vast amount of such work occurs because of its being an independent command and it is not possible to properly train green personnel for this work just prior to embarkation.

b. Combined Operation.

(1) In combined operations Staffs of Task and Sub-Task Forces should consist of officers of the various arms involved. Plans for the operation must be complete prior to arrival at the Port of Embarkation.

(2) Unity of Command: -- It is imperative that all troops of the Sub-Task Force be placed under one command

and assembled in one place in sufficient time to check and complete individual and organizational equipment and to issue all necessary instructions prior to embarkation.

c. Amphibious Operations:

Each Task Force must received from the Navy complete information as to the characteristics of all transports, troop and cargo space, number and type of landing boats, number of holds, and boom capacities, etc. This information must be in the hands of the Staff at least five weeks prior to arrival to the Port of Embarkation. The present "hit or miss" efforts of ship loading, of placing responsibility on poorly trained misinformed transport quartermasters is costing the government millions of dollars and is depriving the troops in combat areas of much needed equipment. ~~Two~~ transports were put to sea partly loaded, ~~not completely~~ while necessary equipment was left. The holds where enlisted men are quartered were so poorly ventilated as to a positive menace to the health of soldiers that were expected to go into combat immediately upon the arrival off foreign shores. These same transports put to sea after the landing still loaded with thousands of tons of valuable, much-needed equipment. It is believed that future operations to be successful must be planned and executed under one commander and that commander must have complete authority over the entire force land, sea and air.

d. ~~After~~ Landing Operations:

(1) To be successful it is imperative that the plan of operation, to be carried out ~~as soon as~~ after the troops ~~have~~ crossed the beaches, be as simple and direct as it is possible to make it. It should provide limited objectives for all elements of the command. It should anticipate the complete failure of all artificial means of communication. It should be flexible enough to stand last minute changes of landing beaches ~~points~~ without confusion and still accomplish the mission.

(2) The plan of operation must be rehearsed

at least twice, with the shore line and interior terrain as nearly as possible like that to be encountered during the actual operation. During practice it is unnecessary to over emphasize ~~It is not believed necessary to stress in training~~ boat drill and debarkation drill, ~~the amphibious phase of the operation at the expense of the tactical phase after the attack is made~~. If the coxswains of the landing craft are properly trained and equipped, the troops will reach the beach. It is then that every man must know his job and go immediately about it without confusion; otherwise, the beachhead will never be established. At least one rehearsal should be made under cover of Navy gunfire - actual fire. Troops that have never experienced terrific effects of ~~real~~ Naval bombardment will ~~visualize~~ imagine all sorts of unknown dangers and will bog down or be thrown into utter confusion by their first taste of it. The opening of our own Naval gunfire, well-timed and accurately placed to support our action ~~during this operation~~ threw one battalion into such complete confusion ~~so~~ that that it was many hours before it could be reorganized. ~~and lead forward to the~~ continue to attack. ~~Our soldiers will go forward bravely and with resolution toward known danger, but if we subject green and untrained troops to terrific unexpected shocks and unanticipated danger, we can expect bewilderment and confusion in the beginning.~~ Troops must be made familiar with the sounds and confusion of battle. This is proved by the fact that the troops of one battalion having broken in confusion at the first sound of Naval gunfire passing over ~~their~~ heads ~~and landing from 900 to 1000 yards away~~, on the opening day, held their positions within 100 yards of the ~~striking~~ target of a terrific air bombing attack, ~~closing with the enemy and capturing the position before the dust of the explosion had cleared away~~, on the third day.

(3) ~~Avoid changes.~~ -- Once the ~~leading~~ debarkation plan has been set up and rehearsed, if changes are needed it should be rehearsed again and thereafter changes should be avoided at all cost. Apparently simple changes which to the uninitiated might be highly desirable; such as adding a debarkation point ~~not previously planned or because of weather conditions~~

~~ing~~ ~~permit~~ loading craft on both sides instead of one etc, ~~debarkation from both port and starboard sides of the ship, when debarkation on one side had been reheared~~, will cause confusion ~~of~~ and uncountable delay in debarking troops. Landing craft should be strengthened to permit loading at the rail so that all assault waves can be loaded ~~at the rail~~ with ~~the~~ equipment and launched ~~from the ship~~ to start on their way to the beach without the endless and confusing milling around in boat circles as it is now practiced in our amphibious ~~training~~ operations. In this connection it is interesting to ~~look at~~ note one battalion landing team having practiced its movement to debarking stations every day of the three week voyage, added an additional debarking station on the afternoon before ~~the actual operation was to be given~~ arrival at transport area. Also a few hours before the debarkation started all debarking stations were moved from starboard to port side, and after they started to load the landing craft it was found that some of the landing nets were too short; some were so new that the soldiers could not get their toes into the openings; some were of experimental types of chains with wooden rungs which ~~would~~ broke. ~~leaving big gaps in the ladder~~. Needless to say this caused great confusion and delay in this battalion.

(4) ~~The selection of leaders~~: -- The selection of leaders for each element of the command ~~that will act independent after the elements have been landed~~ is of vital importance. It is obsolutely necessary that they possess courage and initiative. Unlike all other combat operations, there can be no middle course in a landing operation. The results are either completely successful or disasterous. Therefore the leaders of each unit must be endowed with the spirit to go on to

and assembled in one place in sufficient time to check and complete individual and organizational equipment and to issue all necessary instructions prior to embarkation.

c Amphibious Operations:

Each Task Force must receive from the Navy complete information as to the characteristics of all transports, trrop and cargo space, number and type of landing boats, number of holds, and boom capacities, etc. This information must be in the hands of the Staff at least five weeks prior to arrival to the Port of Embarkation. The present "hit or miss" efforts of ship loading, of placing responsibility on poorly trained, misinformed transport quartermasters is costing the government millions of dollars and is depriving the troops in combat areas of much needed equipment.

d Landing Operations:

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(2) The plan of operation must be rehearsed at least twice, with the shore line and interior terrain as nearly as possible like that to be encountered during the actual operation. During practice do not over emphasise boat drill and debarkation drill. If the coxswains of the landing craft are properly trained and equipped the troops will reach the beach. It is then that every man must know his job and go immediately about it without confusion; otherwise, the beachhead will never be established. At least one rehearsal should be made under cover of Navy gunfire-actual fire. Troops that never experienced terrific effects of Navl bombardment will imagine all sorts of unknown dangers and will bog down or be thrown into utter confusion by their first taste of it. The opening of

accomplish the mission at all costs. This was proven during this operation where a leader permitted his unit to be pinned down by enemy fire and suffered losses, while later with a change in leaders, this same unit moved forward to the attack and complete success with minimun losses.

(2) Individual and Organizational equipment.

(a) The cotton coverall is impractical for landing operations. It takes too long to dry. A light wool combat suit is recommended.

(b) A vast number of cases of failure of automatic weapons were reported following the landing operations because of the effect of sand and water on the mechanizm. It is recommend that light sand- and water-proof cases be provided for all these weapons. Such a case or sack could be constructed of ply-film and sealed with tape and at least insure getting the weapons across the beach in condition to fire.

(c) Radio also failed to function after being soaked with salt water and rain. Radio equipment must be standardized and properly protected in order to be practical for landing operations.

(d) Present landing operation standard procedure contemplates the carrying of entirely too heavy a load of ammunition and equipment by each individual. It would be better to organize replacement of ammunition then to so overburden a trooper with ammunition that he is unable to reach his objective without excessive fatigue.

(e) A light water-proof cape or poncho should be provided for landing operations. This could well be made with a light wool blanket cemented to a thin sheet of ply-film or rubber. It would afford warmth, and protection from the dampness of the ground and rain. During landing operations it is many days before blankets are ashore.

(f) Supply of individual equipment Plans and should be carefully checked and properly prepared prior to

embarkation. One ~~This~~ unit drew and turned in wool underwear and wool caps three times while still at Fort Bragg. They arrived in Africa without either.

(g) The use of Chemical Warfare equipment is greatly overemphasized. Each individual brought to Africa a gas mask and impregnited clothing and have been overburdened with this equipment ever since. Gas masks are being worn out and made unservicable by being carried in the field under all conditions. Impregnited clothing is being worn for an extra change. Impregnited clothing is unsuitable for normal wear, and it is believed ~~faulst economy~~ false economy to wear out gas masks when ~~the need~~ possible use for them is as remote as it appears to be in this operation.

(h) In general the clothing and equipment of our fighting men is entirely to heavy, to bulky and too cumbersome. This is the day of specialized operations and to insure maximum efficiency ~~none~~ specialized equipment should be provided. It is impracticable ~~xx~~ if not impossible to provide the soldier with equipment that will meet any and all circstances of war.

(3) Basic and Special Training of all units.

(a) The basic training of the units ~~xxxx~~ employed in this action was up to peace-time standards. However, the excessive caution and safety requirements ~~followed~~ required during this peace-time training have given the soldier little or no understanding of his support weapons and made him far more afraid of ~~the~~ his own weapons ~~he was handling~~ than he ~~was~~ is of the enemy. Though authorized about a year ago, overhead fire has not been practiced in any practical sense, and troops in this operation ~~on several xxx occasions~~ were known to withdraw or find themselves pinned to the ground by the fire of their own supporting weapons when actually the fire of these weapons was expertly placed in support.

(b) Individuals were given insufficient

opportunity to practice with the weapons with which they were armed. A secret weapon regardless of its potentiality is of little use if it is a secret to the troops who are to employ it. Rocket guns were provided after these troops had embarked and were fired for the first time ~~in most cases on first encounter of the enemy~~ in combat. Rifle grenade launchers had been issued prior to leaving the home station, but little opportunity afforded for practice. Therefore, although these weapons ~~rendered~~ had tremendous possibilities, they were as strange ~~to the individual~~ to us as they were to the enemy and just as fearful. I firmly believe that unless individuals are trained to have confidence in the weapon they are using and fully confidence ~~in their~~ that their support weapons will render timely support, future operation against ~~inferior~~ a determined enemy will meet with many disasters. ~~Further this lack of individual training results in a misunderstanding and waste of ammunition.~~ If 1/10 of the ammunition expended during the battle of Mehdia had been fired at home stations prior to embarkation under realisticly planned combat conditions, it would have saved 75% of the ammunition expended during this battle. ~~with little~~

(c) Communication personnel in many cases were adequately trained in their specific job, but they had not been trained to exercise their ingenuity to constantly improve, reconstruct and parallel communications under combat conditions. Too much dependence upon radio, ~~which still invariable fail in combat~~. To little training and energy displayed in the employment of telephone and no knowledge of training whatsoever in the employment of runner relay systems made communications ~~were displayed during this battle~~. spotty and uncertain.

(d) As indicated above units training had also suffered severely for the lack of opportunity to participate in practical realistic combat exercises. Leaders of small units were totally unaware of the confusion that would exist on the battle field and of the difficulties they would en-

counter in maintaining the control of their units. Carefully planned battle exercises, simulating the sounds of battle to the maximum extent, ~~that require~~ the coordination and timing of all weapons, including artillery and air bombardment, conducted in the States in suitable areas should eliminate the deficiencies.

(4)e Training and Equipment for Combined operations or other special operations.

(a) ~~It is~~ I believe that amphibious training of troops has been overemphasized and that the training of the Navy personnel to operate their landing craft and ships and the soldiers to employ their weapons has received far too little attention.

(b) I believe that maximum of two weeks training in amphibious operations is all that is necessary for a unit that has received the necessary basic and combat training. However, it is important that amphibious operations be rehearsed and that after the final rehearsal no change in the teams be made prior to the actual landing.

(c) The personnel of a Combat Team selected for amphibious training should be frozen in their respective jobs at least six weeks prior to embarking. The injection of large numbers of newly made officers and recruits at the last minute constitute definite weak spots in the team and it is impossible to test these people or to bring their training up to the standard during the voyage.

(d) I believe that the equipment to be used in any operation should all be assembled at the Port of Embarkation and should be ~~loaded~~ but aboard ships by ~~highly~~ specially trained experts of the Navy according to the plan of the tactical commander. In this operation many items of equipment not ~~declared~~ needed early in the operation were loaded while ~~vitally~~ necessary equipment was left on the dock. This was ~~xx xx~~ not the fault of the transport QM. They had been unable to obtain accurate data as to the ships they were to load and had insufficient time to make their loading plans.

They were unable to assemble the cargo at the dock, much of it arrived at the very last moment. The sailing date was set forward first days, then hours. Available tonage was changed constantly during the loading; for example, one ship with considerable equipment still to be loaded, took on over one hundred tons of oil, which brought its load over the ~~prints of the~~ primp sal line and caused the ship's captain to order the loading stopped. ~~the~~ All ships were supposed to have been fueled completely before equipment loading started.

(e) As mentioned above personal equipment and ammunition each individual ~~was~~ was required to carry is entirely too heavy. However, each individual should be trained in the method of throwing off this equipment in the water. Many men drown during this operation in spite of the life ~~savers as~~ preservers, because they were dragged down by their equipment.

(f) To make a successful landing coxswains of all landing craft should be thoroughly trained. They should be carefully selected and ~~imbued~~ imbued with the spirit ~~of~~ of accomplishing their mission. During this operation, coxswains were seen to beach their boats, cut their motors and run ashore when an occasional shell fell nearby. Far too many landing craft were left on the beach. It was obvious that only a small percentage of the coxswain were skillfully trained ~~in the launching of~~ to retract this craft. They should be trained in landing in all conditions of surf.

(g) Properly trained shore parties are vitally necessary in any landing operation. A shore party that is to assist any Combat Team in landing should rehearse with that Combat Team prior to the actual landing.

(h) Chicken whire and cyclone fense are not practical for landing vehicles on soft sandy beaches. Most of ~~the chicken whire and fense~~ this equipment used in this operation was of little assistance and in many cases caused a great

deal of harm in snarling up in the wheels of the vehicles. Planks about 10 inches wide, 1 1/4 inches thick, and 10 to 12 feet long would have been far more suitable to construct roads over the sand and after the landing operations were completed would have been of great value to the troops. ~~continuing the action.~~

(i) The marking of beaches by the use of infra-red light was unsuccessful in the area. However, this is believed to be caused by the fact that no training whatsoever had been conducted in this prior to the operation.

(j) Night landings should be the rule in all operations. The Navy was obviously doubtful of the practicability of the night landing from the beginning. It is believe that this lack of confidence contributed largely to our inability to make our landing during darkness. Night landings should be practiced and rehearsed until all eventualities can be foreseen and provided for.

(k) All landing craft must be provided with proper oriented compasses and coxswains must be instructed in the use of them. Most landings that were made during darkness that should have taken 3/4 of an hour, and in fact, take several hours. because coxswains wandered here and there over the ocean until they accidentally hit a beach. Many of them became discouraged and landed troops on the first beach they encountered.

(8) Cooperation of Navy, Army and Air.

(a) The cooperation between the Army and and Navy during this operation was extremely difficult because of the separation of the headquarters and I believe it will continue to be difficult or impossible until one commander with a combined staff is given complete authority over each Task and Sub-Task Force operation. Cooperation between the Navy air and ~~support of~~ ground troops after and landing was excellent. The support rendered was superior and it is believed that this was probably caused by the close association of the air ground support officer with the commander

of the Sub-Task Force. The system employed w s one of direct control. Planes sent on missions left the carrier and came on the radio beam of the air ground support officer who thereafter directed their movements. This system of control was very much simpler than that used ~~xxxxxx xxxxxx~~ by the Army and I do not believe that the same prompt support can ever be achieved from Army planes until air and ground forces are trained together as ~~the~~ are the navy air and sea forces.

(b) Combined staffs for each Sub-Task Force seems of vital necessity to me. During this operation practical all staff work was duplicated in each headquarters, ~~xxxxx~~ even to include voluminous G-2 estimates which were made by both the Navy and Army rather then one combined estimate.

OIL
RPT

HEADQUARTERS SUB TASK FORCE GOALPOST

15 November, 1942.

SUBJECT: G-2 Reports.

TO : Commanding General, Task Force "A".

(Reference: Task Force "A" message 151530 sgd. BLACK, AC of S.)

1. Daily G-2 reports for the period 8 November to 14 November (incl) are herewith submitted.

2. The operation covered in said reports was of a nature to make the regular dispatch of G-2 reports impossible and the acquisition of complete information on enemy troops excessively difficult. The following should be borne in mind in studying them:

a. The movement of various units was rapid and was proceeding while debarkation continued on at least three separate beaches.

b. Every man, without regard to normal duties, was engaged in active combat with the result that S-2s of several units have today no knowledge of what transpired other than events which came under their personal observation.

c. Prisoners were being taken in such numbers as to preclude even cursory examination. In many cases prisoners had not even been sent back to enclosures when hostilities ceased and they were released.

d. Owing to problems of debarkation our Prisoner of War interrogators were not all available; Some being still afloat during much of the action. (Note: Green Beach, to which a large number of prisoners were evacuated, had no interrogators until they could be brought up from Blue Beach debarkation.)

e. Enemy units were widely scattered and confused as to their own personnel.

3. Referring to Task Force "A" Field Order No. 1, Annex No. 1, Paragraph 2, and to the enclosed reports, the following are the essential elements of information obtained:

a. See attached reports.

b. Attitude of majority of officers encountered was one of regret that they should have been ordered to resist; however, having been ordered to do so they did their utmost "as would any good soldier". The ranks for the most part did not know against whom they were fighting. Granted the obselescence of their equipment the resistance of all branches, Army, Navy and Air, was severe so long as it lasted. Many deserters came across from the Foreign Legion Battalions, especially Czecks, Poles and spaniards.

c. None noted.

d. See attached reports.

e. None noted -- (Coast Defenses manned by Naval Personnel resisted until destroyed).

f. Both European and Native population generally friendly.

4. Resumes of Prisoner of War interrogators hereto attached.

5. Captured documents in process of examination by this headquarters. Anything important will be forwarded subsequently.

For the Commanding General:

P. M. HAMILTON,
Major, AAF,
AC of S, G-2.

G-2 Periodic Report
G-2 Report
No. 1

From: 080001 To: 081200
Sub Task Force Goalpost
Mehdia Plage

No. 1
Maps: 1/50,000 Morocco Situation Overlay

1. Enemy situation at end of period.

a. Enemy front line - See overlay - Infantry, FA and CD units.

b. Defensive organization - Ridge from lighthouse to Kasba entrenched; emplacements on hills east of lagoon; hill of Kasba observation post for entire area; road block on road below Kasba.

c. Units in contact.

Elements of 1st TMs and Sailors.
Southern flank - south end of lagoon.
Estimated strength - 500.
Training good, physical condition good, morale poor beacuse of uncertainty.

d. Artillery One battery, CD, Cal. 5.4" - Kasba 2 - 75MM guns firing from flatcars on river.

e. Reserves

MEKNES -- 7th TMs - combat efficiency - good.
RABAT -- Tanks (62d Cd'A) - combat efficiency - good.
Infantry to be employed to organize defense in depth, Kasba to Port Lyautey; tanks on south flank, along RABAT road.

f. Supply and Evacuation. Evacuation to PORT LYAUTEY then to MEKNES.

2. Enemy Operations During Period.

a. General Summary CD shelled approaching craft and beaches, then long range on transport area.

Garrisoned fort and hill.
Moved reinforcements from east and south.
Air missions -- strafing.

(1) AA - Fired with poor effect -- seemed deliberate.
(2) AT - None in action.
(3) Armored forces - None.
(4) Artillery - CD) Shrapnel on boats and beaches.
155 MM: HE Long range fired on transports.
75 MM)

2. Enemy Operations During Period (Continued)

(5) Aviation - Eleven planes strafed Green Beach while landing was taking place and incoming boats and village.
(6) Infantry - Used to garrison height around fort and the fort.

3. Miscellaneous.

a. Estimated prisoners - 50 Casualties - 100

b. Morale - soldiers confused; most officers depressed and downhearted; most officers cooperative; few would answer any but routine questions.

c. Supply and equipment - shortage of rations, equipment old and inadequate.

d. Terrain not under our control - air observed movement of reserves.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - Complete terrestrial observation over most of our front, except beaches. Little reconnaissance, few prisoners; no known documents lost.

f. Weather and Visibility - Weather clear, visibility good, no meteorlogical observation in enemy country.

g. Enemy intelligence - Captured documents not important.

4. Enemy Capabilities.

a. Counterattack - During the period covered by this report it is estimated that the enemy has insufficient reserves to launch a sustained counterattack. Within 24 hours he should be able to do so.

b. Defend in place - Probable.

c. Retreat - Improbable.

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

G-2 REPORT

From: 081200
To : 091200
Sub Task Force Goalpost
Mehdia Plage, French Morocco

No. 2
Maps: Special Map, Port Lyautey, 1/25,000 with overlay.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line -- See overlay.

b. Defensive organization -- Same; ridge east of lagoon - machine gun pill boxes; O Ps same. No enemy north of river except two machine guns and estimated platoon at west end of bridge.

c. Units in contact -- 1st TMs and Sailors.
1st EI - 75MM pack howitzers.
8 tanks unidentified.
Company unidentified Infantry.
Combat efficiency -- good.

d. Artillery -- Location and calibers.
155MM)
75MM) ---High ground southwest of airport.
CD batteries -- silenced.
75MM -- on shore in river mouth.

e. Reserves -- Location -- Tanks from RABAT.
Truck column from RABAT.
Estimated combat efficiency -- good.

f. Supply and Evacuation -- No change.

2. Enemy operations during period.

a. General -- Defense of KASBA.
Interdiction fire on ridge east of lagoon.
Bringing up of reinforcements.

(1) AA -- Rare and ineffective.

(2) Armored Forces -- Repulsed south and east of lagoon; estimated sixteen tanks.

(3) Artillery -- 155MM)
75MM) ---Height east of KASBA.

(4) Infantry -- Garrison of KASBA.
Accompanying tanks south east of lagoon.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties -- 300, prisoners -- 200.

b. Morale -- High.

c. Supply and equipment -- poor.

d. Terrain not under our control -- Observation spotted reinforcements; also spotted for fire control on enemy positions.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation -- Observation - same. No reconnaissance. Lost about 50 prisoners; no known documents. Inhabitants believed to have furnished information.

f. Weather and visibility.
Weather -- Fair.
Visiblity -- Good.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
Increased reserves bettered chance for counterattack.
Defense in place -- Probable.
Retreat -- Improbable.

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

G-2 REPORT

From: 091200
To : 101200
Sub Task Force Goalpost
Mehdia Plage, French Morocco

No. 3
Maps: Special Map, PORT LYAUTEY, 1/25,000 with overlay.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line -- See overlay.

b. Defensive organizations -- KASBA fallen - high ground in direction of PORT LYAUTEY organized in depth. Trenches on high ground southwest of airport . Observation from high ground near airport.

c. Units in contact -- 1st TM
7th TM
Unidentified tanks
1st Foreign Legion Artillery

Combat efficiency -- Good - However breakdown of supply to tanks, troops, and realization that equipment was not up to ours demoralizing. In addition some not fighting whole heartedly.

d. Artillery -- None observed.

e. Reserves -- No additional reserves observed in movement.

f. Supply and Evacuation -- PORT LYAUTEY, MEKNES: no change.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary -- Continued resistance fort; reinforcements brought in at night. Reoccupation of trenches and lighthouse area. Defense in depth to airport.

(1) AA -- None.

(2) AT -- None.

(3) Armored Forces -- Tanks south and east of lagoon.

(4) Artillery -- Mortar only.

(5) Cavalry -- None.

(6) Infantry -- 1st and 7th - garrison fort; organize ridges south and west of airport.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties - 200; prisoners - 400.

b. Morale -- Deteriorating.

c. Supply and equipment -- Movement of supplies stopped; ammunition plentiful in KASBA.

d. Observation -- only from high ground south of airport. No reconnaissance; very few prisoners lost -- no documents.

e. Weather -- Rain and cold.
Visibility -- Limited -- low fog.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Counterattack -- Still possible with reserves.
Defense in place -- Could continue.
Retreat -- Probable.

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

G-2 REPORT

From: 101200
To : 111200
Sub Task Force Goalpost
Mehdia Plage, French Morocco

No. 4
Maps: Special Map, PORT LYAUTEY, 1/25,000 with overlay.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line -- Had withdrawn to east and south.

b. Defensive organization -- No organized defenses west of PORT LYAUTEY. Those east unknown.

c. Units in contact.
Elements: 1st and 7th TM
Navy
1st Foreign Legion Artillery
Estimated strength -- 500
Combat efficiency -- Poor.

d. Artillery -- None firing.

e. Reserves -- None observed.

f. Supply and Evacuation -- No change.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General -- Withdrawal on defenses on high ground southwest of airport. From 2200 on 10 November order to cease fire had been given.

(1) Armored Forces -- Retreating south on RABAT Road but no action.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties -- 100, prisoners -- 200.

b. Morale -- low.

c. Supply and equipment -- poor.

d. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation probably obscure due to lack of air and reconnaissance units. We lost about 25 men and no known documents. Inhabitants probably furnished information as to our movements.

e. Weather -- Fair and cool.
Visibility -- Good.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Most probable capability to withdraw to the interior and fight on more favorably prepared positions.

SUMMARY IN SERATIM OF PRISONERS' STATEMENTS OBTAINED AT PRISONERS' PEN IN THE FISH CANNERY NEAR BROWN BEACH, November 10 and 11, 1942.

Most men were not certain as to whom they were fighting. Many of them thought they were fighting Italians, whom they despise, Germans, whom they fear and hate, the English, whom they dislike.

Many of the natives did not realize that American forces were fighting against the Germans.

Those who knew that they were fighting Americans fought half-heartedly --didn't aim, shot as few rounds as possible, didn't fire.

It had been intimated to the soldiers that if they did not fight, further retaliations would be made against French prisoners held in Germany.

They were not certain of our mission; they were afraid that we were merely trying to dismember further the French colonial empire and reap the spoils for ourselves.

Most soldiers took the attitude that this was an unfortunate misunderstanding. They were in a dilemma, between two fires literally and figuratively:

Staff officers pro-Vichy vs. Field officers pro-United States
Good soldiers follow orders vs. Respect for the United States

Some feared that this was another Dieppe and that we would not remain to retain control.

All appeared to be sincerely friendly to the United States and will do anything as long as it is fighting the Germans.

Many of the natives were afraid that they would be sent out of the country. (Confusion here with the Laval labor edict and a desire to go to America.)

Most respected PETAIN because he gave his word to Germany under the terms of the armistice to defend the colonial empire.

Many of the native French soldiers are very young (18-21). They joined the colonial forces to escape labor conscription for Germany. (They tell all types of horror stories in connection with forced labor conscription.)

Many of the native French soldiers joined the colonial forces because living conditions in France were very poor. Because of the better pay with the colonial troops they hoped to make a better living here.

The division from Meknes was loaded hurriedly on trains, told it was going on an exercise, was handed outworn equipment. The men did not realize until the last minute that they were going to fight.

The prisoners indicated that mortality among officers was very heavy. The field officers were pro-United States and their superiors shot them when they refused to order fire.

In Port Lyautey the intellectuals who were sympathizers with the Allies lost their professional status and were compelled to perform menial duties. (e.g. school teachers were compelled to take care of pigs; and an ex-chief of police became a waiter in a resturant.)

Constantly in the prisoners' cage the prisoners wanted to know how they might join up with the American forces to march against the "Boches".

The prisoners were exceedingly grateful for their care: they thought the food excellent and were delighted with the abundance of cigarettes and chewing gun.

When the prisoners left the cage on Wednesday evening, the interrogation team stationed there was insuch a position that the five members were "compelled" to shake hands with all the men as they left, "camarade", "a bientot", "nous sommes amis", etc. by French soldiers alike.

There was evidence as to the misrepresentation of the course of the war. (e.g. "Philadelphia is bombed by the Japanese", etc.) Few knew anything about the general progress of the war on the European front.

There was some resentment at the fact that so much armament had been withdrawn from this vicinity and taken to France.

There was resentment at the fact restrictions had been put on the inhabitants of this region by German mandate; not allowed to listen to American broadcasts, see American movies; orchestras were forbidden.

Some citizens of Port Lyautey were expecting and awaiting the arrival of the Americans for the past two years. (When they knew that we were here, they made red, white, and blue bunting out of bed sheets.)

2. Our Situation.

a. Location troops (See overlay)
b. Events 8 Nov. 42.

Sub-Task Force arrived transport area 082440, instead of 082300 as planned. Much time was lost through ships uncertainity of position. Assault ships had lost formation, so great difficulty was experienced in forming assault waves and coordinating movement to the beach. Two assault ships, Allen and Anthony were reported one hour 30 minutes late. At the time first assault waves moved off, ships were believed to be standing out 6 miles, above uncertainly led to breaking of radio silence by Navy, which, with the radio speech by President no doubt alerted the beach. While landing craft were being loaded, five French commercial ships all lights on passed through fleet and one of them flashed the signal "Caution shore alerted for 5 AM." After the loss of more time due to difficulty of wave commanders in finding proper beaches, each Battalion Combat Team landed on or near its assigned beach just prior to first light.

Little or no resistance met initially, except that the fourth and fifth waves of the 2nd Battalion on GREEN BEACH came under heavy French artillery fire and were strafed by two French planes. The 3rd Battalion got wrong direction from its control ship and landed about five miles above its intended beaches. It was strafed by air on the beach and its Anti-aircraft Machine Gun Battery shot down two enemy planes, one containing the body of the French Air Field Commander. This loss of direction and control by assault waves made the whole landing operation a hit or miss affair that would certainly have spelled disaster against an alert and well armed enemy.

Colonel D. P. Craw and Major P. M. Hamilton were sent ashore from the U.S.S. Allen with leading waves to contact French Officials with a message from the Commanding General (Copies attached).

After landing, each pushed on toward its objective. The 1st Battalion by moving about the south end of the lagoon had by 1100 progressed some 2000 yards north on east side of lagoon, where it was held up by machine gun fire. Its right flank guard south of tip of lagoon was attacked by French tanks. The attack was repulsed with a loss of three tanks. However, two of our 37-mm Anti-tank Squads were destroyed by French fire.

The 2nd Battalion landed on GREEN BEACH just prior to first light and was met only by white, red, and green flares. Just after first light when the assault boats of the first three waves were pulling back toward the ship, enemy artillery fire from along the ridge between the lighthouse and Kasba began to fall on the beach. This caused the destroyer "Roe" near the mouth of the river to open fire. Within a few moments the French battery was silent. However, some of these guns fired intermittently on succeeding waves and later two French aircraft strafed the beach with machine gun fire till the arrival of our fighter planes.

During the opening phase communications from shore to ship were had only by returning boats. On two occasions the shelling caused transports to cease loading landing craft causing some added delay in getting units ashore. Also ships moved seaward to a distance of about 15 miles making the beach and return trip unusually long for small craft, and making communications extremely difficult. Naval gunfire direction teams took some time getting control of their fire and when our agents, Colonel Craw and Major Hamilton, with ultimatum to the French, reported that they were being shelled by our own naval fire, we asked the flag ship to cease all naval gunfire till proper control could be obtained. This was accomplished some time later and naval gunfire did excellent work from then on.

By 081200 the 2nd Battalion had taken the ridge and the lighthouse with about thirty prisoners and shortly after, reported that it had troops in the Kasba.

During this period the 3rd Battalion Combat Team had moved rapidly inland from point 5 miles north of river mouth and by noon had taken position on hill 58 overlooking the airport. No landing was made at Red 2 Beach because of poor direction. As a result the artillery that should have occupied the hill opposite the Kasba never reached its position. This artillery would have been able to destroy the French railroad 75-mm guns and interdict other positions in the Kasba that could not be reached by guns from the South.

The 1st Battalion was unable to locate source of rifle and machine gun fire holding it up till late afternoon. When finally located, enemy machine guns were put out by mortar and naval gunfire; however, it was then almost dark and the Battalion Commander was directed by the Commanding General to hold its present position and to gain contact with the 2nd Battalion on its left.

During the afternoon the French counter attacked the 2nd Battalion near the Kasba and lighthouse driving them from their position to fox holes along the slopes near the lighthouse. Naval gunfire could be used only cautiously as the two forces were so interadingled in the area that any naval gunfire on the Kasba area would endanger our people there.

The position of the 2nd Battalion was very critical toward late afternoon. They had suffered severe casualties during the day and were surrounded on three sides by French and in danger of being cut off at any time.

Communication was poor throughout. Most small radios having been drenched by salt water during landing and wire had not come forward. So the plans for the attack on the AM of the 9th were coordinated by the General visiting each unit: The 2nd Battalion to attack the Kasba from the south and east, the 1st Battalion to attack roward the air port on a magnetic azimuth of 64°. Communications with the 3d Battalion had been cut since they landed.

During the day the 3rd Battalion had been unable to move its artillery from the beach, because of difficult country, until late evening when the road was opened. At 1630 the Battalion decided to attack the air field at once. However, both banks of the Sebou were swept by machine gun fire from the heights above the air port and the attack cost several men shortly after getting under way. The 3rd held for the night till it could bring up its artillery.

The 3rd Armored Landing Team landed 6 tanks at 081600 on BLUE BEACH. Due to loss of direction and destruction of tank lighters in the surf, no more were landed until early next morning.

November 9th. At daylight on the 9th, the 2nd Battalion attacked the Kasba while the 1st Battalion continued its advance to the northeast. The 1st Battalion advance was slowed by mortar and machine gunfire from the Kasba ridge and native village to the east. Our own mortar fire and naval gunfire reduced this fire and assisted the advance. At about 1500, it was held up by machine gun and artillery fire from entrenched positions north of Port Lyautey road. Here the 1st Battalion held till dark, when it was ordered to attack the air field that night. Company "C" 70th Tank was attached for the purpose.

It soon became evident to the 2nd Battalion that the French had put reinforcements in the Kasba during the night. One effort to turn the left flank of the 2nd Battalion and attack the Beach Party was repulsed. Every movement of the 2nd was met by heavy snipping and machine gun fire. A coordinated attack with artillery support was attempted late in the PM but lost direction and control because of darkness.

The 3rd Battalion shelled the air field destroyed some planes on the ground and silencing the machine guns on the hills overlooking the airport and pushed "I" Company over the river in rubber boats early in the evening.

During the night 8th and 9th, the Colonel Commanding the Armored Combat Team was ordered to move, such units as he had ashore, southeast of the lagoon to protect the south flank of the force. Enemy tanks and infantry had been reported moving up from direction of Rabat. At 0610 this unit with only 7 tanks attacked a company of French infantry and dispersed it to the south. A few minutes later they were attacked by 14 French light tanks. The detachment 3rd Armored moved to sight defilade and opened fire at the same time a spotter plane directed naval gun fire on the French tanks.

The enemy tanks dispersed to the south leaving four destroyed on the field. At 0815 this force was reinforced by Company "C" 70th Tank and one section Cannon Company self-propelled mounts. At about 0900 the French tanks reappeared and were attacked at once by the 3rd

Armored and 70th L. Tanks. After a three hour running fight the French withdrew. Our "C" Company 70th L. Tank lost one tank in this action and four French tanks were destroyed.

At 1730 the 70th Tank Company was attached to 1st Battalion to assist it in its attack of the airport.

At this time 091800 it was realized that the airport and the Kasba had to be taken the following morning. A coordinated attack by all units after daylight was planned. Detail to remove net was again requested; it had made two unsuccessful attempts previously, due to heavy machine gun and artillery fire; but this night accomplished mission by 100230Z. Two Naval Officers were cited for this operation. General plan same as 2nd phase of 1st day's plan.

November 10th. As ordered, the 1st Battalion moved to attack toward airport at 092300Z. Progress slow due to darkness and constant enemy fire. Units scattered. Sometime after daylight Company "B" with Company "C" 70th Tank, attacked straight toward air field and was successful in gaining positions on high ground above air field. Cos. "C" and "D" attacked flank elements of 1st and 7th Moroccan Regiments at Mazuda; this attack was successful. French withdrew.

The 2nd Battalion having moved its 105 SP Howitzer up during the night attacked as soon as it was light to see. Attack drove almost up to gates of Fort where it was held up by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the Fort. Dive bomber attack was coordinated by radio and by the flash of smoke shell against the Fort to indicate target. Bombers came over recognized target and in four minutes from time of first call placed accurate dive bomber attack on Fort. This attack broke last resistance and troops moved in and rounded up prisoners left alive. Planes were on air alert at time. Excellent communication and prompt intelligent action on part of pilots brought success. Our troops were within 100 yards of point of impact of bombs when attack struck home.

The 3rd Battalion crossed Company "I" over the river on the late PM of 9th and seized the airport. The remainder of the Battalion (less dets) worked round east of the airport and attacked the bridge northeast of Port Lyautey. The bridge was heavily guarded by French artillery and machine guns and 3rd Battalion (-) was forced back to the north.

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(1) Absolute defeat with over 50% casualties of French forces opposing the landing, consisting of the 1st and 7th Regt. Moroccan Infantry, 410th D.C.A., 1st Foreign Legion Artillery and Naval Base Garrison.

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2. Our Situation.

a. Location troops (See overlay)
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It was now apparent that the element of surprise was completely lost and that the assault operation would be carried out entirely without the cover of darkness. Two French planes attacked the landing craft of the 3rd Battalion just as they were forming at their control ship about two miles off shore. Though no casualties resulted several men were nicked and two landing craft were over turned by a bomb. The 2nd Battalion on Green Beach also came in for considerable machine gun fire from French air as well as from 75mm artillery mounted on a railroad car near the base of the Kasba. The 1st Battalion, that was to have landed on Blue and Yellow Beaches, but actually landed half-way between Green and Blue Beach met no opposition. This situation led to great confusion in the 2nd and 3rd Battalion teams. Landing waves were disorganized and control was almost impossible. The combination of inexperienced naval personnel in command of each landing craft and the desperate hurry to reach the beach because of the lateness of the hour finally made the whole landing operation a hit or miss affair that would certainly have spelled disaster against any well armed enemy intent on resisting the landing.

The 3rd Battalion Team landed about five miles above its Red Beach. Its attached 692nd AA Battery fortunately got ashore in some of the first boats to land and started returning the fire of the French planes at once. This battery accounted for two French planes (See account 3rd Battalion). Shortly after this time (About 0800) our Naval fighter planes appeared and French aircraft left the area.

At first light (About 0600) Colonel D. F. Craw and Major F. M. Hamilton left the U.S.S. Allen with a message from General Truscott to the Commander of the French forces. This message stated the American position and urged the French to avoid useless sacrifice of life and to join with us in our war against the Axis. After landing through fire from our own Naval gun fire as well as French Artillery fire. This party finally reached a point about two miles from Port Lyautey. They were in a bantam flying the French and American Flag and a white flag. They had passed French troops on the road where they were told that no guide was necessary and were told the route to French Military Headquarters. Just outside the city of Port Lyautey a blast of machine gun fire hit the bantam and Colonel Craw was instantly killed. Major Hamilton and the driver were taken prisoner and held until the armistice was declared on 11 November 1942.

Major Hamilton was held in the French Headquarters building and had considerable opportunity to talk to French Officer of all ranks, during the three days that followed. It is believed that this contributed greatly to the collapse of French resistance during the day of the 10 November that resulted in the request for an armistice at 2400 that night.

After landing, each pushed on toward its objective. The 1st Battalion by moving about the south end of the lagoon had by 1100 progressed some 2000 yards north on east side of lagoon, where it was held up by machine gun fire. Its right flank guard south of tip of lagoon was attacked by French tanks. The attacks was repulsed with a loss of three tanks. However, two of our 37mm Anti-tank Squads were destroyed by French fire.

The 2nd Battalion landed on Green Beach just prior to first light and was met only by whit, red, and green flares. Just after first light when the assault boats of the first three waves were pulling back toward the ship, enemy artillery fire from along the ridge between the lighthouse and Kasba began to fall on the beach. This caused the destroyer "Roe" near the mouth of the river to open fire. Within a few moments the French battery was silent. However, some of these guns fired intermittently on succeeding waves and later two French aircraft strafed the beach with machine gun fire till the arrival of our fighter planes.

During the opening phase communications from shore to ship were had only by returning boats. On two occasions the shelling caused transports to cease loading landing craft causing some added delay in getting units ashore. Also ships moved seaward to a distance of about 15 miles making the beach and return trip unusually long for small craft, and making communications extremely difficult. Naval Gunfire direction teams took some time getting control of their fire and when our agents, Colonel Craw and Major Hamilton, with ultimatum to the French, reported that they were being shelled by our own naval fire, we asked the flag ship to cease all naval gunfire till proper control could be obtained. It was also reported that a similar order was radioed by the shore fire control party with the 2nd Battalion and that naval gun fire did stop for about ten minutes, but that thereafter destroyers fired at will without control through out most of the day. This contention has been confirmed.

By 1200 the 2nd Battalion had taken the ridge and the lighthouse with about thirty prisoners and shortly after, reported that it had troops in the Kasba.

During this period the 3rd Battalion Combat Team had moved rapidly inland from point 5 miles north of Red Beach and by noon had taken position on hill 58 overlooking the airport. No landing was made at Red 2 Beach because of poor direction. As a result the artillery that should have occupied the hill opposite the Kasba never reached its position. This artillery would have been able to destroy the French railroad 75mm guns and interdict other positions in the Kasba that could not be reached by guns from the south.

By 1245 General Truscott had embarked the reserve and started for Blue Beach. The reserve consisted of Company "L" and two groups of two hundred men each from air maintenance units. These units had been organized during the voyage by Col. Crow from detachments of air plane mechanics, they were armed with light machine guns and Thompson sub machine guns. The General with the reserve (less one group) arrived at Blue Beach at 1405. The groups from Company "L" was landed on Green beach and attached to 2nd Battalion.

The 1st Battalion was unable to locate source of rifle and machine gun fire holding it up till late afternoon. When finally located, enemy machine guns were put out by mortar and naval gunfire; however, it was then almost dark and the Battalion Commander was directed by the Commanding General to hold its present position and to gain contact with the 2nd Battalion on its left.

During the afternoon the French counter attacked the 2nd Battalion near the Kasba and lighthouse driving them from their position to fox holes along the slopes near the lighthouse. Naval gunfire could be used only cautiously as the two forces were so intermingled in the area that any naval gunfire on the Kasba area would endanger our people there.

The position of the 2nd Battalion was very critical toward late afternoon. They had suffered severe casualties during the day and were surrounded on three sides by French and in danger of being cut off at any time.

Communication was poor throughout. Most small radios having been drenched by salt water during the landing and wire had not come forward. So the plans for the attack on the AM of the 9th were coordinated by the General visiting each unit. The 2nd Battalion to attack the Kasba from the south and east, the 1st Battalion to attack toward the air port on a magnetic azimuth of 64°. Communications with the 3rd Battalion had been out since they landed.

During the day the 3rd Battalion had been unable to move its artillery from the beach, because of difficult country, until late evening when the road was opened. Its attached artillery "C" Battery of the 60th came up about 2230, but its self-propelled mounts and anti-tank guns did not arrive until 1400 the following day. The 3rd Battalion was unable to cross the river to the airport that night because it had left its rubber boats on the half-tracks of the SP Cannons, so the 3rd Battalion dug in for the night on hill 56.

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At daylight on the 9th, the 2nd Battalion attacked the Kasba while the 1st Battalion continued its advance to the northeast. It will be noted that this Battalion advanced only about two miles during daylight the 9th of November. There is no explanation of this, save that scattered rifle, machine gun and artillery fire was directed at them during the day and they were crossing very open terrain with little cover. By dark this Battalion had reached the high ground southeast of Kasba (See Sketch) and there it dug in for the night. Company "C", 70th Tank joined about 1730. About this time the

Commanding General joined the Battalion Commander and issued orders for them to attack the airport that night, Company "C", 70th Tank was attached or the purpose.

It soon became evident to the 2nd Battalion that the French had put reinforcements in the Kasba during the night. One effort to turn the left flank of the 2nd Battalion and attack the Beach Party was repulsed. Every movement of the 2nd Battalion was met by heavy snipping and machine gun fire. A coordinated attack with artillery support was attempted late in the PM but lost direction and control because of darkness.

At daylight the 3rd Battalion with Battery "C", 60th F.A. opened fire and silenced the machine guns on the hills overlooking the airport. It remained on hill 58 that day and by dark having received its rubber boats pushed Company "I" over the river.

During the night 8th and 9th, the Colonel commanding the Armored Combat Team was ordered to move, such units as he has ashore southeast of the lagoon to protect the south flank of the force. Enemy tanks and infantry had been reported moving up from direction of Rabat. At 0610 this unit with only 7 tanks attacked a company of French infantry and dispersed it to the south. A few minutes later they were attacked by 14 French light tanks. The detachment 3rd Armored Moved to sight defilade and opened fire at the same time a spotter plane directed naval gun fire on the French tanks.

The enemy tanks dispersed to the south leaving four destroyed on the field. At 0815 this force was reinforced by Company "C" 70th Tank and one section Cannon Company self-propelled mounts. At about 0900 the French tanks reappeared and were attacked at once by the 3rd Armored and 70th Light Tanks. After a three hour running fight the French withdrew. Our "C" Company 70th Tank lost one tank in this action and four French tanks were destroyed.

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(3) Air Port at Sale became subsequently available with the collapse of all French resistance.

(4) The organization of the Port of Lyautey for supply and administration of all units stationed here.

HEADQUARTERS 15TH INFANTRY
APO #3

11 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Leadership.

TO : All Officers, 15th Infantry, APO #3.

1. To insure that all officers understand the meaning of "leadership", and to enable them to perform their duties as officers in an efficient manner, the following information is published.

a. Section IV, FM 21-50, is an excellent guide to leadership. Following units have this manual: Service Co, Hq, 1st Bn, A,B,C,D,G,H, Hq 3rd Bn, I, L, and M Co's. Units not having copies will borrow from those that do.

b. Sufficient copies being unavailable, the following is reproduced for compliance - AR 345-5, WD 2 June 1942, paras 2 - 8 Inclusive:

* * * * * * * * * *

"2. General Duties of Company Commander. - The commanding officer of a company is in general responsible for the administration, instruction, tactical efficiency, and preparedness for war service of his organization.

3. Instruction of Personnel. -

a. General - Company commanders will require all officers of the company to perform periodically all company duties, including the preparation of reports and keeping of records. During such periods the company commander will supervize all duties.

b. Noncommissioned officers - Noncommissioned officers will be carefully instructed in their duties as such.

c. Privates with view to appointment as noncommissioned office. To test the capacity of privates for the duties of noncommissioned officers, company commanders may appoint acting noncommissioned officers, who will be instructed, obeyed, and respected as such; but no company will have more than one acting noncommissioned officer at any time in each grade below the third grade unless there are noncommissioned officers below the third grade absent by authority, during which absences there may be one for each absentee.

4. Squad Leaders. - Squad leaders will be held responsible -

a. For the personal cleanliness and appearance of their men.

b. That those who are to go on duty put their arms, equipment, and clothing in the best possible condition previous to the time of entering upon duty.

c. That those coming off duty place their arms and equipment in the designated places.

d. That the bedding, bunks, and all other property issued to or belonging to the men of their squads are kept in a clean and orderly condition.

e. That all Government property issued the members of their squads is properly recorded and charged.

f. That all losses or damages to Government property issued the men of their squads are promptly reported.

g. That the clothi ; and other effects of deserters, men absent without leave, and men sick in hospital are promptly secured and turned over to the proper agency.

h. That the names of those desiring medical treatment are reported for entry on daily sick book.

i. That those desiring to make deposits present their deposit books at the proper time.

j. That clothing and equipment which is no longer serviceable be turned in for replacement.

5. Inspections. -

a. Company commanders will hold inspections of the personnel, equipment, and buildings, to include ground contiguous thereto, pertaining to their commands as directed by the commanding officer and at such other times as deemed necessary.

b. No one will be excused from these inspections except the guard, the sick in hospital, and those ordered excused by the commanding officer.

