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<p>TASK FORCE GROUPINGS VS. FIXED STRENGTH UNITS</p> <p>Committee # 15 2nd. Command Class</p>

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Cover

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

2ND COMMAND CLASS

Analytical Studies Subcourse

TASK FORCE GROUPINGS VS FIXED STRENGTH UNITS

The Problem	Page 1 Paragraph 1
Definitions	" 1 " 2
Exclusions	" 1 " 3-4
Corollary Problems	" 1 " 5
Facts Bearing on the Problem	" 1-2 " 6-18
Conclusions	" 2 " 19-25
Recommendations	" 3 " 26-28

- ANNEX 1 - Organization of the committee
- ANNEX 2 - Concepts of the committee in making the study
- ANNEX 3 - Analysis of foreign formations
- ANNEX 4 - Poll of officers
- ANNEX 5 - The group vs the regiment
- ANNEX 6 - Air divisions of fixed size vs tactical air commands
- ANNEX 7 - Supplementary discussion
- ANNEX 8 - Bibliography

Submitted by Committee #15

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THE PROBLEM

1. The need for speedy action in combat, the advantages of a flexible unit of small size under greater control, the desirability of getting away from concentrations of troops in future wars, have created in the minds of some the idea that combat teams, properly reinforced, are more effective as combat units than the normal infantry division. The problem is, then, whether the present fixed strength division should be retained and broken up into task force groupings when necessary, or whether it would be better to organize as task force groupings at the outset, and eliminate fixed strength divisions.

DEFINITIONS

2. A task force grouping here considered is a tactically and administratively self-sufficient, balanced, basic, composite command unit of the size of a combat command, regimental combat team or composite brigade including all the elements of reconnaissance, assault, support, service, administration and control.

EXCLUSIONS

3. This study treats the problem in general as applied to all the possible theaters and methods of warfare. It does not include the detailed considerations that affect the composition of a balanced force for a particular task in a particular area, under any particular situation.

4. It does not include a consideration of the lowest level at which a force must be balanced as this can be solved better by experimentation.

COROLLARY PROBLEMS

5. Corollary problems, including those of the regiment vs the group, air divisions of fixed size vs tactical air commands, and analyses of foreign army formations have been studied and are found in ANNEXES 5, 6 and 3, respectively.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

6. The present divisions as now constituted are not tactically self-sufficient, as they require normal attachments of many units such as armor, artillery, AAA, and engineers.

7. The present division is organized along a line of homogeneous infantry regiments which require the improvisation in the establishment of regimental combat teams for successful combat operations.

8. The present division requires extensive road space, assembly areas and means of transportation.

9. The present divisions plus normal attachments have proven their soundness as a basic unit of combined arms tactically and administratively self-sufficient.

10. The division provides interested and helpful supervision of its subordinate units in training and in combat.

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11. The division provides essential control and coordination of artillery and other separate arms.
12. The division provides additional esprit de corps for its subordinate units based on its history and continuity of name.
13. Any flexible, balanced mass, needs some backbone or rigid base to tie into. The division provides this backbone for its subordinate commands.
14. The present division possesses the inherent flexibility in that it can adjust the composition of its subordinate commands to meet changing tactical situations.
15. For political reasons the nation will maintain many small scattered posts. Therefore a unit of task force size will be more practical than one of a larger divisional size.
16. Task force groupings will not readily lend themselves to centralized control of the separate arms.
17. Once the composition of the various task force groupings has been determined, based on particular tasks and situations and the task forces committed to action, the external flexibility for the readjustment of the composition of task forces is lacking to meet changing tactical situations.
18. Infantry and tanks were more successful in combat than infantry alone.

