Cybersecurity via Signaling Games

Abstract

Problem: Cybersecurity. How can we establish trust, manage risk, and mitigate deceptive cyber attacks when our decision-making is constrained to partial information concerning unknowns vulnerabilities, system properties, and threats? Our approach: A fundamental model of humans actions and the safety properties they affect. Game-theoreticalmodel to simultaneously study human and system properties within a social technological systems: Deceptions are definable, allowing risk estimation and policy optimization. Mathematical (and virtual) means to create, explore and design a wide range of mechanisms, including agent based models, simulation, evolutionary games, and analytic calculation of equilibria.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 07, 2015
Accession Number
AD1118399

Entities

People

  • Bhubaneswar Mishra
  • Evan Wright
  • Jose Morales
  • Rhiannon Weaver
  • William Casey

Organizations

  • Carnegie Mellon University

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Asymmetry
  • Control Systems
  • Copyrights
  • Cyberattacks
  • Cybersecurity
  • Deception
  • Department Of Defense
  • Distributed Computing
  • Engineering
  • Game Theory
  • Guarantees
  • Materials
  • Risk Factors
  • Security
  • Simulations
  • Software Development
  • Systems Engineering
  • United States
  • Universities
  • Vulnerability

Fields of Study

  • Computer science

Readers

  • Adaptive Control and Estimation with Uncertainty in Dynamic Systems.
  • Cybersecurity.
  • Strategic Security Studies

Technology Areas

  • Cyber
  • Cyber - Cryptography