

CANTIGNY OPERATION

Documents pertaining to German Raids (May 27, 1918)
and American Attack and Capture of Cantigny (May 28, 1918).

Selected Documents of:

18th Army.
XXVI Reserve Corps.
82d Reserve Division.
272 Reserve Inf. Regiment.

EDITORS NOTE

The following group of selected German documents, bearing on the Cantigny operation, was assembled and translated by Major Paul B. Harm (Retired) Army War College, Washington, D.C.

Certain documents, not included by Major Harm, have been translated and will be found in this volume immediately following Major Harm's compilation.

The general system of indexing explained in the foreword to this volume differs from that employed by Major Harm. In embodying the work of Major Harm, the system of indexing by page numbers which was adopted by the translator, has been followed.

No changes have been made in the work of the translator. However, certain sketches and maps omitted by Major Harm have been inserted in the proper place in the text in order to make the work as complete as possible. Maps and sketches too large to be included in this volume will be found in the Map Atlas.

It will be noted that certain names for terrain features appear in the German documents and on the sketches, which differ from the names employed on the French and U.S. Maps.

The following list shows the equivalent for these names:

- Fasanerie - Bois de Framicourt.
- Rhombus Wald - Bois de Framicourt.
- Grenz Wald - Unnamed wood bordering the southern edge of Cantigny.
- Granat Wald - Woods of the Chateau de Jenlis.
(Grenade Woods)
- M.G. (Machine Gun) Wald - Bois de Fontaine.
- Grafen Waldchen - Unnamed wood at coordinates 23.2 - 31.0
(1/20,000 French Map).
- Zungen Wald - Bois de Cantigny.
(Tongue Woods)
- Narron Fme. - la Folie Fme.
(Fool's Farm)
- Wolfsschlucht - Ravine between the Bois de Lalval
(Wolf's den or gully) and the Bois de Framicourt.
- Ziethen busch - Bois du Vicomte.
(Ziethen thicket)
- Deutz Wald - Bois de Lalval.
- Aival Wald (sometimes Amval or Ainval) - Bois de Lalval.
- Obsgarten - Orchard just west of northern part of Cantigny.
- Keulen Wald - (Not identified).
(Club Wood)
- Brocken Wald - (Not identified).
(Small Wood)
- Tiergarten - (Not identified).
(Game preserve)
- Höllental - (Not identified).
(Hell Valley)
- Kuhschlucht - (Not identified).
(Cow Ravine)
- Hoch Wald - (Not identified).
(High Wood)

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German Organizations Concerned.

General Information Notes by Translator.

- The 18th German Army -
Commander - General of Infantry v. Hutier.
Chief of Staff - Major General von Sauberzweig.
Operation Officer - Major von Platen.
- The 26th German Reserve Corps.
Commander - Lieut. General Baron v. Watter (Arty. Officer)
Chief of Staff - Major von Kahlden.
Gen. Staff Officer - Captain Neitzel.
- The 82d German Reserve Division - (270 Res. Inf., 271 Res. Inf.,
272 Res. Inf. Regts.)
Commander - Major General von St. Ange.
Gen. Staff Officer - Captain von Poser.
- The 25th German Reserve Division - (168th Inf. Rgt. and Reserve
Infy. Rgts. 83, 118)
Commander - Major General von Mohn.
Gen. Staff Officer - Captain von Petery.
- The 30th German Infantry Division.
Commander - Major General Count v. Lambsdorff.
Gen. Staff Officer - Captain von Geyr.
- Regiments: 83 Reserve Inf. - Major Hubner, Comdg.
270 Reserve Inf. - Major v. Rundstedt, Comdg.
271 Reserve Inf. - Col. Friedrichs, Comdg.
272 Reserve Inf. - Major v. Grothe, Comdg.

Explanation of Names Used by the German Army Between
May 26th and June 5th, 1918.

- "Tarnopol" - Under this name, enterprises and raids were made by the 272 Reserve Inf. Rgt. (82d Division) assisted by Artillery and Minenwerfers.
- "Tannenberg" - Under this name, enterprises and raids were made by the 25th Division.
- "Manfred" - Under this name, feint attacks were made by troops of the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps, to divert the enemy's attention from the ensuing attack of the 7th Army.
- "York" - This name covers the offensive conducted by the 7th Army over the Oise - Aisne Canal and of the 18th Army over the Oise.
- "Gneisenau" - This name covers the proposed attack of the 18th Army between Montdidier and Lassigny, and the concentration sector of troops furnished to assist in the attacks.

Translator.

CANTIGNY ATTACK OF MAY 28, 1918.

WAR DIARY

of the

18th ARMY

From May 27 to May 31, both dates
inclusive.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

SITUATION MAP

of the 18th German Army.

Situation: At noon of May 28, 1918.

Cantigny attack of May 28, 1918.
Order of battle of the 26th Reserve Corps,
at noon, on May 28, 1918.
(Extract from battle order map)

(For Situation Maps, 18th Army showing sector
of XXVI Reserve Corps see the Map Atlas.) - P.L.R.

EXPLANATION.

The original war diary of which the within record is a translation used a double page for each daily entry. These two pages which faced each other, were divided into six columns. Beginning at the left hand side of the left page, these columns had painted headings as follows:

First Column:	Date.
Second "	Place and kind of Shelter (billets).
Third "	Military Activity.
Fourth "	Subsistence, State of Health, Weather.
Fifth "	Gain and loss of subordinated troops. Wherefrom and whereto.
Sixth "	Reflections, Experiences and especially Important Orders.

However for convenience, the above form which demands ruling of columns, etc., has not been used (by the officer representing the U.S. Historical Section in Germany). The entries were copied in continuous order from left to right hand, but wherever, one of the printed headings has been found necessary to make sense, the heading has been copied. The same system has been followed by the translator.

(Note: The War Diary for the 27th of May is arranged in the form of the German original.) - P.L.R.

Date.	Place	Military Activity.	Subsistence-	Gain and	Reflec-
	and		State of	Loss of	tions,
	Kind		Health -	subordin-	Exper-
	of		Weather.	ated	iences
	Shelter.			troops	and
				Where-	Espec-
				from and	ially
				Whereto.	Impor-
					tant
					Orders.
May 27, 1918.	Station, Auroir.	<u>Morning Report-At</u> <u>3d Army Corps.</u> lively artillery activity on both sides. A heavy fire was maintain- ed especially against the center and right flank of the 6th Res.Div., and the hollows at Mailly and Sauvillers were gassed at the same time. Moderate harass- ing from the <u>26th</u> <u>Reserve Corps</u> to the left flank of the army. At the 3d Reserve Divis- ion only did the enemy's artillery firing become more active again in the evening. Our own artillery of the 3d Corps and 26th Res. Corps, has commenced the gassing of the enemy's batteries as planned. La Herelle and Sains- Morainvillers were engaged with heavy flat trajec- tory fire by the <u>26th Reserve Corps.</u> The artillery of our 3d Res. Div. fired gas shells from 11 pm. to 1 am. against the wood patch north and northeast of Mortemer. The enemy threw bombs in the rear areas of the right army flank from 10.30 pm. to 1.45 am. <u>Noon Report:</u> This morning the <u>3d</u> <u>Army Corps</u> and <u>26th Res. Corps</u> carried out the	Changing clouds, sight clear to a little unsettled, north to northeast somewhat squally winds. Temperature, 18 degrees centigrade. (64 :4F.)	<u>Gain:</u> Labor Cos., 1st of 78th 3d of 110th, 1st of 177th, 1st of 7th. Road and con- struction: Co. 66 ar- rived in Ham. Mot- ORIZED Train for wire- less con- struction: No. 938 arrived in Flavy le Martel: Staff Of- ficer in charge of Minenwer- fers arr- ived at Ham. Anti-air- craft columns 40 and 75, anti- aircraft batteries: 543, 546, 561 and heavy Wurttem- berg anti- aircraft battery 127 arri- ved at anti- aircraft group No. 13. Staff of Foot Artillery: Rgt. 163 arrived in Maubeuge. <u>Loss:</u>	Orders pertain- ing to Assault battal- ion 12 and as- sault company 18, (las No. 4280 secret). <u>Appen-</u> <u>dix I</u> (Page 32). Reports, nota- tions and op- eration orders= Appendix Opera- tion docu- ments 21 of of May 31, 1918 Orders pertain- ing to new rules for the whole fur- lough traff- ic (Iib No. 2581) <u>Appen-</u> <u>dix VII</u> (page 34). Orders pertain- ing to rules for the whole fur- lough traff- ic (Iib No. 2581) <u>Appen-</u> <u>dix VII</u> (page 34). Orders pertain- ing to rules for the whole fur- lough traff- ic (Iib No. 2581) <u>Appen-</u> <u>dix VII</u> (page 34). Orders pertain- ing to rules for the whole fur- lough traff- ic (Iib No. 2581) <u>Appen-</u> <u>dix VII</u> (page 34).

Date:	Place	Military Activity.	Subsis-	Gain and	Reflec-
:	and	:	tence -	Loss of sub-	tions,
:	Kind	:	State of	ordinated	Exper-
:	of	:	Health -	troops Where-	iences
:	Shelter.	:	Weather.	from and	and
:	:	:	:	Whereto.	Espec-
:	:	:	:	:	ially
:	:	:	:	:	Impor-
:	:	:	:	:	tant
:	:	:	:	:	Orders.
:	:	:Manfred enterprises	:	:Army field	:
:	:	:as planned. After	:	:hospitals	:
:	:	:the movements to	:	:Reserve 42	:
:	:	:the front on the	:	:and 531,	:
:	:	:evenings and back	:	:Staff of	:
:	:	:again during the	:	:Labor Batta-	:
:	:	:nights, had been	:	:lion No. 73	:
:	:	:carried out on the	:	:and Army	:
:	:	:25th & 26th, strong	:	:Corps Reserve	:
:	:	:infantry patrols,	:	:Column No.	:
:	:	:after gassing the	:	:1111.	:
:	:	:enemy's artillery	:	:	:
:	:	:groups, advanced	:	:	:
:	:	:east of Thory, at	:	:	:
:	:	:Grivesnes and Can-	:	:	:
:	:	:tigny, as well as	:	:	:
:	:	:southwest of Fon-	:	:	:
:	:	:taine, and in spite	:	:	:
:	:	:of the furious re-	:	:	:
:	:	:sistance, penetrated	:	:	:
:	:	:the positions of the	:	:	:
:	:	:enemy everywhere. The	:	:	:
:	:	:3d Corps found the	:	:	:
:	:	:front lines evacua-	:	:	:
:	:	:ted. The 26th	:	:	:
:	:	:Reserve Corps cap-	:	:	:
:	:	:tured several Ameri-	:	:	:
:	:	:cans and two Mach-	:	:	:
:	:	:ine guns.	:	:	:
:	:	: Two of the priso-	:	:	:
:	:	:ners taken fell dur-	:	:	:
:	:	:ing the return	:	:	:
:	:	:march thro' the	:	:	:
:	:	:machine gun fire of	:	:	:
:	:	:the enemy. Moderate	:	:	:
:	:	:artillery activity	:	:	:
:	:	:from the <u>9th Army</u>	:	:	:
:	:	: <u>Corps</u> to the left	:	:	:
:	:	:flank of the army.	:	:	:
:	:	:3 prisoners pertain-	:	:	:
:	:	:ing to the French	:	:	:
:	:	:58 Infantry Div.	:	:	:
:	:	:were delivered to	:	:	:
:	:	:the <u>17th Army Corps</u> .	:	:	:
:	:	:they were captured	:	:	:
:	:	:during a patrol en-	:	:	:
:	:	:terprise by the 5th	:	:	:
:	:	:Reserve Division,	:	:	:
:	:	:on the road Hain-	:	:	:
:	:	:villers-Orvillers.	:	:	:
:	:	:They have not been	:	:	:
:	:	:examined yet. A	:	:	:
:	:	:French patrol was	:	:	:
:	:	:repelled east of	:	:	:

Date:	Place	Military Activity.	Subsis-	Gain and	Reflec-
:	and	:	tence -	Loss of	tions,
:	Kind	:	State	Subordi-	Experien-
:	of	:	of	nated	ces and
:	Shelter.	:	Health -	troops	Espec-
:	:	:	Weather.	Wherefrom	ially
:	:	:	:	and	Impor-
:	:	:	:	Whereto.	tant
:	:	:	:	:	Orders.

:Canny sur Matz. One
 :Alsatian of the 84th
 :Infantry Division is
 :missing (desertion
 :to the enemy suspec-
 :ted).
 : The Wilhelm gun
 :fired 15 shots be-
 :tween 7:30 a.m. and
 :12 noon. No counter
 :action. No enemy
 :flyers.
 :
 :Evening report. A
 :somewhat more heavy
 :fire of the enemy is
 :being placed only
 :against the 3d Corps,
 :especially against
 :the 1st Reserve Di-
 :vision in connection
 :with their patrol
 :raids. One of their
 :patrols advanced as
 :far as the park of
 :Grivesnes which had
 :been evacuated by the
 :enemy. Against all
 :the other fronts
 :there is only a mo-
 :derate and in part
 :only a very slight
 :fire activity. Weak
 :flat trajectory fire
 :of the 9th Army Corps
 :kept the railway sta-
 :tion of St. Just
 :under fire after mid-
 :day. At the right
 :flank of the 223d In-
 :fantry Division,
 :after the repulse of
 :an enemy's patrol,
 :one man of the 72d
 :French Division re-
 :mains in our hands.
 :An enemy's patrol
 :was driven back in
 :front of the 38th
 :Reserve Corps, north-
 :east of Manicump.
 :Distance reconnaiss-
 :ance to Beauvais,
 :Clermont, Pont St.
 :Maxence had no resul-
 :ts. The number of

Date	Place	Military Activity.	Subsistence - State of Health - Weather.	Gain and Loss of subordinated troops Wherefrom and Whereto.	Reflections, Experiences and Especially Important Orders.
:	:	:cars at the railway	:	:	:
:	:	:depot Creil seem less.	:	:	:
:	:	:Combat echelons of	:	:	:
:	:	:the 18th Army took	:	:	:
:	:	:part in the fight in	:	:	:
:	:	:Soissons.	:	:	:
:	:	:Reconnaissance	:	:	:
:	:	:results: Of 14 aviators	:	:	:
:	:	:who found the range*	:	:	:
:	:	:6 belong to 17th	:	:	:
:	:	:and 4 to the 8th	:	:	:
:	:	:Army Corps.	:	:	:
:	:	: <u>Losses:</u> Officers	:	:	:
:	:	:dead 2 wounded 5	:	:	:
:	:	:missing 0	:	:	:
:	:	:Men - dead 28 wounded	:	:	:
:	:	:153 missing 3	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:

*(Registration of artillery fire by aerial observation.) - P.L.R.

May 28 (Station
1918 (Auroir.

Morning Report: At the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps, moderate and at times only a somewhat more rapid growing harassing fire, especially against front combat zones. The gassing of enemy batteries was kept up. At the 9th Army Corps, a strong detachment which advanced against the 222d Infantry Division, after heavy artillery preparation, was repulsed in close combat. The artillery of the 26th Reserve Corps and 9th Army Corps kept the railway yards of Bacouel, Gannes and St. Just under fire. The activity of the enemy's artillery grew more rapid toward the evening against the 17th and 8th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps and after midnight especially so against the 38th Reserve Corps. The 75th Reserve Division made one prisoner in the region of Canny. According to a report from the front the prisoner belongs to the 125th French division. At the 8th Army Corps, Lassigny was engaged with heavy calibre, the positions at and east of Lassigny were kept under a heavy fire. Our artillery engaged on the road Cuts-Namcel, some guns which were being diverted, with a heavy flat trajectory fire. The artillery of the 38th Reserve Corps placed destructive fire in the direction of Blerancourt and on the roads leading southeast thereof.

The aviation activity of the enemy remained trivial while ours grew more lively in the evening. In spite of the clear weather, the enemy's aviation activity was indifferent during the night. Only about 50 bombs were thrown in the vicinity of Rozieres and Ham. Observation reconnaissance between 7:10 and 7:50 p.m., resulted in no traffic on the railway stretch Compiègne-Soissons and the railway depots Compiègne, Soissons were found free. Air Service attack Group No. 3 (First Lieut.

Henke) assumed the offensive in the battle of the 7th Army. Successful machine gun attacks against train columns and artillery north of Soissons. Bombing Squadron No. 4 in several flights attacked Clermont and Creil with a total of 573 bombs (12900 kg); one train in the railroad yard of Creil was burning. Aeroplanes which searched the road Clermont-Estrees-St. Denis with light, discovered two auto-columns of about 20 autos running in an easterly direction. Undefined columns were sighted, marching into Clermont and into the east portion of the Compiègne forest in direction of Pierrefond.

The Wilhelm gun fired 3 shots between 6:35 and 7:05 a.m.

Noon Report: The artillery fire of the enemy grew stronger at about 6 a.m., against the left flank of the 3d Corps and 26th Reserve Corps and against the right flank of the 9th Corps. At about 8 a.m. the fire grew denser against Cantigny, Courtemanche and Fontaine. After artillery preparation lasting 45 minutes, the enemy, supported by seven tanks, attacked north and south of Cantigny. The tanks were partly shot to pieces and partly forced to retire. Cantigny was occupied by the enemy. Fighting is going on for height 104 east of Cantigny. A counter-attack is under preparation. A concentrated fire is being placed on Cantigny for the time being. The artillery of the 3d and 9th Army Corps, assisted by engaging the batteries of the enemy and by reinforcing the fire in front of the 25th Reserve Corps. Railway station St. Just is kept under fire. At the 3d Corps, the enemy advanced, during the heavy fire reported this morning, against and east of Lassigny with large patrols. He was repulsed everywhere. The artillery fire of the enemy kept up lively even at the 17th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps. Observation reconnaissance between 6 and 6:10 a.m. indicated a very small rail traffic in the sector Compiègne-Crepyen Valois-Soissons and in an easterly direction. Quiet in front of 8th Army Corps.

At 12 noon our air service attack groups were pitted against the columns, which were withdrawing on the road Soissons-Chateau-Thierry.

Evening Report: At the 3d Army Corps - a patrol advancing against the centre of the 6th Reserve Division was repulsed. At the 26th Reserve Corps - Height 104 east of Cantigny is firmly in our hands. The front line is located about 200 m. east of the town. The counter attack against Cantigny will be carried out this evening after strong concentrated artillery preparation. According to a later report, the attack against Cantigny was driven home by French troops with tanks and attacks by airplanes. American troops who advanced at the same time against the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division were repulsed with heavy losses. The heavy artillery fire against the 26th Reserve Corps reached as far as the right flank of the 9th Army Corps. Montdidier was heavily engaged. Our artillery kept up the fire against St. Just and as observed with good results. The artillery activity of the enemy against the 17th and 8th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps, was limited to moderate harassing. A detachment of the enemy of about 70 men, attacked our outpost this morning south of Dives. The latter retired, under request for barrage, as previously directed. The enemy pursued hotly and captured three of our men. The outpost has reoccupied its old position. The exchange between the 223 Infantry Division and the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division has been accomplished. The 38th Reserve Corps took over the command of the sector of the 202 Infantry Division and of the new sector of the 9th Bavarian Division at noon today.

Fairly strong air activity on both sides during a heavy clouded sky. Distance reconnaissance as far as Ailly-Breteuil-Estrees-St. Denis, indicated only a small road traffic between Cugnieres and Montiers, from 8.05 to 10.15 a.m. Between 1 and 1.30 p.m. no traffic on the railway stretch Maignelay-St. Just-

Clermont. One of our airplanes is missing, one of our balloons shot down. Captain Berthold, commander of pursuit squadron No. 2, obtained his 29th air victory. While the enemy was bombing the town of Ham from the air, the camp of the prisoners was hit. Five of the guard personnel and nine French prisoners were killed and 49 wounded.

Reconnaissance results: Testing the value of the wireless system; of 30 aviators who found the range, 13 belong to the 3d Army Corps. Otherwise nothing new.

Losses: Officers, dead 1, wounded 5, missing 2.

Men: dead 63, wounded 263, missing 56.

Weather: Dry, cloudy, squally northeastern winds. Temperature, 10 degrees centigrade (50:F).

Gain and Loss of Troops, Wherefrom and whereto:

Gain: 3d Labor battalion of 131st, 2d Labor battalion of 28th to the 38th Reserve Corps.

Loss: Army Corps train columns 237, 247 and 351 to the 7th Army.

Reflections, experiences and especially important orders.

Orders relating to distribution of combat zones (Iad. No. 4129 secret). Appendix 1 (page 33).

Reports, notations and operation orders - Appendix: Operation documents 21 of May 31, 1918.

Statements pertaining to the supply of motor vehicles to the Army. Auto running material and rubber - Appendix VII (Page 35).

May 29, (Station,
1918 (Auroir.

Morning Report. A rapid fire was placed against the right flank of the 3d Army Corps up to midnight, as was also against the left flank of the 2d Army. The fire slackened during the morning hours. The counter-attack of the 26th Reserve Corps last evening was not successful. The attack is to be repeated in a few days after careful preparation. From the 9th Army Corps to the left flank of the army, there is only the usual harassing. The 8th Army Corps engaged the roads in the region of Thourotte with heavy flat trajectory fire. 1 noncommissioned post (1 nco and 5 men), are missing since the raid of the enemy yesterday at and east of Lassigny, apparently the post was surprised by the enemy.

With exception of five bombs thrown down in the sectors Vrely and Warvillers there was no air bombing by the enemy during the night. In spite of a dense fog, our bombardment squadron No. 4, reached the railway yard of Beauvais, and attacked same with 5600 kg. bombs. A large explosion was observed in the vicinity of the depot. An unusual large number of camp fires were seen around Beauvais; they were attacked with machine guns. One airplane is missing.

Noon Report: The artillery activity of the enemy was limited generally to a moderate harassing. Rapid bursts of fire only against our front lines by Cantigny as also against the positions and back area east of Noyon. Roye is under a heavy calibre fire. The artillery of the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps, gassed the enemy's artillery groups between 3 and 5 a.m., and placed the enemy's front positions and assembly points of the infantry, under a heavy barrage, in order to circumvent the intention of our attack. The railway Amiens-St. Just was kept under fire at Faloise, Tartigny and Gannes. The railway station at Breteuil was also engaged with a heavy flat trajectory fire. Two ammunition dumps of the enemy west of Sourdon were set on fire. A man of the 4th French Cuirassier regiment, apparently killed yesterday, was found southeast of Lassigny, (confirmed by the 1st Cuirassier Division). An enemy's patrol was driven back at Sempigny. Two men

of our patrol against Sempigny are missing. One of our double posts north of Quierzy was captured by an enemy patrol.

Evening Report: The enemy's artillery is limiting its activity to moderate harassing against the whole front. Bursts of fire against our new line by Cantigny. The artillery of our 3d Corps kept up its fire against the front positions and approach roads. The 26th Reserve Corps harassed against Cantigny, the front lines and assembly points by Cantigny. Firing against the railway Amiens-St. Just was kept up. Two men are reported missing by the 5th Reserve Division. There is a suspicion that they deserted to the enemy.

Up to now the Wilhelm gun has fired 4 shots. Due to unfavorable weather our own air activity is small and that of the enemy is also inferior. No unusual traffic in front of the 8th Corps. The airplane of bombardment squadron No. 4, reported this morning as missing, has returned; it engaged Gleisdreieck* west of Beauvais with 725 kg. bombs. No air attack of the enemy against our balloons today while 8 such attacks were made yesterday, during which one balloon was shot down burning. English clear text comes sporadically from the sector of the French 36th Division. Otherwise nothing new.

Supplement. A heavy artillery fire of the enemy is being placed against our positions east of Cantigny, since 6 p.m. The Wilhelm gun is firing again. Five shots are being fired with this gun in addition to the four previously reported. Only 4 shots can be fired during day time. This is due to the interference of the balloons of the enemy, which must previously be dispersed by aviators or through a heavy flat trajectory fire.

An enemy's airplane was shot down by our pursuit plane No. 15 yesterday, northeast of Soissons.

Compiègne was engaged last night with 10 shots of heavy flat trajectory fire, 15 shots will be fired tonight.

Losses - officers - dead 0 wounded - 4 missing - 0.

Men " 35 " 178 " 2.

Weather: Clear, dry, gentle but squally northeastern winds. Temperature 18 degrees centigrade (64.4F).

Gain and Loss of Troops, Wherefrom and Whereto:

Gain: Ammunition column 253, Foot artillery ammunition column No. 282. Wagon park column No. 691 to the 17th Army Corps.

Loss: Army Corps train columns 78, 15 and 986 and Bavarian No. 185 to the 7th Army. Landsturm battalion No. 4.

Reflections, experiences and especially important orders.

Reports, notations and operation orders - Appendix:

Operation documents 21. May 31, 1918.

Information pertaining to machine gun arrangements and machine gun equipment supplies for the 18th Army, during the spring offensive of 1918.

- Appendix VII (page 37).

Orders pertaining to the change in armament of Field artillery organizations with equipment 16 (Arty. Staff Officer 2, No. 2871/18) - Appendix VII (page 36)

*(Railway triangle or Junction.) - G.W.M.

May 30 { Station,
1918 { Auroir.

Morning Report: At the 3d Army Corps - the enemy is harassing against the front combat zone, Avre bottom and back area. The railway depot at Chaulois was engaged with heavy flat trajectory fire without success. At the 26th Reserve Corps, after a heavy fire on our frontmost lines east of Cantigny, at about 5.50 p.m.,

our infantry aviator was able to observe the readiness of the enemy to attack. The annihilation fire which was placed immediately by our artillery, prevented the development of the attack. Firing increasing in volume was renewed at about 8 p.m. and was followed at 8.45 p.m. by an infantry attack against height 104. The latter was repulsed. Quietness after midnight. At the 9th, 17th and 3th Corps and 38th Reserve Corps, moderate artillery activity as far as Noyon. An ammunition dump was set on fire near Roye sur Matz in front of the 17th Corps. The activity of the enemy's artillery was more brisk after 6 p.m., in front of the 223d Infantry Division. It engaged all the canal crossings, partly with heavy calibre assisted by air observation. A few crossings were destroyed. Based on a wireless message reporting the possible withdrawal of the 55th French Division, patrols, yesterday afternoon and during the night, occupied the south bank of the Oise River and established the fact. The Corps is ready, whenever the situation requires it, to cross the Oise with its flank.

Lively air activity on both sides in the evening and during the night, the weather being clear. Some air squadrons of the enemy advanced as far as our back area and bombed. One squadron threw bombs into Aulnoye causing losses. Another strong squadron (10 airplanes) protected by attack planes, engaged the railroad depot Chaulnes and towns in the sector of the 3d Army Corps with bombs, damage not yet ascertained. Forces of our pursuit squadron No. 2, participated in the fighting southwest of Soissons. Our bombardment squadron No. 4, engaged Beauvais with 4300 kg. bombs. St. Just en Chaussée with 3300 kg. and Clermont with 1600 kg. bombs. Conflagrations were observed at the objectives. Several railway stations examined by flares, showed only a small rail traffic at Rivecourt and Creil and nothing striking. We placed a heavy flat trajectory fire against Tartigny, Breteuil, St. Just, Compiègne, Cuts and Carlepont. One airplane is missing.

Noon Report: Generally speaking, there is moderate harassing. Brisk artillery activity exists from time to time on the Oise front against the 26th Reserve Corps only. The firing increased during the morning against the combat zone of the 26th Reserve Corps northeast of Cantigny, but there is only a slight harassing since 9 a.m. A rapid fire was placed against the sectors of the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division and 223d Infantry Division of the 38th Reserve Corps. The fire against the 9th Bavarian Division died down during the morning hours, but there is still a heavy fire against the Oise front. A patrol of the enemy was driven off southeast of Larbroye. The 38th Reserve Corps has orders to force the crossings of the Oise without delay. To this end, the crossings still held by the enemy as well as the enemy's lively artillery fire are under an effective fire of our own artillery. The 105th Infantry Division (German) is being brought up via Chauny and Vlerancourt. The railroad line Amiens-St. Just is still being engaged with medium and heavy flat trajectory fire. One of our aviators observed a hit made on a train at the Breteuil railway station.

A giant plane of squadron 500, engaged the railway station of Beauvais with 1400 kg. bombs. Long distance reconnaissance has established only a small traffic within a radius of 10 km. around Compiègne. There was a total of 6 trains between 6.10 and 6.40 a.m., in both directions, between Compiègne and Crepy en Valois. There is no unusual traffic on the roads in the area north of this railroad stretch. Three planes of the enemy were shot down, Captain Berthold, commander of Pursuit Squadron No. 2, obtained his 30th and 31st air victory.

The two runaways of the 5th Reserve Division, reported last evening, are from Brandenburg.

Evening Report. With exception of the sector of the 38th Reserve Corps, the artillery activity on both sides was limited to harassing against the combat zone and back area on the whole Army front. Firing against the railroad St. Just-Amiens is being continued in a very active manner. After heavy firing directed against the artillery of the enemy, and the crossings of the Oise River, the infantry of the 223d Infantry Division crossed the river during the afternoon hours, between Varesness and Bretigny. Reports of aviators confirm, that so far 4 companies have passed through Varesness and reached Bretigny. The 105th Infantry Division passed with at least two battalions over the canal at Bichancourt and is advancing against Manicamp. Information submitted by the 7th Army Corps that Manicamp had been taken, has so far not been confirmed. The advance of the 223d and 105th Infantry Divisions continues in a southwesterly direction. The 9th Bavarian Infantry Division will today take over the sector of Pont-l'Eveque-Varesness.

Our own air activity is vigorous, that of the enemy rather inferior.

Long distance reconnaissance showed: Between 11.05 a.m. and 2.45 p.m. a small rail and roadway traffic and normal railroad deliveries, as far as the line south of Nantheuil-Villers-Cotterets-Soissons. At 12.30 p.m.: lively traffic on the road west of Soissons in the region Tracy le Val-Bailly in a westerly direction, at Vic and Attichy in direction to the north and northeast. Lively air traffic at the aerodrome Anvillers south of Clermont. Our heavy flat trajectory fire engaged Carlepont and the roads leading from that place to the south and southeast, Tracy le Val and Tracy le Mont and the ravine leading from Nampcel to the south.

Wilhelm gun fired four shots this morning, four more are to be fired this evening. Results of wireless testing indicate the withdrawal of reserves from the sector southeast of Amiens and that furloughs have apparently been stopped by the enemy.

Losses - Officers - dead 1 wounded 2 missing 0.
Men - dead 45 wounded 200 missing 6.

Weather: Cheerful, dry, a little turbid, somewhat squally north-east winds. Temperature, 19 degrees centigrade (66:2 F).

Gain and Loss of troops. Wherefrom and Whereto:

Gain: Heavy anti-aircraft battery 191 to the 17th Army Corps. Staff of Group train echelon No. 32, Carrier pigeon detachments 1116 and 1119, Group Commander of air service unit No. 1, L of C transport park Column No. 26, Artillery park Company No. 352, Foot artillery Batty. Siege, No. 6, to the 38th Reserve Corps. Army Corps column 352, Wurttemberg column No. 324, to the 17th Army Corps. L of C transport park column No. 159, to the commander of the ammunition columns and trains No. 2. Ammunition column No. 41, to the L of C commandant. 2d Battalion Foot Artillery Rgt. No. 12 arrived at Maubeuge.

Loss: Salvage company Saxon No. 8 and Tradesman Co. II (of the 3d Army), Army Corps column No. 15 and Headqrs. L of C. No. 38.

Reflections, experiences and especially important orders.

Orders pertaining to the employment of Infantry Brigade Commanders (Ia No. 4432 secret) - Appendix I (page 35).

Statements on repairs of salvaged machine gun equipment by the Infantry Machine Gun Workshop of the Army. (Staff officer of M.G. troops 4039) - Appendix VII (page 39)

Reports, notations and operation orders - Appendix - Operation documents 21 of May 31, 1918.

May 31 (Station,
1918 (Auroir.

Morning Report: At the 3d, 17th and 9th Army Corps, the enemy limited its artillery activity to moderate harassing. At the 26th Reserve Corps he frequently answered our feint attack fire with barrage. Our artillery engaged the railway plants south of Amiens and the railway depots Breteuil-Gannes-St. Just with heavy flat trajectory fire. The enemy's artillery activity became more lively during the evening against the centre and left flank of the 17th Army Corps and kept up very active during the night. A patrol of the enemy which, after strong artillery preparation, advanced against the centre of the 75th Reserve Division, was thrown back by a counter-attack after our sentry post had withdrawn as previously ordered. At the 8th Army Corps and right flank of 38th Reserve Corps, increased harassing at intervals. The left flank of the 38th Reserve Corps, last evening, took the towns of the enemy's bank of the Oise River from Conacry-Pontoise, inclusive to and the town of Manicamp, after the 223d and 105th infantry divisions had crossed the river. The 105th infantry division reached the region Camellie and le Fresne. Camellie and le Fresne were taken this morning by troops from the line Rendez-vous-Ferme (east of Pontoise). The towns Cuts and Lombraye have been reached. The enemy resisted at Rendez-vous-Ferme. The crossings at Varesnes and Bretigny were completed during the night. According to an order, which was picked up, the enemy is to withdraw to the region of Touvent-Ferme west of Moulin.

