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The Loading  
of a  
Regimental Combat Team  
for  
Amphibious Operations

Loading of a regimental combat team for amphibious operations, by Lt Col C. A. Dahlen, Inf. Command and Staff College. 1946-47.

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH  
KANSAS

School of Combined Arms  
Regular Course  
1946-1947

THE LOADING OF A REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.  
(Personal experiences of a Regtl Ex O )

Type of Operation Described: Some of the factors and procedures  
used in the preparation of plans.

Lt.Col. Chester A. Dahlen, Infantry

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Bibliography

1. Field Order 1 and Adm Order 1, Hqs, 34th Inf Combat Team, 3 Oct, 1944.
2. Historical Report of the 24th Inf Div Landing Team- Leyte Opns

## NARRATIVE

### I - Introduction

#### 1. Purpose.

Gentlemen- my subject for presentation is "The Loading of a Regimental Combat Team for an Amphibious Operations". In presenting this subject, I intend to cover only the planning phase, which was necessary to accomplish the task indicated. My purpose is to focus your attention on some of the planning factors, procedures, and techniques that were used within our division and which not only simplified our planning tasks but assured their soundness.

#### 2. Description of the Leyte Operation.

To provide the background for this subject, I have chosen the loading out of the 34th RCT for the Leyte Operation. If you will now look at chart No. 1, I'll describe briefly this operation of which the 34th RCT was a part. This chart shows the northeast portion of Leyte Island, Philippines. To the northeast, you can see a small portion of the island of Samar, separated from Leyte by the San Juanico Straits.

The SIXTH ARMY, consisting of two corps, was given the mission of making an amphibious assault on this island on 20 Oct, 1944. On the north, was the X Corps, consisting of the 1st Cav Div and the 24th Inf Div, both in assault. On the south, was the XXIV Corps, consisting of the 7th and 96th Inf Divs, both in assault. The primary mission of the 1st Cav Div and the 96th and 7th Inf Div was to seize and secure the airfields in their zones of operations. The 24th Inf Div was given the initial major tactical effort of the SIXTH ARMY. It was to land in the vicinity of Palo, establish a beachhead and then drive northwest across the island to seize and secure the town of Carigara and the land and sea approaches thereto.

Now, narrowing our look to just the 24th Inf Div, we see that it was landing with two RCT's abreast, the 34th and 19th. The third RCT, the 21st, was under operational control of SIXTH ARMY. It was landing at the southern tip of Leyte on the small island of Panoan, to secure the Panoan Straits, blocking any enemy movement

around the southern tip of the island. Therefore, our division commander, to accomplish his mission and yet to retain maximum flexibility, decided to land with the two remaining RCT's abreast, as shown, and each landing in column of battalions. The two assault battalions, one from each Regt, were to land in zone, to seize and secure the initial beachhead. The next two Bns to land were to push through the first and seize and secure dominating terrain on the A-day objective line to their front. The third Bn to land of the 19th Inf was also to push through the IBH and to attack southwest to seize and secure the town of Palo, and with the 24th Cav Rcn Tr was to protect the Div left flank. The third Bn to land of the 34th Inf was in Div reserve. The actual order of landing for the 34th Inf was the 3d Bn in assault, followed by the 2d, and then the 1st, which was in Div reserve.

## II-Presentation

### 1. Embarkation Order.

With that background of the tactical mission and the scheme of maneuver of the division and its two RCT's, we are now ready to discuss some of the planning factors, procedures and techniques that we used in loading out the 34th RCT for this operation. In the time allotted I can only hit the high spots, emphasizing their application to our administrative and supply planning.

On the 21st of Sept, we were given the alert order for the operation and the go-ahead signal for serious planning. This Div alert order included the tactical mission I have just outlined, an embarkation order, and a tentative boat landing diagram. This information with some supplementary details was all we needed to start our planning.