CONCLUSIONS

19. The present divisional organization with normal attachments is sufficiently flexible to meet needs of modern and future warfare.
20. The idea that the present fixed strength division is too large and inflexible is a misconception arising from the belief that it should be fought in combat like a smaller unit such as a regimental or battalion combat team. Actually, it must be regarded and developed as three combat teams, each of which can be made to meet the specifications desired of units for future wars. It further provides a pool of supporting arms plus the essential command and coordination for its three major subdivisions.
21. The basic composite units should be a brigade, and should include infantry, armor, engineers, reconnaissance, and a controlling headquarters.
22. This basic composite unit can become a self-sufficient task force grouping by the attachment from divisional units of artillery, AAA, engineers, supply, maintenance and medical units.
23. That the task force conception is inflexible rather than flexible.
24. That further flexibility and changes necessary due to changes in methods of warfare or as a result of technological advances can be made internally within the division by addition, substitution or elimination.
25. It is conceivable that a limited number of separate brigades tactically and administratively self-sufficient will be required for small scale operations, in order to prevent the breaking up of divisions already constituted and trained as a team.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

26. That the present fixed strength division be retained, provided that:
- a. In view of their size and composite nature combat commands and combat teams be redesignated as brigades and be commanded by brigadier generals. This would eliminate the regimental headquarters.
 - b. It is fully triangularized so that it may be broken up into three brigades. The light armored division provided with a third combat command headquarters is considered to approach the ideal.
 - c. Units normally attached to the division be made an integral part of the division. This would include armor, AAA, additional engineers and additional artillery.
 - d. That in training the division emphasis be placed on training each brigade to operate separately, always with the same attached units. This will include training of brigade commanders and staffs in the handling of composite units.
27. It is recommended that a limited number of separate brigades, tactically and administratively self-sufficient, be constituted and activated.
28. That further flexibility and changes necessary due to changes in methods of warfare, or as a result of technological advances, be made internally within the division by addition, substitution or elimination.

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ANNEX I

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE

Lt Col C. W. Wells, Inf
Committee Chairman and Secretary

Lt Col V. L. Boylan, Cav
Study and analyze the lessons of World War II in reference to the theory that combat teams and commands, properly reinforced, are more practical and effective as combat units than the normal division.
Make oral presentation.

Lt Col C. L. Elder, AC
Study and analyze the air division vs air command.
Refise bibliography.

Col P. A. Roy, CAC
Study and analyze British and other foreign formations, and the regiment vs the group.

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ANNEX 2

CONCEPTS OF THE COMMITTEE IN MAKING THE STUDY

1. The "offensive" is the goal that is borne in mind in making this study. Task force groupings such as combat commands and regimental combat teams are normally formed to take care of fluid situations arising from aggressive, offensive action, or action where decentralization of control of the separate arms becomes necessary.


2. The wars of the future will include vertical envelopments as real methods of attack. The idea that a battle is lost if a unit is surrounded by the enemy or if land supply and communications are cut off, will not hold in the future unless the air lanes themselves are cut off by enemy air power. Instead of battle lines such as the Siegfried Line, Gustav Line, or Gothic Line, one will find battle areas. Expanding airheads will actually be expanding battle areas thrust deeper and deeper into enemy territory as technological advances are made. These areas will be cells that gradually expand and merge together to cripple the enemy in the same manner a few disease germs attack a vital organ and cripple man.

3. The specifications for the units of the future are:


- a. Capable of speedy action.
- b. Flexible.
- c. Of small size to facilitate control.
- d. Capable of dispersion.
- e. Balanced mass including tactical self-sufficiency.
- f. Capable of being land, air, or waterborne.
- g. At least triangular.

4. Many of the battles in future wars will be fought by the aggressor from interior lines as will develop at the outset from airheads and beachheads. As a result, the units must be at least triangular with additional provision for a central core.

Beachhead



Airhead



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ANNEX 3

ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN FORMATIONS

In making this study, the organization of the following foreign armies were considered:

1. BRITISH: British divisions vs Independent Brigade Groupings.

ANALYSIS: Little difference exists between the British division with its brigades and the U. S. division with its regiments. The British form brigade groupings in the same manner U.S. divisions form combat teams and combat commands. For small, special operations, a few independent brigade groupings are formed. This is the exception rather than the rule. The British appear to be of the same opinion as this committee on this subject.