Slight enemy air activity at night during a clear sky. A few observation planes passed over our front army sector. About 50 bombs were discharged against the rear area of the 3d Army Corps. Our bombardment squadron attacked Creil during the night. Details are lacking.

General impression of yesterday's long distance reconnaissance: Concentration of reserves located in front of the army in the sector St. Just-Breteuil-Conty-Beauvais-Clermont and entraining at the railway depots Milly, Beauvais and Clermont. Bringing up of smaller parts, from the region Estress-St. Denis, direction Compiègne. Moving of empty cars from railway station Creil or transit traffic.

Wilhelm gun fired four more shots last evening besides the 4 already reported.

Compiègne was engaged with 24 cm shells.

Noon Report: The artillery activity of the enemy was lively during the morning hours against the whole of the Army front and at times increased to a very heavy and long lasting fire of concentration, against the sectors of the 1st and 25th Reserve Divisions and the right flank of the 82d Reserve Division, against Mesnil and Fontaine, 3d, 5th and Bavarian 9th, Reserve Divisions and Noyon. Our artillery answered with rapid harass fire against combat and rear zones.

Fire of destruction was placed by us on the enemy's trenches, at Cantigny and the town itself. The railway station of St. Just was taken under fire. Under the protection of its own concentration fire, the enemy captured a double sentry post in the sector of the 6th Reserve Division. A patrol of the enemy was repulsed northeast of the Grivesnes Park by the 1st Reserve Division. Parts of the 223d Infantry Division have crossed the Oise River at Pontoise and are now advancing against the road Sempigny-Laigles. After breaking the strong resistance of the enemy at Rendez-vous-Ferme the road Pontoise-la Pommeraye has been reached. The 105th Infantry Division has won the line Bellefontaine-high road west of Nampcel and has established contact with the 211th Infantry Division. The right flank of the division has been launched against Mont-de-Choisy, which is still in the hands

of the enemy. Command posts 223d Infantry Div. at Morlincourt, 105th Inf. Div. at Camellie et Fresne. In addition to their authorized artillery, 2 mixed heavy field howitzer battalions and 1 mortar battalion have been attached to the 223d and 105th Infantry Divisions. Three heavy battalions have also been assigned to the 38th Reserve Corps. Two dead French soldiers of the 4th Cuirassier regiment (1st Cuirassier Division) were picked up south of Lassigny.

Bombardment squadron No. 4 and Reserve Flight No. 500, attacked the railway depots of Creil, St. Just and Compiègne last night with 21400 kg. bombs. Conflagrations were observed in Creil and hits on the main railway track. Night observations disclosed active railway and highway traffic in the Sector Amiens-Blargies-Compiègne; main direction southeast. Early morning reconnaissance (visual observation) from 8 to 10 a.m. disclosed: (1) Three divisions (estimated) assembling around Crepy en Valois. (2) Main railway traffic on line Paris-Crepy, seven trains were seen, of these four very long ones alone between Tieux-Nanteuil le Haudouain. (3) In direction Paris-Survillers-Creil, 3 trains, in direction Creil-Chantilly, 3 trains (empty). (4) Switching yard of Creil, very much filled. Around Creil, parking of very many motor trucks, apparently waiting to be loaded. (5) Lines Beaumont-Creil and Creil-Clermont, practically empty (bomb attacks?). (6) Clermont placed under heavy fire. (7) Motor traffic very heavy in direction St. Just en Chaussée-Estres-St. Denis and Bulles-Clermont. (8) The auto traffic generally seems to be in the direction of Compiègne, and is very heavy from Compiègne to Vic, the traffic vehicles number about as many as would be necessary for moving the infantry of a division. These are being engaged by heavy flat trajectory fire and air-combat echelons.

Evening Report: The brisk artillery activity of the enemy died down about noon. Only at the 26th Reserve Corps, against the 25th Reserve Division, did the fire grow more heavier for a short time, at about 2 p.m. At the 3d Corps, the railway depot at Chaulnes was engaged with long range railway-guns of the heaviest calibre from the region Blangy-Trouville and without an interruption of the traffic. Engagement of these guns, should they renew their attack, has been prepared for in conjunction with the 2d Army. Roye was also placed under fire several times. Our own artillery kept up its fire against the railway Amiens-St. Just, and the depots at Breteuil and Compiègne. The 223d Infantry Div. has not been able to advance on the attack front beyond the enemy's position in line of Le Meriquin Ferme-Mont de Choisy. 30 prisoners and one machine gun were taken during the repulse of the enemy's counter attacks. According to the latest long delayed reports, the 105th Infantry Div. is advancing from the line, southeast portion of the Bois de le Montagne-high road southwest of Nampcel. Both Divisions have been directed to push the attack home and to reach the Aisne River. The noise of entrenchment work under way on Mt. Renaud was heard during the entire night.

Our own air activity is lively, that of the enemy between Moreuil-Montdidier very lively and between Montdidier and Noyon very slight. Long distance reconnaissance from 7.55 to 11.20 a.m. in sector Poix-Forges-Beauvais-Breteuil disclosed: Slight rail traffic on the main lines, much rolling stock at the railway depot Blargies and more at Beauvais. The railway stations Formerie, Crevecoeur, St. Omer, Milly, Beauvais, Conty and Breteuil suggest a somewhat heavy traffic, the loading platforms being covered with unloaded trucks and horse-drawn wagons. Active traffic on the highways Amiens to Hardivillers, from Conty to Crevecoeur, at Blicourt and to the railway station Beauvais. Aerodrome Tille apparently evacuated. Reconnaissance flights to the Aisne-line disclosed rearward movements to the south. Air attack Group No. 3, participated in the fighting in the region Carlepont-Nampcel. 7800 machine gun rounds and 81 fragmentation bombs were

discharged against columns. 1 captive balloon was shot down and burned. Our pursuit squadron shot down three of the enemy's planes. Lieut. Putter obtained his twenty-sixth air victory. Wilhelm gun fired 6 shots today.

Long distance reconnaissance results of May 30: Testing of wireless service; increased range finding activity on the front of the 3d Army Corps. Four undamped stations have appeared since yesterday in the region Port. St. Maxene. It is possible that these are corps posts. This will have to be cleared up.

Losses: Officers - dead 16 wounded 26 missing 8.
Men dead 255 wounded 844 missing 480.

Weather: Bright, dry, somewhat squally northeastern winds. Temperature 22 degrees centigrade (71.6 F).

Gain and Loss of troops, Wherefrom and Whereto:

Gain: Reserve Field Artillery 57, Field Artillery 221, 8th and 10th companies Guard Reserve Pioneer Rgt. Foot Artillery battalions 160, 42, 46, 2d battalion Reserve 14, 142, 3d battery Bavarian 20, to the 8th Army Corps. Field Artillery 268 and 50, 1st battalion Foot Arty. 9, 4th battalion Reserve 14, 3d battalion foot arty. 25, to the 17th Army Corps. Field Artillery 20, Divisional Bridge Train 32, 2d battalion Foot Arty. 9, 3d Battalion Reserve Foot Artillery 12, 1st battalion Reserve Foot Artillery 14, 3d Battery Foot artillery 149 to the 38th Reserve Corps. Supply park 645 to the L of C. Staff of Foot Artillery 7, arrived at Flavy le Martel, Staff of Foot artillery 13, arrived at Fergnier. New units formed at the Hdqrs of L of C, - Field Police detachment 118, 119, 120.

Loss: Corps Bridge Train Bavarian No. 2, from Jeumont to the 7th Army.

Reflections, experiences and especially important orders:

Reports, notations and operation orders - Appendix :

Operation documents 21 of May 31, 1918.

Estimate of the situation (25 - May 31, 1918) - Appendix III.

Statements of the supply of ammunition, equipment, and replacement of men for pioneer organizations (Gen. of Pioneers, 1600 (IV) - Appendix VII, (Page 40).

For the Army Commander,

Burkner (?)
Lieutenant Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

CANTIGNY ATTACK OF MAY 28, 1918.

War Diary (Selected Extracts)

of the 18th German Army.

Daily results of Reconnaissances

for the period May 28 to May 31, 1918.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

Note: The extracts are complete for the
organizations covered.

Morning Report of May 28, 1918.

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

(6 am.)

Moderate and at times increasing harassing against combat position and rear areas. Our artillery completed gassing the battery nests which were gassed yesterday and placed harass fire against towns and highways far into the rear areas, and against the railway lines at Bacouel and Gannes. Sight good. North wind.

Headquarters, 13th Army.

Against the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps moderate, and at times also a somewhat more increasing harassing, above all, against the foremost combat zone. The gassing of the enemy's batteries was continued. A rather strong detachment of the enemy which, after artillery preparation, advanced against the 222d Infantry Division, was repulsed in close combat. The artillery of the 26th Reserve Corps and 9th Army Corps kept the railway stations of Bacouel-Gannes and St. Just under fire. The enemy's artillery fire increased during the evening against the 17th and 8th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps, and after midnight against the 38th Reserve Corps especially. Our artillery engaged enemy's guns withdrawing on the highway Cuts-Nampcel, with heavy flat trajectory fire. The artillery of the 38th Reserve Corps placed harass fire in the direction of Blercourt and the roads leading from that place to the southeast. In the evening, the air activity of the enemy remained inconsiderable, while ours increased. Although the night was clear, the enemy's air activity was light, only about 50 bombs were thrown down in the vicinity of Rozières and Ham. Air reconnaissance from 7:10 to 7:50 p.m., indicated no railway traffic on the line Compiègne-Soissons. Railway stations Compiègne and Soissons empty. Our battle group No. 3 (1st Lieut. Henke) took part in the battle of the 7th Army and made successful machine gun attacks against columns and artillery, north of Soissons. Bombardment squadron No. 4, in repeated flights, threw 573 bombs (12,900 kg.) on Clermont and Creil. A train was set on fire at the Creil railway station. Planes which illuminated the highway Clermont-Estrees St. Denis, located two auto columns of about 20 cars. Columns of undetermined character were seen marching toward Clermont and in the east portion of the Compiègne forest in direction of Pierrefond. The Wilhelm gun fired 3 shots from 6:35 to 7:05 p.m. Weather clear. Light northerly winds. Temperature 9 degrees centigrade.

Noon Report of May 28, 1918.

(11.35 am.)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

During the remainder of the night lively harassing. Strong fire against infantry and artillery positions since 6:30 a.m. Downstream valley and rearward connections were gassed. The firing increased after 8 a.m. against Cantigny, Courtemanche and Fontaine. The enemy invaded Cantigny from the north and south at about 8:45 a.m. Seven tanks assisted its attack. The latter were partly shot to pieces by our artillery and minenwerfer fire; and partly forced to retire. Cantigny is occupied by the enemy. Fighting is going on for height No. 104. No further reports received. Counter attack is being prepared. At night, our artillery harassed the supports of the enemy and their rearward communications far into the rear areas. Heavy waves of fire were placed in front of the left flank of the 25th Reserve Division. Reports of losses will follow.

Headquarters, 18th Army.

The enemy's artillery fire increased at about 6 a.m. against the left flank of the 3d Army Corps, 26th Reserve Corps and right flank of the 9th Army Corps. At about 8 a.m. the fire grew more heavy against Cantigny, Courtemanche and Fontaine. After 45 minutes of steady artillery preparation, the enemy, supported by seven tanks, advanced north and south of Cantigny. The tanks were partly shot to pieces and partly forced to retire. Cantigny was occupied by the enemy. Fighting for height 104 east of Cantigny in progress. The counter attack is being organized. Concentrated bursts of fire are being placed at present on Cantigny. The artillery of the 3d and 9th Army Corps, assisted by engaging the enemy's batteries and by placing support fire in front of the 26th Reserve Corps. Railway station St. Just is still under our fire. At the 3d Army Corps, during the heavy firing reported this morning, the enemy attacked with a strong patrol against Lassigny and east thereof, but was repulsed everywhere. The harassing of the enemy continued to be lively also, against the 17th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps. Air reconnaissance from 6 to 6:10 a.m., indicated a very light railroad traffic in the sector east of Compiègne-Crepy en Valois-Soissons. It is quiet in front of the 8th Army Corps. At noon our battle planes were set against the enemy's columns withdrawing on the highway Soissons-Chateau-Thierry.

Evening Report of May 28, 1918.

(6:40 pm.)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

The Dom stream valley was densely gassed during the morning hours. Strong artillery activity continued until 10 am. when it died down to a medium harass fire. Dom stream valley is being gassed again densely since 4 pm. After a very heavy artillery preparation, French troops, supported by a great number of infantry flyers and 6 tanks, attacked our positions north, west and south of Cantigny, at 8:20 a.m. American troops which attacked in front of the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division were repulsed with heavy losses. Cantigny was taken by the enemy who is now entrenching about 200 meters east of Cantigny. Our front line runs as formerly established: Right flank - old line plan square 7910-20c, thence to southeast, turning back to plan square 8011/10a, thence in southeast direction to plan square 8111/5d and back to the old line. The following observation was made at about 1 pm: Tanks on the move from Coulemelle to Rocquencourt. Motor trucks from Serevillers to Villers. Reinforcements from Broyes and the forest north of Broyes to the northeast. Skirmishers are advancing to the Belle Assise farm in plan square 8210 and 8310, and to the east. Supports in the Zungen forest. For this reason it is quite likely that the enemy will renew the attack. The counter attack to retake our former position is ordered for 6.45 pm. Our artillery placed annihilation fire repeatedly against enemy's batteries and traffic. Assemblies of the enemy in the Fontaine forest were placed under annihilation fire at 12 noon and 1.15 pm. Air activity very brisk. Two planes of the enemy were shot down with machine-gun fire.

Headquarters, 18th Army.

At the 3d Army Corps - An enemy's patrol which advanced this morning against the centre of the 6th Reserve Division was repulsed. At the 26th Reserve Corps - Height 104 east of Cantigny is firmly in our hands. The foremost line runs about 200 m. east of the town. The counter attack against Cantigny will be carried out this evening, after thorough artillery preparation. According to latest reports, the attack against Cantigny was made by French troops with tanks and battle planes, while American troops, attacking at the same time, against the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division, were repulsed with heavy losses. The enemy's strong artillery activity against the 26th Reserve Corps also reached as far as the right flank of the 9th Army Corps.

Montdidier was heavily engaged. Our artillery kept up its fire against St. Just with good results. At the 17th and 8th Corps and 38th Reserve Corps, the enemy's fire was limited to moderate harassing. An enemy's detachment of about 70 men attacked one of our outposts south of Dives this morning. Complying with instructions, the outpost retired under request for barrage. Three men were made prisoners by the enemy who pursued hotly. The outpost has resumed its former position. The exchange of the 223d Infantry Division with the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division has been accomplished. The 38th Reserve Corps assumed command at 12 noon today, over the sector of the 202d Infantry Division and the new sector of the 9th Bavarian Division. In consequence of heavy clouds there is only a fairly strong air activity on both sides. Air reconnaissance as far as Ailly-Breteuil-Estrees St. Denis from 8:05 to 10:15 am., showed only a light highway traffic between Cuignieres and Montiers. No traffic on the railway line Maignelay-St. Just-Clermont from 1 to 1:30 pm. One of our planes is missing, one of our balloons was shot down. Captain Berthold, commander of Pursuit Squadron No. 2, obtained his 29th air victory. During the enemy's air attack against Ham last night, the camp of the prisoners was hit. Killed, 5 men of the guard personnel, 9 French prisoners; wounded, 49. Reconnaissance results: Wireless intelligence - of 30 range adjustments with the help of flyers, 13 were made by the 3d Army Corps. Otherwise nothing special. Weather, dry, cloudy, squally north-north-easterly winds. Temperature 16 degrees centigrade.

Morning Report of May 29, 1918.

6:55 am.

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

Moderate and at times increasing harass against Infantry and Battery positions and rear areas. Our artillery, acting under orders of the 82d Reserve Division, placed destructive and barrage fire against Cantigny and harassed against enemy emplacements and supports. The counter attack conducted last evening at 6.45 pm, by the 82d Reserve Division, won for us, under heavy losses, our old positions up to 200 m. north and 500 m. southeast of Cantigny. Raiding, conducted last night, against the strongly occupied town, had no success. Our foremost line to the north runs 200 m. north of Cantigny and in the east through the east side of the manor park. Another counter attack is under preparation.

Headquarters, 18th Army.

Up to midnight, a lively fire was placed against the right flank of the 3d Army Corps and also against the left flank of the 2d Army, the fire dying down during the morning hours. The counter attack conducted last evening by the 26th Reserve Corps did not succeed. The attack is to be renewed in a few days after thorough preparation. From the 9th Army Corps to the left flank of the army, there is only the usual harassing. The 8th Army Corps engaged the highways in the region of Thourotte with heavy flat trajectory fire. One noncommissioned officers post (1 nco and 5 men) is missing since yesterday's raid of the enemy at and east of Lassigny, the post evidently being surprised. With the exception of 5 bombs thrown down during the night in the region of Vrely and Warvillers, no bombing was conducted by the enemy's planes.

Our bombardment squadron No. 4, attacked the Beauvais railway station and, in spite of a dense fog, reached that place with 10 planes and engaged with 5600 kg. bombs. An extensive explosion was observed in the vicinity of the railway station. Exceptionally numerous camp fires around Beauvais were engaged with machine guns. One plane is missing. Weather heavy and unsettled, light north wind. Temperature 11 degrees centigrade.

Noon Report of May 29, 1918.

11.30 am.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

During the rest of the night moderate harassing against Infantry and Artillery positions and rearward areas as far as and inclusive of Guerbigny. Toward morning, lively concentration of fire against our line east of Cantigny. Machine gun fire out of Cantigny and terrain north and south there of. Our artillery placed annihilation waves of fire from 3.30 to 4.30 am. in front of right flank of 25th Reserve Division and gassed, from 4 to 5 am. the enemy's battery groups, Machine Gun Woods, hollow south-east of Broyes and forest northeast of Cardennois. At the 82d Reserve Division we discharged barrage and destructive fire, 20 shots being fired on the Gannes railway station.

Losses: 25th Reserve Division (supplement to noon report of May 28):

Officers - dead 0 wounded 4, missing 2.
Men - dead 20, wounded 83, missing 28.
Sick 4.

Of these for Tannenberg enterprise:

Officers - dead 0, wounded 4, missing 2.
Men - dead 16, wounded 58, missing 28.

Those reported as missing were left behind either dead or severely wounded.

82d Reserve Division: (for May 27 and 28)

Artillery - dead 1 officer, 17 men.
- wounded 29 men.

Infantry losses not yet ascertained. Correct report follows.

25th Reserve Division (83d Reserve Inf. Rgt. not included)-

Officers - dead 0, wounded 1, missing 0.
Men - dead 6, wounded 35, missing 0.
Sick - gassed 3, hospital sick 5.

Losses at the 83d Reserve Infy. Rgt. are heavy.

30th Infantry Div. (Reserve). Losses of the Second line echelon, not yet ascertained.

Headquarters, 18th Army.

The artillery activity of the enemy was restricted generally to moderate harassing but there were lively fire concentrations against the front lines at Cantigny as well as against the position and rear areas east of Noyon. Roye was engaged with heavy calibre. The artillery of the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps gassed from 3 to 5 am. the enemy's artillery groups and, in order to mislead our intention to attack, placed heavy waves of fire against the foremost positions and assembly points of the enemy's infantry. The railway Amiens-St. Just was kept under fire at Faloise, Tartigny and Gannes. The railway depot at Breteuil was also engaged with heavy flat trajectory fire. Two of the enemy's ammunition dumps were exploded west of Sourdon. A French soldier of the 4th Cuirassier regiment (1st Cuirassier division) apparently killed yesterday morning, was found southeast of Lassigny. An enemy's patrol was repulsed at Sempigny. Two men of our patrol against Sempigny are missing. One of our double posts was captured by an enemy's patrol, north of Quierzy.

Evening Report of May 29, 1918.

6.15 pm.

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

Slight artillery harassing against Infantry terrain, Dom-stream and batteries. Fire concentration against our new line east of Cantigny. Our artillery harassed against enemy's assembly zones, Cantigny and enemy's lines east and west of the town. Active motor truck traffic on highway from Serevillers to Broyes and Villers was taken under fire; sight good only from the ground. Light north wind. A balloon of the enemy hovers over each of the following plan squares 8303/5c, 8605/18c, 8906/20b. The air service activity is slight.

Headquarters 18th Army.

The enemy's artillery was confined to moderate harassing against the whole front. Concentration of fire against our new lines of Cantigny. The artillery of the 3d Army Corps kept up its fire on front positions and approach roads. 26th Reserve Corps harassed against Cantigny and on the front lines and assembly points, at Cantigny. The railway Amiens-St. Just was further engaged. 2 men missing at the 5th Reserve Division. There is a suspicion that they deserted to the enemy. Wilhelm has so far fired 4 shots. Due to unfavorable weather our air activity is light, that of the enemy very light. No exceptional activity in front of the 8th Army Corps. The plane of bombardment squadron No. 4, reported this morning as missing, has returned. It engaged Gleisdreieck west of Beauvais with 725 kg. bombs. No air attacks on our balloons today while yesterday eight took place during which one was shot down burning.

Results of reconnaissances on May 28: Wireless intelligence service: From time to time English clear text is heard in the sector of the 36th French Division. Otherwise nothing new. Weather bright, dry, light squally north-northeast winds. Temperature 18 degrees centigrade.

Supplement.

Heavy artillery fire of the enemy is being placed against our positions east of Cantigny since 6 pm. Wilhelm has resumed firing. Besides the 4 shots already reported, 5 more will be fired. Due to the interference of enemy balloons, only 4 shots can be fired during the day. The balloons had to be driven off by aviators and through heavy flat trajectory fire, ere the firing could be resumed. An enemy's plane was shot down burning yesterday, northeast of Soissons, by pursuit Squadron No. 15. Compiègne was engaged last night with 10 shots of heavy flat trajectory fire. Fifteen shots are to be fired tonight.

Morning Report of May 30, 1918.

(6:56 A.M.)

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

After thorough artillery preparation against infantry and battery positions, Aival woods and Fasanerie, reaching as far as the center of the 25th Reserve Division, the enemy formed for the attack at about 5:30 p.m. Our annihilation fire, placed immediately and well directed, prevented the development of the attack. The heavy fire of the enemy against trenches east of Cantigny, Framicourt, hollow south thereof and Fontaine continued until about 6:40 p.m., when it slackened somewhat, only to increase again to a heavy annihilation fire. The artillery activity on both sides was very brisk to about 11 p.m. after which it died down by the enemy. Our artillery kept up the fire against Cantigny and the trenches of the enemy. Further attacks were not made. The air activity is brisk on both sides. Bombardment flights during the night.

Headquarters 18th Army.

At the 3d Army Corps the enemy is harassing against the front combat zone, Avre-bottom and rear areas. Railway depot Chaulnes was engaged without results, with heavy flat trajectory fire. At the 26th Reserve Corps, it was noticed that the enemy at 5:30 p.m. was forming for an attack after placing a heavy fire against our front lines east of Cantigny. Annihilation fire opened immediately by our artillery stopped the development of the attack. After another more heavy artillery fire at about 8 p.m., an infantry attack was made at 8:45 p.m., against height 104. This

attack was repulsed by us. After midnight it was more quiet. Moderate artillery activity at the 9th, 17th and 3th Army Corps and 38th Reserve Corps as far as Noyon. An ammunition depot was set on fire in front of the 17th Army Corps at Roye sur Matz. The enemy's artillery was more active in front of the 223d Infantry Division. It engaged all the canal crossings, partly with heavy calibre under air observation. A few of the crossings were destroyed. As a wireless report indicates the possible withdrawal of the 55th French Division, our patrols occupied the south bank of the Oise yesterday afternoon and during the night to make sure of the withdrawal. The corps is ready to cross the Oise with its flank, as soon as the situation demands it. Active aviation during the evening and night by clear weather. Several air squadrons of the enemy attacked our rear areas with bombs. One squadron threw bombs on Aulnoye, causing losses. Another strong squadron (10 planes) protected by battle planes, attacked and bombed the railway station at Chaulnes and towns in the sector of the 3d Army Corps; damage not yet ascertained. Forces of our pursuit squadron No. 2, participated in the combats south of Soissons. Bombardment squadron No. 4, threw 4300 Kg. bombs on Beauvais, 3300 Kg. on St. Just en Chaussée, 1600 Kg. on Clermont. Fires were observed at the objectives. Some illumination of the highways and railway stations showed little traffic at Bivecourt and Creil, otherwise nothing special. Our heavy flat trajectory fire was placed against Tartigny, Breteuil, St. Just, Compiègne, Cuts and Carlepont. One plane is missing. Weather bright, somewhat unsettled, light regular northeast winds. Temperature 8 degrees Centigrade.

Noon Report of May 30, 1918.

(11:35 a.m.)

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

The artillery fire of the enemy revived toward morning and at times lay over the sector of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272 as a heavy annihilation fire, partly it also reached the sector of the 25th Reserve Division. The fire died down slowly. Since 9 a.m. there is only a slight harass against combat positions and rear areas. Our artillery harassed against approach roads, supports and enemy trenches, and gassed the east portion of Villers with mustard gas, and at the dawn of day placed annihilation waves of fire against enemy's trenches north and east of Cantigny. Slight air activity. Sight moderate. Three American prisoners were taken during the counter-attack against Cantigny on May 28.

Losses: 82d Reserve Division (supplement to noon report of May 28)

Infantry - officers	- dead 1, wounded 0, missing 0.
men	- dead 13, wounded 20, missing 0.
Artillery- officers	- dead 0, wounded 2, missing 0.
men	- dead 1, wounded 11, missing 0.

The losses of the infantry which were missing from today's and yesterday's reports are as follows:

25th Reserve Division: (with exception of 83d Inf. Regt. and 3d Battalion, 168th Regt.)

officers	- none.
men	- dead 2, wounded 22, missing 0, sick 8.
horses	- dead 0, wounded 6, missing 0.

Reserve Inf. Regt. 83 and 3d Battln. 168th Rgt. - on May 28 and 29, so far ascertained:

officers	- dead 0, wounded 4, missing 0.
men	- 208 dead and wounded, 3 men sick.

30th Infantry Division:

men	- dead 1, wounded 1. (wounded during drill with hand grenades).
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Headquarters 18th Army.

Generally moderate harassing, at times only a more lively artillery activity at the 25th Reserve Corps and on the Oise front. The enemy's fire revived toward morning at the 26th Reserve Corps against our front combat zone, northeast of Cantigny. Since 9 a.m. inferior harassing. At the 38th Reserve Corps, brisk firing against the sector of the 9th Bavarian Reserve and 223d Infantry Division, during the night. The firing died down toward morning against the 9th Bavarian Division but is being kept up against the Oise front, through heavy harassing. A patrol of the enemy was repulsed southeast of Larbroye. The 38th Reserve Corps has orders to force the crossing over the Oise river without delay. Crossings still held by the enemy, together with some of its artillery which yet is very active, are being effectively engaged by our artillery, to permit a quick crossing of the stream. The 105th Infantry Division has been directed to follow via Chauny to Blerancourt. The railway Amiens - St. Just was furthermore engaged with medium and heavy flat trajectory fire. It has been noticed that a hit was made by a flyer on a train at the railway station Breteuil. Giant air squadron No. 500, attacked the railway station Beauvais with 1400 Kg. bombs. Long distance reconnaissance at 5 a.m., showed little traffic in a radius of 10 km. around Compiègne. From 6:10 to 6:40 a.m., six trains in both directions, between Compiègne and Crepy en Valois. There is no unusual highway traffic in the sector northeast of this railway stretch. Three planes were shot down. Captain Berthold, commander of pursuit squadron No. 2, obtained his thirtieth and thirty-first air victory. Two men reported last evening as having deserted to the enemy, are from the Province of Brandenburg.

Evening Report of May 30, 1918.

6:05 p.m.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Moderate harassing against combat zones and rear areas. Our artillery harassed against Cantigny, Infantry emplacements, supports and approach roads and carried on destructive firing against enemy trenches east and north of Cantigny. Two waves of annihilation fire were placed in front of the sector of the 25th Reserve Division. Sight fair. North wind.

Headquarters 18th Army.

The artillery activity, with exception of the sector of the 38th Reserve Corps, was limited to moderate harassing, on both sides, against the entire army front and against combat and rear zones. The firing of our artillery on the railway St. Just - Amiens was kept up with vigor.

After energetic firing against the enemy's artillery and the crossings of the Oise river, the infantry of the 223d Division crossed the river between Varesnes and Bretigny. Reports of flyers, confirmed by ground observation, indicate that so far 4 companies have passed through Varesnes and reached Bretigny. The 105th Infantry Division has crossed the canal at Bichancourt with at least two battalions and they are advancing on Manicamp. Confirmation of the report of the 7th Army Corps, that Manicamp has been taken, is still missing. The 223d and 105th Infantry Divisions are keeping up their advance to the southwest. The 9th Bavarian Division will take over today the sector Pont L'Eveque - Varesnes. Our air activity is brisk, that of the enemy light. Long distance reconnaissance resulted as follows: From 11:05 a.m. to 2:45 p.m. light rail and highway traffic throughout. Normal rail deliveries to the line south of Nanteuil - Villers - Cotteretts - Soissons. At 12:30 p.m., a more lively traffic on the highway west of Soissons in region of Tracy le Val - Bailly and in a westerly direction and at Vic and Attichy in a northern and northeastern direction. Heavy air activity at aerodrome Auvillers south of Clermont. Our heavy

flat trajectory fire engages Carlepoint and the highways leading from that point to the south and southeast, Tracy le Val and Tracy le Mont and the ravine which runs from Nampcel to the southeast. Wilhelm fired four shots this morning, four more are to be fired this evening. Wireless intelligence: Signs are in evidence for the withdrawal of reserves from the sector southeast of Amiens. Furloughs have apparently been stopped by the enemy. Weather bright, dry, somewhat unsettled, slight squally north winds. Temperature 19.9 degrees Centigrade.

Morning Report of May 31, 1918.

(6:18 a.m.)

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Moderate harassing of the enemy against combat positions and rear areas. A feint bombardment commenced by us at 7:20 pm, was answered by the enemy with a rapid fire against our trenches and height 104. It also fired barrage several times. Our artillery kept up the destructive fire against the enemy's new trenches at Cantigny and the approach roads leading thereto, harassed against supports and traffic and placed sweeping fire on the rear zones. Railway station at Gannes was engaged with 30 shots. Sight good. Weather clear. Distribution of forces of the 82d Reserve

Division:

In the foremost line -	1st and 2d Battlns,	270 Regt.
	3d battalion,	271 Regt.
	1st battalion.	118 Regt.
In support -	3d battalion,	270 Regt.
	2d battalion.	271 Regt.
In Reserve -	3d battalion,	99 Regt.
	2d battalion,	143 Regt.

Withdrawn to rest quarters - 272 Regt. (less Regtl. Headqrs.)
 - 1st battln. 271 Rgt.
 - 2d battln. 83 Rgt.

In addition, the 3d battalion 271 Rgt. will be withdrawn during the night of May 31st, - June 1st.

Headquarters 18th Army.

At the 3d, 26th Reserve and 9th Corps, the enemy's activity was limited generally to moderate harassing. In answer to the feint bombardment delivered by the 26th Corps it frequently fired barrage. Our artillery engaged the railway plants south of Amiens as well as the railway stations Breteuil-Gannes-St. Just, with medium and heavy flat trajectory fire. Last evening, the artillery activity of the enemy revived against the center and left flank of the 17th Army Corps and it kept up during the entire night. After strong artillery preparation by the enemy, a patrol advanced against the centre of our 75th Reserve Division. It was repulsed by our counter attack, after our sentries had withdrawn as previously directed. Increasing harass fire at intervals, against the 8th Corps, and right flank of the 38th Reserve Corps. The 223d and 105th Infantry Divisions of the 38th Reserve Corps, having crossed the Oise river, the left flank of the corps, last evening, took the towns from Conarcy - Pontoise to Manicamp inclusive, on the river bank occupied by the enemy. The 105th Infantry Division reached the region Camellie et le Fresne. Our troops advanced this morning out of the line Rendezvous Ferme (east of Pontoise) - Camellie et le Fresne. The towns of Cuts and Lombraye were reached, but at Rendezvous Ferme the enemy is still resisting our advance. The crossings at Varesnes and Bretigny were repaired during the night. According to a picked up order, the enemy is to retire to the region of the Touvent Ferme west of Moulin. Although the sky is clear the air activity

of the enemy is but light. A few reconnaissance planes of the enemy flew over the front army terrain. About 30 bombs were thrown down on the rear zone of the 3d Army Corps. Our own bombardment squadron attacked Creil during the night. Particulars not yet reported.