If you will now look at chart No 2, the embarkation order, you will see that it is essentially a troop list consisting of the 34th Inf, other troops to make up the RCT, and then divisional troops attached for the ride only. There are two features of this order that I want to point out and which were fundamental to the formulation of our plans. First, notice the uniform characteristics of the Naval shipping which had been allotted to this Embarkation Group No 2. For example, each assault transport (APA) was presumed to have a personnel capacity of 1300, a square footage capacity for vehicles of 8000, and a tonnage capacity of 600. This was an arbitrary assignment made by division as to the various capacities of the various types of ships and was based on prior, sad experience. The first amphibious assault ~~for~~ our division was the Hollandia Operation, which I still vividly remember because of the paucity of shipping. Couldn't be helped, there just wasn't any more in the SWPA at that time. To make maximum use of every ship assigned, our division based their plans on the exact characteristics of each ship, as best they could be obtained from higher headquarters or from the Navy. Now it is all very fine if your shipping is laying quietly out in the harbor and you can go aboard and check your ships. That was not the case for us, The ships didn't pull into harbor until the last possible moment prior to loading, so that we

no opportunity to go aboard and verify each ship's capacity before completing our detailed loading plans. Well, when the ships did pull into harbor and we started to load, our troubles began. It wasn't so bad for the APA's, their capacities compared favorably with those previously obtained. But not so for the IST's and it was on these ships that we had planned to load the bulk of our vehicles and cargo. Although this type of ship is of standard design, they appeared in harbor with all different kinds of additions or alterations, changing their capacities and which knocked the bottom out of our loading plans. Two ships that I remember in particular. On the first, the enterprising skipper had decided he needed more AAA protection. So he had installed six twin Bofors guns, three on each side of the main (weather) deck. You can well imagine what those six guns, with their protective guard rails, did to the deck space on which we had planned to place our vehicles. The second ship wasn't so bad. Here the skipper had installed a salt-water distilling plant just forward of the deck house. The space it occupied knocked 4-5 vehicles off our loading list. The net result was a mad, last-minute scramble to re-adjust the vehicle loading list for all the shipping, to insure that all the highest priority vehicles were taken. For my Bn, we were finally able to load one 3/4-ton truck and three 1/4-ton trucks with trailers (one for Bn Hqs, one for Hv Wpns Co, and one for Bn Meds)

So here is our first and very important planning factor, the assignment of arbitrary capacities to the Naval shipping, which were conservative enough to cover all types of ships. To us, it meant that our plans could be made on a firm basis, with minimum chances for last minute changes

The second feature of this order is the data given for each unit listed on the order. The left column is simply an estimated troop strength to be embarked. It was a G-1, G-3 optimum estimate. That didn't bother us too much, for their figures were always too large. We never got all our replacements. Also, the passenger capacities of the APA's were usually more than 1300. If we happened to draw a small ship, we could put the overflow on IST's. In this operation, we planned to put only 350 aboard each ship, while in the

Hollandia Operation we averaged 500-600 soldiers aboard each LST. The second, middle, column is the most important of the three. It is the square footage allowed each unit for its vehicles. Since it would in no way cover all the T/E vehicles, it actually was a division limitation on the number of vehicles to be loaded by each unit. For this operation the division was able to bring about 54% of its T/E vehicles. Within the prescribed allowance, each unit could bring the vehicles they desired. The last, right, column is really for information only. It gives the estimated weight of a unit's vehicles and other impedimenta. Theoretically, if you were to subtract the figure 3583, total of this last column, from the figure 6475, the total allowable ship capacity given above, the difference, 2892, would be the tonnage that you could take in other supplies. However, we never approached that figure. First, because we didn't have the cargo space to load that amount. Our vehicles took up the bulk of the ship's loading space. Secondly, even if we could, the Navy wouldn't permit us to. For example, aboard each LST, the maximum total weight permitted was 700 tons. This limitation was set in order to allow that ship to beach properly. Also, on the APA's, the Navy required those ships to be so loaded that all cargo could be discharged prior to darkness of D-day and the ship out to sea. So the criterion for these ships was not the tonnage they carried but their unloading time. From a Navy point of view, they would much prefer to unload in one lift a 30-ton tank, then the same weight in rations, 30-tons, in 20-25 lifts. Our TQMS so loaded their APA's that they could be unloaded in 6-7 hours. This meant about 50 lifts per hatch. If it was more than 60, there little chance of securing Naval approval of our loading plans.