2. GERMAN: German Divisions.
Einheit theory, or the interchangeability of component parts.

ANALYSIS: The Germans, in their desire to conserve manpower and materiel, formed their divisions to be tactically and administratively self-sufficient from the lowest echelon on up to fit particular situations and locations. They would not permit unnecessary elements to be retained in any unit, and would strive to estimate or anticipate exactly what they would need to have a balanced force. Their divisions were all different. They were composed of various combinations of task forces made up of standard einheit cells. Under the einheit theory, every opportunity is taken to standardize their elements at all echelons to make them interchangeable. This is similar to our cellular T/O's and E's. Combining this with standardization of training, the Germans were able to form effective battle groups even after their units were badly shot up. The German army man was FIRST a soldier, and SECONDLY a specialist.

3. RUSSIAN: Soviet Ground Formations.

ANALYSIS: For conservation of manpower and materiel, the Russians use temporary tactical and administrative groupings to fit every different situation. These groupings are changed for every change in situation, consequently requiring an immense amount of detailed planning in the higher echelons. These groupings are not cellular like the Germans'. The Russians merely take what they believe they need out of the units of the separate arms and services and form their groupings for the particular situation. These temporary formations mark the extreme in variations of task force groupings. When the situation is not properly estimated, the grouping is unbalanced. These constant regroupings preclude advantages of close personal contact between commanders.

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4. JAPANESE: Task Forces.

ANALYSIS: The Japanese went whole-hog in forming task forces of various sizes composed of varying air, ground, and naval elements. This system led to a decentralization of control of the separate arms with a consequent inability to acquire the effective massing of their particular arms where indicated.


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ANNEX 4

POLL OF OFFICERS ON THE QUESTION OF FIXED STRENGTH DIVISIONS VS TASK FORCE GROUPINGS

To obtain the views of the cross section of officers with combat experience represented by the students of the Second Command Class and officers on the Faculty on the question of the practicability of replacing fixed-strength units with task force groupings, here defined as a tactically and administratively self-sufficient, balanced, basic, composite, combat unit of the size of a combat command, combat team or brigade, a poll was taken, the following question being asked of each officer:

"Do you favor elimination of the present fixed-strength division and substitution therefor of task force groupings as defined above that would operate under a new type division headquarters for (1) tactical coordination, and (2) centralized control of the separate arms in stabilized situations? Please answer Yes or No and list the advantages or disadvantages of one type unit over the other."

Of the forty officers polled, thirty-six or 90% answered "No" and four or 10% answered "Yes". In general the advantages cited for the fixed-strength division are: (1) its ability to form balanced combat teams within itself when additional units are attached and (2) the desirability of a stable central authority to better control the action of the tactical unit, and (3) development of greater morale and esprit de corps. Reasons advanced by the minority include: (1) better suited to airborne operations, (2) better equipped for attack which is a requisite to win. The following tabulation gives the opinion of several officers which are representative of the group followed by his name and combat assignment:

No. There appears to be little reason why balanced teams cannot be made organic within the division by the addition to the T/O & E of necessary tanks, AAA and other supporting arms. These teams should be fully organized and trained together, in fact more training as combat teams is indicated than separate unit training. The great disadvantage of a combination of separate groups is that the commanders do not have the intimate knowledge of and confidence in each other that comes only from combat as part of the same team. Esprit de corps is notably lacking in corps units as compared to division units, because their association is more transitory. Shifting of administrative problems to lower levels is not economical and unduly burdens personnel whose primary duty should be combat. That it is practicable to have balanced teams in a fixed-strength division is demonstrated by the armored division.

Lt. Col. G. F. Rogers
C.O. Separate Tank Battalion
C.O. Armored Group

No. The present fixed strength division provides a sound organization administratively and tactically from which task force groupings can readily be formed for fluid situations. The RCT is ideal for the task force principle. It can be built up to size needed by adding tanks, tank destroyers and AAA. In fixed divisions the commander knows the capabilities and limitations or shortcomings of his units and commanders. Commanders and staffs learn personalities they are working with. Teamwork and confidence between divisional units (RCTs) and between divisional units and those attached units normally supporting the division is gained after the first fight they have together. This would be lost where units were continually changing. Also there would be a loss of esprit de corps. Strange units working together make for poorer communications in that each higher headquarters has different SOPs and characteristics of operation peculiar to that headquarters. Normally a division type headquarters is established to fight three regiments and to fight four or five RCTs makes for loss of efficiency.