General survey of yesterday's long distance reconnaissance:

Assembly of the reserves of the enemy formerly located in front of the Army in the sectors, St. Just, Breteuil, Conty, Beauvais and Clermont and their entraining at the railway stations, Milly, Beauvais and Clermont. The bringing up of smaller detachments from the region Estrees-St. Denis and from the direction of Compiègne. Shifting of empty rolling stock or transit traffic, from the Creil railway station. In addition to the four shots already reported, Wilhelm fired four more last evening. Compiègne was engaged with 24 cm.

Weather: Bright, dry, unsettled, no wind. Temperature 8 degrees centigrade.

Noon Report of May 31, 1918.

(11:25 am)

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Moderate harassing during the remainder of the night. Beginning with 7 a.m., a heavy fire was placed against the sector of our 25th Reserve Division and south thereof; in part this fire also reached as far as the 82d Reserve Division. Sharp outlined firing against Mesnil and hollow south thereof was observed from a great height by one of our artillery flyers who had at first requested annihilation and then barrage. An attack has not been reported so far by the Infantry. The enemy's fire died down after 7:30 a.m., against the sector of the 25th Reserve Division but increased against the right flank of the 9th Army Corps. The fire against the 82d Reserve Division died down shortly after 8 a.m., but increased again with great force at 8:45 a.m., against the front and rear zone of the division. Weak artillery firing only, against 25th Reserve Division since 8:30 a.m., and against 82d Reserve Division, since 9:15 a.m.

Our artillery harassed against woods, hollows, batteries, highways and towns and fired barrage and annihilation. It also engaged the trenches at, and the town of Cantigny with destructive fire.

Sight misty. Northwest wind. Air bombing by the enemy at night in the neighborhood of Curchy resulted in no damage. Lieut. Berksemeyer of Reserve Infy. Regt. 118, returning from a scouting trip brought in two severely wounded men of Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83, pertaining to the Tannenberg enterprise, whom he had found lying close to the enemy's wire entanglement.

Losses: 82d Reserve Division: dead 6 - wounded 15, missing 0.
25th Reserve Division: (less Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83):
Officers - wounded 1.
Men - wounded 13 - hospital cases 3
30th Infantry Division - none.

Headquarters 18th Army.

The enemy's artillery was very active during the morning hours against the whole army front and at times increased to a very heavy and lasting concentration fire against the sectors of the 1st Reserve Division, 25th Reserve Division, right flank of 82d Reserve Division, against Mesnil and Fontaine, against 3d and 5th Reserve and 9th Bavarian Reserve Divisions, and Noyon. Our artillery replied with lively barrage against combat and rear zones. The trenches at, and the town of Cantigny were placed under destructive fire. The railway station at St. Just was engaged. Under the protection of the concentration fire, the enemy was able to capture one of our double sentry posts in the sector

of the 6th Reserve Division. A patrol of the enemy was repulsed by troops of the 1st Reserve Division, northeast of the park of Grivesnes. The 223d Infantry Division has crossed the Oise at Pontoise, with a part of its troops and is advancing against the road leading from Sempigny to Laigles. The highway leading from Pontoise to La Pommeraye was reached after the enemy's resistance had been broken at Rendezvous Ferme. The 105th Infantry Division has taken the line, highway Bellefontaine west of Nampcel and has established contact with the 211th Infantry Division. The right flank of the division has formed for the attack against the Mont de Choisy which is still held by the enemy. The divisional command posts are located as follows:

223d Infantry division - at Marlincourt; 105th at Camelin et Fresne. In addition to their authorized artillery, 2 mixed heavy field howitzer battalions and 1 mortar battalion, have already been attached to the 223d and 105th Infantry Divisions, 3 heavy artillery battalions have also been attached to the command of the 38th Reserve Corps. Two dead soldiers of the 4th French Cuirassier regiment (1st Cuir. Div.) were found south of Lassigny. Our air bombardment squadron No. 4 and giant air squadron No. 500, attacked last night the railway stations of Creil, St. Just and Compiègne, with 21,400 kg. bombs. Fires and hits were noticed on the main railway line in Creil. Night reconnaissance in the sector Amiens- Polargies - Compiègne, divulged active rail and highway traffic, mainly to the southeast. Early morning reconnaissance through visual observation from 8 to 10 a.m., showed the following:

1. Around Crepy en Valois, the assembling of from 2 to 3 divs. (estim.)
2. Main rail traffic on the railway line Paris-Crepy, a total of 7 trains were sighted, of which 4 long ones, between Thieux- Nanteuil le Haudouain.
3. In direction Paris-Survillers-Creil, 3 trains, in direction Creil-Chantilly, 3 trains (empty?).
4. The switching yard at Creil is very heavily crowded with rolling stock. Many motor cars are parked around Creil, indicating trans-shipment.
5. Line Beaumont-Creil and Creil-Clermont practically empty (bomb attacks?).
6. Clermont is crowded with rolling stock.
7. Motor car traffic very heavy in direction St. Just en Chaussee-Estrees St. Denis and Bulles-Clermont.
8. The auto traffic appears to be directed mainly toward Compiègne. It is very heavy from Compiègne to Vic, and is estimated to be sufficient to move the infantry of a division. Heavy flat trajectory firing and air bombardment squadrons have been directed against this traffic.

Evening Report of May 31, 1918. (6:10 p.m.)

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Moderate harassing against combat and rear zones. The south side of height No. 104 and the forest of Fontaine were at times under an independent fire of medium and, as alleged, also of heavy calibre. The firing increased suddenly at 2:15 p.m., against the sector of the 25th Reserve Division, especially against Mesnil. The Dom-stream valley and the batteries of the division also were engaged by a rapid artillery fire. Our artillery harassed against enemy's trenches, hollows, supports and approach roads and placed two waves of fire in front of the 25th Reserve Division. It also carried on destructive firing against the enemy's trenches at Cantigny and supported with its fire the 1st Reserve Division.

Sight good. East wind.

Approximate losses by the 82d Reserve Division on May 28 and 29:

Officers - dead 14, wounded 17, missing 8.
Non-com. officers and Privates - dead, wounded and missing, 1280.

Headquarters 18th Army.

The lively artillery activity of the enemy, during the morning hours, died down toward noon. Only at the 26th Reserve Corps, against the 25th Reserve Division, did the enemy's firing increase again at 2 p.m. for a short time. At the 3d Army Corps, the railway station Chaulnes was engaged by long range railway guns of the heaviest calibre, from the region Blangy - Trouville, though without interruption of the traffic. Arrangements have been made with the 2d Army to engage these guns in case they renew the firing. Roye also was frequently engaged. Our artillery kept the railway Amiens-St. Just, and the railway stations Breteuil and Compiègne under fire. The 223d Infantry Div. has not been able, so far, to advance beyond the enemy's position in the line Le Meriquin Ferme - Mont de Choisy. During the repulse of enemy's counter attacks, 30 prisoners and 1 machine gun were captured by us. According to the long delayed last reports, the 105th Infantry Division is advancing from the line, southeast part of the Bois de la Montagne- Chaussee southwest of Nampcel. Both divisions have been ordered to accomplish the attack and to reach the Aisne River. Trench work under way on Mont Renaud was heard during the entire night. Our air activity was lively, that of the enemy very lively during the morning between Moreuil-Montdidier, and very light between Montdidier and Noyon. Long distance reconnaissance from 7:55 to 11:20 a.m., in the sector Poix-Forges-Beauvais-Breteuil indicate the following: Light railway traffic on the main lines, heavy deliveries at railway station Blargies, and more heavy yet at Beauvais. The railway stations at Farmerie, Crevecoeur, St. Omer, Milly, Beauvais, Conty and Breteuil, partly indicated a heavy traffic of motor and horsedrawn vehicles unloaded and standing on the platforms. Lively traffic on highways Amiens to Hardivillers, from Conty to Crevecoeur, on the highways by Blicourt and Beauvais, up to the railway station. The aerodrome at Tille has apparently been evacuated. Reconnaissance flights, as far as the Aisne-line, showed rearward movements to the south. Battle squadron Group No. 3, participated in the battle in the region Carlepont-Nampcel. It engaged columns with 7800 machine gun shots and 81 fragmentation bombs. One captive balloon of the enemy was shot down. Our pursuit aviators shot down 3 enemy planes. Lieutenant Putter obtained his twenty-sixth air victory. Six shots were fired today by the Wilhelm gun.

Reconnaissance results of May 30. Intelligence service:

Increased artillery adjustment activity on the front of the 3d Army Corps. Four undamped stations have appeared since yesterday in the region Pont St.-Maxence. It is possible that these are corps stations. Further investigation regarding same is necessary.

Weather: bright, dry, somewhat squally northwest winds.
Temperature, 22 degrees centigrade.

CANTIGNY ATTACK OF MAY 28, 1918.

WAR DIARY (Selected Annexes)
of 18th GERMAN ARMY.

Daily results of Reconnaissances.

Consolidated situation reports made up
from the daily field reports with battle maps.

Translated from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

HdQRS. 18th German Army.

Ia/M.S.O.*

SECRET.

Consolidated report of the situation on May 28, 1918.

(Including those reports received at HdQRS. up to 9.30 a.m., May 29, 1918).

I. TACTICAL EVENTS.

The enemy's fire, consisting of lively harassing, was placed yesterday morning against the whole army front and rear areas.

In preparation of several large patrol enterprises, the infantry and artillery positions of the 26th Reserve Corps especially, were placed under a very heavy fire and Dom-stream valley also was gassed, prior to the attack on Cantigny.

The vigorous artillery activity of the enemy continued throughout the day and even reached the right sector of the 9th Army Corps. The artillery activity was limited to a moderate harassing against the 9th, 17th and 8th Corps and 38th Reserve Corps.

Against the 3d Corps, the artillery firing was very active up to midnight, especially so against the 6th Reserve Division.

The special objective of the enemy's artillery fire was directed:

At the 3d German Corps: against infantry combat zones, especially that of the 6th Reserve Division, through brisk harassing. 500 shots medium calibre were fired against an un-manned battery position.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: against Infantry and Artillery positions, rearward connections, Cantigny, Courtemanche, and Fontaine, with heavy fire. Dom-stream valley was densely gassed. Harassing during the night on positions and zones to the rear.

At the 9th Army Corps: against positions and rear areas, especially the right division sector, with heavy fire, also Montdidier.

Two battery positions on the north edge of Piennes were engaged with 400 shots medium calibre.

At the 17th Army Corps: Barrage on the sector of the 5th Reserve Division. Lively harassing on infantry positions especially at the 3d Reserve Division.

At the 8th Army Corps: against positions and rear areas through harassing and partly also through gas.

At the 38th Reserve Corps: Harassing on infantry positions and rear areas. Our own artillery answered the enemy's fire actively through harassing, against positions and rear areas, also on railway plants at St. Just. The 3d and 9th Corps assisted with its artillery fire during the French attack against Cantigny and in preparing for our counter-attack by keeping down and gassing the enemy's batteries, woods, roadways and hollows.

Our artillery firing in detail:

At the 3d Army Corps: Enemy's batteries, woods, hollows and roadways in front of sector 26th Reserve Corps and Villers Tournelle, with gas.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: Infantry positions, batteries, assembly points, traffic and gatherings in the Fontaine woods with annihilation fire, Cantigny with destructive fire and barrage.

At the 9th Army Corps: Reinforcing the fire in front of sector of the 26th Reserve Corps. Harassing against railway station and the city of St. Just (Hit at the objective noticed.)

Destructive firing against enemy's batteries northwest of Tricot and west of Courcelles, with 200 shells heavy field howitzer and 200 mortar shells.

*M.S.O.= Intelligence Officer. - P.L.R.

At the 17th Army Corps: Harassing against positions and rear areas. Assisting, with artillery fire, the enterprises of the 75th Reserve Division. One destructive firing against enemy's batteries west of Gury with 300 shells heavy field howitzer.

At the 8th Army Corps: Destructive fire against dugouts south of Lassigny, hollows west of Tiescourt and north of Belval. Mareuil was harassed. Roadways in the region of Thourotte were placed under heavy flat trajectory fire. Barrage and annihilation fire was placed against Lassigny and Cuy upon request for same.

At 38th Reserve Corps: Harass against Infantry and Battery positions. Adjustment firing against batteries of the enemy.

Infantry Activity:

After heavy artillery preparation, frequently intermixed by gassing, French troops, supported by infantry aviators and 6 tanks, attacked our positions north and west of Cantigny and penetrated our positions. Some of the tanks were disabled or forced to retire by the fire of our artillery and minenwerfers. Height No. 104 for which there was heavy fighting is firmly in our hands.

The counter-attack of our 82d Reserve Division which began at 6.45 pm on May 28th, resulted in the regaining of our former old positions up to 200 meters north and 500 meters south-east of Cantigny. The town itself is still in the hands of the enemy. American troops, which attacked the 25th Reserve Division at the same time, were repulsed with heavy losses.

After strong artillery preparation (even with heavy calibre) an enemy's patrol advanced against a position of the 222 Infantry Division, 300 meters west of the roadway Vaux-Piennes and entered our foremost trench. The enemy was driven out of the trench by our counter attack. Three men are missing. A patrol of the enemy which advanced at the same time against the right regimental sector of the 222d Infantry Division, was repulsed.

During an advance of the enemy (about 70 men) against our outpost at the field railway grove, 1 km. south of Dives, three of our men were made prisoners. The outpost has reoccupied its former post.

Several large patrols which advanced on the morning of May 28, against the inner flank-sectors of the 3d and 5th Reserve Divisions, were repulsed with heavy losses.

II. AVIATION.

The air activity on both sides was fairly brisk. Combat planes of the enemy remained mostly on the other side of our line.

Our aviators made 328 flights against the enemy, 244 of them were pursuit flights. They made 479 photographs. Of artillery adjustment, 12 were successful and 3 interrupted.

Light railway and highway traffic was noticed everywhere in front of the army.

During the enemy's attack, 4 Infantry flyers observed the combat situation at the 26th Reserve Corps and established the new front line. Two Infantry flyers supported the counter-attack against Cantigny with 1600 machine gun shots. Other ground objectives were engaged with 3050 machine gun shots.

Combat squadron No. 3, participated in the combat in the region of Soissons with 15 airplanes and engaged infantry detachments, wagons and auto-columns moving in a southerly direction, with 8775 machine gun shots and 48 fragmentation bombs.

Bombardment squadron No. 4 with 10 planes, attacked the railway station Beauvais during a heavy fog and threw down 5600 kg. bombs. A large explosion was observed in the vicinity of the railway depot. Unusual large numbers of camp fires were noticed around Beauvais and engaged with machine gun fire.

Two of the enemy's observation planes passed through our lines as far as the region of Ham.

The air bombing activity of the enemy was slight during the night. Five bombs were thrown down in the region of Vrely and Warvillers. The enemy lost two planes. Captain Berthold obtained

his twenty-ninth air victory. We lost two planes through anti-aircraft fire, and one through headlong fall (without action of the enemy). One service plane is missing.

The leading plane (of commander) of Pursuit Group South, was hit and fell burning beyond our lines, during an air attack in the evening.

III. BALLOONS.

The sight for observation was sufficiently clear during the morning only. During the afternoon it was prevented by a dense fog.

14 balloons went up.

Balloons 118, 33, 41, 82, 40, 32, 91 and 120 were attacked by aviators of the enemy. Balloon 33 was set on fire. The observer landed fair by the use of his parachute.

17 balloons of the enemy were sighted in front of the army.

According to observation, the traffic by the enemy was normal. 65 observations of fire were completed, (52 for range adjustment, 7 for destructive, 2 for testing and 4 for harassing).

14 balloons are ready to ascend on May 29, 1918.

IV. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RESULTS.

The wireless service on May 28th established the following troops: 3d French division, 35th French Army Corps and the 38th French divisions.

Through the listening-in system, the 15th Colonial, 3d French, 1st American, 60th, 72d and 38th French divisions, were established as present on May 28th.

At the 1st French Army, the wireless service was lively again by the 31st Army Corps, while at its other Army Corps it was only normal.

By the 3d French Army, the wireless service was slight at the 35th Corps but grew stronger toward the east. It was heavy at the corps in Compiègne.

Clear text English is heard at times from the sector of the 36th Division. The text is transmitted quickly and in changing strains. Further observations are necessary.

V. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE.

Development of photographs taken on May 27, show increased deliveries at the railway stations Beauvais and Monchy la Ville and on the stretch Beauvais-Creil.

The region of Creil and Pont St. Maxence, show an increased traffic of loaded wagons.

Sixteen loaded wagons from Beauvais in direction of Creil, 22 on the highway Trosly-Breuil-Compiègne, in direction of Compiègne. 90 on the highway Rethonde-Attichy, in direction of Soissons.

The aerodrome Canly, formerly located through visual reconnaissance, is shown in the photograph with 2 meter halls and not wholly roofed. No flying activity.

It has also been established that the Beauvais-Pierrefond position is located as indicated on the map picked up.

There is a continuous trench and obstacle, northwest of Clermont, from the southwest of Haudivillers to north of Remerangles. There are two trenches with communicating trenches, from south of Balles to $2\frac{1}{2}$ km. west of Bizancourt (no obstacle.)

VI. LOSSES ON MAY 27, 1918.

Dead 30, wounded 158, missing 3, gas-sick 3.

VII. WEATHER.

Cloudy, dry, a little unsettled, squally northeasterly winds. Temperature, 17 degree centigrade.

VIII. SPECIAL MATTERS.

38th Reserve Corps has taken over the command of Sectors B and C (8th Army Corps), at noon on May 28, 1918.

FISCHER,
First Lieutenant.

HdQRS. 18th Army.
Ia/M.S.O.*

May 30, 1918.

25/26

SECRET.

Consolidated report of the situation on May 29, 1918.
(Including those reports received at HdQRS. up to
9.30 a.m., May 30, 1918).

I. TACTICAL EVENTS.

The enemy's artillery, generally during the day, was active against the whole army front with harass fire. A stronger fire, mixed with bursts of fire, was placed against our new positions near Cantigny only.

The fire increased against our positions east of Cantigny at about 6 p.m., in preparation for a new attack of the enemy.

The special objective of the enemy's artillery fire was directed:

At the 3d Army Corps Against the railway station at Chaulnes, with heavy, flat trajectory fire though without result.

Bursts of fire on positions of the 1st Reserve Division, east of the park of Grivesnes. Harassing on the front combat zone. Mailly, Sauvillers, St. Ribert Ferme, Plessier, La Neuville and Avre bottom through sweeping fire.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: During the day bursts of fire on our new trenches east of Cantigny and Framicourt, hollow south thereof, Fontaine, Ainal-woods, and Fasanerie, also a heavy fire against our battery positions in preparation for an attack.

Harassing against the other positions and rear areas as far as Guerbigny.

At the 9th Army Corps: A few gas grenades on highway Assainvillers-Rollet. Some bursts of fire on the Regimental centre sector of the 22d Infantry division, otherwise only slight harassing. 29 shots of heavy calibre placed on Roye.

At the 17th Army Corps: Slight harassing only.

At the 8th Army Corps: Bursts of fire on trenches at Canny and Lassigny.

At the 38th Army Corps: A rather rapid fire on the sector of the 223d Infantry division. Heavy calibre fire with plane observation against canal crossings.

Our own artillery maintained the usual harassing on positions and rear areas.

Enemy's battery groups were gassed in front of the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps to deceive our intention of attacking. Railway plants on the front were placed under a heavy flat trajectory fire.

Our artillery firing in detail:

At the 3d Army Corps: Gassing of enemy's batteries as planned.

Heavy waves of fire on infantry lines and assembly points of the enemy. An ammunition depot was exploded by our fire near Chirmont.

Annihilation fire against Villers Tournelle and Cantigny. Heavy flat trajectory fire was placed on the railway line, - Amiens-St. Just, at la Faloise and Tartigny, also on the railway station Ailly and Breteuil.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: Rapid harassing against enemy's trenches, assemblies, assembly points and Cantigny. Battery groups, hollow southeast of Broyes and woods northeast of Cardonnais gassed. Barrage and destructive fire in front of 82d Reserve Division. Motor traffic from Serevillers to Broyes and Villers and railway station Gannes, placed under fire.

At 9th Army Corps: Welles-Perennes, la Morliere, Rocquencourt, Domfront, Domelin and Godenvillers were gassed.

Long distance firing against Maignelay and St. Just.

One destructive firing with 300 shots heavy field howitzers, against enemy's batteries near Broyes.

At 17th Army Corps: Rouance forest gassed.

During the firing on Roye-sur-Matz, explosions of several light rocket depots were observed on the north exits of the town.

At 8th Army Corps: 100 shots destructive fire against shelters and dugouts at Belval. Harassing the terrain at Roye-sur-Matz.

At 38th Reserve Corps: Movements south of Sempigny, Compiègne, Outs and Carlepont placed under a heavy flat trajectory fire.

Infantry Activity.

After a heavy artillery preparation, the enemy at about 5.30 p.m., formed for the attack against the terrain east of Cantigny. Due to our well directed annihilation fire, set up at once, the attack did not develop. The enemy's fire increased to a heavy annihilation fire at about 8 p.m. to be followed at 8.50 by an attack in the direction of height 104. This attack was also repulsed.

A dead French soldier of Cuirassier Rgt. No. 4 (1st Cuirassier Division) was picked up at 1 a.m. May 28th southeast of Lassigny.

Patrols and sentries, yesterday afternoon and during the night, established without doubt, the occupation of the south bank of the Oise River.

II. AVIATION.

The air activity on both sides was rather light during the day but grew more brisk toward evening and continued so during the night.

Air squadrons of the enemy penetrated to the rear areas and threw bombs on Aulnoye, Parvillers, Beaucourt, Folies, le Quesnel, Hangest, railway station Chaulnes, vicinity of Omicourt and our searchlight position No. 240a at Roye. Damage not known yet. Losses at Aulnoye, dead 2, wounded 7 men.

136 flights were made against the enemy, 93 of which were pursuit flights. 4 artillery adjustments were accomplished with success. 52 photographs were taken. Ground objectives were engaged with 25 kg. bombs and 800 machine gun shots.

The railway traffic at Beauvais and east of the town, was more lively, and sets up the presumption of troop transfers to the southeast. At the wooded region north and south of Compiègne and east of these woods slight, west thereof, lively highway traffic to the south. A heavy traffic in the vicinity of Carlepont but the direction of same was not ascertained.

Searching with light the highways and railway depots at Rivecourt and Creil, showed only a slight traffic and nothing out of the ordinary.

Our bombardment squadron No. 4, placed 4300 kg. bombs on Beauvais, 3300 on St. Just, 1600 on Clermont. Fires were noticed at the objectives. We lost one plane.

III. BALLOONS.

Observation at close distance was possible only during the evening hours and at certain places. 13 balloons went up. 6 enemy balloons were sighted.

Observations of fire were completed for range adjustments on two positions and for one harass fire.

A brisk auto traffic was observed on the highways Serevillers-Villers and Rocquencourt-Coullemelle during the evening hours, and a lively wagon and motor truck traffic at the 8th Army Corps (German), on the highway Nampcel to Caisnes.

Balloon No. 33 and 127 threw down 170 newspapers to the enemy.

13 balloons are ready to ascend on May 30, 1918.

IV. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RESULTS.

According to "trustworthy information", the departure of the 55th French Division can be anticipated.

Facts established:

Through "trustworthy information": Presence of 3d French Corps at Breteuil, of 1st American and 125th and 38th French divisions.

Through "reports of troops", presence of 15th Colonial, 3d, 152d French, 1st American, 60, 72, 38th and 55th French divisions. Of twenty three artillery adjustment firing (German), 6 were made by the 3d Army Corps, 4 by the 26th Reserve Corps, 1 by the 9th Army Corps, 7 by the 17th Army Corps and 5 each by the 8th Army and 38th Reserve Corps.

The wireless service was normal by the 1st French Army. By the 3d French Army it was light to the west but more lively to the east.

V. LOSSES ON MAY 28, 1918.

Dead 84, wounded 279, missing 43, gassed and sick 4.

VI. WEATHER.

Cloudy, dry, squally northeasterly winds, somewhat unsettled. Temperature, 17 degrees centigrade.

FISCHER,
First Lieutenant.

HdQRS. 18th German Army.
Ia/M.S.O.*

May 31, 1918

27/28

SECRET.

Im

Consolidated report of the situation on May 30, 1918.

(Including those reports received at HdQRS. up to 9.30 a.m., May 31, 1918).

TACTICAL EVENTS:

In general there is only a moderate harassing by the enemy against our entire army front.

At the 26th Reserve Corps the artillery activity of the enemy increased from time to time against our combat zone east of Cantigny. Heavy harassing was placed against the Oise sector of the 38th Reserve Corps during the entire day.

The enemy replied frequently to the feint firing of our 26th Reserve Corps, with barrage.

*M.S.O.= Intelligence Officer. - G.L.M.

The special objective of the enemy's artillery fire was directed:

At the 3d Army Corps: Against positions and rear areas, with harass fire. Mailly and hollow south thereof and Davenescourt with gas. Batteries with destructive fire without results.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: Against positions and rear areas through harassing. Sector of Reserve Infantry Rgt. No. 272 and right sector of 25th Reserve Division, with waves of annihilation fire.

Trenches east of Cantigny and Height 104 with a furious fire, which at times changed to barrage.

At the 9th Army Corps: Positions and rear areas with slight harass fire.

At the 17th Army Corps: Fire of concentration against the sector of 3d Reserve Division interchanged at times by gas shells. Between 4 and 5 am, on May 31, annihilation fire against combat zone of the 75th Reserve Division, in preparation of a patrol raid by the enemy.

At 8th Army Corps: Lively harassing at times against positions at Lassigny and rear areas as far as the highway Noyon-Roye sur Matz.

At the 38th Reserve Corps: Lively harassing against sector of the 223d and 105th Infantry division, part time also with gas. Terrain between Porquericourt and Noyon with heavy fire of concentration.

Our own Artillery kept up the usual harass fire on positions and rear areas. Railway plants in front of the army were placed again under a heavy flat trajectory fire. Compiègne was engaged with 24 cm shell.

Our artillery firing in detail:

At the 3d Army Corps: Traffic at Villers Tournelle with harass fire. Heavy flat trajectory fire against the railway line Amiens-St. Just, railway stations Ailly and Breteuil.

At the 26th Reserve Corps: Trenches at Cantigny, infantry positions, assembly points, and approach roads with harass fire and waves of annihilation fire. East portion of Villers-Tournelle with mustard gas. Harassing against railway station Gannes.

At 9th Army Corps: Harass fire against railway station St. Just, at which place a hit on a train was observed by an aviator. Long distance fire against railway station Breteuil.

At 17th Army Corps: Railway station and pass west of Ressons sur Matz, with concentration fire. About 25 ammunition dumps were set on fire through our harassing on the ammunition depot on the north exits of Roye sur Matz.

Against captive balloons (in two cases balloons were pulled down at once).

At the 8th Army Corps: Effective bombardment against batteries southwest of Belval and infantry emplacements in and north of Plessis.

At the 38th Reserve Corps: Towns, approach roads and batteries engaged with harass fire. Preparation for York enterprises from 12.30 to 2.30 p.m. Renewed artillery and minenwerfer preparation, commencing at 5 p.m., for the attack against line Varesnes-Bretigny.

Carlepont and the highways leading from that point to the south and southeast, Tracy le Val, Tracy le Mont and the gorge leading from Nampcel to the southeast, were placed under a heavy flat trajectory fire.

Infantry Activity.

Three Americans were made prisoners at the counter-attack against Cantigny on May 28th.

A patrol of the enemy advanced, after sudden artillery preparation, on the highway Roye sur Matz-le Cessier against our 75th Reserve Division. Our sentries gave way as previously directed. The enemy was thrown back by a counter attack.

An enemy's patrol was repulsed by the 38th Reserve Corps southeast of Larbroye.

Our patrols confirm the occupation of the enemy's trenches on Mt. Renaud.

After our first artillery preparation for York, a patrol of the 223d Infantry Division, advanced against the south bank of the Oise River at Manicamp and returned with two French prisoners of the 55th French Division. The south bank of the Oise everywhere, was strongly occupied.

After the planned preparation by our artillery and minenwerfers, the 223d Infantry Division (German), formed for the attack at 5.30 p.m., against the line Varesnes-Bretigny and in advancing, forced a crossing over the Oise River and took the towns Varesnes, Bretigny and Quiercy. An obstinate resistance was made by the enemy at the Rendezvous Ferme. 200 prisoners of the 38th and 55th French divisions have so far been brought in. In order to protect its flank against the forest of Carlepont, the 223d Infantry took the towns of Pontoise and Couarcy during the evening hours.

On this morning, May 31st, the 223d Infantry Division is attacking beyond the Rendezvous Ferme, against the line Layle-Caisnes.

The 105th Infantry Division was brought up via Chauny to the canal bridge at Bichancourt. Here it crossed the canal and without much resistance, reached the line Camelin et Fresne-region northwest of Cuts. La Pommeraye was found unoccupied by the enemy.

According to a picked up order, the enemy is to retreat to the Touvert Ferme west of Moulin.

II. AVIATION.

Our air activity was lively, that of the enemy moderate, throughout the day.

Several bombardment squadrons of the enemy passed through our lines to the rear area and threw bombs on Aulnoye, Chaulnes, Nesle, Curchy, Rethonvillers, Beaucourt, Guerbigny and firing position of anti-aircraft batteries Nos. 119 and 127, at Parvillers and Folies. Damage not yet ascertained.

Our Giant flight No. 500 attacked Beauvais with 1400 kg. bombs. Creil also was bombed.

163 flights were made by us against the enemy of which 120 were pursuit flights. 14 artillery adjustment firings were completed successfully. Ground objectives were engaged with 100 kg. bombs and 100 machine gun shots.

During air combats, the enemy lost 3 planes on May 29 and 2, on May 30. One of our planes has not returned from a flight to take photograph.

Captain Berthold obtained his thirtieth and thirty-first air victory.

No unusual traffic was observed in the region Compiègne-Crepy en Valois, during the interval from 5 to 6.40 am. During the interval from 11.05 am to 2.45 pm there was only a light traffic on the railway and highway west of Soissons and in the region Tracy le Val-Bailly. To the north and northeast of Vic and Attichy the traffic was more lively.

Aviation was very active at the aerodrome Auvillers south of Clermont.

Reserves are apparently being assembled in the sector St. Just-Breteuil-Conty-Beauvais-Clermont. They are being entrained at the railway stations of Milly, Beauvais and Clermont.

III. BALLOONS.

Observation possibility poor, on account of heavy fog, the sight being sufficient only on the south front. 10 balloons went up.

Balloon No. 33 was attacked by aviators of the enemy, but without success.

Observations of fire were completed for five artillery adjustments, seven destructive, six harass and one test firings.

13 enemy balloons were sighted. The enemy's activity was slight.

Air squadrons 37 and 67 dispatched 625 copies of the Gazettes des Ardennes to the enemy by means of small parachutes. 9 balloons are ready to ascend on May 31, 1918.

IV. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RESULTS.

Trustworthy information confirms the presence on May 30, of the 15th French Colonial Division in the sector previously indicated.

The corps group at Esserteaux has not been heard from since May 27th and it is possible that the Corps has been relieved. The 9th French Corps, according to trustworthy information, is located in the region of Bonnes northwest of Chateau Thierry and the 1st French Corps in the region east of Vic.

According to wireless, furloughs are no longer granted by the enemy. Troop reports confirm: Presence of 15th Colonial, 3d, 152d, 72d and 38th French Divisions.

Of twenty eight artillery adjustment firings (German), 12 were made by the 3d Corps, 4 by the 26th Reserve Corps, 2 by the 9th Corps, 5 by the 17th Corps, 5 by the 8th and 38th Reserve Corps.

At the two northern corps of the 1st Army (French), the wireless service was normal, by the corps to the south it was more active. At the 3d Army, it was light by the 35th Corps, moderate by the 34th Corps and brisk by the corps stationed to the east.

V. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE.

Development of photographs taken on May 30, show the following presence of rolling stock at railway stations: Beauvais-660 cars, 30 cars of an abolished train. Milly - 50 cars, 100 cars next to an abolished train. Crevecourt - at the hospital south of the railway depot - 34 railroad cars. A troop train with 30 closed and 16 open cars running into Beauvais enroute from Forges.

The aerodromes at Fouquerolles, Tille and Verrines remain without change. 3 halls have been reconstructed at Pierrefonds. The aerodrome at Canley previously located through visual observation, has been confirmed through photography.

No activity at the Pierrefonds aerodrome. Evidently its airplanes are reinforcing the 7th Army (French).

VI. LOSSES.

Dead 33, wounded 140, gas sick 11.

VII. WEATHER.

Clear, dry, somewhat squally northeasterly winds. Temperature, 20 degrees centigrade .

FISCHER,
First Lieutenant.

CANTIGNY ATTACK.

War Diary of the 26th Reserve Corps, from
May 27 to June 5, 1918, inclusive.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

Extracts from 26th Reserve Corps War Diary.

September 16, 1916 to November 11, 1918.

Monday, May 27, 1918.

To divert the enemy's attention from the ensuing main attack of the 7th Army, dummy arrangements of different kinds were installed during the last few days in several positions of the front. These enterprises were covered by the name "Manfred".

A patrol enterprise sent out from each trench division on May 27th, was to strengthen these dummy measures and make the enemy believe that an attack on a grand scale was to take place on the front of the 26th Reserve Corps in close connection with neighboring corps. The enterprise took place by the 82d Reserve Division from "Tarnopol" and by the 25th Reserve Division from "Tannenberg".

Both enterprises were carried out as planned.

Three raiding groups of the 82d Reserve Division penetrated the enemy's position at Cantigny and captured two Americans, which on the way back were killed by the enemy's fire. One machine gun also was taken. The enemy's artillery counter-effect was strong, especially from the northwest, apparently Ainval group.

The enterprise of the 25th Reserve Division met with strong infantry counter-effect. One American soldier and one light machine gun were brought in.

Otherwise the day passed quietly. Moderate harassing was placed by the enemy against combat positions and back area.

The German artillery fired against the enemy's trenches, roads leading to the front and towns. It also covered Sains-Morainvillers and Herelle with long range fire. The railroad plants at Bacouel were shelled.

Sight:	Misty.	Wind:	Moderate.
Losses:	82d Reserve Division	- dead,	1 officer, 4 men.
		- wounded,	5 officers, 22 men.
	25th Reserve Division	- dead,	8 men.
		- wounded,	1 officer, 22 men.
	30th Infantry Division	- dead,	1 man (during
		- wounded,	2 men (exer-
			{cises
			{with
			{hand
			{grenades.

Tuesday, May 28, 1918.

Brisk enemy's harassing fire after midnight. Infantry and artillery positions, the Dom-stream valley and the rearward connections have been under a heavy fire since 6.30 a.m. The Dom-stream valley has been gassed. Firing against Cantigny, Courtemanche and Fontaine, after 8 a.m. became more intense. The enemy penetrated our lines north and south of Cantigny at 8.20 a.m. Tanks supported the attack, which apparently was undertaken by the French and Americans. The firing started with great vehemence and was augmented by tanks and infantry guns, the infantry guns especially caused heavy losses to our infantry. The enemy occupied Cantigny and entrenched about 200 m. east of the town after their further advance had been stopped. A counter-attack, launched immediately, failed in regaining the town for us.

It has been established at this time that our infantry maintained the line: Right flank, old line in plan square 7910/20 c., thence to the southeast and running back to plan square 8011/10 a., then in a southern direction to plan square 8111/5 d., back to the old line.

A heavy traffic of the enemy was noticed and engaged between Serevillers-Brockenwald, by Belle Assise Fe, Zungenwald and Cantigny. Our artillery laid down, repeatedly, an annihilating fire over the foremost trenches of the enemy in front of the 82d Reserve Division, and in front of the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division.

The auto traffic on the road Villers-Rocquencourt was taken under fire. Firing batteries recognized as pertaining to the enemy were shelled with harassing fire.

The counter-attack which was launched at 6.45 p.m., after the artillery preparation, by the 82d Reserve Division against Cantigny and the trenches north and south thereof, was without success. Three Americans were made prisoners.

For particulars of the enemy's attack and of the German measures for defense, see operation records, document "Cantigny".

Losses: 82d Reserve Div. -	Dead,	1 officer,	3 men.
	Wounded,		51 men.
	Missing,		17 men.
25th Reserve Div. -	Dead,		20 men.
	Wounded,	4 officers	85 men.
	Missing,	2 officers,	26 men.

The missing, of the 82d and 25th Reserve Divs., include the dead and wounded which fell into the hands of the enemy during the enterprises from "Tarnopol" and "Tannenberg".

30th Infantry Div. - Wounded, 1 man.

Wednesday, May 29, 1918.

During the night, moderate harassing by the enemy against our infantry and artillery positions and back area as far as and including Guerbigny. Towards morning rapid bursts of fire against our line east of Cantigny. Machine gun fire from Cantigny and from the terrain north and southwest thereof.

Our artillery put down waves of annihilation fire in front of the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division at 3.30 and 4.30 a.m. It gassed from 4 to 5 a.m. the enemy's battery groups, Machine Gun Wood and hollow southeast of Broyes and the forest northeast of Cardennois. Destructive fire was directed against the trenches in front of the 82d Reserve Division.

The active motor transport traffic on the roads from Serevillers to Broyes and Villers was fired upon. After a preceding heavy fire against infantry and battery positions in front of the 82d Reserve Division and right wing of the 25th Reserve Division, the enemy formed for the attack at 5.30 p.m. A well directed annihilating fire set up immediately stopped the development of this attack. The heavy fire of the enemy kept up until 6.40 p.m. when it died down, only to swell again to a heavy annihilation fire at about 8 p.m.

An assembly in the enemy's trenches, reported by an aviator about 7 p.m. was broken up through our annihilation fire. The enemy attacked at 8.50 p.m. in the direction of ridge No. 104, but was repulsed with heavy losses.

The artillery activity on both sides kept up briskly until about 11 p.m., when it died down. Our artillery kept Cantigny and the enemy's trenches under fire. Brisk aviation activities on both sides. Bombs were thrown down during the night in the back area.

Losses: 82nd Reserve Div. - not yet determined.
25th Reserve Div. - dead, 20 men.
- wounded, 2 officers, 96 men.
- missing, 2 men.

(The missing fell dead or badly wounded in the hands of the enemy during the combats for Cantigny.)

30th Inf. Div. - none.

Thursday, May 30, 1918.

The enemy's artillery fire revived again towards morning and from time to time a heavy annihilation fire was placed against the sector of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272 (82d Reserve Div.) Partly, it also reached the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division. The fire died down gradually. Since 9 a.m. light enemy's harassing fire against our battle line and back area.

At daybreak our artillery fired counter preparation against the trenches of the enemy north and east of Cantigny and during the day harassed the roads leading to Cantigny, against supports and trenches.

Sight: fair. North wind.
Losses: 82nd Reserve Div. - not yet determined.
25th Reserve Div. - dead, 12 men.
- wounded, 1 officer, 89 men.
- missing, 5 men.

(The missing fell either dead or badly wounded in the hands of the enemy during the combats for Cantigny.)

30th Inf. Div. - dead, 2 men; wounded, 23 men.

The latter losses occurred in organizations of the division which were assigned to support the 82d Reserve Division or were formed up for that purpose.

Remarks: The Corps Headquarters in its operation report No. 2066, I.C., to Army Headquarters has made request for a change in the light signals, because there is an impression that the meaning of the present light signals are known by the enemy.

Friday, May 31, 1918.

Moderate harassing fire during the night. A heavy artillery fire started at 7 a.m. against the sector of the 25th Reserve Div., and south thereof and also encroached parts of the sector of the 82nd Res. Div. Our artillery flight observed, from a great height, severe fixed firing against Mesnil, hollow south of Mesnil, Granatwald and Fontaine and requested annihilation fire and then barrage. The enemy did not attack. The foe's fire died down in the sector of the 25th Res. Div. at 7.30 a.m., but increased against the right flank of the neighboring corps to the left. The fire slackened against the 82nd Res. Div. shortly after 8 a.m., but started again with full force at 8.20 a.m. Since 9 a.m. only weak firing.

With the exception that firing against the 25th Reserve Div. revived once more at 2.15 p.m., the remainder of the day passed quietly.

Our artillery harassed against forests, hollows, batteries and towns and delivered barrages and annihilation fire and also covered infantry positions at Cantigny with destructive fire.

Lieutenant Berkemeyer of the Res. Inf. Regt. No. 118, returning from a night raid brought back two severely wounded men of Res. Inf. Regt. No. 83, pertaining to the enterprise from "Tannenberg", who had been found lying close in front of the enemy's wire entanglements.

Losses: 82nd Res. Div. (from May 29 to 31 inclusive).
Dead, 15 officers, 177 men.
Wounded, 23 officers, 633 men.
Missing, 8 officers, 480 men.
25th Res. Div.
Dead, 1 man.
Wounded, 1 officer, 20 men.
30th Inf. Div.
Dead, 4 men; wounded, 4 men.

Remarks: The situation on May 31, 1918 (Ia No. 2072 b 1) has been judged to be as follows: that it was the intention of the enemy, in his attack on May 28, to take possession of height No. 104, in order to gain a view of the Dom-stream valley and toward Montdidier. Signs for attacks on a large scale are not in evidence, but the continuation of attacks at Cantigny for gaining height No. 104 must be reckoned with.

The 206th Infantry Division, located in the area of the 26th Res. Corps, was in accordance with a telephone conversation with the Headquarters of the Field Army (Ia/m 4419, secret) shifted to the sector east of Noyon.

Examined:

Corps Headquarters, May 31, 1918:
The Chief of the General Staff
(signed) v. Kahlden,
Major.

Saturday, June 1, 1918.

The enemy fired rapidly against the battle position and back area during the night.

Our artillery harassed against Cantigny and trenches around Cantigny as well as the roads leading thereto. The railroad station Bacouel was placed under harassing fire.

A German captive balloon drifted over our lines during the morning and was fired upon by our artillery without success. The inmate landed at Etelfay by means of the parachute.

Sight good, Northeast wind. Bombs were thrown on Guerbigny and surroundings during the night.

Losses: 82nd Res. Div. - dead, 6 men.
wounded, 23 men.
25th Res. Div. - dead, 1 officer, 16 men.
wounded, 55 men.

Remarks: Under orders issued from the Headqrs. of the Field Army, No. 4466 secret, and telegram of June 1st, the 19th Infantry Division, serving as Army High Command Reserve was placed in the corps zone area at Voyenne.

The Army High Command, through telegram No. 4431 Ia, directed the Commanding General of the Field Army, that the proposed counter-attack to retake Cantigny should not be carried out.

Sunday, June 2, 1918.

The night passed quietly. The enemy's harassing also kept within moderate bounds during the day.

Our artillery harassed against the usual objectives and carried out two destructive firings against batteries of the enemy and one against infantry positions at Cantigny. Lively aviation activities on both sides. At 6.30 and 11.30 p.m., enemy aviators flying low attacked with machine guns the most advanced trenches of the 82nd Reserve Div. Bombs were thrown on Villers les Roye during the night.

Losses: 82nd Res. Div. - wounded, 1 man.
25th Res. Div. - dead, 7 men, wounded, 31 men.
also 15 sick from carbon monoxide gas through a direct hit into a dugout.

Remarks: The report of the 82nd Reserve Division, Ia O. 2015, of May 31, pertaining to the enemy's attacking against Cantigny and the reasons for the unsuccessful result of the counter-attack with remarks of the corps commander (Ia 2137 operation) has been submitted to the Headquarters of the Field Army.

Monday, June 3, 1918.

Very little harassing by the enemy against the known objectives.

Our own artillery harassed against Cantigny, supports and forests, and fired on the railway depot of Bacouel.

Two destructive firings against enemy's batteries, one against trenches at Cantigny and one against emplacements in the Zungenwald were carried out.

An enemy's patrol of from 12 to 15 men which operated during the night against the picket on the left flank of the 25th Res. Div., was dispersed through rifle fire and hand grenades.

Little aviation activity. Sight: misty - northeast wind.

Losses: 82nd Res. Div. - wounded, 3 men.
25th Res. Div. - wounded, 11 men - 6 men sick from carbon monoxide gas through a hit in a dugout.
30th Infantry Div. - dead, 1 noncommissioned officer. (killed himself through carelessness).

Remarks: Under instructions contained in Ia 2148, operation, new directions for conducting the combat in the corps sector were issued to the divisions.

Tuesday, June 4, 1918.

The harass of the enemy remained indifferent during the day, but during the night it grew more rapid against our positions and back areas.

Our own artillery harassed against infantry positions at Cantigny and against assembly points and batteries. As the advancing of small detachments from Rocquencourt and Serevillers to Cantigny indicated that troops were being relieved, gas concentrations were placed in the hollows between Cantigny-Villers-Tournelle and Cantigny-le Plessier, while the terrain at Cantigny was covered at irregular periods with bursts of fire. The railway plants at Bacouel were again fired upon.

Destructive firing was carried on against two batteries and infantry emplacements of the enemy.

Little aviation activities by poor sight. Northwest wind.

Losses: 82nd Reserve Div. -- dead, 1 man; wounded, 9 men.
25th Reserve Div. -- dead, 3 men.
30th Infantry Div. -- wounded, 1 man.

Wednesday, June 5, 1918.

Animated harassing against combat positions and back area by the enemy during the night. The west brink of the manor park of Fontaine and hollow east of the town was gassed. Moderate harassing only during the day.

Our own artillery harassed against known objectives and covered hollows, assembly points and batteries with concentrated bursts of fire. The railway depot at Bacouel was again placed under fire. One destructive firing against a battery, one against trenches at Cantigny were carried out.

Sight: misty. Northeast wind.

Losses: 82nd Res. Div. -- dead, 3 men; wounded 8 men.
25th Res. Div. -- dead, 7 men, wounded, 27 men.
30th Inf. Div. -- none.

Remarks: Under Ia 2142, operation, the troops were furnished with "Points for the procedure at attacks of the enemy", based on experiences gained at Cantigny.

CANTIGNY ATTACK

of

May 28, 1918.

Operation Documents of the 26th Reserve Corps

from May 31 to June 5, 1918.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchives.

(Translation by Major Harm).

Selected Documents of the 26th Reserve Corps
for the period May 31 to June 5, 1918.

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ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.
(from May 24 to May 31, 1918)

According to the situation conditioned by the attack of the 7th Army, a general attack of the enemy against the 18th Army is, for the time being, improbable.

The feints for a German attack against Amiens carried out by the 2d and 18th Army apparently were successful.

The enemy is keeping back with his seven divisions, which located between the Somme and the Oise, must for the present be considered as possible reserve, and he may be bringing up even stronger reserves for the first repel of a probable anticipated German attack against Amiens.

According to reports of aviators and wireless messages, signs are present which would indicate that a portion of the reserves located south of Amiens are to be moved away. It has been ascertained from prisoners that the Moroccan and 131st divisions are facing the 7th Army. The enemy, on the left flank of the army is yielding to the east bank of the Oise river, leaving behind strong rear guards or even placing new ones. It appears as if he does not wish to hold the old positions. Bailly-Bois St. Mard-south of Moulins sous Touvent, with the major part of his forces, for a heavy traffic was observed on May 31, over the Aisne river toward the south. Further rigorous pursuit no doubt will clear the situation.

After the successful thrust of the enemy at Cantigny and with the increasing importance to the enemy, of gaining a clear understanding of the German intentions, local attacks of the enemy must more than ever be reckoned with. With this, the moral element, of the success obtained by the enemy, must also not be underrated. For the French especially, due to the momentary serious situation between Noyon and Rheims, it is of extraordinary significance, for the encouragement of the frame of mind, to be able to report even a partial success.

The greatly increased range-finding activities against our 3d Army Corps, during the last days and the persisting lively artillery fire against the 3d Army Corps and 26th Reserve Corps, indicate that part attacks there will occur more than likely.

By direction of the Commanding General
of the Army,
The Chief of the General Staff,
(Sgd) v. Sauberzweig,
Major General.

Official:
v. Platen,
Major, General Staff.

PLAN OF DISTRIBUTION:

		<u>Headquarters 18th Army.</u>
Army Group Crownprince Rupprecht.	1	Comdg. General, C. of S.,
Army Corps - 3", 26" Res., 9",		Deputy C. of S., Opera-
17" and 8"., 38 Res., Line of		tion Section, Chief of
Communication command, each 1.	7	Artillery, Chief of
Headquarters 2d & 7th Army, ea. 1.	2	Engineers, Chief of
		Aviation Section, Intel-
		ligence Officer, Asst.
		to Operation Section,
		Corps Daily Order,
		Records and Extra copy (1b)
		each 1 12

June 5, 1918.

The reports of Regimental and Battalion commanders who participated on May 28, in the combats around Cantigny show, that the failure of this day is due mainly to errors made in the guidance of and by the troops. The most important points will be called special attention to hereinafter. I request that remedial action be taken at once, for it is not improbable that the enemy will renew its attack at a very early date.

1. The reason of the surprise of a combat battalion through the attack of the enemy has been excused, because the battalion took up its position only during the night of May 27-28, and had not yet been able to sufficiently carry out observations against the enemy.

The relief of troops must not even for a moment infringe upon the complete combat readiness of the sector. The troops relieved depart only after the incoming troops have arranged all details and are fully combat ready. Above all else, uninterrupted observation against the enemy is a part of combat readiness.

2. The surprise of a garrison, sheltered in dug-outs and cellars, as apparently was arranged in a large measure at Cantigny, must under all conditions, even under the heaviest fire, be guarded against.

In every dug-out or cellar (if cellars must be used at all) a commander must be designated, who is responsible for the safety of the occupants and who must guard against surprises by setting up an uninterrupted observation.

3. One regiment excuses the lack of the counter-attack of the support-companies against the invading enemy, by stating that the young company commanders did not know how to grasp the conception and the task of the support-battalion, at the moment of the enemy's penetration.

It is the duty of regimental and battalion commanders to take care that the commanders of all the forces assigned for the counter-attack, must not only be properly prepared for their tasks during exercises, but above all on the spot, that is, in the very position, in such manner, that the counter-attack takes place automatically without further orders, when the enemy penetrates.

(Paragraph 1, Part 8, page 42, compiled pamphlet).

4. At first the counter-attack on May 28, 1918, was to take place at 6 pm, later it was postponed to 6:45 pm. As a matter of fact, the Infantry was not ready for the attack at 6:45 pm.

The consequence was, that

(a) the attack of the Infantry was not conducted in a united manner, but by the separate battalions at different times.

(b) every kind of agreement between the counter preparation fire of the artillery and the infantry attack was missing, so that the infantry had to thrust against an enemy fully prepared for the combat.

Precipitated counter attacks will always lead to failures.

5. It appears, that the destructive fire of the artillery against the enemy's trenches north and east of Cantigny for the preparation of the counter attack on May 28", was badly adjusted.

The assurance of proper artillery fire observation, in preparing the attack, constitutes the foundation on which rests the effective fire delivery, which must absolutely be demanded from the artillery.

6. According to the report of the commander of a battalion which joined in the counter attack, there was no artillery liaison officer with the commander of the attack, and no artillery observer on the front line of his command zone.

The artillery liaison officer is indispensable for the centralization of the Infantry and Artillery combat conduct, his absence is a serious mistake.

The artillery observers placed in the front line (with the necessary communication personnel and equipment), especially in a combat which is subject to changes and to the shifting incident thereto, are indispensable to one's own and to the enemy's front lines, to quickly accommodate the adjustment of the artillery fire, to the changing conditions.

Even when due to difficulties in communications, the adjustment of artillery fire is not entirely successful, the artillery observers are of great value, because the confidence of the infantry is strengthened by the cooperation of the artillery.

7. Every counter attack will lead to the intermixing of organizations. The difficulties which arise from it, must find its solution through exercises of the rest battalions. This must never furnish a reason for the failure of an attack.

The Commanding General,
(Sgd.) Baron v. Watter.

Official:

Neitzel,
Captain, General Staff.

Distribution:

25" & 82" Reserve and 30" Infy. Div., each 10	--	30
Headqrs. 26" Res. Corps		4
Records and reserve copies		6
		<u>40</u>

Headquarters - 18th Army
Operative and Tactical Section.
No. 4498 - Secret.

(No. 79)

Relative - 1.) Combat for strong points.
2.) Training in forest terrain.

ARMY ORDERS.

1. Recently the enemy has succeeded in taking without much trouble, two of our strong points located in the foremost battle zone - Park Grivesnes and the town of Cantigny, and in doing so has either destroyed or captured the entire emergency garrison. He could obtain such great successes only through a complete out-flanking movement of the strong points. By attacking the front with main forces, supported by the heaviest artillery fire and tanks, the enemy penetrated on both sides of the strong points and then cleared the front from the flank. In this, the enemy complied with the simple and well known rule, never seize a steer by its horns. In accordance with this rule, the words of which may readily be transposed to, that one must attack the position of the enemy where it is the least difficult, we have acted accordingly and with good results in the great offensive battle. Unfortunately, it seems that this act has not been observed in our local attacks and counter-attacks, during the trench warfare.

For this reason most of our enterprises of late have failed.

On this account I call special attention to the following points:

(a) The emergency garrison of a strong point must defend itself from the depth. One or more parts of strong points prepared for an obstinate resistance on the rearward edge and specially manned, will give the necessary foothold for the defense.

Strong points must be shut off in their flanks with wire obstructions. The obstructions in the strong point itself, need not of necessity be placed on the outer edges of the strong points alone, but are best located on the inside, where they cannot be destroyed by the enemy in a systematic manner.

The main point though is the construction of machine gun nests on the sides of strong points so that the enemy's attack against the flanks will itself be enfiladed.

As the enemy will also employ tanks to break through the connecting lines, anti-tank guns or minenwerfers must be placed in readiness for the defense.

A few machine gun nests must also be constructed back of the strong points so that they can prevent the enemy from leaving the captured strong point. The presumable laying of the enemy's barrage must be considered in the construction of these nests.

The occupation troops of a town must not, as at Cantigny, consist of two different troop units. The troops must be placed under the command of a specially designated strong point commander. The greatest importance should be attached to well functioning connections toward the rear, especially with the artillery, even during invisible weather.

(b) At the attack against a strong point of the enemy or at a counter attack against one lost, the thrust in general must primarily be conducted, less against the front than against the connecting lines of the strong point. If these are penetrated, then the strong point must be cleared from the side with strong forces, and the edge toward the enemy occupied immediately. Local conditions of course, may also demand variations in the attack direction. During the clearing, one's own artillery-destructive fire, which is laid down on the attack objectives, will be guided through light signals.

The reserves will follow closely so that they can run under the barrage of the enemy. If this is done they will certainly be available to beat back the enemy's counter-attack, which he is sure to launch.

2. As the continuation of our main attacks may lead the army into a terrain which in parts is largely covered with hedges, orchards and forests, troops must be carefully and practically trained in moving through and in combat for such terrain. When this can not be done partly, they must at least be instructed and trained theoretically.

During movements and combats in covered terrain, in forests especially, the main point to observe is, firmest coherence toward all sides. The extended order line of the open terrain, and the following up of detached reserves into this line are absent. The foremost lines advance best by platoon - in files or at least by group - in files, if only to prevent disintegration (N.C.Os. or dependable men in rear). Thus the group or platoon commander has his men together and can, should he meet the enemy, quickly form the extended order line. Here, the company, platoon and group commanders are the main pillars of the combat. On their decision, prudence and adroitness depends the success. The quick and firm use of the bullet, hand grenades and bayonet is especially indicated in the woods. No enemy resists our hurrah. The light minenwerfer, bomb thrower and the infantry guns have a decisive bearing. The battalion commander must hold everything firmly together and cause a reckless advance. The reserves follow close in rear. The accompanying artillery must also follow the infantry as close as possible. The staff, even the division

staff, also belong close by. Communications must be kept up with the greatest energy, not only from front to rear, but also from rear to front and sideways. The replacement of ammunition, of the infantry and their minenwerfer, bomb throwers and infantry guns located in the front line, must receive special attention.

Quick and thorough successes can be obtained only in this way.

If we train our infantry in keeping with these instructions, it will be spared from heavy losses.

The Army Commander,
v. Hutier,
General of Infantry.

Distribution List:

Army Corps	12
Divisions	25
Staff	10
Extra copy	<u>13</u>
Total	60.

Action:

Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps, June 3, 1918.
Operative and Tactical Section, No. 2139.
Secret.

- (1) 1 copy without addendum furnished,
82 and 25" Reserve and 30th Infy. Divisions.
- (2) Original filed.

For the Corps Commander,
(Sgd) v. Kahlden.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps. (No. 85)
Operative and Tactical Section, No. 2100.
Secret. June 1, 1918.

To the Headquarters, 18th Army.

The 26th Reserve Corps transmits a map 1:25,000, showing the infantry strength distribution (existing at noon June 1st), boundaries of sectors and infantry and artillery command posts. The 1st battalion Reserve Infy. Regt. No. 118, will be relieved during the night of June 1st and 2d, by a battalion of Reserve Infy. Regt. No. 271, and will rejoin the 25th Reserve Division.

Due to the failure of the counter attack against Cantigny, the former regimental sector disposition at the 82d Reserve Div., will be resumed during the next days, under which the following order of battle will set in again:

82d Reserve Division - Right Sector	: Res. Inf. Regt. 270.
Middle Sector	: Res. Inf. Regt. 272.
Left Sector	: Res. Inf. Regt. 271.

On account of the losses of Res. Inf. Regt. No. 83, Reserve-Infy. Regt. No. 118 will be posted on the right flank of the 25th Res. Division. The order of battle of the 25th Reserve Division then will be:

Right sector : Res. Inf. Regt. 118.
Middle sector : Res. Inf. Regt. 83.
Left sector : Regt. Inf. 168.

For the Corps Commander:

The Chief of Staff,
v. K.
Major.

Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps.

(No. 88)

Operative and Tactical Section, No. 2072.

Secret.

May 31, 1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

No change has taken place in the enemy's strength distribution. A wounded American officer who fell in our hands during the last patrol raid of the enemy, as well as two prisoners who were taken during our patrol enterprise on May 27, confirm the presence of the 1st American Division in the sector in question. The presence of the 60th Infantry Division, has also been established through characteristic calls.

The enemy's infantry activity was more spirited than during the former week. Reconnaissance raids by the enemy were repeatedly repulsed. During the patrol enterprises of the 82d and 25th Reserve Divisions on May 27, 1918, the parties of both divisions encountered an enemy who rendered a stout and bitter resistance. After heavy artillery preparation and supported by French shock troops and tanks, as well as by aeroplanes and flame projectors, the Americans succeeded, on May 28th, to take and occupy the town of Cantigny. Their further advance against height No. 104, was frustrated through our counter attack. An attack against Height No. 104, repeated by the enemy on the evening of May 29th, was repulsed.

The artillery activity of the enemy during the first days of the week remained unchanged. A systematic engagement of their batteries took place only against the 2d Battery of the 15th Reserve Foot Artillery Regt. The counter action of the enemy's artillery during our patrol operations on May 27, in front of the 26th Reserve Corps was inferior, due no doubt to the preceding nightly gassing; a heavier fire was directed from the northwest.

The heavy artillery action combined with the attack against Cantigny kept up during the whole of the day on May 28, and also continued strongly during May 29th. A reinforcement of the enemy's artillery by from 15 to 20 batteries with a reduction of heavy calibre at the same time, must be reckoned with. Reports of 82 firing batteries in all were received, as against 46 during the former week, but the actual strength is estimated to be about 60 batteries, for as usual, the enemy seems to make an abundant use of changing their positions. The firing against towns in the Avre valley has weakened.

Enemy's minenwerfer were used for the first time at Cantigny.

The traffic in the enemy's rear area up to May 28, showed nothing startling. Two armored motor trucks were noticed by Coullemelle running south and heavy traffic between Rocquencourt-Serevillers and Villers-Tournelle.

The enemy's field of activity is lively.

The enemy's aviation activity could not be observed on account of bad light and weather, but at the time of the attack against Cantigny on May 28, it was very active.

Opinion as a whole: In his attack on May 28, it seems as if the enemy's design was to gain Height No. 104 which affords a view into the Dombach valley and toward Montdidier. Signs for attacks on a large scale are not in evidence, but the continuation of attacks by Cantigny and for gaining Height No. 104, must be reckoned with.

Combat value of Divisions:

82d Reserve Div. For the defense, still combatable, Res. Inf. Regt. No. 271 and 272, but with the limitation that these regiments must be withdrawn for a short period to rest. The divisions will be fit to attack again if it is given 21 days to rest and train outside of the zone of the enemy's fire during which period replacements are furnished. The losses since March 21, when it joined the 18th Army, are 54 officers and 1846 men (The figures are not entirely complete). Replacements received during this period: officers, none; men 70; horses, none. Prospective replacements - none.

25th Reserve Div. For the defense, still combatable and after 14 days rest and training outside the zone of the enemy's fire during which time replacements are furnished, fit to attack again. Losses since March 21, when it joined the 18th Army, up to May 27th incl.: 49 officers, 1607 men and no horses. Replacements received during this period: officers, none; men, 159; horses, none. Prospective replacements - officers, none; men 236; horses, none.

2d Battln. Reserve Foot Arty. Regt. No. 15 - Due to vacancies in officers and men and deficiency in material, combat fit only partially for the defense. Withdrawal is necessary, and after three weeks' rest and training outside the zone of the enemy's fire, during which replacements of personnel and horses are furnished it, will again be able to attack. Losses: 2 officers, 129 men. Replacements furnished: officers, none; men, 113.

30th Infantry Div. In need of rest. After 3 weeks' of rest in good billets and training, outside of the zone of the enemy's fire, during which replacements are furnished it, will be able to attack again. The necessary period for rest and training remains at three weeks, for neither the rest of the division nor the replacements furnished it, have been materially sufficient after its employment as attack division. Losses since it joined the 18th Army: 76 officers, 2668 men. Replacements furnished: 38 officers, 1714 men. Prospective replacements: 17 officers, 378 men.

206th Infantry Div. In need of rest. After three weeks rest and training outside of the zone of the enemy's fire, during which it receives replacements, it will be fit to attack again. (Report of the division follows). Losses since March 21st: 103 officers, 3166 men. Replacements received: 27 officers and 1548 men. Prospective replacements: officers, none; men 450.

3d Battln. Foot Arty. Regt. No. 7. Needs to be withdrawn. After 3 weeks' of training and rest will be fit to attack again. It suffers from malaria relapses, general exhaustion and nervousness, due to incessant employment since March 5, 1918.

Foot Arty. Battln. No. 33 - Urgently in need of withdrawal. After 3 weeks' rest and training, fit again to attack.

Foot Arty. Battln. No. 98 - Needs to be withdrawn. After three weeks' training and rest and replacement of horses, fit again to attack.

The Commanding General,

(Sgd) Baron v. Watter.

Official:

v. Kahlden,
Major.

Distribution:

Headqrs. 18th Army by telegraph.	
3d and 9th Army Corps, each 1,	- 2
82d and 25th Reserve, 30" and 206"	
Infantry Divs., each 1	- 4
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Records and Extra copies	- 4

16

26th RESERVE CORPS.

CANTIGNY.

Selected Documents relating to the
operations of May, 1918.

(The enemy's attack on May 28, 1918
against Cantigny)
85174/43723.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

Appendix 1.

To the Commanding General 18th Army.

Attached hereto is submitted the report of the 82d Reserve Division giving the reasons for the success of the enemy's attack against Cantigny and for the failure of the German counter attack on May 28, 1918.

Map 1.

1). The town of Cantigny, which on account of its location offers a poor defense, had to be retained in the foremost main defense line, the low depth just at this point leading to the Dom stream valley.

The construction of the defenses was rendered very difficult due to the limited means and on account of the activity from the northwest and south of the higher located enemy. The work could be performed only during the short hours of the nights. The enemy shot the position to pieces during the day.

The front field west of Cantigny lies in the low land, completely controlled by the enemy. Furthermore, the foreground west of Cantigny and Cantigny itself, with exception of the northern portion, can be seen from the German side through aerial observation only. The success of the enemy's attack against Cantigny is due to the surprise of the forces occupying the town. The enemy was observed only after he had entered Cantigny. The surprise was favored because the troops occupying the foreground were put out of action by the heavy fire of the enemy and due to the fact that the hollow which leads from the west to the southwest edge of Cantigny, can not be overlooked from any point of the battle line. The surprise was also enhanced by the appearance of tanks, which our men had never seen before.