### 3. Unit Personnel and Vehicle Table.

With the information contained in the embarkation order, we were then ready to start the preparation of our loading plans. Naturally, our first step in planning was to prepare the tactical plans to achieve the mission assigned. That was no easy task, but the real pick-and-shovel work came in the preparation of our administrative plans, such as our loading plans, which had to

support the tactical plans. Our biggest job was to load the vehicles on the proper ship and in such an order on each ship, that when unloaded and delivered on the far shore, they arrived in the desired priority to support the landing attack. That is one definition of combat loading. Simply put, it meant that the first we wanted off the ships were the last to be loaded. So the first thing we had to do was to determine the exact vehicles by type that were to be taken by each unit. Within the 34th Inf our policy was very simple. We gave highest priority to our 2½-ton trucks, never leaving them behind if at all possible. It was the vehicle that could haul both cargo and troops. It could get through the loose sand on the beaches and the mud of the jungles. It was the versatile vehicle and gave what little mobility we had to the regiment. To stay within our allowance, we cut out practically all 1-ton trailers, reduced the number of ½-ton trucks by 50% and required practically every one to pull a ¼-ton trailer. By cutting some 1½-ton and ¾-ton trucks we were able to stay within our allowance.

Having done that, then came the jig-saw puzzle of so loading these vehicles to meet the requirements stated above and, as far as possible, to keep these vehicles with their unit. For that purpose, we devised a Unit Personnel and Vehicle Table. If you will now look at chart No 3<sup>A</sup>, you will see such a chart made out for our 3d Bn. Notice that it lists the units that were to be loaded on a particular ship, in this case, APA No 4; the strength of each unit; and most important the vehicles that were to accompany the troops, by number, type, and square footage. Looking a little closer at this chart, you might well wonder why we planned to load approximately two-thirds of the AT Co and did not load the 3d Bn At Plat. We did this because we wanted to get that Plat in on the second run (first re-run) of the small boats. However, there were so many high priority vehicles on this ship scheduled for that trip, that something had to be thrown back. Our solution was to load this Plat on the APA carrying the 2d Bn and scheduled them to come in on the second trip of small boats from that ship.

A similar chart was made out for each ship allotted to the embarkation groups, showing in similar detail the unit and their vehicles to be loaded aboard each ship.. These charts served a very useful purpose. First of all, they were a convenient checklist for the RCT staff to account for all units and their vehicles. But more important, it was an accurate method of disseminating information and instructions to the BLT(Bn) Comdrs and their TQM's, who were to actually load the ships.

### 3. Organization of the Batallion Landing Team.

A logical sequel to these charts was to consolidate the information contained in them for each Batallion Landing Team. If you will now look at Chart No 3, you will see such a consolidation that was made for the 3d Bn. Notice that this Bn was loaded on one APA, one LST, and one LSM. This LSM was one of four in the 6th wave and scheduled to land at H/25. On it we loaded high priority Shore Party equipment (essentially bulldozers) and as many tanks as the remaining space permitted. By the addition of such information as the CO of Troops, TQM, and Billeting Officer for each ship, this chart was then titled 'Organization of the Batallion Landing Team' and made an annex to our field order.

On checking the totals at the bottom of the page, you will see that the planned loads in personnel and vehicles agree closely with the assumed capacities for each type ship, except for the APA. Here, we were a bit optimistic. However, alternate loading plans were available. If APA No 4 turned out to be a small ship, part or all of the AT Co, both personnel and vehicles, could be loaded aboard another ship. Also, there were 92 EM aboard from the 532d EB&SR which could be shifted if necessary. Remember also, that the figure 1451 is an optimim estimate of the strength to be loaded.