6. Company Mess. -

a. Where companies are not joined in a general mess, the company commander, assisted by the other officers of the company, will supervise the cooking and messing of his men.

b. Where all the companies are joined in a general mess, he will confine his supervision of the mess of his company to observation and to notifying the officer in charge in writing of anything requiring remedy. Should this officer fail to apply proper remedy, report will then be made to the appropriate commander.

c. Kitchens will be placed under the immediate charge of noncommissioned officers, who will be held responsible for their condition and for the proper use of rations.

d. * * * * * * * * *

7. Enlisted men - Correspondence. - Upon joining his organization and repeatedly thereafter each enlisted man will be advised to correspond with his next of kin, guardians, beneficiaries, and all correspondents, and to notify them to -

a. Make carefully and retain a memorandum of his Army serial number, his grade, and the designation of the company and regiment or other organization to which he belongs, to include his full name, mailing address, etc; that in all communications to the military authorities or to the United States Veterans' Administration regarding him or to him, they include his full name, grade, Army serial number, and organization, and that on the envelope or wrapper of such mail matter they include the name and address of the sender thereof.

b. Address communications of inquiry to the commanding officer of the company by title and not by name.

8. Miscellaneous. -

a. When possible the company commander will see that every grave of the men of his company who die or are killed on the battlefield is carefully marked so that future identification can be easily made.

b. Noncommissioned officers will be supported by company commanders in the performance of their duties. They will not be detailed for

any duty nor permitted to engage in any occupation inconsistent with their work and position. Officers will be cautious in reproving them in the presence or hearing of privates.

c. Clothing and equipment will be fitted to the men under the direction of an officer."

* * * * * * * * *

2. Parts of publications indicated in a and b above will be read to or read by all officers by 30 April 1944. A careful study of these paragraphs and adherence to them will not only make better officers but will also make better soldiers.

"CAN DO"

Richard G. Thomas, Jr.

RICHARD G. THOMAS, JR.
Colonel, 15th Infantry
Commanding.


Lenzi Beachead

This paper was actually published by a regimental commander and from the states to his organization which had 168 days of combat immediately behind it, and just prior to its returning to battle from a rest area.

April 15th, 1944

AW6

DECLASSIFIED



HQS 3RD INF DIV (REIN)
CAMP PICKETT, VA.
1200, OCT 17TH, 1942

OPERATIONS OVERLAY
ANNEX NO 1, FO NO 1
MAP: 1/50,000 FRENCH MOROCCO

ROUTE 101 → IMPROVED ROADS

OFFICIAL -
Harrell
HARRELL a/c
G-3


ANDERSON

(SHEET 1 OF 2 SHEETS)

THIS OVERLAY WILL NOT BE TAKEN OFF THE TRANSPORT

44121-N

LL121-N



OPERATIONS OVERLAY

SHEET No 2

THIS OVERLAY WILL NOT BE TAKEN OFF THE TRANSPORT

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

FO I

MAPS: a.) Road Map, Morocco, 1:1,000,000; b.) Strategic Map, French North Africa, 1:500,000; c.) Battle Map, French Morocco, 1:50,000; d.) Special Map, enlargement of Map C, 1:25,000; e.) Photo Map, Morocco, 1:20,000; f.) City Plans, Miscellaneous Maps.

1a G-2 Annex

b Task Force A lands on D-day, H-hour at three points as follows: Right, Sub Task Force Blackstone in vicinity of Safi; Center, Sub Task Force Brushwood in vicinity of Casablanca; Left, Sub Task Force Goalpost in vicinity of Port Lyautey.

c Naval Fire Support Groups of the Fleet will support the attack as follows:

(1) Commencing at H-Hour:

a Without Call--against illuminated searchlights.

(2) Commencing at Daylight:

a On call from BLT's--against defended areas and hostile formations and routes of advance.

b Without call--(1) Against hostile coastal defense installations that open fire to seaward.
(2) From H to H plus 4 hours, on targets located by Navy more than 1,000 yards WEST of line--WEST end of Beach Y-2--RR crossing over WADI MELLAH---crossing of RTE 1 PRINCIPALE over WADI MELLAH.
(3) After H plus 4 hours, on targets located by Navy WEST of Sub Task Force "Brushwood" objective.

d NAVAL AIR GROUP:

(1) Attacks enemy aircraft at CASABLANCA (Gazes) airport and fields in the vicinity, and submarines in CASABLANCA harbor.

(2) Reconnaissance over the CASABLANCA-MEDIOUNA-FEDALA area commencing at daylight.

(3) Bombing and strafing missions against enemy troops on roads and railroads approaching the beach-head; against other targets on call.

2. 3d Inf Div, reinforced, constitutes Sub Task Force "Brushwood," lands D-day, H-hour, in FEDALA BAY, establishes beach-head shown and advances to the SOUTH WEST, captures CASABLANCA; See Opns Map.

3a RLG-7:

BLT 1 land at Beach RED 2 at H-hour, advance inland, attack town of FEDALA from EAST, capture RLG objective shown.

BLT 2 land at Beach RED 3 at H-hour, advance inaldn, seize RLG objective shown, seize crossings over WADI HELLAH in zone of RLG-7.

BLT 3 land 1 rifle Co at Beach YELLOW 2 at H plus 1 hr. This company advance inland, seize corssing of MEDIOUNA-FEDALA HWY over the WADI MELLAH and the RR crossing over the WADI MELLAH 1100 yards SOUTH thereof.

Remaining elements RLG land in zone of RLG-7 on regimental order after H-hour.

Upon seizure of line of WADI MELLAH, RLG-7 continue advance to "Brushwood" objective.

b RLG-30:

BLT 1 land at Beach BLUE at H-hour, advance inland to "Brushwood" objective, assist advance of RLG-7.

BLT 2 land at Beach BLUE-2 at H-hour, advance inland, capture hostile coastal defenses EAST of WADI NEFIFIKH. Advance inland, seize and hold crossings over WADI NEFIFKH on the "Brushwood" objective.

BLT 3 land 1 rifle Company, reinforced, at Beach BLUE 3 at H-hour. This company advance along coast in direction WADI NEFIFIKH, capture any hostile defensive installations EAST of objective of BLT 2 and assist BLT 2 in capture of hostile coastal defenses on left of Beach BLUE 2.

Remaining elements RLG land in zone of RLG-30 on regimental order after H-hour. RLG-30 protect left flank of "Brushwood," seize and hold "Brushwood" objective in its zone EAST of WADI MELLAH.

c RLG-15:

Land on "Brushwood" order after H plus 2 hours at beach to be designated, move inlandto assembly area in left of zone of RLG-7, reconnoiter routes to and crossing over WADI MELLAH in preparation for advance on CASABLANCA on left of RLG-7.

d COMBAT TEAM, 2nd ARMD DIV:

Land on "Brushwood" order after H plus 3 hours at beach to be designated, assemble in area SOUTH of FEDALA to be designated, prepare to cross WADI MELLAH and attack hostile formations advancing from the direction of CASABLANCA.

e 2d BN 20th ENGRS (C):

Land on "Brushwood" order at beach to be designated after H plus 3 hours, move to FEDALA, prepared to relieve elements of RLG-7 in FEDALA and mop up hositle resistance in FEDALA and FEDALA HARBOR.

f 3d RCN TR:

Land at H-hour from rubber boats at Beach YELLOW 2, advance inaldn, capture hostile installations in golf course are, assist RLG-7 in capture of FEDALA.

g 436th CA BN (AA) AW:

Land on "Brushwood" order at beach to be designated, provide AA protection for shore party installations or as otherwise directed.

h 204th MP CO:

Land on "Brushwood" order. Traffic control and police of FEDALA area.

i HQ "BRUSHWOOD"
3d SIG CO
HQ & MP CO, 3d INF DIV:

Land on "Brushwood" order after H plus 4 hours, establish command post in area SOUTH of FEDALA shown on map. Establish forward CP in vicinity of BEACH RED 2 at H plus 2 hours.

j SERVICE ELEMENTS 3d INF DIV:

Land on "Brushwood" order D plus 1, establish bivouac in area shown.

k HQ TASK FORCE A:

Hq Task Force A (Fwd Ech)
Sig Sec Hq Task Force A
Dets Air Task Force (GASC)
Det 66th Engrs (TOP)
Det 1st Armd Sig Bn
Det 239th Sig Co (Oper)
Det 122nd Sig Co (RI)
Det 163d Sig Co (Photo)
Det Co C. 829th Sig Serv Bn
Det Spec Rad Co
Counter Intelligence Group
Censorship Unit
Civil Government Personnel

Land on notice "Brushwood" after establishment of "Brushwood" CP. Establish CP in area shown. Priority of units will be furnished by CG Task Force A.

x (1) When hostile coast defenses open fire to seaward, or if searchlights are illuminated, our Naval fire support groups will return their fire without notice to Army elements ashore.

(2) No firing from support boats or landing boats prior to daylight except on illuminated searchlights.

(3) Watches will be synchronized with ship's time before debarkation.

(4) H-hour will be signalled by Navy.

(5) The following will not be damaged beyond temporary disability or interruption to prevent use by enemy:

a Power Plants
b Ports and port facilities
c Radio station at Casablanca
d Telegraph and telephone lines.

(6) No firing against civil population or damage to their property, unless necessary for protection and fulfillment of mission.

(7) The location of any fields or roads thought suitable for use as air fields will be immediately reported.

(8) Military or civilian units or individuals offering resistance will be destroyed.

(9) Military and civilian authorities, or military units displaying conciliatory attitude will be accorded friendly and courteous treatment.

(10) Local civilian authorities in captured localities will be urged to continue their administrative and judicial functions.

(11) Sultan"s Palace, Houses of Worship, Mosques, cemeteries, and private homes will not be disturbed or entered unless they are used as defensive works.

(12) Women, both European and Native will be treated with the utmost respect. Soldiers guilty of assault on women or looting will be shot.

4. a Uniform and Equipment:

(1) Assault troops to include all RLG elements including officers--Herringbone Twill Suits----------.
(2) Individual equipment--Combat packs, gas masks.
(3) Blanket rolls of combat units--tagged for identification and left on board; to be brought ashore by shore parties.

b Rations:

(1) Individual reserve (on the man): 1 and 1/3 K.
(2) Initial Reserve: 1 C, 1 D, and 2/3 K.

c Ammunition:

(1) Individual Reserve

Weapons	U/F	Amt to be brought ashore w/weapons in term of U/F
Rifle	150	1
BAR	750	2/3
MG .30 LT	2,000	2
MG .30 HVY	3,000	2
Pistol	7	2
Sub MG on Combat Vehicles	200	2
On individual	60	1
Mortar (60mm)	100	2/3
Mortar (81mm)	100	2/3
37mm (towed)	100	1
75mm (pack how)	300	1/3
Grenade, Hand, Frag MK II	50	2½ per Co. (rifle, C Engr Cav Tr.)
Offensive MK III	800 per Inf Reg't	1/16 per Co.

For other weapons, including Artillery, Infantry Cannon and AA-Sp and AA towed---not to exceed 2½ U/F.

(2) Initial reserve--2½ U/F and in addition thereto, ammunition loaded in troop space in excess of requirements of (1) above.

d Water:

(1) Individual Reserve--two filled canteens on the man. This amount may be reduced by RLG commanders if desired, for personnel of loading waves to increase their mobility.

(2) Initial Reserve--to be brought ashore by Shore Parties--all extra 5 gallon water cans filled. TBA issue cans remain w/kitchen.

e Vehicles--Windshields and tops down.

(1) Motors will be started, warmed up and running when the landing craft strikes the beach. Vehicles will clear landing craft at good speed if landing is on dry sand beach.

f (1) Evacuation--to beach

(2) Medical--Each unit surgeon of organizations combat loaded, will obtain from Transport Surgeon, adequate phenobarbital half grain tablets for distribution to personnel 2 hrs prior to H-hour for purposes of combating seasickness. One tablet will be taken immediately upon issue and the dose repeated an hour later in such cases as in opinion of unit surgeon may require it.

g Priority of Unloading:

(1) Beach Marking Parties.

(2) Combat Elements, their equipment and supplies as prescribed by BLT commanders.

(3) Shore parties with their equipment.

(4) Initial Reserves.

(5) Beach Reserves.

5. a Succession of Command, Sub Task Force Brushwood:

(1) Major Gen Anderson embarked on TRUE

(2) Brig. Gen Campbell embarked on DIRK

(3) Brig. Gen Eagles embarked on TRUE

(4) Colonel Monroe embarked on GLUE

b Command Posts Afloat:

Sub Task Force Brushwood	TRUE
RLG-7	ETCH
RLG-30	LOAF
RLG-15	GLUE
CT 2d AD	SPUR
2d Bn 20th ENGRS	SORT
3d RCN TR (until H-2 hrs)	JUGS

Locations ashore to be reported.

c See Signal Annex.

OFFICIAL:

ANDERSON
Maj Gen

/s/
HARRELL
G-3

ANNEXES:

1 Opn Overlay
2 Intelligence
3 Alternate Plans
4 Administration
5 Signal
6 Boat Employment
7 Naval Fire Support

DISTRIBUTION: F

Reproduced, Archives, USA CGSC, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 Jan 58.
Original transferred to 3d Inf Div Assn, 13 Jan 58.

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Headquarters 3rd Infantry Div.
Camp Pickett, Virginia
1200 October 14, 1942

Annex #2 to F. O. #1

MAPS:

a. Road map, Morocco 1/1,000,000
b. Strategic map, French North Africa 1/500,000
c. Battle map, French Morocco 1/50,000
d. Special Map, (Enlargement of "c" above) 1/25,000
e. Photo map, Morocco 1/20,000
f. Miscellaneous maps, city plans, panoramic sketches, aerial photos.

1. Summary of Enemy Situation:

a. See enclosure #1, attached hereto, which includes information on French forces, strength, disposition of troops, estimate of probable resistance, and terrain study. Maps, sketches, aerial photos and the special instructions for each unit which are sealed and packaged also contain detailed information on beaches, fixed defenses and enemy troops available on "D" day. Additional copies of enclosure #1 will be placed aboard each ship for further dissemination. A few marked maps have been placed in each group. Units may mark additional maps as directed by C. O. of each unit.

b. An information pamphlet in three sections, has been prepared and placed on each ship in quantity for study by all officers and instruction of enlisted men. It is vitally important that the information concerning the religion, customs, and manners of the Moroccan people be thoroughly understood by all personnel. Daily instruction will be held shipboard in order to impress upon the command the necessity of committing no act which may incite the hostility of friendly natives. This pamphlet should be retained and preserved. No further copies are available.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION - D Day

Essential elements of information	Analysis of essential elements of information	Collecting agency.	Specific Orders or requests	Hour and destination to be reported.
Conditions of surf and beach.	Report of successful landing.	3rd. Rcn. Tr. 1st Bn. 7th 2nd Bn. 7th 1st Bn. 30th 2nd Bn. 30th Co. K 30th	Brief report on landing conditions at each beach.	Radio to 3rd Inf. Div. C.P. (True) thru Shore Party net.
Beach defenses	Strength, location and identification of forces Type and location of beach defenses.	Same as above	Negative report when no defenses	Same as above.
Capture of fixed coastal or AA guns at Fedala and North of Wadi Nefifikh.	Report the capture of personnel and weapons of assigned missions.	3rd Rcn. Trp. 2nd Bn. 30th 3rd Bn. 30th 1st Bn. 7th	Report capture AA guns near Golf course. Report capture Battery DUPONT BLONDIN. Report capture fixed defenses SE of WADI ARENA (Beach Blue 3) Report capture Battery de Fedala & 75 mm guns on Cape Fedala	Radio, liaison officer, or messenger to Div. C.P. shipboard or forward C.P.
Attitude of hostile forces and civilians; Amount of opposition encountered	Report whether hostile forces resist stubbornly or are making token resistance. Whether prisoners are voluntarily surrendering. Are native civilians hostile or friendly	All units	Identify all French units whether friendly or hostile.	Quickest means available

2. (Contd.)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION - D Day.

Capture or surrender of any body of troops or specific objective assigned in Fedala	Report identity and strength of unit. Report capture Miramar Hotel.	All units 1st Bn. 7th Inf. 3rd Rcn. Trp.	Report when accomplished	Radio or messenger.
Control of highways to Casablanca and Rabat.	Report seizure of bridges over Wadi, Mellah, and Wadi Nafifikh.	30th Inf. 7th Inf.	Report when accomplished	Radio or messenger
Movement of hostile forces from Casablanca, Marrekech, Berrechid, Settat, Mazagan, Qued, Rabat.	Report any troop movement including direction, strength and mobility. Include movements by rail.	All 3rd Div. Units Navy and Army air craft	Request C.G. 3rd Div. be notified of results of aerial missions.	Radio or quickest means available.
Defensive positions between Fedala and Casablanca.	Report strength and location of troops. Type of defense, condition of bridges.	All units navy and army aircraft.	Commanding General 3rd Division to be notified of results of aerial missions.	Messenger, overlay or aerial photo.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. Ground

(1) To be moved toward the Brushwood objective "D" day as soon as practicable in zone of action of 7th Infantry and in zone of action of the 30th Infantry, SW of WADI NEFIFIKH In zone of action of the 30th Infantry, NE of WADI NEFIFIKH, to cover all routes of approach from the NE toward FEDALA. Upon reaching BRUSHWOOD objective "D" day reconnaissance to be pushed toward CASABLANCA.

(2) Missions for 1st Bn. 67th Armd Regt. and 3rd Rcn. Troop to be announced.

b. Air

(1) Naval

Priority to naval combat missions. Reconnaissance planes will be available on call. Missions have been requested as indicated in paragraph 2 above for reconnaissance of movement of hostile forces toward FEDALA and defensive positions between FEDALA and CASABLANCA. Reports to be forwarded to Commanding General 3rd Division when information is received by Carrier Commander.

(2) Army

None available until after capture of landing fields. Thereafter on call and only through air ground support party with Division Headquarters.

4. HANDLING OF PRISONERS and CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

a. Prisoner of War collecting and examining points as designated by RLG commanders. Division P. W. enclosure to be announced.

b. Prisoner of War Interrogation Group Teams:

(1) Initial Assignment:
RLG-30 - Team 1 "Y" (French)
RLG-7 - Team 2 "Y" (FRENCH)
RLG-7 - Team 3 "Y" (German)
All units - Team 4 "Y" (Italian, Spanish, Arabian)
To be used as interpreters or interrogators as directed by unit commanders.

(2) Employment:

Groups have been trained to operate as teams. Team 4 "Y" has been split initially to give all units interpreters in Arabic. This team may be reformed upon direction of the Commanding General. Teams may be reassigned during operations depending upon their needs.

c. French Interpreters, Army Specialist Corps.

(1) Assignment of officers, subject to availability

Div. Hdqs.	2
Each RLG Hqs. - 2	6
Each Inf. Bn. Hdqs. - 1	9
1st Bn. 67th Armd. Reft.	4
204th M.P. Co.	2
2nd Bn. 20th Engineers	2
436th C. A. Bn.	1
	26

d. Instructions in handling prisoners of war.

(1) Classification:

(a) French military personnel and civilians surrendering as individuals or en masse, who commit no overt hostile act and who profess to be friendly will not be classified as prisoners. They will be handled as indicated in subparagraph (3) below.

(b) Any personnel, military or civilian, who show any signs of unfriendliness or who commit any overt hostile act will be classified as prisoners of war.

(2) Prisoners will be marched on foot to collecting points. Severely wounded prisoners may be carried by their comrades. Wounded will be treated by medical personnel, but with priority to American personnel. Identification tags will not be removed from prisoners. Time and place of capture of both prisoners and documents is of primary importance. This information must accompany captured prisoners and be recorded in writing by the unit affecting the capture. French troops who have voluntarily surrendered should be segregated and treated in a friendly manner, but they will be relieved of all ammunition and kept guarded. Great care must be taken to differentiate in the treatment given friendly French elements and the treatment given hostile French forces.

(3) Specific instructions:

(a) Sentinels, patrols, or small combat groups on initial landings:

Until the attitude of the hostile force is ascertained and to insure surprise, French sentinels, patrols or small combat groups will be seized, without firing if possible. Weapons will be used at once if resistance is made, surrendering is delayed or an attempt is made to escape or give the alarm. Upon capture, these units will be disarmed and held as prisoners of war.

(b) Hostile forces whose attitude is doubtful, who have exhibited signs of hostility or have opened fire:

These troops will be disarmed and marched to the rear under guard as prisoners of war.

(c) Individuals voluntarily surrendering or professing to be friendly.

These individuals will be relieved of their arms and ammunition, held under observation until a group has been collected and sent to the rear under light guard.

(d) Troops surrendering in large groups or professing to be friendly:

Hostile leaders will be required to assemble their men, turn over all arms, ammunition, equipment and vehicles, except individual arms, personal equipment, and organizational colors. The unit will be marched by its leaders to an area which does not interfere with our advance, there stack arms and remain under observation. The leader and

chief subordinates will be sent to the next higher headquarters for examination by P. W. Interrogator Groups, if available. The higher headquarters will examine the officers, retain a number of them as guarantees of good faith and return the others to their units.

(e) Fixed coastal and anti-aircraft installations:

French troops will be immediately removed from the vicinity of the weapons whether they be captured by assault or surrender. Batteries will be placed under guard. If insufficient strength is available for guarding the weapons must be rendered unserviceable by demolition or Thermite grenades. However, every effort should be made to keep the weapons and ammunition serviceable for our own use.

(f) Officers and non-commissioned officers:

Officers and non-commissioned officers should be segregated and interviewed separately. Non-commissioned officers are probably the finest source of information, but will only divulge facts when their officers are not present.

(g) Civilians:

Openly hostile civilians should be put under guard and treated the same as hostile soldiers. Friendly civilians should be disarmed, interrogated and released at such location as will not interfere with the operation.

e. Handling of captured documents, codes, maps, etc.

(1) Documents will be removed at once from the prisoner, wrapped or bundled and sent along with the prisoners to Prisoner Interrogation Groups. Documents will be marked in writing with the time and place of capture by the unit making the capture. Documents of great importance should be transmitted as promptly as the circumstances may permit. It is important that the lower unit S-2 carefully evaluate documents prior to forwarding in order to eliminate these documents of little or no value.

5. MAPS -

a. Distribution -

All maps, photomaps, road maps, city plans, sketches, aerial mosaics and verticals have been packaged, sealed, and delivered to each ship by Task Force Engineers. They will be distributed by the C. O. of troops on each ship. Delivery lists and instructions are included in each package.

b. Battle map: -

The battle map is designated as the 1/50,000 French Morocco. the Special map 1/25,000 is an enlargement of the 1/50,000 French Morocco Map and is of equal accuracy. Recent aerial mosaics may be used for artillery fire.

c. Road maps:

Should be issued in sufficient quantities for distribution to all officers and drivers. Detailed road information on certain routes is contained in information pamphlet.

d. City maps, panoramic sketches, and certain aerial photos should be used for those units and subordinate groups employed on special missions.

e. Some sketches, aerial photos and city maps have been prepared by the Ridgway Div Division. These are also issued in sealed packages from the 3rd Division. An effort has been made to mark the position on at least one map or photo of the various positions, and key points of Fedala area near [illegible] and CASABLANCA. Units will mark such other maps as may be necessary, but not with our own plans or units designated.

f. Grid Systems:

(1) British Military grid system has been prescribed by higher authority (see [illegible]).

(2) When communicating with any unit other than 3rd Inf. Division (Rein.) the British Military Grid system should be used to designate coordinates.

(3) Within the 3rd Division (Rein.) lower elements may prescribe other grid systems as directed by unit commanders.

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

a. Surprise

(1) Initial success of this operation is predicated on surprise. Parties detailed to mark beaches will operate in silent motor boats to be provided by navy or in rubber boats. Silence will be maintained on beaches. Lights will not be used except as required to mark beaches and only to seaward.

(2) Landings of all waves will be made with as little noise as possible until the element of surprise has passed.

b. Camouflage

Cover is scarce and consists of scattered low bushes and olive orchards. What little is available should be used, but in no case will bunching of personnel and equipment be permitted.

c. Counterespionage only by agents operating under orders of C. G. 3rd Infantry Division and higher headquarters.

d. Press and Propaganda will be controlled through G-2 3rd Infantry Division andhigher headquarters.

e. Documents

No map, overlay, photo or sketch which shows the plan, strength, or disposition of our forces will be allowed to go ashore. Maps, sketches and photos of enemy installations may be used by personnel assigned specific tasks and concerning the pertinent enemy installations or location.

f. Radio

(1) C. O. of troops on each ship is responsible that no personally owned radios will be used shipboard.

(2) Communication between ships after embarkation will be a function of the U. S. Navy.

(3) Army sets will operate only as directed in Annex #5 to F. O. #1

(4) Army radio sets will not be operated while shipboard except when expressly required during operations. Receivers will not be turned on; code practice will not be included in shipboard training.

g. Distinctive insignia and special vehicular markings will not be removed. Officers and enlisted men will wear Division shoulder patch and organization insignia at all times. Special markings placed on motor vehicles at port of embarkation will not be removed.

h. Censorship: Unit censorship at all times. Blue envelopes should not be used until Base Censorship units are operating in French Morocco.

7. Reports

a. Special reports

(1) Immediate by the quickest means available for following information:

(a) Successful landing at designated beach.
(b) Capture or reduction of fixed coastal defense, AA Battery or specific objective.
(c) Positive information concerning attitude of hostile units and groups of civilians.
(d) Securing of bridges over Wadi Nafifikh and Wadi Mellah.
(e) Movement of hostile forces toward Fedala.
(f) Reaching of Brushwood objective "D" day.

b. Combat Reports:

Continuous, as noted above, until H plus 4. Beginning at H plus four and every two hours after H plus 4.

c. Periodic report

Daily as of 1000Z. To be at Division C.P. by 1200Z.

8. RECOGNITION SIGNALS:

a. To be used on initial night landings to challenge and respond to challenge. To be announced to troops after five days at sea.

b. Verbal:

Challenge Word: - "GEORGE"

Response: - "PATTON"

c. Flashlight:

Challenge - 3 short flashes

Response: - 1 long flash

d. Yellow smoke grenade.

May be used as a signal to other units, including naval fire support groups and friendly aviation to indicate, "Friendly troops here".

9. TIME:

The western coast of French Morocco utilizes Greenwich Civil time (Greenwich Mean time - British)

Anderson
Major General

OFFICIAL

Walter
G-2

1 - Enclosure

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION
Camp Pickett, Virginia
Office of A. C. of S. G-2

October 1942

Enclosure No. 1 to Annex No. 2 (Intelligence)
To Field Order #1

CONTENTS

1. Intelligence Annex and G-2 Estimate (French Division)
2. Battle Order of units at Fedala and Casablanca
3. Estimate of Probable Hostile Opposition at Fedala
4. Beaches at Fedala.
5. Enemy Facilities and Fortifications at Fedala.
6. Fedala, Information Sheet.
7. Casablanca, Information Sheet.

ANDERSON
Major General

OFFICIAL

Walter
G-2

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX AND G-2 ESTIMATE
COMBAT ESTIMATE -FRENCH MOROCCO.

September 22, 1942.

An estimate of the probable disposition of the French forces to resist an invasion of French Morocco, combined with a study of ports, port facilities and landing beaches, leads to the following conclusions:

I MOBILE TROOPS:

1. The center of mass of the French Moroccan Army will be dispersed in the area AZEMMOUR - KASBA TADLA - MEKNES - PORT LYAUTEY, with the objective of defending CASABLANCA and communications with ALGERIA.

2. In general French Morocco will be divided into two defensive areas, north and south of the river OUED OUM ER RBIA. The southern sector will be lightly held, the northern sector strongly held. In case of successful landing operations in the south, the line of the river OUED OUM ER RBIA will be held.

3. In the northern sector RABAT-PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA-CASABLANCA will be organized as sub-sectors for defense. In this area, the ports of PORT LYAUTEY, RABAT, FEDALA AND CASABLANCA will be organized as centers of resistance and strongly held. The general reserve for the northern sector will be in the vicinity of MEKNES. Between centers of resistance the beaches will be patrolled with native troops and the highways with armored cars.

French troops in the mountains, except those guarding the mountain passes on the frontier of Spanish Morocco, will probably remain at their posts.

The garrison now stationed at OUEZZANE will probably either move to the vicinity of MECHRA bel KSIRI or to PORT LYAUTEY itself upon warning of the approach of a hostile fleet.

The present dispositions of the French forces are shown on the attached map.

With these dispositions, the mobile garrison of the RABAT - PORT LYAUTEY area could easily be reinforced by an additional reinforce regiment prior to D-day, still leaving three regiments of infantry, one battalion of medium artillery, one battalion of light artillery, a squadron of cavalry and 1/2 a tank battalion in the general reserve in the MEKNES-FEZ area, which could be moved to the PORT LYAUTEY - RABAT area in approximately forty-eight hours by rail or 4 1/2 days by marching, or to the CASABLANCA - FEDALA area in approximately five days by marching.

In the southern sector, the garrison at SAFI could be reinforced by the motorized battery from MOGADOR in a few hours. The infantry battalion

at MOGADOR will probably not be moved until it was assured that no landing would be made at AGADIR. When it could reach SAFI by marching in about four days. Reinforcements from MARRAKECH consisting of one mechanized cavalry group and one battalion of 75 mm. field artillery motorized could arrive at SAFI in one day, by marching. It is unlikely that the infantry or cavalry would be moved in the initial stages of the operation.

II COAST DEFENSES (list)

III ARMY AIR ESTIMATE

The air arm consisting of 74 fighters, 13 reconnaissance planes, and 81 long range bombers, would probably operate initially from the coastal airdromes against our convoy, withdrawing to the airdromes at MARRAKECH, MEKNES, and FEZ as landing operations commence.

Air support by long range German bombers, operating from French and Spanish airfields, may be anticipated. No reinforcements of the French air forces in French Morocco is anticipated, however, unless supplies of fuel and bombs are materially increased prior to D-Day. For detailed air estimate, see Air Estimate attached.

It is believed that limited air reconnaissance seaward is now in operation.

IV NAVY

The following naval units are now in French Morocco:

Casablanca

1 battleship (Jean Bart)

2 light cruisers

8-10 destroyers

10-12 submarines

2 motor torpedo boats

12 Navy fighter aircraft

Port Lyautey

Approximately two squadrons of 24 torpedo boats.

Submarines based at CASABLANCA are now believed to be partolling the coastal waters, and coastal shipping is convoyed by destroyers.

It is probable that the submarine and destroyer force will be used to intercept a convoy approaching the coast. Judging from the action at DAKAR; that the cruisers will not leave port while the Jean Bart serves merely as a floating fortress.

V Lack of good landing beaches, heavy surf and swell along the entire coast may be anticipated, with an average of about one day in five on which landing operations will be feasible.

Under these conditions it may be anticipated that the French defense will probably consist of initial air and naval attacks against our convoys, stubborn defense of the ports of PORT LYAUTEY, RABAT-FEDALA-CASABLANCA, and SAFI and AGADIR, organized as points capable of reinforcement by mobile reserves at MEKNES-FEZ and MARRAKECH, with a final defense of CASABLANCA north of the OUED-OUM-RBIA.

Battle Order of Casablanca and Fedala and Vicinity

Based on reports dated:
July 16, 1942
August 20, 1942
September 12, 1942

AT FEDALA

SIZE	NAME	STRENGTH (Approximate)
INFANTRY		
1 Co	1st Regt Tirailleurs Marocains (at Airport 2/5 way to Rabat)	194
2nd Bn	6th Regt Tirailleurs Marocains	865
1 Co/II Bn (?)	6th Regt Tirailleurs Senegalais	194
1 Plat (3-25mm AT guns)	6th Regt Tirailleurs Senegalais	27
CAVALRY		
2 Mecz Trs	3rd Regt Spahis Marocains	837
ARTILLERY		
1 Bn (mixed 75mm & 16-13.2mm MGs, no. of 75s is unknown)	Defense Artillerie du Territoire (DAT)	400-500

CASABLANCA

INFANTRY		
2nd Bn	Regt d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc	865
Regtl Hq & 3d Bn	6th Regt Tirailleurs Senegalais	865
III Bn plus Depot Co	6th Regt Tirailleurs Marocains	865 plus
(It is suspected that an additional Inf Bn or Regt is at Casablanca)		
CAVALRY		
1 Troop (Horse)	1st Regt Spahis Marocains	180
1 Troop (Mecz)	1st Regt Spahis Marocains	125
Hq & 1 Sq (Horse)	2nd Regt Spahis Marocains	360
ARTILLERY		
Regtl Hq & 2d & 4th Bns (24 - 75mm guns)	Regt Artillerie Coloniale du Maroc	1240
1 Bn	64th Regt d'Artillerie d'Afrique	620 plus
(The identification of this regiment is not good. It has been variously reported as being armed with 75s, 105s and even 155s)		
ANTI AIRCRAFT ARTY		
Bn Hq & 1st Bn (has 10-75mm guns, and 2-13.2mm Guns) (three batteries)	410th Defense Contre Avions (D.C.A.)	400-500
ENGRS		
Detachment	33rd Engr Bn	?
Detachment	41st Engr Bn(Sig Com)	?

MEDIOUNA

(About 20 miles inland from Casablanca)

INFANTRY		
1st Bn	6th Regt. Tirailleurs Marocains	865

Hq 3d Inf Div
Camp Pickett, Va.
October 10, 1942

Estimate of Potential Opposition To a Landing at FEDALA

1. Defenses of FEDALA:

a. Troops:

	Strength
2nd Bn, 6th Regt Tirailleurs Marocains	865
1 AT Plat, 6th Regt Tirailleurs Senegalais	27
2 Trs - Mecz, 3d Regt Spahis Marocains	837
1 Co, Inf, 2d Bn (?) 6th Regt Tirailleurs Senegalais	194
1 Arty Bn, Defense Artillerie du Territoire (Mixed 75mm's of unknown number and 16-13;2mm MG's)	400-500

b. Coast defenses:

4 138.6mm Guns
2 75mm Guns
4 100mm Guns
4 Large guns, caliber unknown (8000 yds to NE)
(All fixed guns are believed to be wired in)

c. Anti-Aircraft Defenses:

12 13.2mm twin barrelled AA MG's
4 75mm or 90mm AA Guns, with searchlight
3 AA Guns, caliber unknown, with searchlight
4 guns, cal. unknown, ----end of mouth of WADI NAFIFIKH.

d. Trenches:

1. Across neck of Peninsula which ends in CAPE FEDALA.
2. Along Coast from CAPE FEDALA to mouth of MELLAH RIVER immediately to S.W. There are numerous short trenches, apparently for AA passive defense, in and about the town of FEDALA.

e. Underwater obstacles have not been reported on any beach.

2. Troops at CASABLANCA - 16 miles from FEDALA:

3 Bns - Inf
1 additional Bn suspected - Inf
3 Trs - Horse Cav
1 Tr - Mecz Cav
1 Bn Horse Arty (105mm and 155mm)
2 Bns - Arty (75mm - reported mecz)
1 Bn - Horse Arty (75mm and 12.2mm)

These units must be taken as present for the defense against a force landing at FEDALA. In addition, it is possible that the guns of the battleship JEAN BART secured in CASABLANCA harbor may bear on this action, although at a maximum range.

3. Troops at MEDIOUNA * 20 miles away from FEDALA:

1 Bn - Inf (Note: This Bn can brought up in defense during D-day)

4. Troops at MAZAGAN - about 76 miles away:

1 Bn plus 1 Co - Inf
1 Tr - Cav

This Bn could be brought into action by good coastal roads against landings at SAFI or FEDALA at D-day plus 1, leaving the Co and Tr to defend the town.

5. Troops RABAT-SALE - 43 miles away from FEDALA:

3 Bns - Inf
1 Regt plus 1 Sq - Mecz Cav
1 Sq - H Cav

This sizeable force could split to defend against landings at MEHDIA (PORT LYAUTEY) and FEDALA, or lend itself to either defense during D-day, leaving a minimum of 1 Bn to defend the city.

6. Troops at MARRAKECH - 176 miles from FEDALA:

1 Bn - Inf
1 Bn - Arty (probably mtz)
1 Bn - Arty (reported mecz)
1 Det - Cav

While this force is more likely to defend against a landing at SAFI, being probably a headquarters for units stationed in the southern area, it could move by rail and road to be near CASABLANCA in about 24 hours.

7. Troops at SAFI:

2 Bns - Inf
2 Sqs - Cav

If SAFI were not attacked, approximately one half of this force could move to CASABLANCA by road and railroad to defend not earlier than D-day plus 2.

8. Troops at MEKNES - about 118 miles away:

This force is apparently set up to defend the northern eara. Their main route of advance to the CASABLANCA area by rail may be cut at MEHDIA, the main roads at RABAT. Using alternate routes, the mecz Cav and Tks could arrive on D plus 2, the remainder on D plus 3.

9. Troops at OUEZZANE - about 145 miles away:

1 Bn - Inf
1 Bn - Arty

Same remark as for MEKNES.

10: Troops at FEZ and EL HAJEB - about 140 miles away:

Same remark as for MEKNES.

11. It is assumed that units at the ports of MOGADOR and AGADIR and PORT LYAUTEY, will remain at those ports. It is also assumed that certain scattered mountain units less the battalions will remain in their interior positions. It is further assumed that units at TAZA and GUERCIF guarding the gap of TAZA will remain in position.

12. Based on the above summary and notes, this table shows the possible but not probable opposition to a landing at FEDALA; Landings at PORT LYAUTEY and SAFI will be opposed by some of the units noted above:

	Considered Present	Additional on D-Day	On D/1	On D/2	On D/3	Total
Inf	5 Bns	3 Bns	2 Bns	1 Bn	9 Bns	20 Bns
Mecz Cav	3 Trs	1 Regt &		1 Sq		5 Sqs
H Cav	3 Trs	1 Sq		1 Sq		3 Sqs
Arty	4 Bns		2 Bns		3 Bns	9 Bns
Tks				1 Bn		1 Bn

13. This table shows the probable opposition to a landing at FEDALA considering the landings at PORT LYAUTEY and SAFI are opposed:

	Considered Present	Additional on D-day	On D plus 1	Total
Inf Mecz	5 Bns	1 Bn	2 Bns	8 Bns
Mecz Cav	3 Trs	1 Sq		3 Sqs
H Cav	3 Trs			3 Trs
Arty	4 Bns		2 Bns	6 Bns

WALTER
G-2

BEACHES

Fedala - No. 1 Starting about 2½ miles So. of Fedala and running about 2 miles SW - 100 yards or less wide. Covered at high tide. 4 foot line about 150 yards offshore.

No. 2 About 2 miles SW Fedala, South about 1 mile. General characteristics as above. Shoals offshore.

No. 3 Starting 1½ miles SW Fedala. About ½ mile long. Characteristics as in No. 1 and 2.

No. 4 One beach divided by rock. Starts immediately at
No. 5 breakwater, runs NE ½ mile to rock, then another ½ mile. 4 foot line about 300 yards offshore. Immediate access to city. Light surf.

No. 6 One beach divided by rocks offshore. Starts 1½ miles north of breakwater. Rock in center, each part ½ mile long. 4 foot line 300 yards offshore. Heavy surf, probably covered at high tide.

Beaches 4-7 are subject to flanking fire from guns on Cape.

No. 8 Mouth of River Nefifikh. South bank has silted forming a sturdy beach. About 300 yards long, 200 yards wide. At tide it is possible to go all the way to railroad and highway bridges, about ½ mile upstream. Good for spot landings.

No. 9 About 1 mile NE of River Nefifikh. ½ mile long. Characteristics as in No. 1. Extremely heavy surf.

No. 10 River mouth at Mansouriah. About 100 yards wide. Up to 200 yards long.

Water approaches. Thirty-foot water is found 1000 yards offshore.

Surf conditions and tides. Surf is heavy from November to March and moderate at other times. Fedala Bay is sheltered except when winds are from between north and west. Tides rise on the average 7 feet but during springs they rise to 11½ feet.

Winds and fogs. In summer the prevailing winds are from the northeast, although the effect of land and sea breezes is well marked so that usually they are from a northerly or northwesterly direction from 10 A.M. to 7 P.M. and from a northeast or east (offshore) direction at night and early morning. In winter the prevailing winds are southwesterly, westerly and northwesterly. Bad weather and high seas are then frequent. Fogs are less frequent, than farther south but occur occasionally in summer, generally lifting by noon.

Terrain and vegetation. The coastal area is flat back of the dunes. 700 to 1100 yards inland there is a bluff beyond which the upland rises to 100-200 feet. This bluff is rarely a sharp feature. The vegetation consists of fields, scrub, pastures, and a few very small stretches of forest.

Fields of defensive fires. Direct fires would be restricted by the dunes back of the beach. Flanking fires would be possible against beaches from Cape Fedala.

Observation and critical terrain features. The lighthouse is an ideal observation post. The gorges cut by the Oued Nefifikh and smaller streams would restrict inland movement parallel to the coast.

Roads. A local road parallels the coast 500-1200 yards inland. A good road runs inland from Fedala to the main Casablanca-Rabat highway. There are numerous local tracks, few of which lead to the beaches, however. The railroad is less than 100 yards inland south of Fedala Bay.

Factors favorable for a landing. The possibilities for deployment both while landing and afterward are favorable to landing here. Other conditions are poor.

(g) ENEMY Facilities and Fortifications

FEDHALA

Defenses: (a) Coast defense guns.

(1) Estimated battery of four 138.6 mm guns, known as "BATTERIE DU PONT BLONDIN", about 3 miles E of lighthouse. It is believed that the battery can be located by the little domed chapel in green fields. The chapel is said to be in the midst of the camouflaged emplacements. Ammunition is reported as brought to the guns "on trucks which are on lines in cemented trenches". Estimated range of guns: 18,000 meters. There is believed to be one searchlight, about 350 meters NE of the battery, and one 13.2 mm AAMG. Position of battery: 33° 43' 48" N, 7° 20' 35" W.

(ii) Estimated battery of 2 guns, probably 75 mm, on tip of CAPE FEDHALA. These are not believed to be camouflaged.

(iii) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 100 mm, known as "Battere de Fedhala", said to be near the signal station on CAPE FEDHALA. Position: 33° 42' 55" N, 7° 24' 10" W. Estimated range: at least 14 kms. One searchlight believed to be about 100 meters to the E. One 13."mm AAMG believed to be at the battery.

(iv) Three or four large-caliber guns reported about 1,600 yds. SW of MANSOURIA inlet, NE of FEDHALA, at 33° 45' N, 7° 18.6' W.

(b) AA guns.

(i) Estimated 2 twin barreled 13.2 mm AAMG's near (a) (iii).

(ii) Estimated 2 twin-barreled 13.2 mm AAMG's with detectors and range-finders, next to (a) (ii).

(iii) Estimated 8 twin-barreled 13.2 mm AAMG's, possibly also 25 mm and 37 mm.

(g) ENEMY Facilities and Fortifications

FEDHALA

Defenses: AA guns, in and around the area surrounding the oil tanks.

(iv) Estimated one battery of four 75 mm AA guns near the golf course. These may be 90 mm and not 75 mm. There may also be, in addition, two 105 mm AA guns. Position: 33° 42' 22" N, 7° 23' 56" W. There are probably 2 searchlights, a range finder, and soundranging equipment at the battery position.

(v) Possibly about six 37 mm AA guns on the golf course, across the river to the SW of town.

(vi) Three AA guns, with searchlight, reported 1½ miles W of SIDI BOU LANOUAR (SIDI ALI BOU NUAR), SW of FEDHALA, at 33° 40.6' N, 7° 27.2' W.

(c) Miscellaneous.

(i) It is probable that there is a trench system, with weapon pits, along the coast from CAPE FEDHALA to the mouth of the MELLAH RIVER, and also a belt across the neck of the peninsula which ends in CAPE FEDHALA.

(ii) Believed that the following area may be an AA barrage zone: 33° 50' N, 7° 17' W, to 33° 50' N, 7° 32' W.

(a) THE PORT

(1) GENERAL

Port de Fedala (Fedhala or Fedala) (33° 43' N, 7° 24' W.) is an artificial harbour built in the extreme west of Baie de Fedala, south-east of the peninsula of Cap de Fedala, from which (and from its off-lying shoals) natural shelter is obtained. It is the principal Moroccan port for oil and oil products. The port is normally dredged to a depth of 19½ feet.

Reclamation and construction work is in progress, mainly in the northern part of the harbour near the oil storage installations.

The seaward approaches are clear of dangers except for Rocher Lozero (with 9 feet over it) and Rochers de Fedala (12 to 21 feet high), which lie 500 yards north and 400 yards northwest respectively of the end of Cap de Fedala. The 10 fathom contour lies about a mile from the shore, but an isolated shoal, Basse de Fedala, with 7 fathoms, rock bottom, lies one mile north of Cap de Fedala.

(2) Anchorage

Anchorage may be obtained in Baie de Fedala, in 33 to 54 feet, fine sand or rock bottom. The anchorage is exposed to the prevalent westerly swell, and holding ground is not good.

Berth recommended is due north of Minaret de la Kasba (Casbah) with Cap de Fedala bearing 292°, distant about 700 yards in 6½ fathoms, fine sand.

(3) Conspicuous objects

White oil tanks on Cap de Fedala.

Two chimneys, about 800 yards southwest of the south breakwater lighthouse.

Harbour Master's house, white, west of town and 1,100 yards west-south-west of the south breakwater lighthouse.

Minaret de la Kasba, about a mile south-south-east of the south breakwater lighthouse; difficult to identify from the west.

St. Jacques church tower, in middle of town, half a mile southwest of the south breakwater lighthouse.

Montagne de la Selle (Saddle hill), about 7 miles south of the port.

(4) Tides and currents

Spring rise 11½ feet.

Neap rise 9 feet.

Tidal streams are negligible.

Currents within 2 miles of the coast are reported to have a northerly set, but, except after southwesterly gales, they are negligible. In the offing the general set is southwesterly, parallel to the shore, at varying rates up to one knot.

(5) Weather

The port is accessible in all weathers, but off-loading into lighters at the anchorage is liable to be greatly hampered by swell. The swell from Mansouriah to Fedala is prevalent chiefly in the winter months. A moderate swell, 5 to 10 feet high, may be experienced at any time of year, but occurs most often in winter, averaging 8 to 9 days a month from October to December. A rather heavy swell, 10 to 16 feet high, may be expected on 3 to 6 days a month between October and April; and a heavy swell, 16 to 23 feet high, on one or two days a month from October to February.

(6) Description of harbor.

The harbor formed in the narrow western end of Baie de Fedala is enclosed by two breakwaters, the northern extending about 800 feet southeast from the peninsula of Cap de Fedala and the southern extending about 1,600 feet northeast of the breakwaters faces southeast and is about 600 feet wide. A channel, 270 feet wide, leading in from the eastward, was kept dredged to 19-1/2 up to the outbreak of the war. The main part of the harbor was dredged to the same depth.

Ships up to 445 feet long and 27 feet draught have used the harbors.

NORTHERN PART OF HARBOR.

Quai des Petroliers is a slightly dog-legged sea wall with two protruding quay faces, formerly the T heads of two oiling jetties. The ground behind the sea wall is being reclaimed. A small jetty extends 160 feet south from the eastern end of the sea wall.

Running southwest from Quai des Petroliers is a sea wall over 1,000 feet long leading on to the sand in the western end of the harbor, which dries at low water. Quai du Commerce, about 160 feet long, projects about 50 feet from this sea wall close to its northeastern end. For about 380 feet southwest of Quai du Commerce the sea wall is quayed and is used by lighters discharging cargo.

SOUTHERN PART OF HARBOR.

This part of the harbor is very shoal.

Immediately east of the southwestern end of the sea wall in the western part of the harbor is a sandy bay, which it is proposed to reclaim, though apparently work has not yet started.

Immediately east of this is a patent slip and a small repair yard, and close east of the slipway is a jetty, Quai des Bardiniers. The outer end of this jetty is narrower than the root; the approach was kept dredged to 6 feet up to the outbreak of the war.