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It is not recommended that such a headquarters fight more units. Division held administration of lower units together. I believe it would fall apart if division headquarters was tactical only.

Lt. Col. H. E. Hassenfelt
G-3, 30th Infantry Division

No. I concur in the comments of Lt. Col. Rogers and Lt. Col. Hassenfelt. One of the major problems of the war was the administration of the "roving" separate unit. It is believed that a task force system would magnify this problem. The importance of esprit de corps that can only be built up within a fixed unit wearing the same shoulder patch or insignia is something that we cannot afford to lose sight of in this discussion. It is very desirable that unit commanders know each other well; it leads to better teamwork which is vital to success in combat. Individual leaders have individual characteristics which the higher commander must know and understand to fight his command well. A situation calling for aggressive leadership can best be met by the commander who is able to select an aggressively-led unit to assign to the mission. Likewise, the commander can assign the steady, thorough and detail-minded leader to execute a mission calling for such leadership. Personalities play a big part in combat. The task force setup would submerge this important factor.

Lt. Col. J. F. Ruggles
Battalion Commander
Regimental Executive
Regimental Commander
all of 22nd Inf, 4th Inf Div

No. Advantages of a fixed-strength division:

- a. Administrative control easier.
- b. Training easier. (Fixed chain of command and same commanders.)
- c. Intimate contact of commander and subordinates.
- d. Can be readily made into task forces for special missions. (If troops normally attached were made an integral part of the division this would be further simplified.)
- e. Saving of troops as many type units needed for special task forces need only be attached from corps or army troops as needed.
- f. Regimental combat teams already ready-made as a nucleus for a task force.

Disadvantages resulting when a task force is needed.

- a. Staffs and commanders must be improved; sometimes this is poorly done.
- b. Prior planning for task force operations cannot be as adequately done as no permanent personnel for this.
- c. Communications more difficult.

Lt. Col. A. J. Maroun
Battalion Commander
378th Inf, 95th Division

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No. I operated as a task force from Normandy, St. Lo, Vise, Falaise Gap, Paris, Meuse, Monchau, the Rhine, Leipzig and Pilsen.

- a. The organization of the new division is sound; from it can be organized three combat teams of equal balanced strength.
- b. When combat teams are formed in a division centralized control and massed artillery fire are forfeited until combat teams revert to divisional control on meeting heavy resistance.
- c. Regaining control by division is simple and easy.
- d. Several combinations of combat teams can be found to meet the enemy situation. The terrain and the many other conditions encountered on the battlefield.
- e. As long as the division is in combat team formation of any kind the strongest weapon we had, the mobility of our artillery fire, it's massing, etc. is lost.
- f. Task forces must vary constantly in attachments and strength. There could not be a suitable standard task force.
- g. A fixed standard task force would be wasteful of men and equipment.
- h. They would have to be given an organic supply system.
- i. It's easier to attach units (i.e., company of tanks, engineers, tank destroyers, battalion artillery, etc.) and have them do a good job than it would be to bring them together as small unit and consolidate them into divisions to execute a main mission.

Col. C. A. Dolph, III
102nd Cavalry Group (Task Force)

Yes. Advantages and disadvantages:

a. General: The chief advantages of the Task Force Groupings are self-sufficiency in practically all situations, mobility (ability to move quickly and on short notice with little loss of effectiveness), teamwork (gained both in training together as a team and in combat), and suitability for future warfare, which should be still more fluid than the last (more destructive weapons, improved airbourne equipment and technique, greater mobility). The chief disadvantages are reduced economy of military manpower and equipment, reduced flexibility in shifting and concentrating the power of supporting arms behind broad fronts, and shifting of administrative worries closer to the front.