### 5. Cargo

We have now quickly covered the loading of the personnel and vehicles of the 34th RCT. The third and last major part of our loading plans is the loading of the cargo aboard the assault shipping. This cargo can be divided into two general classes: that cargo which was to be mobile loaded on our vehicles and that cargo which was to be loaded in bulk in the holds of the ships. Since we

have already made the loading plans for our vehicles, we need only consider now the bulk cargo. This bulk ~~property~~<sup>Cargo</sup> should normally consist of organization property and allied impedimenta and of all the classes of supply. By directive, the amount of organizational property to accompany troops was so limited, that it too could be mobile loaded on our few administrative vehicles and trailers. The only impedimenta that I can recall which we took on this operation was the one small water-proof clothing bag permitted each individual. In this we carried our voyage clothing (CKC), socks, underwear, towels, extra pair of shoes, and one OD blanket. Since this bag went with the individual into the troop compartment, no hold space allowance was necessary. So, by elimination, our cargo loading plans were concerned only with the bulk cargo, which in turn was the various classes of supply to be brought in on the assault shipping.

By SIXTH ARMY order, our division was to bring in the following amounts of supply:

Class I: 1-K and 1-D, carried on the individual  
1-K and 7-10 inl, bulk cargo. Total - 10 days.

Class III: 5 days, 80 octane gasoline  
10 days, 100 octane gasoline  
10 days, distillate  
10 days, oils and grease

Class IV: 10 days, Engr, mostly bridging materials

Class V: 3 U/F, all units except Arty  
3½ U/F, Arty

Class II: 5 days, selected items of Engr, Ord, Sig, Chem.  
To be mobile loaded on their trucks.

Since our ammunition vehicles would carry about one unit of fire, this left the following cargo to be loaded aboard the division shipping: 7 days of Cl I, none of Cl II, all of Cl III and IV, and 2 or 2½ U/F of Cl V.

The assembling and proper loading of these supplies presents one of the most difficult tasks for an amphibious operation. Here is where our division stepped squarely into the picture and did an excellent job in both planning and execution. First of all, they organized a provisional labor Bn, consisting of two rifle Cos,

one ~~form~~<sup>from</sup> each regiment and a motor pool of vehicles from all divisional units plus what could be obtained from Base Section. The main job of the Bn was to assemble all supplies (less C1 V) and then to assist in loading them on the various ships. To do this, they worked according to a definite and progressive plan. First of all down at the loading area, either near the wharfs or the loading beaches, a specific piece of ground was reserved for division use. This area was broken down into smaller plots, one for each ship that was to carry bulk cargo. To this plot, called a beach slot, was hauled, checked, and guarded all the supplies destined for that ship.

The determination of the actual amount of supplies to be loaded aboard each ship was a simple proposition. All classes of supplies, except class V, were kept under division control. They simply told us how much we were to carry on our ships. For example, we were ordered to take 100 tons of class I, 350 tons of class III, and 46 tons of class IV. The control of Class V was made an RCT responsibility. This was done for several reasons. First of all, because the amounts and types of ammunition to be taken were based on the various weapons within the RCT. Each unit S-4 could best and most quickly determine the amounts by weight for his unit and, most important, how much by weight would be mobile loaded and how much would be bulk cargo. Secondly, it gave assurance to the RCT Comdr that the proper amounts and types of ammunition were being taken by all units of the Embarkation Group. Lastly, it equalized the work load in requisitioning and hauling the supplies to the beach. The provisional labor Bn, under division control, hauled classes I, III, and IV, while all units, under RCT control, hauled their respective amounts of bulk ammunition.

The planning job, then for the RCT, was simply to determine the amounts by weight for each class of bulk cargo that was to be loaded on each ship. We followed a simple policy. All class I was to be loaded on the APA's. In so far as possible, all class V was to accompany troops. Class III was to be loaded on the AKA and the two LST's. If you will look at chart No 4, you will see our "Cargo Assignment Plan" for this operation. Notice that the APA's had

only rations and ammunition, except APA No 4, which had some Engr supplies. This was some high priority materials, that the shore group needed on the beach at the earliest possible moment. On the AKA and the LST'S was loaded all the Cl III, the ammunition of the troops embarked, and then the remainder of the Cl IV and V that couldnt be loaded aboard the APA's. Having made this plan, we then notified division of the amounts of class I, III, and IV to be hauled to each slot and, similarly, the subordinate units of the amounts of Cl V they were to haul to designated slots. The consignee column is more for information only, especially on the class V, in that it showed who the ammunition was for. To be strictly correct, we should have shown Ord 0, 24th Div LT, since all bulk cargo went into division dumps and was issued from them under their control.