According to the reports received from the commander of the front line troops of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 and of the officers of the support companies, the light signals of the occupation troops of Cantigny, requesting barrage and annihilation fire were not seen by any of our positions.

Accordingly, there exists the impression that the occupation troops of Cantigny were located in the cellars of the town and were run down by the enemy.

A flyer who hovered over the positions of the 26th Reserve Corps on the morning of May 28th, for the purpose of assisting a battery of the 25th Reserve Division in finding its ranges, sent the following wireless message at 7:13 a.m.:

"Enemy preparing attack against 82d Reserve Division in sectors b and c."

Appendix 2.

The flyer also made four wireless requests between 7:15 and 7:42 a.m., for annihilation fire in front of these sectors. These messages failed to penetrate (see attached report).

After the loss of Cantigny, counter attacks were made by our support battalions against the enemy advancing from Cantigny. Our troops threw themselves bravely against the enemy. The support battalion of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271, assisted by two nearby companies of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, cleared the enemy from height No. 104, while the

support battalion of Reserve Regiment No. 272 confined itself in occupying the high terrain north of Cantigny, to repulse with its fire the advancing enemy. Due to these purely defensive measures, a complete success was frustrated.

The rest battalions advancing from their shelters on the west bank of the Dom stream, were not available for the counter attack, because their approach was delayed by the enemy's fire and the gassing of the Dom stream valley, also, because the air until the arrival of sufficient numerous German flyers, was controlled by low flying aeroplanes of the enemy.

2.) The cause of the failure of the counter attack is not to be found in the "strength of the enemy" nor in the composition of the assault troops, but in the fact that the attack was slated to take place too soon. The infantry on the right flank was not ready at 6 p.m., neither was it ready for the assault at 6:45, to which time the attack had been changed afterwards. Orders were issued for the infantry of the left flank to attack at 6:45 p.m., but the order was not received until after that time. Consequently, the infantry did not advance together for the attack objective. It also started belated and after artillery preparations had been laid down for some time; thus, the enemy was no longer under subjection.

Moreover, the Americans used white light balls with stars as a signal for their barrage, which were interpreted as German signals for the lifting of the artillery fire. Information acquainting the artillery commander of the 82d Reserve Division, with the front line of the enemy's infantry, was furnished him by infantry flyer as early as 1:20 p.m., by a generally correct description which accompanies Appendix No.3.

Appendix No. 3.

In spite of the unfavorable conditions mentioned, our north attack wing advanced close to the north portion of Cantigny. The battalion commander of this wing has personally reported to me his impression of the affair and stated that the defense strength of the Americans was small and that our counter attack would have been successful, if it had been undertaken in mutual cooperation with the artillery and, if the whole attack front had been launched at the same time.

3). It must be mentioned that the infantry of the division suffered great losses in their leaders. Relief from this condition is urgently requested.

The Brigade Commander, Major General Nucker, suffering with sciatica, has not fully performed his duties.

The commander of Infantry Reserve Regiment No. 271, Colonel Friedericks, due to combat impressions, is suffering from irritation of the nerves. Replacement requested. Of the battalion commanders, Captain Schlettwein was buried by the collapse of a trench, probably will be fit for duty in eight days. Further, Captain Axt, of the 2d Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 271, has been wounded by shell splinters in several places. Whether or not replacement is necessary, depends on the duration of his recovery, decision on this question still pending. Captain von Klein of the 1st Battalion Infantry Reserve Regiment No. 272, is sick with malaria, his replacement has been requested.

I am of the opinion that exceptionally robust commanders, strong in character, must be assigned to the troops, in order to overcome quickly the sway of the past combat actions.

The Commanding General,
(Signed) Baron v. Watter.

82d Reserve Division.
Chief of Staff No. 739
Operation - Secret.

(3)
St. Quentin June 3, 1918.
June 4, C.S. v. Kalden.

To Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.

In compliance with instructions of the Corps Commander - Office Chief of Staff - 3000 Operations, dated June 1st, all original reports will be placed before regimental and battalion commanders.

13 Appendices.

von?

Reserve Infantry Regiment 272.
Personally
with respect to Cantigny.

(4 & 6)

To 82d Reserve Infantry Brigade.

Order of battle at 5 a.m., May 28th - see appendix.

The annihilating fire which began suddenly and heavy against our trenches about 7 a.m., on May 28th, hit the companies in sector B, a-b-c- which were still in the act of installing themselves and were not sufficiently prepared.

The companies had only arrived in the position during the morning hours and had not yet become fully acquainted with all the details. Thus the commanders, as well as the men of the b and c sub-sector company (x) lost their heads somewhat and in any case forgot all about observation during the brief but intense bombardment which caused trench and cellar entrances to fall in. The company commander of the a sub-sector observed and recognized the approach of the Americans, opened fire against them and obtained such a success, that at his position the attack came to a halt, the Americans turned aside to continue the attack against the b and c sub-sector company. It has been alleged that our own barrage lay in front of the company, but I am of the opinion that this was the American fire wave of their advancing infantry. This mistake of the otherwise very attentive commander of the a and c sub-sector company had not been observed, hence there was a failure in the timely request for the barrage - it has been stated that it was requested later; but this can no longer be established. The artillery observer of strong point "Essen", was present and observed the fire and saw the advance of the enemy, but his telephone to the rear was destroyed and he had no quick communications to the rear; hence, the combat battalion remained without artillery support. The commander of the d sub-sector company ordered the rest of his company to advance at once to the high ridge west of company commander b, but failed to add to his order: "for the counter stroke." Consequently the company remained on the high ridge, and stopped the enemy instead of throwing him back.

When at 7:40 a.m., I learned of the anticipated attack, I placed immediately the companies of the e and f sub-sectors of the B battalion under the command of the front line troop commander and also ordered: "all necessary disposition to be made." Accordingly, the commander of the front line troops ought to have ordered the e and f sub-sector companies to hold themselves in readiness for the counter stroke. The company commanders of these companies, which also had arrived in their position only during the morning, should have grasped the situation and acted independently without orders when they saw the enemy advancing, and ought not to have engaged their companies separately, but should have planned, prepared and acted together.

(x) Meaning that they forgot their main duty. - June 2 - v.K.

When the companies finally advanced to the counter stroke, it was too late, for by that time the enemy was too combat strong.

The e (8th) sub-sector company was well led and had small losses, but as it took up the counter thrust alone, it met with heavy machine gun and artillery fire.

All the reasons mentioned here have resulted in the non-success of the counter stroke. (x) At the decisive moment the young company commanders failed to comprehend the idea of and the tasks assigned to a support battalion.

While e and f sub-sector companies were put in for the counter stroke, I moved up g and h sub-sector companies from the Ziethen thicket and one of them (5th Company) was put in next to the 8th Company, because the reports received by me indicated that everything was so favorable there, that I thought I could count on a successful stroke at that place.

The last company of the B battalion sector (11th Company) remained as regimental reserve. I should not have put in the 5th Company at this time, it is likely that later it could have rendered better service in the counter-attack.

After the failure of the counter stroke, orders were given for the counter attack.

The causes of the failure of the counter attack can be gathered briefly from the following:

First of all, consideration must be given to the fact that three companies of the rest battalion - 2d, 3d and 4th - were relieved from the position (as combat battalion) early on the morning of May 28th and had arrived at their shelters in the forest south of Arvillers only during the forenoon. These companies marched back over the same road at noon and arrived at 5:30 p.m. at the regimental command post, and at 6:20 p.m., at the scene of action. Hence the combat effectiveness of the troops was reduced considerably, the physical efforts were not insignificant and the renewal of the increased fire of the enemy which set in, caused losses and further reduced the combat effectiveness. At first the counter attack was ordered for 6 p.m. and then was changed, on my representation, to 6:45 p.m. The interval at disposal though was insufficient to acquaint every sub-commander with his task. Thus, the necessary calmness and safety were missing as the attack was launched. Our artillery had been firing since 5:15 p.m., but did not hit the enemy's foremost trenches - once more there was no observation that is - it was not possible to report same. Afterward the fire had to be lifted until 6:45 p.m., this alone reduced the force of the action.

The attack was formed and carried out. The Herzberg battalion was conducted calmly and safely. The attack would have succeeded without doubt, if (1) the enemy's front lines had met with losses and (2) the enemy's artillery had been successfully engaged. To this must be added the exhausted state of the troops and the heavy losses of officers and leaders, so that after the initial success, the brave advance of the extreme left flank of the regiment, the attack came to a standstill and could proceed no farther.

(x) The tasks must be clearly fixed beforehand by the Regimental Commander. There is lack of training. v.K.

Even the insertion of two companies of the rest battalion (2d battalion, 270th Reserve Infantry Regiment) into the fight could not change anything on the failure, because the advancing left flank of the regiment (11th Company) was not followed by the right flank of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 which had also been reinforced by the 7th Company of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 270. With the badly confused intermixing of the companies of the regiment, a centralized combat command was no longer possible.


The hard working runners displayed great courage, but it took too long for the commander to receive the reports of the situation through them - it seems to me that ground buzzer (telegraph) functions best. This pertains, as now done, to the artillery observer and the commander of the front line troops, as well as to the Brigade observation east of the Down-stream valley.

(Signed) von Grothe,
(Commanding Regiment)
(Reserve Infantry No. 272).

Official:

Odenbreit,
Lieutenant and Orderly Officer.

1st Appendix



(7)

June 2, 1918.

Report of the Acting Battalion Commander
of the 3d Battalion 272 Reserve Infantry Regiment
with reference to May 28, 1918.

- a. Cantigny was occupied by the 12th Company, 272d Reserve Infantry Regiment. The major part of the company occupied the cellars of Cantigny at the time of the attack and only a few advanced day posts covered against the enemy. Due to the intense bombardment of the town, the men came out of the cellars and dugouts too late. No signals asking for barrage were fired. Thus the Americans entered and emptied the cellars one after another without being hindered by German artillery fire. Six tanks which were noticed by men of the 10th company and of the 3d Machine Gun Company, participated in silencing the light machine gun groups which kept up the resistance. (Statements of men of the 12th Company).
- b. For the counter attack, all of the remainder of the 3d Battalion, especially the 11th Company and the Command Reserve under Lieutenant Gutsche, were placed, partly under the command of the commander of the front line troops 1, and partly under Captain v. Hertzberg. (x) The commander of the 3d Battalion was at the time of the counter attack functioning as commander of the supports at Maresmontiers and had no knowledge of the orders and of the accomplishment and failure of the counter attack, for which reason he is unable to give an opinion as to the causes leading to the failure.

Kaul,
First Lieutenant,
Acting Battalion Commander.

(x) Commander of supports without troops.

1st Battalion, Infantry Reserve,
Regiment No. 272

June 2, 1918.

(8)

To:
Commanding Officer Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272.

Herewith the reports of Companies (9, 10, 12 and 1), which at the beginning of the combat action on May 28, were under the command of the commander of the front line troops, v. Klein.

I. The causes, which led to the success of the enemy's surprise of the town of Cantigny, may have been as follows:

1). Prior to the commencement of the attack, ground observation gave no indication of an impending attack.

2). No light signals came through from the front at the commencement of the attack. Our own barrage therefore likely too late.

3). The troops in Cantigny were for the most part in cellars and had no chance for observation. The observation posts in sub-sectors b and c were put out of action by annihilation fire, hence no lasting defense through which it would have been possible to bring up reserves.

4). The reserve company (1st) missed the opportunity for a counter-stroke, it waited for orders.

II. For the failure of the counter attack.

1). The order to attack reached the commander of the front line troops too late - at 6:30 p.m. - due to which it could not be transmitted in time to the front line.

2). The left contact battalion could not, for some reason or another, participate in the counter attack.

3). The enemy whose main resistance took place in the Manor-park of Cantigny, due to the absence of means of communication with our artillery, was not engaged by a heavy bombardment immediately preceding the assault, nor was the enemy kept down by an effective artillery fire.

4). The second successive wave, which could not deploy as such, pressed to the right, where no enemy was found.

2 appendices.

Huhz.

June 2, 1918. (9 and 10).

Report of the Acting Battalion Commander,
3d Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272,
on the combat situation from May 28 to 30, 1918.

The commander of the 3d battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272, Captain Axt, was located at Maresmontiers on the morning of May 28th, in command of the supports. Under his command were the 7th and 8th Company in the Aival woods, the 5th and 11th Company in the Ziethen brush, the minenwerfer and parts of the machine gun company of the 3d battalion in the gravel pit and machine gun nest No. 48. Captain Axt was wounded during the morning. His substitute, First Lieutenant Kaul, arrived at Maresmontiers at about 11:30 a.m. The Americans in the mean time had attacked with success. The 7th and 8th Companies were placed under the command of the commander of the front line troops, Captain v. Klein at about 7:45 p.m. He ordered the two companies to advance at once to the counter stroke.

The 7th Company under command of Lieutenant Haese advanced right and left from the strong point "Essen" and forming lines of skirmishers from the edge of the forest, proceeded in the direction of the front line troop command. Lieutenant Haese reported upon arrival and received orders to advance in the direction of Cantigny as support to the 12th Company, 272d Reserve Regiment. The company advanced on the road, from front line troop command to Cantigny and on the ridge received heavy machine gun and rifle fire, resulting in considerable losses. Heavy artillery fire forced the company to retire soon afterwards. The company assembled at the bottom and advanced again in an extended order as far as the ridge and there dug in, because a further advance was not possible on account of the heavy artillery fire. The company was reinforced during the evening by parts of the 11th and 1st Company and during darkness advanced up to a point 200 meters from the enemy. Lieutenant Haese was wounded in the course of the afternoon and had to turn the company over to noncommissioned officer Klenczar, Vice Sergeant Major Hartel having been killed and Vice Sergeant Major Lowenstein wounded.

Klenczar also fell soon afterwards, leaving Corporal Intze as the only noncommissioned officer leader.

The order to attack did not reach the 8th Company. All attempts to establish contact with the 7th Company, 272d Reserve Regiment, or with the commander of the supports failed due to the runners being shot down or wounded. The company received information only at 11:45 a.m. that the Americans had taken Cantigny. Lieutenant Marschner, the company commander, was ordered to report to the commander of the front troop line. He turned the company over to Lieutenant Orion with the direction to lead the company forward to the Wolfgorge and to wait there for further orders. The company reached this point and dug in. It moved forward in junction with the advancing battalion toward the b sector company as the counter-attack of Captain von Hertzberg set in, at about 7 p.m. It was successful in running underneath the heavy fire and to advance as far as the invading point of the American line. The first wing of the company was heavily harassed by machine gun fire from the direction of Framicourt - Cantigny. It occupied the front trench of the straw stack toward the right and worked its way further to the left, whereby two Americans, one of which a wounded sergeant, were made prisoners and two light machine guns, food stuff and articles of equipment were captured. The company made contact to the left with the 10th Company, 272d Reserve Regiment and to the right with assembled detachments of different companies under Lieutenant Schneider.

The 5th Company received orders at 10:45 a.m. to move at once to the Deutz Forest (Aival woods) and to hold itself in readiness for the attack on Cantigny. Three of its five groups had been detached for labor duties and had not yet returned. For this reason, the company commander moved two groups to the south edge of the forest where they arrived about 12 noon. The two labor groups arrived at about 5 p.m., when the company formed, as ordered, in the direction of the front line command and then advanced in successive waves from point B (see sketch) in the direction of the straw stack. As the first successive wave, two machine gun groups reached point C, at about 7:45 p.m. and prepared for the defense for the reason that there was no contact toward the right and left. Contact was established at dark, to the right with the 10th Company, the left flank occupying the a company sub-sector. Contact to the left was established with the 8th Company of Reserve Regiment No. 270. The two machine gun groups which had been posted in sub-sector a were, upon orders of the battalion commander, posted in the reserve trench of sub-sector a, during the evening of May 29th.

The 11th Company had, just as the 5th Company did, moved at about noon of May 28th, from the Ziethen-Brush, to the Deutz forest and there received orders to advance against Cantigny and establish contact with Reserve Regiment No. 271. The company advanced and soon found the required contact. It met with heavy losses through artillery fire during its advance to the front line command. It received orders at 7 p.m. to participate in the counter attack led by Captain v. Hertzberg. The left wing advanced the farthest on the road leading from the front line command to Cantigny and up to the foremost American trenches, although only with heavy losses. Nearly all the men on the right flank were wounded or dispersed by the heavy artillery fire. Contact toward the right was lost, because the other companies had moved to the right. Orders were received at 3:15 a.m. for the attack against Cantigny. The company still counted 17 heads. Reserve Regiment No. 271 reported from the left that it could not participate in the attack on account of great losses. Thereupon, the company received orders to advance in shock groups and to support the attack which had started on the right. In conformity with this order, the company advanced to 150 meters of the enemy's line but could go no further as there were several machine gun nests at the edge of the town. It left listening posts at the front and dug in on the road leading from Cantigny to St. Aignan.

During the night from May 29th to 30th, sub-sector c (Cantigny) was occupied by the companies of the 3d Battalion in the succession of the 11th, 9th and 10th Companies. The remainder of the 12th Company, one Lieutenant and three men, were with the 9th Company. The battalion commander had gone already during the day from Maresmontiers to the Höllenschlucht (Hellgorge).

Kaul,
First Lieutenant,
Acting Battalion Commander.

2d Battalion,
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272

(11 and 12).
In the field, June 2, 1918.

Report on the failure of the counter attack against Cantigny on May 28th and 29th, 1918.

On the morning of May 28th, the rest battalion of the regiment was composed of three companies of the 1st Battalion - the 2d, 3d and 4th Company, the 6th Company of the 2d Battalion, a part of the 2d Machine Gun Company and the 1st Minenwerfer Section. The companies of the 1st Battalion had been relieved from the battle line during the night from May 27th to 28th, and had arrived at 5 a.m. in the forest camp of Arvillers. The following order was received at 9:20 a.m. from the Division:

"Enemy has engaged sector c. Battalion will hold itself in such march readiness that it can move immediately when ordered. The telephone will be watched over continuously." The battalion was placed in readiness immediately. Men who were absent at work, or who were training in the terrain, were called back. The following orders were received by the battalion at 9:45 a.m.

1). A heavy fire has been laid by the enemy since 7 a.m. on the line Cantigny - Fontaine and the Dom stream valley has been gassed. The enemy has attacked since 8:15 a.m. Enemy in three columns between Cantigny and Framicourt against height No. 104 and Fasanerie. Seven tanks are said to be west of Framicourt.

2). Battalion moves at once beyond Becquigny as far as the north edge of the Bracht-forest northeast of Fignieres. The battalion commander will proceed to the brigade headquarters at Fignieres. Plenty ammunition will be taken along.

The companies moved at 10:30 a.m. They marched singly, so as not to be seen and to avoid losses, to the Bracht-forest. The field kitchens could not be taken along immediately and were given orders to follow. The battalion arrived at the forest at about 1:30 p.m.

The battalion commander was fully informed of the situation at brigade headquarters and directed to report with his battalion to the commander of Reserve Regiment No. 272 designated to direct the attack against Cantigny. The battalion marched off at about 2:30 p.m. via Fignieres, Gratibus and Maresmontiers, to the northeast edge of the Deutz forest.

In order to avoid the heavy artillery fire and also to remain unseen by the enemy, the companies marched independently. The battalion commander proceeded in advance to the regimental command post and there was informed of the combat situation and received verbal orders to attack with his battalion. Zone of combat: to the right, the correct regimental boundary passing to Ba. Left regimental boundary: South edge of the Deutz forest, exit of Cantigny to le Plessier. The battalion was to advance as follows: Two companies in the first line, one company in the second line in rear of the center of the first line, one company in the second line to the left in echelon. The machine gun company and minenwerfers were to assist in the attack. The battalion was then to advance, together with the front line companies commanded by Captain von Klein, and retake the old position.

The battalion reached the Deutz forest at about 6:20 p.m. As a heavy fire was being placed on the Deutz forest the companies had to evade same, so the battalion was not united. The battalion received the attached written order to attack at 6:20 p.m. The battalion commander reported to regimental headquarters that it would not be possible to begin the attack at 6:45 p.m. as ordered. He received orders to attack nevertheless. The battalion marched through the Deutz forest and advanced in the zone of attack as

directed, with two companies in the front line, two companies in the second line and with the machine guns supporting the attack from the rear. The first companies stepped out of the forest for the attack at about 7:15 p.m., in the direction of Cantigny. Our own artillery fire had ceased at about 6:45 p.m., in consequence of which the enemy was keeping up a heavy artillery fire on the Deutz forest and on the intervening terrain. The commanders of the 4th and 6th Companies were killed soon afterwards. The commander of the 2d Company and the next senior officer were wounded. In spite of this fact the companies went ahead in good order. Until they reached their own front line their losses were heavy, due to the heavy artillery and machine gun fire of the enemy, so much so, that when they reached their front line, they were no longer fully combat able. The right wing of Klein's battalion together with parts of the attacking battalion, which had smaller losses, and which of itself had a greater strength, was able to gain ground, while the left flank, especially the 271st Reserve Infantry Regiment which had joined, could not advance on account of the heavy losses. After the receipt of reports and after a somewhat clear picture of the situation was at hand, another attack was ordered during the evening, especially under a strong pressure from the right flank. The right flank succeeded, even before darkness, in retaking the whole of the old B.a. line and in retaking B.a. partly. On the left flank the attack came to a stop at Cantigny. Another attack launched at 3:30 a.m. on May 29th, failed also in spite of the fact that a company of the 270 Reserve Infantry Regiment and the command reserve were thrown in.

Why did the attack fail?

- 1). The men of the 2d, 3d and 4th Companies, who had only been withdrawn at 5 a.m., after occupying the front line position for twelve days, had to march again at 10:30 a.m. without rest and without having been well subsisted. It was not possible to subsist the men prior to the combat. For this reason, the companies did not arrive fully combat able at the Deutz forest.
- 2). The time allowed between the arrival and attack of the battalion was too short. A good knowledge of the affair, establishment of connections with the front line and the adjoining regiments up to company commanders, was not possible.
- 3). The battalion advanced to the attack after our own artillery had ceased firing on the enemy's line. For this reason it soon met with heavy and bloody losses and in spite of the fact that the men advanced dashing, it could not carry the weak front line along with it.
- 4). A united command of the whole attack of the two regiments, was not arranged for.
- 5). (x) There was no artillery liaison officer present with the commander of the attack and no artillery observer with the front line.
- 6). The connecting regiment, Reserve Infantry No. 271, had according to reports, received such heavy losses, that it could not advance against Cantigny. For this reason, the left flank of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272, could also not advance as otherwise it would have been exposed.
- 7). (xx) The formations were soon broken up through the entry in the line of the skirmishers of Captain Klein's battalion. The companies were thrown together pell-mell and a centralized combat command was no longer possible.

8). (xxx) The organization cannot be blamed for the failure. It passed smoothly through the heavy artillery and machine gun fire, but with its inferior shock strength, could no longer break the resistance of the enemy without strong artillery preparation, and without an exact centralized command over both regiments.

von Hertzberg,
Captain and Battalion Commander.

1 inclosure.

(x) An artillery observer with the front line is not of much benefit. He must be close to the front with a telephone. v.K.

(xx) This happens at every attack and furnishes no just grounds for the failure. v.K.

(xxx) Here two regiments have already been mentioned. The 83d also must be added. To many troops entirely. v.K.

(13, 14 and 16).

9th Company,
(272 Reserve Infantry Regiment.)

June 1, 1918.

Report of the Command Reserve and of the collected 9th
Company, from May 28 to 30, 1918.

On May 28, I received from First Lieutenant v. Raesfeld the following orders: "The Command Reserve of the 3d Battalion - with all machine guns will march at once and report to the regimental commander at his command post".

The Reserve moved at 5:20 p.m.

Strength: 1 officer 10 noncommissioned officers and 56 men with 4 light machine guns.

1 officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, 15 men, 3 heavy machine guns.

At Maresmontiers I reported to Major von Grothe. Here I was informed of the general situation and received further orders to report with the reserve to Captain Klein at the front line command. In the Hollenschlucht (Hellgorge) I lost 4 men through heavy artillery fire. At the front line command, orders were given me at first, to place 2 groups and one light machine gun at disposition of the 11th Company. The three heavy machine guns and 1 light machine gun and two groups of the 9th Company dug in at the height of the old troop support camp. The rest of the reserve was used as ammunition carriers and 4 men as bearers for Lieutenant Kruger. Toward morning I collected about one group of stragglers of the 9th Company. I lost three men and the light machine gun through a direct artillery hit. During the morning of May 29, I established contact with Lieutenant Heilmann. Both of us then sent out patrols (crawling), to ascertain the neighboring organizations. The gap was about 600 meters. A report was received from Lieutenant Heilmann that the Americans were forming for a new attack and were densely occupying the trenches. Again I collected stragglers of the 3d Battalion and took them along to the front. The attack of the enemy out of Cantigny was smoothly repulsed through barrage, infantry and machine gun fire. At darkness I walked over the whole line and found the gap fairly well closed up to the 2d Company, Reserve Regiment No. 272, by the 5th Company, Reserve Regiment No. 270 and 1st and 10th Companies, Reserve Regiment 272. A heavy barrage set in against Hellgorge, early, about 5 a.m., on

May 30th. A probable intended attack could not develop due to our artillery fire. The night, as well as May 30th generally, passed much more quiet. The 9th Company had the following losses on this day: dead 4, wounded 27, missing 39.

Signed - Gutsche.

10th Company,
(272 Reserve Infantry Regiment).

Report of the activity of the company on
May 28, 29 and 30, 1918.

The company relieved the 2d Company in sector A, during the night from May 27th, 28th. The enemy opened its fire against the trenches at 5:45 a.m., heavy especially against the left flank. The range of the fire was shortened at about 7:30 a.m., and I looked about from the trench. In front of me a heavy barrage of our own artillery, back of me the enemy's range of fire. At the same moment American troops came out of their trenches in dense successive waves. Met by a heavy infantry and machine gun fire a part ran back to the trenches, while another part evaded our barrage and invaded the adjoining company (the 9th) to the left. American troops advancing against the left adjoining sector also were engaged with machine gun and infantry fire, from which they suffered heavy losses. Tanks (6 to 8) supported the invasion of Cantigny. Forthwith, the Americans tried to extend to the right in the trenches but were stopped by a few sharpshooters who poured an enfilading fire into the trenches. The Americans, who had invaded the line of the 9th and 12th Company, had in the meantime advanced beyond Cantigny and were digging in. A brisk traffic was carried on throughout the day to the exit position of the attack. The company's line was extended to the left during the evening, first by the 8th and later by the 5th Company 272 Reserve Regiment and by the 8th Company 270 Reserve Regiment. Contact was not established even on the next day with those parts of the regiment lying in front of Cantigny. The company was relieved during the night of May 29th and 30th, by the 8th Company and moved into the position in front of Cantigny, where it was relieved on May 31st by the 8th Company, 270 Reserve Infantry Regiment.

(Signed v. Vegesack.

12th Company, 272 Reserve Infantry Regiment.

The company moved into the Cantigny position at 12:30 a.m. on May 28th, with a combat strength of 2 officers and 55 men. The outposts, with the exception of the noncommissioned officer post, were withdrawn to Cantigny at daybreak. The night was comparatively quiet. A heavy bombardment (artillery medium and heavy mines) was laid on the town and position of Cantigny, from 6:30 to 7:45 a.m. Lieutenant Kuntze who was located in the dug out of the F sector, looked out of the gallery at about 7:15 a.m., being of opinion that the fire had been shortened. While in this act, he was hit in the head by a splinter of a grenade which struck close to the entrance of the gallery. He died shortly afterwards. First Class Private Lustig and Private Ratzke were sent by Lieutenant Seczcpinski at 7:30 a.m., to the

advance message centre to ascertain if connections of any kind were still existing. The advance message centre reported that there were none. The two men returned to the dug out in sector F and on their way back observed machine gun fire on the right. The company reserve (1 officer, 2 noncommissioned officers, 10 men) now left the dugout and established itself in the shellhole in rear of Cantigny. A light machine gun was placed in position, but as no enemy could be seen for dust and smoke, it was not fired. The company commander received a report, that the entrance to all the men's galleries were obstructed, on account of which a defense could not be undertaken against the enemy at the proper time.

The company reserve had received orders from the company commander to defend itself to the last man. The resistance of the reserve was broken by the preponderance of two charging columns and because they were not recognized until too late (about 30 meters away). Those who were not killed were made prisoners. Two men, one of them wounded, who had hid behind a hedge and were not discovered by the enemy, got away. As these men were unable to join an infantry detachment, they made their way to Maresmontiers. The wounded man reported at the first line transport and there gave a full account of the affair.

The command reserve of the 12th Company - (1 officer, 8 men) in conjunction with the command reserve of the battalion was sent into the line under the combined command of Lieutenant Gutsche under orders from Regimental Headquarters, and complied with the order, "to carry ammunition to the foremost line and then to serve as security detachment for the commander of the front line command". The reserve command of the 12th Company received orders at 6 a.m., on May 29th, to fill the gap between the 5th and 11th Company. During the night from May 29th to 30th, it was moved toward the left into the new sector of the 9th Company and remained there until the morning of May 31st.


(SIGNED) Kokok.
Lt. & Company Commander.

5/272

Sketch of the Development of Action

15)

28th May 1978
Scale: 1:40,000



June 1, 1918.

Telephone message to the 82d Reserve Division.

During the days prior to May 28, heavy bursts of fire lay frequently over Cantigny and the front line. The troops of the foremost line consisted, from right to left, of the 1st, 3d and 2d Companies. The 1st and 3d Companies each set up one light machine gun group at the front of their sectors. The 4th Company acting as the reserve for the combat battalion, was posted with two thirds of its strength on the road Cantigny to the front line command and with one third in the Fasanerie quarry. In addition, a chain of light-signal sentries were posted from the advance message centre to the commander of the supports. The enemy's heavy bombardment against Cantigny and the front line, set in at about 6 a.m. Cantigny itself, from the foreground to the manor park, was kept by the enemy under the heaviest fire of every kind of calibre. The commander of the 3d Company considered this only a retaliatory fire and not anticipating an attack, failed to order the firing of light signals. The 1st platoon of the 3d Company remained in the cellars until 8 a.m. but nothing was seen any more of the other platoons located in other cellars. After 8 a.m., the enemy's artillery fire was placed further to the rear. At this time too, the Americans advanced to the attack in dense masses - about two battalions - from the preserve park and Zungen forest toward east-north-east. Immediately, the 2d Company fired about 12 green light-signals with the signal-bomber and Very pistol. No artillery fire followed these signals. More than likely, these signals were not seen due to heavy smoke and mist. The 2d company took the attacking enemy under an enfilading fire. Lt. Schuster with the 1st platoon of the 3d Company, came out of the cellar at 8 a.m. and took up a position in the shell hole which had formed there. The enemy was not seen. About one half hour later the company heard machine gun fire in its rear to the right, and it withdrew to the rear in an easterly direction because it had been enveloped.

The loss of Cantigny is mainly due to the fact that the companies were located in deep cellars, which excluded every observation. In addition the major part of the 1st Company and two platoons of the 3d Company were probably blocked in the cellars, so that the enemy's attack could hardly have been stopped with the few available men. The light-signal sentries and the foremost line, no doubt were shot down in a short time. It is doubtful if light-signals could have been seen at this time, due to the very heavy fog. The chain of light-signal sentries saw the Americans first at about 9 a.m. The commander of the front line command received this information, only after two orderlies sent out by the front line command had returned with the written report of Lieut. Scharffenstein "Cantigny occupied by the enemy, barrage requested." This report was transmitted immediately to the commander of the supports.

The main reason for the failure of the counter attack against Cantigny is the too late a transmission of orders to the commander of the front line command and to the companies. Besides this though, the companies were far too weak for a counter attack. The average strength of the companies in sector C, consisted only of from 15 to 20 rifles.

For the regiment.
(271 Res. Infy.)

von -----
(name illegible).

(18)

Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271.

June 2, 1918.

The report no doubt has been prepared mainly on the statements of the adjutant of the 1st Battalion and of Lieut. Schuster.

I am adding the following.

- (1) The commander of the 3d Company had no reasons to fire light signals in consequence of the enemy's artillery fire.
- (2) The deep cellars did not exclude observation.
- (3) Not all of the companies assigned to the counter attack in sector C, had only from 15 to 20 rifles, certainly not before the commencement of the attack. At the end of the attack only the 10th Company of the 3d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271, had this number, the other companies had from 30 to 50.

In my opinion, Cantigny was taken through a surprise attack of the enemy's infantry conducted from close proximity and through the breaking down of the means of communication.