From the root of Quai des Sardiniers a sea wall extends for about 190 yards to Quai des Chalutiers (Trawler Quay), a stone jetty lying nearly parallel to, and about 100 yards from, the southern breakwater. The Fish Market (Halle aux Poissons) is situated on the end of this jetty. The area between Quai des Sardiniers and Quai des Chalutiers is known as Port de Peche.

The area between Quai des Chalutiers and the southern breakwater is very shoal, and the sea wall at its southern end is almost hidden by sand (1941).

(7) Mooring buoys

Two (1941): one in northern part of Port de Peche, and one off the middle of the sea wall running southwest from Quai de Commerce.

(8) Accommodation

One ship of about 400 feet and 26 feet draught at Quai des Petroliers.

One ship of about 300 feet and 19 feet draught at Quai du Commerce.

Possibly one ship of 400 feet moored head and stern in the harbour.

(9) Method of discharge

By cranes of ships' appliances into trucks or lorries.

By ships' appliances into lighters at the anchorage 800 to 1,000 yards from the Quays.

(10) Quayage, cranage, and clearance from quays. (See attached table)

(11) Other cranage

Floating sheerlegs, 40 tons.

One fixed, steam crane, 10 tons, near railway sidings 80 feet behind lighter quay southwest of Quai du Commerce.

(12) Trade

Annual traffic (1937): 172 ships, total tonnage 172,000.

Imports: Mainly oil: total (1937) 62,677 tons.

Exports: Tinned sardines, fruit and vegetables for early market; total (1937) 3,024 tons.

(13) Essential civil traffic

Very small.

(14) Estimated daily capacity

One ship working 2 holds at Quai des Petroliers.....	300 tons
One small ship at Quai du Commerce	300 "
One small ship moored in harbour discharging into lighters.....	200 "
Total	800 Tons

In calm weather additional ships could discharge into lighters at the outer anchorage and (if mobile cranes were made available) on the Quai des Chalutiers, say 200 tons per day; but it is doubtful whether much more than 800 tons could be cleared from the port area.

(15) Harbour craft

The following were observed in November 1941:

6 tugs (one of 95 feet, 3 of 70-75 feet, and 2 of 50 feet).

12 lighters (5 of 50-75 feet and 7 under 50 feet). Some of these may be oil tank lighters. In addition one oil tank lighter of 500 tons (self-propelled).

One motor launch.

One dredger and one hopper.

About 25 fishing boats and unidentified small craft.

(16) Landing of men and stores by water transport

Men. At Quai des Chalutiers, at Quai des Sardiniers, and possibly on beach close east of the former.

Stores. At sea wall southwest of Quai du Commerce, and at Quai des Chalutiers. (A portable crane rigged on the latter would greatly facilitate this.)

Distance between ships at anchorage and landing places about 1,000 yds.

(17) Warehouses and stacking space

Little warehouse accommodation.

One warehouse adjacent to Quai du Commerce; two (one very small) behind Quai des Sardiniers. Fish market could probably be utilized. Railway lines alongside all of the above.

(18) Coal, oil, and water

Coal

Coal dump behind Quai du Commerce. Supplied to ships at anchor or alongside quays.

Oil

4 storage installations;

Shell: south-east end of promontory, immediately north of northern breakwater. 8 tanks, total capacity 4,262,806 gallons. 2 pipelines to Quai des Petroliers.

S.V.O.C. - Cimar: northeast end of promontory, north of Shell installation. 7 tanks, total capacity 3,322,698 gallons. 2 pipe lines to Quai des Petroliers.

Steaua Francaise: north-west of town, on tongue of land between the sea and Oued Mellah. 6 tanks, total capacity unknown, but over 1,010,000 gallons. 2 pipe lines to Quai des Petroliers.

Cie. Marocaine des Carburants: on western promontory, immediately west of lighthouse. 6 tanks, total capacity 1,393,800 gallons. An air intelligence analysis dated July, 1942, based on photos taken in January 1942, indicates the presence of 29 tanks. These are estimated to have a total capacity of 378,000 bbls.

Water

Laid on to quays.

(19) Docks, slipways, and repair facilities

No docks.

Patent slip (Cale da Halage), close west to Quai des Sardiniers: length 262,5 feet, lifting power 250 tons, capable of taking ships 196 feet long. There is also a small boat slip close west of patent slip.

Small repairs can be effected.

(20) Facilities for clearing port area

Rail. Railway sidings adjacent to all quays but not available for direct loading into trucks. Harbour branch joins main Casablanca-Petitjean (electrified) line close southwest of station, which is southeast of town.

Road. Road clearance by Rue Pasteur from western end of port to Rond Point Pasteur, then either through the town to Rond Point Petain or southeast by Boulevard des Zenatas parallel to the railway.

(21) Labor situation

Though plentiful, labor may be unwilling to work for money which can purchase no goods.

(10) Quays, cranage, and clearance from quays

Name	Depth at L.W. (feet)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Height above H.W. (feet)	No. of berths	Capacity No.	Capacity (tons)	Type
QUAI DES PETROLIERS Main Quay	28	230	About 90	About 6	-	-	-	-
Small quay close west of above	13	82	About 50	About 6	-	-	-	-
QUAI DU COMMERCE	19	168	About 90	About 6	-	2	2	Fixed, steam.
SEA WALL SOUTH-WEST OF QUAY DU COMMERCE	7 to 2	About 380	About 25	About 6	-	2	2	Fixed, steam.
QUAI DES SARDINIERS	3 (at N. end)	About 200	30(at N. end) 55 (at S. end)	2 to 6	-	-	-	-
QUAI DES CHALUTIERS Western quay	About 10	About 220	About 15	About 5	-	-	-	-
Head	About 10	About 120	10 to 50	About 5	-	-	-	-

Height in feet above chart datum			Spring rise $8\frac{1}{4}$ feet.
	(M.H.W.S.	11.5	
	(M.H.W.H.	8.9	
	(M.L.W.N.	4.6	
	(M.L.W.S.	2.3	

Rail, road, and discharge facilities.	Remarks
No facilities for discharging cargo, but if part of the dividing wall were destroyed lorries could probably be brought onto quay from Quai du Commerce.	Used by tankers discharging oil: 7 pipelines, some of which are carried well above quay level. Tankers of over 400 ft. can be berthed.
No facilities for discharging cargo, but it would appear quite practicable to bring lorries on to quay from Quai du Commerce.	Formerly dead of original oiling pier. Tankers of 300 ft. have been seen alongside.
By cranes and ships' appliances into lorries. A single railway track just reachds back of quay, but as it cannot be spanned by the cranes it would probably be of very little use in clearing cargo.	Ships up to about 300 ft. could berth alongside, but if a ship of that length were berthed it would probably prevent use of small oil quay above. Coal dump behind quay.
Lighters discharge by cranes into trucks or lorries. A single railway track runs along quay.	Quay available for lighters only. The two cranes are built on projections slightly outside line of quay, 100 and 200 ft. respectively SW. of Quay du Commerce. One warehouse and good stacking space behind railway. (Note: The sea wall SW. of the quayed part has a steeply sloping face and an additional length of about 100 ft. might be available for lighters.)
None.	Used exclusively by small fishing craft The southern 120 ft. is 55 feet wide, and 6 ft. high. Northern part is 30 ft. wide and slopes down to about 2 feet above H.W.
A single railway track runs along east side to end of quay.	Used by trawlers. Total length about 500 ft. Effective quayage apparently confined to north part of west side and head of quay (which is set at an angle to its general line of direction). Fish market is on north part of quay and limits the width of the quays to the dimensions given.

CASABLANCA.

Description. This is the most important port on the French Moroccan Atlantic coast. The artificial harbor is formed by two breakwater-docks, the Jettee Delue which extends northeastward from the northern end of the town, and the Jettee Transversale, extending north-northwestward from a position about a mile southeastward of the root of the Jettee Delure. Entrance to this harbor is effected through an opening between the end of the Jettee Transversale and a section of the Jettee Delure. This opening is about 300 yards wide. There is another quai jutting into the harbor from the shore and running parallel to the Jettee Transversale. It is called the Mole de Commerce and it separates the harbor into two basins. This artificial harbor can accommodate up to three battleships, a squadron of cruisers, and as many as two flotillas of destroyers.

Due to the extensive wharfage in the harbor, it is an excellent place for embarkation and disembarkation of troops. In 1935 there was a total length of 11,320 feet of quayage in the harbor, of which about 10,000 feet were available for vessels with a draught of over 23 ft.
The quay of Jettee Transversale, the northern end of which is reserved for vessels embarking phosphates and fuel, and Quay Delpit, on the northeastern side of the Mole de Commerce, are each available to vessels with a draught of 29-1/2 ft.

The docks mentioned above are connected with the railway system and therefore goods can be put aboard trains on these quays for shipment into the hinterland. There is a granery and storage facilities on the Mole de Commerce. Recently, three heavy service cranes have been mounted on this quay. Our observer was of the opinion that they were for loading heavy tanks.

Anchorages. There are numerous anchorage berths inside the harbor with depths up to 46 ft. Just outside of the harbor anchorages may be had, but berths with better holding grounds are located north of the head of Jettee Delure.

Port facilities.

Jettee Transversale. The northern end is used for vessels embarking phosphates and fuel. Length of docks: 890 yards. Depth: 29 ft. Seven berths. One 12-ton traveling crane to load ore in freighters.

Mole du Commerce.

Quai Delpit -	length	825 yds.	Depth	29 ft.
Quai Delande -	"	575 "	"	23 ft.
Quai de Tableau -		220 "	"	23 ft.

Warehouses cover an area of 40,000 sq. yards. A grain silo, capacity 300,000 quintals. Loading at rate of 400 tons per hour. Phosphate silo loading at rate of 1800 tons per hour. Cranes: 30 five-ton.

electric; one 1-12 ton electric; one floating crane- 15 tons; floating sheers at 150 tons; and 2-15 ton bunking cranes (used for coal).

Inner harbor. Length of docks: 460 ft. Accessible to vessels up to 246 ft. in length and 15 ft. draught.

Floating dock moored in Bassin Delpit. It has a traveling crane of 10-ton capacity (lifting). Length: 447 ft.; width, 607 ft., lifting capacity, 5,500 tons.

One patent slip capable of taking a vessel of 1,000 tons.

The docks are connected with the railway system, and there is approximately 16 miles of trackage on the docks.

Port cargo handling capacity: 8,300 tons per day. Of this amount 5,660 tons could be handled by the railroads and the balance would have to be handled by trucks or stored.

Harbor craft.

	No.	Gross Tons	Length	Horse-power
Tugs -	1	43	62	150
	1	45	75	150
	1	132	80	650
	1	122	80	504
	1	283	121	1050
	8 smaller tugs.			

(Three of the larger tugs are sea-going. One is a salvage vessel, equipped with pumps and capable of carrying forty people.)

Cargo craft, lighters and barges -

5 water-tank boats, capacity 50-100 tons
5 barges - 120-160 tons
18 " - 80-100 tons
30 " - 50-60 tons
40 " - 30 tons

Fuel oil pipe lines: There are two fuel oil pipe lines for Navy use connecting the Army and Navy petroleum depot with the port:

a) One for fuel oil - 12 inches.
b) One for fuel oil - underground protection - pumping station at port.

There is also one pipe line for gas-oil. This is being repaired or changed.

CASABLANCA.

Fixed Defenses.

Minefields.

There is no evidence of mining at Casablanca, though there have been reports of mine exports being sent to Casablanca during 1941, and of the assembly of mines in small quantities at the Magazine at Bou Skoura (10 miles south of Casablanca), but it is not known where these mines are intended. It has been reported that the heavy swell prevalent on the coast makes the secure mooring of mines impossible.

Booms or nets.

A boom closing the harbor entrance extends south-southeast from the short spur jetty projecting from Jettee Delure to a buoy moored about 27 yards northeast of the pilot station at the head of Jettee Transversale. It is supported by cylindrical drums, spaced about 12 to 15 feet between centers, and is believed to be a French-type- anti-torpedo net, consisting of steel nets reaching to the bottom (36 to 46 ft. deep).

A large buoy moored midway between the heads of the spur jetty and Jettee Transversale divides the net in two. The northern section, supported by 22 drums appears to be permanent; the southern section, supported by 19 drums forms the gate, secured at its northern end to the large buoy just mentioned; the gate is opened by securing its southeastern end to a third large buoy, moored 100 yards northeast of the middle buoy. The gate is reported to be opened and closed by towing. The same report states that the gate is opened by day, and, when it is closed by night, an armed trawler is moored to the northeastern buoy.

The gap between the southeastern end of the gate, when closed, and the head of Jettee Transversale is used by small craft. This gap is reported to be sometimes protected by a steel cable (this may be the wire hawser used for closing the gate should the "towing" report not be true).

In May 1942, in addition to the anti-torpedo net across the harbor entrance, an anti-boat boom was observed; it consists of 11 or 12 rectangular pontoon sections, about 50 feet long and spaced about 10 feet apart. The anti-torpedo net was seen drawn back parallel to Jettee Delure; it is probably moored alongside the anti-boat boom when the latter is closed.

What appears to be a line of small floats extends southeast from the head of Epi Vrignaud to the large raft, carrying Naval Offices, moored in the middle of the entrance to Petit Port, thus closing off the northwestern part of the entrance. It has the appearance of some form of net defense, but there appears to be no reason why Petit Port (depth of water only 13 feet) should be so defended.

The battleship "Jean Bart" alongside the northwestern end of Quai Delande, is surrounded by a double line of torpedo netting. The two lines, which are about 100 feet apart, are moored to two series of buoys and converge to moorings on Quai Delande at either end of the ship.

Off-shore warning devices.

In December 1941 it was reported that three submarine detector cables run northeast, north, and northwest respectively from the eastern end of Jettee Delure and connect to a post on the spur jetty. Another report of the same date states that the cables enter the water on the southeastern side of Jettee Delure, 300 yards northeast of the spur jetty. From this point there is reported to be a connection to the Admiralty Offices.

The French have knowledge of asdics but are known to favor the use of hydrophones; it is quite possible, however, that the cables reported are loop indicators. In May 1942 "Alpha" equipment (? asdics or hydrophones) was reported.

There is a buoy a few yards east of the end of Jettee Delure, which may either mark the end of the foundations or possibly have some connection with defense.

Coastal defenses.

4 - 194 mm (7.6") guns) At Point El Hank, Naval
4 - 138 mm (5.4") guns, also range finders (all around transverse.
4 - 155 mm (Possibly 100 mm) guns 2 kilometers N.E. of Roches Noire at Aoukacha Point.
2 - 75 mm CD guns in open concrete barbettes on pilotage jetty at the end of the Jetty Transversale.
18 - Concrete block houses at 100 meter intervals for machine guns along sea side of Jetty Transversal.
5 - Concrete gun casements (estimated from reports) on Jetty Delure between 1550 and 2100 meter points (measured from shore). These are connected by a tunnel.

Anti-Air

1 - or 2 btrys 75 mm long AA guns near lighthouse at Point El Hank; also 2 twin 37 mm machine guns and 4 AA machine guns of 8 mm.
8 - 90 mm long AA guns in pairs mounted in gun shields to left and right of entrance to Jetty Transversal also their searchlights, range finders, etc.
4 - 90 mm (possibly 40 mm) long AA guns mounted in pairs at 1000 meters mark on Jetty Delure.
3 - Heavy M.G. or "pompom" shelters of concrete on small jetty extending S.E. from Jetty Delure at 1650 meter mark; also 2 - 13.2 mm AA machine guns around beacon at end of this.
1 - (possibly 2)..batteries of 75 mm or 90 mm long AA guns on golf course at Anfa. Concrete marks under construction.
6 - or 8 - 13.2 anti-aircraft MG on golf course; also range finders, searchlights, etc.
1 - btry of 75 mm or 90 mm long AA at Beau ain Sebou (7 kilos up Rabat road measured from the Place de France at Casablanca.).
2 or 4 Double 13.2 mm and 37 mm AA machine guns right side of road leading into Jetty Transversal.

2 - AA 13.2 mm MG around signal station on pilotage jetty, also a searchlight.
6 - 13.2mm machine AA guns on roof of phosphate shed on Jetty Transversal.
4 - pairs of 13.2 mm machine guns on building roof at entrance to Mole du Commerce.
1 - Btry of 75 mm AA guns recently reported to be mounted in the square of the Depot dis Equipages.
2 - Machine AA guns on roof of Garde Mobile Bldg.

Naval.

Battleship "Jean Bart."
15 - 37mm long AA guns
12 - 13.2mm AA MG's. (Some 90mm AA guns).
Usually two cruisers, some destroyers, and a number of submarines.

Torpedo tubes.

There is no evidence of the existence of any land torpedo tubes.

Coast artillery searchlights.

S/L 1 In view of their inland site and limited range of horizontal vision, it is exceedingly unlikely that these searchlights would be used on surface targets.

S/L 3 Jetee Transversale: one or two searchlights reported on roof of pilot station.

S/L 4 Jetee Delue (Grande Jetee) and spur jetty: there is a searchlight in the tower at the head of the spur jetty.

S/L 5 El Hank barracks: in a building adjoining the barracks is a searchlight, believed to be of 36 inches diameter, with an arc of approximately 180° from east, through north to west; the generator is on the ground floor, and the searchlight is run out on rails (when required) from the floor above.

Obstructions.

Underwater. There are apparently no obstructions deliberately laid as such.
The French minelayer "La Tour du Auvergne" was wrecked by internal explosion alongside the northern part of Quai Delure. Salvage work has been carried out; the fore part has been cut adrift from the after part and is now floating. Wreckage from the after part may still be an underwater obstruction. Depth of water in vicinity is 36 feet.

Surface wiring. There are signs of local defenses on the coast due north of the Ain Sebaa district.

There have been several high-grade reports of barbed and H.T.

electrified barbed wire along the top of the concrete parapet (6 feet high) which runs along the seaward (north-east) side of Jetee Transversale to a point 100 yards from the head of the jetty. One report states that three H.T. cables are fixed on porcelain insulators attached to iron rails fixed at right angles to the eastern side of the Jetee (as a precaution against landing) along the whole length; but it is not quite clear whether this means low down on the water or, as in the other reports mentioned above, at an angle to the top of the wall. The switch controlling the cables is reported to be at the pilot station.

A wire fence (not barbed) is reported to run across the root of the narrowed portion at the head of Jetee Transversale, thus isolating the pilot station and the pillboxes at the head of the jetty from the main part of the jetty.

The area round Boulevard Sour Djedid (the boulevard on the south side of the Naval Barracks) is reported to be surrounded by wire.

Wire is reported to run along the beach from the Admiralty Offices to the swimming-baths (piscine Municepale).

It must also be assumed that all coast defense and A/A defense positions are wired or are strong points in themselves.

Walls.

There is a concrete wall, 6-1/2 ft. high and 4 inches thick, from the root of Jettee Transversale to the root of Jetee Delure. This wall is reported to have electrified barbed wire along the top, joining up with the similar wire running on top of Jetee Transversale parapet.

A wall also encloses the Admiralty Offices and Naval barracks west of the root of Jetee Delure. The wire reported in the Boulevard Sour Djedid area possibly surmounts this wall.

Trenches.

Except for trenches close to a school in the Maarif district, about 500 yards south-east of the Velodrome, which might possibly be for defense purposes, there are apparently no trenches other than open air-raid shelters.

Balloon barrage.

There is no evidence of a balloon barrage, but towards the end of 1941 a shed 250 yards east of the root of Jetee Transversale was reported as being a hangar for a balloon or airship. There has been another (unconfirmed) report of a balloon being seen inside the (hangar).

Warning systems.

There is a D.F. station at Casablanca (Cazes) aerodrome, but there is no evidence of any R.D.F. (Note: It is believed that since the

Armistice the French have continued experiments on ultra-short and C.M. waves, and there are reports that the destroyer "Mameluck" has been fitted with a modern D.F. set, by which an R.D.F. set or perhaps a submarine listening device was meant. It is further reported that the "Strasbourg" has been fitted with a "detecteur-ultra-son". What appear to be R.D.F. aerials were seen on the "Richelieu" at Dakar. In view of the above it is quite possible that there is some form of R.D.F. installed.

General.

Degaussing plant. It was reported that a "demagnitization" plant had been erected on Jetee Transversale. In March 1942 two parallel lines of floats, (probably baulks of timber and buoys) were seen projecting 750 feet south-west from the north-west corner of Quai des Phosphates. It is very probably that these are in fact a degaussing plant, since a ship has been seen moored inside them.

Magazines. The main magazine for Casablanca is reported to be at Bou Skoura, on the more westerly road to Ber Rechid, 11-1/2 statute miles due south of Pointe d'El Hank. There is also said to be an ammunition store at Medioura, 7 statute miles east of Bou Skoura, on the Marrakech road.

It is also reported that ammunition or armaments are stored in warehouses Nos. 15 and 17, situated close south of Bassin Delande (400 yards southwest, and 300 yards, south, respectively, of the grain silo on Mole du Commerce).

A warehouse, probably No. 1 (the most north-easterly) warehouse, on Mole du Commerce is reported to contain torpedoes.

State of efficiency of coast defenses. It is believed that there is frequent A/A practice and though it is not known to what extent coast defense guns are exercised, there has been a report that the battery at Port Blondin (Fedala) is "well regulated and made excellent practice against towed targets;" and the two batteries at El Hank have occasional practice. In view of the amount of ammunition believed to be crossing from France to North Africa, there is no reason to suppose that the coast defense guns have not adequate stocks of ammunition or that the A/A guns have not at least an initial supply.

Annex No 3
to FO 1

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf
Camp Pickett, Va.,
1200 17 Oct '42

ALTERNATE PLANS

ALTERNATE PLAN AFFIRM ONE : In event either BLT 1, RLG-7 or BLT 2, RLG-7 is not available to land at its prescribed beach:

CO RLG-7 will employ his reserve BLT to perform the mission prescribed for the missing BLT.

BLT 1, RLG-15 will become available to RLG-7 and will perform the mission prescribed for BLT 3, RLG-7

ALTERNATE PLAN BAKER ONE : In event either BLT 1, PLG-30 or BLT 2 RLG-30 is not available to land at its prescribed beach:

CO RLG-30 will employ his reserve BLT, less Co L, to perform the mission prescribed for the missing BLT.

BLT 1, RLG-15 will become available to RLG-30 and will perform the mission prescribed for the BLT 3, RLG-30, less Co L.

Co L, RLG-30, will perform the mission prescribed for it regardless of where the remainder of BLT 3 is employed.

ALTERNATE PLAN BAKER TWO : If Co L, RLG-30, reinf, is not available to land at Beach BLUE-3 because of its failure to arrive in the transport area, another company of BLT 3, RLG-30 will be designated to perform this mission.

ALTERNATE PLAN BAKER THREE : If BLT 1 RLG-15 is employed under Plan A and thus not available to RLG 30, the BLT 3, RLG-15 will perform the mission originally prescribed for BLT 3, RLG-30.

ALTERNATE PLAN CAST ONE : BLT 1, RLG-15 land at Beach YELLOW, advance inland, capture coastal defenses at Point Oukacha and attack enemy forces in vicinity of Beach YELLOW.

ALTERNATE PLAN CAST TWO : BLT 1, RLG-15 land at Beach YELLOW-2 on "Brushwood" order as soon after H-hour as it can be determined that Beach Y-2 is suitable, advance rapidly inland, seize and secure the bridges over the WADI MELLAH within the "Brushwood" D-day objective for use in the advance on CASABLANCA.

ALTERNATE PLAN CAST THREE : BLT 3, RLG-15 land at Beach YELLOW, advance inland, capture coastal defenses at Point Oukacha and attack enemy forces in vicinity of Beach YELLOW.

ALTERNATE PLAN: DOG ONE BLT 1, RLG-15 land at Beach BLUE 3, advance inland, attack flank and rear of enemy resistance opposing RLG-30.

ALTERNATE PLAN DOG TWO : RLG-15 land at BLUE 3, advance inland, attack flank and rear of enemy resistance opposing RLG-30.

ALTERNATE PLAN EASY ONE : Elements of RLG-15 to be designated in the order from "Brushwood," land at beach to be designated, reinforce elements previously landed at that beach. For example: BLT 2, RLG-15 land at Beach BLUE, BLUE 2 or BLUE 3, reinforce RLG-30.

ALTERNATE PLAN FOX ONE : 2d Bn, 20th Engrs land on "Brushwood" order at beach to be designated and perform a mission other than relief of BLT 1, RLG-7; For example: Land at Beach BLUE 2 and defend crossings over WADI NEFIFIKH, relieving RLG-30.

ALTERNATE PLAN GEORGE: (To be followed on "Brushwood" order, in the event the landing(H-hour) is after daylight.

MAPS: FO 1, no change

a FO 1, no change.

b FO 1, no change.

c Naval Fire Support Groups of the Fleet will support the attack as follows:

(1) Commencing at Daylight: By fire on hostile coastal defenses.

(2) From H -30 to H-5 by fire on Beaches RED-2, RED-3, BLUE and BLUE-2 and thereafter on call as follows:

(a) 1 DD in direct support of landing on Beach RED-3.
(b) 1 DD in direct support of landing on Beach BLUE.
(c) 1 DD in direct support of landing on Beach BLUE-2.
(d) 1 CA or CL in direct support of landing on Beach RED-2.
(e) 1 CA in direct support of landing on Beach BLUE-3.

(3) The leading wave of each assault landing team will be accompanied by 2 Support Boats equipped with rocket projectiles. These boats will support the landing of their respective landing teams by fire on the beach. After the landing, they will continue to support the advance by fire on targets inland.

d (1) FO 1, no change.

(2) FO 1, no change.

(3) FO 1, no change.

(4) Bombing and strafing enemy beach defenses from H-20 to H-2.

2. FO 1, no change.

3. FO 1, no change except 3f to read as follows:

3d Recn: Remain aboard transport awaiting "Brushwood" order.

4. FO 1, no change.

5. FO 1, no change.

OFFICIAL:

ANDERSON

HARRELL,
G-3

[redacted]

****
* [redacted] *
Auth: CG Brushwood
*Initials [illegible] *
Date Oct 15, 1942
****

Annex No. 4 to FO No. 1

1. SUPPLY:

a. Class I, II, III, IV, and V--Resupply initially from beach dumps as required.

b. Water: Resupply from beach until establishment of water points ashore, by Engineers. All water will be chlorinated. Individua l chlorination tablets (12 per bottle) issued will be used when water is obtained from other than specified Army Supply Points, on the basis of two tablets per canteen of water.

2. EVACUATION:

a. Casualties:

(1) While in small Boats. Casualties incurred in landing craft will not be landed but returned to transport.
(2) Ashore:
(a) To Aid Station: By litter bearers of battalion and regimental medical sections.
(b) To Beach: Initially by medical sections Bn. service and supply parties. Later by collecting companies attached to RLGs under RLG control.
(3) Clearing Station: To be established on order of Sub-Task Force commander.

b. Co-ordination with Navy. Medical Officer 3d Medical Battalion attached to each Batta lion LT (Service & Supply Party) is designated as the "Army Evacuation Officer" to assist the "Naval Beach Evacuation Officer" in:

(1) Selection of site nea r beach from which casualities are to be taken over by Navy.
(2) Sorting of Casualties to determine those to be given first priority for evacuation to transports.

c. Burial: Collection by units. Reports giving exact location by map reference and sketch to G-1. Burial by Quartorma ster under Special instructions.

d. Salvage: Initially by Units to Beach Dumps. Reports to G-4.

e. Captured Material: Initially to be used or disposed of as determined by unit commander with report of facts to G-4. Any large quantity of material captured will be promptly reported and guarded until receipt of instructions.

f. Prisoners of War:

(1) Special Instructions Annex No. 2.
(2) Enclosure--To be announced. Evacuation to and operation of enclosure by Division Provost Marshall.

g. Internees: Special instructions Annex No. 2.

3. TRAFFIC: Initially under Landing Team Commanders.

4. TRAINS:

a. All motor vehicles initially will be pooled, under Battalion and in turn under Regimental Landing Team Commanders.

b. All vehicles on trips to beaches will assist in evacuation of litter casualties and will stop at collecting stations for this purpose.

nnex No. 4 to FO No. 1 (continued)

c. Division Motor Pool: All motor transportation of all units of "Drushood" and such transportation as may be obtained under special instructions issued ill operate as a Sub-Task Force Pool under the Qua rtermaster.

5. PERSONNEL: S'raggler lines and collecting points initially as prescribed by Landing Team Commanders.

6. MISCELLANEOUS:

(a) S-1 reports (midnight to midnight) to G-1 by o730 daily.
(b) S-4 reports (midnight to midnight) to G-4 by 0730 daily.
(c) Battle casualty reports: As required.
(d) Property accountability: Cir. 105 W.D. '42, No formal accounting for supplies will be required (FM 100-10 par. 522). No formal accounting for property while in the theater of operation (FM 100-10 par. 520).

ANDERSON
Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

NEWTON
G-4

Annex No. 5
G No. 1

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf,
Camp Pickett, Va.,
1200 17 Oct '42

Annex 5

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. EXISTING WIRE FACILITIES:

The following wire communication facilities exist in FRENCH MOROCCO:

a Submarine Cable:

(1) CASABLANCA to DAKAR---one cable.
(2) CASABLANCA to BREST, FRANCE---one cable. (This cable has been cut
(3) CASABLANCA to TANGIER---three cables.

b Telegraph:

(1) RABAT to CASABLANCA.
(2) CASABLANCA to MAZAGAR-SAFI-MOGADOR-AGADIR.
(3) CASABLANCA to MARRANECK-MOGADOR.

c Telephone:

(1) Telephone Cable:

(a) RABAT to CASABLANCA (underground) consists of 59 quads, 2 screened pairs, 60 of above used for dialing between CASABLANCA and RABAT. Equipment supplied by Compagnie Generale des Constructions Telephoniques.

(2) Telephone Lines (overhead):

(a) CASABLANCA to MARRAKECH to MOGADOR
(b) Lines generally along coast through MOGADOR, MAZAGAR, CASABLANCA, RABAT ARBAOVA, ARZILE, TANGIER.

(3) Telephone Central Offices at:

(a) CASABLANCA---6,000 line automatic exchange; R-6 system supplied by Thomson-Huston---also has repeater station.
(b) Best information indicates that many of the smaller towns have telephone service. Most of these towns probably have small common battery or magneto type switchboards.

d Miscellaneous:

(1) It is believed that telephone and telegraph lines are built along most of the railroads and main travelled highways. There are approximately 4,000 miles of telegraph lines in FRENCH MOROCCO.

(2) Approximately fifty percent of the common battery-manual systems will probably use high resistance transmitters.

(3) There are emergency telephone stations in most of the smaller towns and along most of the secondary roads of the interior.

2. EXISTING RADIO FACILITIES:

	Call Sign	Freq, Kilo	Power Aerial KW	Position and Details
CASABLANCA	CNP	132	2	PTT Coast Station
		143	2	33° 36' N
		447	2	7° 38' 05" W
		500	2	Service exclusive to
		8,333	2	shipping. 24 hr. ser-
		11,235	2	vice. Conjoined with
		17,725		Chetaba (Gonio) near Casablanca. Transmits meteorological bulletins and navigational warnings on 447 or 500 Kc/s on request.

	Call Sign	Freq, Kilo	Power Aerial KW	Position and Detail
CASABLANCA (Aeradio)	CNB	257	2	Air Ministry Station 33° 34' 36" N. 7° 37' 21" W No other details available.
		264	2	
		268	2	
		272	2	
		276	2	
		280	2	
		284	2	
		287	2	
		288	2	
		336	2	
		340	2	
		447	2	
		5,600	2	
		6,375	2	
		6,975	2	
		11,152	2	
		8,220	2	

3. EXISTING POWER FACILITIES:

a Most of the electric power in FRENCH MOROCCO is provided from water power generating plants.

b The largest stream power plant is located at CASABLANCA and has a capacity of 14,500 KW.

c The railroad system is largely electrified with transmission lines along the right-of-way. No information is available regarding these lines.

d Local Power Facilities:

Locality	Voltage	Characteristics	Power Available
CASABLANCA	110/190	3 phase 50 cycle	*14,500 KW
FEDALA	115/200	3 phase 50 cycle	*----------

* Connected to transmission line net-work.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES FOR SIGNAL COUNTER MEASURES:

a "Jamming" tactics.

b False Messages.

c Interception of our traffic.

d Cryptanalysis of our codes and ciphers.

5. SECURITY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN:

a Prior to D Day:

(1) No radio set will be allowed to switch on during the voyage. Commanding officers will take steps to bring to the notice of all radio operators that infringement of this order may jeopardize the safety of the entire convoy.

(2) Army circuits will maintain radio silence until H-hour.

b Ashore:

(1) Radio: Enemy interception and direction finder operations will be counteracted by:

(a) Limiting transmitter power to minimum required.
(b) Reducing transmission time to minimum and breaking necessary long transmissions into short irregular intervals.
(c) Locating transmitters away from Command Posts and other important installations.
(d) Using prescribed radio procedures exactly and without variations.

(e) Adherence to rules of cryptographic security.
(f) Constant monitoring of nets and strict enforcement of radio discipline.
(g) Authentication procedure will be used on all radio transmission. Messages not properly authenticated will be so marked.

(2) Enemy interference on our radio channels can be avoided by use of tone modulation wherever possible, or of CW instead of voice.

(3) Clear text will be used only when speed is of greater importance than secrecy and the enemy has not time to act on information transmitted. Cryptographic text will be used at all other times.

(4) The 3d Signal Company will provide for radio interception, direction finder, and monitoring missions.

Radio ruses, faked messages etc, will be organized and directed by the Signal Service, WTF.

Information gathered by radio, interception and position finding will be submitted to G-2, Hq 3d Inf Div.

(5) Wire:

a Field and open wire lines and cables will be patrolled completely at irregular and frequent intervals to guard against tapping. Captured commercial wire lines will be completely isolated from outside connections before being put in use.

b Conversations will be carefully guarded. The use of simple local codes within units is encouraged.

(6) Distribution of Codes and Ciphers: See SOI 2 (d) 1

6. DETAILED SIGNAL PLAN:

a Message Centers:

(1) Message centers will be operated continuously. Personnel to operate message centers aboard ship will be provided by embarked units.

b Messengers:

(1) While at sea and then in cases of emergency only, destroyers may be called upon to act as messengers between the major Hq ships. This use will be reduced to absolute minimum, since it deprives the convoy of necessary protection.

(2) During landing operations, maximum possible use will be made of boats shuttling from ship to shore for messenger service.

(3) In towns where there is any doubt as to the loyalty of the native population, foot messengers will be provided additional protection.

(4) Maximum use will be made of Liaison officers from major units and subordinate HQs for special messenger service or for carrying classified items.

c Radio:

(1) Joint US Army -Navy Procedure, FM 24-10 will be used on all nets of Task Force "Brushwood."

(2) Ship-Shore Communications will be established in accordance with United States Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force Tentative SOP dated 28 August 1942.

(3) Shore Fire Control Parties will be allocated to each

assault battalion. One frequency is allocated to each party.

(4) Two Naval Air Support Parties are available to Sub Task Force "Brushwood," and will be employed with assault RLGs. Each of these above parties includes 1 SCR-193 mounted in a ¼ ton 4x4 truck, provided and manned by the 1st Armd Signal Bn. One Naval Air Liaison officer will travel with each vehicle.

(5) Ground Air Support parties will be allocated as follows:

Sub Task Force "Brushwood"	1
Each Infantry BLT	1 (Total 9)
Grand Total:	10

Equipment provided for each of the above Ground-Air Support parties consists of 1 SCR-193 mounted in a ¼ ton 4x4 truck.

(6) Call Signs: The basic call sign is allocated to Headquarters afloat. When each headquarters is established ashore the Suffix 1 will be appended to the basic call sign for the shore station.

(7) All ships' radios operating on Military or Joint Shore Party channels will open listening watch at H minus 30 minutes.

d. Wire:

(1) Full use will be made of telegraph to provide additional channels.

e Visual Communication:

(1) During the voyage assistance may be required by the Navy of the Military and Military Communication officers who will cooperate closely with Naval Communication Officers and will provide such visual operators as are required to insure sufficient visual facilities between ships.

(2) During the assault phase, one of the principal channels of communication between the beaches and to the seaward will be visual signalling either by lamp or flag.

(3) Units and formations ashore will utilize their visual equipment to the maximum ashore after landing.

(4) Panels: The standard panel signals will be used as prescribed in the Air-Ground Liaison Code. A directional arrow may be used with any panel signal to further amplify its meaning.

(5) Pyrotechnics: (Also in SCI)

(1) By Ground Troops:

Signal, ground, Amber Star, parachute M21--Lift Fire
Signal, ground, Green Star, cluster M20--Visual Message Received.
Signal, ground, Green Star, parachute M19--Cease Firing (Artillery or Navy)
Signal, ground, White Star, cluster, M18--objective taken
Signal, ground, White Star, parachute, M17--For Artillery Use Only (Range Indicating)
Signal, ground, high burst ranging, M27--For artillery only
Signal, ground, range indicating, parachute M47--For Artillery only. Range Indicating
Grenade, hand, yellow, smoke--Indicates to our aircraft the presence of our troops.

(2) By Aircraft:

Double Star red-red, interim type, AN-M28--Mark your front line.
Double Star yellow-yellow, interim type, AN-M29--Display Ident Panels
Double Star green-green, interim type, AN-M30--Remove Panels
Single Star red, interim type, AN-M34--Friendly Plane
Single Star yellow, interim type, An-M-35--Signal not Understood.
Single Star, green, interim type, AN-M36---Signal Understood.

7. COMMUNICATION ISOLATION PLAN:

The following plan for the interruption of and making available to our own troops communication facilities in Task Force "Brushwood" sector will be carried out:

a Radio Broadcast and Communication stations will be located on operation maps.

b Radio Communication will be interrupted as soon as possible and with least possible damage to equipment. Each interruption will be directed to power and antenna installations rather than transmitter equipment. A small detachment from Co. C, 829th Sig Service Bn will accompany Sub Task Force "Brushwood" for the purpose of repairing any damage to these stations.

c Submarine cables will be interrupted as soon as possible by taking control of cable terminals. No attempt will be made to grapple for cables or to cut lines under water.

d Telephone cables and open wire lines will be interrupted at the first contact. Interruptions will be of a temporary nature, capable of being readily repaired. Small detachments of the 239th Signal Operation Co. will accompany Sub Task Force "Brushwood" for the purpose of repairing any damage to the main cable and wire lines.

e Telephone Central Offices will be taken over in a manner similar to radio stations. Service will be interrupted by cutting lines rather than by damaging Central Office equipment. Small detachments from the 239th Signal Operation Company will accompany Sub Task Force "Brushwood" for the purpose of repairing damage to Central Offices.

f Allottment of existing commercial facilities:

(1) Wire and radio facilities will be allocated to services as and when captured and ready for use.

(2) Special instructions relative to traffic over commercial systems, call signs and frequencies to be used will be published when systems become available.

8. MAINTENANCE:

a Every radio set operated from day batteries will land with new batteries installed and three new sets of batteries spare. These spare batteries will be carried in a watertight container. All batteries will be tested with a voltmeter prior to landing, and dates on batteries checked. No time expired batteries will be used.

b During the voyage all dry batteries will receive special consideration as to storage. They will be stored in the coolest, driest possible place in the ship and will be enclosed in waterproof containers.

c Radio sets will be stored aboard ship in the driest and coolest possible place.

d All signal equipment subject to salt water damage will be waterproofed before being brought ashore.

e 3d Signal Company will operate a signal corps repair service for radio, wire and other communications equipment for the entire command, except that units will be responsible for first echelon repairs to all communications equipment issued to them.

ANDERSON

OFFICIAL: [illegible]

HADDELL
G-3

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

Annex No 7 to FO 1. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. For details on type of fire support for night landing see paragraph 1c FO 1.

2. For details on type of fire support for daylight landing see Alternate Plan George.

3. Fire Support Groups 61, 62, 63, 4, 5, will furnish close supporting fire to the following elements Task Force "Brushwood" commencing at daylight.

a D-Day:

FSG 5	1CL	1 Bn, 7th Inf
FSG 61	1DD	2 Bn, 7th Inf
FSG 62	1DD	1 Bn, 30th Inf
FSG 63	1DD	2 Bn, 30th Inf
FSG 4	1CA	General Support

b D plus 1 Day:

FSG 5	1CL	1 Bn, 7th Inf
FSG 61	1DD	2 Bn, 7th Inf
FSG 62	1DD	1 Bn, 15th Inf
FSG 63	1DD	2 Bn, 15th Inf
FSG 4	1CA	General Support

c DD's will furnish close supporting fire with main batteries, and CA, CL with secondary batteries, on request of Shore Fire Control Parties.

4. For the purpose of Naval Gunfire, the following M-square grid system (See CSP 734 p 40-41) will be used. Allant 57 will not be used for Naval Gunfire.

a M-square grid system (BLUE) Center Attack Force. Latitude 33° 10' N; Longitude 800' W of Greenwich. Length of side, Latitude and Longitude, 20 minutes.

b Shore Fire Control Parties will be prepared to utilize other M-square grid systems used by Task Force "A."

(1) M-square grid system (GREEN) Latitude 32° 20' N; Longitude 9°40' W of Greenwich. Length of side, Latitude and Longitude, 20 minutes.

(2) M-square system (RED) Latitude 34° 00' N; Longitude 6° 20' W of Greenwich. Length of side, Latitude and Longitude, 20 minutes.

(3) M-square system (YELLOW) Latitude 35° 40' N; Longitude 6° 00' W of Greenwich. Length of side, Latitude and Longitude, 20 minutes.

c The origins designated above are those of the SOUTH WEST corner of the base grid (Square M) of each M-square system.

d Near the junction of any two systems, color will be radioed in the clear.

5. Shore Fire Control Parties superimpose M-square system (BLUE) on 1/50,000 scale maps---FEDALA and CASABLANCA sheets.

6. Rapid fire will be the fire minute rate on all targets for a maximum of three minutes.

7. In event of enemy air or sea activity, Fire Support Groups will cease shore bombardment. Information will be radioed in clear to Shore Fire Control Parties.

8. The following signals will be used:

Amber Star Parachute---Lift Fire
Green Star Parachute---Cease Fire
Hand Grenade, Yellow Smoke---Indicate to aircraft presence of our troops.

9. Shore Fire Control Parties will use Shore Fire Control Code (USF 100B) revised May, 1942. Authenticators will not be used.

10. On order from Hqs 3d Inf Div, RLG 15 will dispatch one Shore Fire Control Party to the forward echelon, 3d Div Command Post to utilize FSG 4 as general support.

11. At direction of any BLT commander, Shore Fire Control Parties will radio information in clear to FSG when Battery Blondin has been captured.

12. For call fires see map 1/50,000 CASABLANCA and FEDALA Sheets as provided Shore Fire Control Parties.

13. Shore Fire Control Parties will revert to respective Artillery Battalions on order of Hqs 3d Inf Div.

OFFICIAL:

HARRELL,
G-3

ANDERSON

[redacted]

Headquarters Task Force "A",
Camp [redacted] P. Hill, Virginia,
11 Oct. 1942 1000 EWT

34

: [redacted]
: Auth: CG [redacted] AU :
: Initials [redacted]
: Date: 10-11-42

ADM O 1 To Accompany FO 1.

Maps: Same as FO 1

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1. SUPPLY.

a. Class I (Rations) (Ground and Air). For details see Annex 1.

(1) Individual and initial reserve, Type C - 1 day, Type D - 1 day, Type K - 2 days.

(2) Beach reserve -- Type C - 8 days, Type D - 1 day, Type K - 4 days.

(3) Type B Landing Ration -- Sixty (60) days (Type C biscuit substituted for bread).

(4) Additional items for creating good will and payment for labor --fifteen days (15) supply tea, rice, sugar and cotton cloth.

(5) Salt Tablets: Automatic to ships with B ration. Method of issue to be determined by the unit medical officer.

(6) Floating reserve, thirty (30) days, with flour component, available at main port of entry at time and place to be announced.

b. Class II.

(1) Quartermaster (Ground and Air).

(a) Thirty (30) days combat maintenance individual clothing and equipment per battalion combat team, regimental landing team, or similar unit. For details see Annex 1.

(2) Ordnance (Ground and Air).

(a) Initial supply - organic loads by units concerned, including air corps.

(b) Floating reserve - Ninety (90) days supply major ordnance replacement items, weapons, accessories, spare parts, ordnance and quartermaster tools --- to be available after D plus 20. Availability to be announced.

(c) Ordnance Cleaning and Preserving Material --

1. Initial supply, at least thirty (30) days, organic.

2. Floating reserve to main port of entry, ninety (90) days supply. Availability to be announced.

(3) Engineer (Except Air Units).

(a) Initial supply - thirty (30) days special combat maintenance per battalion combat team, regimental landing team, and armored combat team. Packed for rough handling over the beaches.

(b) Floating reserve for main port of entry -- ninety (90) days. Availability to be announced.

(4) Medical (Ground and Air). (See Medical Annex No. 2.)

(a) Initial supply -- thirty (30) days combat maintenance, augmented by blood plasma, special drugs, and essential biologicals for unloading at beaches "X", "Y" and "Z".

(b) Floating reserve for main port of entry -- sixty (60) days maintenance. Availability to be announced.

(5) Signal (Except Air Units).

(a) Thirty (30) days combat maintenance.

(b) Floating reserve to main port of entry -- sixty (60) days. Availability to be announced.

(6) Chemical Warfare (Ground and Air).

(a) Initial supply and equipment.

1. Protective clothing -- gas mask; dust respirator; two (2) each capes, impermeable or covers, protective; ointment, protective; and impregnite, shoe.

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2. Eight per cent (8%) combat replacement gas mask, service, for ship capacity -- to be packed for rough handling on the beach.
3. Floating reserve to main port of entry -- ninety (90) days, including gas mask replacements. Availability to be announced

c. (1) Class III - Motor Fuel (V-80) and Lubricants. (Ground and Air). Annex 1
(a) Initial Supply -- Vehicular tanks 90% filled. Organic gas drums, five-gallon -- filled.
(b) Fifteen (15) days supply, based on 100 miles per day. This includes gasoline for ranges, M-1937.
(c) Diesel Fuel -- Fifteen (15) days supply for water distillation equipment of engineers.
(d) Lubricants -- Fifteen (15) days supply.
(e) Floating Reserve -- Fifteen (15) days supply motor fuel and lubricants, kerosene and cleaning solvent to main port of entry after D plus 5. Availability to be announced.
(f) Floating Reserve -- Sixty (60) days to main port of entry. Availability to be announced.

(2) Motor Fuel (100 Octane Blue) Aero Gasoline.
(a) Initial Supply and distribution to ships as per approved schedule
(b) Floating reserve to main port of entry -- availability to be announced.
(c) Responsibility of unloading and transportation of aero gasoline and lubricants rests with each Force Commander, utilizing such personnel as required and assisted by air-ground troops.

d. (1) Class IV (Ground and Air).
(a) Initial Supply -- Thirty (30) days special allowance of pest control material per individual on ship:
One (1) can, two oz., insecticide.
One (1) bottle, two oz., flying insect repellent.
(b) Per personnel landing boat: Twenty (20) Bangalore torpedoes; two (2) rolls 6'x50' chicken wire. (Ground troops)
(c) Per tank lighter: Six (6) expanded metal mats, 4'x12'. (Ground)
(d) Per engineer shore company: One (1) water distillation unit and one drivepoint well set.
(e) Floating reserve -- Class IV engineer material and equipment to main port of entry - ninety (90) days supply. Availability to be announced.