The chief advantages of the Fixed Strength Division are economy, and flexible employment, on broad fronts, of military manpower and equipment, placing the administrative burden as far to the rear as practicable, greater suitability in stable situations, and fact Fixed Strength Division is familiar to all, and its capabilities known from recent combat.

b. Actual Experience: In the fighting in Burma and Western China (Salween), task force groupings were necessitated by the difficult and compartmented terrain in both the jungle and mountain areas. Task forces were usually out of touch with each other and could not be reenforced rapidly by divisions or corps due to difficult communications. The advantage went to the side which was always ready to exploit at once all favorable situations. While the fixed strength division was the basic organization it seldom retained centralized control and did little more than administer, and provide for tactical coordination. Supply was usually by air-drop to the regiment or, when feasible, was air landed in the division area, and picked up by pack-animal by the regiments.

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c. Detailed Examination:

Some principles of Org.

Unity: one comdr to direct operations

Task Force Grouping

Better in fluid sits, which are the pay-off

Fixed Str. Div.

Better in stable sits, which don't win wars.

Simplicity: limited number of comdrs in chain of comd.

The Task Force comdr is in control of elements necessary to exploit rapidly.

Simple in defense, but must form combat teams each time situation arises not defensive.

Unity of Action: similar or related functions under one command

Already has related functions under one command, grouped in the direction of the enemy. Better for offense.

Has related functions under one command in a direction parallel to the enemy. Better for defense.

Self-sufficiency: each org. has all units necessary

Conforms with this

Not necessarily conforming. Fixed str. may be too much or too little for task, and may be improperly distributed at critical time.

Flexibility: Can change groupings readily.

Can readily give up units to Div in stable sit.

Cannot always rapidly form combat teams when sit. becomes fluid.

Mobility: Move quickly with little loss of effectiveness.

Can do at almost any time.

Cannot always do.

Administration: No comment due to inadequate experience in this at Div level.

d. Conclusion: Favor substitution of task force groupings for fixed strength division.

Col. F. Hill
G-3, CBI Theater

Yes. I concur with Col. Hill's comments in which he has covered the subject quite thoroughly. It is believed the tempo of war will increase and, if so, we shall certainly see task force groupings to a greater extent in any future war than in the one just finished. If this be so, why not adopt an organization that is designed for such employment rather than continually resort to improvisation? I believe that proper headquarters and administrative units can be organized and SOPs set up that will minimize the administrative difficulties found by many officers in an organization of this kind. While I had no actual combat experience and do not feel fully qualified on this subject, the Signal Service Group I served in and commanded was actually a task force organization; it was composed entirely of T/O & E 11-500 cellular units and I can state without qualification that in esprit de corps, morale, administration and every other respect this unit was as good as, if not superior, to any unit I have served in or seen in the Army during the war or in peace time.

Lt. Col. R. H. Mapes
Executive Officer and C.O.
3141 Sig. Sv. Gp.

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No. It seems to me that everyone who has commented so far, with the exception of Col. Dolph, has overlooked one of the most important, if not the most important points, i.e., the flexibility and massing of supporting artillery fire. To obtain this flexibility and mass of fire it is essential that all artillery battalions be coordinated and tied together by survey. Division artillery does this for the battalions within the division. The artillery of one division is tied together with that of the adjacent division through the medium of the corps artillery headquarters. Thus, it is possible for an infantry battalion (or even a squad) to obtain the mass support of all the artillery with the corps. This last war definitely proved the overwhelming advantage of this technique in giving to the infantry real support. The task force organization would not lend itself to the degree of centralized control and coordination necessary to obtain this all-important flexibility and mass.

Lt. Col. G. W. Power
C. O. Field Artillery Battalion
(Division Artillery)

No. From the G-4 viewpoint I favor the present fixed strength division because of the following:

- a. A unified command, commander, can adjust his combat teams to meet the situation.
- b. Within a division there is centralized administrative control.
- c. Tends to increase the esprit de corps and offers more chance for promotion.