To sum up briefly on the planning procedures for bulk cargo, it was RCT responsibility to determine what amounts by weight and class were to be loaded aboard each ship and to haul all Cl V to the beach slots. It was division responsibility, using the labor Bn, to haul all other classes to the beach slots and then to assist in the loading of each ship in accordance with the TQM's loading plans.

##### 5. Tactical Planning.

In the few minutes remaining I want to cover one feature of our tactical planning which may be beneficial to all of you. Since our planning methods were no different than what you are now so familiar with, I am just going to cover one technique we used in the preparation of our field order. As you can see, this order is a rather thick document (Hold copy up for class to see). It actually consisted of the field order itself with 14 annexes and the accompanying administrative order with 9 annexes. Its preparation was a lengthy, time-consuming process. So this technique that we used was just a means to reduce the time required for its publication. At the very start of planning and in the division planning tent, was set up a large bulletin board. On this board, as soon as prepared, was placed the rough draft copy of the field and administrative orders and their annexes. We did the same thing at RCT Hqs. By daily trips to Div, our staff could keep themselves

~~could keep themselves abreast~~ with division plans, come back and modify theirs accordingly. BLT Comdrs and their staffs could, in turn, come up to see our plans and keep themselves abreast with them. This procedure only supplemented all the many planning and coordinating conferences held at the two levels of command. But it did insure constant familiarity with all the written material and ironed many discrepancies and errors which are bound to occur between oral and written orders and instructions. It was a simple method of disseminating information and insuring concurrent planning at all levels of command. It wasn't long in the planning phase where many annexes would be so firmed up that we could go ahead and mimeograph them. In that manner we had a lot of the order published long before the "freeze" order came. The division would announce a date when their plans would be frozen, no further changes permitted. This occurred when the Navy had given final approval to the plans and was generally 5-6 days before sailing date. Well, with our plans constantly up to date with division's, their "freeze" date was also ours. In the meantime we had been polishing up all orders and annexes not yet mimeographed. So then it became just a simple proposition of pulling the remaining parts off the board and handing them to the typists for stenciling.

### III-SUMMATION

#### 1. Results of the Loading Plan.

Now to sum up briefly what I have covered. I have just highlighted some of the factors, procedures, and techniques, and their reasons, which we used in loading the 34th RCT for the Leyte Operation. Since our biggest planning problem, at the RCT level, was the loading of the vehicles, I spent a large part of the time explaining the purpose of the division embarkation order and how we proceeded from there to arrive at our organization of the battalion landing teams. Our planning was based on conservative and proven factors and procedures. It was orderly and progressive. It was simple and accurate. All of which meant that there was no lost motion, no useless calculations and that we could produce a sound workable plan in the minimum of time. To me, time was the critical factor in all our planning. Although it is recognized that amphibious operations require the most careful, detailed, and fully coordinated plans, it was never our experience that sufficient time was allowed for that purpose. For example, in this operation, we were alerted for this operation on Sept 21st. 16 days later, Oct 7, we met our opposite numbers, the Navy, for the first time. That was a Sunday morning. Our TQM's went aboard their ships that afternoon. The next morning we started to load. In other words, we had 17 days to complete our plans, assemble all the supplies, and be ready to load. It meant that our plans had to be workable, to meet prompt Naval approval, and not be subject to any last minute, violent changes. By Thursday noon, all vehicles and supplies were loaded. By Friday morning, all personnel was aboard, and we set sail 1300 that afternoon, Friday, 13th Oct. I am sure that you can readily understand why the lack of time was such a critical factor in our planning and our efforts were directed to meet the requirements it imposed. We could not afford any last minute changes to our plans.

You may be interested in the actual loading of APA No 4. If you will follow on charts No 3 and 4, I'll give you some of the figures. On personnel, we loaded 1265 officers and enlisted men. We loaded 90 vehicles (planned-87) with a square footage of 7093. In bulk cargo, we loaded 107 tons as follows: 38.7 tons of Cl I,

15 tons of C1 IV, 10 tons of C1 V for 85th Cml Bn, and 43.3 tons of C1 V for 34th Inf.

