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Procurement of Enlisted Personnel -AGF

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LESSON PLAN

for

THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

# 10

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Robey # H-5894

## REFERENCES

### Wartime Procurement

1. Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: The Problem of Quality. Studies in the History of the Army Ground Forces, No. 5.

### Procurement since V-J Day

2. Statement by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, supplementing his Remarks on Demobilization made to Members of Congress, 10:00 A.M., EST, Tuesday, January 15, 1947. War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Press Branch. Mimeographed.
3. "The Postwar Military Establishment and its Manpower Problems," presented by Lieutenant General Collins, Chief of WD Information, and Brigadier General Trudeau, Personnel and Administration Division, WDGS. War Department Public Relations Division, Press Section, 17 January 1947. Mimeographed.
4. "Legislation and the New Army," Army Information Digest, Vol. II, No 2, pp. 7-33. A series of articles.
5. WD Circulars, as follows:
  - 1945: # 310, sub: Enlistment and Reenlistment in the Regular Army. Amended or supplemented by # 88, 1946, sec. iii; # 171, 1946, sec. vii; # 238, 1946, sec. iii; # 241, 1946, secs. ii and iii.
  - 1946: # 105, sub: Critically Needed Specialists.
    - # 124, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army.
    - # 239, sub: Enlistment and Reenlistment in the Regular Army.
  - 1947: # 6, sub: Enlistment and Assignment of Partially Disabled Combat Veterans of World War II.
6. WD Memos as follows:
  - 1946: 600-750-7, sub: Enlistments for Military Intelligence Service Language School.
    - 600-750-3, sub: Recruiting.
    - 600-750-8, sub: Enlistment of Japanese Linguists.
    - 600-750-9, sub: Choice of Service for Individuals who Enlist or Reenlist for three-year Periods.
    - 615-500-2, sub: Initial Assignment of Enlisted Men.
    - 615-500-4, sub: Flow of Enlisted Personnel from Induction and Central Examination Stations.
  - 1947: 615-600-1, sub: Procurement, Training, and Assignment of Enlisted Personnel, Technicians.

References, continued

7. ACF letter of Lt Col W. A. Hamrick for CG's, 16 Jan 46, sub: ACF Classification and Assignment Policy for Enlisted Men. 220.3/2707 (16 Jan 46) GNACR. Inclosure 1 gives additional references.
8. Memo (S) of G-3 to Gm His, 17 Apr 46, sub: History of ACF during the Demobilization Period. Tab C, Mobilization.
9. Report of WD Director of Personnel Administration, C.S. # 64, WDGPA-39, sub: Results of Actual Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army through 21 January 1947.

Note: A copy of a speech by Col. H. E. Kessinger, entitled "Utilization of Negro Manpower," was circulated in this headquarters about 1 February 1947. The speech is a commentary on and an analysis of Circular 124, 1946--a very full and illuminating commentary. To date the file where this document is available has not been discovered by the historian preparing this outline.

CHARTS

Charts depicting problems of wartime procurement are available in Study No. 5, Reference # 1, above.

Charts depicting problems immediately following V-J Day are appended to the mimeographed copy of General Eisenhower's statement, Reference # 2.

## WARTIME PROCUREMENT

I. Statement of the Problem: The problem in the procurement of enlisted personnel for the ACF was one of quality. The combat soldier's job required a specialist; yet the quality of manpower in the ground arms at the end of mobilization (late in 1943) compared unfavorably with that of other elements of the Army.

## II. Reasons for Relative Inferiority of Enlisted Personnel in Ground Arms.

### 1. The Operation of the Army Classification System.

- a. The armed forces as a whole had no central system of personnel classification; e.g., the Navy and the Marine Corps obtained personnel entirely from voluntary enlistment.
- b. The operation of the War Department classification system was such as to relegate men of the lower intelligence levels to combat arms.
  - (1) It permitted voluntary enlistments; this meant that some of the best men were not subject to classification.
  - (2) The three-way classification operated often to keep men of higher intelligence levels out of the combat arms.
    - (a) The simple, bipartite grouping on physical lines into general and limited service categories allowed men to be assigned to combat units for which they were sometimes unfit.
    - (b) Assignment to units according to MOS tended to keep men of higher intelligence levels out of the combat arms.
    - (c) The failure of the system to define mental aptitudes desirable for combat service meant that enlistees well qualified mentally were assigned to the Air Forces and the Service Forces, for which branches well-defined mental aptitudes and abilities were prescribed.