The administration of a separate unit, as indicated by Lt. Col. Ruggles, was a major problem in Europe and I feel sure it was just as much of a problem in the Pacific.

Col. W. A. Huntsberry
Assistant G-4, First Army

No. The definition of a task force grouping submitted by Committee #15 is in fact a definition of a division except that the size is specified as being smaller for the task force. To make such a smaller combat unit administratively self-sufficient is not in the best interests of manpower conservation and unnecessarily detracts the commander from his main mission of destroying the enemy by burdening him with administrative matters. I concur with Cols. Dolph, Power and Ruggles and submit that, by augmenting the control means available to the infantry regimental C.O. and by the inclusion of organic tanks and AAA in the infantry division, our combat team concept gives us the maximum of tactical flexibility and the minimum of administrative problems.

Lt. Col. M. S. Davison
C.O. Inf Bn, 45th Division
G-3 VI Corps

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No. I favor the fixed-strength division.

Task for groupings:

a. Advantages:

- (1) The task force would be more suited to fluid situations.
- (2) The grouping could be varied in size to fill particular missions.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) The grouping would not be particularly effective in heavy offensive or defensive combat due to varying methods, morale, personalities, etc.
- (2) The communication and fire control of a grouping would be weak initially.

Fixed-Strength divisions:

a. Advantages:

- (1) Division is more suited to heavy combat.
- (2) The intangibles (morale, unit pride, personalities, etc.) are more controllable in a division.
- (3) Supporting units (artillery, engineers, etc.) are better trained, better cared for, and more sensibly employed in a division.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) Change over to RCT task forces for fluid situations is not automatic.
- (2) Division system usually tends to reduce number of extra units, particularly infantry, available for reinforcement.

Discussion: The task force as presented appears to be a RCT with all attachments organic. The grouping is merely a gathering together of these under one head. — The task force system appears to infer that fluid situations are the most important combat mission. This is not true. Any unit with communications can drive ahead in a fluid situation. The real test comes in heavy offensive or defensive combat. Past experience indicates much more time in stabilized situations than in fluid ones. The problem of higher commanders would be tremendously complicated under a task force grouping system. The army and corps would have a hodgepodge of task forces of varying sizes and effectiveness with hundreds of little mongrel engineer, quartermaster, ordnance, signal, etc. units floating around either in a task force or lost. Another factor is the difficulty of securing task force COs competent to handle their jobs. Fighting a RCT with attachments is hard enough. Fighting a unit with many more variables would be a most difficult task.

Conclusion: It is concluded that the fixed strength division is the better of the two.

Recommendation: That the control facilities of the present infantry regiment be augmented. That the division itself contain a reasonable number of needed units i.e., tanks, TD, AAA. That training stress the use of the reinforced regiment in combat. That troop basis for armies or corps contain enough RCTs to allow some reinforcement of divisions.

Col. J. J. Ewell
C.O. Prcht. Inf. Bn. & Regt.
101st Airborne Division

No. Advantages of a fixed strength system:

- a. Administrative control decidedly easier.
- b. Formations of Corps made easier.
- c. Capable of sustained combat.
- d. Capable of improvisation and great flexibility. Note: In a certain as a combat team commander I had attached to my regiment troops which more than equalled my norman command. As soon as the operation was over the CG detached all strength he considered superfluous.
- e. Fixed system produces a fertile bed for high morale and esprit de corps.
- f. Continuity of command remains throughout the life of a division.
- g. Saves men and materiel.

None of the above advantages can be equalled by a task force grouping. The overwhelming majority of experienced and thinking leaders favor the fixed-strength system. An inference may be drawn from this fact.

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Col. J. G. Ondrick
Regimental Commander
309th Infantry, 78th Division

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No. Advantages of task force groupings:
More command responsibility on more officers.
Unit is ready to exploit promptly a sudden favorable small-scale "break."
Adequate and not improvised command and support facilities are at hand when subdivision is desirable.
Adopted to police and guerilla type war which may be very common in the future.
Could serve in peace as nucleus for division or higher units in war.
Facilitate organization, administration and training in time of peace.
Permits greater dispersion of forces under effective command.
More suitable to most likely peace-time needs, e.g. riots and disasters.
In effect it means making a smaller division.