(2) Class IV - Air Engineers.
(a) Initial supply, including steel landing mats, distributed to ships as per approved schedule.
(b) Floating reserve to main port of entry. Availability to be announced.
(c) Air Technical Supplies.
1. Prestone and special fluids distributed as per approved schedule.
2. Floating reserve to main port of entry. Availability to be announced.

e. Class V Ammunition. Ground Troops.
(1) Five (5) units of fire, as follows:
(a) 2½ units of fire for vehicular weapons, to be loaded on vehicles at the port prior to embarkation.
(b) 2½ units of fire for individual and non-vehicular automatic weapons, companionway storage, for issue to troops prior to debarkation.
(c) 2½ units of fire for (a) and (b) above and any excess from (a), cargo loaded on ships, marked for the particular troops on those ships.

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(2) Ten (10) units of fire, all types, marked for each Force, loaded as far as practicable on same ships as weapons. Five (5) units of fire, all types, plus any part of first fifteen (15) units which may not be loaded, to be carried in floating reserve to main port of entry. Availability to be announced.

(3) Establishment of Ammunition Supply Points -- Responsibility of each Force Commander, assisted by his own ordnance personnel. These Ammunition Supply Points pass to control of Task Force "A" upon arrival of Task Force "A" ordnance personnel at Ammunition Supply Point.

(a) Initial support assignment -- Ordnance Ammunition Companies:
"X" -- 604th Ord Co (Amm)
"Y" -- 64th Ord Bn (less 69th and 604th Cos)
"Z" -- 69th Ord Co (Amm).

(4) Ammunition for Air Force Units.

(a) Quantity and distribution to ships as per approved lists which have been furnished all concerned.

(b) Floating reserve to main port of entry. Availability to be announced.

(c) Responsibility for unloading and transporting ammunition and bombs rests with each Force Commander, utilizing such personnel as required and assisted by Air Force ordnance personnel.

f. WATER. To be provided by Naval vessels until adequate shore sources are developed. Assault troops to carry two (2) filled canteens upon debarkation. For details to water plans, see Annex No. 3. (Engineer Plan).

2. EVACUATION. For details, see Medical Annex No. 2.

a. Casualties.

(1) Personnel.

(a) Embarkation phase: Existing army medical facilities at ports of embarkation.

(b) Afloat: Navy, assisted by army medical personnel.

(c) Assault phase:

1. By Army medical personnel to beaches.

2. By Navy medical personnel to transports. Casualties incurred in landing craft will not be landed but returned to transport.

(d) Clearing Stations: To be established by the 56th Medical Battalion at "X" and "Z" at such time after D plus 5 as the situation permits.

(e) Evacuation hospitals: To be established at the main port of entry. Time of opening and location to be announced.

(f) CP Surgeon, Western Task Force, beach "Y", D-day, in proximity to CP of 3d Division.

(2) Motor Vehicles and Weapons.

(a) To Collecting Parks (Ground and Air) as selected by each Force Commander.

(b) To Task Force "A" ordnance units such time after D plus 5 as the situation permits.

b. Burial.

(1) By organizations.

(2) Graves to be carefully marked and locations reported to Task Force "A" Commander.

c. Salvage and Captured Material: Collected by organization and location reported to Task Force "A" Commander.

d. Prisoners of War: By organizations to collecting points.

3. TRAFFIC.

a. Ship traffic control and regulation in ports by the Navy.

b. Circulation: Land.

(1) Landing and Marking of Routes: By Force Commanders within their respective areas.

(2) Traffic Priorities: Land. As directed by the Force Commander.

c. Traffic Control:

(1) Beach area by shore party.

(2) Traffic control posts and stations to be established by Headquarters

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Task Force "A" -- location to be announced.

d. Construction and Maintenance of Routes:
   (1) By Force Commanders within their respective areas.
   (2) By Headquarters Task Force "A" for main supply roads. To be announced

e. Construction and Maintenance of Docks and Railroads:
   (1) Army Engineers.

4. SERVICE SUPPORTING TROOPS.

Consisting of Port, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Medical, Signal, Engineer, and Chemical Warfare personnel -- to be available upon arrival of later convoy at main port of entry. Time of arrival to be announced.

5. PERSONNEL.

a. Stragglers -- By organization to collecting points.
b. Mail -- Suspended to D plus 10. Complete instructions later.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Location of G-4, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Medical, Signal, Engineer, and Chemical Warfare representatives -- with D Convoy.
   (1) Remainder -- Rear Echelon of these actions - main port of entry. Time of arrival and location to be announced.

b. Property Accountability.
Property will be accounted for as prescribed in War Department Circular No. 105, dated April 10, 1942. Terminal property audit will be waived by the Theater Commander. The Theater Commander will, upon termination of formal property accountability of any unit in the theater, notify the Chief of Finance, through proper channels, of the actual closing date of that property account.

c. Purchasing Supplies and Services.
See Annex No. 4.

7. Force Commanders will be responsible for the proper functioning of their own supply systems until taken over by the normal supply systems of Task Force "A".

PATTON
Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

Muller
MULLER G-4

G-4 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION.

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HEADQUARTERS [redacted] FORCE "A"
Washington, D. C.

Oct. 9, 1942.

ANNEX NO. 1)
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1)

DECLASSIFIED

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES

CLASS I RATIONS

1. Troops Combat Loaded: To arrive D Day

a. Reserve Rations: -- Automatic to ships for full capacity of personnel. Not to be consumed on voyage.

(1) Issue to organization at port of embarkation prior to embarkation and to be stored on vehicles or space assigned organizations.

Type "C" -- 1 day

Type "D" -- 1 "

Type "K" -- 2 "

(2) Issue individuals by organizations on shipboard prior to debarkation:

Type "K" -- 1 1/3 days (included in (1) above.)

(3) Loaded in hold of ships:

Type "C" -- 8 day

Type "D" -- 1 "

Type "K" -- 4 "

b. Type "B" Rations: Temperate and Tropic Menu -- Automatic issue to ships for full capacity of personnel. Not to be consumed on voyage.

(1) 60 days rations (less bread ingredients, which will follow on cargo ships. A supply of menu and issue charts will be included with each shipment.

(2) Full 60 days supply of Type "C" Biscuit to be substituted for bread.

(3) Items to supplement the Type "B" ration for special diets for patients in hospital will be furnished on an automatic basis by the S.O.S., based upon the number of rations furnished the theater.

c. Tobacco, Candy, and Toilet Articles: -- gratuitous Issue: Under the provisions of Cir. WD 245, July 25, 1942, each type "B" ration will include the following items which will be issued to troops as indicated per ration.

Blade, safety razor	each	.275	Cigarettes, each		20.
Razor, safety	"	.010	Tobacco, cigarette	oz.	.05
Shaving cream, brushless	oz.	.14	Tobacco, pipe	"	.08

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Brush, tooth	each	.015	Tobacco, chewing	oz.	.02
Powder, tooth	oz.	.035	Papers, cigarette, sheets		2.5
Soap, toilet	"	.14	Matches, safety	book	2.
Candy, hard		1.	Gum, chewing	stick	1.

Packaging:

Item	Rations per Package	Weight
Cigarettes and Tobacco	200	26 lbs.
Candy and Gum	400 (per wooden case)	58 "
Toilet Kit	800 " " "	39 "

d. Additional Items: The following additional quantity of items will be carried on each ship for the purpose of creating good will with the labor employed in the Theater. It will be used, in part, for payment of services in lieu of money.

Item	Amt/Lab/Day	Total 15 day Supply	Packed
Tea	.03 lb.	53 lbs.	1 lb. pkg.
Rice	.15 lb.	262 "	"
Sugar, lump	.3 lb.	524 "	"
Cloth, cotton	.083 yd.	150 yd.	25 yd. bolt

e. Salt Tablets: Automatic to ships with Type "B" ration based on:

8 -- 10 gr. Tablets per ration.

f. Packing and Markings: Packages will be prepared for one man loads at Depot as far as practicable and marked for the ship concerned by code name. Shipment will be made to HR PE on call by the Commanding General, HR PE. Reserve ration to be broken down and issued to organizations, will be marked "FOR ISSUE."

CLASS II AND IV SUPPLIES

General:

a. Thirty day maintenance of certain articles of individual clothing and equipment will be prepared by the Richmond Quartermaster Depot and will be shipped to the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation on call by the Commanding General HR PE.

b. Packages will be one man loads, not over 70 lbs., strapped for rough handling on beaches.

c. Maintenance will be prepared for Bn. CT, Reg't Landing Groups, and other personnel with the team and will be divided equally among ships carrying the team.

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d. Marking: Packages will be marked with contents and quantity, and with the number designating the team--QM, and the number of the ship within the group of ships carrying the teams. -- Remaining items of maintenance for 30 days not included in "a." above, will be available at Port of Entry, -- to be announced.

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CLASS III SUPPLIES
FUEL AND LUBRICANTS.

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1. General:

   a. All vehicular fuel tanks will be 90% filled and organizational gasoline cans, 5 gal., will be filled prior to arrival at Port of Embarkation. Supply of reserve gasoline to be carried on combat loaded ships will be automatic.

2. Gasoline:

   a. V-80 gasoline will be supplied for all motor vehicles and kitchen ranges. Initial allowance based on 100 miles of operation per vehicle per day.

   b. Fifteen day supply will be loaded aboard each combat loaded ship as follows:

      12,000 gal. in 5 gal. cans for each AP (except Armored Combat Teams.)

      20,000 gal. in 55 gal. drums for all AK ships.

      62,000 gal. in 5 gal. cans to be distributed between AK and AP containing armored units.

3. Diesel Oil:

   a. Diesel Fuel Oil, conforming to Specifications 2-102 B, will be supplied on an automatic basis to ships for use by Engineers for distillation purposes.

   b. Total requirements, 18,000 gal. initially.

4. Lubricants and Greases:

   a. Requirements for fifteen days will be supplied automatically to ships and for vehicles aboard ship. Allowances:

Engine Oil,	5.5 gal. per 100 gal. gasoline.
Gear Oil,	1 gal. per 100 gal. gasoline.
Chassis Grease	1.6 pounds per 100 gal. gasoline.

   b. Initial 15 day Supply:

Engine Oil	32,736 gals.	(12--1 qt cans per case.)
Gear Oil	48,650 pounds	(1 - 25 lb. pail per case.)
Chassis Grease	17,707 pounds	(6 -- 5 lb. cans or 1 - 25 lb. pail per case, except Water Pump Grease, in 1 lb. cans, 12 per case.)

5. Additional Supply:

   a. Additional fifteen day supply of all fuel and lubricants including

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kerosene and cleaning solvents will be available on D plus 5 Convoy.

By Command of Major-General PATTON:

R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General.

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REQUIREMENTS CLASS III SUPPLIES -- FIRST ECHELON [redacted]

Incl. #1 to Annex #1.

	Marking	Gasoline V-80 Gallons	Eng.Oil SAE 10 Gallons	Eng.Oil SAE 30 Gallons	Eng.Oil SAE 50 Gallons	Univ.Gear Lubr.Cl.II SAE 90 lbs.	Grease GP #1 Pounds	Grease GP #2 Pounds	Grease Wheel Bearing #3 lbs.	Grease WP #4 Pounds	Diesel Fuel Oil Gallons	Kero-sene Gallons	Fuel Oil Gallons	Clean-ing Sol-vent.gal	Pres-tone Gals.
Combat Loaded Troops Initial 15 day supply for Combat load-ed Troops shipped D Convoy	(marked) for Com-bat Team ORD-(No. Vessel)	707,000 (in 5 gal cans)		19,800 (in 1 qt. cans 12 per case)	12,900 (in 1 qt. cans 12 per case)	48,650 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	12,830 (in 5# cans, 6 per case or 25# pails)	3,475 (in 5# cans, 6 per case or 25# pails)	1,250 (in 5# cans,6 per case or 25# pails)	144 (in 1# cans,12 per case)	18,000 (in 5 gal. cans)				
Additional 15 Day Supply for Combat Loaded Troops shipped D plus 5 Convoy in approx. equal lots aboard 10 fast cargo vessels	4411-K-ORD-III	707,000 (in 55 gal. drums.)	6,000 (in 1 qt.cans 6 per case)	19,800 (in 1 qt. cans 12 per case)	12,900 (in 5 gal can 2 per case)	48,650 (in 25# pails or 5 gal. cans, 1 per case)	12,830 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	3,475 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	1,250 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	144 (in 1# cans 12 per case)					
Convoy Loaded Troops 30 Day supply for Convoy loaded Troops shipped D plus 5 Convoy in approx. equal lots aboard 10 fast cargo vessels	4411-K-ORD-III	1,186,000 ($\frac{1}{2}$ this quantity in5 gal. cans, $\frac{1}{2}$ 55 gal. dr.)	6,000 (in 5 qt. cans,6 per case)	29,400 (in 5 gal. cans, 2 per case)	33,100 (in 5 gal. cans,2 per case)	52,700 (in 25# pails or 5 gal. cans, 1 per case)	22,140 (in 25# pails 1 per Case)	7,050 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	2,250 (in 25# cans 1 per case)	52 (in 1# cans 12 per case)		23,000 (in 55 gal. drums)	20,000 (In 55 gal. drums)	5,000 (in 55 gal. drums)	
Cargo Loaded. 60 Days Supply--all 1st Echelon Troops and 90 day supply Port Equipment shipped D plus 20 Convoy	4411-ORD-III	5,200,000 (in 55 gal drums)	24,000 (in 5 gal cans 2 per case)	138,000 (in 5 gal cans 2 per case and 88,875 in 55 gal. drums	60,000 (in 5 gal.cans 2 per case and 29625 in 55 gal dr.)	300,000 (in 25# pail or 5 gal. cans 1 per case)	78,000 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	28,000 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	10,000 (in 25# pails 1 per case)	680 (in 1# cans 12 per case)		46,000 (in 55 gal. drums)	40,000 (in 55 gal. drums)	10,000 (in 55 gal. drums)	8,000 (in 1 gal. 6 per case.)
Recommended Supply Level 90 Days -- to be maintained		7,800,000	36,000	295,875	106,000	450,000	125,800	42,000	14,750	1,020		69,000	60,000	15,000	8,000

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[redacted]
Headquarters Task Force "A"
Washington, D. C.

October 10, 1942.

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ANNEX NO... 2)
TO :
ADM. O. NO. 1)

MEDICAL

1. SUPPLY.
   a. Attached medical troops will land with unit equipment and combat supplies minus those items coming in later convoys.
   b. 30-day maintenance of medical supplies, augmented by blood plasma, special drugs, and biologicals essential for this operation, combat loaded, will be unloaded at beaches "X", "Y" and "Z", when the situation permits.
   c. 60-day maintenance, in units of supply, convoy loaded, will be unloaded at the main port of entry when the situation permits.
   d. 45-day medical supply level will be maintained.
   e. Medical supply points will be established at beaches "X", "Y", and "Z" immediately subsequent to the landing of assault troops for each combat group. These supply points will be dispersed on beaches in protected places and pushed forward as enemy reaction permits.
   f. A medical depot will establish at the main port of entry, subsequent to D5 as the situation permits, for the supply of the Western Task Force.
   g. Arrangements will be made for the exchange of litters, blankets, splints and other equipment at transfer points. This will minimize disturbing the wounded and make possible an even distribution and flow of equipment

2. EVACUATION.
   a. Embarkation phase. Evacuation by existing army medical facilities at ports of embarkation.
   b. Afloat. Navy medical personnel will provide for the treatment and hospitalization of all sick and wounded. Attached army medical personnel will assist in these duties.
   c. Assault phase.
      (1) Evacuation of casualties will start as soon as all combat troops are landed. Casualties incurred in landing craft will not be landed but returned to transports. Cases of acute communicable diseases in infectious stages will not be debarked but returned to base ports.
      (2) Each combat group commander will detail one (1) medical officer and eight (8) enlisted men from medical personnel available in his command to assist each naval medical beach party.
      (3) Attached medical personnel debarking with combat units will carry in water proof canvas bags, sufficient medical supplies for rendering first aid.
      (4) On each beach will be an army evacuation officer who will be responsible for the initiation and maintenance of pertinent medical records and for the selection of casualties for evacuation. Final decision on all matters of evacuation seaward rests with the navy evacuation officer on each beach until such time as army medical service is established.
      (5) Initially, all wounded who may not be immediately returned to their respective organizations will be evacuated seaward. Prior to the departure of the convoy those casualties with a convalescence expectancy of less than 30 days will be returned ashore. This will also be carried out when army transports arrive at D 5, and prior to the establishment of adequate medical installations ashore. In principle it is desired to evacuate all casualties of protracted convalescence expectancy (30 days or longer) to ships for evacuation to base ports; and to retain those of short convalescence expectan

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(less than 30 days). Later, as army hospital facilities become available ashore, casualties will be segregated and only those of protracted convalescence expectancy (exceeding 120 days) will be evacuated to ships.

(6) Unit medical personnel will land as directed by their combat group commander. As the unit to which they are attached moves forward, they will follow in normal close support. Casualties will be moved initially to a place of comparative safety, pending evacuation seaward. Grouping of casualties initially on the beach will be avoide Gas casualties and cases of communicable diseases will be isolated to the extent possible.

(7) Attached to each landing force on beaches "X", "Y", and "Z" will be one (1) litter bearer section and one (1) ambulance section (less vehicles), consisting of 2 officers and 69 enlisted men, for the pu pose of reinforcing the attached medical personnel and evacuating casualties from combat units to the beach.

(8) Evacuation hospitals will establish at the main port of entry when the situation permits.

(9) The clearing company of the 56th Medical Battalion will establish a clearing station at "X" and "Z" at such time subsequent to D 5 as the situation permits. Casualties will be evacuated to beach "Y". (See Par. 2, c (8)). Evacuation of casualties from beaches "X" and "Z" will be made by ambulances or other available vehicles in guarded convoy, initially. This applies to casualties that cannot be evacuated seaward and for those occuring after the convoy depart.

(10) Enemy wounded will be treated according to existing international conventions, but will not be evacuated to transports.

(11) The following is an estimate of the number of casulaties that may be expected, based on an estimation of 3 days to secure the beach head.

Strength of Combat Troops				
1st day	38,000	Battle casualties 15%	5700	
		Less drowned and killed in action 30%	1710	
				3990
2nd Day	32,300	Battle casualties 10%	3230	
		Less drowned and killed in action 30%	969	
				2261
3rd day	29,070	Battle casualties 5%	1454	
		Less drowned and killed in action 20%	290	
				1164
		Total		7415

[redacted]

Approximately 1150 this total figure may be expected to be seriously wounded.

The remainder slightly wounded.

d. Subsequent operations

(1) After D 40, fixed hospitals will be available.

(2) Buildings and existing hospital facilities will be utilized by such elements of medical units insofar as practicable.

(3) An evacuation policy of 120 days will be in effect. Later this wil be extended to 180 days.

3. RECORDS AND REPORTS.

a. The attention of all concerned is directed to pertinent Army Regulations

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Field Manuals, War Department Circulars, and Circular Letters from the Office of the Surgeon General as they apply to the preparation and forwarding of medical reports and records of units of this Task Force in its prescribed Theatre of Operations.

b. Report of Sick and Wounded (AR 40-1025, FM 8-45). Forms used are as follows:

(1) For Regiments, battalions and similar units having attached medical personnel, for medical units, dispensaries, and all places of treatment other than hospitals:

(a) Report Sheet (Form 51 MD).

(b) Emergency Medical Tag (Form 52 b MD).

(2) For Mobile Hospitals in Operation:

(a) Report Sheet (Form 51 MD).

(b) Field Medical Record (Forms 52 c and 52 d) with inclosures. For all cases completed during the month by death, return to duty or otherwise than by evacuation.

c. Current Statistical Reports (AR 40-1080, FM 8-45).

(1) Reports will be forwarded as prescribed for a Theatre of Operations

(2) Sick and Wounded sent to Clearing Stations and Mobile Hospitals will be carried by organizations as still belonging to their units until advised of death or transfer to the Zone of the Interior. Cases sent to fixed installations will be dropped from organization record

d. Monthly Sanitary Reports. These reports will be prepared and forwarded as required by AR 40-275 and War Department Circular #71, 1941.

e. Monthly Venereal Reports will be prepared as indicated in W. D. Circular #71, 1941, and AR 40-235.

f. Report of Casualties.

(1) Assault Phase. A report showing the unit, location and date will be made to include the following items: 1. Number of disease, injury, wounded, and gassed casualties of the unit and the number of casualties belonging to other units or the enemy. Grand total to be shown 2. These casualties to be further classified as remaining from last report, received, duty, died, evacuated, other dispositions and remaining at end of day report is rendered. Reports will be rendered by 0800 daily for the reportable period ending at 2400. The senior surgeon of each combat command will consolidate these reports for all units of the command and transmit a copy to the Force Surgeon before 1200 daily. The original and the copies desired will be rendered to the combat commander as he directs. Surgeons of Army units and commanding officers of Army Medical units will render these reports promptly as outlined above. Under "Remarks" will be entered the name, rank and diagnosis of each officer evacuated and the name, rank, cause of death and location of remains of those killed in action or evacuated to a medical installation. Casualties evacuated from beaches seaward who are not accounted for on navy casualty reports will be reported as wounded, missing.

(2) Beach evacuation officers will record by name, rank, and army serial number all casualties evacuated seaward, giving diagnosis and stating name of transport to which evacuated. This report will be checked against the report of the naval beach office, and transmitted to the Force Surgeon as early after the reportable period (2400) as possible by such means as may be available.

(3) Subsequent operations.

(a) All medical units affording hospital facilities will render reports required in a Theatre of Operations (FM 8-45).

(b) Nothing in Par. 3 f (1) & (2) above, will be construed as releasing officers concerned from compliance with Circular #1, A.F. Hq, 1 October, 1942.

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g. Dental and Veterinary Reports will be rendered in accordance with pertin regulations after the situation becomes static.

h. Special Reports and Records.

(1) Commanding Officers of mobile medical units will keep the Force Surgeon informed of the location of their respective command posts.

(2) Clearing Station and Collecting Station Commanders initially, will request transportation facilities for evacuation of wounded, of the Force Surgeon. Subsequent evacuation will be in accordance with usual procedure.

(3) Evacuation Hospitals, acting initially as fixed hospitals will maintain the usual records and render the customary reports required of fixed installations. They will complete entries under sub-paragraphs L, P, and Q, on form 86 ab.

i. General.

(1) All casualties, the sick and those killed in action or otherwise will be tagged with the Emergency Medical Tag, Form 52 b MD by the first officer or enlisted man of the medical department contacting them.

(2) Transmittal of Reports will be as prescribed for a Theatre of Operations.

(3) Initially it may be impossible to transmit detailed casualty reports by each combat group. Coded reports giving total number of wounded, divided into seriously and slightly wounded, and number killed will be transmitted over the administrative radio net, or by such other means of communication as are available.

4. SANITATION.

a. In the absence of adequate screening all persons will sleep under bed ne

b. All barracks, billets and tents with framing, which are intended for con tinued use, will be screened with 18 mesh screening.

c. Personnel outside screened areas at night, during the mosquito season (average temperature above 60°F), will make use of repellents and head nets. Two ounce bottles of "Indalone" or equivalent repellent will be issued to each person. Replacement on the basis of 2 ounces per month will be maintained.

d. Personnel on guard details will wear gloves during the mosquito season.

e. 2 ounce can of repellent powder for crawling insects will be issued each person. This will be dusted in the clothing to repel lice and fleas. Replacement on the pasis of 1 can per person per month will be provided.

f. Funds will be available to the Force Surgeon to be used for the initiati and development of a sanitary program involving the hiring of civilian labor.

g. See attached inclosures, 1 to 4.

1. Sanitary order.
2. Sanitary ordinance.
3. Sanitary code.
4. Mosquito control ordinance.

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By command of Major General PATTON:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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DRAFT FOR SANITARY ORDER

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GENERAL ORDER:

NO. . . . . :

1. GENERAL--The following provisions for the sanitation of this command are published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

a. Responsibility. Commanding officers of all grades are responsible for sanitation and for the enforcement of sanitary orders and regulations within their organizations and within the boundaries of areas occupied by them as provided in AR 40-205 and FM 21-10.

b. Medical Department. The senior surgeon is responsible for the general supervision of the Medical Department of the command in the performance of its duties. He is responsible for investigating, reporting on, and making recommendations relating to all matters affecting the health of the command. All medical officers of the command will act in like manner as technical advisors to their respective commanding officers.

c. Medical Inspectors. The Medical Inspectors are charged with the supervision of the sanitation of their respective commands under the direction of the Surgeon of their unit. Veterinarians are in like manner charged with matters in regard to animal sanitation, inspection of foods of animal origin, and dairy hygiene.

d. Water supply. Commanding Officers of all grades will insure strict compliance with regulations regarding procurement, storage, distribution, and conservation of water. All water will be considered non-potable until pronounced potable by competent authority. Water from local sources (streams, wells, springs) will be filtered and chlorinated by Engineer water purification units. Troop units away from authorized sources will purify their water by boiling under close supervision, or by the use of Halazone grams .004; 2 to 4 tablets to one canteen of water depending on turbidity, when directed by the Surgeon. A minimum of two gallons of water per man per day for drinking will be provided.

e. Food and Messes. Food supplies will be stored, issued, handled, prepared and served in a sanitary manner. They will be protected from heat, sun, dust, dirt, insects such as flies and roaches, rats, mice, and other rodents or damaging agents. Protective covering, for example clean bed sacks will be provided for transporting bread, fresh meat and other exposed foods. Meats and other foods of animal origin will receive veterinary inspection and approval before issue to troops. Local root and leafy vegetables will not be used except when thoroughly washed, scaled or peeled. Washing vegetables in unsafe water will be avoided. Boiled water will be used when necessary. The above facts will be brough to the attention of all troops, especially isolated units. No food will be purchased from any local source unless specifically authorized by the Commanding General of Task Force "A".

Care will be exercised in preparation and handling of food, especially avoiding all use of left over cooked foods for subsequent meals where adequate refrigeration is not provided.

Food handlers will be examined and inspected as prescribed in Par. 12, AR 40-205. Carriers of intestinal disease will not serve as food handlers. Monthly inspection will he held and recorded on permanent food handlers certificates which will be conspicuously displayed in the organization mess.

Police and cleanliness of messes will receive special emphasis to prevent disease outbreaks. All utensils used in the preparation of food will be thoroughly washed and sterilized in boiling water. Mess kits will always be washed in three large containers, two with hot soapy water and one

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of hot clean water. The water will be kept as near boiling as possible and changed after each one hundred (100) mess kits have passed through the water. Mess kits will be air dried.

f. Waste disposal. Intestinal disease being very common, especial care is demanded. Human excreta will be disposed of by one of the following methods:

Straddle trenches properly maintained.
Deep pit latrines with standard fly proof boxes.
Urine soakage pits.
Septic tanks and other water carriage systems where present and proper maintenance is possible.

Garbage will be disposed of by burial or incineration, liquid waste by soakage pits or trenches, employing grease traps.

g. Quarters. All barracks, tents, or billets will be maintained in a clean and sanitary state. Overcrowding will be avoided as directed in FM 21-10. All buildings will be thoroughly fumigated or sprayed before occupation as quarters in order to eliminate fleas and other disease bearing insects. Location of quarters near swamps, oases, or crowded sections of cities will be avoided.

h. Insect Control. Mosquitoes, lice, flies and fleas will be vigorously combatted by all approved methods (FM 8-40) to prevent malarial fever, yellow fever, typhus, and intestinal diseases. All troops will sleep under nets. Screening of permanent quarters will be accomplished as soon as possible. Personnel on guard details will wear gloves and head nets during the mosquito season.

i. Personal Hygiene. A high standard of personal hygiene will be maintained. Bathing will be as frequent as possible and the avoidance and correction of lousiness is paramount to prevent typhus fever. All personnel will be directed to report to the unit medical officer immediately upon discovery of infestation of lice.

j. Dispensaries. Unit dispensaries will establish station at all appropriate times and locations. Units not assigned medical personnel will be referred to nearby dispensaries by appropriate commanders.

k. Venereal Prophylaxis. Venereal prophylaxis will be available at each dispensary referred to above. Lists of prophylactic stations in nearby communities will be posted on all organization bulletin boards. Personnel on pass will be required to have on their persons mechanical and chemical protective material.

l. Physical Inspections. Physical Inspections will be held monthly and at such other times as recommended by unit surgeons and approved by unit commanders. Careful inspection for lice in connection with troop movements will be necessary to keep areas free from lice.

m. Special Precautions. Wading, bathing or swimming in fresh water will be prohibited until freedom from the Schistosome parasite can be determine

Eating of locally cooked foods is prohibited.
Handling of live snakes is prohibited.
Clothing and bedding will be routinely searched for scorpions.

Contact with native civilian elements and their habitations will be avoided.

2. CIVILIANS--All civilians and civilian organizations attached to this command will comply with this order insofar as it applies to them.

By command of

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[redacted]

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The Ordinance

(Part of the Proclamation first Published)

Sanitation and Public Health Section.

Existing laws and regulations on sanitation and public health will be continued in force except as modified and supplemented by the Sanitary Code as published by these Headquarters. Health Officers of _____, its departments and circumscriptions and cities will continue their duties under the supervision of medical officers of the Army of the United States on duty with the military government. The failure of any person to comply with laws, regulations, or orders with respect to sanitation or the public health will render him liable to punishment by military tribunal.

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Incl. 2, to
ANNEX 2.

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SANITARY CODE

By authority of The Commanding General of the military forces of the Army of the United States now established at _____, the following Sanitary Code is proclaimed. The purpose of this code is to protect the health of the United States Forces and citizens alike.

The cooperation of _____Health Officers with the Chief Health Officer appointed by those Headquarters shall be full and complete.

The Chief Health Officer shall exercise supervision over the public health, including sanitation, the control of communicable diseases, the protection of food, milk, and water supply, hospitals, drugs, the practice of medicine, dentistry, midwifery, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine, diseases of animals, and similar matters.

Local authorities shall be responsible that the premises of all habitations are maintained in a clean and sanitary manner conducive to the adequate control of disease.

All cases of the following communicable diseases shall be reported promptly to the Chief Health Officer of the United States Forces and the Director of Public Health of _____:

Typhus exanthematique	Yellow fever
Plague	Amoebic dysentery
Typhoid fever	Bacillary dysentery
Smallpox (Varioli)	Malarial Fever
Fievre Boutonneuse	Relapsing Fever
Schistosomiasis	Sand Fly Fever
Dengue Fever	Undulant Fever
Trypanosomiasis	Cerebrospinal meningitis
Leishmaniasis & Oriental Sore	Measles
Cholera	Diphtheria

Any other disease that shows an unusual number of cases.

Water to be used for drinking and cooking purposes shall be taken from designated areas and shall be protected from pollution by defection in the water or on the banks. No animals shall be permitted to pollute such water supplies. Bathing and the washing of clothes shall not be permitted in such areas which shall be plainly marked.

Foods will be handled, prepared and served in a sanitary manner. They will be protected against heat, sun, dust, rodents, insects, and other harmful agents and be subject to inspection by the representatives of the Chief Health Officer.

Milk supplies shall not be sold to or delivered to United States personnel unless previously inspected and passed by the Veterinary Inspector.

All garbage, trash and wastes shall be disposed of by burning, burial or some other manner acceptable to the Chief Health Officer.

Effective measures by filling, draining, oiling and the use of larvacides shall be taken to control mosquito breeding.

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The control of lice, transmitters of typhus exanthematicus, by bathing, delousing and fumigation shall be vigorously prosecuted.

Quarantine and travel restrictions necessary to prevent the spread of disease will be enforced.

Hospitals shall continue to function for the care of citizens of this country.

All those duly licensed and recognized practitioners of Medicine, Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine, Pharmacy, Nursing and midwifery shall continue to practice their healing arts unless restricted for cause. Their qualified assistants shall continue their duties.

The Chief Health Officer shall recommend such other measures as are necessary to protect the public health.

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MOSQUITO CONTROL ORDINANCE

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Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to have, keep, maintain, cause or permit within the corporate limits of towns or cities or thickly settled areas of _____ any collections of standing or flowing water in which mosquitoes breed or are likely to breek, unless such collection of water is treated so as effectually to prevent such breeding.

Section 2. Collections of water in which mosquitoes breed or are likely to breed are those contained in ditches, ponds, pools, excavations, holes, depressions, open cesspools, privy vaults, fountains, cistern, tanks, shallow wells, barrels, troughs, urns, cans, boxes, bottles, tubs, buckets or any other object capable of serving as a container of water.

Section 3. The presence of mosquito larvae in standing or running water shall be evidence that mosquitoes are breeding therein.

Section 4. Collections of water in which mosquitoes breed or are likely to breed shall be treated by one or more of the following methods.

(a) Screening with wire netting of at least 18 meshes to the inch each way, or with any other material which will effectually prevent the ingress or egress of mosquitoes.

(b) Complete emptying every seven days of unscreened containers, together with their thorough drying and cleaning.

(c) Using a larvacide approved and applied under the direction of the health officer.

(d) Covering completely the surface of the water with kerosene, petroleum, or parrafin oil once every seven days.

(e) Cleaning and keeping sufficiently free of vegetable growth and other obstructions and stocking with mosquito destroying fish.

(f) Filling or draining to the satisfaction of the Health Officer.

(g) Proper disposal, by removal or destruction, of tin cans, tin boxes, broken or empty bottles and other articles likely to hold water.

(h) Adult mosquitos shall be killed by spraying, swatting or other effective methods.

Section 5. The Health Officer and his assistants and Sanitary crews shall have access to any and all premises for the purpose of inspection to determine whether of not the provisions of this ordinance are being carried out. Where mosquitoes are found breeding they shall take necessary and effective steps to control mosquito breeding, including oiling or emptying water containers and spraying in houses. Due regard to privacy of women's quarters shall be observed by these Inspectors and sanitary crews, giving notice to the head of the household so women's quarters may be evacuated for the necessary period or by employing especially trained boys under fourteen years of age for this work.

Section 6. Any person found guilty of a violation of this ordinance shall be punished as the military tribunal may direct.

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Incl. 4, to
ANNEX 2.

HEADQUARTERS TASK FORCE "A"
Room 2405, Munitions Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

October 12, 1942.

[redacted]

Auth CG, T. F. "A"
Init
Date 10/12/42

Annex No. 3 to
Administrative Order No. 1.

WATER SUPPLY PLAN

Water Supply - Assault Phase -

Assault troops will carry 2 filled canteens (1/2 gallon) ashore apiece (D).

Additional water in 5-gallon cans will arrive on the beach with ammunition and shore party personnel to provide an additional 1 gallon per man (D plus 1).

Each kitchen to carry at least T/BA allowance of 5-gallon cans to be immediately available (one gallon per man) when kitchens are debarked. (D plus 1 to D plus 5).

In order to avoid waste canteens will be filled from organic canvas water sterilizing bags. Shore party elements and tactical headquarters will set up their organic water sterilizing bags at appropriate locations for this purpose.

Necessary additional water will be provided by the Navy on the basis of 2 gallons per man per day until its departure from the area. Organic water supply equipment of the Division Engineer Battalions will not be used on the beach except in an emergency.

Water points will be established by the shore party at each beachhead. Potable water on basis of 2 gallons per man per day will be delivered in boats by the Navy as close as possible to these points. The shore party will receive, store and distribute this water.

In the event that local water sources are unavailable, the Engineer component of the shore party will produce water by distillation and by the use of dry points. Distillation sets (total of 12 of 2,000 gallon capacity each) will be available for this purpose, one for each Engineer Shore Company.

Water Supply - Consolidation Phase -

Organic Division Engineer Battalions will be ready to participate in any tactical operations using their intact organic water supply equipment.

The 401st Engineer Battalion after landing over the docks at (D plus 5), (equipped with 4 well-drilling rigs) will be available to supervise water supply in stabilized ports and will also be ready to back up water supply for troops engaged in tactical missions.

A second Engineer Water Supply Battalion will be ready after (D plus 40) to further assist in water supply.

ANNEX 3.

JOHN F. CONKLIN,
Colonel, C. E.,
Engineer.

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: CG, SOS, WDA
Initials:
Date: 10-5-42

ANNEX NUMBER 4) (Initially issued as)
TO : (Adm. Memo. No. 13.)
ADM. O. NO.. 1) Oct. 5, 1942.

PURCHASING SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
TASK FORCE "A"

The following instructions will govern all purchasing of supplies and services for Task Force "A" and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

1. POLICY:
   a. The primary purpose of this directive is to furnish the Fighting Man with supplies and services necessary for the prompt accomplishment of his mission.
   b. Required items must be furnished when needed without delay and with a minimum of paper work.
   c. Funds and credits have been allotted the Commanding General, Task Force "A", and at the appropriate time such funds and credits will be sub-allotted to commanders of lower echelons.

2. PURCHASES BY TROOPS IN THE FIELD:
   a. AGENT OFFICERS
      (1) All regimental commanders and commanders of higher echelons will immediately initiate appropriate action to secure the appointment of a sufficient number of officers in their command as Class B Agent Officers in order to properly comply with this directive.
      (2) Officers appointed as Class B Agent Officers for the purpose of complying with this directive will not operate as such while within the continental limits of the United States.
      (3) Pertinent Army Regulations will apply in this instance with particular reference to AR 35-320 and AR 35-6300 with the following exceptions:
      (a) Certificate:
      1. The certificate required by Par. 5a, AR 35-6300 will be modified to read:

         I certify that the supplies enumerated hereon were received by me and that payment therefor has been made by me as Agent Officer in cash this _____ day of _____, 19____, from funds entrusted to me by _____, finance officer. Procurement Authority Number_____.

         _____
         (Name, Grade)

         Exceptions taken to accounting procedure will be consistent with policies announced by the War Department and the Commanding General, Task Force "A".

         Certifications required on Vendor's bills and Agent Officer's certifications will be available in the form of rubber stamps which may be secured upon application to Task Force "A" Quartermaster.

      (4) It is imperative that such purchases be paid for immediately. Immediate payments create good will and cooperation in the local inhabitants.

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3. PURCHASES OF SUPPLIES AND NON-PERSONAL SERVICES BY CHIEFS OF ARMS AND SERVICES.

a. POLICY:

(1) While it is the Administrative function of G-4 to coordinate all supply operations, the several Arms and Services are charged with certain procurement functions as generally established in Field Service Regulations FM 100-10.

(2) If, however, circumstances arise wherein it would be impracticable for any such Arm of Service to make purchases as herein directed, request will be made to Task Force "A" G-4 who will procure the required supplies without delay.

b. PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY:

(1) Upon commencement of operations outside the continental limits of the United States, the members of the Special Staff, Task Force "A", representing the several Arms and Services are herewith authorized to purchase any required supplies that may be available, within such limits and amounts as may be established at a later date.

(2) Members of the Special Staff, Task Force "A", may re-delegate this authority to other commands under their jurisdiction subject to limitations and restrictions as may be determined by the Special Staff member re-delegating the authority.

(a) In all instances, members of the Special Staff will be responsible for the proper application of the authority granted under this directive.

c. PURCHASING PROCEDURE:

(1) In the initial phases of operations outside the continental limits of the United States, and until further notice, the following purchasing procedure for supplies will apply in those instances wherein the procedure established in Par. 2, is impracticable.

(2) CERTIFICATES

(a) Purchase Orders(WD, QMC, Form No. 308) and Receiving Reports (WD, QMC, Form No. 431) will not be used. In lieu of the above forms, the officer making the purchase of supplies will accomplish the following certificates:

I certify that the supplies enumerated hereon were purchased and received by me and that payment was NOT made by me this _____ day of _____, 19____ .
Procurement Authority No. _____.

_____
(Name, Grade) Purchasing & Contracting Officer.

(b) Purchasing Officers will in each instance be responsible for securing Vendor's bill or invoices in triplicate upon the original copy of which must be entered the following certificate:

_____
(date)

I certify that the above account is true and correct and that payment therefor has not been received.

_____
(Signature of Vendor)

(c) Purchasing officers' certificates will be entered upon all Vendor's invoices or bills for purchase of supplies.

On invoices or bills for non-personal services, the

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following certificate will be accomplished in lieu of certificate required in Par. 3 c (2) (a):

_____
(Date)

I certify that the services have been rendered as stated and that payment has NOT been made by me. Procurement Authority No. _____.

_____
(Name, Grade)

(3) PAYMENT.

(a) Invoices or bills containing the required certificates will be forwarded, in triplicate, to a disbursing finance officer for payment.

(b) Purchasing Officers will in each instance be responsible for the prompt and immediate submission of Vendor's invoices or bills, and required certificates to a disbursing finance officer for payment.

(c) The aforementioned certificates are available in the form of rubber stamps and may be secured from the Quartermaster, Task Force "A".

4. PROCUREMENT OF LOCAL LABOR.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Procurement of local labor will be under the direct supervision and control of divisional and task commanders and Commanding General, Task Force "A".

(2) At the earliest practicable date, local labor pools will be established within divisions and larger units.

(3) It will be the direct responsibility of divisional and task commanders, under the supervision of Task Force "A" Commander, to operate the local labor pools and make proper allotments to the various Arms andServices requiring such labor.

(4) It is the further responsibility of division and task commanders to effect measures to insure the prompt payment of the local labor in their labor pools.

(5) No responsibility established in Par. 4 may be re-assigned to a lower echelon without prior approval of Task Force "A" Commander.

b. WAGES.

(1) A wage scale for local labor will be established by Commanding General, Task Force "A", at the earliest practicable date and it is mandatory that this wage scale be strictly adhered to. No deviation will be made without prior approval, Commanding General, Task Force "A". This wage may be in cash or in kind, or in a combination of both.

c. TROOP SERVICE POOLS

(1) The establishment of local labor pools will not relieve the divisional commanders and Task Commanders from their responsibilities for the operation of general service pools of troop labor within the divisio

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By Command of Major General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Colonel, GSC.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ E. E. Cummings,
E. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, AGD.,
Adjutant General.

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR 3D RECON TR AND
CO L, 7TH INFANTRY IN CONNECTION WITH FO 1, HQ 3D INF DIV

1. BEACH AND SURF CONDITIONS:

a Location:

Beach YELLOW 2 is located at the mouth of the WADI MELLAH a mile and a half SOUTH WEST of the Cape FEDALA lighthouse.

b Extent:

The beach is about 1500 yards long, but the portion near the river mouth to the NE should be used to prevent landing too far from the objective.

c Surf:

The beach is fully exposed to the swell and surf which are likely to be heavy.

d Exits:

The beach is backed by low sand dunes which give way to marshy land along the very winding WADI MELLAH and extending to the CASABLANCA-FEDALA road about a mile inland. During the winter, the marshy area is frequently flooded. Vehicles can probably not be landed at this beach because of the high surf and lack of usable routes from the beach. FEDALA golf course is directly behind the NORTH EASTERN portion of the beach.

3D RCN (cont.)

2. TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND MARKS:

a See enclosure.

b FEDALA: A fairly modern city and is known as the Riviera of French Morocco. The population is about 16,000 with about 1,600 Europeans. It is well laid out with broad streets flanked by palm trees. The buildings are scattered and for the most part modern. In the Kasba (Native Quarter), is centered the majority of FEDALA's population.

The following objects are conspicuous from the SEA:

(1) White oil tanks on Cape FEDALA.
(2) Two chimneys about 800 yards SOUTH WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.
(3) Harbor Master's house, white, WEST of town and 1100 yards WEST-SOUTH-WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.
(4) Minaret de la Kasba about a mile SOUTH-SOUTH-WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.

(5) Montagne de la Salle (Saddle Hill) about seven miles SOUTH (inland) of the port.

(6) The Casino which fronts beach RED is about 250 yards from the breakwater. Between the Casino and the beach and extending about 600 yards from the breakwater, is a wall about ten feet high. It has three or four openings, including two broad flights of steps directly in front of the Casino that lead down to the beach. At the EAST end of the wall is a line of hedge or shrubbery which extends a few hundred yards further EAST. Beyond this, the beach is backed by sparsely built up town blocks and cultivated.

c The WADI MELLAH makes two hairpin bends near the coast. The ground between these bends is cultivated. Some product such as rice which requires flooding is probably grown there. The golf course lies just to the NORTH of the bends in the MELLAH. It is not full-sized and may be in a run-down condition. Several rows of trees run in a general EAST-WEST direction around the golf course and separating the fairways. There is a growth of trees along the NORTH bank of the MELLAH at this point. There are two bridges across the MELLAH from the golf course area into FEDALA.

On the narrow finger of land which separates the MELLAH from the ocean are six sunken oil tanks. About 500 yards NORTH EAST of these tanks is the Battery de Fedala, easily identified on the airplane photos. The lighthouse on the WESTERN side of the coast near the oil tanks should be clearly visible during the day. It will probably not be illuminated at night, however.

3. ENEMY INFORMATION:

a Dispositions: FEDALA is garrisoned by the following:

Infantry: 2nd Bn 6th Moroccan Riflemen
1 Company, 6th Senegalese Riflemen
1 Plat., 6th Senegalese Riflemen (w/3 25mm AT guns)

Cavalry: 2 mechanized troops, 3d Moroccan Spahis

Artillery: 1 Bn Defense Artillerie du Territoire (With unknown number of 75mm and sixteen 13.2mm MG's)

b Description:

See information pamphlet on organization and identification of the enemy.

c Coast Defenses:

(1) Battery of four 138.6mm guns known as "Batterie Du Pont Blondin." It is located on the seaward slope of bluff just EAST of mouth of WADI NEFIFIKH. A little domed chapel is said to be in or near the emplacements which are probably camouflaged from ground observation. Ammunition is reported as brought to the guns on trucks which are on lines in cemented trenches. Estimated range of the guns is 20,000 yards. There is believed to be one searchlight about 300 yards NE of the battery and one 13.2mm MG for AA protection.

(2) Estimated battery of 2 guns, probably 75mm, on tip of Cape FEDALA. These are not believed camouflaged. Range: 9,000 yds.

(3) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 100mm, known as "Batterie de FEDALA" located on the WEST coast of the cape NW from Rond Point Pasteur. Estimated range at least 15,400 yards. One searchlight believed to be about 100 yards to the EAST. One 13.2mm AAMG believed to be at the battery.

(4) Three or four large caliber guns reported about 1600 yards SW of Mansurian inlet, NE of FEDALA.

(5) Estimated 2 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's near (1).

(6) Estimated 2 twin-barreled AAMG's with detectors and range-finders next to (2).

(7) Estimated 8 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's, possibly also 25mm and 37mm AA guns, in and around the area surrounding the oil tanks.

(8) Estimated one battery of four 75mm AA guns near the golf course. These may be 90mm and not 75mm. There may be, in addition, two 105mm AA guns. There are probably two searchlights, a range-finder and sound ranging equipment at the battery.

(9) Possibly about six 37mm AA guns on the golf course, across the river to the SW of town.

(10) Three AA guns with searchlight reported 1½ miles W of Sidi Bou Lanour (Sidi Ali Bou Nuar), SW of FEDALA.

(11) Trenches can be seen on the aerial photographs in and around the town of FEDALA. Wire entanglements may exist on the beaches and around all fixed defenses. Defenses plotted on photo mosaic of FEDALA area represent latest available information.

4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

a 3d Recon Tr:

(1) The objectives of the 3d Recon Tr in order of priority are as follows:

(a) To destroy AA installations in and around the golf course area.

(b) Attack hostile positions on FEDALA POINT from the land side and on the WEST of BLT 1, RLG 7. To do this will require crossing of WADI MELLAH after clearing the golf course area. All possible speed is essential in order to get across the MELLAH before daylight.

(c) The guns on FEDALA POINT must be put out of action early to prevent enfilade fire against boats entereing FEDALA BAY after daylight and to permit the movement of transports closer to shore. The 3d Recon Tr should attack enemy defenses on the WESTERN end of FEDALA POINT; i.e, those nearest Beach YELLOW 2.

(2) The exact location and caliber of the AA guns on the golf course are not known. It will be necessary to secure more detailed information by reconnaissance ashore. For available information, see paragraph 3.

(3) There are probably wire entanglements around the installations. These must be cut or blown out with demolitions. Secrecy of landing and movement thereafter should be maintained until its is apparent that the French are aware of your presence.