## 2. LUZON Operation.

A further illustration of the merits of our planning system occurred several months later on LEYTE. On 1 Jan, 45, the 34th RCT was ordered out of combat and, as operational troops of the XI Corps, was to spearhead an amphibious assault on LUZON for the 38th Inf Div. The Corps attached us to the Div for administration, supply, and loading out. During the planning period, Jan 8-23, we were concurrent with the Corps on the tactical plans and averaged 4-5 days ahead of the division on the administrative and loading plans. Unfortunately, this was to be the first amphibious assault for the division. Inexperienced, they followed literally the then-current book teachings. In so doing, the G-3 and G-4 section attempted to do all the detailed loading calculations for the landing team. During the period, they had 3 major changes in ship assignment and several minor substitutions. Using the exact capacities of the ships, this meant constant revision of their loading plans. As a consequence, the division staff became completely bogged down in a morass of detailed calculations that could have well been done by the subordinate units. A point in particular that pleased us at that time was the publication of the field order. When the Corps announced their "freeze" date, it became ours also. We delivered completed copies of our order to the Corps Hqs 6 hours before they finished publication of theirs, much to their amazement, and we beat the 38th Inf Div by two days.

## 3. Relationship with the Navy.

In this summation, I want to cover one additional factor that was basic in all our planning and has been undercurrent in what I have said so far. It was our relationship with the Navy. Early in our amphibious experience, we found that the Navy was quite rigid in their loading doctrines, that in resolving the many differences that were bound to occur in the loading plans, it was the Army who did the compromising. We soon realized that this apparent uncompromising attitude on the part of the Navy, with little or no desire to appreciate our problems and to cooperate with us, was not due

to a dogmatic adherence to their doctrines. Far from that, they were as cooperative and willing to please as they possibly could be. What we "landlubbers" had to learn was that the Navy dealt with inflexible ships and equipment. Their doctrines were based on exact characteristics and capacities, specific dimensions, and rigid safety regulations, all of which extremely limited their ability to have any flexibility in their loading plans. Realizing these limitations, we made our plans accordingly and thus avoided any friction or last-minute disapproval of our loading plans.

#### IV - CONCLUSIONS

##### 1. Experience.

From this brief narrative, I believe that we can arrive at two logical, definite conclusions. The first is quite self-evident: simply, that "Old Lady Experience" is still the best teacher.

##### 2. Centralized Planning Versus Decentralized Planning.

FM 100-5 state in effect - 'That an amphibious operation is a special operation and that it is characterized by centralized planning at the higher headquarters and decentralized execution, initially, by the subordinate units. Well, to me, where amphibious operations became our normal means of entry into combat, I don't view with alarm the specialized nature of this type of operation. With training and the application of common sense, they are no different in their planning approach than any other form of offensive combat. So, I say, take the above quote with a grain of salt. Don't centralize your planning to the extent you become involved in a minutia of details. Let your subordinate units do that.

## V - LESSONS LEARNED

### 1. Reference Book.


We definitely learned many lessons in this type of operations, as future staff officers a few of which I think will be beneficial to you. First, keep a ready reference book, a FM 101-10, with all the possible data applicable to your particular unit. It will be a tremendous time-saver for you in your planning. Its compilation will be a good job for one of your assistants. Be sure that he keeps it up-to-date.

### 2. Charts, Graphs, or Work Sheets.

Secondly, so much of your planning will involve calculations and the compilation of data, that you should be on the alert to devise your own chart, graph, or work sheet to record this data. They will prove invaluable in the consolidation and verification of your plans and in disseminating such information, accurately, to you subordinates.

### 3. Subordinate Units.

My third and last lesson is really a corollary to my second conclusion. Have trust and faith in your subordinate units. If you expect them to execute your plans, surely they must be capable of assisting in their preparation. Make every effort to facilitate their planning and have it concurrent with yours. Most important, give them a mission, the means to accomplish it, and then let them plan the details of its execution.