### 2. The High Rate of Attrition among High-Grade Men of Ground Arms.

- a. Many officer candidates from combat divisions elected to try for commissions in branches outside the ground arms.
- b. Many high-grade enlisted men were lost in 1943 to the ASTP.
- c. Many men in ground units volunteered for the Air Forces as aviation cadets, as was permitted throughout the period of mobilization.

Wartime Procurement, continued

3. The Preferential Position of the Air Forces.

The War Department ordered that 75 percent of men sent to the AAF from reception centers must have AGCT scores of 100 or over.

III. The Unsatisfactory Condition of the Ground Arms toward the Completion of Mobilization--Summer, 1943.

1. The ground combat arms had the highest proportion of poorly educated and lowest intelligence personnel.
2. Physically inferior men began to accumulate in combat units.
3. Good squad and patrol leaders were scarce in the ground arms.
4. War neurosis occurred at a much higher rate in the Infantry than in any other branch of the service.
5. Moral was lowest in the ground arms, a situation which may have been due to
  - a.
    - a. the lower pay rate for combat men than for those in the AAF and the technical services.
    - b. the greater danger in combat jobs.
    - c. the possible correlation between morale and intelligence.

IV. Attempts to Rehabilitate the Ground Arms.

1. First attempts--Summer, 1943.
  - a. Unteachable enlistees were eliminated at reception centers.
  - b. Reassignment of high-intelligence men was authorized.
  - c. The success of these attempts was limited because of the continued preferential treatment accorded the AAF.
2. The "Infantry Program" inaugurated in August 1943.
  - a. An intensive publicity campaign was undertaken to glorify the Infantryman.
  - b. The Combat Infantryman Badge was authorized as recognition of combat service.
  - c. An increase in combat pay was allowed to the Infantry.
3. The Physical Profile Plan--set up in January 1944.

Wartime Procurement, continued

- IV. 3. a. In a redefining of physical categories, an overwhelmingly high percentage of top quality men were assigned to AGF.
- b. The plan was only partially successful, because
- 1) profiling was not very accurate.
  - 2) it often operated to the continued advantage of the AAF.
4. Transfer of high-quality personnel to combat positions--early 1944.
- a. Dissolution of the ASTP gave the AGF 73,000 men of the high intelligence levels.
  - b. 24,000 aviation cadets were transferred to the AGF.
- V. The Over-All Result: The last units shipped to the theaters by AGF were generally superior to those shipped earlier in the war.

PROCUREMENT SINCE V-J DAY

- I. Statement of the Problem: To provide the overseas forces with an adequate number of personnel qualified to perform the functions of the occupation armies; and to maintain installations of the Z/I at strength necessary to perform the functions incident to separating veterans and inducting and training new recruits.
- II. Complications in the Problem.
1. There was strong public sentiment against continuing the draft, and public pressure to get the boys home was terrific.
- Note: The magnitude of this aspect of the problem is reflected in General Eisenhower's Statement, Reference # 2, above.
2. The supply of draftees now available was limited to inexperienced and comparatively uneducated 18-year-olds and to a small number of more mature men who had had wartime deferment.
  3. The rapid rate of demobilization tended to deplete the supply of critically needed specialists.
- III. The Voluntary Enlistment Program.
1. It was desired to recruit men in sufficient numbers to do away with the draft.
    - a. This would placate public opinion.
    - b. It would make the army more stable to have term enlistments longer than the term of service allowed under selective service.

Procurement since V-J Day, continued

III. 2. Inducements to enlist or reenlist were publicized.

- a. Choice of assignment was open to three-year enlistees.
  - b. Participation in the benefits of the G-I Bill of Rights was extended to enlistees in the Postwar Army.
  - c. Reenlistment in grade was offered to those who reenlisted within 20 days of discharge; those honorably discharged in grade 7 could reenlist within 20 days in grade 6.
3. Special efforts were made to recruit critically needed specialists.
- a. Interviews were held with such veterans at separation centers.
  - b. Career programs were planned for certain re-enlisted specialists.
  - c. Enlistees in the Military Intelligence Language Service School were promised rapid promotions.
  - d. Partially disabled combat veterans of World War II having certain badly needed MOS's, or trainable in certain skills, were permitted to re-enlist.

IV. Policies on Procurement of Negro Personnel.

1. The one-to-ten ration of Negro to white soldiers was set up.
2. Excessive enlistments during 1946 made necessary the temporary suspension of Negro enlistments except for those having certain needed MOS's.

V. The Army of the Future.

Procurement policies for the future Army are contingent upon the adoption of UMT by Congress.

See statement of General Trudeau, Reference # 3, above.

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