(4) The BLT 1 of the 7th Inf, while attacking the town, will operate a flank patrol down the Boulevard des Zenatas and will attempt to secure contact. Keep the CO, BLT 1, 7th Inf informed of your dispositions after the golf course area has been cleared.

(5) Co L of the 7th Inf will land on Beach YELLOW 2 at H plus 1 hour and will advance inland to seize the bridges over the MELLAH. Give them what protection and fire support you can. All of your personnel should be informed and fully understand the mission and tactical plan of BLT 1, RLG-7 and Co L.

b Co L, 7th Inf:

(1) The objectives of Co L in order of priority are as follows:

(a) Seize crossing of FEDALA-MEDIOUNA HWY over WADI MELLAH.

(b) Seize railroad bridge over WADI MELLAH 1100 yards SOUTH of a above.

(2) These bridges must be seized with the least practible delay to prevent their destruction by the enemy. They may be prepared for demolition. The enemy may attempt to retreat across them from the EAST or he may attempt to bring reenforcements across them from the WEST.

(3) BLT 2, RLG-7 has been given the mission of securing these bridges and will advance on them from the EAST. All men must be informed to that effect to prevent their firing on friendly troops.

(4) The 3d Recon Tr will land on Beach YELLOW 2 ahead of you and will assist in protecting your landing.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARD AND METHOD OF HANDLING FRENCH FORCES TAKEN PRISONER:

a General: The United States Forces are friendly toward the French Forces in the area of the landing. However, we will advance on our objectives, with-holding fire, but taking every precaution for our own safety and prepared to overcome any resistance to our advance. Should the French Forces open fire on us or otherwise commit an overt act, we will attack at once, using every weapon at our disposal.

b Prisoners of War: It is impractible for us to guard, feed, transport and otherwise care for large numbers of prisoners. The number that can be interrogated will be limited. Consequently, procedure as outlined below will be followed:

(1) Sentinels, Patrols, or Small Combat Groups: As a safety precaution before the attitude of the French has been ascertained, and to insure surprise, French sentinels, patrols and small combat groups will be seized, without firing if possible. When any of these elements resist, delay in surrendering, or attempt to escape or give an alarm, we will use our weapons at once. Upon capture, these groups will be disarmed and held as prisoners.

(2) Troops Captured After Having Opened Fire Against Us Or Otherwise Exhibited Signs Of Hostility, Or Whose Attitude Is Questionable:

These troops will be disarmed, marched to the rear under guard, and turned over to higher headquarters for disposition.

(3) Individuals Voluntarily Surrendering Or Professing To Be Friendly:

They will be relieved of their arms and ammunition, held under guard until a group is collected, and sent to join larger groups in the rear which have surrendered.

(4) Forces Surrendering In Large Groups Or Professing To Be Friendly:

The leaders will be required to assemble their men and turn over all arms, ammunition, equipment and vehicles except individual arms, personal equipment and organizational colors. All ammunition will be surrendered.

The unit will then be marched by its leaders to an area which does not interfere with our advance. Here it will stack arms, move a short distance from the stacks and remain under observation.

The leader and his chief subordinates will be turned over to higher headquarters for examination and disposition. The higher headquarters will examine the officers of the unit, retaining a number of them as guarantees of good faith.

(5) Fixed Coastal Defensive Installations:

French troops will be immediately removed from the vicinity of coastal defense installations, whether they be captured by assault or surrender. The batteries must be guarded. If insufficient strength is available for guarding, the guns must be rendered unserviceable by demolition or thermite grenades.

6. INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN ALL MEN:

a Plans contemplate that leading waves will reach the beach two and one-half hours before sunrise.

b Our tactical doctrine of aggressive action with speed exactly fits this particular operation and will be followed. Furthermore, our equipment, organization and state of training are superior to that of the enemy.

c This operation is the first large scale offensive action by American troops in World War II. The eyes of our country and the world will be on us. Our success or our failure will be written into the Nation's history.

d The attack will continue by day and by night. It will be rapid, violent and continuous.

e Pin the enemy by frontal fire and attack his flanks and rear. Do not butt away your strength in frontal attacks.

f We must conserve our rations and water. Resupply will be difficult.

7. INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDERS:

a Do not carry any copies of written orders or overlays ashore. Take ashore plain maps, bearing only a few markings to show your own objective. There is plenty of time on board ship for each officer and NCO to become familiar with his mission and to memorize the plan of higher units, including plans of action of neighboring units.

b Check all Signal personnel to make certain that they are carrying no codes or ciphers which may be captured by the enemy forward of the Battalion Command Posts.

c All drivers will be issued road maps and will be told their route and destination before departing on a mission.

d The beachmarking is the responsibility of the Navy and will be covered in orders to the Ship's Captain. BLT commanders should ascertain early from the Captain the method prescribed for locating and marking all beaches so that all personnel may be instructed in this matter and will know exactly where their boat group is being landed in the ship to shore movement. BLT commanders will also coordinate with the Captain for details and will furnish any assistance required.

e Tentatively, D-day has been set for November 8, 1942, H-hour for 0400Z. Check with Ship's Captain for changes.

OFFICIAL:

HARRELL,
G-3

ANDERSON

Hq 3d Inf Div (reinf)
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CO. L, RLG-30, (REINF)
IN CONNECTION WITH FO 1, HQ 3D INF DIV

1. BEACH AND SURF CONDITIONS:

a Location:

Beach BLUE-3 is located at the head of a small cove into which empties the WADI ARIMENA. On the SOUTH side of the cove is a small beach fronted by rocks.

b Approach from Seaward:

No off-shore dangers exist. The opening of the cove is readily recognized in daylight by Minaret de Mansouriah, a tower in the village of the same name just SOUTH of the cove and about 5 miles ENE of Cape FEDALA.

c Extent:

The beach is a 'spot beach' and suitable for landing only small detachments.

d Exits:

A few hundred yards beyond the cove is the FEDALA road which parallels the coast and passes directly behind the "Batterie du Pont Blondin" and across the Blondin Bridge to FEDALA.

e Surf and Tides:

The cove is fully exposed to the surf and swell. The surf will probably be heavy. The tide range averages about 8 feet.

2. TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND MARKS:

a Cultivated fields lie beyond both the EAST and WEST banks of the cove. The WADI ARIMENA is lined with trees which should afford considerable ground cover. The WADI itself is small and dry much of the year, though at the time of our landing will probably be partially filled. It is probably fordable.

b Inland 2300 yards is the CASABLANCA-RABAT railroad which, in general parallels the coast line and passes through FEDALA. Further inland about 3½ miles, the main CASABLANCA-RABAT road also parallels the coast and runs through FEDALA on to CASABLANCA.

c The ground slopes gradually upward from the coast, though it is relatively flat.

d The Minaret de Mansouriah is the most prominent landmark in the vicinity.

3. ENEMY INFORMATION:

a Dispositions: FEDALA is garrisoned by the following;

Infantry: 2nd Bn 6th Moroccan Riflemen
1 Company, 6th Senegalese Riflemen
1 Plat., 6th Senegalese Riflemen (w/3 25mm AT guns)

Cavalry: 2 mechanized troops, 3d Moroccan Spahis

Artillery: 1 Bn Defense Artillerie du Territoire (With unknown number of 75mm and sixteen 13.2mm MG's)

b Description:

See information pamphlet on organization and identification of the enemy.

c Coast Defenses:

(1) Battery of four 138.6mm guns known as "Batterie Du Pont Blondin." It is located on the seaward slope of bluff just EAST of mouth of WADI NEFIFIKH. A little domed chapel is said to be in or near the emplacements which are probably camouflaged from ground observation. Ammunition is reported as brought to the guns on trucks which are on lines in cemented trenches. Estimated range of the guns is 20,000 yards. There is believed to be one searchlight about 300 yards NE of the battery and one 13.2mm MG for AA protection.

(2) Estimated battery of 2 guns, probably 75mm, on tip of Cape FEDALA. These are not believed camouflaged. Range: 9,000 yds.

(3) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 100mm, known as "Batterie de FEDALA" located on the WEST coast of the cape NW from Road Point Pasteur. Estimated range at least 15,400 yards. One searchlight believed to be about 100 yards to the EAST. One 13.2mm AAMG believed to be at the battery.

(4) Three or four large caliber guns reported about 1600 yards SW of Mansurian inlet, NE of FEDALA.

(5) Estimated 2 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's near (1).

(6) Estimated 2 twin-barreled AAMG's with detectors and range-finders next to (2).

(7) Estimated 8 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's, possibly also 25mm and 37mm AA guns, in and around the area surrounding the oil tanks.

(8) Estimated one battery of four 75mm AA guns near the golf course. These may be 90mm and not 75mm. There may be, in addition, two 105mm AA guns. There are probably two searchlights, a range-finder and sound ranging equipment at the battery.

(9) Possibly about six 37mm AA guns on the golf course, across the river to the SW of town.

(10) Three AA guns with searchlight reported 1½ miles W of Sidi Bou Lanour (Sidi Ali Bou Nuar), SW of FEDALA.

(11) Trenches can be seen on the aerial photographs in and around the town of FEDALA. Wire entanglements may exist on the beaches and around all fixed defenses. Defenses plotted on photo mosaic of FEDALA area represent latest available information.

4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

a Objective:

The objectives of Co. L, 30th Infantry in order of priority are as follows:

(1) Destruction of all coastal installations and AA weapons between Mansourian Cove and line of "Brushwood" objective.

(2) Assist 2nd Bn, 30th Inf in reduction of "Battery du Pont Blondin."

b Reports of enemy installations SOUTH WEST of Mansouriah are not specific. Three or four large caliber guns are reported in the general area, but their exact location or exact caliber is unknown. Whether they are AA or coastal defense guns is also unknown. There may be several installations of small AA along the coast.

c The FEDALA road (the one nearest the coast) will serve as a left boundary. The 2nd Bn of the 30th Inf will send a platoon to contact your company if you have not already established contact with them by the time "Batterie du Pont Blondin" has been captured.

d If you run into more resistance than is anticipated, try to contact the 2nd Bn by runner. He, of course, must make his way across country, avoiding contact with either natives or enemy forces.

e Don't overburden yourself with prisoners. Destroy the guns with thermite grenades, and disarm the men. For more details, see paragraph 5.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARD AND METHOD OF HANDLING FRENCH FORCES TAKEN PRISONER:

a General: The United States Forces are friendly toward the French Forces in the area of the landing. However, we will advance on our objectives, with-holding fire, but taking every precaution for our own safety and prepared to overcome any resistance to our advance. Should the French Forces open fire on us or otherwise commit an overt act, we will attack at once, using every weapon at our disposal.

b Prisoners of War: It is impractible for us to guard, feed, transport and otherwise care for large numbers of prisoners. The number that can be interrogated will be limited. Consequently, procedure as outlined below will be followed:

(1) Sentinels, Patrols, or Small Combat Groups: As a safety precaution before the attitude of the French has been ascertained, and to insure surprise, French sentinels, patrols and small combat groups will be seized, without firing if possible. When any of these elements resist, delay in surrendering, or attempt to escape or give an alarm, we will use our weapons at once. Upon capture, these groups will be disarmed and held as prisoners.

(2) Troops Captured After Having Opened Fire Against Us Or Otherwise Exhibited Signs Of Hostility, Or Whose Attitude Is Questionable:

These troops will be disarmed, marched to the rear under guard, and turned over to higher headquarters for disposition.

(3) Individuals Voluntarily Surrendering Or Professing To Be Friendly:

They will be relieved of their ammunition, but not side arms, held under observation until a group is collected, and sent to join larger groups in the rear which have surrendered.

(4) Forces Surrendering In Large Groups Or Professing To Be Friendly:

The leaders will be required to assemble their men and turn over all arms, ammunition, equipment and vehicles except individual arms, personal equipment and organizational colors. All ammunition will be surrendered.

The unit will be moved to an area which does not interfere with our advance and kept under observation.

The leader and his chief subordinates will be turned over to higher headquarters for examination and disposition. The higher headquarters will examine the officers of the unit, retaining a number of them as guarantees of good faith.

(5) Fixed Coastal Defensive Installations:

French troops will be immediately removed from the the vicinity of coastal defense installations, whether they be captured by assault or surrender. The batteries must be guarded. If insufficient strength is available for guarding, the guns must be rendered unserviceable by demolition or thermite grenades.

Hq 3d Inf Div, (reinf)
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BLT 2, RLG 30
IN CONNECTION WITH FO 1, HQ 3D INF DIV

1. BEACHES AND SURF CONDITIONS:

a Location:

Beach BLUE 2 is at the head of a small cove into which flows the WADI NEFIFIKH. There is a rocky promontory on either side of the cove. Inside the cove, and at half tide there is about 600 yards of usable beach. At low tide, landings are limited to a line extending across the mouth of the cove, but at high tide, landings can be made on either side of the cove up as far as the highway bridge.

b Approach from Seaward:

No off-shore dangers exist. A small bar about 1 fathom deep in the center of the mouth of the cove will probably cause heavy surf on the beach.

c Exits:

The tide may not permit the landing of vehicles or heavy equipment at Beach BLUE 2 initially. Plans should not include the landing of anything but foot elements with weapons carried by hand, until its suitability for motor transportation is determined.

2. TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND MARKS:

a WADI NEFIFIKH:

The NEFIFIKH is a river typical of many of those which may be found in California. During the wet season, the river runs full, but drops off quickly as the dry season comes on. At this time of the year, the stream is probably not fordable, particularly at the mouth where the tide backs the water up as far as the Blondin Bridge. At the mouth of the river, a cove 400 yards wide is formed. Rocks flank the entrance to the cove for some distance on either side, but the cove itself forms a sandy beach of about 600 yards usable length. On either side of the cove are small bluffs, the one on the EAST having an elevation of 54' at its crest.

b Road Net:

The FEDALA-MANSURIA Highway crosses the NEFIFIKH at the Blondin Bridge a few hundred yards SOUTH of the cove mouth. This is a good, hard-surfaced road which parallels the coast. 1½ miles inland (SW), the main coastal road (CASABLANCA-RABAT) and the railroad cross the river. Secondary roads and trails exist in abundance as study of the map will reveal. The road net on the EAST bluff is such that units attacking the battery can easily orient themselves.

c Fields:

The area along the coast on either side of the NEFIFIKH is highly cultivated. The long axis of the fields run perpendicular to the beach and form a ready means of orientation. Many of the fields appear to be surrounded by hedges or bushes of some sort which should afford excellent ground cover.

d Land Marks:

The battery itself is probably camouflaged against ground observation by rows of trees and other vegetation. On the bank of the EAST bluff the scattered houses which show in the photograph are probably not occupied at this time of the year. They are beach shacks or cabins which are used mostly during the summer months. A small domed chapel sits in the middle of the fields in or near the battery position.

3. ENEMY INFORMATION:

a Dispositions: FEDALA is garrisoned by the following;

Infantry: 2nd Bn 6th Moroccan Riflemen
1 Company, 6th Senegalese Riflemen
1 Plat., 6th Senegalese Riflemen (w/3 25mm AT guns)

Cavalry: 2 mechanized troops, 3d Moroccan Spahis

Artillery: 1 Bn Defense Artillerie du Territoire (With unknown number of 75mm and sixteen 13.2mm MG's)

b Description:

See information pamphlet on organization and identification of the enemy.

c Coast Defenses:

(1) Battery of four 138.6mm guns known as "Batterie Du Pont Blondin." It is located on the seaward slope of bluff just EAST of mouth of WADI NEFIFIKH. A little domed chapel is said to be in or near the emplacements which are probably camouflaged from ground observation. Ammunition is reported as brought to the guns on trucks which are on lines in cemented trenches. Estimated range of the guns is 20,000 yards. There is believed to be one searchlight about 300 yards NE of the battery and one 13.2mm MG for AA protection.

(2) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 75mm, on tip of Cape FEDALA. These are not believed camouflaged. Range: 9,000 yds.

(3) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 100mm, known as "Batterie de FEDALA" located on the WEST coast of the cape NW from Road Point Pasteur. Estimated range at least 15,400 yards. One searchlight believed to be about 100 yards to the EAST. One 13.2mm AAMG believed to be at the battery.

(4) Three or four large caliber guns reported about 1600 yards SW of Mansurian inlet, NE of FEDALA.

(5) Estimated 2 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's near (1).

(6) Estimated 2 twin-barreled AAMG's with detectors and range-finders next to (2).

(7) Estimated 8 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's, possibly also 25mm and 37mm AA guns, in and around the area surrounding the oil tanks.

(8) Estimated one battery of four 75mm AA guns near the golf course. These may be 90mm and not 75mm. There may be, in addition, two 105mm AA guns. There are probably two searchlights, a range-finder and sound ranging equipment at the battery.

(9) Possibly about six 37mm AA guns on the golf course, across the river to the SW of town.

(10) Three AA guns with searchlight reported 1½ miles W of Sidi Bou Lanour (Sidi Ali Bou Nuar), SW of FEDALA.

(11) Trenches can be seen on the aerial photographs in and around the town of FEDALA. Wire entanglements may exist on the beaches and around all fixed defenses. Defenses plotted on photo mosaic of FEDALA area represent latest available information.

4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

(1) The objectives of BLT-2, RLG 30, in order of priority as follows;

a Batterie du Pont Blondin on the bluff EAST of the mouth of the WADI NEFIFIKH. This includes all small caliber AA weapons or close defense weapons which may be in the immediate vicinity. These guns must be put out of action early to prevent enfilade fire on the beaches after daylight and to permit the movement of transports closer to shore.

The Blondin bridge, a few hundred yards inland from the mouth of the WADI NEFIFIKH, must be seized at once and held in order to permit communication with, and if necessary, the reinforcement of elements attacking the Batterie du Pont Blondin.

The most recent aerial photographs show new construction in the area just EAST of Blondin Bridge. This may be a camp. There may also be gun emplacements between the camp and the bridge. The area EAST of the bridge must be reconnoitered at once.

b Other crossings over NEFIFIKH to include the railroad bridge and the bridge on Route Principale No. 1 (CASABLANCA-RABAT HWY).

c Line of NEFIFIKH (Brushwood objective) for defense of the beach-head from the EAST. The line must be advanced EAST of the NEFIFIKH near the coast to protect Beach BLUE 2 from small arms and light artillery fire.

(2) The WADI NEFIFIKH is not fordable near the mouth. All personnel must be instructed that, should they be landed on the EAST bank at the mouth of the river, they must immediately assist in the attack on the defenses on that bank, regardless of any previously assigned mission. Staff officers should be sent to this flank to insure liaison with the forces landed on the WEST bank.

(3) Study of aerial photograph indicates trenches in rear of the battery, probably for close defense of the guns. No trenches appear to be in front of the guns. There are probably wire entanglements around the battery. The unit attacking this position should have demolition equipment and be prepared to cut or blow up wire.

(4) Buildings shown on beach at mouth of WADI NEFIFIKH are reported to be summer beach huts, probably vacant at this time of the year.

(5) Company L of the 3d Bn will land at Mansurian Inlet 5,000 yards to the NORTH EAST and will advance down the coast toward WADI NEFIFIKH, overcoming any resistance encountered on the way. All personnel in the 2d Bn LT must be instructed to this effect. Once the battery is reduced and if Co. L has not as yet made contact, a reconnaissance patrol at least the size of a platoon, should be sent in the direction of Mansuria with the mission of gaining contact with Co. L.

(6) For information on occupying the position and handling prisoners, see paragraph 5.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARD AND METHOD OF HANDLING FRENCH FORCES TAKEN PRISONER:

a General: The United States Forces are friendly toward the French Forces in the area of the landing. However, we will advance on our objectives, with-holding fire, but taking every predaution for our own safety and prepared to overcome any resistance to our advance. Should the French Forces open fire on us or otherwise commit an overt act, we will attack at once, using every weapon at our disposal.

b Prisoners of War: It is impractible for us to guard, feed, transport and otherwise care for large numbers of prisoners. The number that can be interrogated will be limited. Consequently, procedure as outlined below will be followed:

(1) Sentinels, Patrols, or Small Combat Groups: As a safety precaution before the attitude of the French has been ascertained, and to insure surprise, French sentinels, patrols and small combat groups will be seized, without firing if possible. When any of these elements resist, delay in surrendering, or attempt to escape or give an alarm, we will use our weapons at once. Upon capture, these groups will be disarmed and held as prisoners.

(2) Troops Captured After Having Opened Fire Against Us Or Otherwise Exhibited Signs Of Hostility, Or Whose Attitude Is Questionable:

These troops will be disarmed, marched to the rear under guard, and turned over to higher headquarters for disposition.

(3) Individuals Voluntarily Surrendering Or Professing To Be Friendly:

They will be relieved of their ammunition, but not side arms, held under observation until a group is collected, and sent to join larger groups in the rear which have surrendered.

(4) Forces Surrendering In Large Groups Or Professing To Be Friendly:

The leaders will be required to assemble their men and turn over all arms, ammunition, equipment and vehicles except individual arms, personal equipment and organizational colors. All ammunition will be surrendered.

The unit will be moved to an area which does not interfere with our advance and kept under observation.

The leader and his chief subordinates will be turned over to higher headquarters for examination and disposition. The higher headquarters will examine the officers of the unit, retaining a number of them as guarantees of good faith.

(5) Fixed Coastal Defensive Installations:

French troops will be immediately removed from the the vicinity of coastal defense installations, whether they be captured by assault or surrender. The batteries must be guarded. If insufficient strength is available for guarding, the guns must be rendered unserviceable by demolition or thermite grenades.

Hq 3d Inf Div, (reinf)
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BLT 1, RLG-7
IN CONNECTION WITH FO 1, HQ 3D INF DIV

1. BEACHES AND SURF CONDITIONS:

a Location:

Beaches RED and RED-2 lie between the FEDALA harbor breakwater and a rocky reef about 1800 yards to the EASTWARD. These beaches of firm sand, are well sheltered by Cape FEDALA and are so shelving that the water is shallow for a considerable distance off-shore. The two beaches are separated from one another by a small covered rocky reef about 200 yards off-shore. This reef lies directly on the extension of a line through the minaret which stands in the Kasba and a beacon in the rear. (Bearing 187 degrees true). This line gives an easily defined right boundary to Beach RED-2 if the beacon can be seen.

b- Extent:

Beach RED-2 has about 500 yards of useful length and Beach RED about 800 yards. The beaches are 30 to 60 yards wide.

c Sea Approach:

No off-shore obstructions except a ½ fathom spot on the EASTERN line of Beach RED-2 about 500 yards off-shore. Tanks and other vehicles should be water-proofed and expect to travel some distance through the water because of the gradual slope of the bottom.

d Surf and Tide:

Beaches RED and RED-2 are protected by Cape FEDALA from the prevailing sea and the extreme surf conditions which may be encountered at the other beaches may not exist there. The mean range of tide is 7.1 feet.

e Exits:

The exit from Beach RED is directly on the streets of FEDALA. Exits from Beach RED-2 are just to the EAST of the town and pass through cultivated plots and sparsely built up town blocks. Fronting Beach RED about 250 yards from the breakwater is a large wooden casino surrounded on three sides by gardens.

2. TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND MARKS:

a FEDALA: A fairly modern city and is known as the Riviera of French Morocco. The population is about 16,000 with about 1,600 Europeans. It is well laid out with broad streets flanked by palm trees. The buildings are scattered and for the most part modern. In the Kasba (Native Quarter), is centered the majority of FEDALA's population.

The following objects are conspicuous from the Sea:

(1) White oil tanks on Cape FEDALA.

(2) Two chimneys about 800 yards SOUTH WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.

(3) Harbor Master's house, white. WEST of town and 1100 yards WEST-SOUTH-WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.

(4) Minaret de la Kasba about a mile SOUTH-SOUTH-WEST of the SOUTH breakwater lighthouse.

(5) Montagne de la Salle (Sadale Hill) about seven miles SOUTH (inland) of the port.

(6) The Casino which fronts Beach RED is about 250 yards from the breakwater. Between the Casino and the beach and extending about 600 yards from the breakwater, is a wall about ten feet high. It has three or four openings, including two broad flights of steps directly in front of the Casino that lead down to the beach. At the EAST end of the wall is a line of hedge or shrubbery which extends a few hundred yards further EAST. Beyond this, the beach is backed by sparsely built up town blocks and cultivated.

3. ENEMY INFORMATION:

a Dispositions: FEDALA is garrisoned by the following;

Infantry: 2nd Bn 6th Moroccan Riflemen
1 Company, 6th Senegalese Riflemen
1 Plat., 6th Senegalese Riflemen (w/3 25mm AT guns)

Cavalry: 2 mechanized troops, 3d Moroccan Spahis

Artillery: 1 Bn Defense Artillerie du Territoire (With unknown number of 75mm and sixteen 13.2mm MG's)

b Description:

See information pamphlet on organization and identification of the enemy.

c Coast Defenses:

(1) Battery of four 138.6mm guns known as "Batterie Du Pont Blondin." It is located on the seaward slope of bluff just EAST of mouth of WADI NEFIFIKH. A little domed chapel is said to be in or near the emplacements which are probably camouflaged from ground observation. Ammunition is reported as brought to the guns on trucks which are on lines in cemented trenches. Estimated range of the guns is 20,000 yards. There is believed to be one searchlight about 300 yards NE of the battery and one 13.2mm MG for AA protection.

(2) Estimated battery of 2 guns, probably 75mm, on tip of Cape FEDALA. These are not believed camouflaged. Range: 9,000 yds.

(3) Estimated battery of 4 guns, probably 100mm, known as "Batterie de FEDALA" located on the WEST coast of the cape NW from Rond Point Pasteur. Estimated range at least 15,400 yards. One searchlight believed to be about 100 yards to the EAST. One 13.2mm AAMG believed to be at the battery.

(4) Three or four large caliber guns reported about 1600 yards SW of Mansurian inlet, NE of FEDALA.

(5) Estimated 2 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's near (1).

(6) Estimated 2 twin-barreled AAMG's with detectors and range-finders next to (2).

(7) Estimated 8 twin-barreled 13.2mm AAMG's, possibly also 25mm and 37mm AA guns, in and around the area surrounding the oil tanks.

(8) Estimated one battery of four 75mm AA guns near the golf course. These may be 90mm and not 75mm. There may be, in addition, two 105mm AA guns. There are probably two searchlights, a range-finder and sound ranging equipment at the battery.

(9) Possibly about six 37mm AA guns on the golf course, across the river to the SW of town.

(10) Three AA guns with searchlight reported 1½ miles W of Sidi Bou Lanour (Sidi Ali Bou Nuar), SW of FEDALA.

(11) Trenches can be seen on the aerial photographs in and around the town of FEDALA. Wire entanglements may exist on the beaches and around all fixed defenses. Defenses plotted on photo mosaic of FEDALA area represent latest available information.

4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

FEDALA should be attacked from the EAST. The Moulay Youssef and the Rue Du Sokko, an extension, should be used as a line of departure. Every effort should be made, however, to avoid the Kasba where the bulk of the Native population live.

Three main axes of advance for the attack of the city from the EAST are :

(1) Boulevard Moulay Ismael
(2) Rue de Fes
(3) Ave de la Kasba--Rd Pt. Petain--Boulevard Foch

There is a contonment EAST of Hotel Miramar where troops are quartered. These troops are believed to be Senegalese (black). It consists of a row of low huts on the sea side of Boulevard Moulay Ismael. This area should be attacked from the land side after the advance has progressed past this area so as to prevent the escape of the troops.

One unit, at least a platoon, should surround the Miramar Hotel after the advance has passed that point and seize members of the German commission residing in the hotel. This should be accomplished with the utmost surprise and dispatch to prevent the destruction of secret papers, codes etc., to prevent the escape of the Germans, and to seize any communications equipment therein. A German and French interpreter should accompany this unit.

The following points once seized should be lightly garrisoned to insure control of the area captured:

(1) Rond Point Lyautey
(2) Place de la Kasba
(3) Rond Point Petain
(4) Place de la Gare
(5) Rond Point Pasteur

The following installations should be taken over after the attack has passed beyond them:

(1) Telephone Exchange
(2) Oil Storage Tanks
(3) Railway Station
(4) Defensive Installations
(5) Port Facilities
(6) Town Hall
(7) Public Works Building
(8) Bank

All ranks should be informed that the 3d Recn Tr lands at Beach Yellow-2 and attacks installations in the Golf Course area. Contact should be established with this unit.

The greatest danger to landings on all FEDALA beaches lies in the coast defense and AA guns in and around Cape FEDALA. These guns are in a position to deliver flanking fire on the beaches and must be silenced by daylight. Other missions must be subordinated to those operating to clear the beaches of aimed fire.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARD AND METHOD OF HANDLING FRENCH FORCES TAKEN PRISONER:

a General: The United States Forces are friendly toward the French Forces in the area of the landing. However, we will advance on our objectives, with-holding fire, but taking every precaution for our own safety and prepared to overcome any resistance to our advance. Should the French Forces open fire on us or otherwise commit an overt act, we will attack at once, using every weapon at our disposal.

b Prisoners of War: It is impractible for us to guard, feed, transport and otherwise care for large numbers of prisoners. The number that can be interrogated will be limited. Consequently, procedure as outlined below will be followed:

(1) Sentinels, Patrols, or Small Combat Groups: As a safety precaution before the attitude of the French has been ascertained, and to insure surprise, French sentinels, patrols and small combat groups will be seized, without firing if possible. When any of these elements resist, delay in surrendering, or attempt to escape or give an alarm, we will use our weapons at once. Upon capture, these groups will be disarmed and held as prisoners.

(2) Troops Captured After Having Opened Fire Against Us Or Otherwise Exhibited Signs Of Hostility, Or Whose Attitude Is Questionable:

These troops will be disarmed, marched to the rear under guard, and turned over to higher headquarters for disposition.

(3) Individuals Voluntarily Surrendering Or Professing To Be Friendly:

They will be relieved of their ammunition, but not side arms, held under observation until a group is collected, and sent to join larger groups in the rear which have surrendered.

(4) Forces Surrendering In Large Groups Or Professing To Be Friendly:

The leaders will be required to assemble their men and turn over all arms, ammunition, equipment and vehicles except individual arms, personal equipment and organizational colors. All ammunition will be surrendered.

The unit will be moved to an area which does not interfere with our advance and kept under observation.

The leader and his chief subordinates will be turned over to higher headquarters for examination and disposition. The higher headquarters will examine the officers of the unit, retaining a number of them as guarantees of good faith.

(5) Fixed Coastal Defensive Installations:

French troops will be immediately removed from the the vicinity of coastal defense installations, whether they be captured by assault or surrender. The batteries must be guarded. If insufficient strength is available for guarding, the guns must be rendered unserviceable by demolition or thermite grenades.

Hq 3d Inf Div, reinf
Camp Pickett, Va.,
17 Oct '42

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BLT 2, RLG 7 AND BLT 1, RLG 30 IN CONNECTION WITH FO 1, HQ 3D INF DIV

1. BEACH AND SURF CONDITIONS:

a Location:

Beaches RED 3 and BLUE constitute a continuous beach line, with RED 3 on the right (WEST) and BLUE on the left (EAST). However, there is a sand bar at ½ fathom located 400 yards off-shore opposite the center that divides the 600 yard stretch of sand, into two separate beaches for landing purposes, it being doubtful that this bar can be crossed except at high water in calm weather. There is a prominent rock 17 feet above water, located 200 yards off-shore at a point 600 yards to the right (WEST) of the beach RED 3. 200 yards off-shore and at the left (EAST) of beach BLUE is a rock 28 feet above the water. A short distance farther to the left (EAST) there is a rock 20 feet above water at the WEST limit of the cove formed by the mouth of the WADI NEFIFIKH, Beach BLUE 2.

b Extent:

Beaches RED 3 and BLUE on each side of the ½ fathom bar respectively are each about 400 yards in length.

c Sea Approach:

No off-shore dangers except the ½ fathom bar which may ground landing boats prematurely.

d Surf and Tide Conditions:

The bar in the center off-shore may cause surf on beaches RED 3 and BLUE.

e Exits:

Exits from both Beach RED 3 and Beach BLUE are across cultivated ground to the FEDALA road which parallels the coast about 400 yards inland.

2. TOPOGRAPHY AND LAND MARKS:

At the right flank of Beach RED 3 and directly inland is a ladder shaped grove of trees. The fields have their long axis perpendicular to the beach and are separated by clumps or hedges, which give a means of orientation for direction.

The FEDALA road, the railroad, and the main CASABLANCA highway come together in FEDALA. They are all approximately perpendicular to the axes of advance to the objectives of BLT 2, RLG 7 and BLT 1, RLG 30. These roads serve as means of orientation.

The ground slopes gradually upward to the objectives. The ground throughout is cultivated and affords scattered ground cover.

3. ENEMY INFORMATION:

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4. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

a BLT 2, RLG 7

(1) Objectives:

BLT 2, RLG 7--The three crossings over the WADI MELLAH, Route No 110, the railroad and Route No 1. The advance to these crossings should include the seizure of the high ground on the EAST bank indicated as RLG initial objectives.

(2) The prompt seizure of the line of the MELLAH is vitally important since the enemy may attempt to reenforce the FEDALA garrison or he may elect to defend CASABLANCA on this line.

b BLT 1, RLG 30

(1) Objective:

The ridge SOUTH of Route No 1. The front to be covered is very wide and will permit the occupation of only the key points on the ridge with patrols between, and reserves in rear.

c The importance of rapidity of movement cannot be overemphasized. Prompt action must be taken to attack and drive back any enemy formations encountered in the movement to the objective.

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION
Office of the A.C. of S.,G-2
Camp Pickett, Virginia.

October 10, 1942.

INFORMATION PAMPHLET
ON
FRENCH MOROCCO

Compiled and reproduced by direction of Commanding General of 3rd Infantry Division, under supervision of the A.C. of S., G-2 3rd Infantry Division.

SECTION 1

Contents

1. General.
2. Directive Task Force "A" reference instructions shipboard.
3. Political and Psychological Estimate.
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6. Religious Considerations Affecting Tactical Decisions.
7. Moroccan Government.
8. Military Leaders.
9. Moroccan Press.
10. Financial Situation

ANDERSON
Major General.

OFFICIAL
WALTER
G-2

This pamphlet will be used for reference and shipboard instructions of officers and enlisted men. It is highly important that all members of the command fully understand the customs, religion and mode of living of the natives of French Morocco. More harm may be done to hamper our friendly relationship between soldiers and natives by ridicule or failure to respect the customs of these people than by actual hostile overt acts. Our aim is to win these people over to our side without force of arms and to maintain cordial friendship afterwards.

The information pamphlet is published in three sections to facilitate its use. It should be carefully kept in each unit and organization for future reference. No further copies will be made available, Much of the pamphlet was prepared from stencils previously cut, consequently, there are references that are missing and the pages are not consecutively numbered.

1. During the voyage all officers and enlisted men will be instructed in the subjects covered below.

a. Respect for customs of the inhabitants.

(1) Religion--The Moors and Arabs who constitute 94% of the population of Morocco are Mohammedams. They are very serious about their religion. They resent the presence of an unbeliever near their Mosques and any attempt to enter a Mosque will undoubtedly result in a riot. Under no circumstances should an American mimic the Moslems at prayer or in any of their customs.

(2) Women-- Moslems keep their women very sheltered. When women go out doors they are always veiled. The native men do not speak to or look at women in the streets. American soldiers must do the same. Remember we want to preserve good relations with the natives so that we can get at the Germans. Also the natives are good fighters, quick to resent what they think an insult and very handy with a knife.

(3) Personal dignity--Moslems are dignified and courteous in their relations with strangers. Never slap a Moslem on the back, never touch his arms or body, do not expose any part of your naked body to his view. Do not urinate where he can see you.

b. Aims and Objectives.

The purpose of our expedition is to destroy the Axis military forces. We have no territorial ambitions in Africa and will restore the occupied country to its rightful owners as soon as the Axis has been defeated. Soldiers must not irritate the local population by indicating the possibility of permament occupation.

c. Health. Venereal diseases, skin diseases, eye infections and malaria are widespread. Typhus is present. Every means should be taken to avoid these diseases.

d. The local population will respect strong quiet men who live up to their promises. Do not boast nor brag and keep any agreement you make.

2. The French in Morocco have done a remarkable job in controlling the native government and the people. We do not wish to waste any fighting men to take over civil administrative jobs. It is expected and desired that the French remain and continue to perform their present duties. Be courteous to them and regardless of language difficulties, never get angry.

3. If through careless and inconsiderate action the population of Morocco becomes resentful we may fail to get within striking distance of our real objectives. On the other hand generous, cheerful, courteous conduct can result in the cooperation of the Moroccans and French. This we must have to supply labor and essential services. The conduct of the American soldier in Morocco is a challenge to the good sense and ability of the American people. -- We shall meet that challenge.

By Command of Major General Patton

Hobart R. Gay
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ESTIMATE

There are insufficient grounds for supposing that an American Expeditionary Force could expect to enlist the immediate support of any organized dissident movement in French Morocco. The leaders in the Government and to a large degree in the armed forces are personally loyal to Vichy as the established Government of France. Following the collapse of France they were convinced of the inevitability of a German victory. Their belief in a German victory lessened with continued British resistance. Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar, Syria, and Madagascar, together with fears of British Imperalism have aroused anti-British sentiment. The De-Gaullist movement has not been received with favor. U. S. entry into the World War has, however, renewed hopes of ultimate freedom of France from German domination. There remains hatred of Germany, jealousy of England, fear of Communism and hope in America.

Since free speech and free press do not exist, the incessant Vichy propaganda and loyalty oath to Petain have drawn the French leaders more and more to the support of the Vichy Government. Although the sentiments of a large number of the officers of the armed forces are pro-American, this gives no positive indication that they would not obey orders if attacked.

The Arab population of the coastal areas is to a large extent indifferent, while the tribesmen of the interior would ally themselves with any army which showed sufficient power.

In conclusion, it is believed that the French forces in Morocco would offer resistance to any attempt at invasion. In case of overwhelming force and initial success, this resistance might rapidly collapse. In case, however, that the initial assault failed to gain immediate success, the French resistance would stiffen. Strong resistance, therefore, on the part of the French forces should be anticipated to oppose our initial landing operations.

FRENCH MOROCCO

II. People and Religion

Of the 7,200,000 people of Morocco only about 200,000 are Europeans, who dominate a restless population. In Spanish Morocco an army of nearly 150,000 and 60,000 Europeans reside among 800,000 natives. In French Morocco about 250,000 Europeans represent the ruling class among 6,000,000 natives.

The natives consider Morocco as their own, and the Europeans as interlopers. They have submitted only to superior power, but their linguistic and tribal divisions make it easy for a small minority to control them.

Among the natives are counted about 180,000 Jews, who are looked down upon by both Europeans and the non-Jewish natives. Protected at first by the French against the Moslems, these Jews have recently been subjected to anti-semitic Vichy legislation, which removed many of their liberties.

The rest of the natives are classified as Moslem, but they are divided linguistically between Berbers and Arabs. Racially both of them are largely Berber - the native stock of Morocco - but most of the tribes in the fertile plains have absorbed Arab culture and language.

The Arab centers are the big cities, like Fez and Meknes. Here some noisy nationalist parties have agitated the city mob against Europeans. Here the Sultan might occasionally find support for a policy antagonistic to the French. Those Arabs, however, have not become part of a pan-Islam movement, since they are too far removed from the near Eastern centers of Moslem agitation. Altogether, these Arabs lack an intelligent leadership.

The Berbers are divided into small political units, somewhat democratically organized. They live in the northern coastal strip of the Rif in Spanish Morocco and in the Atlas Mountains. They are considered culturally inferior and as semi-pagan by the Arabs because they fused their original beliefs with Islam, instead of becoming pure Moslems.

Arab and Berber antagonism is of long standing, but lack of leadership on both sides has prevented the linguistic division from assuming practical importance in recent times. Berber tribes often hate each other more than the Arabs. Only in southern Morocco has El Glawi, the present Pasha of Marrakech been able to unite a number of tribes under his leadership.

The natives cannot be described as either pro-Axis or Pro-Ally. They all respect power, and reports indicate that German victories have impressed them deeply. On the other hand, many people of the Rif, remembering their victories of the 1920s, hate and despise Spaniards. Many natives in French Morocco are restive under French rule. Tribal antagonisms, however, might influence some tribes to ally themselves with Europeans in order to fight their hated native rivals.

Any generalization about Moroccan natives is bound to be contradicted by exceptions. In general, Moroccans dislike Europeans and will be impressed by any successful show of force. Political ideals will influence the choice of only a few. Many of the Berbers will fight for money, loot, and food. Local

prestige and local antagonisms, not international rivalries, will determine the attitude of most Moroccans.

French colonial policy has been remarkably successful in handling the natives. This is particularly evident in Morocco, where they have respected local religious customs and have scrupulously maintained the pretense of political and religious control by the Sultan of Morocco. All native chiefs, regardless of their category, continue to exercise their normal local control functions except where the authority of the French army is concerned.

The Moslems.

There are a few Christians and Jews and other sects among the Moroccans, but by far the most people you will meet and see are Moslems. This means that they are followers of the religion founded by Mohammed. But you should not call it the Mohammedan religion, for the Moslems do not worship Mohammed as Christians worship Christ. They believe in one god, Allah, and that Mohammed was His prophet. The religion is called Islam and the people who believe in it are called Moslems.

The Moslem bible is known as the Koran and the Moslems worship in mosques (mosks). They are very devout in their religion and do not like to have "unbelievers" (to them you are an "unbeliever") come anywhere near their mosques. You can usually tell a mosque by its high tower. Keep away from mosques. Even though you may have visited mosques in Syria or Egypt, the mosques in Morocco must not be entered. If you try to enter one, you will be thrown out, probably with a severe beating. The Moroccan Moslems even resent unbelievers coming close to mosques. If you have blundered too near a mosque, get away in a hurry before trouble starts. The Moslem religion requires a man to pray five times a day. This is done by facing the holy city of Mecca and going through a series of prostrations. Don't stare at anyone who is praying, and above all do not make fun of him. Respect his religion and he will respect yours.

Moroccan customs and manners.

Most of the Moroccan customs and manners are religious in their origin. For example, there is the month of fasting each year called "Ramadan" (ra-ma-Dahn). This period is similar to the Lenten period in many of the Christian Churches. In 1942 Ramadan begins September 12th. In 1943 it will be about two weeks earlier. During this period the Moslems do not eat, drink, or smoke between sunrise and sunset. Avoid offering, or asking them for food, drink, or smokes at this time, except after sunset. All hesitations and refusals at this period should be accepted without any attempts at persuasion. Any drawing of blood, during this period, even if accidental, such as a scratch or a nosebleed, may have serious consequences. Remember that Moslem tempers are very short during this month as yours would be under similar circumstances.

The Moslem day of rest is Friday, and their stores are closed on that day. In Baghdad and the other large cities many shops are closed on Saturday, the Jewish day of rest, while Christian shops are closed on Sunday.

Moslems, Christians, and Jews all have a number of religious holidays. Some of these are solemn fasts like Ramadan, others are colorful festivals. You will be wise to respect the observance of these holidays.

The "Evil Eye".

Many of the Moroccans believe in the "evil eye". This is a good

deal in their minds like putting a "hex" on a person is to people in parts of our country. If you stare at people, especially children, someone may think you are the possessor of an "evil eye", and are trying to put a curse on the person you are staring at. Some of the Moroccans think that the lens of a camera is an "evil eye", and you will make enemies by taking close-up snapshots and possibly wind up with a knife in your back. General views or street scenes will cause no trouble--except mosques. Don't try to photograph mosques.

Beggars are not numerous in Morocco. Those you will see live mainly in the cities and are mostly professionals, and it is not a good idea to give them money. If you do, the word will spread to all the beggars in the city you are an easy mark. Of course, some of them may be deserving, and if you feel moved by their plight, give them a little something--but better be prepared to repeat.

Bargaining in the shops and bazzars is great national pastime. You will have to bargain for almost everything you buy. The price first quoted is usually one-third to two-thirds higher than what you should pay. In bargaining the important thing is not to hurry. A little American horse trading will carry you a long way in this game.

Manners are important.

Moslems pay much attention to good manners.

Handshaking in Morocco is considered an important part of good manners. You will be greeted with a handshake on every occasion that you meet a Moroccan. His handshake is cordial and sincere. Return it in the same spirit

But do not touch or handle a Moroccan in any other way. Do not wrestle with him in fun, and don't slap him on the back. Any such contact is offensive to his idea of good manners. Above all never strike a Moroccan.

Do your swearing in English. Avoid the native oaths--you will not know their exact meaning and they may get you into trouble. Don't under any circumstances call a Moroccan a "dog", a "devil", a "native", or a "heathen". These terms are all deadly insults to him.

They do not drink liquor or eat pork. So respect their feelings and do not drink in their presence. They do not like to see others drink and it offends them to see others drunk. Never give them pork to eat or offer it to them even in fun.

Pigs are "unclean" to Moslems, So are dogs. If you happen to have a mascot dog, be particularly careful to keep him away from mosques.

Moslems do not let other people see them naked. Do not urinate in their presence. They do it squatting and dislike to see other people do it standing up. These things may seem trivial, but they are important if you want to get along well with the Moroccans.

Moslem women.

Moslem women do not mingle freely with men. The greater part of their time they spend at home and in the company of their families. Never make advances to Moslem women or try to attempt to attract their attention in the streets or other public places. Do not loiter near them when they are shopping. If a woman has occasion to lift her veil while shopping, do not stare

or smile at her. Look the other way. These rules are extremely important. The moxlems will immediately dislike you and there will be trouble if you do not treat women according to their standards and customs.

These rules apply both to the cities and towns and to the villages and the desert. The village and desert women go unveiled more often than the women in cities and seem to have more freedom. But the rules are still strict Any advance on your part will mean trouble and plenty of it. Even when speaking to Moroccan men, no mention should be made of their female relatives. The Moroccans themselves follow this custom and would resent anyone, especially a foreigner, not doing the same.

To repeat-- don't make a pass at any Moslem woman or there will be trouble. Anyway, it won't get you anywhere. Prostitutes do not walk the streets but live in special quarters of the cities.

Moroccan hospitality.

If you are entertained in a Moroccan city home, you will probably find dishes and silverware and customs somewhat like our own. But do not eat too much of the first course of a meal. There is probably more coming.

In the country there will probably be no table, plates, or silverware. You will be expected to sit on the ground as your host does. Follow his example. Roll up your right sleeve and eat with the tips of your right fingers--even if you are a southpaw. It is considered rude to eat with your left hand. If your host tears of tid-bits and hands them to you, eat them. In the country there will probably be only one course. After the meal, water will be brought to wash your hands and a towel to wipe them.

In the desert the customs are much the same as in the country, except that there is less variety in the food. You may be offered only some bread and milk or soured milk, like buttermilk. These people are poor and are offering you the best they have. You must not refuse it--but do not take too much.

Coffee drinking is equally popular in the city, country, or desert. Even a shopkeeper may offer you small glass of coffee. Do not refuse it or throw it away half-drunk, even if it does not taste like our American coffee. If you are offered a second cup, take it, and also a third. But it is customary to refuse a fourth.

These are some general hints about manners. But the main thing is the SPIRIT of politeness and courtesy. If you show this, the Moroccans will understand and forgive any lapses you may make through not knowing their customs. If you show you really want to be friendly, you'll get along.

The language.

The native language of Morocco is Arabic. You will not need to know many words to get along. A few simple words will go a long way. Learn a few words and phrases--you will find a helpful list at the end of this guide--and talk to the Moroccans in their own language. They will like it even if your pronunciation is not the same as theirs. They will be especially pleased when you use their polite salutations even if you do not know any other words. When you hear one of them speak English--no matter how badly--you will understand the pleasure they feel when you speak to them in their language.

Many Moroccans speak a few words or at least understand English, especially those in the larger stores in the cities and others in the oil regions which were developed by the British. Occasionally among the wealthier classes French, Turkish, and sometimes German are spoken. In most of the Bagdad bazaars, Persian is understood. From Mosul north both Turkish and Kurdish are heard commonly.