In absence of the Regimental Commander,
v. Lingenthal,
Major.

(19)

2d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271. June 2, 1918.

Report to the 82d Reserve Division - I a 6458, of June 1, 1918.

The battalion was resting in and near Becquigny and was ordered to the front only after the loss of Cantigny. For this reason there is nothing to report in regard to question a (the first attack).

Regarding b. (counter attack).

For the counter attack, two companies (the 5th and 6th) were placed at the disposition of the commander of the front line. From what I have heard, these two companies attacked with vigor. The commanders of both companies fell at the head of their company - one severely wounded, the other killed. The commanding officer of the 6th Company, Lieut. of Reserve, Chroback, though wounded twice retained the command of his company until killed by a third shot. The attack failed to advance because the enemy's machine gun nests had not been silenced and that a heavy artillery fire was placed against the attacking companies. Our own artillery fire was placed too far forward and not against the foremost line of the enemy.

I have ascertained these facts after inquiring from some of those who participated.

Personally I can only state that it is my opinion that the order for the counter attack came too late, that there was not sufficient time to make the necessary preparations (to give orders to organizations). I happened to be at the regimental battle headquarters when the order for the counter attack arrived (between 5:25 and 5:30 p.m.). The attack was to take place at 6 p.m. During the intervening half hour the runners could hardly have carried the order to the commander of the front line. The changing of the time afterwards to 6:45 p.m., could not alter the situation. Thus it happened that the attack was not conducted in a centralized manner, but scattered by the several

units with results that each was nipped in the bud.

Paletta.

(20)

Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 and 3d Battalion.
Daybook No. 364 - Secret.

June 2, 1918.

Report

By telephone to 82d Reserve Division Ia. 02034 of June 1, 1918.

On May 28, 1918, the undersigned was in command of the supports in Sector C.

Reference to a).

At first the commander of the supports received the following telephone message from the commander of the front line at 7:55 a.m. "The enemy is about to attack." After this he requested increased readiness for action. The two companies at Framicourt which had been made responsible for the counter attack at the opportune time, formed for the attack even before 8:30 a.m., and threw the enemy back over height No. 104 and to near the manor park of Cantigny. These two companies then advanced as far as the line on the southwest edge of the Fasanerie woods and continuing southeast with the connecting left flank company from Fontaine, where the latter company acted as contact company, kept on as far as the southeast corner of the manor park. Here they were met by a very heavy artillery barrage of the enemy, which caused heavy losses and prevented the retaking of Cantigny. This also was the reason why the two companies of the arrived reserve battalion of the regiment, which had been placed at the disposition of the commander of the supports between 3 and 4 p.m., and then placed by him beyond the south edge of the Fasanerie woods, could not make headway with the counter attack.

Reference to b).

For the counter attack which at first was ordered to take place at 6 and then changed to 6:45 p.m., there was not the necessary time in which to instruct the commanders of the organizations and for arranging a united advance. Some of my companies, of the 3d and 2d Battalion 271 Reserve Infantry Regiment, actually did try to advance at 6 p.m., while to the right, Reserve Regiment No. 272, advanced only at 6:45 from further to the rear.

Twice during the night of May 28th-29th, at 3:10 and 5:05 a.m., I received orders to attack and in each case the attack was to begin five minutes later. Upon receipt of the first order, I made request for reinforcements on the commander of Reserve Regiment No. 272, under whose command I had been placed for the attack on the preceding afternoon. Reinforcements were assigned, but in spite of the fact that officers were sent out to meet them, they could not be located in time. They had not found the way to the supports. For these attacks there also was not the necessary time for preparation.

We tried to advance but failed due to the weakness of the organizations and the heavy machine gun fire of the enemy.

Having assumed command of the regiment on May 29th, in the absence of the regular commander, and after hearing the reports of the members of the regimental staff, I can only state as

regimental commander, that the failure of the counter attack was due to the entirely too insufficient time for the preparation of a united command.

In absence of the Regimental Commander,
v. Lingenthal,
Major.

To the 82d Reserve Infantry
Brigade.
- 2 copies -

1st Company Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272. (21 & 22).
Report.
on the engagements on May 28th, by Cantigny.

The enemy began its artillery fire at about midnight of May 27-28th. Even the camp of the supports of the 1st Company was taken under a heavy fire from the very beginning. The enemy's fire increased at 6 a.m. to an annihilation fire. Lieut. Schreiber, who commanded, ordered the company into the dugouts, the observers only remaining outside. The attack of the Americans was reported by Lieut. Kruger at 7 a.m. Lieut. Schreiber sounded the alarm immediately and in this act was severely wounded. Sergeant Major Kunnt assumed command and occupied the height near the company support camp, instead and better to form at once for the counter stroke. He considered himself too weak with his 35 rifles, for a counter stroke and so reported to the commander of the front line. The company had shrunk to this number through losses, assignment to machine gun nests and details as dispatch runners, signal posts and to the (x) regimental scout detachment.

Orders came from battalion headquarters at about 10 a.m. for the counter stroke. Lieut. Kruger was to assume command of the company and together with his own men, lead them in the attack. Lieut. Kruger (xx) also was of opinion that a counter stroke now, with the small number of men, could have no success and remained at the height. A report of this effect was sent by him to battalion headquarters. The company remained at the height until 6:30 p.m., when it fell in with the Hertzberg battalion for the attack under command of First Lieutenant Bassler. The attack advanced smoothly until Lieutenant Bassler was wounded. Heavy artillery and machine gun fire of the enemy stopped the advance. If it had advanced further it would have been harassed by a flanking fire out of Cantigny and resulted in great losses. A simultaneously conducted attack from the south while the troops occupying Cantigny were kept busy in the front would in all probability have resulted in a successful attack against Cantigny without too heavy losses.

Losses - dead	1 officer	0 noncom.	5 men
- missing		1 "	3 "
- wounded		4 "	17 "
Total	1 "	5 "	25 "

In addition 1 light machine gun was destroyed, 1 was turned over to the front line command in an unserviceable condition. Another one, completely sand locked, which was left at the support camp, could not be found later on.

Fuglach *

Note to Falling out of leaders, numerous; very disturbing but must not eliminate the counter attack which has grown to be a habit. v. W.

(x) Incorrect, no special men detailed at Regtl. Headqrs.-Rgtl. Comdr.
(xx) That also is correct. v.W.

2d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83.

June 2, 1918.

To the 50 Infantry Reserve Brigade.

Battle report of the 2d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regt. No. 83.

In compliance with Division Ia 378 secret, of June 1st, the 2d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, was relieved at 1:40 p.m., on May 28, by the 3d Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83 in support, and ordered to report to the commander of the front line troops. Distribution made: 5th Company in the artillery cover position at the supports, 7th Company placed at the disposition of the commander of the front line troops at Fontaine. The 6th and 8th Companies reported at 2 p.m. to the commander of the front line troops.

Strength:	6th Company	-	1 Officer	10 N.C.O.	52 men.
	8th	"	1 "	8 "	48 "

The following order was received from Regimental Headquarters at 7:05 p.m.: "To Captain Behm. Form immediately for the counter attack con-jointly with troops on your right in the combat zone a-b (see sketch). Cantigny is to be outflanked from the south. Do not advance via the former front field zone. Attack begins at 6:45 p.m. (signed Hubner)."

Simultaneously with this order, the attack orders of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 were received, stating also that the 2d Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, had been placed under the command of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271.

Though both orders were received as late as 7:05 p.m., while the attack was already under way north of the road Cantigny - Framicourt, since 6:45 p.m., I still made up my mind to attack and issued the following attack order:

"Connecting regiment No. 271, engaged in counter attack against Cantigny since 6:45 p.m. The battalion forms for the counter attack at 7:45 p.m. The task is to advance in junction with the connecting regiment No. 271 and to outflank Cantigny from the south but the advance will not be made via the former front field zone." The 6th Company will form on the right flank on the road Cantigny - Framicourt connecting with Reserve Regiment No. 271, the 8th Company on the left adjoining the 6th, then the 1st Company, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83. Breadth of companies about 200 meters. Two platoons each with two heavy machine guns of the 3d Machine Gun Company, will follow the 6th and 1st Companies at an interval of 100 meters.

Artillery will engage the woods close by and south of Cantigny, south edge Cantigny and Keulen forest, with annihilation fire, at 7:45 p.m.

The strength of the battalion was: (that is the three combat companies of the first line - 6th, 8th and 1st, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83 of the 25th Reserve Division).

3 officers, 26 non-commissioned officers, 140 men, 12 light and 4 heavy machine guns.

The companies formed at 7:54 p.m. The artillery preparation and fire support did not take place due to the short time available to inform the artillery. The companies reached the height of the Grafenbush without losses. Here the enemy's barrage was encountered and run into. The attack came to a standstill at 250 to 300 meters east of the road Cantigny - Fontaine, through the heavy and destructive machine gun fire of the enemy out of the Keulen and Zungen forest, from the road Cantigny - Fontaine as well as from the north exit and from the manor park of Cantigny. In spite of the extremely brave and resolute conduct of

the companies and their leaders, a further advance was impossible on account of the great losses through the enemy's machine gun fire. Contact was retained to the right with the 10th Company of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271. As heavy losses had been sustained during the advance, Companies 9, 12 and 5 with one heavy machine gun platoon were, upon my orders, sent to the front at 1:30 a.m., with directions to establish a centralized battle line in contact with Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 on the road Framicourt - Cantigny and to connect right and left with Reserve Regiment No. 83. The 10th Company lay about 150 meters in rear of the front line, and for the time being was to remain thereat as support company at the disposition of the battalion.

The officers and men of the battalion advanced with great dash. In spite of the most difficult conditions and without artillery support, they engaged an enemy who had taken up a position and had suffered little through artillery fire and was equipped with a large number of machine guns which were very effective, from the flanks especially. The attack was accomplished up to about 200 to 300 meters of the road Cantigny - Fontaine. A part of the right flank was able to work up to 50 meters of the manor woods of Cantigny during the night of May 28th - 29th. The other companies also were able to dig in at about 100 to 150 meters east of the road Cantigny - Fontaine.

According to statements of different men of the battalion, the most advanced sentries of the Americans fell back. If a concerted attack had been made against Cantigny from both sides with proper artillery preparation, I think that Cantigny could have been retaken and with considerable less losses at that.

I could not know at 7:54 p.m., on May 28, that the counter attack of the neighboring regiment, No. 271, against Cantigny had failed. A clear insight in the situation was received by me only after the attack, about 9:50 p.m., through men of my companies, for, during the day every kind of communication in this terrain was impossible due to the fire of the enemy.

Behm.
Captain and Battalion Commander,
2d Battalion, 83 Reserve Inf. Regt.

50th Reserve Infantry Brigade.
4597.

June 3, 1918.

To the Division.

H.
Schwartz.


25th Reserve Division.
Section Ia, No. 383 secret.

Division Headquarters, June 3, 1918.

To the Corps Commander.

In compliance with Ia 3000 of June 1, from the 26th Reserve Corps. The line reached by Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, can be seen from the attached aeroplane photographs.

In absence of the Division Commander,
v. Petery.



Note: The above sketch was made from a copy of the original airplane photograph, (Item 25). In the original folder of documents there are two photographs, Items 25 and 26. These photographs being identical, only one is reproduced here. - P.L.R.

Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83.

June 2, 1918. (27)

Daybook No. I 2446

Reference to: 50th Reserve Infantry Brigade No. 4559
secret, of June 1, 1918.

To 50th Reserve Infantry Brigade.

As to a) A constructed main defense line between Cantigny and the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division, really did not exist; it was only planned (see sketch).

Tactically such a line was designated, the approximate course being the road Cantigny - Fontaine.

As to b) The counter attack was to begin at 6:45 p.m. The order for same though reached Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, only at 6:25 p.m.

For this reason, the falling in for the counter attack was delayed until 7:50 p.m. (distribution of Regimental orders to the three battalions and by the latter to the companies).

In the advance of parts of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, only the 10th Company Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 participated by joining on the right. Due to this fact, the right flank was completely exposed which rendered the attack very difficult.

The attack of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83 and 10th Company Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271, on the right flank, came to a stop, about 100 to 150 meters east of the manor woods of Cantigny. This happened because Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271 failed to come up, necessitating the withdrawal of the 10th Company of the latter regiment to the North-Northwest, to guard against outflanking by the enemy.

In the center, the attack reached a little beyond the planned main defense line. On the left flank it reached the old main defense line on the road, thus re-establishing contact with the 25th Reserve Division.

In this way, the goal indicated in the order, "to retake the main defense line without fail," was accomplished so far as the strength of the regiment would permit.

Hubner,
Major and Regimental Commander.

50th Reserve Infantry Brigade.
No. 4597

June 3, 1918.

To the Division.

Schwartz.

25th Reserve Infantry Division.
Section Ia No. 383 secret.

Division Hdqrs. 3, June, 1918.


To the Corps Commander.

"In compliance with Ia 3000 of June 1".

In absence of the Division Commander.

1 sketch.

v. Petery.



Group - Intelligence - Commander 728.: Corps Headquarters,
German Field Post 970. : June 2, 1918.
Section II Br. B. No. 486/18 secret. :

REPORT.

I. An artillery airplane of flight No. 247, started at 6:30 a.m., on May 28, 1918, with orders to locate with the help of aerial 3/33, of the 25th Reserve Division, the range for the heavy gun battery No. 18. For the reception of the wireless reports, the aviation aerodrome and the wireless station 3/33, were available. He was able to obtain contact only with the aerodrome, but not with the artillery aerial, because the battery as well as the whole of the sector of the 82d Reserve Division lay under the heaviest kind of the enemy's artillery fire.

When the aviator sent the wireless reports he was in the locality of Montdidier - Cantigny - Gratibus. Having observed the preparation for the enemy's attack against Cantigny, he dropped the range finding task at once and followed the activities of the enemy. He sent a wireless report of his discovery and made four requests for annihilation fire. For copies of his notes made in the airplane, see appendix 1.

Neither the first report nor the four requests for firing reached a command post.

II. The inquiry for the reasons of this failure resulted as follows:

For the reception of the five wireless messages of the aviator, the following stations are concerned:

- | | | | |
|---|-------|----------|----|
| (1) At every trench division | ----- | totaling | 9 |
| (2) At every trench division, the artillery aerial | " | | 11 |
| (3) The aviation receiving station of the Group-wireless detachment | " | | 1 |
| (4) At flights No. 251 and 247, the aerodromes | " | | 2 |

(with reference to 1) At the division wireless stations, an infantry aviation aerial has been regularly set up for receiving infantry aviator reports. Both stations though, according to the reading of the instructions contained in the regulations, are available only for the receipt of messages from the infantry aviator when the stations are advised of his ascension, otherwise they take care of the receipts of the messages of their own, or of the enemy's wireless affairs at different wave lengths. No notification was given by the infantry aviator, because he ascended as an artillery flyer. The other stations, with exception of the division station of the 25th Reserve Division, attended to tactical affairs as can be seen from the extracts made from their station books. The 25th Reserve Division station was ready for its own affairs with wave lengths at 370 meters.

(With reference to 2) Of the 6 aerials of the 82d Reserve Division, 5 were placed out of action through the enemy's fire (see reports -appendix.3). The only aerial ready to receive, reported that due to the strong derangement of the enemy's aviators and of the short length station, the wireless messages of the aviator was not heard.

Of the 5 artillery - aerials of the 25th Reserve Division, aerial 3/33, was destroyed by gun fire, the remaining 4 also lay under a heavy fire of the enemy. On account of the heavy fire and the interruptions caused by enemy's fliers, also due to our

own small length stations, the receipt of the messages sent by the infantry aviator was made impossible.

(With reference to 3). The aviation receiving station of the Group - Wireless Detachment was engaged with observation and warning service of the enemy's fliers. The receipt of messages by this station was possible only through mere accident.

(With reference to 4). Flight No. 251 did not arrange its airdrome station for the receipt of messages.

The airdrome station of flight No. 247 received the infantry aviator's report as to the enemy's preparation for the attack and two of his requests for firing, but failed to transmit same on account of a special understanding, for individual cases, under which it was believed that no attention should be paid to reports of the aviator not connected with range finding, unless a special request for same was made by the aviator in which case the signal "ve?" was to prelude the message. Under existing instructions, such a special understanding cannot be justified, neither can the conduct of the operator, who should have called the attention of the detachment commander to the receipt of the messages, but failed to do so. (See Appendix 4).

III. To guard against similar occurrences in the future, the following has been ordered:

(1) For the setting up of a permanent aviator counter station at the divisions, a request has been made to the Army Commander for the return of the battle wireless of flight No. 247, from its present duties with Pursuit Group North.

(2) For the reception and transmittal of wireless messages, of aviators and of land wireless stations, of wave lengths from 150 to 350, two artillery aeriels will be set up for permanent service at each division, commencing with 5 a.m., May 31.

(3) The wireless station detachments of the aviation airdromes have been instructed in regard to the release and delivery of artillery fire, upon request of wireless and ground telegraph messages.

(4) One airdrome wireless station of flight 247 and 251, opposing each other in wave lengths, will receive messages continuously during flying weather.

(5) The daily receipts of wireless messages recorded in the station book of the front wireless stations, will not be destroyed as formerly, but will be forwarded every 24 hours, at 8 a.m., to Division Headquarters. The Division Intelligence Officers will report weekly - Sunday to Saturday the result of their examination of the messages, submitting the originals with their reports.

In absence of
(signed) Fuchs.

4 Appendices.

Remarks of the Corps Commander:

(1) The activity of the aviator is appreciated; the only thing lacking is, that, besides sending the wireless messages, he failed to cast the messages to the ground.

(2) The operator will be punished.

(Signed) v. Watter.

Official
Fuchs
June 3rd.

Appendix 1.

(31)

Copy of my notations made while in the aeroplane,
on May 28, 1918 during the flight from 6:46 to 8:45 a.m.

Time	Call	Message	End.
1 - 6:57	wps	v neL	
2 - 7:13	nLa	ibb hg 59	wrx
7:15	---	vn hg 59	wrx
7:18	---	vn hg 59	wrx
7:29	---	vn hg 59	wrx
7:32	nmp	af 8408f	
7:42	---	vn hg 9	wrx
3 - 7:47	whL	af 8409, 24c	
7:49	wps	af 8409, 24c	
4 - 8:15	wps	af 8507, 15ac	

(Signed) Geh,
Lieut. of Reserves,
Observation Officer of Flight 247.

Appendix 2.

Division Wireless Station 174.
Extract from the station book of May 28, 1918.

Time	Sent		Received		Sent or Received	Name of the Receiver or Sender.
	to	From	to	from		
6:58	dct	dok			about 6:58	Rosmus.
7:02	dxb	dok			about 7:02	
7:05	dxb	dok			about 7:05	
7:06			dct	dxb	about 7:06	
7:08	dxb	dok			about 7:08	
7:09		dct	dxb		cipher code message - about 7:11	
7:11	dxb	dok			about 7:12	
7:15	dxb	dok			about 7:15	
7:23	dxb	dok			about 7:23	
7:28	dkp				about 7:28	
7:33	dxb				-0655 - cipher code message - about 7:35	
7:44	dxb				-0655 - cipher code message - about 7:45	
7:50	dxb				about 7:50	
8:10	gmh				about 8:10	
8:16	gmb				about 8:16	
8:33	gmb				about 8:33	
8:41	dxb				about 8:41	
8:44	dct				about 8:44	
8:58					cipher code message - 9 a.m.	
9:28						

Appendix 3.

(33)

Division Intelligence Commander.
B No. 2427.

May 30, 1918.

Group Intelligence Commander. 726.

During the time from 7:13 to 8 a.m. on May 28, 1918, during which the artillery aviator sent wireless messages, the division wireless station, assigned as Infantry aerial, was engaged as follows:

7:02, 7:04, 7:06, 7:08, 7:09, 7:11, 7:15, 7:23, 7:28, 7:33, 7:44, 7:56 and 8:10 a.m.

It is very probable, that the aviator wired during the time the aerial was engaged and that for this reason, the infantry call was not heard.

In addition, the wireless station was very much engaged during this time with other aviators. The division station had to struggle with great difficulties in order to hear the calls of their own ground stations besides which, the ascension of the infantry aviator was not reported. The station was aware that it had been assigned as Infantry aerial and understood the call "mLa".

According to the report of the artillery commander, the only artillery aerial which was in working order to receive, also did not hear the call. The group wireless station has submitted a similar report.

(Signed) Rieman,
First Lieut.

Appendix 4.

(34)

Copy from the Station book of the aerodrome wireless station of flight No. 247, during the morning of May 28th

Time Wave	On Wave	From	Received	Name of the Receiver.	
Wave 250			Wireless station ready at 6 a.m.		
1 - 6:38	Wbe	-wbe	v neL neL	operator Lehman.	
		aerodrome 247			
	6:39	Wbe	-wbe	ve ve	ar ar
	6:48	Wps	-wps	v neL neL	
2 - 6:55	nLa	-nLa	Cipher code message		
	7:08	answer of aviator of 82 Res Div.	Cipher code message		
3 - 7:36	whL		Cipher code message		
	7:21	Nmp	Cipher code message	without call signal of the Sender.	

Wireless closed at 11 a.m.
A True Abstract Copy
(Signed) Geh
Lieut. Reserve,
Wireless Officer.
Flight No. 247.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps -
Ic No. 2125 Operations.

June 4, 1918. (35).

To: Reserve Flight No. 247.

The report of Lieutenant Geh contained in the appendix submitted by him, indicates that wireless messages relative to the preparation for an attack by the enemy, and requests for annihilation fire, were not transmitted at the proper time, for the information of the 82d Reserve Division and the corps headquarters, although the wireless station of the aerodrome was ready for receipt of messages and actually received the above messages on May 28, 1918.

The occurrence will be investigated and a report made, to show who is to blame for not transmitting at once, these so important messages.

1 Appendix of
Flight No. 247
Section No. 2217.
Received June 4, 1918 -
Transmitted -----

For the Corps Commander:
v. Kahlden,
Major, Chief of Staff.

Flight No. 247
Section No. 2217
Received - Transmitted, June 6, 1918.

Aerodrome, June 5, 1918.

To the Corps Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.
Section Ic.

The blame, that the wireless messages of Lieut. Geh, could not be transmitted falls mainly on the receiving operator, because he failed to report the receipt of these messages. He has been punished.

Bedermann (?)
Captain and Flight Commander.

June 6, 1918. Reference letter to flight No. 247 - (36)
report required what punishment has been imposed
vK

Flight No. 247
Section No. 2245
Transmitted June 7, 1918.

Aerodrome, June 7, 1918.

To Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps
Section Ic.

Operator Lehman has been punished with three days light field arrest because he failed to transmit to his flight commander a wireless message which he knew to be important.

Bedermann (?)
Captain and Flight Commander.

S.E.

May 29, 1918. - IaK

Report on the Combat Strength of the 82d Reserve Division.

Reserve Infantry Regiment 270 - With exception of the 4th, 7th and 8th companies, this regiment has not participated in the engagements.

Reserve Infantry Regiment 272 -
2d battalion (combat battalion on May 28th).

8th company - 35 men.
5th company - 20 men.

1st battalion - (support battalion on May 28th).
1st and 2d companies - dispersed during the counter attack)
3rd and 4th companies - each 20 men.

3d battalion - (employed during the counter attack)
9th and 12th companies - each 25 - 30 men.

Reserve Infantry Regiment 271 -
1st battalion (combat battalion on May 28th).
1st company - destroyed at Cantigny.
2d, 3d and 4th companies - each 25 men.

2d battalion (counter attack on May 28th).
5th company - 18 men.
6th company - 12 men.
7th company - 16 men.
8th company - 22 men.

3d battalion - (support battalion, Height 104).
9th company - only a remnant.
10th company - 17 men.
11th company - 30 men.
12th company - 11 men.

v.K.

Station 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Detachment 726. (38).

Received June 3, 1918, at 8:25 p.m. through Wespenborn.
transmitted June 3, 1918, at 8:34 p.m. through Mte an Villers.
Telephone message No. 550 from the field.

June 3, 1918.

To - 18th Army.

Herewith a statement of the losses of the three divisions which in the noon reports from May 28th to 31st were reported incompletely or not at all:

82d Reserve Division -

May 28 - Officers - dead 1 wounded 0 missing 0

Men - " 3 " 51 " 17

The missing fell into the hands of the enemy, either dead or wounded, during the Tarnopol enterprise.

May 29th to 31st. (inclusive).

Officers - dead 15 wounded 23 missing 8

Men - " 177 " 633 " 480.

25th Division.

May 28th.

Officers - dead 0 wounded 4 missing 2.
Men - " 20 " 85 " 26.

(4 men sick). The missing fell in the hands of the enemy either dead or wounded, during the Tannen-berg enterprise.

May 29th.

Officers - dead 0 wounded 2 missing 0
men - " 20 " 96 " 2.

(of men - 1 gas and 5 hospital sick).

May 30th.

Officers - dead 0 wounded 1 missing 0
Men - " 17 " 89 " 5

(21 men sick) The missing on May 29th and 30th belong to Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83 and are either dead or wounded.

May 31st.

Officers - dead 0 wounded 1 missing 0
Men - " 1 " 20 " 0

(14 men sick) The high number of sick is explained by the numerous dug-out collapses.

30th Infantry Division.

May 28th.

Men - dead 0 wounded 1 missing 0

May 29th.

" - " 0 " 0 " 0

May 30th.

" - " 2 " 23 " 0

May 31st.

" - " 4 " 4 " 0.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps
Ic No. 2146 operation.

v. K.

back to Ic.

SKETCH

Cantigny Operation.

Order of Battle at Noon on June 1, 1918.

(For this Sketch, Item No. 39, see the
Map Atlas). - P.L.R.

(40)

Station - Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps --- Telephone Section
425.

Received - 6:35 p.m. June 3, 1918 ----- through Meyer.

Transmitted - 6:42 p.m., June 2, 1918 ----- through Kohrenbach
to 25th R. Div.

6:50 p.m., June 3, 1918 ----- through Kohrenbach
to 82nd R. Div.

Telephone message No. 543 from the field.
Second Copy.

June 3, 1918.

To - 82d Reserve Division (1)
25th Reserve Division (2)

With reference to tender of 25th Reserve Division Ia 990 of
June 2, 1918.

(1) Increased readiness remains. The withdrawal of a third
Rest battalion is not authorized for the present.

(2) The employment of four machine guns O8 of the Landwehr
Infantry Regiment No. 87 in sector A, of the 25th Reserve Division
in support of the right flank, and keeping two machine gun de-
tachments of Landwehr Infantry Regt. No. 87 on the east bank of
the Dom stream and one machine gun company in rest quarters, is
authorized.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps,
Ia No. 2128 Operations.

back to Ia

v.k.

(41)

Station Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps Telephone Section 726
Received - 12*20 a.m. June 2, 1918, through Grunfeld from
Schonfeld.

Telephone message No. 51 from the field.

June 2, 1918 Ia 2128 Oper.

To - Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Division requests the following authority:

(1) Withdrawal of another battalion to rest quarters during
the night of June 2d to 3d.

(2) The employment of four machine guns of Landwehr Regiment
No. 87 in sector A, to support the right flank. Two machine gun
detachments of Landwehr Regiment No. 87, to remain in position
on the east bank of the Dom stream. One machine gun company in
rest quarters.

The relief of the 1st battalion Reserve Regiment No. 118,
by the 82d Reserve Division not carried out because the reliev-
ing troops came up too late. Verbal report already made.

25th Reserve Division Ia 900.

Division has 3 companies Landwehr Regiment No. 87 (each has 12
machine guns).

1 company in rest quarters at Fignieres.

2 companies in combat position to the rear.

(42)

Station Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps
Received 2:48 p.m. June 2, 1918

Telephone Section 726
by Mete from Villers.

Commanding General - Chief of Staff - June 2, 18th Ia Arty.
2106 Oper:

To: Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps -
Reference to the request of the Corps Headquarters - Ia Artillery
2106.

All units of the 30th Infantry Division must have been withdrawn by noon of June 3d. (conversation Chief of Staff with Major Jacobi). A pioneer company of the division cannot be placed at disposition, as it may become necessary to employ same for other purposes.

The withdrawal of the artillery is agreed to - to b2 ---: Two battalions field guns 16 are not available. Army Headquarters has requested the Headquarters of the army group, to assign one experimental regiment with 10 cm guns. If assignment is made sector of 26th Reserve Corps will receive a part of it ---- to b3 --- gun reserve heavy field howitzers and 10 cm mortars not available for corps headquarters. Deficit must be reported to the Army Headquarters. As to assignment of field artillery material, the artillery staff officer 2, will furnish more detailed information.

Headquarters 18th Army.
4483 Secret.

(43)

Station - Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps
Received - 8:20 p.m. June 2, 1918.
Transmitted at 8:35 p.m. June 2d.
No. 490 from the front.

Telephone Section 726
through?
" Schmidt to 82d
Res. Div.

To: 82 Reserve Division.

The proposed place for sheltering the rest battalions to be brought further to the front, will after search for suitable shelter be reported to the Corps Headquarters. The Corps Headquarters will make its decision after receipt of the report.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps,
Ia. No. 2131 Operations.

Back to Ia
for file with Cantigny records.

(44)

To 25th Reserve Division by Lt. Schadel at 10:50 a.m. - June 2,
1918.
82nd Reserve Division by Lt. Herzing at 11: a.m.
30th Infantry Division by 1st Lt. Schurambar at 11:15 a.m.

Corps Orders.

(1) The 30th Infantry Division will withdraw the troops of Infantry Regiment 99 and the special units attached thereto, on the evening of June 2, from the support positions to the rest quarters.

(2) The 82d Reserve Division relieves on the evening of June 3 - the 1st and 3d battalions of Infantry Regiment 99 through the rest battalion of the 82d Reserve Division. Upon being relieved the rest battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 99, will proceed to their rest quarters.

(3) The 82d Reserve Division withdraws the following artillery of the 30th Infantry Division from their present positions to their rest quarters. On the evening of June 2, the 2d battalion of Field Artillery Regiment No. 84. On the evening of June 3d the Bavarian Foot Artillery Battalion No. 10.

(4) In addition the following organizations will be withdrawn from their present positions on the evening of June 2.

(a) By the 82d Reserve Division, the foot artillery battery No. 9, of the 19th and the 3d battery of the 60th battalion

(b) By the 25th Reserve Division, the 3d battalion 72d Field Artillery Regiment and Ft. Art. Btl. 33.

The rest quarters of the organizations to be withdrawn on June 3d, will be indicated later.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2120 Secret.

(45).

Station - Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section 726.

Received - June 2, 1918 - 1 a.m. through Zimmermann
Transmitted June 2, 1918 - 1:35 a.m. " Becker to 82"Res. Div.

Telephone message No. 451 from the field.

June 2, 1918.

To: 82nd Reserve Division.

That part of the assault battalion No. 12, which was placed to the disposition of the 82d Reserve Division for the proposed attack, will join their battalion on June 2d and will be moved to the rear in direct understanding with assault battalion No. 12.

Returned to Ia Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps,
for file with Cantigny records. Ia 12/30. E

(46).

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia Artillery, No. 2106 Operation.

With reference to telephone conversation with Headquarters of the 18th Army, dated June 1, 1918. Ia No. 4431 pertaining to II.

To: Headquarters 18th Army.

For the support of the 82d Reserve Division the following will be necessary.

A. Infantry: Regimental Headquarters and 1st Battalion 99th Infantry Regiment on the east bank of the Dom-stream, until the evening of June 3d, 2d Battalion 99th Infantry Regiment, on the west bank of Dom-stream, until the evening of June 4th.

Authority is requested to move up one Pioneer company of the 30th Infantry Division, to assist in completing the construction of the defense positions east of Cantigny, because one company of the 82d Reserve Division is being used for restoring the crossings of the Dom-stream, and one pioneer company is not sufficient for the work incident to the construction of the defense positions.

B. Artillery: None of the artillery of the 30th Infantry Division was, and since the seizure of Cantigny by the enemy, has been employed to reinforce the artillery.