Disadvantages:

All advantages applicable in war listed above can be secured in standard division by training and prior planning.
All advantages applicable in peace can be secured by activating divisions in part only in time of peace.
Making smaller independent divisions (which is what a task force really is) increases overhead in command, communication and service and support elements.
Combination of small task forces into divisions will increase coordination troubles and will aggravate the deficiencies which resulted from the change from regiment to group in artillery, engineers, etc.

Col. H. D. Kehm
Psychological Warfare, SHAEF
G-2 Ninth Army

Disadvantages (additional): Loss of esprit due to permanent division organizations having history and continuity.

No.

Col. R. A. Hewitt
G-3 II Corps
Executive G-3 First Army

Advantages (additional): Lends itself more readily to an airborne operation than does the fixed type of division. With the prospects of guided missiles, atomic energy and other future developments, small compact forces readily and rapidly transported by air are needed.

Yes.

Lt. Col. J. S. Upham
Battalion Commander
Separate Tank Battalion

Advantages (additional): Permits greater flexibility, consequent greater massing effect in critical areas; utilizes manpower to maximum.

Yes.

Col. E. H. F. Svensson
G-2 War Dept. General Staff
(No combat)



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ANNEX 5

THE GROUP VS THE REGIMENT

THE PROBLEM

1. The group organization was introduced after World War II was well under way. Many commanders and other officers who belonged to the close-knit regiments and had served with them through peace, on into the war, were averse to change. Immediately the group was introduced, they tried to find every reason why the group organization should not work. Under such circumstances the new organization was not given a fair trial. On the other hand, many group commanders, who were bound to make their group organization work, were very successful.

2. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the group and the regiment to determine which type of organization should be retained for the wars of the future.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. The primary consideration in organization for war is to provide all commanders with the means to accomplish their assigned missions.

4. With the technological advances in war comes more extensive specialization, hence the more composite the nature of the units.

5. There are two extremes in organization. One is the very rigid fixed-strength organization; the other is the extreme cellular task-force organization that is good only for a particular situation. The most desirable type of unit for war may be found somewhere between these two extremes, neither of which give desired flexibility.

6. In the wars of the future as in the past war, certain types of units may be used universally with little change in composition, whereas other types of units, if of fixed strength, can be used only under one situation. There were many examples of this in the past war. The anti-aircraft regiment, regardless of its fixed composition, could be used as a unit in very few situations as every area, every installation, every type of unit it supported varied in size and vulnerability. Constant attachments and detachments were indicated to make the best use of the available anti-aircraft. Use of the group organization was essential in anti-aircraft. The Infantry regiment, on the other hand, proved that it could be used universally with only minor modifications. Between these two extremes were found the other arms such as Artillery, Engineers, and Armor.

7. Every unit must have a parent organization to coordinate, control, assist, and supervise it. The parent organization can control only a limited number of units. Both of these statements were definitely proven in Seventh Army where there were many different types of separate Quarter-master units of company size all operating independently with no supervising headquarters. The administration in these units was very poor until the 561st QM Group took them over. Courts-martial, for example, were three months in arrears in bringing accused to trial. The number of units attached to this group was far beyond what it could handle, but it was able to remedy many deficiencies, especially among inexperienced, low-ranking officers.

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8. This study would apply more to Army and Corps units of the separate arms or services than it would apply to divisional troops as in the latter, the regimental organization can be more readily used.

9. Except for the Infantry, where the group organization was not used, it is generally agreed that all battalions must be self-sufficient administratively, and have the necessary tactical staff to be able to operate alone.

10. "The flexibility provided by the group has 'proven' of great tactical value," especially in:

a. Ability to make shifts in battalions from one group to another to mass facilities and meet changing situations and requirements.

b. Ability to change the composition of the group as to weapons and type of units.

c. Ability to extend over a wide area, especially since the battalions are self-sufficient for administration and supply and in the staff.