Some important do's and don'ts.

Keep away from mosques.

Smoke or spit somewhere else--never in front of a mosque.

If you come near a mosque, keep moving (away) and don't loiter.

Keep silent when the Moslems are praying (which they do five times a day) and don't stare.

Discuss something else--NEVER religion or politics or women--with Moslems.

Remember the fear of the "evil eye". Don't stare at anyone.

Don't point your camera in anyone's face.

Avoid offering opinions on internal politics.

Shake hands with the Moroccans, otherwise don't touch them or slap them on the back.

Remember that the Moroccans are a very modest people and avoid any exposure of the body in their presence.

Keep out of the sun whenever you can. When you can't, keep your head and neck covered.

Start eating only after your host has begun.

Eat with your right hand--never with your left, even if you are a southpaw.

Always tear bread with your fingers--never cut it.

Bread to the Moslems is holy. Don't throw scraps of it about or let it fall on the ground.

In the city eat only part of the first course. There may be more coming.

In the country leave some food in the bowl--what you leave goes to the women and children.

Don't offer Moslems food containing pork, bacon, or lard, or cooked in pork products. All such food is religiously "unclean" to them.

Don't eat pork or pork products in front of Moslems.

Be pleasant if Moslems refuse to eat meat you offer.

Don't offer Moslems alcoholic drinks. Drink liquor somewhere else--never in the presence of Moslems.

Knock before entering a private house. If a woman answers, wait until she has had time to retire.

Always respect the Moslem women. Don't stare at them. Don't smile at them. Don't talk to them or follow them. If you do any of these things, it means trouble for you and your unit.

In a house or tent, follow the rule of your host. If he takes off his shoes on entering, do the same.

If you are required to sit on the floor in a Moroccans house or tent, cross your legs while doing so.

When visiting, don't overstay your welcome. The third glass of tea or coffee is the signal to leave unless you are quartered there.

If you should see grown men walking hand in hand, ignore it. They are not "queer."

Be kind and considerate to servants. The Moroccans consider all people equals.

Avoid any expression of race prejudice. The people have very little color line.

Talk Arabic if you can to people. No matter how badly you do it, they will like it.

Shake hands on meeting and leaving.

On meeting a Moroccan, be sure to inquire after his health.

If you wish to give someone a present, make it sweets or cigarettes.

If you are stationed in the country, it is a good idea to take sweets and cigarettes with you when you visit a Moroccan home.

Show respect toward all older persons. If serving food, the eldest person should be served first.

Be polite. Good manners are important to the Moroccans. Be hospitable.

Bargain on prices. Don't let shopkeepers or merchants overcharge you; but be polite.

Be generous with your cigarettes.

Above all, use common sense on all occasions. And remember that every American soldier is an unofficial ambassador of good will.

PRINCIPAL NATIVE MOROCCAN FESTIVALS

The Mussulman calendar does not correspond to the Christian calendar. The year is lunar and divided into 12 months which come on the same date about every 33 years. For example, Rhamadan, the month of Fast, is the ninth month on the Mussulman calendar, and in 1939 began on Oct. 13 and ended Nov. 13, in 1940, began on Oct. 2 and ended on Nov.2. As I understand it, in 1973 it will begin and end on the same day as in 1940. This year it began at sunset on Sept. 11 and ends at sunset Oct. 11.

The chief festivals are:

1) The "Chabana" which occurs on the eve of the first day of the fast of the month of Rhamadan. It is particularly brilliant at Fez. It occurred on Oct. 13 in 1939 and Oct. 2 in 1940. This year it fell on Sept. 11.

2) The "Aid el Seghir" (Little Festival) which marks the closing of the month of Rhamadan. It is one of the three great annual festivals and is the occasion of three days of rejoicing during which everyone appears in new clothes for which the American white cotton goods are needed. It occurred in 1939 on Nov. 13 and in 1940 on Nov.2. It occurs this year on Oct. 12.

3) The "Aid el Kebir" (Big Festival), one of the three great festivals, which is the festival of the sacrifice of sheep. Each family chief sacrifices a sheep by cutting its throat, the head placed in the direction of Mecca. This festival occurred in 1939 on January 31 and in 1940 on January 19. It falls this year on Dec. 20, 1942.

4) The "Mouloud" which is the feast of the nativity of the prophet Mohammed is the third of the great annual festivals. It occurred in 1939 on May 1 and in 1940 on April 20. The night before the feast is passed in rejoicing and all the mosques are illuminated. It falls on March 20, 1943.

5) The "Achoura" which is the festival of the Mussulman New Year. This occurred in 1939 on Feb. 27 and in 1940 on Feb. 16. It is the occasion for carnivals, masquerades etc. It falls next on Jan. 18, 1943.

RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING TACTICAL DECISIONS

1. Approximately 94% of the population of Morocco are Mohammedans. They take their religion very seriously. At times they are fanatical in their adherence to religious precepts. We may be assured that German agents will use any error we may make to stir up religious antagonism.

2. Rabat and Sale are sacred cities in addition to the fact that the Sultan of Morocco has one of his palaces located in Rabat. The inhabitants of the Rabat-Sale area are particularly religious.

3. A recent but unconfirmed report has been received that a large religious assembly of Arabs is scheduled to take place early in November.

4. The Mohammedan month Dulkadha begins on November tenth. This is the month in which Mohammedans prepare for their pilgrimage to Mecca. The pilgrimage itself being accomplished in the following month.

5. There are four months in the year in which it is unlawful to initiate a war. They are the first, seventh, eleventh, and twelfth months on the Mohammedan calendar. This year the eleventh month starts on November 10 and the period during which it is unlawful to initiate a war extends from November tenth to the seventh of February.

6. The Mohammedans celebrate their Sunday on Friday of our week.

FRENCH MOROCCO

MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT

The government in Morocco is of a dual nature consisting of a native Sultan called the Makhzen on the one hand and of the organizations of the French and Spanish protectorates on the other.

The Makhzen (the system of native government) is headed by the Sultan who combines religious with civil suthority and is styled Amir-al-Mu'minin (commander of the believers). He is chosen from the "Alid Filali Sharifian" dynasty which has ruled Morocco since 1649. He is assisted by a vizir or prime minister who in the past has usually been chosen from among his favorites. All functionaries of the court are Arab.

There are three ministries: Interior, Justice, and Religious. The Sultan is represented by a "Khalifah" or viceroy at Tiznit, Fez, and Marrakech, but the administrative power is in the hands of the pashas or governors.

Order is maintained by the Pasha's police. The pasha (governor) is also head of the judiciary.

The Sultan is native ruler of both Spanish and French Morocco; the High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco and the Resident General of French Morocco confer from time to time.

The French organization is supposed to parallel that of the native government. The French Resident-General (Nogues) occupies the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Makhzen, and must approve all important decrees issued by the Makhzen. The Resident-General also represents the French government and is assisted by a delegate as well as by three services: Financial, economic, and social.

The subordinate government posts are filled by natives as far as possible.

The French civil administration is subordinated to the French military administration in the regions of Fez, Meknes, Taza, Marrakech, and the autonomous sub-division of Casablanca; in other regions, the civil regime is independent of the military. The military administration is headed by a superior officer of general (Nogues) aided by an information service.

This resume of the government is presented because many of the names of important officials are not known. On the attached list, however, are the known names and positions of important people in these specified areas.

ALL FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

MILITARY LEADERS

*** Major General Alphonse Pierre Juin - Commander-in-Chief of the Military and Naval forces of French North Africa. Described as an opportunist and said to be pro-American.

*** Vice-Admiral Fenard -Secretary-General of North Africa. He acts under the direction of the Vice-President of the Council of the Ministers at Vichy, coordinating the activities of the various residents - General and Governors-General in French North Africa on economic affairs whenever questions arise concerning several French African territories. He is empowered to settle differences between the different Governors - General. He is really the administrative link between Vichy and the various French governors.

*** Laneziere - Assistant to Admiral Fenard.

*** The Count of Paris - Resides in Rabat, French Morocco, French North Africa.

*** General Jean Mendigal - Head of French North African Air Command. Succeeded General Odic. Unfriendly.

*** General Mast - Chief of Staff, XIX Army Corps, Algeria. Completely on our side.

NAVAL LEADERS

** Admiral Ollive - Supreme head of all French Naval Forces in French West Africa and French Northwest Africa. His position is comparable to that held by General Juin in the French Army in Africa. Very unfriendly. Intriguer working to get Fenard out.

CIVIL LEADERS

*** General Yves Chatel - Secretary-General of the Delegation of the Governor-General of French North Africa.

* - Pro-Axis
** - Sentiment unknown
*** - More Pro-Ally than anything else.

FRENCH MOROCCO

MILITARY LEADERS

** General F. Laseroux - Commanding General of Morocco.

** General Salbert - Commanding General of Fez.

** General Jouffrault - Commanding General of Oujda.

*** General Martin - Commanding General of Marrakech.

*** General La Houle - Rabat. Sympathetic to American cause. His Assistant Commandant Koechlin-Schwartz. Very friendly.

*** Brig. General Bethouart - Commanding the Casablanca division. Appointed to this command in January 1942. Sympathetic toward American cause. Antagonistic toward Nazis.

*** Colonel d'Hauteville - Commandant du District Militaire d'Agadir 1942. Sympathetic to American cause.

** Lt. Colonel Bertrand - In charge of General Nogues' military cabinet closely associated with Nogues; almost dismissed because of his indifferent policy in Vidy.

** Commandant Ribault - Secretaire General de la Region de Marrakech (civil Chief of Staff attached to the General commanding the region.)

** M. Fremont - Regional supply Administrator for Region of Meknes.

** Controller Thiabaud - Secretary General of Region of Fez - October 1941. Has charge of distributing imported products and rationed goods.

** Monsieur Spilmann - Secretary General of Region of Meknes (includes Ksares-Souk and Ta Filalet), who has charge of distributing imported products and rationed goods, October 1941.

** General Mordacq - Regional chief of the Legion des Anciens.

COMBATTANTS

** General Dody - Chief of the Meknes Region.

** Captain Christian - Regional director of Agadir region - Supply Administrator.

* Captain Saint Quentin - Commands 3rd and 4th Squadron of 4th Spahis Moroccain - Fascist sympathizer.

** Captain Schmidlin - Commands group at Casablanca air port.

** Colonel Threbaud - Secretary General of Fez region.

** Major Tricand - Commands group at Casablanca and port.

** Colonel Vignoli - Lives in Marrakech. Retired since Armistice.

** Lt. Colonel Humbert - Commander of the base at Casablanca air port.

** Colonel Labaurie - Commander of base at Meknes air port.

* - Pro-Axis
** - Sentiment unknown
*** - More Pro-Ally than anything else

* Admiral Emile Raymond Gervais de la Fond - Now head of cruiser and submarine division at Casablanca. Thought to be a thorough-going collaborator.

** General Francois - Commander of the Legion. (Bad news.)

** General Fichepain - Commandant of the Subdivision of Casablanca.

* Colonel Brault - Casablanca. Actively pro-Vichy, probably pro-German.

** Colonel Kientz - Liaison with the German Armistice Commission.

*** Colonel Denis - Commanding the "Territoire d'Agadir".

** Chief of Battalion Deleuze - Chief of Battalion at Agadir.

** Commandant De Grigny - Senior R.T.O. officer at Casablanca port.

* Major Boyer - In the 2nd Bureau under Colonel Cuhamel.

** Captain Levacon - In the 4th Bureau of the Chief of Staff.

** Captain de Gres - Chief of Cabinet for Major Bubiest.

** Captain Genu - In the 4th Bureau E.M., Rabat.

** Captain Garnier - In the 4th Bureau of the Chief of Staff, Casablanca.

? Captain Clement - Hates British. (Bad news.)

* Lt. de Vaisseau[1] Halle - Chief of the 2nd Bureau Marine (Navy Intelligence Service). He is a tool of Darlan. He is in fact more powerful than the Admiral of the Moroccan Navy himself. He is the most determined enemy of the Democracy.

(1) Lt. de Vaisseau - Naval Lieutenant

** Lt. Tariel - Assistant to Lt. Halle, who is Chief of the 2nd Bureau Marine. Tariel is in constant relation with Halle by a special code.

** Captain Serafino - In the 2nd Bureau of Casablanca.

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MILITARY LEADERS

** Captain Marchand - Commanding the 2nd group of the 64th Regiment of Artillery in Casablanca, Morocco.

** Major Michel - Commanding group Marrakech air port.

** Lt. Morangi - Stationed at 2nd Bn. at Rabat. Always wears civilian clothes.

*** Command de la Mourria - Stationed at Casablanca on "Jean Bart" - sympathetic to American cause.

** Lt. Colonel Moussacq - Commands group at Port Lyautey air port.

** Colonel Van Hecke - Head of Youth Movement in French North Africa. He has worked closely with General Weygand and Weygand's son. Acted as liaison officer to the Youth Movement. Col. Van Hecke is in close touch with the Comte de Paris. Good soldier. Anti-Nazi. Politically unsound. Very loyal.

*** Colonel Cuhamel - Chief of G. S. of Moroccan Army Corps - well acquainted with Morocco.

** Lt. Colonel Allongue - Commands supply depot at Meknes.

** Lt. Colonel de Freidaigue - Assistant head of French Youth Movement for all North Africa. He is active officer in French army and in close contact with key members of General Staff throughout French North Africa and Metropolitan France. Pro-Vichy. Same as Van Hecke. Not intelligent.

** Major Drillan - Second in command at Casablanca air port.

*** Colonel Renard du Verger - Commander of Marrakech air force. Convinced of a United Nations victory.

** Commandant Frandon - Commander of Liore bombers at Casablanca.

*** Colonel Guillaume - Directs native affairs in Morocco. Able and energetic.

*** Captain Hardy - Agadir. Pro-British.

* -Pro-Axis
** -Sentiment unknown
*** -More Pro-Ally than anything else

September 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PERCY BLACK, G-2

Subject: Moroccan Press.

1. The following is information pertaining to the press in Morocco.

PRESS: Political leanings and character.

Practically all the Moroccan press is under Axis control and all editorials are Vichy and Axis inspired. In addition to the dailies, which we are listing below, there is an Arab daily published in Rabat for the natives. It is very carefully prepared and controlled by French authorities from all points of view and colored by Vichy collaborationist influence. There is also an official publication of the Navy in Casablanca known as "Moniteur de la Marine" for distribution through the fleet. It is absolutely Vichy-Darlan-Anglophobe.

List of dailies published in Morocco:

1) La Vigie Marocaine, published at Casablanca, circulation of about 45,000. Evening daily, Axis inspired. Founded 1909. Incorporated in May 1921 as a limited company with the two Mas brothers (Antoine and Pierre) Bourrageas, the Compagnie Marocaine, the Compagnie Pacquet and certain local merchants as the leading stockholders. Tendencies are definitely of the Radical-Socialist variety.

2) Le Petit Marocain. (The Mas Group - Regional), published in Casablanca, circulation of about 35,000. Morning daily. Founded in 1912. Owned by Mas family. Political affiliations of the Mas group are those of LE PETIT MAROCAIN, Axis-imspired.

3) L'Echo du Maroc, (The Mas Group -Regional), published in Rabat, circulation of about 15,000. Morning daily. Founded in 1913. One of Mas group. Tendencies are Left; of the Radical-Socialist variety; in support of whatever program the Residency may follow.

4) Le Courrier du Maroc, (The Mas Group - Departmental) published in Fez, circulation of about 10,000. Morning daily. Founded 1929. Owned by Mas group. Influence local. Tendencies are Left, the Radical-Socialist variety; in support of whatever program the Residency may follow.

5. La Presse Marocaine, (The Busset Group - Departmental). published in Casablanca, circulation of about 15,000. Morning daily. Founded 1914. Owned by Busset group. Policies definitely to the Right. Influence local.

6) Le Soir Marocain. (The Busset Group -Departmental), published in Casablanca, circulation of about 5,000. Evening daily. Founded 1929. Expresses Rightist views of M. Francis Busset. Influence local.

H. E. MAGUIRE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, European Branch.

September 21, 1942

Financial Situation in French Morocco.

1. On July 28, 1942, the official rate of exchange in French Morocco was 43 Moroccan francs to the dollar. On the black market the rate was 115 Moroccan francs to the dollar in Morocco and 120 to 130 Moroccan francs to the dollar in Algeria, but Moroccan francs cannot be used in Algeria.

2. In Tangiers, Spanish Morocco, French Moroccan francs are used as money while French francs are not. In July, an oversupply of Moroccan francs in Tangiers caused a depreciation in their value. The German Armistice Commission was bringing large amounts of French francs from Paris to Casablanca and converting them into Moroccan francs at par, though the market on July 5, for example, quoted 58 Moroccan francs for 100 French francs. And on that date the British sovereign was quoted at 1450 Moroccan francs in Tangier, 3000 French francs in Algiers, and 4000 French francs in Paris. The Germans, reportedly because they could find nothing more to buy in France, were said to be trying to purchase foreign exchange with a part of the 300 millions of francs exacted daily under the terms of the Armistice and were using French francs to buy Moroccan francs at par -- at a profit of 42 per cent -- and with them buying sovereigns at 1450 Moroccan francs to sell in Paris at 4000 French francs -- a profit of 276 per cent.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION

Office of A. C. of S. G-2

INFORMATION PAMPHLET
on
FRENCH MOROCCO

Compiled and reproduced by direction of
Commanding General of 3rd Infantry Division
under supervision of the A. C. of S., G-2
3rd Infantry Division.

SECTION II

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SCRIPTION OF UNITS AND UNIFORM
FOR PURPOSES OF IDENTIFICATION
FRENCH MOROCCO

Moroccan Troops - General

The Tirailleurs Marocains are native Moroccan troops (Arab - Moslem, Semetic in race), officered by European French officers and non-coms. This is also true of Spahis Marocains, Chasseurs d'Afrique, and Native artillery units. Tirailleurs Sénégalais are colored troops from Senegal, French West Africa, abd are also officered by European French officers and non-coms. In all of these the French government has seen fit to commission certain trusted natives as offficers and non-coms.

Units designated as colonial are European French, both officers and enlisted men. Foreign Legion Infantry and Cavalry are of mixed European nationalities. These units have been known in the past as being "penal" outfits, taking in men of all nationalities, who join to escape or forget retribution for some crime. It is boasted that, since many of the men therein have no nationality, France is their "mother". The majority of members are always French. Officers and non-coms are also European French.

French Army Organisational, Branch and Distinctive Insignia

The French Army indicates branch and organisation by the use of collar tabs called pattes de collet, on which appear inverted V - like ribbons called soutaches. Just below the soutaches are the identifying numbers and distinctive insignia of the unit. The color of the soutaches and collar tabs vary according to branch and unit. The basic color of the branch of service forms the background color of the collar tab on which the soutaches, numbers, and distinctice insignia are placed. Identifying colors of combat branches are as follows:

Infantry.....Khaki
Cavalry.....Blue
Artillery.....Brilliant Red
Engineer Corps.....Black Velvet.

Color of Soutaches:

Infantry:

Line Infantry (Continental European French).....Dark Blue
Tirailleurs Marocains.....Light Blue
Tirailleurs Algériens.....Light Blue
Tirailleurs Sénégalais..... ?
Foreign Legion Infantry.....Green
Light African Infantry.....Violet
Tanks.....Light Gray

Cavalry:

Spahis . . . . . yellow
Chasseurs d'Afrique . . . . . yellow
Foreign Legion Cavalry . . . . . green

Artillery:


All Artillery . . . . . .Dark Blue

Engineers:


All Engineers . . . . . .Bright crimson

Thus, the collar tab for the 6th Tirailleurs Marocains would appear as follows:


(Field Dress)



Addition of one purple Soutache indicates a given unit is motorized. Aline motorized unit's collar tab would appear thus:



For a Colonial Artillery Unit.




Blouses:

French Army field uniforms are in general much similar to our own and the British; that is, olive drab shirts, blouses and breeches or slacks are worn. The olive drab blouse is worn in combat. It has a high cut roll collar. It is on the lapels of the collar that the collar tabs (pattes de collet) are placed. Rank for both officers and enlisted men is worn on sleeves. The blouse is single brested, with two pockets and has olive drab buttons. Officers in the field generally wear leather puttees or boots, depending on their assignment or duty. Officers' breeches are of lighter color than the blouses. They are, in fact, something like our "pinks." Enlisted men's breeches are of the same color as the blouse.

Headgear:

When not wearing the steel helmet, European Frenchmen wear the Kepi (similar to our garison cap.) Native officers or enlisted men wear turbans or fezzes; Képis are designed and colored according to grade, branch and unit. Officers' Depis have bands called galons de grade around the circumference thereof, the number of which indicates the officers rank. These correspond with the rank worn on the sleeves. The number of bands on the Képi for all officers of field grade and below correspond in number and color with the bars worn on the sleeve. See illustration of sleeves attached.

For example, a Captain's Képi would appear as follows:



The French Army helmet has a rib going fore and aft over the top of it, and also has an ornament in front.

Belts:

Officers in the field wear a double Sam Browne belt, the shoulder straps of which may be removed for garrison wear. Enlisted men wear cartridge and pistol belts somewhat similar to our own.

Insignia of Rank:

See mimeographed sheet attached.

Description of Uniforms of Native Moroccan Troops.

In the field, that is, in combat, native troops dress in much the same manner as European or continental French troops. Therefore it can be expected that a normal type French helmet, blouse, and breeches will be worn. However, officers and men will wear certain identifying branch and organizational insignia, which are broken down as follows:

Tirailleurs Marocains:

Steel helmet ornament has initials "RF" with a crescent (croissante) below. On the collar tabs, there will be two blue soutaches, identifying blue number with a blue star below. Collar tab is khaki. Kepi bands, indicating rank (Galons de grade) are dark green.

Régiment d'infanterie coloniale du Maroc (Regt of Colonial Infantry of Morocco):

Colonial troops are unnumbered, taking their designation from the colony in which they reside. Field uniform is the same as that previously described, except that in place of the number that usually appears on the collar tab, there is an anchor. These troops are therefore often mistaken for naval personnel. Collar tab is khaki (olive drab). The anchor also appears on helmet and cap ornaments.

Régiment étranger d'infanterie (Foreign Legion Infantry)*

Ornament on helmet has a bursting bomb with the letters "RF" on it. Collar tabs, soutaches and identifying numbers are green. A light blue star is below the number. Collar tab itself is khaki. Also the Galons de grade are green.

Chasseurs d'Afrique (Cavalry):

Uniform in general is like that of troops previously described. Color of collar tab is dark blue with two soutaches and number below in yellow. Insignia on helmet has a bursting bomb with letters "RF" (République Francaise) on it. Galons de grade (bands on kepi) are dark green.

Spahis Marocains (Cavalry).

Uniform in general is the same. Color of collar tab is dark blue with two soutaches, number, and star in yellow. Gallons de grade are dark green. Ornament on helmet has letters "RF" with crescent below.

Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment):

Color of collar tab is dark blue with two soutaches number and bursting bomb in green. Gallons de grade are green. Ornament on cap has bursting bomb on it with letters "RF".

Artillery Units:

Uniform in general is that described for other units. Insignia on helmet has bursting bomb over crossed cannon. On the bomb are the letters "RF". Collor of Galons de grade are dark green khaki. Collar tab is a bright red with two soutaches and number in blue. An anchor takes place of the number for Colonial Artillery regiments.

Engineer Troops:

Collor of collar tab is black velvet with two soutaches and number in red. Ornament on helmet has a bust of medieval armor with letters "RF" on it. Color of Galons de grade is dark green khaki.

It will be noted that native Moroccan troops will have as insignia the star and crescent either on helmet ornament or on collar tabs.

Formal Uniforms for Native Troops
(For reference only)

Garrison uniforms for French Native and Colonial troops vary widely according to unit. No effort is made here to describe them fully, in that common sense tells us that they will not be worn in combat. However, soldiers and officers on leave or higher staff duty will be seen wearing them. In a similar manner to the field uniform, there will be identifying features on these which are as follows:

Tirailleurs Marocains:

The Tirailleurs Marocains enlisted men wear white turbans with a binding ribbon and star in the middle. The manner of winding these turbans is different in each regiment. Difference in color indicates different batallions. Blouses are the same in cut as the field uniform, but the color is light blue. A wide scarlet sash, called a Cummerbund, is worn with a tan leather belt over it. Slacks are a deep red (garance) and baggy. In cool weather, a long dark blue cape is worn. Galons de grade are light green. On the blouse, slacks, and cape is light green piping, called passepoils.

Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Colonial Infantry Reg't.)

Moroccan Colonial Infantry dress much the same way as line regular outfits. For headgear, the kepi or sun helmet is worn. There are no insignia on these. The blouse is khaki, with high collar turned over, single breasted, two pockets, with piping on cuffs, and shoulder straps The overcoat is khaki (OD), low collar, double breasted, with two pockets. It has piping (passepoils) on cuffs and shoulder straps. Color of Galons de grade and passepoils is a deep red (garance). All buttons are copper colored.

Spahis Marocains (Moroccan Cavalry).

The blouse (vests) of the Spahis is exactly like the one just described as far as the collar and buttons is concerned. It is light blue in color, and is short, with scarlet sash and tan leather belt over it. There is no piping on shoulders, a little in yellow on the cuffs, like an inverted V. Slacks are light blue and baggy. In cool weather, a long dark blue cape, called a burnois, with hood lined in white is worn. Galons de grade are yellow, and buttons are copper colored. For garrison, khaki (OD) shirt with scarlet sash and dark blue tie is worn.

Chasseurs d Afrique (Cavalry).

The blouse (vests) is light blue, like vests of the Spahis Marocains, with same piping on cuffs. However, the collar is standing, rather than turned over, and yellow and light blue. There are also white shoulder straps (pattes d'epaule). A scarlet sash is worn. Breeches (culotte) are turkey red (garance) in color. In cool weather a long coat (manteau) blued steel gray in color

with sleeves, and a cape over it coming down to the cuffs, is worn. It has collar tabs (pattes de collet) on the collar. Galons de grade and piping are yellow. Buttons are gray, tin-colored. In garrison, a khaki (OD) shirt is worn instead of blouse. Scarlet sash and dark khaki tie are worn.

Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie (Foreign Legion Infantry):

Foreign Legion Infantry wear kepis with turkey red (garance) top and light blue around the side. Galon de grade are green. No other insignia on the képi is worn. Blouse is same as for other units, except that in warm weather, a light sun-tan one is worn. Piping is green and buttons are copper-colored. Over the blouse a dark, steel gray sash is worn. On Sundays and Holidays, large red Epaulettes are worn. Buttons have "Legion Etrangere" on them.

Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (Foreign Legion Cavalry):

Uniform is the same as Foreign Legion Infantry above. Difference, however, will be noted in collar tabs, which are also worn with the formal uniform.

Artillery Units:

Képi has blue top and sides. Galons de grade are scarlet. Blouse is the same as that described for Tirailleurs. However, piping is scarlet too. Overcoats (manteau) are the same except for mounted units, in which case it has a high collar turned over, and is single breasted. It does not button back, and has no pockets. There is scarlet piping on cuffs and shoulder straps. In garrison, artillery men wear khaki (OD) shirts, with tan leather belt and dark khaki tie. It will be noted that there is a predominance in scarlet for artillery uniforms.

Engineer Troops (Génie):

In general their uniform is the same as that just described for artillery. The main difference is in the collar tabs which are black velvet with red soutaches and red numbers. Garrison dress is the same as for artillery.

List of Titles of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men, French Army

French	English
Officers généraux	**General Officers**
Général en chef (Marechal de France)	Field Marshal
Général d'armée	General
Général de corps d'armée	Lieutenant-General
Général de division	Major-General
Général de Brigade	Brigadier-General
Officers supérieurs	**Field Officers**
Colonel	Colonel
Lieutenant-Colonel	Lieutenant-Colonel
Commandant (Chef de Bataillon - Inf) (Chef d'escadrons - Cav) (Chef d'escadron - Arty)	Major
Officiers subalternes.	**Junior Officers**
Capitaine	Captain
Lieutenant	1st Lieutenant
Sous-Lieutenant	2nd Lieutenant
Sous-officers	**Non-commissioned Officers**
Aspirant	Cadet
Adjudant-chef	Similar to Chief Warrent Officer
Adjudant	Similar to Warrant Officer
Sergent-chef (Called a"Maréchal des logis"-Chef for Cav, Arty, QMC)	Either 1st Sgt or Mr Sgt
Sergent (Called a"Maréchal des logis" for Cav, Arty, QMC)	Sergeant of Staff Sgt.
Soldats	**Enlisted Men**
Caporal-chef (called a Brigadier-chef in Arty)	Senior corporal
Caporal (Called a Brigadier in Arty)	Corporal
Soldat de Premiere Classe (Arty - Canonier de 1ère Classe) (Cav - Cavalier de 1ère Classe, (Engr - Pionnier (Sapeur) de 1ère Classe)	Private 1st Class
Soldat de Deuxième Classe (Arty canonier de 2e classe) (Cav - Cavalier de 2e classe (Engr - Pionnier (Sapeur) de 2e Classe)	Private

FRENCH ARMY
RANK OF OFFICERS



Maréchal de France
(Field Marshall)



Général d'armée
(General)




Général de corps d'armée
(Lieut. General)



Général de Division
(Major General)



Général de Brigade
(Brig. General)



Colonel



Lieutenant Colonel



Commandant
1. Chef de batillon
(Infantry)
2. Chef d'escadron
(Artillery)
3. Chef d'escadrons
(Cavalry)
(Major)



Capitaine
(Captain)



Lieutenant
(1st Lt.)





sous-Lieutenant
(2nd Lt.)




Aspirant
(Cadet)

WARRANT OFFICERS & ENLISTED MEN
OF THE FRENCH ARMY







FOREIGN LANGUAGE MILITARY TERMS

U.S.A.	BRITISH	GERMAN	ITALIAN	SPANISH	PORTUGUESE	BRAZILIAN	FRENCH
Army	Army	Heer	Esercito	Ejercito de tierra	Exercito		Armée de terre
Navy	Royal Navy	Kriegsmarine	Marina	Armada	Armada		Marine
	Royal Air Force	Luftwaffe		Ejercito del aire	Arma aero-nautica Aviação naval	Força Aeria	Armée de l'air
Group of Armies		Heeresgruppe					Groupe d'armées
(Field) Army	Army	Armee		Ejercito	Exercito		Armée
Corps	Corps	Armeekorps		Cuerpo de Ejercito	Corpo de Exercito		Corps d'armée
Division	Division	Division	Divisione	División	Divisão	Divisão	Division
Brigade		Brigade	Brigata	Brigada	Brigada	Brigada	Brigade
Regiment	Brigade	Regiment	Regimento	Regimiento	Regimento	Regimento	Régiment
Bn (Inf)	Battalion	Bataillon	Battaglione	Batallón	Batalhão	Batalhão	Bataillon
Sq (Cav)	Squadron(?)	Abteilung		Grupo	Grupo		Groupe d'escadrons
Bn (Arty)	Battery	Abteilung		Grupo	Grupo	Grupo	Groupe
Co (Inf)	Company	Kompanie	Compagnia	Compañía	Companhía	Companhía	Compagnie
Tr (Cav)	Troop (Sq(?)	Schwadron		Escuadrón	Esquadrão	Esquadrão	Escadron
Batry(Arty)	Troop	Batterie		Batería	Bataría	Batería	Batterie
Plat (Inf)	Platoon	Zug		Sección	Pelotão	Pelotão	Section
Plat (Cav)		Trupp			Pelotão		Peloton
Plat (Arty)		Zug					
Sec (Inf)	Section	Gruppe		~~Grupo~~ Grupo	Secção		Groupe
Sec (Cav)					Secção		Groupe
Sec (Arty)							
Sqd (Inf)	Sub-section			Escuadra	Esquadra		Demi-groupe
Sqd (Cav)					Esquadra		Escouade
		Luftflotte					
		Flieger Korps					
		Flieger Division					
Wing	Group	Geschwader		Escuadra			Escadre
Group	Wing	Gruppe					Groupe
Squadron	Squadron	Staffel		Esquadrilla	Esquadrilha		Escadrille
Div (USMC(USN)	Flight	Kotte		Patrulla			
Flt (USA)							

VOCABULARY OF WEAPONS, UNITS AND MATERIAL

AMERICAN ENGLISH	GERMAN	FRENCH	SPANISH	PORTUGUESE
Rifle	Gewehr	Fusil	Fusil	Espingarda
Pistol	Pistole	Pistolet	Pistola	Pistola
Machine Gun	Maschinengewehr	Mitrailleuse	Ametralladora	Metralhadora
Light Machine Gun	Leichtes Maschinengewehr	Mitrailleuse légère	Ametralladora ligera	Metralhadora ligeira
Heavy Machine Gun	Schweres Maschinengewehr	Mitrailleuse lourde	Ametralladora pesada	Metralhadora
Mortar	Granatwerfer	Mortier	Mortero	Morteiro
Bayonet	Bajonett	Baïonette	Bayoneta	Sabre-baioneta
Hand Grenade	Handgranate	Grenade à main	Granada de mano	Granada de mão
Rifle Grenade	Gewehrgranate	Trombion V.-B.	Granada de fusil	Lança Granada
Revolver	Revolver	Revolver	Revolver	Revolvo
Antitank Gun	Panzerabwehrkanone	Canon anti-chars	Cañon anti-tanque	Canhão anti-carro
Antitank Rifle	Panzerbüchse	Fusil anti-chars	Fusil antitanque	Espingarda anti-carro
Howitzer	Haubitze	Obusier	Obuse	Canhão Obus
Tractor	Schlepper	Tracteur	Tractor	Tractor todo terreno
Antiaircraft Gun	Flugabwehrkanone	Canon contre-avion	Cañon anti-aereo	Canhão anti-aereo
Tank	Panzerkampfwagen	Char de combat Char d'assaut	Carro de combate	Carro de combate
Scout Car	Panzerspähwagen	Auto-mitrailleuse	Auto ametralladora	Auto-ametralhadora
Armored Car	Panzerwagen	Voiture blindée	Carro blindado	Carro blindado
Airplane	Flugzeug	Avion	Avión	Avião
Submachine Gun	Maschinenpistole		Ametralladora	Metralhadora
Compass	Kompass	Boussole	Brújula	
Rifle Co.	Schützenkompanie	Compagnie de fusiliers voltigeurs	Compañía de tiradores	Companhia de atiradores
Bn Wpns Co.	Maschinengewehrkompanie	Compagnie d'accompagnement	Compañía de ametralladores	Companhia de acompanhamento
Rgtl. Wpns Co.	Infanterie-Geschützkompanie	Compagnie régimentaire d'engins	Compañía de engeños	Companhía de engenhos
Rgtl. AT Co.	Panzerjägerkompanie	Compagnie anti-chars	Compañía Regimental de cañon antitanque	Companhía de engenhos anti-carro
Hq. Co.		Compagnie de commandement	Compañía de mando	Formação
Serv(Sup Tn) Co.	Leichte Infanterie kolonne	Compagnie hors rang	Tren	Trem
Staff	Stab	Etat-major	Estado-mayor	Estado -maior
Hq.	Kommando(Hauptquartier)	Commandement (Quartier-général)	Mando(Cuartel general)	Quartel general
Com. Sec. (Inf.Rgt)	Nachrichtenstaffel	Groupe de transmissions et renseignements	Sección de transmisiones de regimiento	Secção de transmissões
Div. Rcn. Tr.	Divisions-Aufklärungsabteilung	G.R.D.I.(Groupe de reconnaissance de division)	Grupo de reconocimiento de división	
Army Corps Rec. Sq.		G.R.C.A.(Groupe de reconnaissance de corps d'armée	Grupo de reconocimiento de ejercito	
Arty. Btry.	Artillerie-Batterie	Batterie d'artillerie	Batería de artillería	Batería de artilharía
Arty. Bn.	Artillerie-Abteilung	Groupe d'artillerie	Grupo de artilleria	Grupo de artilharía
CP	Gefechtsstand	Poste de commandement	Puesto de mando	Posto de commando

STRENGHT TABLE FRENCH ARMY
(Normal type units)

UNIT	No. of MEN	WEAPONS (In addition to usual Inf Rifle)
INFANTRY (3 INF REGTS IN DIV):		
Sqd (Groupe de Combat)	12	1 Auto-Rifle 1 Rifle Grenade discharger Rifles
R. Plat (Section de fusiliers-voltigeurs)	41	Rifles 4 Rifle Grenade dischargers 3 Auto-Rifles
R. Co (Compagnie de fusiliers-voltigeurs)	194	Rifles 12 Auto-Rifles 16 Rifle Grenade dischargers
Bn (Bataillon d'Infanterie)	871	36 Auto-Rifles 16 MG's 2 25 mm Guns 3 60 mm Mortars 2 81 mm Mortars 48 Rifle Grenade dischargers
BN WPNS Co (Compagnie d'accompagnement)	209	16 MG's 2 81 mm Mortars 2 25 mm Guns
INF REGT (Régiment d'Infanterie)	3080	112 Auto-Rifles 144 Rifle Grenade dischargers 48 MG's (Hotchkiss M1914) 9 60 mm Mortars 8 81 mm Mortars 12 25 mm Guns (M1934)
INF DIV (Division d'Infanterie)	16650	
ARTILLERY (For Inf Div)		
1 - 75mm Gun Regt (3 Bns, 1 Bn now has 105's)		
Btry (Batterie)	150	4 74 mm Guns
BN (Groupe de 75)	620	12 75 mm Guns
BN (Groupe de 105 C)	620	12 105 mm Hows
Regt (Régiment de 75)	2160	24 75 mm Guns 12 105 mm Hows
DIV AT BTRY	Unknown	6 Guns cal. unknown
1 - 155 mm How Regt (2 Bns) Horse		
BTRY (Batterie de 155c)	Unknown	4 155 mm Hows
BN (Groupe de 155c)	Unknown	12 155 mm Hows
REGT (Regiment de 155c, hippo)	1710	24 155 mm Hows
DIV RCN BN		
1 Horse Sq (Escadron a cheval)	210	? Rifles 1 60 mm Mortar 2 MG's
1 25mm Gun Sq (Groupe de canon de 25)	25	2 25 mm Guns
1 Hv Wpns Sq (Escadron de nitrailleuses st canons de 25)	119	8 MG's 2 25 mm Guns
Div Rcn Vn (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie)	688	24 Auto-Rifles 10 MG's 4 25 mm Guns 2 60 mm Mortars

UNIT	No. of MEN	WEAPONS (In addition to usual Inf Rifle)
CAVALRY		
Cav Div (H)(Division de Cavalerie)	10930	- - - - - -
2 Brigs (Brigade de Cavalerie)	2345	- - - - - -
2 Regts ea. (Régiment de Cavalerie)	1140	48 Auto-Rifles 8 MG's 4 AA MG's 4 25 mm Guns 4 60 mm Mortors
DIV MTZ Elements (Unités motorisés)	2385	- - - - - - -
SCOUT CAR REGT (Régiment d'auto-mitrailleuses)	1046	32 Auto-Rifles 2 60 mm Mortars 12 Scoutcars 40 Halftracks 12 Hv Half tracks (Combat)
BN of DRAGOONS, PORTÉ (Batqillon de dragons portés)	1032	52 Auto-Rifles 16 MG's 8 AA MG's 4 25 mm Guns 3 60 mm Mortars 4 81 mm Mortars
DIV AT TR (Escadron divisionnaire anti-chars)	164	Unknown
REP TR (Escadron de reparation)	153	- - - - - - -
ARTILLERY (CAV DIV (H):		
Mixed Regt of Arty (Régiment mixte d'artillerie)	1733	- - - - - - -
2 Bns-75mm Guns (Groupe de 75)	Unknown	(Same as Inf Divs)
1 Bn- 105 mm Hows (Groupe de 105c)	Unknown	(Same as Inf Divs)

FRENCH ARMY

Inf Bn
(Bataillon d'Infanterie, 865 men)

- Stf (Etat-major, 4)
- Hq Plat (Section de Commandement, 76)
  - Com & Int Sec (1er Groupe: Transmissions et Renseignements)
  - Sup Sec (2e Groupe: Ravitaillement)
  - Med Sec (3e Groupe: Service Sanitaire)
- 3 R Cos (Compagnie de Fusiliers-Voltigeurs, 194)
  - Hq Plat (Section de Commandement)
    - Com & Int Sec (1er Groupe: Transmissions et Renseignements)
    - Sup & Serv Sec (2e Groupe: Ravitaillement et Services)
    - 60mm Mort Sec (3e Groupe: Piece de mortier de 60, 6 men) (1-60mm mort)
    - Hq (Commandement, 5) (1 Grenade discharger in plat hq)
    - R Sec (Groupe de combat, 12) (1 auto-rifle & 1 Grenade discharger in R Sec)
  - R Plat
  - R Plat
  - R Plat (Section de Fusiliers - Voltigeurs, 41 men)
  - R Plat
- Bn Wpns Co (Compagnie d'accompagnement, 209 men)

(See diagram below.)

Bn Wpns Co (Compagnie ~~regimentaire d'engins~~ d'accompagnement, 209)

Note:
16 MGs in Bn Wpns Co, Hotchkiss Mod. 1914, 8mm.
2 81mm Morts.

- Hq Plat (Section de Commandement)
  - Com & Int Sec (1er Groupe: Transmissions et Renseignements)
  - Sup & Serv Sec (2e Groupe: Ravitaillement et services)
- MG Plat
- MG Plat (Section de mitrailleuses, 34)
  - Hq (Commandement)
  - MG Sec
  - MG Sec (Groupe de mitrailleuses, 15 men) (2-MG's)
- MG Plat
- MG Plat
- Wpns Plat (Section d'engin 38 men)
  - 81mm mort sec (Groupe de mortiers de 25, 21 men) (2-81mm mortars)
  - 25mm Gun sec (Groupe de canons de 25, 17)
    - Hq (Commandement) 3 men
    - 25mm Gun (Pièce de 25, 7)
    - 25mm Gun (Pièce de 2 7)

NOTES ON FIRE POWER-INF REGT:
112 auto-rifles Mod'24&29, 7.65mm.
144 greande dischargers in regt.
48 Hotchkiss MG's Mod '14, 8mm.
9-60mm Morts, mod'35.
8-81mm Morts, mod 27-31.
12-25mm Guns, mod '34.

FRENCH ARMY

Inf Regt
(Regiment d'Infanterie, Type Normal, 3080 men of all ranks)

- Stf (État-major, 8)
- Hq Co (Compagnie de Commandement, 209)
  - Serv Plat (1re Section (Service de la Compagnie)
  - Stf Plat (2e Section: Etat-major)
  - Com & Int Plat (3e Section: Transmissions et Renseignements)
  - Pion Plat (4e Section: Sapeurs-Pionniers)
  - Mtcl Plat * (5e Section: Eclaireurs-Motocyclistes, 26)
    - Hq (Commandement, 6)
    - Sec (Groupe, 10
      - Hq (Commandement, 2)
      - Sqd (Escouade, 4)
      - Sqd
    - Sec
- Serv Co (Compagnie hors rang, 176) (See diagram below.)
- 3 Inf Bns (Bataillon d'Infanterie, 865) (See next sheet.)
- Regtl Wpns Co (Compagnie régimentaire d'engins, 108) (See diagram below.)

* Has one mtcl w/sidecar and 24 solo mtcls.

Serv Co
(Compagnie hors rang, 176)

- Serv Plat (1re Section: Services de la Compagnie)
- Sup Plat (2e Section: Ravitaillement)
- Sup Plat (3e Section: Approvisionnement)
- Rep Plat (4e Section: Dépannage)
- Med Plat (5e Section: Service Sanitaire

Regtl Wpns Co
(Compagnie régimentaire d'engins, 108)

- Hq Plat (Section de Commandement)
- 25mm Gun Plat (Section de canons de 25, 27 men)
  - Hq (Commandement, 6)
  - 25mm Gun Sqd* (Pièce de 25)
  - 25mm Gun Sqd * (Pièce de 25) (7 men)
  - 25mm Gun Sqd* (Pièce de 25)
- 25mm Gun Plat (Section de canons de 25)
- 81mm Mort Sec (Groupe de Mortiers de 81, 21 men)

Wpns in Co:
2-81mm Morts
6-25mm Guns

*There is one 25mm Gun in each of the above sqds.

All French names above are underlined.

FRENCH ARMY

The Infantry Division, 1939
(16,650 men)

	Number of men
Div Hq (Quartier-Général)	270
Sig Bn (Transmissions)	407
Tg Co (Compagnie télégraphique)	234
Rad Co (Compagnie radio)	123
Div Inf (Infanterie divisionnaire)	9622
Inf Regt (Régiment d'Infanterie)	3080
Inf Regt (Régiment d'Infanterie)	3080
Inf Regt (Régiment d'Infanterie)	3080
Div AT Co (Compagnie divisionnaire anti-chars)	?
Pion Co (Compagnie de pionniers)	?
Div Arty (Artillerie divisionnaire)	4064
75mm Regt(Régiment de 75)(24-75s, 12-105 how)	2160
75mm Bn (Groupe de 75)(12-75s)	620
75mm Bn (Groupe de 75)(12-75s)	
105mm How Bn (Groupe de 105c)(12-105mm's)	620
Div AT Btry (Batterie divisionnaire anti-chars)(6 guns)	194
Engr Bn (Génie)	572
Div Rcn Bn (Groupe de reconnaissance de division d'infanterie)	688
Mtcl Tr (Escadron motocycliste)	
Horse Tr (Escadron à cheval)(2 MGs)(1-60mm mort)	
25mm Gun Sec (Groupe de canons de 25)(2 guns) horse.	
MG Tr (Escadron de mitrailleuses et canons de 25) 8 MGs, 2-25mm's	
Med Bn (Santé)	285
Div Med Co, Horse, (Groupe sanitaire divisionnaire)	234
Med Amb plat, L type (Section sanitaire auto, type leger)	51
Labor Plat (Intedence - Groupe d'exploitation)	52
Div Arty Park (Parc d'artillerie divisionnaire)	412
QM Bn (Train)	236
Truck Co (Compagnie auto)	32
Horse Co (Compagnie hippo)	204

Note: The French Army also has a Mtz Inf Div, organized as above, but has enough vehicles to trans-port itself similar to American Mtz Inf Divs.

FRENCH ARMY
1939
Normal Type Cavalry Division
(Division de cavalry, type normal,
(10,930 men)

Cav Div Hq (Quartier-général)	320
Cav Brig (Brigade de cavalerie)	2345
Cav Regt (Regiment de Cavalerie)	1140
Cav Regt (Régiment de Cavalerie)	1140
Cav Brig (Brigade de cavalerie)	2345
Cav Regt (Régiment de Cavalerie)	1140
Cav Regt (Régiment de Cavalerie)	1140
Mtz Echelon (Unités motorisées)	2385
Scout Car Regt (Régiment d'auto-mitrailleuses)	1046
Bn of Dragoons, Porté (Bataillon de argons portée)	1032
Div AT Tr (Escadron divisionnaire anti-chars)	164
Rep Tr (Escadron de reparations)	153
Mixed Regt of Arty (Régiment mixte d'artillerie)	1733
75mm Bn, Tractor (Groupe de 75)	?
75mm or 105mm Bn, Tractor (Groupe de 75 ou 105)	?
105mm Bn (Groupe de 105c)	?
Div Med Det (Sante)	202
Div QM Bn (Train)	406
Horse drawn Co (Compagnie hippe)	47
Truck Co (Compagnie auto)	359
Div Sig Bn (Transmissions)	478
Tg Co (Compagnie telegraphique)	228
Rad Co (Compagnie radio)	232
Pidgeon Det (Détachment Colombophile)	19
Div Engr Bn (Génie)	533
Engr Bn (Batalllon du genie)	400
Pontoon Co (Equipe de Ponts, mod. 1935)	133

Cavalry Regiment (Cav Div)
(1140 men)

Hq (État-major)	
Serv Tr (Escadron hors rang)	
Cav Sq (Groupe d'escadrons)	371
Cav Sq (Groupe d'escadrons)	371
Hv Wpns Tr (Escadron de mitrailleuses et engins)	216

Fire power table, Cav Regt.