- (1) The following organizations can be withdrawn:
 During the night from June 2d to 3d - the 2d battalion, 84th Regiment, 3d battalion 72d Regiment, 3d battalion 60th Regiment and the 33d battalion.
 During the night from June 3d to 4th the 1st and 2d battalions, 72d Regiment.
 Field Artillery Regiment No. 27 and 33d battalion, report to the 38th Reserve Corps for duty at "Gneisenau."
- (2) To compensate for the artillery thus relieved, the 26th Reserve Corps requests the assignment of two field gun battalions 16th, to be posted during the night from June 3d to 4th. The two field gun battalions 96, now available, can not alone solve the combat tasks, which fall to the lot of the light artillery, for the reason of insufficient range. The light artillery howitzer 16 and 10 cm batteries can be employed only in a limited way due to the ammunition conditions.
- (3) Request is also made for the assignment of the following gun reserve:
- | | Model. |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| 6 field guns | 96 |
| 6 field guns | 16 |
| 12 field Howitzers light | 16 |
| 4 field Howitzers, heavy | 02 |
| 3 long field Howitzers, heavy | 13 |
| 2 10 cm guns, | 14 |
| 1 10 cm gun | 04 |
| 2 long mortars. | |

With the remaining scantily allotted artillery, the Reserve Corps is able to solve the task, to repel an attack, provided that for each gun lost, another is on hand to replace same.

For the Reserve Corps Commander,
 v. Kahlden
 Major, Chief of Staff.

Copy to Ia
 E Artillery
 Cantigny records.

(47).

June 1, 1918
 11:30 p.m.

To 82d Reserve Division by Lt. Leusner, 11:30 p.m.
 25th Reserve Division by 1st Lt. Engels, 11:30 p.m.

The following brief original reports will be submitted by the evening of June 3, by the parties concerned:

- (a) Regimental Commanders or their representatives.
- (b) Battalion Commanders or their representatives.
 Of the reasons.
- (a) for the loss of Cantigny.
- (b) for the failure of the counterattack against Cantigny, on May 28, 1918.

Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps,
 Ia 3000 Operations.

(48).

June 1, 1918.

To: 82d Reserve Division, by Lieut. Leusner, 5:10 p.m.
25th Reserve Division, by 1st Lieut. Engels, 5:15 p.m.

The 1st battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 118, will be relieved by the 1st battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271, during the night of June 1st to June 2d. The former will join the 25th Reserve Division.

The 25th Reserve Division is authorized, to withdraw a second battalion to rest quarters, during the night from June 1st to 2d.

Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2103 Secret - v.K.

(49).

Station - Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps Telephone Section 726
Received - 3:50 p.m., June 1, 1918.
Telephone Message.

Through LO Vz. from Headqrs
18th Army. Operations.

Ia 2103
E 2106 Operations.

HASTE

June 1, 1918.

To Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.

The counter attack for the retaking of Cantigny will not take place. The 26th Reserve Corps will report today by telegraph, if and what part of the 30th Infantry Division (infantry and artillery) and of the artillery reinforcements employed since the seizure of Cantigny by the enemy, are still necessary for the support of the 82d Reserve Division and how long.

Commanding General 18th Army.

Released by Ia Artillery No. 2106 - of June 1, 1918.

(50).

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia. No. 2090 Operations.

May 31, 1918.

Secret:

Draft.

To 82d Reserve Division.

The following is remarked with reference to the plan for the attack of the division.

1. To advance the foreground up to the old first trench of the enemy, between the orchard and the game park, is not advisable, because the trench lies too far forward of the general line of the foreground of the sector of the 26th Reserve Corps, and on the left flank would have to face the Zungen forest.

For this reason the attack objective will be our former main resistance line on the west and south edge of Cantigny. In front of this line a foreground of about 100 meters will be pushed forward in direct junction with the attack.

2. The Division is to launch a surprise attack. That will not be successful, if the enemy's attention is called to the proposed

attack through the gassing of the enemy's artillery on the day prior to the attack. For this reason the batteries of the enemy must be gassed only on the day of and immediately prior to the attack, and gassing must take place with non-persistent gas and not with mustard gas.

3. For the infantry attack, there is no first, second, third, or fourth objective, but only the final objective to which the attack must lead in one dash.

The division actually intends, against its realization, to carry the attack to the final objective in one dash.

The flame projector squad should not be distributed among the first wave, but kept back at the beginning. Its activity commences when it becomes necessary to break an obstinate resistance at a certain point.

4. The order to the contact troops, to support the attack only with its fire and to join in the advance later on, is not practicable. The attack will start coincidentally from the line x-a-b-l-c-l-d-l-l.

For the protection of the left attack flank against machine gun fire from the Zungen forest, the north portion of these woods must be dominated and screened with smoke in its whole width.

5. The attack sector of the battalion of the right attacking group will be lengthened toward the west to point x, and the attacking zone of the battalion of the left attacking group will be changed as marked in red. Two companies of the regimental sector C only, participate in the attack.

The attack will be carried out by Reserve Infantry Regiment 270, which will be posted in the attack sector during the night from May 31st to June 1st. It will be strengthened by one half of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 118 from regimental sector C.

6. The attack will be ordered to take place at 7:20 a.m., on June 3.

(Signed) Baron v. Watter,
Commanding 26th Reserve Corps.

Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps,
Ia No. 2090 operations.

May 31, 1918.

(52 & 53)

Secret.

To Headqrs. 18th Army.

Enclosed is a draft of the 82d Reserve Division, for the retaking of Cantigny. The Commanding General of the 26th Reserve Corps, has to remark the following:

1) Advancing the foreground to the enemy's old first-trench line, between the orchard and the game park, is not advisable, because the trench lies too far forward of the general line of the x x x x x x etc., etc., inclusive of par. 5, as contained in the enclosed draft (see Item No. 50).

6) The attack will be ordered to take place at 7:20 A.M., on June 3d.

It is necessary that the ammunition specially called for be furnished immediately.

7) The 82d Reserve Division must be relieved soon after the attack is accomplished.

So far as has been ascertained now, the combat strength of the infantry of the division is as follows:

Reserve Infy. Rgt. 270	-	1st Battln.	455 men
		2d Battln.	431 "
		3d Battln.	410 "

Reserve Infy. Rgt. 271	-	1st Battln.	91 men
		2d Battln.	240 "
		3d Battln.	252 "
Reserve Infy. Rgt. 272	-	1st Battln.	160 "
		2d Battln.	230 "
		3d Battln.	270 "
			<u>2539</u> "

(Sgd) Baron von Watter,
Commanding 26th Reserve Corps.

Official:
von Kahlden,
Major.

May 31, 1918. (54)

To 30th Infantry Division, 82d Reserve Division, Lt. Leusner
6:30 P.M. to Lt. Beyer 6:20 P.M. E.

The 2d Battalion Infantry Rgt. No. 143, in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division, on the west bank of the Dom stream, will be relieved during the night from May 31st to June 1st, by the 1st battalion Infantry Rgt. No. 99 now at assembly sector I. The other battalions and the regimental staff of Infantry Rgt. 99, with the special formations attached thereto, will remain in assembly sector I pending further orders.

The 143d Infantry Regiment will be withdrawn to the shelters of attack echelon II.

Everything else will be arranged by the 30th Infantry Division in understanding with the 82d Reserve Division.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps,
Ia, 2093 - secret.
v.K.

(55)

May 31, 1918 - 4:55 P.M.
Lieut. Ahrens. E

To Commanding General 18th Army.

Two battalions of Infantry Rgt. No. 99, are still needed west of the Dom stream and the third battalion on the east side of the Dom stream.

Infantry regiment 143 will be withdrawn to the shelters at L'Echelle Villers les Roye during the night from May 31 to June 1.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2091 - secret.
v.K.

Addition to Telephone message Ia - 2091

Besides the infantry reported to be with the Second line division (Eingreif division), the following artillery is also in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division: 2d battalion Field Arty. Rgt. No. 84, and the Bavarian Foot Artillery Battln. No. 10. It is intended to retain these organizations until the evening after the counter attack is accomplished.

To Lt. Ahrens at 3:40 P.M. through E. Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2091

(56)

May 31, 1918 - 12:20 P.M.

Major Jacobi advises that

A brief report be submitted showing what parts of the Second line division (Eingreif division), now west of the Dom stream, are still required and how long.

Further, how long the remaining parts should be retained at Fignieres.

This report is necessary, because Headqrs. of the 18th Army has to report to the Headqrs. of the Army Group, when troops of the second line division are employed at the front.

Tschunke.

Filed with Cantigny records.

E

May 31, 1918 - 9:00 A.M.

(57)

25th Reserve Division reports that its aviator has wired twice for annihilation fire and once for barrage because he noticed a heavy encircling fire at Mesnil and Manor woods. At present the fire has died down on the entire front. Infantry signals for barrage were not observed.

Tschunke.

(58)

Division Headqrs. May 30, 1918 - 7:00 P.M.

25th Reserve Division,

Section Ia. No. 371 - secret.

SE 31/5 Ia 2095 Oper.

Division Orders:

1) The enemy has not renewed his attacks on May 29 and 30. The 2d battalion and parts of the 3d battalion of Reserve Rgt. 83 worked their way slowly to the road Cantigny - Fontaine and up to 100 meters from the manor park of Cantigny, on May 28 and during the night of May 28-29. Cantigny is still in the hands of the enemy. The 82d Reserve Division is preparing to retake Cantigny in the first days of June.

2) During the period from May 30 to June 2 - sector A, exchanges with sector B, as follows:

a). During the night of May 30 to 31 -

1st battalion (support battalion), Infantry Rgt. 118, with the troops of the 2d and 3d battalion 83d R. Inf. posted in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division. The 1st company of the 83d Res. Rgt. will rejoin its battalion.

The battln. staff and the 10th and 11th companies Res. Inf. Rgt. No. 83, remain in their present position as a contact command. They will be placed under the jurisdiction of sector A. The 9th and 12th Company of regiment No. 83, will move into the company positions to the north, formerly occupied by the 1st battalion of the 118th Infantry; one company to serve as security detachment for the artillery protective position. The 2d battalion 83d regiment will march to the rest quarters south of Becquigny.

b). During the night of May 31 to June 1 -

1st Battalion Reserve Rgt. No. 83 (support battalion) with 3d Battalion Res. Rgt. No. 118 (combat Battalion).

c). During the night from June 1 to 2d -

2d Battalion Res. Rgt. 118 (Reserve Battln.) in the valley of the Dom stream southeast of Courtemanche, with 3d battalion Infantry Rgt. No. 168 (combat Battln. in sector A).

Everything else with reference to the advance and rearguards will be regulated by the 50" Reserve Infantry Brigade.

3) The machine gun companies will be relieved either 24 hours prior or after the relief of their battalions.

4) The Regimental Sectors will be taken over at 9:00 A.M., June 1.

5) The Regimental Commander of the 118" Rgt. is specially charged with responsibility of the safety of the right flank of the division. An enemy who advances to height 104, will be thrown back at once (the contact company will automatically fall in for the counter attack).

6) The 1st Battln. Reserve Infy. Rgt. No. 118, is tactically placed under the command of Reserve Infy. Rgt. No. 271.

7) The 50" Reserve Infy. Brigade will report in its daily noon report to the division, the relief which has actually taken place and that contact is being maintained.

8) The 50" Reserve Infy. Brigade will submit by June 2, a sketch which is to show the distribution of the forces down to include the companies.

9) Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83 submits to the division by June 3d, a tactical report of its forces from May 27 to June 1, with an opinion of the combat value of the regiment.

10) Minenwerfer Company 225 is placed to the disposition of the 82d Reserve Division.

v. Mohn.

Plan of distribution:

Div. - Ia - Ib - OI - Divk -	4
Brigade	4
Artillery Comdr. 3 Pi. 1	4
Corps Headq. 1. 82 Res.Div. 2.	3
2d Infantry Div.	1
	<u>16</u>

Extract sent in advance to the Brigade by telephone.

(59)

Station, Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps,
Received at 5:37 P.M., May 30.

Telephone Section 726,
through Mete Hrf. from
Villers 2068 operations.

May 30, 1918 - Ia. Pi.

To Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps Sector.

Minenwerfer Company of 30" Infantry Division is made available for engaging the enemy.

Commanding General 18" Army.

For file with Cantigny records. E

(60)

May 30.

To 82d Reserve Division - by Lt. Heising 4:12 P.M.
25" Reserve Division - by 1st Lt. Heisel 3:55 P.M.

In preparation of the attack against Cantigny, a feint attack will be made daily by the 82d Reserve Division:

Accomplishment of plan:

a) Artillery preparation against the enemy's front line trenches north and east of Cantigny, with heavy bombardment against Cantigny.

b) Lifting of the fire (box barrage) while at the same time simulating an infantry attack (machine gun fire; leaping forward of individual men; etc.).

c) Sudden drop back of the fire on the enemy's front line trenches.

These exercises will take place at different times of the day and sometimes also at different places of the front. They will begin on May 30.

It is necessary that during the feint operations against Cantigny, the conditions of the enemy's standing barrage be established, by all reconnaissance units.

For the Commanding General 26" Reserve Corps,
Ia 2072 - secret.
v.K.

(61)

May 30, 1918.

To 82d Reserve Division, 4:12 P.M. Lt. Heising.
25" Reserve Division, 3:55 P.M. 1st Lt. Heisel.
30" Infantry Division, 4:20 P.M. Lt. Beyer.

Corps Orders:

1) The 1st battalion Reserve Infantry Regt. 118, is placed under the jurisdiction of the 82d Reserve Division for the relief of that part of Reserve Infy. Rgt. No. 83, located in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division. The relief will take place during the night of May 30-31. The troops of Reserve Rgt. No. 83, so relieved, will rejoin the 25" Reserve Division.

2) The following will be withdrawn to rest quarters during the night of May 30-31.

- a) of the 82d Reserve Division - the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions Reserve Infantry Rgt. No. 272.
- the 1st battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 271.
- b) of the 25th Reserve Division - the 2d battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83.

3) The 3d battalion Infantry Rgt. No. 99 and the 2d battalion Infantry Rgt. No. 143, will remain under the command of the 82d Reserve Division. They will be employed as support or reserve.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2071 - secret.
v.K.

Note:

It can not be doubted that this is done only, to quickly restore the combat efficiency of the corps.

v.K.

(62)

Station - Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726
Received - 12:23 P.M., May 30. through - LoVz -
from Headqrs. 18" Army.

May 30, 1918 - Ia 2064 operations.

To 26" Reserve Corps.

In the telegram beginning with: One attack echelon of the 46th Reserve Division, etc., the signature should read

Commanding General 18" Army
4389 secret.

Station Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps Telephone Section (63) 726.
Received 12:31 P.M., May 30. through Lo Vz
from Headqrs. 18" Army -Op.
May 30, 1918. Ia.

To 26" Reserve Corps.

In the telegram beginning with: The infantry of the attack echelon of IX Corps will be, etc., the signature should read "Commanding General 18th Army".

Commanding General 18th Army.
4388 secret.

Telegram not filed as yet.

Station Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps. Telephone Section (64) 726.
Received 12 noon, May 30, 1918. through Lo Vz
from V St. Ch.
urgent - 11:20 A.M., May 30. 2083 op.
May 30, 1918. Ia.

26" Reserve Corps:

Readiness for action, of the attack echelon of the 46" Reserve Division, is suspended.

Commanding General 18" Army
4385 secret.

Station Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps. Telephone Section (65) 726
Received 9:30 P.M., May 30, 1918. through Wespenborn
transmitted 10:10 P.M., May 30, 1918. through LoVz at V St. Ch.
Telephone message No. 303 from the field -
To Headqrs. 18" Army.

For assisting in the counter attack, the Bavarian foot Artillery battalion No. 10, as well as the 2d battalion Field Artillery No. 83, of the 30" Infantry Division, was assigned on

May 29th. It is intended to maintain this assignment until the operation has been carried out.

26th Reserve Corps, Ia Artillery
No. 2081 operation
E
Operation Cantigny.

Back to D. Arty.
R. Ic.

(66)

May 30 - 6:00 A.M.

1) 5:30 A.M.
Attack echelon No. 1, of the 30th Infantry Division arrived at the designated assembly point.

2) 5:45 A.M.
143d Infantry Rgt. is at the place designated.

6:00 A.M. Tsch.

(67)

May 30 - 1:45 A.M.

To 25" Reserve Division - Lieut. Schadal, 1:45 A.M.
82" Reserve Division - Lieut. Heising, 1:40 A.M.

Due to the losses in the contact company of the 82d Reserve Division, maintaining the junction between the two divisions, a contact command of the 25" Reserve Division with strength of two companies will be established at this junction. The contact command will be under the jurisdiction of the 25" Reserve Division.

Commanding General 26" Reserve Corps.
(sgd) v. Kahlden.

(68)

Station - Headqrs. 26" Res. Corps.
Received - 1:40 A.M., May 30/18.
transmitted 1:50 A.M., May 30/18.

Telephone Section 726

No. 240 from the field.

May 30.

To Headqrs. 18" Army.

The following is the order of battle of the infantry in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division:

Right Regimental Sector: In the first line - 1st battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment 270.
In the second line - south of Malpart, 9th Co. Reserve Infy. Rgt. 270. In the Wolves' glen, 12th Co. Reserve Infy. Rgt. 270.

Center Regimental Sector: In the first line - 2d, 1st and 3d Battlns. Res. Infy. Rgt. 272.
In the second line - in the Ainval Woods, the 2d Battln. Res. Infy. Regt. 270.
In the third line - on the north edge of the Ainval Woods, the 3d Battln. Infy. Regt. 99.

Left Regimental Sector: In the first line - 3d, 1st and $\frac{1}{2}$ of
2d Battln. Res. Infy. Rgt. 271
and 2d Battln. Res. Infy.
Rgt. No. 83.

In the second line - west of Frami-
court, the 7" and 8" Company
Res. Rgt. 271.

Division Reserve: 2d Battalion 143d Infy. Rgt. west of
Maresmontiers.
10th and 11th Companies Res. Infy. Rgt.
270, on the east edge of the Aival Woods.
Two contact companies of the 25" Reserve
Division at the junction between the two
divisions.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
(Sgd) v. Kahlden.

(69)

1:30 A.M., May 30

To Commanding General 18" Army.

To Hughes E

Order of battle of the Infantry in the sector of the 82d
Reserve Division, as stated above.

(70)

12:30 A.M.

RUSH

To Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps.

Reference Ia No. 2061 Operations.

Shock battalion No. 12 will furnish the 26" Reserve Corps
with 8 shock squads (each 1 commander and 8 men), also 2 officers
and 4 flame projector squads (8 small flame projectors and 18
men), for the counter attack against Cantigny. The squads will
be moved by motor trucks from Burg at 9:00 A.M. and report to the
Headqrs. 82d Reserve Division at Erches.

Headqrs. 18" Army.

Ia d

4372 secret

Transmit verbally to 82d Reserve Div.

v.K.

transmitted at 1:40 by Lt. Heising.

(71)

Station - Headqrs. 26" Reserve Corps.

Received - 12 noon, May 29/18.

Telephone Section 726
through Kramer from the
82d Reserve Division.

May 30 - 12:25 A.M.

P. Ia. E.

Telephone No. 576 from the field.

To Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

The division requests four flame projector squads and eight
shock squads of Assault Battalion No. 12, also 12 medium minen-
werfers new pattern with 600 shells for same.

Oral requests for these
already made to the C.S.
on May 29.

(72)

12:15 A.M., May 30.

Instructions to 82d Reserve Division - 11:45 P.M.

- 1) Commanders will be designated for regiments 271 and 272 and for 2d battalion 143d and 2d battalion 99th regiments.
- 2) Foreground against the enemys trenches north and east of Cantigny will be pushed ahead.
- 3) Artillery to be informed where barrage is to be placed for Rgts. 271 and 272.
- 4) Subsistence to be controlled by a special personnel, likewise the supply of ammunition, light signal rockets and close-range weapons.

Oral instructions conveyed by Captain v. Poser from the chief of staff 26th Reserve Corps at 11:30 and 11:45 P.M.

Tschunke.

(73)

By 1st Lieut. Schwambach 11:38 P.M.
May 29.

To 30th Infantry Division.

To be moved forward as Corps Reserve:

- 1) Infantry regiment 143 (less the 2d battalion already ordered to the front), immediately to the point of assembly II. Liaison officer of the regiment to the command post of the 82d Res. Infantry Brigade at Fignieres. The regiment will report its arrival at the assembly points direct to the Corps Headqrs.
- 2) Infantry Rgt. 99 (less the battln. already ordered to the front) in such manner that it arrives at assembly point I before daybreak. Liaison officer and report of arrival, the same as in par. 1).

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
v. K.

(74)

11:30 P.M., May 29.

To Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.

Wireless message from Regiment A. (83d Res. Inf.). A holds the line indicated since this morning.

25th Reserve Division.

Chief of Staff and Commanding General informed.

Tsch.

(75)

10:55 P.M., May 29.

Infantry aviator reports 10:35 P.M. Heavy enemy's fire in the hollow between Ainval Woods and Fasanerie, against Fasanerie, east edge of height 104, Fontaine and Grenade forest. The German annihilation fire placed over Cantigny, north and south of the High woods and west of Mesnil. Zungen forest and Fontaine forest lies under fire. The attack intention cannot be recognized due to the approaching darkness.

To both divisions by flyer.

Holdermann.

Chief of Staff advised.

Tschunke.

(76)

10:15 P.M., May 29.

Wireless message to Infantry aviator at 9:50 P.M.

Heavy enemy's fire against Fasanerie, Fontaine and Grenade forest. Barrage for left flank 82d Reserve Division and right flank 25th Reserve Division called for at 9:50. Further observation requested.

Captain Holdermann.

Chief of Staff and Commanding General informed.

Tschunke.

(77)

10:15 P.M., May 29.

To Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps.

Barrage was requested for the right at 9:45 P.M. and for the entire front at 9:48 P.M., through wireless.

25th Reserve Division.

Commanding General and Chief of Staff informed.

Tschunke.

(78)

Station - Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section 726
Received 10:05 P.M., May 29, 1918. through Kr. A from Op.
2064 operation.

10:10 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

One second line echelon of the 46th Reserve Division and one infantry regiment, will be held in constant readiness tonight. Their employment may be needed by the 82d Reserve Division.

Commanding General 18th Army Sector.

Ia m 4389 - secret.

one battalion - Arvillers
two battalions - north of Contoire.

(79)

Station - Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section 726
Received 10:30 P.M. through Kr. A from Operation.

10:10 P.M., May 29.

RUSH

To 26th Reserve Corps.

The infantry regiment of the second line echelon of Army Corps IX, will be placed at the disposition of the 26th Reserve Corps. Its movement will be arranged directly by the Corps Commanders. 26th Reserve Corps will report this evening by telegraph, how the infantry in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division is to be formed during this night.

Commanding General 18th Army.

Ia. m. 4388 - secret.

(80)

10:07 P.M., May 29.

Above all other, the enemy has placed a heavy annihilation fire, during the last half hour, against Fontaine.

The report at 10:02 states, that the annihilation fire against Fontaine has somewhat abated, but is still heavy northwest of Fontaine.

Balloon detachment 28.

Commanding General and Chief of Staff informed.

Tschunke.

(81)

10:15 P.M., May 29.

Major Spelmann informs that:

Requests for two battalions at Contoire and one at Arvillers, (216th Infy. Rgt. 45th Reserve Div.), must be made to Headqrs. of the Army. In such case the 3d Army Corps must be advised.

One light howitzer battery)
One heavy field howitzer battery) is shelling Villers Tour-
One mortar battery) nelle

The left flank of the 1st Division has placed its rearward troops on the left bank of the Avre river.

Tschunke.

10:00 P.M., May 29.

(82)

To Headqrs. 18th Army - by Lt. Ahrens at 10:12 P.M.

It is requested that 4 flame projector squads and 8 shock squads be assigned to the 82d Reserve Division for the Cantigny counter attack. It is necessary that they arrive in Erches on May 30.

Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2061 operations.

(83)

9:50 P.M., May 29.

To 25th Reserve Division by 1st Lt. Engals at 10:07 P.M.
82d Reserve Division by Lt. Lenzner at 9:55 P.M.

1) The battalion of Reserve Infy. Rgt. 82, which moved into the sector of the 82d Reserve Division, remains under command of the latter until further orders.

2) The minenwerfer company of the 25th Reserve Division is available to the 82d Reserve Division for the counter attack against Cantigny. In addition a request has been made to the Army Headquarters for a minenwerfer company of 8 medium guns for the 82d Reserve Division.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2050 operation.

v.K.

(84)

To 82d Reserve Division - sent by Lt. Heising at 9:40 A.M., May 29.
25th Reserve Division - sent by Lt. Engels at 9:40 A.M., May 29.

A light signal station connected by a chain of sentry posts between height 104 east of Cantigny and height 112 east of Framicourt, will be established by the 82d Reserve Division during the night of May 29-30. This station and connections are to assure the positive transmittal of the signals from the western to the eastern bank of Dom stream, for barrage and annihilation fire. To make certain the transmittal of light signals over the Dom stream valley, during fog, smoke and after gassing, it is necessary that sentry posts on both sides of the valley are placed so numerously, that quick connections are possible by running sentries. Watch tower no. 112, is responsible for the transmittal of the signals on the east bank of the Dom stream, from which tower connections are made with the artillery observers and command posts.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

(85)

Station - Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Station 726
Received 9:05 P.M., May 29 - - - - - by Dienst
Transmitted 9:35 P.M., May 29 - - - - - by Kohrenbach to 82d
Reserve Division.

No. 218 from the field.

URGENT

To 82d Reserve Division.

1) Report requested by 12 noon, May 30, how the counter attack against Cantigny has been planned (map 1:25,000 to accompany report).

2) A report of the loss of Cantigny and the failure of the counter attack on May 28, will be submitted as soon as possible.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia 2059 operation - secret.

Returned to Ia.

v.K.

(86)

7:30 P.M., May 29.

Balloon observation 710 P.M.

Weak harrassing only now from Cantigny to Fontaine. In the rear area weak harrassing on the road Montdidier to Pierrepont.

82d Reserve Division.

(87)

To Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps.

Reference to telephone message Ia 2053 op. 8:45 P.M., May 29.

Contact exists. Has been inspected by an officer.

82d Reserve Division.
Ia 2007.

Commanding General and Chief of Staff
informed by

Capt. Tschunke.

(88)

8:08 P.M., May 29.

Orientation to Ia - 3d Army Corps.

The enemy's occupancy of the trenches at Cantigny has been reduced due to our artillery fire. No attack anticipated at this time. No attacks have occurred so far against the 25th Reserve Division.

Conversation Chief of Staff with Major Spemann.

(89)

8:00 P.M., May 29.

Firing has subsided. Aviator has ascertained that the occupancy of the enemy's trenches has been reduced. It appears, due to our artillery fire, that no attack will take place for the time being. No attacks have occurred so far.

Conversation Chief of Staff with Headqrs. 18th Army.

(90)

7:50 P.M., May 29.

Conversation.

On account of the subsiding fire of the enemy, the battalion of the 99th Infy. Regt., will be pushed to the front only as far as in the region of Boussicourt. The battalion of the 118th Inf. Rgt. remains in the rear sector of the 25th Reserve Division (in the vicinity of Fignieres) and remains under the 82d Reserve Division. The battalion of the 143d Infy. Rgt. moves by the field railway to the road Fignieres - Etelfay.

Conversation Chief of Staff with Capt. v. Poser of 82d Reserve Division.

(91)

Station - Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps.
Received - 3:55 P.M., May 29.

Telephone Section 726.
through Lo Vz - from
Army Headqrs. operation
2059 operation.

May 29 - Ia

v.K.

To Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps -

1) As, according to the morning message of today, the counter attack against Cantigny has failed, a report will be submitted indicating the intention for retaking the town, also the time and manner planned to accomplish the scheme (a map 1:25,000 to accompany the report). I reserve the decision whether or not the scheme shall be carried out. In the meantime all arrangements for the counter attack will go on, regardless of this request and instruction.

2) A report of the 82d Reserve Division relating to the loss of the town and of the failure of the counter attack will be submitted as soon as possible.

The Commanding General of the Army.

(Sgd) v. Hutier
4356 - secret.

(92)

7:45 P.M., May 29.

Infantry aviator reports 7:40 P.M.

The enemy's fire died down considerably at 7:15 P.M. A few individual shells are still falling on the Fasanerie. Our own fire is still lively against Cantigny and trenches south and east thereof. No gatherings or tanks have been noticed. Have come to conclusion that the trenches, during my second flight, are not so filled as they were during my first flight. Infantry aviator remains at the front.

Captain Holdermann,
Flight No. 247.

(93)

7:45 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

9th Army Corps will furnish 26th Reserve Corps with a battalion of his second line attack echelon. Arrangement as to the march objective will be made direct with Corps Commander concerned.

Ia m 756.

Headqrs. 18th Army.

7:33 P.M., May 29.

(94)

Conversation

The battalion of the 143d Infy. Rgt. will advance as far east as possible in the assembly space of sector II, on the road Fignieres - Etelfay. Place of receipt of orders, Brigade Headqrs. Fignieres.

Conversation Chief of Staff with Maj. Kaupisch of the 9th Army Corps.

(95)

7:30 P.M., May 29.

Measures to be taken.

The 82d Reserve Division will move the battalion of the 99th Infy. Rgt. forward, as far as Davenescourt by motor trucks, thence by marching to Maresmontiers. The battalion of the 118th Regiment into the forest southwest of Boussicourt. The battalion of the 143d Regiment will hold itself in readiness in sector II on the road Fignieres - Etelfay.

(96)

7:29 P.M., May 29.

25th Reserve Division reports:

Regimental Commander A (83d) reports: Enemy's attack against Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83 has not taken place. The regiment is of opinion that the enemy is placing defensive fire.

The artillery of the Division is well placed.

The artillery liaison officer of the 1st battalion Reserve Infy. Rgt. No. 83, wired at 7:02 P.M. for annihilation fire against Cantigny.

Tschunke.

(97)

7:10 P.M., May 29.

Measures taken.

1) 1st battalion, 83d and 3d battalion 168th Rgts. assigned to reconnaissance (protection) duties and for a possible counter-stroke against 104.

2) One battalion of the 25th Reserve Division is placed at the disposition of the 82d Reserve Division to be moved to Maresmontiers via Bouillancourt. Can not arrive at Maresmontiers during the next three hours.

3) Distribution in depth of the artillery has been accomplished.

4) Rest-battalion of the 43d Regiment has been placed in readiness south of Fignieres. Its further employment depends upon the situation.

5) Rationing so far in good shape.

Conversation of Chief of Staff 26th Res. Corps with
Chief of Staff 18th Army.

6:58 P.M., May 29.

(98)

At 6:45, firing by Cantigny has subsided. Heavy fire against and in vicinity of 104.

82d Reserve Division.

6:55 P.M., May 29.

(99)

Balloon Detachment reports:

The enemy's fire is very heavy against Height 104. The fire has slackened against Fontaine and against our positions northwest of height 104.

Tschunke.

(100)

6:45 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps: -

The enemy's fire is slackening. Everything quiet south of Fontaine. Numerous bombing attacks of enemy's aviators against our batteries.

25th Reserve Division.

(101)

6:43 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Infantry aviator reports at 6:30 P.M., that the new trenches of the enemy east and southeast of Cantigny are strongly occupied. The Infantry aviator is at the front.

Similar report to the 82d Reserve Division and to the Artillery Commander 82d Reserve Division.

Heavy fire against Framicourt and terrain between flank road and Height 104.

Captain Holdermann.

To 25th Reserve Division,
by 1st Lieut. Engels at 8:48 P.M.

(102)

6:40 P.M., May 29.

The 3d Army Corps will move up three companies into the forest of Bouillancourt.

(103)

6:30 P.M., May 29.

To Headqrs. 18th Army.

Request temporary assignment of a battalion of the second line attack echelon, of the 9th Army Corps.

26th Reserve Corps.

(104)

6:15 P.M., May 29.

To 25th Reserve Division by 1st Lt. Engels at 6:20 P.M.
82d Reserve Division by Lieut. Lenzner at 6:40 P.M.

Rest battalion of Reserve Rgt. 118 placed at the disposition of the 82d Reserve Division. It will be moved up after arrangement between the 82d and 25th Reserve Divisions.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

(105)

5:30 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

Captain von Uckermann reports: Enemy attacks out of Cantigny in direction of Framicourt. The 83d Reserve Rgt. has orders, to prevent the enemy from taking summit 104, under any and all conditions.

25th Reserve Division.

(106)

5:28 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

Captain v. Poser reports: American troops attack out of Cantigny in direction of Framicourt. The Division requests that reserves be placed in readiness.

82d Reserve Division (Capt. v. Poser).

(107)

5:18 P.M., May 29.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

Heavy artillery fire of the enemy since 5:10 P.M. against infantry positions east of Framicourt, Fasanerie and Grenade forest. For the present our own artillery has the enemy's trenches under a deliberate destructive fire, in front of the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division and in front of the left flank of the 82d Reserve Division.

25th Reserve Division.

(108)

11:50 A.M., May 29.
transmitted to Lieut. Heisig.

Tsch.

To 82d Reserve Division.