# LEYTE OPERATION

20 Oct 1944

Scale 1:250,000



Chart No 1

(A-Day)  
EMBARKATION GROUP NO 2

Comdg

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Sq ft</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
3 APA's (No 4, 5, & 6)	3900	18000	1800
2 LST's (No 3 & 4)	700	16000	1400
1 LSM (No 2)	52	825	150
1 AKA (No 2)	250	14000	2000
1 LSD (No 2) (14 LCM)	290	3400	425
<b>TOTAL AVAILABLE</b>	<b>5192</b>	<b>52225</b>	<b>6475</b>

Units

34th Inf Regt	2889	13190	1130
63d FA Bn	457	10031	580
Co C, 3d Engr Bn	150	3070	175
Co C, 24th Med Bn	90	850	90
Det Hq, Hq Co & MP Plat 24th Inf Div	20	600	25
Det 24th QM Co	55	2050	90
Det 24th Sig Co	4	85	5
Det 724th Ord Co	20	600	30
Co D, 24th Med Bn (-1 Plat)	75	775	42
Btry D, 469th AAA Bn AW	195	3100	150
Det 101st QM Gr Reg Plat	10	120	8
Plat, 603d M Tk Co	25	825	180
Co D, 85th Cml Bn	140	960	75
Det 727th Amph Trac Bn (-1 Co)	51	3160	205
12th Air Ln Pty	10	630	30
171st Bomb Disp Sqd	7	300	12
605th Med Clr Co	100	1600	85
407th Med Coll Co (- det)	50	850	48
36th Evac Hosp (- det)	70	3500	170
532d E B & S Regt (- dets)	500	5000	400
609th Port Co	230	300	35
Det 339th Engr Cons Bn	180	—	18
	<u>5328</u>	<u>51596</u>	<u>3583</u>

Note: strengths and Organizations as of 1200 1 October 44.  
Minor day to day changes will occur.

UNIT PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE TABLE

Unit or sub-division of a unit (3d Bn Landing Team, 34th RCT) (to be loaded on APA #4)	Pers	Trucks										Trailers				Tractors			Guns			Misc	Vehicles, Tanks, Towed Guns, Tlrs, SP Mounts, & Engr Equip (incl mobile loads)												
		Trk 1-t	Trk 3/4-t, C&F	Trk 3/4-t, WC	Trk 1-t	Trk 2-t, SNE	Trk 2-t, LWB	Trk 2-t, Lump	Trk 2-t, Wrecker	Trk 4-t, Wrecker	Trk	Trk	Trk	Ambulance	Trk	Trl 1-t	Trl, water	Trl, pole	Trl	Limber, S-1	Tr-9 w/bl		Tr-9 w/o bl	Trac E-L	Trac R-4 w/bl	Trac D-4 w/bl	Trac D-6 w/bl	Trac I-7 w/bl	Trac	Gun 37mm	105mm How	SPM	Gun	Gun	Handcarts
3d Bn, 34th Inf w/Bn Med Sec (-AT Plat)	820	14	2	1										13																					1670
2d Plat, Can Co, 34th Inf	30	1												1																					411
1st, 2d, & Mine Plat, AT Co, 34th Inf	98	6																									6								750
Det, Sv Co, 34th Inf	19																																		156
Det, Hq & Hq Co, 34th Inf	84	2												1																					99
1/2 Regtl Med Sect, 34th Inf	12	1												1																					57
FO Pty, Btry C, 63d FA Bn	7	1																																	202
Det, Hq & Sv Btrys, 63d FA Bn	35		2																																57
FO Pty, Btry B, 63d FA Bn	7	1																																	258
2d Plat, Co C, 24th Med Bn	32											2																							151
3d Plat, Co D, 85th Cml Bn	37				1																														101
Det, 532d EB&S Regt	92																																		1230
1/3 609th Port Co	72		1																																856
Det, 36th Evac Hosp (-Dets)	45	2	1	2	3											2		1																	418
407th Med Coll Co (-Dets)	36	2	2	1								3				1																			57
Det, Hq & Hq Co, 24th Div	16	2		1										2	1																				
Det, 24th Sig Co	3	1																																	
Photo Unit A	6																																		
TOTALS	1451	33	8	1	5	3						5	18	4	1												6	3						6473	