48-auto-rifles
8 MGs
4 AA guns
4 25mm guns
4 60mm morts

Key to Abbreviations of French Names of Army units usually found in Frnech Morocco

D.C.	Division de Cavalerie (Cav Div)
D.C.A.	Défense contre avions (Anti Aircraft)
D.I.	Division d'Infanterie (Inf Div)
M & S	Mineurs et Sapeurs (Miners and Sappers (Engrs)
R.A.C.M.	Régiment d'artillerie coloniale du Maroc (Regt of colonial Inf of Marocco)
R.A.A.	Régiment d'artillerie d'Afrique (Regt of African Artillery)
R.I.	Régiment d Infanterie (Inf Regt)
R.I.C.M.	Regiment d·Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Regt of Colonal Inf of Morocco)
R.T.M.	Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains (Regiment of Moroccan Riflemen - Inf)
R.T.S.	Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (Regiment of Senegalese Riflemen - Inf)
R.T.T.	Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens (Regiment of Tunisian Riflemen - Inf)
R.S.A.	Régiment de Spahis Algériens (Regt of Algerian Spahis - Cav)
R.S.M.	Régiment de Spahis Marocains (Regt of Marocan Spahis - Cav)

NOTE: The "R" in many of these is sometimes omitted

Infantry Regiment

Inf Bns are numbered I, II, III in Roman numerals. Cos are numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 with-in the Bn. in Arabic numbers. Thus the 4th Co, of the IInd Bn of the 6th Tirailleurs would be expressed "4/II/6TM". Roman numerals are used to designate Bns, Brigades, and Corps. Arabic numerals for Cos, Regts, Divisions, and Army.

MAP SYMBOLS FOR FRENCH UNITS
(See key to Abbreviations of French Names of Army units in Morocco)

In plotting units on situation maps, it is requested that symbols used to indicate French Moroccan troops be labelled as indicated below for sake of consistency. Arabiv numerals are used to indicate Cos, Regts, Divs, and Armies. Roman numerals are used to indicate Bns, Brigs, and Corps. Cos are numbered within the Bn. It is necessary to use abbreviations after identifying numbers, to differentiate between regular and native units.

INFANTRY

SYMBOLS

3/III	6RTM	3rd Co of the 3rd Bn, 6th Régt Tirailleurs Marocains.
III	6RTM	3rd Bn, 6th Régt Tirailleurs Marocains.
3/II	6RTM	3rd Co, 2nd Bn, 6th Régt Tirailleurs Marocains
	6RTM	6th Régt Tirailleurs Marocains
1/III	6RTM	A plat of the 1st Co, 3rd Bn 6th Regt Tirailleurs Marocai
	27	27th Régt d'Infanterie (Regular Troops)
	RICM	Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Unnumbered)
2/I	2RSM	2nd Tr, 1st Sq, 2nd Régt Spahis Marocains
II	2RSM	2nd Sq, 2nd Régt Spahis Marocains
III	1RCA	3rd Sq 1st Régt Chasseurs d'Afrique (Armd)
3/III	RACM	3rd Btry, 3d Bn, Régt d'Artillerie Coloniale du Maroc (Unnumbered)
	RACM	Régt d'Artillerie Coloniale du Maroc
II	63RAM	2nd Bn 63d Régt d'Artillerie Marocaine
I	24RAA	1st Bn. 24th Régt d'Artillerie D'Afrique
	410 DCA	410th Régt Défense contre avions (AA Regt)
	410 DCA	3 Btry, 3d Bn, 410th Régt Défense contre avions

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION
Office of A.C. of S., G-2

INFORMATION PAMPHLET
on
FRENCH MOROCCO

Compiled and reproduced by direction of Commanding General of 3rd Infantry Division under supervision of the A.C. of S., G-2, 3rd Infantry Division.

SECTION III

Contents

1. Topography and Climate.
2. Supplementary notes on maps.
3. Water supply.
4. Special disease hazards in French Morocco.
5. Road Data.
6. Conversion Table to Metric System.

I. Topography and Climate

Morocco is divided into six general areas:

1. The coastal plain
2. The Tableland or meseta
3. The Atlas Mountains
4. The Riff Mountains
5. The Fez--Taza Gap
6. The Moroccan Desert

The most important part of the Country is the Atlantic coastal plain; by far the easiest and best developed lines of communication lead in from the Atlantic. On the north, east, and south, Morocco is hemmed in by mountains and highlands. On the north the rugged Riff mountains effectively insulate the country from Spanish Morocco and the Mediterranean, except for connections at either end of Morocco and three poor roads in the center. On the south the high Atlas Mountains block easy access to the Sahara. On the east the Riff and Atlas close in and leave only one relatively good passage to Algeria. This east-west passageway winds through valleys, over hills and across plains for almost 200 miles through the central trough of Morocco. It starts near Fez and passes through the strategic gap of Taza on to the Tell Plains of eastern Morocco and through Oujda to the Algerian Border.

CLIMATE

Western and Northern Morocco have the Mediterranean type of Climate characterized by rather mild temperatures and a fairly low rainfall, sharply concentrated in the winter season, from November to March. In parts of the Atlas Mountains, however, the Mediterranean climate is not characteristic, rainfall is heavier and winter temperatures low. Much snow falls and blocks most passes from November through March.

Water Supply.

Water supply is a serious problem in most parts of Morocco because of the seasonal character of the rainfall and the extent of evaporation. The river flow is generally low. Heaviest rainfall and consequent heavy flow of streams and rivers occurs in November. Near the ocean the water of large streams and rivers is usually brackish. Most of the streams flow westward to the northern part of the Atlantic coast, which is consequently the best watered region. Along the Mediterranean coast and south of the Atlas the streams are dry during part of the year. In all areas flash floods may occur, especially from November to March.

In Most areas where subsurface water must be used, the water table is relatively deep. The position of the water table is fairly reliable in the Atlantic coastal plains, the piedmont plains between the Meseta and the Atlas, and in the Sous basin at Agadir. Wells frequently reach water at a comparitively shallow depth in the dry floors of intermittent streams; such wells are a major source of water in the Sahara border region.

Agricultural settlements and the position of the souks or weekly markets, are generally indicative of sources of water.

Morocco is divided into several areas, each of which has its own characteristics with respect to water supply. Each area is discussed below.

Atlantic Coastal Plain.

The coastal plain extends from Rabat on the north to Mogador on the south. The section of the coast from Rabat to Tangier (Spanish Morocco) might also be considered part of the coastal plain. There is an isolated bit of arid coastal plain around agadir in the south.

The coastal plain has few indentations with deep water and consequently all the harbors except Port Lyautey are man made basins protected by heavy breakwaters.

Most of the coastal plain, particularly the northern part, has a thin belt of sand dunes along the coast. In many places, however, between Mogador and Agadir, the coast is rocky. In some places the dunes are solidified into sandstone hills difficult to cross. Back from the dunes there is generally a low zone, often marshy, (especially in the rainy season) which impedes penetration to the interior.

The coastal plain is generally undulating. Major streams such as the Oum er Rhia east of Mazagan and the Oued Mellah and Oued Nefifik between Casablanca and Rabat have cut deep gorges across the plain and constitute barriers to overland movement parallel to the coast.

The soil of the coastal plain is compsed of recent marine sediments, varying from sands which dry out quickly to rich black soils that become mud, after rains. Much of the soil is quite fertile, especially around Casablanca, and supports a thriving agriculture, concentrated principally on wheat and barley growing. There are few forests, save in the south around Mogador, where there is an open forest of scrub evergreen and cork oak. Cultivated groves of trees, especially Eucalyptus, are scattered over parts of the plain and often line the roads.

The Coastal plain is bounded on its interior by an escarpment 300 to 600 feet above the plain. The escarpment runs close to Rabat, recedes about 40 miles from the coast southward of Casablanca and comes close to the Atlas drop precipitously into the sea until Agadir is reached. At Agadir the Sous valley, a fertile irrigated plain at the foot of the mountains, leads into the interior some 50 or 60 miles to the point where the High and Anti-Atlas mountains join. The desert coast from Agadir south has many sand dunes along the water's edge.

Climate.

The climate of the coastal plain is characterized by warm, rather even temperatures throughout the year, and fairly scanty rainfall, concentrated sharply in the winter months. Average temperature of the hottest month at Casablanca (August) is 73.3°F., of the coldest month (January) 53.6°F. Average annual rainfall is 15.6 inches. Rainfall increases to the north, decreases to the south (Rabat has 19.7 inches, Mogador 13.7 inches, and Agadir, on the edge of the desert only 9.6 inches). Summer fog is frequent along the coast.

Water Supply.

In this region, between Rabat and Mogador, the rainfall is low and most

streams are fed by springs in the Meseta. The most important streams in this region are the Oued mellah, the Oum er Rbia, and the Tensift. Their flow is extremely irregular with the exception of the Oum er Rbia whose flow runs between an average 1413 cubic feet/ sec. minimum and 7590 cubic feet/sec. maximum. The lower 11 miles of the Oum er Rbia are tidal. In the case of the Tensift the water diversion for irrigation in the region of Marrakech further restricts the flow. Wells which supply the local population exist in all the populated areas but water is a scarce commodity. Subsurface water is generally within 50 feet of the surface in the plain between Rabat and Oum er Rbia. At some points, such as the Casablanca, there are also waterbearing beds at 400 feet. South of the Oum er Rbia water levels are lower, between 200 and 300 feet, and the average flow is from 350 to 865 cubic feet/sec.

At certain points water may be stored for irrigation, as at Sebh el Achrin on the Mellah river. Obtaining large quantities of potable water is difficult; subsurface water is usually inadequate, and surface water is contaminated.

North Central Lowlands of Coastal Plain.

The central western portion is predominantly an alluvial plain composed of sediments brought down by the Sebou, the largest river of Morocco. Extensive marshes (Merjas) fringe the lower Sebou. The marahes are covered with water up to twelve feet deep in winter, and are most difficult to cross, save on a few main roads, but are relatively dry and grassy in summer, at which time they are used for grazing. River channels wind across the area between natural levees as high as thirty feet above the surrounding plain. Roads and tracks run along these levees and connect settlements on them. The fertile alluvial soils rest on stiff marine marls and are poorly drained; floods are especially likely to occur in March and April. The population is sparse outside the few better drained districts. The area is a combination grazing and cereal crops region; hard and soft wheat and barley are the principal crops.

The Coast of the North Central Lowlands is bounded by almost continuous sand dunes extending as far north as Larache in Spanish Morocco, and in places beyond to Tangier. The coastal zone in Spanish Morocco is actually a continuation of the coastal plain south of Rabat, and is not an alluvial plain such as the Sebou Valley. The coastal plain in Spanish Morocco, however, is hillier because outliers of the Riff Highlands are close, descending actually to the sea near Tangier and the Straits of Gibralter.

Climate.

Rainfall in the North Central Lowlands is greater than on the Coastal Plain or Tableland, averaging about 22 inches, concentrated in winter; the amount increases as higher land is reached east of Fez (see Climate Tables in Appendix and Precipitation Map of Morocco). Temperature range is slightly greater than on the coast, winters are slightly cooler, summers considerably warmer. Average temperature of warmest month at Fez (July) is 81.2°F, of coldest month (January) 50°F.

Water Supply.

In this region, the plain between Rabat and Cape Spartel, surface streams are of more importance as a source of water than underground supplies. The most important streams are the Loukkos, the Sebou, the largest river in Morocco, and its tributary, the ouarga. Both streams are subject to large floods in the winter months, and both create marshy areas in the

Coastal plain. The Sebou has a heavy flow which forms marshy terrain, or "merjas", of over 100,000 acres. The "merjas", which remain moist throughout the year, are an important source of water in the dry season. As in the coastal plain there are reservoirs for irrigation purposes on some of the streams.

The Moroccan Tableland or Meseta.

The Moroccan Tableland is located parallel to and just east of the coastal plain. It is an extensive plateau, with level areas, rough surfaces and some mountains scattered over it. Four subregions stand out in the plateau surface. The largest and most important strategically, is the Zaer-Zaiane highland in the northeast. This region is very rough, wooded, and until recent years, fierce tribes readily blocked movement across the harsh highlands. The Zaer Zaiane region effectively separated Morocco into two main political regions based on the interior cities of Fez in the northeast, and Marrakech in the southwest. Connection between the two cities was via the only lowland route, through Rabat on the coastal plain. Today the Zaer Zaiane is crossed by one or two strategic roads, but it remains a difficult region to traverse.

Two small mountain areas, the Rehamna and the Djebilet, in the southwest of the Tableland, form other distinctive subregions. These bare mountains, however, do not form as serious obstacles to travel as do the Zaiane.

At the foot of the Atlas Mountain wall in the southern part of the region is a piedmont plain, composed of material washed down from the mountains. Much of this alluvial plain is fertile and is irrigated by water from the mountains, especially in the vicinity of Marrakech, the largest city of southern Morocco. Elsewhere, much of the plain is used for grazing. The entire plain is unforested.

Climate.

The Moroccan Tableland is generally drier than the coastal plain; this is especially true outside the northern Zaer Zaiane district.Marrakech has 9.6 inches of rain, concentrated in winter; the annual temperature range is greater than on the coastal plain, since the area is farther from the moderating effect of the ocean. Average temperature of hottest month at Marrakech (August) is 86°F, of coldest month (January) 52°F. Because of the drier climate, agriculture must be carried on under irrigation as in the piedmont plains, or confined to dry weather crops (barley, some wheat, etc.). Because of dryness, most of the region, as mentioned earlier, is devoted to grazing, particularly sheep and goats.

Water Supply.

The most important river which crosses the tableland, or Meseta, is the Oum er Rbia. Most of the streams have cut deep and often inaccessible gorges through which they run only during the rainy season. There is little surface water in the uplands at any time.

Surface water is not plentiful in the broken belt of plains stretching around the southern end of the Meseta. The streams feeding the Tensift have a small flow and during dry years fail entirely.

There is little subsurface water on the Meseta. On the Settat plateau toward Oued Zem water is found at 300 feet, and in the vicinity of El Borukj

at 80 feet. The water bearing rocks are discontinuous so the supply is uncertain in any particular area. In the Piedmont plains the water table is more constant in depth, nearest the surface along the major streams. In the Marrakech region are numerous underground tunnels, which tap subsurface water and carry it to irrigated farms.

There are some dams, such as that at Neffis, 25 miles Southwest of Marrakech, which store water for irrigation.

Riff and Pre-Riff.

Almost all the Riff Mountains lie in Spanish Morocco; like-wise, practically all of Spanish Morocco is composed of the Riff. Most of the Pre-Riff, a somewhat lower area on the south, is in French Morocco.

Pre-Riff Highlands.

This area south of the Riff is somewhat lower but is nevertheless a very rough region gashed by many stream valleys. The soil, however, is fertile and communication is difficult. Forests cover extensive areas.

Climate.

Rainfall in the Pre-Riff is the heaviest in Morocco, exceeding forty inches in places. The westward, Atlantic facing slopes receive the highest rainfall. For this reason the Mediterranean slope of the Riff has a low rainfall, although it is sufficient for agriculture. Temperatures are low in the high mountains in winter, and considerable snow falls. Winter is the heavy precipitation season in this region.

The Taza Gap.

Between the Pre-Riff and the Atlas lies the east west pass- the only important gateway between Morocco and Algeria. Both road and rail communications run thru this pass. North of Fez, the Oued Sebou is joined by Oued Inaouene, along the right bank of which lies a series of clay plains. These plains are bounded on the south by the high country of Rhiata, a narrow terrace in front of the summits which mark the northern end of the Moyen Atlas; the slopes are wooded or cultivated. On the north, also, hills border the plains, but they rise less abruptly; their slopes are bare and rocky; the rivers which run thru them carry water only in winter.

This area constitutes the western part of the strategic gap of Taza, a corridor 25 miles long and never less than one mile wide. At no point does the gap rise above 2,000 ft. Taza is built on two terraces, 500 and 250 feet respectively above the Inaouene valley which is 3 km wide at this point. To the east the corridor is continued by the valley of the Oued Msoun.

The Atlas Mountains.

The Atlas Mountains form a high chain extending from the coast north of Agadir northeastward across Morocco and into Algeria. The Atlas has the highest mountains in Morocco and is difficult to cross, although there are some passes; these are liable to be blocked by snow from November through March.

The Atlas has a three-fold division from north to south of Middle, High and Anti-Atlas.

The Middle Atlas, mainly high limestone plateaus, has mountain chains along its southern and eastern border. Everywhere the elevation is over 3,600 feet, with summits rising to 10,000 feet. Forest cover is dense. There are many streams carrying water throughout the year, unlike the Riff.

The High Atlas is a plateau at its western end, in a single, high mountain wall south of Marrakech, and is lower and broader, with both plateaus and chains in its eastern section.

The Central Rampart of the High Atlas has the highest elevations of the whole Atlas Range. Several peaks tower above 12,000 feet. The High Atlas is forested on its north, moist slope, but it is generally bare on its dry southern side.

The Anti-Atlas is a much lower plateau and ridge massif on the edge of the desert. It is barren, devoid of forests.

Water Supply.

The Sous, which rises in the high Atlas and flows west between the High and the Anti-Atlas, reaches the sea at Agadir. It is an intermittent stream with a comparatively small flow which is further diminished by the withdrawal of water along its courses for irrigating purposes. Wells in this section reach water fairly near the surface, at an average of 70 feet in those places where there is no seepage. About 1000 pumps are being used at present to obtain water for irrigation.

Passes.

The main passageway across the Atlas is thru its widest extent--from the Meknes-Fez area South across the Middle and High Atlas. Although wide, the mountains are not as high as farther west. There is no one commanding pass or route through the mountains. Rather a series of passes and valleys is followed by the roads; pass elevations range from 5,000 to almost 7,000 feet and are liable to be snow blocked from November to April, although snow plows have cleared the roads near Azrou. The towns of Azrou and Midelt, in longitudinal valleys of the Atlas, mark the route of the main road but there are also connecting roads coming down to Midelt from the north. Only one route leads south from Midelt to the Oasis of Tafilalet in the Sahara.

Farther east the "High Atlas" is so low near the Algerian border that a road and railway (northern part of Trans-Saharan project) cross passes never blocked by snow. This is the only part of the Atlas not liable to be snow blocked in winter.

South of Marrakech two passes carry roads across the High Atlas. The eastern of these two roads runs through the pass of Tizi n'Tichka at an elevation of 7,447 feet. The western route crosses via Tizi n'Test Pass at an elevation of 6,690 feet. Both of these passes are liable to be blocked by snow from December until April.

Climate.

The Middle Atlas has a harsh climate. In winter temperatures are low and storms are frequent. Snow falls as low as the 3,000 foot line. Higher up it reaches depths of 5 feet and stays on the ground from December until late in spring. Precipation throughout the Middle Atlas is high, being exceeded only by the Pre-Riff. Precipitation is heaviest in winter, although not nearly as

marked as in the rest of Morocco. The High Atlas, since it is farther south, has less precipitation, higher snow line and shorter duration of snow cover than the Middle Atlas.

The Sahara Border.

Beyond and to the south of the Atlas Mountains lies the Sahara Desert. The most important stream in this region, which includes the desert area south of the Atlas and anti-Atlas, is the Dra. Even in the driest summers the Dra, fed by the Dades river does not dry up above M'Hammid. Its lower course, along the frontier of Rio de Oro, is dry except after heavy rains. Like all desert streams it is subject to violent flash floods, and in places becomes a half-mile wide. Not even the valleys of the streams in this area reach the sea.

Wells sunk in the floors of dry wadis usually reach water; the depth depends upon the season and rainfall. Along some wadis, such as the Imiter and the lower Todgha, tunnels have been built to tap the subterranean flow along the dry channel.

Supplementary Notes on the Map of Morocco

1. Streams as barriers. a. All Moroccan streams vary greatly in volume. Streams which are hardly brooks in midsummer are creeks in winter and may become torrents during the spring floods.

b. The major streams are considered briefly in order from southwest to northeast.

(1) The Sous even in flood is rarely a barrier for more than a few hours. During the dry season it dries up.

(2) The Tensift is a very irregular stream, entrenched in its lower course. The valley sides are so gentle and the stream so shallow, however, that it affords but a slight barrier to passage.

(3) The Oum er Rbia flows throughout the year. It is probably fordable in its upper course but after it turns northwestward, it must be crossed by ferries. Soon after the stream becomes deeply incised in the plateau. Its canyon is a definite barrier except at the few bridges. Near the coast it can be crossed by ferries.

(4) Between Casablanca and Rabat a number of small streams cut across the plateau in courses perpendicular to the coast. These streams are entrenched but their valleys are so shallow that they are a serious barrier only near the coast. Here the coastal road crosses their gorges by a series of bridges.

(5) The Bou Regreg and its tributaries are deeply incised into the plateau. Their gorges average 200-300 feet in depth and are so continuous as to be a very definite barrier to movement.

(6) The Sebou flows in a wide swampy valley. During flood season its waters spread over the lower valley floor and create vast marshes.

(7) The Moulouya is a very irregular stream which rises in the mountains and, in its middle course, loses considerable water by evaporation. It is fordable at most points except during floods. It is 150 yards wide at

Guercif.

c. Except in some of their upper courses, Moroccan stream valleys are barriers rather than corridors. Roads generally avoid the streams either because they are too winding, too swampy, or too deeply incised.

2. Defiles. a. Although Morocco is mountainous, defiles are not common. Winding stretches of road with blind corners provide places, however, which would have many of the barrier possibilities of a defile.

b. The principal defiles are to the west of Taza on the Taza-Fez road. Other important defiles are on the routes crossing the High Atlas. In Spanish Morocco the Tetuan-Melilla road passes through only two defiles. However, this road has gradients of as high as 1:16 and is precariously perched on steep mountain sides in its central portion.

WATER SUPPLY

Petit Jean - Aboundant water supply.

Lyautey - Supply along reinforced concrete aqueduct from Fouarat springs in the Forest of Mamora.

Rabat - Same - Between Rabat and Casablanca are caline coastal streams unsuitable for drinking. Water bearing strata lie close to surface.

Fedhala - Same

Casablance - Two sources of supply -fror Fourat springs along the aquoduct; from springs at Tit Mellil, Oued Mellah and Ain Dissa.

Chaouia plains - Water bearing strata near the surface between Casablanca and Mazagan.

Dou Kkala plain - Wells 300' deep between Casablanca and Mazagan.

Mazagan - Wells 300' deep.

Safi -Deep wells near coast (notably at Sidi Bou Zid) Inland water is deeper.

General - After winter rains, springs are abundant where an permeable material overlies clay. Spring flooding on the Sebou plain leaves seasonal pools, but he annual ten foot depth of water is usually brackish.

Water points are common north, northeast and east of the region of the seasonal pools.

Conclusion - During the rainy season, the water supply should be considerable. (November is the month of heaviest rainfall) Surface supplies are inadequate, and subsurface supplies frequently are bacteriologically contaminated. Purification of water to be used for drinking purposes will be necessary.

Special Disease Hazards in French Morocco.

Malarial fever comprises 38% of all treatments of patients in the area and is especially dangerous near marshes and oases. It is less common in the winter.

Venereal diseases are widespread, syphilis especially common and there is no control of prostitution.

Typhus fever, louse borne, is especially common and lice may be picked up in old houses, public conveyances or by mingling in crowds. Typhus is worse in the winter.

Intestinal diseases. Amoebic dysentery, typhoid fever, and bacillary dysentery next to malarial fever cause the most sickness. Unauthorized food and drinks spread the intestinal diseases.

Diseases of minor importance are:
Relapsing fever carried by lice and one form of ticks.
Schistosomiasis from wading or swimming in polluted water.
Leishmaniasis spread by sandflies.
Plague sometimes occurs, from bites of fleas, and is important when present.
Vaccination is available if the disease occurs.
Skin diseases, scabies and dhobie itch are common.
Eye irritation from sun, wind, glare and blowing sand is prevalent.
Pests are bedbugs, straw mites and scorpions.
Three poisonous snakes, two vipers and one cobra are present.

Cholera and yellow fever are not present.

All foods and water must be boiled.

ROADS

Inasmuch as the railway only serves a limited part of French Morocco the roads were designed as main system of land-communication. Principal groupings are as follows:

A. Road #1 --an arterial road connecting the Atlantic ports, running mostly along the coast from Agadir northwards and into Tangier.

B. Roads running inland from coast or Road #1 and serving great inland towns of Marrakech, Meknes and Fes.

C. Roads traversing the Atlas Foothills; crossing the Atlas passes.

D. Secondary roads and tracks serving fertile coastal areas.

Generally they are classified as follows:

Main Roads--Routes Principales: usually 16-1/2 to 20 feet wide designed to take heavy loads.

Secondary Roads.--Routes Secondaires--about 13-1/2 feet wide, reasonably heavy duty.

Tracks--Pistes--Trails that are cleared and maintained. Not usable as a rule during rainy weather.

Main roads will take two-way military traffic except at bridges and railway crossings which are usually one-way. Most of the North-South roads cross the Atlas to Atlantic watershed and, therefore, bridge a large number of rivers. These crossings represent the main military hazards as they could easily be sabotaged.

Description of Main Roads.

Route #P 1-Casablanca to Port Lyautey.
Casablanca-Rabat. Local No: P 1. Distance: 93 km., 58 miles.

General itinerary.

This section, the best, widest, and most frequented route in Morocco is of great importance as connecting (a) the chief port with the administrative capital, and (b) Marrakech and the southern coastal region with the fertile districts of northern Morocco. Alternative routes are available from Casablanca to Meknes, from Rabat to the south, and from Marrakech to Meknes, but they all pass through more difficult country and are greatly inferior as roads. The road Casablanca-Rabat, however, is doubly vulnerable; it is nowhere farther than 4 miles from the sea, and it crosses four rivers running in deep ravines. Of the four bridges at least two are only wide enough for one stream of military traffic.

The road leaves Casablanca eastward from Place Cuny, 2 km. east of Place de France, and skirts the industrial quarter of Roches Noires, crossing the railway by a long embanked bridge at 4 km.

At Ain Sebaa (6 km) it passes under the railway, and thence forward the two are close together, the road on the inland side until 10 km. from Rabat. After Ain Sebaa, where gardens and parks should provide a good deal of cover, the country is flat, fertile, and open.

At 24 km., 30 km., and 58 km., and 70 km. ravines are crossed by bridges.

Several roads connect the main road with the coast roads and tracks. There are metalled roads along the coast from Casablanca to Mansouria (35 km.) and from Temara to Rabat (12 km); between Mansouria and Temara there are only tracks possible for light vehicles.

Rabat (93 km.) is entered from the southwest by Avenue de Temara or Avenue de la Victoire; the latter avoids the port and is the better route for through traffic; the two streets fork 300 yards southwest of the Experimental Garden (Jardin d'Essais.)

Apart from the railway, there appears to be no obstacle to driving off the road until at Temara a built-up area is entered. The country is suitable for A.F.V.s; there is no cover from air observation.

Petrol stations: at Roches Noires, Ain Sebaa, at 27 km., at St. Joan de Fedhala (29 km), at 32 km., at El Gourma (39 km), Bou Znika (51 km), Ain el Aiba (63 km), at 65 km., 70 km., 77 km., and at Temara (80 km.).

Construction.

Bituminous concrete, "two-coloured" in parts. This was the first of the French roads in Morocco to be constructed, and has received continuous superimposed dressings; it should be capable of taking loads of 25 tons at least, perhaps of 40 tons. In 1938 a count showed a daily traffic of nearly 7,000 tons at the exit from Casablanca and nearly 9,000 tons at the entry into Rabat.

The trees formerly fringing the road are now reported to have been cut down, in some places at least.

Width: bed of 12 metres (39 ft. 4 in.) including metalled roadway of 7 metres (23 ft).

Bridges.

T 1	4 km.	Roches Noires.	Concrete, over railway; long ramps.
T 2	24 km.	Oued Mellah	Masonry, 3 arches; doubtful if two-way for military traffic; should carry at least 25 tons. Banks steep. Approaches dangerous.
T 3	30 km.	Oued Nefifikh	Masonry; doubtful if two-way; should carry at least 25 tons. Awkward turns on both sides. Banks steep.

T 4	58 km.	Oued Cherrat	Identical bridges, built in 1922. Suspension type, single span, masonry supports; roadway of reinforced concrete, with quartzite pavement. Length 103.5 metres (339 ft. 6 in.); width of roadway 5.5 metres (18 ft.). Should carry at least 25 tons. Approaches straight. Banks steep and rocky.
T 5	70 km.	Oued Yquem.	
T 6	82 km.	2 km. north of Temara.	Over railway.

Sharp turns.

4 km. Roches Noires. Embankment leading to bridge over railway; curves at both ends.

24 km. Oued Mellah. Dangerous turns on both sides of bridge.

30 km. Oued Nefifikh. Approaches to bridge.

Defiles.

4 km. Bridges over and under railway. These can be avoided by using (a) coast road to Fedhala, or (b) a minor road out of Casablanca running on the south side of the railway, or (c) Road 58* for 5 km. and then the circular road which forks left, or (d) Road 58* for 13 km. and then Road 62**.

Of the four river bridges mentioned above, those over Oueds Mellah and Nefifikh can be avoided by using coast road through Fedhala and tracks leading thereto.

There is a concrete bridge of 4 spans carrying an unmetalled road, connected with the main road, over Oued Cherrat 800 yards downstream from T 4. The present condition of the former bridge is not known; it used to carry a narrow-gauge railway.

The railway bridges which cross these four rivers immediately north of the road bridges might be available.

Rabat-Port Lyautey. Distance: 40 km., 25 miles.

The road descends from Rabat on the east, traverses the salt marshes, and after crossing Oued bou Regreg forks left to skirt the native town of Sale (4 km.). It then runs for 25 km. parallel to, and within 3 km. of the sea, from which it is separated by a low ridge. The railway runs alongside inland. At first there are gardens and orchards, but the soil soon becomes sandy, and scrub is rare. East of the railway is the edge of the Mamora forest (cork-oaks), which extends for a length of 60 km. and a breadth of 30 -40 km. on a sandy plateau. There are several wide tracks or ridges through it, and even elsewhere movement is possible, since the trees grow some distance apart and there is no undergrowth.

At about 30 km. the road bears north-east away from the sea, and after crossing under the railway at 37 km., passes through the town of Port Lyautey, where it comes within half a kilometre of Oued Sebou and recrosses the railway.

Route # P 2 -Port Lyautey to El Arbaa du Rharb. Distance: 77km; 48 miles.

North of Port Lyautey the road runs through the fertile plain of the Rharb, crossing several tributaries of the Sebou by bridges. From El Mograne (66km)

* Local No. S 106

** Local No. S 107

where it crosses Oued Beth, to Sidi Allal Tazi (83 km) where it crosses to the right bank of Oued Sebou, it traverses a narrow tongue enclosed by these two rivers, which are liable to flood from November to April or May. The Sebou, normally 100 yards wide, is a sluggish stream flowing between low muddy banks; the Beth is a much less formidable obstacle.

North of Sidi Allal Tazi the country is flat and in dry weather very suitable for A.F.V.s. Southeast of the road, as far as Et Eleta (104 km), the windings of the Sebou restrict movement. One kilometre east of Et Tleta, a "Route Secondaire" (Local No. S 210) runs close to the river for 16 km.

El Arbaa du Rharb (117 km.) is of considerable importance as a road junction controlling the routes from the Spanish Zone to Fes and Meknes.

Route # P 3 Port Lyautey to Fes.

Port Lyautey - Petitjean-Fes. Local No.: P2 for 8 km., then P3. Distance 167 km., 104 miles.

General itinerary.

The road runs for 84 km. in straight level stretches along the southern edge of the fertile Rharb plain, immediately south of the railway, to the important road and rail junction of Petitjean. For the next 70 km. it runs through hills, rising up a narrow valley to the Col de Segotta, on the northern slopes of Djebel Zerhoun, and then crossing a steep shoulder as it winds southeast to strike Road 12* at 10 km. from Fes.

The country is suitable for A.F.V.s as far as Petitjean (except for small irrigation canals in the Sidi Sliman region) and again for the last 15 km. before reaching Fes. There should be some cover from air observation in the Mamora forest, in the plantations west and east of Sidi Yahia du Rharb, and in parts of the Zerhoun hill country.

Petrol stations: At Sidi Yahia du Rharb, Sidi Slimane.

From Port Lyautey to Petitjean. Distance: 84 km., 52 miles.

Forking right from Road 1* at 8 km. from Port Lyautey, the road passes for 2 km. through the northern outskirts of the Mamora cork forest, before entering the Rharb plain. Eight km. later it again skirts the forest, which is continued on to Sidi Yahia du Rharb (26 km) and beyond by plantations of eucalyptus and other trees. Apart from recent planting the plain is treeless, but it is very fertile, and in the region of Sidi Slimane (63 km.) a road junction at the crossing of Oued Beth, it is being exploited for cereals and fruit. Irrigation canals in the region might give trouble to A.F.V.s. Just before entering Petitjean the road crosses the railway and joins Road 1[illegible].*** Immediately behind the small town a ridge running from northeast to southwest rises steeply from the plain.

From Petitjean to Fes. Distance: 83 km., 51 miles.

The road runs northeast along the foot of the hills for 4 km. and then turns southeast to rise up the narrow valley of Oued Teslalt to the cross-roads at the Col de Segotta (108 km., height 1,[illegible]22 ft.), where Road 13B**** forks right for Meknes. The left road, which at present only runs as far as some oil borings 9 km. to the north, is eventually to be continued to join Road 77*****, so forming a direct route from Meknes to Ouezzane.

* Rabat-Fes-Oujda-Algerian Frontier road. ** Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road

*** Local No. P 6 **** P 28, P 6 (Col de Segotta-Meknes)

***** P 28

Road 13* descends southeast across the bare northern slopes of Djebel Zerhoun, then rises over a shoulder, passing at 121 km. a poor road (local No. S 306), which climbs southward by the village of Skhirat to cross the ridge and descend to Moulay Idriss before joining Road 13B***. From the shoulder Road 13* slopes down into the valley of Oued Mikkes, and then up over another rise, before finally descending across the fertile country to join Road 12** at Douiyet, 10 km. from Fes.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; two-way; was being widened and reconditioned in 1938-9. Reported as a good road (1939).

Bridges.

Reported as "well-bridged", but few details available.

27 km. Small bridges over Oued Smento and Oued Tiflet.

63 km. Oued Beth. Reported as reinforced concrete, two-way; river not more than 80 feet wide and not normally a serious obstacle. Photographs show an aqueduct over the river.

82 km. Oued Rdom.

132 km. Oued Mikkes. Stone, built by a French engineer about 1870.

Gradients.

About 122 km. and 130 km. Gradients of 7 to 12 per cent (1 in 14 to 1 in 8) on ascent to shoulder and on descent to Oued Mikkes.

Sharp turns.

132 km. Dangerous turns at exit from bridge over Oued Mikkes.

Defiles.

8-10 km. Mamora forest. The trees do not normally grow so close as to prevent movement.

87-137 km. First the Bab Tiouka defile at the foot of the Teslalt valley and then hilly country, in which M/T could not operate off the road.

Observation point.

108 km. Col. de Segotta; view northeast. North of the road is a small plateau, about 1,500 by 1,000 yards, rising to 1,358 ft.

Seasonal variations.

Movement of M/T off the road may be difficult in the section Sidi Yahia du Rharb-Petitjean in the wet season (November to April, particularly February and March). According to a guide-book of 1933 the volume of Oued Beth varies from one cubic metre per second at minimum to 600 cubic metres per second at flood; it is not known whether these figures take account of the construction of the El Kansera dam in 1933.

Route # P 5 Meknes to Fes. Distance 61 km., 38 miles.

The road [illegible] along Avenue Lyautey through the European town and crosses the railway. On leaving the town it traverses a cultivated district winding through two ravines and rising to nearly 2,000 feet, with the Zerhoun ridge on the left, before descending into the fertile Sais plan.

* Local No. P 2 for 8 km., the P 3 (Port Lyautey-Fes road)

** Rabat-Fes-Oujda-Algerian Frontier road.

*** Local No. P 28, P 6.

On the outskirts of Fes, one km. before Bab Segma is reached, the road for the European town and Taza turns right to cross Oued Fes and skirt the west and south walls of the palace gardens in Fes Djedid; the road for Taza then turns sharp left and crosses a stream.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; width nowhere less than 6 metres and in parts much wider. The road was being widened and reconditioned in 1938-9. One of the most frequented roads in Morocco, regularly used by bus traffic, which is advertised to cover the distance in 3-1/2 hours; known to carry petrol lorries with a load of 20 tons.

Observation point.

164 km. Wide view over Sais plain.

Route # P 6 El Arbaa du Rharb to Petitjean. Distance: 60 km., 37 miles.

General itinerary.

The road crosses the Rharb in long straight stretches to Petitjean.

North of Petitjean the country off the road is suitable for A.F.V.s except where the Sebou is in flood. There is no cover from air observation in this section.

South of Petitjean the hill country off the road is not suitable for A.F.V.s; there is vegetation along the river-bed, but this would give little cover from air observation.

The road is vulnerable at the Sebou bridge at Mechra bel Ksiri.

The road and railway follow the same course, generally close alongside.

The road crosses the railway and runs over the fertile plain to the village of Mechra bel Ksiri (14 km., population 600), where it is joined by a side road (Local No. S 210) which connects it along the right bank of the Sebou with Road 1*, 16 km. distant. This district is subject to inundations, which have been known to submerge both railway and road; south of the Sebou road and railway run dead straight for the next 11 km. close to the winding river, and after that almost straight to the little town of Petitjean, a route-centre at the foot of a range of hills.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; two-way at least as far as Petitjean and probably also from Petitjean to Meknes.

Bridges.

2 km. Bridge over railway reported. No details.

16 km. Oued Sebou — At Mechra bel Ksiri. Steel girder bridge, 177 metres (581 feet) long, two-way, which also carries the railway and may therefore be taken as up to any weight.

The Sebou is a serious obstacle, but the current is not swift. There is another bridge about 20 km. downstream, south of Et Tleta.

Defiles.

16 km. Crossing of Oued Sebou at Mechra bel Ksiri.

60 km. Passage through Petitjean.

* AGADIR-CASABLANCA-RABAT-TANGIER road.

Seasonal variations.

The floods of Oued Sebou may obstruct passage across country, and even along the road near the river, in the period between November and April; they are greatest in February and March.

The minimum summer volume of the river at Mechra bel Ksiri is 12 cubic metres per second; its mean volume is 24 cubic metres per second; its flood volume may rise to 2,000 cubic metres per second, and its level at such times may be 8 metres higher than at low water.

Route # P 7 Casablanca to Marrakech. Distance: 240 km., 150 miles. Bridge over Oued Tensift reported as only 5 mtrs. wide

General itineray.

This road is the principal highway to southern Morocco, and bears most of the traffic from Fes and Meknes to Marrakech, being considerably easier and more reliable than the route through Kasba Tadla. It runs in long straight stretches over plain for the most part featureless. At Settat (72 km.) it rises through low hills to a plateau which continues until the valley of Oued Oum er Rbia is reached. South of the river another (higher) plateau is traversed, and at about 200 km. the road rises to cross the Djebilet hills. The country is very suitable for A.F.V.s, but there is no cover from air observation before the palm-groves of Marrakech.

The road has one vulnerable point, the bridge over the Oum er Rbia at Mechra ben Abbou (119 km.).

From Ber Rechid (42 km.) southward the standard-gauge railway follows the same course as the road; there are several crossings. The stations are marked by eucalyptus trees.

Petrol stations; at Mediouna (19 km.) Ber Rechid (42 km.) Bou Farouj (50 km.), Khemisset (95 km.) Mechra ben Abbou (119 km.) El Arbaa des Skhouf (142 km.), Ben Buerir (170 km.).

From Casablanca to Settat. Distance 72 km., 45 miles.

The road leaves Casablanca by Route de Mediouna, passing over the railway east of the Nouvelle Medina, and at 5 km. crosses the Circular Road ("Route de Grande Ceinture.")

Outside the town the country is open and rolling. At Mediouna (19km) a small stock-raising and market-gardening centre, Road 62* comes in from the northeast, providing a short cut 21 km. long by which traffic from Rabat to the south can avoid Casablanca and so save 16 km. Passing at 24 km. along the west side of Mediouna airfield. Road 9** continues over the fertile treeless plain past Ber Rechid (42 km.), a route-centre in a grain-growing district, until at about 65 km. it enters a region of hills, which rise at first to some 1,300 feet, and mounts through young plantations to Settat (72 km., height 1,150 feet). East and west the ground rises to 1,500 feet, giving a wide view over the plain to the southwest. This explains the strategic importance attached to Settat by General Lyautey in 1908.

From Settat to Ben Guerir. Distance: 98 km., 61 miles.

Mounting from Settat, the road crosses a low plateau, passing

* Local No. S 107

** Local No. P 7

wells and clumps of olive trees at Khemisset (95 km.) until at 108 km. it begins to wind down through uncultivated country to Mechra ben Abbou on the right bank of the Oum er Rbia which is here an important obstacle. On the south side it rises to the dry and stony Rehamna plateau. From El Arbaa des Skhouf it mounts a rocky ridge about 2,000 feet above sea-level and traverses it for some 20 km. before sloping down to Ben Guerir (170 km.).

From Ben Guerir to Marrakech. Distance: 70 km., 44 miles.

The road continues due south in a straight line, past Nzalet el Adem (183 km.) a village near deep wells, until just before the village of Sidi bou Othmane (205 km.) it rises to cross the low Djebilet plateau, with its bare pointed hills, which provides a covering position for Marrakech on the north. On the farther side it enters the Haouz plain, irrigated partly from Oued Tensift, which it crosses at 235 km. and then passes through the belt of palm-trees extending to the outskirts of Marrakech. The road from Mazagan and Safi comes in on the right about 2.5 km. north-west of Place du 7 Septembre in the Gueliz quarter.

Construction.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; width nowhere less than 6 metres (19 ft. 8 in.) and over long stretches wide enough for four lanes. In 1938 this road carried a total daily traffic of nearly 3,000 tons at the exit from Casablanca, and it is regularly used by petrol lorries with a load of 20 tons.

Condition.

Good. In peace-time buses were advertised to cover the 150 miles in 4 hours, but a good car could do the journey in 2-1/2 hours.

Bridges.

There are only two important bridges.

T 1 119 km. Oued Oum er Rbia St Mechra ben Abbou. Iron or steel lattice-girder bridge on masonry piers; 2 unequal spans with arch at each end forming abutment; two-way; carries 20 tons regularly. Crossing would be difficult were this bridge destroyed, since the stream has considerable volume and speed at all times and flows in a deep gypseous bed. Volume: mean, 40 cubic metres per second; flood, 1,000 cubic metres per second, a rise of 6 metres above low water; minimum, 35 cubic metres per second. Current varies between 1.5 and 3.5 metres per second. The railway bridge crosses the river some 3 km. upstream. Photographs show an old suspension bridge (length 328 ft., width of roadway 12 ft. 3 in., between footpaths each of 2 ft., 5 in., capacity about 6 tons) behind the new bridge.

T 2 235 km. Oued Tensift Ancient stone bridge, 350 metres (1,148 ft.) long with 27 arches; width 5 metres. The river is not a serious obstacle except in flood; the railway bridge is some 3 km., and another road bridge 6 km. downstream.

There are also several crossings over and under the railway, of which details are not available.

A bridge over the railway, with a long ramp, is reported at 58 km.

Passages under the railway are reported at 82 km. (narrow and blind); north of Mechra ben Abbou (two); and just south of El Arbaa des Skhouf.

There are also crossings on both sides of Sidi bou Othmane: the road goes over the railway at one, under at the other.

Gradients and sharp turns.

Gradients are easy. Sharp turns are reported at 68 km., 85.5 km; 86.5 km.

Defiles.

Besides the bridges mentioned above, the passages through the hills at Settat, and El Arbaa des Skhouf appear to need special care.

Observation points.

13 km. From a rise: view of the Chaouia plain to the south.
67 km. From high ground north of Settat: view to the north.
73 km. From high ground west of Settat: view to the south-west.
142 km. Point 711 (grid 5759), 2 km. south-east of road at El Arbaa des Skhouf.
152 km. Marabout of Sidi Amara (Point 524, gird 5452), 1.5 km. west of road.
213 km. View south over Haouz plain and Marrackech.

Seasonal variations.

For Oueds Oum er Rbia and Tensift, see Bridges above. South of the former river there is a marked change in climate, rain becoming much rarer.

Route # P 8 Mazagan to Casablanca (via Foucauld)

Distance 134 km., 83 miles. Local No. S 113 to Foucauld, then S 109.

General itineray.

This road, of which little information is avaiable, provides a line of communication not vulnerable from the sea between Mazagan and Casablanca. The Oued Oum er Rbia, which it crosses at the Sidi Said Maachou dam, is the only serious obstacle, winding in a steep-sided valley.

The ground off the road is suitable for A.F.V.s; there is no cover from air observation, except a few small woods, mostly west of the river, which might serve as tank harbors.

From Mazagan to Foucauld. Distance: 66 km., 41 miles.

The road forks south-east from Road 8* (Mazagan-Marrakech) not quite 3 km. from Mazagan and traverses the stony undulating plain, bearing east after about 30 km. It then runs over slightly higher ground (about 700 ft.) before descending north-east to cross Oued Oum er Rbia (50 km.). The road crosses by the Sidi Said Maachou dam and then turns sharply to the right; the road to the left leads to the power station. On rising from the valley Road 57** leaves on its left a metalled road (Road 57B***) running north for 30 km. to Bir Djedid St. Hubert on Road 1****, and continues south of east across the plateau to Foucald (66 km.) an agricultural center.

* Local No. P 9 ** Local No. S 113 to Foucaluld, then S 109 (Mazagan to Casablanca)

*** Local No. S 115 **** Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road.

From Foucauld to Casablanca. Distance: 68 km., 42 miles

The road runs northeast over fertile country, crossing Road 57A** (from Ain Saierni on Road 1* to Ber Rechid) at 115 km., passing through Bou Skoura (119 km., height, 440 feet), the site of a former fort, and entering Casablanca on the east side of Parc Lyautey.

Construction.

"Route Secondaire". Waterbound macadam to Foucald (1937), then tarmac. Two-way.

Bridges.

50 km. Oued Oum er Rbia. The bridge (reinforced concrete girders resting on 6 piers and 2 abutments of masonry or concrete, two-way) forms a part of the actual dam.

There are small islands or banks in the river at various points, and its flow can presumably be controlled from the dam.

There is a bridge upstream at Boulaouane.

Sharp turn.

50 km. Immediately after crossing the river the road turns sharp right.

Defiles.

46-62 km. Crossing of valley of Oued Oum er Rbia.

Immediately below the dam the river describes a complicated westward loop forming a peninsula shaped something like a shamrock, not quite 1,000 yards wide at its neck on the east side, where the road crosses. The area corresponding to the southern leaf of the shamrock is low and flattish, as is the ground on the left bank opposite, to northwest and to east. Elsewhere, on both banks of the river, the ground rises steeply, overlooking the valley floor.

Four km. from the bridge the road coming from the southwest descends from the plateau in a narrow glen or combe; it then runs for 2 km. across a level space 2 km. wide with the stream on three sides, and is subject to enfilade fire from beyond the bridge.

After crossing the bridge it runs for one km. or more up to the right bank of the river at the foot of the hills before turning left to mount the plateau.

Observation points.

46-62 km. The hills overlooking the winding valley give good observation of the defile.

Route # P 9 Mazagan to Marrakech. Distance: 196 km., 122 miles.

General itinerary.