11. The greatest advantage of the regiment over the group is the continued association of the same battalions, commanders, and staffs. It is generally agreed by most commanders that this advantage must be acquired for the group organization whenever possible. Provided the team fits the situation and the task, it should always be kept together.

12. There is pride in organization for the regiment that does not exist in the group. It does exist, however, in the separate battalions in the group. The regiment thus provides only an additional measure of esprit.

13. The regiment provides consolidation of administration and supply. The group, being tactical does not provide this but yet must handle some administrative and supply matters. The greatest confusion in the group organization in this war arose from a failure to standardize procedure in the army as to what administrative matters the group should handle. If it be desired, and given the means, the group can also consolidate administration and supply.

CONCLUSIONS

14. The group organization is essential, to corps and army troops, to

a. Those arms that operate on an area or task basis rather than on a unit basis. This includes especially Antiaircraft, and to a lesser degree the Engineers, and Artillery.

b. Provide operating and coordinating headquarters for composite commands.

c. Provide parent organizations for the services.

15. The regimental organization may be retained in divisional units for the present.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

16. It is recommended that:

a. The group organization be retained and be made universal in all the arms and services for corps and army troops.

b. Emphasis be placed on continued association of the same units with the same groups whenever and wherever possible from the start of training on through combat. That this be done by keeping at least one battalion under the same group throughout. In some cases there may be two battalions that can be used with the same group at all times.

c. The number of group headquarters provided be sufficient to have a normal ratio of three battalions per group.

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ANNEX 6

AN AIR DIVISION OF FIXED SIZE AND COMPOSITION VS A TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

THE PROBLEM: Whether it would be more practical to employ an air organization of fixed size and composition in cooperation with a ground army than one composed of varying amounts of different types of air striking power.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM: While it is true that tactical air commands are normally charged with the responsibility of providing coordinated air cooperation for equivalent ground units, they are not always charged with equivalent tasks. Factors which cause variation in the task of aiding the ground elements include:

- a. Size of friendly army being reinforced.
- b. Type of maneuver employed by reinforced army.
- c. Possession of air superiority by friendly or enemy forces.
- d. Strength of enemy ground elements.

In addition the basic tactics and technique of air warfare are not well-trying and established and what is considered to be the best possible procedure now may change rapidly as a result of observation of combat action, necessitating major changes in the composition of the force required, such as different types of aircraft, change of emphasis from day to night operation, etc.

It is possible for an Air Force to control and coordinate its subordinate elements on the air division-tactical air command level with sufficient ease that reinforcement of tactical air commands when necessary can be effectively accomplished.

CONCLUSIONS: It would be impractical to attempt to plan an organization of fixed size and composition to carry out the task of air cooperation with an army in all situations.

Greater economy of force can be gained by employing no fixed strength unit of the size of a tactical air command but rather furnishing only sufficient striking power to accomplish the task assigned.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That tactical air commands, as they exist in the present organization of the air forces, not be replaced by air divisions of fixed size and composition.

VI

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ANNEX 7

SUPPLEMENTARY FACTS NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL
IN ARRIVING AT CONCLUSIONS

1. The complete adaption of the task force concept must be treated with reserve as what appears to be flexibility is destroyed by the detailed planning called for in forming a force, for a particular mission, from task forces. The details of this planning would be so great that the initiative of the commander would be limited, and his ability to adjust his forces to meet errors in the original estimate be reduced.

2. The adaption of the task force concept creates a need for leaders experienced in the use of combined arms to a greater extent and on a lower level than does the larger fixed strength divisions.

3. From the viewpoint of results of training the task force concept would provide units better schooled in the problems of combined arms.

4. Plans for the future must consider the probable situation as to manpower and materials. From this point of view it is felt that the fixed strength division will furnish more opportunities to properly use:

- a. Our citizen soldier with his lack of training.
- b. To fully utilize full man, or "woman" power of the nation.
- c. Most effectively man the complex, technological equipment that will be used.

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ANNEX 8

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ANNEX 8