ANNEX #4 TO FO #1

ORGANIZATION OF BATTALION LANDING TEAMS

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Sq Ft</u>	<u>CO OF TROOPS</u>	<u>TQM</u>	<u>BILLETING O</u>
APA #4	1300	6000			
LST #3	350	8000			
LSM #2	52	2000			
TOTAL AVAILABLE	1702	16000			

BLT #9	APA #4		LST #3		LSM #2		TOTALS	
	Per	Sq Ft	Per	Sq Ft	Per	Sq Ft	Per	Sq Ft
*3d Bn 34th Inf W/Bn Med Sec (-3d Bn AT Plt)	820	1670					820	1670
*2d Plt Can Co 34th Inf (3-M8 in LCM)	30	411					30	411
*1st & 2d Plts & Mine Plt AT Co 34th Inf	98	750					98	750
*Det Serv Co 34th Inf	19		10	786			29	786
*Det Hq & Hq Co 34th Inf	84	156	10				94	156
* $\frac{1}{2}$ Regtl Med Sec 34th Inf	12	99					12	99
*"C" Btry 63d FA Bn	7	57	77	1804			84	1861
*Det Hq & Serv Btrys 63d FA Bn	35	202					35	202
*F O Party, B Btry 63d FA Bn	7	57					7	57
*3d Plt Co C 3d Engr & Hq Co 3d Engr			48	1165			48	1165
*2d Plt Co C 24th Med Bn	32	258					32	258
*3d Plt Co D 85th Cml Bn	37	151					37	151
*1st Plt 603d M Tk Co			5	165	15	495	20	660
*Det 24th QM Co			15	963			15	963
$\frac{1}{2}$ D Btry 469th AAA AW Bn			114	1537			114	1537
Det 532d Engr B&S Regt & NB Party	92		25	878	37	1467	154	2345
Det 3d Plt Co A 727th Amph Trac Bn			3	285			3	285
1/3 609th Port Co	72	101					72	101
Det 36th Evac Hosp (- Dets)	45	1230					45	1230
407th Med Coll Co (- Dets)	36	856					36	856
Det 724th Ord Co			2	244			2	244
Det 339th Engr Cons Bn			50				50	
Det Hq & Hq Co 24th Div	16	418					16	418
Det 24th Sig Co	3	57					3	57
Photo Unit A	6						6	
TOTAL	1451	6473	359	7827	52	1962	1862	16262

Note: \* indicates units attached to or in direct support of CT-34

CHART #3

Hq CT-34  
 APO 24  
 1200I 3 Oct 44

ANNEX H TO ADM O #1 - CARGO ASSIGNMENT PLAN.

1. Bulk cargo is assigned to ships as follows:

a. LST #3:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Class III	50	QM, 24 Div LT
Ammunition	72	63d FA Bn
Ammunition	25	34th Inf
Ammunition	3	3d Engr Bn
Ammunition	5	85th Cml Bn
Ammunition	18	603 M Tk Co
	<u>173</u>	

b. LST #4:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Class III	50	QM, 24 Div LT
Ammunition	72	63d FA Bn
Ammunition	25	34th Inf
Ammunition	3	3d Engr Bn
Ammunition	5	85th Cml Bn
Ammunition	10	603 M Tk Co
Class IV	15	3d Engr Bn
	<u>180</u>	

c. APA #4:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Rations	34	QM, 24 Div LT
Ammunition	36	34th Inf
Ammunition	10	85th Cml Bn
Class IV	15	3d Engr Bn
	<u>95</u>	

d. APA #5:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Rations	33	QM, 24 Div LT
Ammunition	56	34th Inf
Ammunition	10	85th Cml Bn
	<u>99</u>	

e. APA #6:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Rations	33	QM, 24 Div LT
Ammunition	65	34th Inf
Ammunition	10	85th Cml Bn
	<u>108</u>	

f. AKA #2:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Gasoline	200	QM, 24 Div LT
Class IV	16	3d Engr Bn
Ammunition	72	63d FA Bn
Ammunition	80	85th Cml Bn
Ammunition	25	469 AAA Bn
Ammunition	16	34th Inf
	<u>409</u>	