The road runs in a southerly direction over the rolling Doukkala country, rising very gradually for the first 120 km. It then crosses a low ridge and continues almost due south until at 152 km., it rises to cross the Djebilet hills, from which it descends to Marrakech.

The country is open throughout, suitable for A.F.V.s but without cover from air observation until the palm-groves of Marrakech are reached.

* Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road ** Local No. S 103

Petrol stations: at Sidi Smaine (50 km.), Sidi ben Nour (71 km.), Tnine Bouchane (115 km.), at 154 km.

Water: at 126 km. (Smaira spring) and 129 km. (Atatfa wells).

From Mazagan to Sidi Smaine. Distance: 50 km., 31 miles.

The road forks right at Place Lyautey and runs due south, following the same course as Road I.*** The country is for the most part stony and not much cultivated, but there is some cornland. From 25 to 35 km. low hills overlook the road from the west.

From Sidi Smaine to Junction with Road 7.** Distance: 104 km., 65 miles.

For the first 40 km. the country is fertile and to a large extent under cultivation, including vineyards and orchards; it then becomes more hilly and less cultivated. At Sidi Rahal, a remount station (92 km.), and Guerando (101 km.) the road and its neighborhood are commanded by two low hills. After crossing Road 80* and the railway the road rises over a low ridge (about 126 km.).

From junction with Road 7** to Marrakech. Distance: 42 km., 26 miles.

The road crosses the bare Djebilet ridge, which rises to a number of sharp pointed summits, forming a position of tactical importance covering Marrakech on the north; it then descends into the plain and a few miles from the town passes through the western fringe of the Marrakech palm-groves

Construction.

"Route Principale." Tarmac, with firm edges. Width two-way throughout, with four lanes over the greater part (report of August 1941).

Condition.

Reported as excellent in August 1941. There was a regular bus service in peace-time, advertised as taking 3-1/2 hours.

Bridges.

T 1	118 km.	Oued bou Chane	Reinforced concrete, 4 spans. The stream is not normally an obstacle.
T 2	187 km.	Oued Tensift	Masonry and reinforced concrete, 5 spans, two-way. The river is sluggish and normally not more than waist-deep.

The road is reported to cross over the railway just before 120 km. and at 191 km., but no details of the bridges are available.

Gradients and sharp turns.

Gradients are easy throughout. A U-shaped turn is reported on an upward slope at 42 km. and sharp turns at 132 km. and 169 km.

Observation points.

92 km. Mtal hill, 1,400 feet high, east of road gives observation to north and west.

101 km. Height 1,350 feet, west of road, gives observation to west and south.

There is wide observation to north and south from the Djebilet ridge.

* Local No. S 125 to Ben Guerir, then S 503. (Chemala to El Kelaa Des Srarhna.)

** Local No. P 12 to 110 km., then P 9. (Safi-Marrakech.)

*** Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road.

Route # P 10 Mogador to Marrakech. Distance 176 km., 109 miles.
Local No. P 11 to Dar Harabida, then P 10. Bridges might require strengthening for constant use by very heavy traffic.

General itinerary.

This road runs nearly due east over easy country suitable for A.F.Vs without any steep gradients. Near Mogador there are dunes; then argan forest, which gives some cover from air observation without seriously impeding movement. Eastwards the country becomes more and more bare.

Petrol stations: at Ounara (25 km.), Et Tleta el Hanchene (38 km.), Sidi Moktar (76 km.), Chichaoua (102 km.), crossing of Oued Nfis (153 km.).

Water: At Ank Djemel, about 15 km. west of Chichaoua, there if reported to be a water tank filled by conduits from the hills.

From Mogador to Chichaoua. Distance 102 km., 63 miles.

Leaving Mogador south-eastwards along the beach, the road forks left 2 km. from Bab Marrakech and rises over dunes which should give good cover except from the air, then through a belt of argan woods to Dar Harabida (21 km.); the wooded region is sometimes described as a forest, but space between the trees allows movement and undergrowth does not constitute an obstacle.

For 4.5 km. from Dar Harabida the road follows the same route as the Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road; it then branches east and continues to rise over undulation bush-covered country. There are fewer argan trees, but at about 30 km. and 50 km. the road passes through belts of them some 2 km. wide.

In the stony country between Sidi Moktar and Chichaoua it crosses a pass (93 km.) between two flat-topped hills of the gara type. It then descends to the green valley of Oued Chichaoua, overlooked on the northwest by Djebel Tilda (1,500 ft.).

From Chichaoua to Marrakech. Distance: 74 km., 46 miles.

The road runs almost straight across the vast bare plain of Haouz, which is intersected by numerous irrigation channels. Entering Marrakech it passes south of the station and Djebel Guelis to Place du 7 Septembre.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; width easily two-way. Reported to be a first-class road which should carry vehicles of 20 tons. For a short time it should be able to take heavier traffic. There was a regular bus service in peace-time, advertised as taking 3-3-1/2 hours.

Bridges.

102 km.	Oued Chichaoua.	
122 km.	Oued Mellah	
153 km.	Oued Nfis.	Reinforced concrete, 5 or 6 spans. None of these streams are reported as being a serious obstacle.

Defiles.

None, except the woods mentioned in General itinerary above.

Observation points.

93 km. Flat-topped hills (1,600 ft.) at summit of pass should give good observation east and west.

Route # P 11 Mazagan to Mogador. Distance: 260 km. 160 miles.

General itinerary.

25 km. from Mogador the road bends northeast and runs in long straight stretches, between ridges of hills as far as Oued Tensift, then across a plain.

The whole country north of Mogador is suitable for A.F.V.s but there is no cover from air observation beyond that noted in the text below, and possible tank harbors in the orchards around Azemmour.

Petrol stations: between Mogador and Mazagan, at Sidi Tlaa (24 km.), Telmest (61 km.) Sebt Gzoula, Et Tleta de Sidi Embarek (126 km.), El Djema Sahim (144km.), Sidi Smaine (210 km.);

The road starts southeast from Mogador along the beach and at 1.5 km. from the Medina forks left and rises for some 2 km. through sand-dunes and then for about 12 km. through groves of stunted argan trees which should afford some cover for A.F.V.s and not seriously obstruct their movement, though their speed would be reduced.

At 9 km. a track branches north; after 7 km. it runs for about 12 km. parallel to, and within about 3 km. of the sea; several tracks branch seawards from this track, giving good observation of the coast and the dunes; tracks connecting with the main road run inland at points about 5 km. and 20 km. respectively distant from where this track branches north from the main road.

After the junctions with the inland road from Agadir (21 km.) and the Mogador-Marrakech road (P 11 and P 10) from Marrakech (25 km.) trees become fewer and there is little cover from air observation; the ground off the road is hilly, but quite suitable for A.F.V.s.

At about 44 km. the road approaches the long, rocky, bush-clad ridge of Djebel Hadid, which rises on the left to over 2,000 feet. Farther from the road, on the right, stretches another long ridge, covered with bush at its southern end.

The road, which has risen to 1,000 feet, then descends the wide scrub-covered valley of Oued el Aoudnat to cross Oued Tensift (71 km.), and rises steeply, crossing a narrow ridge. Henceforward it is straight, level, and fast; the country is less bare, and becomes very fertile. Near Sebt Gzoula (106 km.), where a short-cut to Safi forks northwest, there are a number of farms.

North of the road Safi-Marrakech (junction at Et Tleta de Sidi Embarek, 126 km.) and after passing under the railway, the road continues over the fertile, treeless plain in long straight stretches; its surface improves.

After Sidi Smaine (210 km.), where the road Marrakech-Mazagan comes in, the country is stony and less fertile, rising somewhat higher on the west side.

The road enters Mazagan (260 km.) from the south and leads to Place Lyautey, opposite the Post Office.

Construction.

Tarmac; four lanes of traffic (report of August 1941). A count in 1938 showed a daily traffic of over 3,000 tons at the entry into Casablanca.

Condition.

Greater part of road reported excellent, with hard shoulders.

Bridges.

T 1	61 km.	Oued Telmest.	Reinforced concrete, probably one-way. Stream difficult to ford; usually little water.
T 2	71 km.	Oued Tensift.	Reinforced concrete and masonry, 5 spans; probably two-way. River contains water all year, but it is only 3 feet deep in summer; difficult to ford; high banks.

Gradients and sharp turns.

71 km. North of Oued Tensift. Ascent with one dangerous bend: Gradient 1 in 9 or 10.

Observation point.

73 km. Hill (885 ft.), 2 km. northwest of Tensift crossing, should give good observation over the plain to northward.

Defiles.

68-73 km. Crossing of Oued Tensift and ascent.
260 km. Passage through Mazagan. Centre of town could be by-passed to south.

Seasonal variations.

71 km. Oued Tensift would become a serious obstacle after heavy rain (probably October or March).

Route # P 12 Safi to Marrakech. Distance: 111 km., 69 miles to junction with P 9; total 153 km., 95 miles.

General itinerary.

The road runs southeast almost straight for 110 km., for the first 40 km. across the Abda plain, after which it mounts to the desert-like Ahmar plateau; at 110 km., on the northern slope of the Djebilet hills, it joins P 9 from Mazagan.

The country is suitable for A.F.V.s; there is no cover from air observation until the Marrakech palm-groves are reached.

From Safi to Sidi Ahmed Tiji. Distance: 41 km., 25½ miles.

The road leaves Safi by Avenue Moulay Youssef and rises gradually over the country which is sandy at first but stony farther inland, and later becomes fertile. At Et Tleta de Sidi Mabarek, where the Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road is crossed, there is a remount depot.

From Sidi Ahmed Tiji to junction with P 9.

The road enters a gorge and rises for 9 km. to a pass; giving a wide view of the Ahmar plateau in front. It then descends and at 67 km. passes north of Lac Zima, a salt lake extending about 4,000 by 1,500 yards, which never entirely dries up.

From Chemaia (68 km.), whence S 125 connects with the railway at Louis Gentil, the road runs very straight across the plain, till it rises up the northern slope of the Djebilet hills, a ridge with a number of bare conical peaks which forms an important tactical feature. After passing north of one of these summits (2,400 ft.) it joins with P 9.

From junction with P 9 to Marrakech. Distance: 42 km., 26 miles.

The road descends into the Haouz plain and crosses Oued Tensift (145 km.) before traversing the western fringe of the Marrakech palm-groves a few km. north of the town. Local P 7 from Casablanca comes in 2.5 km. from Place du 7 September.

Construction.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; two-way.

Condition.

Good; buses in peace-time were advertised to take 3 hours.

Bridges.

None of importance before junction with P 9.

T 1 145 km. Oued Tensift. Masonry and reinforced concrete, 5 spans, two-way. River is sluggish, not more than waist-deep. P 7 and the railway cross the river, 6 km. and 3 km. respectively upstream.

Gradients and sharp turns.

Gradients easy; sharp turns reported at 127 km. on south slope of Djebilet hills.

Defile.

42-50 km. The so-called gorge of Sidi Ahmed Tiji may constitute a defile: information is lacking.

Observation point.

There should be good observation east and west from the head of the pass, about 50 km., and north and south from the slopes of the Djebilet hills.

Route # P 13 Ber Rechid to Kasba Tadla. Distance: 157 km., 97 miles.

General itinerary.

The road forks southeast from P 7 one km. south of Ber Rechid and 43 km. from Casablanca. For the first 22 km. it traverses a fertile plain gradually rising to 1,000 feet. Hills then begin and the road rises

to a plateau which remains fertile for about 10 km. beyond Ben Ahmed (2 km. south of the road at 39 km., height 2,000 feet), a junction of minor roads and tracks. Cultivation then comes to an end, and the road traverses a dry stony plain, about 2,500 feet above sea-level. The wooded Zaer hills are seen to the northeast.

Kourigha, which lies 2 km. south of the road at 78 km., is the industrial centre of a phosphates-mining district. Fifteen km. farther the highest point of the plateau (2,800 feet) is reached. Oued Zem (111 km.), railhead and the point of junction with Local No. P 22 lies at the foot of a slope; it is well supplied with water and fig-trees, and is the centre of a district now being developed for its stock-raising and agricultural possibilities, as well as for its phosphates mines; it is also a remount depot. To the northeast rise the wooded heights of the Zaian region.

After Oued Zem the road slopes down over bare, rolling country past Boujad (132 km.), a village with religious associations situated among gardens to the important military post of Kasba Tadla (157 km., height 1,640 ft.), on the right bank of the Oued Oum er Rbia. The stony ground gives place to good pasture-land.

One km. before Kasba Tadla is reached there is a choice of routes: the right fork, keeping west of the town and commanding Kasba, crosses the river by the old "Portuguese" bridge, and joins Local P 24 about one km. on the farther side; the left fork runs north and east of the old town crosses the river farther upstream by a modern bridge and joins Local P 24 after one km., close to the conspicuous monument.

The country through which this road passes is suitable for A.F.V.s; there is no cover from air observation, but occasional small plantations along the road and at the village might harbor a few tanks.

Petrol station: At Venetville (54 km.).

Construction.

"Route Principale." Tarmac; two-way; reported as used for heavy phosphates traffic.

Condition.

Buses in peace-time took 4 hours from Casablanca to Kasba Tadla.

Bridges.

Between Boujad and Kasba Tadla the road crosses three streams flowing in deep ravines: Oued Takhasr iat (135.5 km.), Oued Sriou (146 km.), Oued Kaikat (154 km.). No details of the bridges are available.

The following information has been received about the bridges over Oued Oum er Rbia at Kasba Tadla:

T 1. "Portuguese" bridge; stone, 150 metres (492 ft.) long, with 10 arches of unequal spans; reported as very solid; width not known.

The river at this point is 30-40 metres wide, with a swift current. Volume in July is 12 cubic metres per second, in flood up to 580 cubic metres per second. The normal winter level is 3 metres above the summer level; floods may cause an additional rise of 5 metres.

T 2. New bridge: reinforced concrete, bowstring type, 66.8 metres (219 feet) long; double traffic; completed in 1938.

Observation point.

109 km. Dechra des Beni Smir, close to the marabout of Sidi Abd el Azziz on a spur south of the road, gives good observation over the basin in which Oued Zem lies.

Seasonal variations.

For variations in current of Oued Oum er Rbia, see Bridges, above.

Route P 14 Rabat to Meknes. Distance 139 km., 86 miles.

Leave Rabat on the east and the road runs between salt marshes, crosses Oued bou Regreg and immediately forks right. It then passes under a railway bridge, leaves S 204 on the right, crosses a branch railway by a level crossing, and ascends through a ravine to a plateau, where it joins the road Sale-Meknes and turns right.

At Mamora (11 km.) it enters the forest of Mamora (cork-oaks), through which it continues until 40 km. The soil is sandy and there is little undergrowth. Several tracks, some 30-40 feet wide, unmetalled, have been cut through the forest, and movement is probably possible off them in most places. There are native encampments in the clearings; at Monod (30 km.) tar is extracted.

After leaving the forest the road mounts gradually through dwarf palms and cultivated land to Tiflet (55 km.) and on to the tribal centre of Khemisset (81 km.) (height 1,450 ft.); at both these places there are remount depots.

The ground now becomes more broken; the road winds down to Oued Beth (101 km.) and rises beyond by zigzags up scrub-covered slopes to the fertile plateau on which Meknes stands.

On reaching Meknes (139 km. 86 miles) the direct road enters by Bab Berrima and passes through the old city and over Oued bou Fekrane to Avenue Lyautey, but fast traffic usually takes the northern by-pass which skirts the walls and municipal gardens and rejoins after 4 km. on the right bank of the stream.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale". Tarmac; width nowhere less than 6 metres and in parts much wider. The road was being widened and reconditioned in 1938-9. One of the most frequented roads in Morocco, regularly used by bus traffic, which is advertised to cover the distance in 3-1/2 hours; known to carry petrol lorries with a load of 20 tons.

Bridges. (All fit for heavy traffic.)

T 1 2 km. Oued bou Regreg.

T 2 101 km. Oued Beth. Masonry, total length 88.27 metres (290 ft.) including one span of 42.6 metres (140 ft.) and two hollowed abutments. Arch is constituted by two girders each 1.85 metres wide. Width of roadway is 5.6 metres (18 ft. 4 in) between footways. When the bridge was built the roadway was divided by a central pavement one metre wide into two tracks each 2.3 metres (7 ft. 6 in.) wide. It is to be supposed, but it is not known, that the central pavement hasnow been removed.

Gradients and sharp turns.

Gradients in general are easy.

The following sharp turns are noted:

56 km. Crossing valley of Oued Tiflet.

101 km. Slope on both sides of Oued Beth.

Defiles.

From Rabat to 4 km.: marshes, bridges, and ravine.

From 11 km. to 40 km.: forest of Mamora.

No others except river crossings mentioned in Bridges, above.

Route P 15-16 Fes-Oujda-Algerian Frontier.

Local No. P 15 to Taza, P 16 Taza to Oujda, P 17 Oujda to Algerian frontier.

Distance: 360 km., 224 miles.

General itinerary.

This road follows the historic route of invasion and is of great strategic importance, being the only metalled road in French territory connecting western Morocco with Algeria. Its key point is Taza, which commands the gap between the Rif and Atlas ranges. The road winds a good deal between Fez and Taza, and frequently crosses the standard-gauge railway, which follows the same course; but there are no level crossings and good speeds are possible.

A.F.V.s could probably operate off the road everywhere except a few km. each side of Sidi Abdallah (86 km.) and in the passes west and east of Taza. There should be cover from air observation in the olive-groves of the Fes region and on the wooded slopes of the upper Inaouene valley, but once the watershed is crossed vegetation begins to disappear.

The country north of the road was the scene of operations against the Rif tribesmen in 1925-6.

Petrol stations: at Tabouda (36 km.), Bir Tentane (41 km.) Matmata, (67 km.), Chbabat (71 km.), Sidi Abdallah, Souk el Djema, Msoun (150 km.), Guercif, El Agreb (214 km.), Taourirt, El Aioun, Naima (314 km.).

From Fes to Taza. Distance: 122 km., 76 miles.

Starting from the European town, the road passes south of Fes el Bali, crossing and recrossing Oued ez Zitoun on its descent. Beyond the Moslem cemetery of Bab Ftouh the road forks right; it then descends olive-clad slopes into the valley of Oued Sebou, and after crossing Oued Sidi Harazem (13 km.) and Oued Sebou itself (17 km); climbs to the plateau of Ain Sbit; near Bir Tentane (41 km.) it swings northward, to descend gradually into the fertile valley of Oued Inaouene.

Near Sidi Abdallah (86 km.) the valley narrows and the road winds round a rocky spur, crossing first Oued Zireg and then Oued Inaouene. At about 95 km. it starts to climb to the Col de Tounhar (105 km, height 2,230 feet), while the river describes a loop to the south in a deep wooded gorge. After a steep descent and several river crossings the road reaches Taza station (122 km., height 1,410 feet), at the foot of the spur on the successive terraces of which the European, military, and native quarters of the town of Taza are built, the native citadel rising to over 1,900 feet.

From Taza to the Algerian Frontier. Distance: 238 km; 148 miles.

Nineteen km. from Taza station, after crossing several small oueds, the road reaches the summit of the Col de Redjam Zaza (141 km., height 1,800 ft.), the watershed between the basins of Oueds Sebou and Moulouya. The soil on the west side is clay and covered with scrub and dwarf palms; on the east the scenery changes completely, the soil becoming much less fertile and the valley of the Moulouya merging into a steppe-like plain, bare in summer but covered with thin grass after the rains.

Crossing the railway at 179 km., the road follows the left bank of Oued Melloulou to Guercif (188 km., height 1,200 feet), an important route-centre in an agricultural district near the confluence of the Melloulou with the Moulouya, which below this point constitutes a serious obstacle. At 191 km. road and railway both cross the Moulouya and then run side by side across an uncultivated plain furrowed by its tributaries.

Approaching Taourirt (239 km., height 1,200 feet) the road bends away from the Moulouya towards the foothills from which issues Oued Za. The village stands on the left bank at the foot of a rocky hill rising to 1,400 feet. The road then bears north and soon afterwards east, crossing numerous watercourses as it rises out of the Moulouya valley; at several points dry weather tracks run north-west to the river and connect with the Spanish Zone.

From El Aioun (288 km., height 1,980 feet) where there are springs and orchards, the road continues in long straight stretches across a plain bearing little vegetation until about 15 km. from Oujda (346 km.), the chief town of eastern Morocco and an important route-centre.

Passing through the town, the road continues north-east across the Angad plain for 14 km. to the Algerian frontier.

Construction and condition.

"Route Principale." Tarmac; width nowhere (except for some of the bridges) less than 6 metres and in parts much wider. The section Taza-Oujda was being widened and reconditioned in 1938-9. In 1938 the road is reported to have carried a daily traffic of 385 tons; it is known to have taken petrol lorries with a load of 20 tons. Regular bus services were advertised as covering the journey from Fes to Oujda in 6 hours.

Bridges.

Bridges are numerous, since the route is along valleys intersected by tributary watercourses and runs close to the railway, over which it frequently crosses by reinforced concrete bridges (there are no level crossings). The only stream east of the watershed, however, which is an obstacle at all seasons, is the Moulouya, and few of the bridges are such that their destruction would seriously delay the movement of troops. All are reported as capable of taking heavy military loads.

The following are those about which information is available:

T 1 13 km. Oued Sidi Harazem — Masonry and reinforced concrete, total length 16.6 metres (54 ft. 5 in); single arch of 13.8 metres (45 ft. 3 in.)

Observation points.

105 km. Col de Touahar; distant view all round.
122 km. Citadel of Taza, 4 km. south of road, gives good view of the approaches to the town.
155 km. Tamnaseft, 5 km. east of Msoun, is the site of a "poste d'observation."
239 km. A rocky- eminence above the camp at Taourirt gives a wide view in all direction.

Between El Aioun (288 km.) and 337 km. several hills rise close to the road to heights of 2,500 feet and over, which should give good observation over the flat country.

Seasonal variations.

The numerous water courses draining into Oued Moulouya are usually dry, but might prove serious obstacles between November and April. The current of Oued Moulouya itself is also affected.

Route # P 22 Rabat-Oued Zem-Fkih Ben Salah. Distance: 223 km., 138 miles.

General itinerary.

The road runs south over easy wooded country for some 30 km.; it then bears east and crosses the gorges of Oued Korifla. Soon after N'kheila (49 km.) it bears south again over a plateau from which it descends to Marchand (82 km.). Beyond Marchand it rises to cross a much larger and higher plateau to Oued Zem, passing wooded hilly country on both sides. At Oued Zem (173 km.) it crosses the road from Casablanca to Kasba Tadla (P 13) and continues south towards Oued Oum er Rbia and the road from Marrakech to Kasba Tadla. There is a good bridge across this river at Sidi Aissa, but, so far as is known, the road has not yet been metalled beyond Fkih ben Salah (223 km. from Rabat, 17 km. from Sidi Aissa, and about 30 km. from Road P 24, which it is intended to join 73 km. from Kasba Tadla).

The country is suitable for A.F.V.s except in the Korifla valley; there should be cover from air observation in the woods fringing sections of the route.

Petrol station: at Ain el Aouda (27 km.)

From Rabat to Marchand. Distance: 82 km., 51 miles.

The road leaves Rabat by Bab Zaer south of the Residence and runs due south, with the aerodrome on its right, rising gradually to cross a small plateau. At 7.5 km. a track forks left to stone quarries 6.5 km. distant. From 8 to 21 km. the road skirts cork-woods, with a deep ravine on its left. Ain el Aouda (27 km.) is a small colonization centre.

At about 32 km. the road starts to descend into the wooded gorges of Oued Korifla, passing, between 38 and 39 km., the junction with Road S 218 which connects southward with Local No. S 106; after crossing the valley P 22 winds up to N'kheila (49 km.), and again skirts woods. From 55 km. it runs south across a fertile plateau; 6 km. from Marchand, immediately after the junction with S 106 it starts to descend some 350 feet into the valley in which lies Marchand (Romani) the centre of the Zaer County.

T 2	17 km.	Oued Sebou.	Mesdoura bridge. Masonry and reinforced concrete; Total length 120,8 metres (396 ft); 3 spans; central arch 35 metres long, flank arches 30 metres; each arch is constructed of three rings 1.6 metres wide with intervals 1.1 metres wide; roadway 5.2 metres (17 ft.) wide, between footways 0.95 metres wide, is supported on slabs of reinforced concrete. The work is founded on a stratum of very hard clay found at an average depth of 3.5 metres (11 ft. 6 in.) below the river-bed.
T 3	86 km.	Oued Inaouene.	At Sidi Abdallah. Reinforced concrete girder bridge on piles; total length 101 metres (331 ft. 4 in.); 3 spans: central 37.95 metres (124 ft. 6 in.) flanks each 30,65 metres (100 ft. 6 in.); abutments and parapets. Roadway 6 metres (19 ft. 8 in.) wide.

Several bridges over Oueds Inaouene and el Hadar are reported, including:

T 4	112 km.	)	Girder bridges; T 5 is reported to be 61 metres (200 ft.)
T 5	113 km.	)	long, one-way and dangerous; no further details.
T 6	191 km.	Oued Moulouya	Reinforced concrete girder bridge of at least 5 spans; total length reported as 133 metres (436 ft. 4 in). Railway bridge runs alongside. The river is reported to be normally some 160 ft. wide, flowing in a bed of three times the width.
T 7	198 km.	Oued Cefla.	Single span; apparently masonry and reinforced concrete. Railway bridge close downstream.
T 8	210 km.	Oued Telagh.	A large bridge is reported here.
T 9	240 km.	Oued Za.	Bridge 135 metres (443 ft.) long.

Bridges over the railway in the section east of Taza are reported at 178 km., 231 km., 339 km., and 349 km.

The road is reported to cross Oued el Abid (218 km.) by a "cassis."

Gradients.

No difficult gradients are reported, but steep slopes are reported on the western side of the Col de Touahar, about 100 km.

Sharp turns.

17 km.	Hairpin bends on ascent from crossing of Oued Sebou.
98-108 km.	Dangerous turns are reported.

Defiles.

82-8 km.	The road in this section crosses the railway and rivers and winds through rocky country. From Sidi Abdallah, the Taza-Sidi Abdallah route (Local No. S 311) offers a diversion to Taza.
98-108 km.	Col de Touahar.
239 km.	In the neighborhood of Tacurirt the road is overlooked by hills, and special precautions might be advisable.

From Marchand to Oued Zem. Distance: 91 km., 56 miles.

The road rises steeply and crosses a rolling plateau sloping up to wooded hills on the east. After passing the former military post of Christian (111 km.), it continues to rise between wooded hills which reach 3,000 feet. Later it descends to Oued Zem (173 km.), the terminus of the railway from Casablanca.

From Oued Zem to Fkih ben Salah. Distance: 50 km., 31 miles.

The road runs due south for 30 km. and then turns southwest, descending all the way; the country becomes flat and bare and mirage is common.

South of Fkih ben Salah the road is in process of construction in the direction of the new bridge at Sidi Aissa, due south. A track runs southwest for 35 km. to an older bridge at or near Dar Ould Zidouh. Both villages are on the left bank and are connected by tracks with P 24.

Construction.

"Route Principale," under construction. Tarmac as far as Christian, after which for some 25 km. it was (1937) waterbound macadam. In 1938, 44 km. (presumably including the section south of Fkih ben Salah) had earth surface only. Width two-way. This road does not carry much commertial traffic; the section Marchan-Christian is described as a tourist road.

Condition.

Reports differ; up-to-date information is required.

Bridges.

T1 44 km. Oued Korifla. Reinforced concrete, 6 spans on a curve high above the bed of the stream, shown as dry in different photographs; two-way.

T2 About 240 km. Oued Oum er Rbia. At Sidi Aissa. Reinforced concrete, bowstring type, single 220 foot span, with rise of 36 ft. 7 in. Roadway 19 ft. 8 in. wide between footpaths each 2 ft. 4 in. wide. Deck slab is 6½ inches thick; carried on 3 longitudial girders and a system of transverse beams spaced at 16 ft. 10 in. centres. Abutments of mass concrete founded on compact tuff. Tested with two 21-ton trucks and one 10-ton roller as movable loads. Erected in 1936.

There is another bridge at Dar Ould Zidouh, 22 km. downstream; if, as seems likely, this is the so-called Termast bridge, the following details are available: reinforced concrete, overall length 74.7 metres (245 ft.) including arch over river with span of 36 metres (118 ft.); width 4.1 metres (13 ft. 5 in.), comprising roadway 2.6 metres (8 ft. 6 in.) wide, between footways. Erected in 1929.

Gradients and sharp turns.

32-46 km. Korifla ravine: steep descent and ascent and numerous turns, some of which are reported to be unprotected.

76-86 km. Sharp turns on descent to Marchand and steep ascent.

Defiles.

8-21 km. Woods on right, ravine on left; could be avoided by using road running south from Agadir-Casablanca-Rabat-Tangier road at Temara station via Sidi Yahia des Zaer to Ain el Aouda.

32-46 km. Korifla ravine; side road (S 218) might be used.

76-86 km. Crossing of glen in which Marchand lies.

Observation points.

Viewpoints reported numerous in region Marchand-Christian.

Seasonal variations.

The portion of the road with earth surface south of Oued Zem would be slippery after rain.

Route # P 24 Marrakech-Azrou-Fes. (Crosses P 21 at Azrou, leading to Meknes) Distance: 403 km., 250 miles to Azrou, 494 km., 307 miles to Fes.

General itinerary.

This strategic road, which skirts the northern slopes of the Atlas, provides an alternative line of communication, not exposed to attack from the sea, between southern and central Morocco. For the first 100 km. it crosses the dry plain of the Haouz; it then approaches the Atlas and crosses the foothill region known as the Dir, of which Beni Mellal is one of the centres; from the important route-centre of Kasba Tadla it mounts the valley of Oued Oum er Rbia to beyond Khenifra; it then climbs through hilly and sometimes wooded country to Azrou, where it crosses local P 21 leading to Meknes. It is not certain that the continuation direct to Fes via Immouzer has been completed; the route lies over high wooded ground which may be obstructed by snow in winter.

The road is much inferior to the normal route from Marrakech to Fes via Casablanca and Rabat, and there are two sections which may still have only an earth surface.

A.F.V.s can operate off the road everywhere except in the section Khenifra-Immouzer. There is little cover from air observation after the palm-groves of Marrakech except in this section, but olive-groves and orchards at some of the villages and towns should give cover to vehicles when halted.

Petrol stations: at Tamelelt el Djedid, El Kelaa des Srarhna, Mrirt (346 km.), besides the towns.

Water: Water-points in the Haouz region at Oued Rdat (34 km.), Oued Gaino (74 km.), at 114 km.

From Marrakech to El Kelaa des Srarhna. Distance: 85 km., 53 miles.

After leaving the palm forest the road traverses the dry plain, crossing a number of unimportant watercourses, and gradually rises in a northeasterly direction. After the olive-groves of Tamelelt el Djedid (55 km) it runs close to the eastern end of the Djebilet hills and bears north to descend to El Kelaa des Srarhna, a small native town with some gardens and orchards near.

From El Kelaa des Srarhna to Kasba Tadla. Distance: 140 km., 87 miles.

The road runs north-east for 15 km. and then turns east towards the Atlas foothills, traversing ground in places covered with scrub. At 125km. it winds down to cross Oued el Abid. Part of the next section, between Imdahane and Oulad Embarek, had as late as April 1940 only an earth surface, and buses sometimes preferred a diversion by a track to the north of the road passing through Dar Ould Zidouh. Other tracks branch left in this section to cross Oued Oum er Rbia by bridges at Dar Ould Zidouh and Sidi Aissa respectively. The Tamelelt El Djedid to Oulad Embarek (Pistes 87, 81,80) road provides a possible but difficult alternative through the hills to the south.

Beni Mellal (195 km., height 2,000 feet) is a well-watered little town, well supplied with olives and fruit-trees, which overlooks the plain from one of the hills of the fertile Dir region at the foot of the Atlas.

The road then bends away from the mountains and makes for Kasba Tadla (225 km.) but does not cross the river to the town; mirage effects are common on the road north of Oued Derna as one looks west or north-west.

From Kasba Tadla to Azrou. Distance: 178 km., 110 miles.

The road continues on the left bank through the Tadla sheep country; at 245 km. a road forks right and leads for 6 km. up to Ksiba (height 3,200 ft.)in the wooded hills to the south-east whence a mountain track connects with Itzer and Midelt.

At 288 km. the road passes the village of Ait SSHak (height 2,600 ft.) dominated by a hill with a broad flat top once occupied by a military post.

At 322 km. it passes Khenifra (height about 2,700 ft.), once an advanced post of the French, which lies on the right bank of Oued Oum er Rbia near the exits of the tracks across the gap between the Moyen and the Haut Atlas.

The Road continues up the left bank as far as El Bordj (322 km.) where it crosses. The valley is here narrow, and the road climbs northward through mountainous country in parts wooded. On the northern side of the watershed it crosses several streams draining into Oued Beth, and then rises to Azrou (403 km., height 3,900 ft), a fertile and well-watered station on the route from Meknes to Midelt and the south. Fast, heavy traffic for Fes normally proceeds via Meknes (Local P 21 and Rabat-Algerian Frontier (P 14, P4, P 5).

From Azrou to Fes. Distance: 91 km., 57 miles.

The direct route to Fes, only recently opened and probably not yet metalled throughout, climbs through cedar and oak forest to the summer resort of Ifrane (420 km., height about 5,400 ft.), situated in a large clearing. It then descends through rocky wooded country to Immouzer (455 km.) whence there is an easy run down of 39 km. due north to Fes. The road joins P 20 at its entry into the European town (Ville Nouvelle).

The section Azrou-Immouzer may be snow-bound between November and April.

Construction.

"Route Principale," but it is not certain whether the section Ifrane-Immouzer has been completed. Believed now tarmac to Ifrane, except for a stretch of earth road, slippery after rain and dusty in summer,

 between Imdahane and

Oulad Embarek; according to one report the section Kasba Tadla-Azrou was not tarred in 1940. Width two-way, except perhaps between Ifrane and Immouzer and at some bridges.

The detour by Meknes is tarmac and two-way throughout.

Condition.

Up-to-date information is required. Reported (April 1940) good for first 40 km., poor for next 15 km., fair Tamelelt el Djedid-El Kelaa des Srarhna. According to another report of 1939 or 1940, poor Imdahane-Oulad Embarek, good Oulad Embarek-Kasba Tadla-Azrou. Very good Azrou-Ifrane (April 1940).

No information available about the detour by Dar Ould Zidouh.

Bridges.

There are numerous unimportant bridges or culverts over small [illegible] oueds running north and west, and over irrigation canals.

The most important bridges are:

T 1.	16 km.	Oued Zat (or Hadjar)	Concrete, two-way. Always some water in river.
T 2.	102 km.	Oued Terraout (or Tessaout).	One-way; speed limit to 10km.p.h. (1938). It is unlikely that the destruction of this bridge would cause serious delay.
T 3.	126 km.	Oued ol Abid	At Imdahane. Reinforced concrete, single span of 45 metres (148 ft); two-way. Current is very strong.
T 4.	207 km.	Oued Derna	No information, Unlikely to be a serious obstacle.
T-5.	277 km.	Oued Ouaoumana	Reinforced concrete; overall length 64 metres (210 ft.); roadway supported by arch of 43 metres (141 ft) span over stream and by two piers on left bank; mass concrete abutments. Width of Roadway 6 metres (19 ft. 8 in). Constructed in 1931-2.
T 6.	306 km.	Oued Serrou	No information. Unlikely to be a serious obstacle.

At Khenifra there is an old stone bridge (single span) leading to the Medina; also a modern iron or steel bridge farther upstream leading to the camp.

T 7.	332 km.	Oued Oum er Rbia.	At El Bordj. Iron or steel girder bridge, one-way.
T 8.	371 km.	Oued Ifrane	Reinforced concrete roadway (3 spans each 16 metres (52 ft. 6 in) long resting on mass concrete piers and abutments. Width of roadway 6 metres (19 ft. 8 in.)

A paved ford or drain is reported at 38 km., and two "cassis" at Oulad Embarek, (146 km.)

Gradients and sharp turns.

126 km. Winding ascent for one km. from Oued el Abid.
340 km. Numerous sharp turns in neighborhood of Foum Teguett.

Defiles.

Bridges T 3 and T 7, above.
342-5 km. Foum Teguett valley.
403-55 km. The wooded district between Azrou and Immouzer.

Observation points.

195 km. Beni Mellal; wide view of Tadla plateau from point near Ain Assordoun, a spring above the town.
288 km. Tourguillal hill above Ait S'Hak gives observation over Tirral plain to northward.

Seasonal variations.

In the Haouz plain round Marrakech rain falls only in October and March (occasionally also in early November and early April), and then only on a few days, but the soil is clay, and the country off the roads may be rendered impassible for 3 days at a time.

The streams from the Haut Atlas are never altogether waterless, but the snow water has generally gone by June. Only the Oum er Rbia is a big river all the year.

The section of earth road after the crossing of Oued el Abid, if not yet metalled, is slippery after rain.

Snow may obstruct the section Azrou-Immouzer between November and April.

CONCLUSION

The Moroccan roadnet is dense, well maintained, and exceptionally suitable for military traffic. Only possible bottlenecks occur at River crossings where bridges, as a rule, are one-way; and the Taza pass which provides the main egress to Algeria. (See special survey.)

From a defensive point of view the roads provide ways of rapid reinforcement to endangered areas, and in event of successful beachheads, enemy mechanized progress could be retarded by destruction of key bridges, particularly on the coastal roads.

Immediate objective of an invasion force after landing must be the securing of the vital bridges and thereafter the important crossroads.

CONVERSION TABLE TO METRIC SYSTEM

LINEAR MEASURE

1 Myriameter....10,000 meters	
1 Kilometer..... 1,000 meters	.62 miles or 1,094 yds.
1 Hectometer.... 100 meters	328 feet
1 Decameter..... 10 meters	393 inches
1 Meter.....- - - -- - - -.....	39.37 inches or 1.094 yds
1 Decimeter.....1/10 of meter	3.93 inches
1 Centimeter....1/100 of meter.....	.393 inches
1 millimeter....1/1,000 meter.....	.0393 inches

WEIGHTS

One ounce equals.....	28,34 grams
One ton equals.....	1,016.04 kilograms
Two pounds 3 oz	1 kilogram

LIQUID MEASURE

U.S. Gallon equals.....	3.785 liters

METRIC EQUIVALENTS OF SOME COMMON UNITS

Inch	2.54 cm.
Foot	.3048 meter
Yard	.9144 meter
Mile	1.6093 km.
Sq Yd	.8361 sq meter

Description of route from Fez eastward through Cap Taza to the open country at Guercif.

General note on drainage. Two important streams flow westward, the Sebou and the Inaouene. The second stream flows from the gap and roughly parallels the eastward half of the approach to the divide. This stream carries a larger volume of water in its upper course than does the Sebou. This is largely because the neighborhood of the gap is better watered than most parts of the country, and because the rocks near the gap do not blow by the rainwater as much as the rocks do farther west and south. The Sebou on the other hand passes through limestone country which does not have normal drainage. The Sebou in its upper course has a fairly regular flow; the other stream has a variable flow and is subjected to heavy floods which may damage roads and bridges after a rain period. However, even the least variable stream has on occasion had very severe floods.

Starting from Fez. The road extends eastward through a valley three kilometers wide. The road follows the southside of the valley and just south of the road a hill rises about 400 feet. The hill is covered with orchard, probably olives. The Sebou river winds westward on the opposite side of the valley. Going eastward the road is almost straight and has only a very slight urrinage. The valley narrows until 16 kilometers east of Fez, the road crosses the river by a bridge at a point where the valley is only 1 kilometer wide. At this point the hills to the south rise 700 feet while the hills to the north rise somewhat more steeply to about the same height. From ridge to ridge there is 4 kilometers; however, only 1 kilometer of this distance is to the north of the road. 22 kilometers east of Fez the road makes a sharp hairpin turn and then winds up the hillside attaining an elevation of 600 additional feet in an airline distance of two km. The road attains this

elevation by four hairpin turns and the actual road distance is at least 3½ km. The road now proceeds across a rolling plateau, so far as can be determined no bridges are crossed by the road other than the bridge mentioned. An important exception to this statement: The road crosses the railroad 3 times possibly by bridge.

38 kilometers east of Fez, the road rises gently through a gap 1000 yards wide - To the north and south of the road are barren hills with elevations of about 400 feet above the road.

Bir Tamtam 41 kilometers from Fez, the road turns northward and continues across a gently rolling upland planted in cereals. 14 km. north of Bir Tamtam the road turns northwestward and descends for one kilometer then turns northeastward and follows the rolling edge of the Inaouene Valley. The elevation of the road is approximately 50 feet above the river although it attains slightly higher elevation between the small valleys tributary to the Insouene. The road apparently crosses the railroad 1 kilometer west of El Khemir. About 4 kilometers east of El Khemir a road turns northward and crosses the river by a bridge. 3000 yards to the north of this bridge, a hilltop 1400 feet above the valley would make an excellent observation point. East of the bridge, a road going southward departs from the main road 2 kilometers east of the bridge, the main road crosses over a saddle 250 feet above the valley level then descends to cross an intermittent stream. The main stream passes through a shallow divide north of the road. Eastward the Inaouene winds along the northern edge of a valley three to four km. wide while the road and railroad follow the southern edge of the valley at an elevation of 100 or more feet above the stream. 34 km. from Bir Tamtam a bridge crosses a small tributary of the Inaouene 40 km. from Bir Tamtam the road crosses under the railway. After passing through a defile less than one kilometer wide, 250 feet deep, 5 kilometers long.

45 km. from Bir Tamtam, the road and railroad cross the Insouene and then pass along the northern side of a corridor, 2 kilometers wide and 10 kilometers long. The winding river occupies the southern half of this corridor. At the eastern end of this corridor, the river turns southward through an impassable gorge while the road winds up 750 feet over a saddle and then winds up into another corridor 1 kilometer wide and ten kilometers long. The Insouene winds through this corridor and is crossed by girder bridges 69 and 70 kilometers from Bir Tamtam. At 75 km. the road crosses the River and then passes into a narrow defile about 1 quarter kilometer wide and 4 kilometers long. East of the defile the valley opens to 3 kilometers and makes room for Taza, the city for which the gap was named. Beyond the city the valley opens and the road extends in broad curves over rolling ground for about 10 km. The road then winds up over the divide through a shallow defile ½ km. wide with low cliffs 50-75 feet high to the south. The road then descends gently with wide curves to the valley of the Msoun River. Near the broad sandy plain of this river which is probably covered by water during the flood the road turns southeast when 3 kilometers farther on it proceeds eastward across broad plains drainage only by intermittent streams into the Moulouya reaching Guercif at the junction of the Melculou with the Moulouya.

TRANS-ATLAS ROADS

There is a road crossing the Middle Atlas Mountains to the high plateau region and the Algerian border. This constitutes the only other possible way of getting from Morocco to Algeria with the exception of the route throug the Taza Pass. This route must not be considered an alternate route should the Taza Pass route be destroyed as it is very mountainous and not constructed for heavy military traffic.

The road begins at Azrou in the foothills of the Middle Atlas Mountains. From there it ascends through a pass to Tiguelmamine thirty-nine miles south of Azrou at an altitude of nearly 7,000 feet. This section of the road is hard surface and in good state. Two miles past Tiguelmamine the road runs through the Zad Pass at an altitude of 7,145 feet and from there it begins its descent down the eastern slope of the Middle Atlas Mountains towards the valley which separates the High and Middle Atlas. The valley has somewhat the appearance of New Mexico with similar mesa-like formations and scrub brush.

Midelt is on the southern slope of the High Atlas. From Midelt the road takes a generally southeastern sweep and begins its ascent of the High Atlas. The ascent is accomplished on a road built by French military engineers between 1938 and 1931. It is well made and protected on the outer side by a retaining wall but there are many hairpin turns. The high point on this road is the Pass of Talrhemt at an altitude of 6758 feet. (A few miles before reaching this Pass a road branches off to the north and closely paralleling the Oued Moulouya runs north till it joins the main east-west road through the Taza Pass at Guercif).

The descent into the plain from this pass is very rapid but the road continues to be an excellent secondary one. The road continues on following the river bed of the Oued Ziz. It is frequently washed out by floods running down this river bed.

Sixty miles south of Midelt is a small village and outpost of Kerrando. Ten miles south of Kerrando along the same river bed the road reaches the small oasis of Tamnerache. Fourteen miles south of this town the road proceeds through some very difficult country consisting of small canyons, etc. On emerging into the open country the road becomes much better again and at ninety two miles south of Midelt is the important town of Ksar-es-Souk.

Here the road branches off to the west although there is a continuation to the south to the town of Irfoud some fifty miles south of Ksar-es-Souk on the north edge of the Sahara. This town is the northern terminus of an ancient caravan route to Tombouctou.

The branch to the westward of Ksar-es-Souk extends along a broad plain with barren brown stone cliffs to the north and a desolate desert stretchin south towards the Sahara. The road is a secondary one of dirt. Water is found in small quantities at various intervals along this route.

About forty miles southwest of Ksar-es-Souk the road passes through a few hills and arrives at the oasis of Goulmina. Two miles westward of Goulmina the road passes through some sand. Thirteen miles southwest of Goulmina very bad sand is encountered and a brief detour is necessary. Fourteen miles from Goulmina is the town of Tinjdad which is somewhat of an important communication center for the trails and tracks in this area.

Twenty four miles west of Tinjdad is the town of Tinerhir. Between the two settlements is a desolate desert. The road is traversed by water courses running from north to south from the foothills of the High Atlas. Speed is therefore impossible to motor vehicles.

Thirty-six miles southwest of Tinerhir is the oasis of Boumalne which lies in a bare plain. From Boulmane the road continues on to El Kella following the Valley of the Dades. From El Kella all the way to Immissine, a distance of ten miles, the road leads through a desert with mesa formations in the distance. The road then passes a formation of water sheds and winds in and out of broken barren hills almost all the way to Ouazzarzate, a distance of fifty-eight miles from El Kella, the desert being broken only very occasionally by an oasis.

Along this road eight miles beyond Immissine there is a short stretch of plain. Skoura is fifteen miles along the road from Immissine. From Skoura to Ouazzarzate the road is being reworked and there is a bad detour from six to eight miles past Skoura. From here the road lies over a very desolate waste plain all the way to Ouazzarzate the road continues up and down hill but follows an almost straight line west.

From Ouazzarzate there is a road crossing the High Atlas to Marrakech, Twenty-two miles north of Ouazzarzate this road begins an almost straight-away climb to the immediate foothills of the Atlas.

The southern slope of the mountains is terrifying in its hairpin turns, without any protection on the outer side of the road from a fall into the abyss below, thousands of feet. The road is first class. It eventually arrives at the Tichka Pass (altitude 7,380 feet), which it begins its descent to the coastal plain and the city of Marrakech. The descent is marred by a succession of hairpin curves following the mountain gorge thousands of feet below. The most abrupt part of this descent is from the Pass to the town of Taddert ten miles beyond. Thirty-four miles from the height of the pass the road leaves the mountains after sixty miles of almost continuous hairpin turns.

Twenty-six miles after leaving the mountains the road arrives at Marrakech after having passed through a richly fertile valley.

This great Trans-Atlas road is connected with the Agadir-Taroudant-Marrakech road by a branch leaving the road a few miles west of Ouzzarzate proceeding through the Atlas Mountains to the Sousse Valley where it connects with a forementioned route. Little is known of this route and it is not felt that it would be available for heavy traffic.

Repair and Refueling Facilities:

There are gasoline pumps at least every thirty miles along the roads and every hamlet, however small, has at least one pump. There being no gasoline in Morocco for civilian use it is probably that many of these pumps have shut down and have no doubt suffered some deterioration as a result.

Repairs are available at all the large towns but at present replacement parts are unavailable; so only repairs requiring no new parts can be made.

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