According to a report of Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83, the right flank of that part of the regiment put in to the sector of the 82d Reserve Div. on the road Cantigny - Framicourt, is without contact with the infantry of the 82d Reserve Division. The Division will cause officers to examine into the breaks of the connections of the present foremost line, north and east of Cantigny and will take care that contact on these lines are positively maintained. A report of action taken, will be submitted.

A map showing the positions in the sector of the 82d Reserve Division and the assignment of the forces including that of companies, will be submitted not later than 4:00 P.M., May 29.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia No. 2053 operation.

Back to Ia.

(109)

10:00 A.M., May 29.

Requests for flame projector detachments, minenwerfers, etc., will be submitted today. Requests for reinforcements of artillery from the 3d Army Corps, 25th Reserve Division and 9th Army Corps will be submitted as soon as possible.

Baron von Watter,
Ia 2051 / operation.

(110)

10:00 A.M., May 29.

To 82d Reserve Division - by Lt. Lenzner, 9:50 A.M.
25th Reserve Division - by 1st Lt. Engels, 10:45 A.M.
30th Division - by Lt. Schwambach, 10:00 A.M.

Corps Orders.

1) The counter attack of the 82d Reserve Division on May 28, has not been successful.

2) Orders which places Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83, the 3d battln. Reserve Infy. Rgt. 168, as well as the artillery of the 25th Reserve Division under the command of the 82d Reserve Division is rescinded. Those troops of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 83, put in to the sector of the 82d Reserve Division, will be relieved during the night of May 29-30.

3) The 82d Reserve Division will keep the enemy in and around Cantigny, constantly in check through its artillery fire.

4) The 82d Reserve Division will arrange at once for a new attack against Cantigny. The objective of the attack is the complete retaking of our positions and the advancing of the foreground up to the foremost trenches of the enemy west and south of Cantigny. The attack will not take place until June 2, early.

5) Request of the 82d Reserve Division for reinforcements through - (here the page ended)

(Translators note - From a general study of other orders and messages of this file it appears that par.5 ended with "artillery, minenwerfer and flame projector detachments and additional units to bolster up his diminished command".)

(111)

Station Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Detachment 726
Received 9:45 A.M., May 29. by Kohranbach
from the 30th Infy. Div.
Telephone message from the field

9:54 A.M., May 29.

To Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps -

Headquarters 30th Infantry Division left Becquigny at 9:30 A.M.

30 I.D. Ia

To be turned over to 1st Lt. Ehlermann for file with records of 30th Inf. Div.

(112)

9:00 A.M., May 29.

To 30th Infantry Division to Lt. Bayer, at 9:30 A.M. - Tsch.
25th Reserve Division to 1st Lt. Engels, at 9:05 A.M. - Tsch.
82d Reserve Division to Lt. Lenzner, 9:10 A.M. - Tsch.

The Field Artillery Battalion and the Battalion of heavy Artillery of the 30th Infantry Division remain in their positions under the command of the 82d Reserve Division.

The readiness of all other parts of the 30th Infantry Division, in support, is rescinded. These troops will be withdrawn to rest quarters.

If such action is necessary to avoid losses, Infantry troops and the Field artillery battalion formerly attached to the 25th Reserve Division, will be withdrawn from the zone of fire only after darkness has set in.

For the Commanding General 26th Res. Corps.
Ia No. 2050 operation.
v.K.

(113)

1:45 midnight, May 29.

All companies of 83d Reserve Regiment have only 40 men.

Attack from north and south will be continued.

Accompanying guns at Ainval woods, Fasanerie, hedge north-east of Cantigny.

Objective for direct firing, to engage the annoying machine guns in Cantigny and to return to cover prior to dawn of day, there to repel tanks. When Cantigny has been taken, distribution in depth.

As minenwerfer must be hauled from the support sector (it will take from 2 to 3 hours) attack is hardly possible before day break.

Instructions from the Brigade not yet received.

Captain Schoen.

(114)

11:05 P.M.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

1st battalion 105th regiment arrived at its assembly point at 10:50 P.M. The other two battalions follow closely.

Chief of Staff informed. E. 30th Infantry Division.

9:00 P.M., May 28.

(115)

Enemy is withdrawing from Cantigny in the direction of the St. Eloi forest. 1st Reserve Division causes difficulties about artillery assistance.

82d Reserve Division.

Commander of front line troops reports at 9:30 P.M., that 2d battalion, 272 Reserve Rgt. has reached south edge of Cantigny.

82d Reserve Division.

(116)

7:47 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

60th Infantry Brigade in Fignieres since 7:00 P.M. Regiment 105 will reach assembly sector II by 9:00 P.M.

30th Infantry Division.

Chief of Staff informed.

E.

(117)

5:45 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

Wagon column of 99th regiment arrived with the last part of the regiment at 4:45 P.M. in the assembly sector I.

30th Infantry Division.

Chief of Staff informed.

E.

(118)

5:25 P.M.

To 25th Reserve Division

The 3d battalion Reserve Rgt. 168, returns to the command of the 25th Reserve Division. It will remain for the present on the west bank of the Dom stream.

For the Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

Transmitted to:

v.K.

82d Reserve Div. at 5:20 P.M. by Lt. Lenzner.

25th Reserve Div. at 5:25 P.M. by Lt. Vollert.

(119)

5:20 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

The enemy responded to our preparation with a heavy fire against our positions. The hollow between Courtemanche and Fontaine is being gassed.

25th Reserve Division.

Chief of Staff informed.

E.

(120)

5:15 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Division headquarters arrive at command post Becquigny at 5:00 P.M.

30th Infantry Division.
Ia.

Received by 1st Lt. Schwambach.

Chief of Staff informed.

Tsch.

(121)

4:00 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Division headquarters moves via Headqrs. 82d Reserve Division to Becquigny. Brigade Headquarters will be ordered to Fignieres and will assume command of echelons I and III.

Chief of Staff informed. 30th Infantry Division.
E. Ia.

4:00 P.M.

(122)

To 3d Army Corps at 4:00 P.M. by 1st Lt. Knohr.
9th Army Corps at 3:43 P.M. by Lt. Eike.

5:10 P.M. Artillery preparation.
6:10 P.M. Counter attack of 82d Reserve Division against Cantigny.

26th Reserve Corps.
v.K.

(123)

3:45 P.M., May 28.

Lieut. Konig of field balloon 28, reports, that everything has become entirely calm during the last half hour. Only a light searching fire is being placed in the Corps Sector.

Chief of Staff informed. Bickes, (?) 1st Lieutenant.
Tsch.

(124)

3:45 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps -

At present, a uniform and deliberate harassing against our front positions, each about 1 Km north and south of Cantigny. At times heavy firing against Grenade forest. Deliberate harassing also against the artillery positions of the 82d Reserve Division. Tanks have not been sighted so far. Balloon flights 41, 33 and 82 were attacked by 4 enemy aeroplanes and balloon 33 came down burning. (The observer of balloon 82 - V.F. Adolf - jumped and made a good landing). He went up again immediately.

Chief of Staff informed. Field Balloon Pilot 28.
E.

3:20 P.M., May 28.

(125)

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Artillery preparation begins 5:15 P.M.
Counter attack 6:00 P.M.

Chief of Staff informed. 82d Reserve Division.
E.

(126)

2:30 P.M., May 28.

To 30th Infantry Division - by Lt. Beyer 2:34 P.M. B.

The second line echelon III (less Field Artillery Battalion and the ^xFoot Artillery Battln. already assigned to the 25th Reserve Division and sent in advance) will immediately be brought up to the assembly sector II, south of Fignieres. Arrival to be reported.

The Division commander remains in command of the second line echelons I and III.

The arrival at the command post will be reported to Corps Headquarters.

26th Reserve Corps - Ia.

x has been changed.

E.

(127)

1:45 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Reserve Infy. Rgt. 83 reports - American troops advancing from the Zungen forest at 8:45 A.M., completely repulsed. Right connecting troops bent back somewhat. Contact to the right maintained. Artillery reports that the gatherings of enemy's troops in the Zungen forest have been under their long distance fire since 1:20 P.M. It also has engaged sharpshooters in the line Machine gun forest - Belle Assise farm and movements from Brocken forest and Belle Assise farm to Machine gun forest.

25th Reserve Division.

1:45 P.M. received by 1st Lt. Engels.
Chief of Staff informed.

E.

1:45 P.M., May 28.

(128)

To 82d Reserve Division - 11:30 A.M. from C. of S. to Capt. v. Paser.

25th Reserve Division - 11:49 A.M. by 1st Lt. Engels.

30th Infantry Division - 12:07 P.M. by Lt. Beyer.

1) According to Infantry aviator report, our own front line should run along from our former line from the north border 8010 beyond the west border of the Rhombus-forest, thence on the field path over height 104. Fontaine is in our hands.

2) After thorough artillery preparation the enemy will be thrown back by a prepared counter attack. The task is - the complete retaking of our former positions.

3) The commander of the 82d Reserve Division is designated to command the counter attack.

4) In addition to the artillery units of the 30th Infantry Division already attached to the command of the 82d Reserve Division, the following troops will also be placed to the disposition of the division for the counter attack:

a) Reserve Infantry Rgt. No. 83 with those parts of the regiment which at present are located on the west bank of the Dom stream.

b) Two rest battalions of the 25th Reserve Division.

c) The entire artillery of the 25th Reserve Division.

5) The commander of the 82d Reserve division will report the time at which the attack is to take place. He will also submit

a request for further assistance for artillery from the 3d and 9th Army Corps, in so far as this can not be regulated directly.

6) Air blockade will be arranged by the Corps Headquarters.

(Sgd) Baron v. Watter,
Lieut. General, Commanding 26th Reserve Corps.

Copy to Army Headquarters at 12:43 by Lt. Glahn.
3d Army Corps at 1:08 by 1st Lt. Knoehr.
9th Army Corps at 1:45 by Lt. Eike.

(129)

1:45 P.M., May 28.

To 3d Army Corps.

1) Orientation - autos beyond Villers and tanks at Coulemelle.

2) Gassing of Villers and Rocquencourt by 1st Reserve Division urgently desired.

82d Reserve Division.

The Commander in Chief desires improvement of the Cantigny foreground at a favorable moment after Cantigny is retaken.

v.K.

(130)

1:15 P.M., May 28.

During the counter attack against Cantigny our supports of Reserve regiments 271 and 272, crossed height No. 104, at 12 noon. At the southeast exit of Cantigny white-light signals, whether ours or those of the enemy, is unknown.

Attack was made by the French.

Following reports received:

- a) Motor trucks moving from Serevillers toward Villers.
- b) Tanks on the move from Coulemelle to Rocquencourt. 1st Reserve Division will hold Villers under annihilation fire. Gassing of Villers requested.

82d Reserve Division.

(131)

1:15 P.M., May 28.

To 26th Reserve Corps.

Second line echelon 1 on the march to the assembly sector, the remainder of the division (2d echelon excepted) is ready to march.

30th Infantry Division.

Transmitted 1:15 P.M. by 1st Lt. Schwambach.

v.K.

(132)

12:30 P.M., May 28.

The right flank of the 25th Reserve Division is in complete possession of the old positions and to the right has contact with the 82d Reserve Division. The advance of the enemy out of Cantigny to the southeast has been stopped by a counter attack. Height 104 in our possession. Enemy hold Cantigny and is entrenching 200 meters east thereof. Cantigny is burning.

For Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

to:

v.K.

Army Headquarters - by Lt. Glahn at 12:43 P.M.
25th Reserve Div. - 1st Lt. Engels at 12:45 P.M.
82d Reserve Div. - Lt. Lenzner at 12:45 P.M.
30th Infantry Div. - Lt. Beyer, at 1:02 P.M.
3d Army Corps - 1st Lt. Knohr at 1:08 P.M.
9th Army Corps - Lt. Eike at 1:45 P.M.

(133)

11:50 A.M., May 28.

To Commander of Aviation troops

A strong force of enemy aviators over Cantigny direct their artillery and prevent, that our troops who are to take up the counter attack, be placed in readiness in covered positions. Strong resistance through pursuit planes urgently and immediately necessary.

26th Reserve Corps.
Ic.

To Capt. v.d. Goltz at
Headqrs. of Aviation troops.
transmitted

Tschunke.

(134)

11:15 A.M., May 28.

Infantry aviator ascertained at 10:30 A.M.: Course of the foremost line, from St. Aignan church to the cut of the trench at the road St. Aignan church to Cantigny then bending back to the east. To the west border of the woods of Fasanerie, thence in a southeasterly direction along the field path which ends on the road Fontaine - Framicourt almost on the northeastern exit of Fontaine. Fontaine is in our hands. Heavy barrage between Cantigny and Fasanerie.

Captain Holdermann.

Added - The sector between the cut of the trench and road and the woods of Fasanerie has not yet been sufficiently reconnoitered.

10:55 A.M., May 28.

(135)

To 30th Infantry Division by Lt. Schwambach at 10:40 A.M.
82d Reserve Division by Lt. Heisig at 10:47 A.M.
25th Reserve Division by Lt. Engels at 10:56 A.M.

1) Enemy is entrenching on height 104 between Cantigny and Framicourt.

2) Second line attack echelon I of the 30th Infantry Division advances in the assembly sector north of Fignieres. The artillery

battalion of this echelon and the heavy artillery battalion of the 30th Infantry Division, are placed to the disposition of the 82d Reserve Division for insertion.

3) The artillery battalion of the second line attack echelon III of the 30th Infantry Division are placed to the disposition of the 25th Reserve Division. Insertion of the artillery is necessary against Cantigny and Height 104 east of Cantigny.

26th Reserve Corps.
v.K.

10:50 A.M., May 28.

(136)

At present a destructive fire is being placed on our infantry positions north of Cantigny and between Cantigny and Fontaine. Rapid fire in the Dom stream valley between Gratibus - Framicourt - Courtemanche.

Field Balloon Detachment No. 28.

10:30 A.M., May 28.

(137)

To 30th Infantry Division, by Lt. Schwambach at 10:30 A.M.

Enemy with tanks has invaded at Cantigny. Counter attack of 82d Reserve Div. under way. Second line attack echelon No. 1, will be brought up at once to the assembly sector north of Fignieres. The remainder of the division (less second line attack echelon No. 2) will be placed in readiness to march. A report will be made as soon as the command is ready to march.

Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.

10:45 A.M., May 28.

(138)

To Headqrs. 18th Army.

Enemy supported by seven tanks has taken Cantigny and is entrenching on height 104 west of Cantigny. The conditions on the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division are not clear. Fire in front of this flank has eased up.

The following troops are marching:

3 Rest battalions of the 82d Reserve Division via Bouillancourt.

3 Rest battalions of the 25th Reserve Division.

Second line attack echelon No. I of the 30th Infantry Division in region north of Fignieres.

Artillery of the 30th Infantry Division: One battalion Field Artillery one battalion heavy artillery are placed at disposition of the 82d Reserve Division and one battalion field artillery, at disposition of the 25th Reserve Division.

Counter attack is planned from north and south.

26th Res. Corps.

10:15 A.M. May 28.

(139)

To Headquarters 18th Army.

Supported by seven tanks, enemy has penetrated our position at Cantigny. Understood that tanks reached the region west of Framicourt. 1 or 2 tanks shot to pieces the rest are retiring.

Counter attack of the 82d Reserve Division under way. Second line attack echelon No. I of the 30th Infantry Division is being brought up into the assembly sector north of Fignieres. The remainder of the division ready to move.

Commanding General, 26th Reserve Corps.

9:50 A.M., May 28.

(140)

Enemy has penetrated the first line. Seven tanks are said to have reached the region west of Framicourt, one or two have been shot to pieces, the rest are retiring. Counter attack in progress. Rest battalion advancing via Bouillancourt.

82d Reserve Division.

9:45 A.M., May 28.

(141)

To Field Artillery Rgt. No. 72.

3d battalion, 1st Guard Reserve Foot Artillery will be placed in readiness to march. The readiness to march will be reported by telephone without delay. Report immediately if ammunition is on hand.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Received by Capt. Kunst, Adj. 72d.

9:45 A.M.

9:35 A.M., May 28.

(142)

To 30th Infantry Division.

Increased readiness for action 9:35 A.M.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.

Received by First Lieut.

Schwambach at 9:40 A.M.

9:30 A.M., May 28.

(143)

Aviator reports that infantry of the enemy has invaded Cantigny.

3d Army Corps.

To 3d Army Corps.

Artillery of the 1st Division assists 82d Reserve Division through gassing of the Aival and Coulemelle groups, and against infantry of the enemy.

Request continuation of assistance.

26th Reserve Corps.

(144)

9:20 A.M., May 28.

To Headquarters 18th Army.

Barrage was requested at 8:45 A.M., for the junction between 82d and 25th Reserve Division. Dom stream valley is being gassed.

According to reports received, enemy attacked between Cantigny and Fontaine. (Another report not yet confirmed, indicates that the enemy has entered Cantigny).

Rest battalions have been alarmed, 4 battalions will advance to the west bank of the Dom stream. Our artillery is engaging the enemy with annihilation fire and barrage and is gassing the enemy artillery.

Artillery assistance of the III and IX Army Corps under way.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

(145)

9:20 A.M., May 28.

To Headqrs. 26th Reserve Corps -

For the time being the fire has slackened. It was noticed that the fire of the enemy at Cantigny was being lifted at 8:40 A.M. The fire against infantry positions keeps up in the same volume, but is less heavy against artillery positions.

Field Balloon Detachment No. 28.

- - - - -

Reports to be called for -

- a) From divisions:
 - 1) Has the division wireless detachment transmitted the above report immediately to other divisions?
 - 2) When?
 - 3) What was done after receipt of same?
- b) From aviation detachment:
 - 1) Why was landing made only at 8:30?
 - 2) Was annihilation fire requested from the air?
 - 3) Were reports flung to the ground?

Tsch.

(146)

9:20 A.M., May 28.

Captain Holdermann reports:

An aeroplane sent the following message at 6:55 A.M., to the division wireless station of the 82d Reserve Division:

"Enemy is preparing an attack against the centre and left flank".

The aviator landed at about 8:30 A.M. on the landing field Erches, and drove to the division.

Tschunke.

(147)

9:15 A.M., May 28.

To 25th Reserve Division.

Increase readiness for action. Advance rest battalion Reserve Rgt. 83, to the west bank of the Dom stream.

Report without delay the march readiness of the two other rest battalions.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

9:15 A.M.

(148)

Enemy's fire now also in front of the left flank of the Div. Annihilation fire is being placed on Mesnil.

IX Army Corps is assisting against enemy's artillery, Broyes and against infantry of the enemy.

25th Reserve Division.

9:40 A.M.

To IX Army Corps.

Request that assistance given the 25th Reserve Division be continued.

Commanding General 26th Reserve Corps.

7:30

(149)

Increased artillery activity against 25th Reserve Division and adjoining divisions since 6:30. Communications with our own infantry destroyed. Apparently the enemy is placing retaliatory fire.

25th Reserve Division.

7:35

The fire of the enemy has weakened, it is placed mainly against our artillery positions and intervening terrain.

25th Reserve Division.

8:00 A.M.

The enemy's fire has been concentrated against the right flank of the 25th Reserve Division. Our artillery discharged a few waves of annihilation fire and is now placing deliberate destructive fire against the enemy's infantry positions in front of the right flank. The enemy's fire seems unsteady.

25th Reserve Division.

8:40 A.M.

In reply to inquiry, the 82d Reserve Division reports, that the enemy's fire was placed against the left flank of the 82d Reserve Division and right flank of the 25th Reserve Division (Sector Cantigny - Fontaine). Enemy apparently is sending out raiding parties. Quiet in front of right flank of 82d Reserve Division.

82d Reserve Division.

8:45 A.M.

25th Reserve Division reports that our infantry in front of the right flank has requested barrage. Enemy apparently is sending out raiding parties. Division has information of the situation at the 82d Reserve Division. Quiet in front of left flank of 25th Reserve Division.

25th Reserve Division.

(150)

(For sketch showing detailed dispositions of sector of 82d Res. Div. after the attack, see Map Atlas.) - P.L.R.

26th RESERVE CORPS.

Group Orders from December 30, 1917 to Nov. 6, 1918.

Cantigny Attack of May 28, 1918.

Selected orders of the 26th Reserve Corps
bearing on this action.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

Selected Documents.

26th RESERVE CORPS
(Corps Orders.)

for the period May 27 to June 5, 1918, pertaining
to the Cantigny Attack of May 28, 1918.

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May	27	-	Corps Orders of the Headqrs., 26th Reserve Corps.					
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Headqrs., 26th Reserve Corps,
Ia No. 2028 operations.

(152)
May 27, 1918.

Corps Orders.

(Paragraphs 2 and 3 are extracts from Army Orders No.23 of May).

1. After gassing the enemy's batteries, the 82d and 25th Reserve Div. each undertook one raid in the sector of the 26th Reserve Corps. The raiding troops of the 82d Reserve Division penetrated the position of the enemy at Cantigny and captured two Americans which however, were killed by the enemy's fire while the raiding troops were returning to our positions. The enemy's artillery defense against our raids was strong, mainly from the northwest, apparently Amval Group.

The raiding troops of the 25th Reserve Div. encountered a tenacious resistance. The artillery defense was but slight. One American prisoner and one light machine gun were taken. It is understood that four American prisoners were taken by a raiding party which for the time is located in the line of the enemy's posts and is unable to return at day time.

3d Army Corps: No events of special importance. Two patrol enterprises were without results. The enemy's batteries replied strongly in parts only while it was being gassed.

9th Army Corps: Little combat activities. The counter - defense of the enemy was inferior while its batteries were being gassed.

2. Major Buddeberg is designated as Staff officer of the Minenwerfer troops, in compliance with the instructions of the Army Group German Crownprince, Ia/Pi 2888.

He is in charge, under the Chief of Artillery, of the tactical employment and the bringing up of the minenwerfers.

The Chief of Engineers has charge of the ammunition and all affairs pertaining to minenwerfers, in close conjunction with the staff officer of Minenwerfer troops.

3. The pioneer companies of the 227th, 105th and 206th Infantry Div., attached to the 17th and 8th Army Corps for mine and dugout construction work, will return to their divisions on June 1st.

Addition to the Corps: The bringing up of the Pioneer Company of the 206th Infantry Division, will be effected by the Division under immediate agreement with the Commanding General of the 8th Army Corps.

4. Army Field Hospital No. 531 will be relieved at once by Field Hospital No. 115 (82 Reserve Div.) The former is assigned to the 7th Army and will reach Hamm on May 28 and Versigny on May 29. (Its arrival will be reported in advance through telephoning.)

5. Supply park No. 803 (Pack train) is transferred to the 8th Army Corps and will reach Cugny on May 28th.

6. Artillery organizations relieved to rest:

The artillery relieved to rest becomes Corps reserve. Their management for the time being will be placed in the hands of a Field or Foot artillery commander who is serving under the direct jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Corps (for the time being the Commander of Field Artillery regiment No. 72).

The foregoing order takes effect on May 28. The instructions of the Corps Commander of May 4, 1918, Ia/Arty. No. 1708, are revoked on the same date.

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd) Baron v. Watter,

OFFICIAL: v. Kahlden.

Usual distribution.

Headquarters 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia No. 2044 operations.

May 28, 1918.

Secret.

Corps Orders.

(Par. 5, is an extract from Army Orders No. 24 of May.)

1. Lively harassing by the enemy during the night. Down-stream valley was gassed.

The fire against Cantigny and Fontaine became more dense after 8 a.m. The enemy invaded north and south of Cantigny at 8.45 a.m. Seven tanks supported his attack, some of them were forced to retire having been shot to pieces by our artillery and minenwerfer fire. Cantigny has been occupied by the enemy. Height 104, east of Cantigny remains in our hands. The advance of the enemy from Cantigny to the southeast was stopped by a counter-thrust.

3d Army Corps: Strong patrols of the corps advanced against Gravel-pit-wood and park of Grivesnes and found that the enemy had evacuated the foremost position. The patrols returned without prisoners to their own trenches. The 165th French Division has been identified as the one in front, north of the 3d Army Corps.

9th Army Corps: An enemy patrol of 50 men attacked during the night of May 27-28, the center of the sector of the 222d Infantry Div. (left flank division) after a brief artillery preparation. The attacking forces were thrown back in close combat. Otherwise no special events.

2. The Reserve Division bridge train No. 44, is transferred to the 38th Reserve Corps and has to reach Beaugies on May 28th.

3. The damage to telephone lines must positively be avoided during firing exercises. When exercises can not take place at the artillery firing range, specially provided for by the Corps Headquarters, grounds for such exercises will be selected previously in each case with consent of the Group Signal Commander, No. 726, at Corps Headquarters.

4. To Army Orders No. 7 of May 7, 1918 - paragraph 2.

The Army High Command has telegraphed under 86731, operations:

The filled in secret folder must be kept secret, while the keybook need not. The secret folder will be carried along separately.

The attachment or pasting in of the secret folder in the key book is, in conformity with part 10 of the regulations for the trench warfare, inadmissible for all branches of the service.

5. The flying over Ham, Nesle and Chaulnes at night is forbidden.

Anti-aircraft has barrage freedom over these cities. The range will be ascertained for barrage firing during the day.

Aeroplanes who are forced to fly over these cities will make themselves known as German flyers, through frequent firing of the identification signal.

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd.) Baron von Watter,
Official: v. Kahlden,
Major.

Usual distribution.

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia No. 2056, operations.

(150)
May 29, 1918.

SECRET.

Corps Orders.

A counter-attack undertaken at 6:45 p.m. to regain the lost position was without success. Two American prisoners were taken. Our artillery engaged the enemy at Cantigny and during the night of May 28-29, gassed the enemy's battery groups, Machine Gun Wood, hollow southeast of Broyes and the forest northeast of Gardonnois.

At 3d Army Corps: No special events. The 1st Reserve Division supported with a heavy fire, the 82d Reserve Division in the battle for Cantigny.

One of our balloons was shot down by the enemy on the afternoon of May 28. The observer landed by means of his parachute.

At the 9th Army Corps: No special events.

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd.) Baron von Watter,

Official:

v. Kahlden,
Major.

Distribution as usual.

Headquarters 26th Res. Corps,
Ia No. 2067, operations.

(149)
May 30, 1918.

SECRET.

Corps Orders.

1. After previous heavy firing on Infantry and Battery positions, Aival Woods and Fasanerie, extending as far as the centre of the 25th Reserve Div., the enemy formed for the attack at 5.30 p.m. Immediate and well placed annihilation fire prevented the development of the attack.

The heavy fire of the enemy kept up until 6.40 p.m., after which it died down somewhat only to increase again about 8 p.m. to a heavy annihilation fire. The enemy attacked at about 8.50 p.m. in the direction of Height No. 104, but was repulsed, while his densely occupied trenches were kept under an effective fire.

Our artillery continued to keep Cantigny and the enemy's trenches under fire and they harassed against approach roads and supports and gassed the east portion of Villers with mustard gas.

During the counter-attack on Cantigny three Americans were made prisoners.

At the 3d Army Corps. no special events. Its artillery supported the 82d Reserve Division and during the afternoon gassed Villers Tournelle.

At the 9th Army Corps. no special events.

Its artillery gassed Welles-Perennes, La Morliere, Royaucourt, Domfront and Godenvillers. (Ia)

2. The Headquarters of the 223d Foot Arty. Regt. started on its march on May 30th, to the 8th Army Corps.

3. Our Bombardment Squadrons No. 1 and 4, attacked during the night of May 28, the railway and road junction points over which the main traffic on the south front of the army is moving. This squadron in several flights between the time from 10.30 pm to 4 am. operated successfully with bombs and machine guns. A total of 28450 kg. bombs were thrown. The railway track to Beauvais was damaged and two cars of a freight train at the railway

station Clermont were set on fire. Columns on the march were covered with machine gun fire and partly dispersed.

Our battle squadron No. 3 participated in the engagement for Soissons with 15 planes and during the attack with 8575 machine gun shots and 48 fragmentation bombs on motor trucks, wagon columns and marching infantry detachments, producing heavy losses to the enemy and causing confusion among the columns leading to an interruption of the traffic. Gainful ground targets were also attacked during the day with 3050 machine gun shots.

Our bombardment squadron, during the night of May 29, in spite of a heavy fog, attacked with a total of 18900 kg. bombs, Beauvais, Clermont, St. Just, Crepy-en-Valois, Villers-Cotterets and towns in the Aisne valley with great success. Some of the planes went down as far as 300 m. from the ground, in consequence of which they obtained good hits.

A large explosion was observed at 1.27 a.m. at the railway depot at Beauvais and several fires and explosions were witnessed in the Aisne valley. Recognized camps and troops marching toward Soissons were attacked with machine guns.

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd.) Baron von Watter,

Official: v. Kahlden,
Major.

Usual distribution.

(148)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

May 31, 1918.

Ia No. 2089 operations.

SECRET.

Corps Orders.

1. Our trenches on Height 104 east of Cantigny were covered several times yesterday by a heavy fire of the enemy and, off and on during the evening he also delivered barrage fire. This morning at about 7 o'clock he opened a heavy artillery fire against the sector of the 25th Reserve Division and the terrain south thereof and partly covered also the sector of the 82d Reserve Division. Our aviator observed from great heights, heavy fixed firing against Mesnil and the hollow south thereof, against Granatwald and Fontaine and at first signalled for annihilation and then barrage fire. The enemy did not attack. The firing relaxed about 7.30 a.m., but increased once more at 8.30 a.m., against the sector of the 82d Reserve Division. Inferior firing has been going on since 9 a.m.

Our own artillery fired the usual harass and upon signals of the air observer, barrage and annihilation. Destructive fire was kept up against the new trenches of the enemy at Cantigny. The railway depot at Gannes was fired upon with 30 shots.

Lieutenant Berkemeyer, Reserve Inf. Regt. No. 118, returned from a raid with two severely wounded men of Reserve Inf. Regt. No. 83, pertaining to the Tannenberg enterprise, who were found lying close in front of the enemy's entanglements.

At 3d Army Corps: No special events. The artillery of the 1st Reserve Division supported the 82d Reserve Div., through vigorous harassing against Villers. A battery assumed to be the one which fired on the railway depot at Chaulnes yesterday, was gassed.

At the 9th Army Corps: No special events. The harass against the railway depot St. Just and Breteuil was continued. Hits on a train were observed by aviators without trouble.

2. The following troops will be transferred:
- 1st Cyclist Company and 1st Jager Battln., on May 31.
 - Army Corps Columns No. 127, 353, 358, on May 31.
 - Ammunition Column No. 221, on May 31.
 - Depot Supply park Column No. 160, on May 31.

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd.) Baron von Watter,

Official:

v. Kahlden,
Major.

Usual distribution.

(147)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia No. 2098 Operations. Secret.

June 1, 1918.

Corps Orders.

1. The enemy's fire against both division sectors, revived several times yesterday during day and night. No infantry activity. Our own artillery harassed against the usual objectives and set up concentrated bursts of fire on enemy's trenches and batteries, it also supported the 1st Reserve Division. The railway depot and railroad plants of Bacouel were placed under fire.

At the 3d Army Corps: A double sentry post of Reserve Inf. Regt. No. 35 of the 6th Reserve Division was captured by a French patrol, south of the road Sauvillers-Thory. An enemy's patrol was repulsed by the 1st Reserve Div. north of the park at Grivesnes. The enemy covered the corps sector with the usual harass fire, which from 5.45 a.m., on May 31, increased to great vehemence. The enemy did not attack.

At the 9th Army Corps: No special events. Its artillery kept up its fire on the St. Just railway station.

2. Starting several times, the aeroplanes of squadrons No. 1 and 9, and of Giant Flight No. 500, attacked during the night of May 30, 1918, railway stations at Beauvais, St. Just, Clermont, Crepy-en-Valois, Villers-Cotterets and marching columns, with a total of about 24,000 kg. bombs and with machine guns. Several explosions occurred at 11.50 pm. and 3.30 am. Fires were observed in the city of Villers-Cotterets and a large ammunition explosion at the railway station, thereof. Three long ammunition trains blew up one after another.

During the day and by stormy weather, enemy's ground targets were attacked by aeroplanes with 25 Kg. bombs, and 800 machine gun shots. We shot down three enemy airplanes and forced one to make an emergency landing over the enemy's landing station after the combat. Captain Berthold, commander of Pursuit Sq. No. 2, won his thirtieth and thirty-first air victory.

Our bombing squadrons Nos. 1 and 4 and Giant Flight 500, attacked the railway station Creil with a total of 18,400 kg bombs. At the second start of the bombing squadrons the emergency objectives, St. Just, Gleisdreieck, Rivecourt, railway depots at Estrees St. Denis and Compiègne, as well as the towns in the Aisne valley were covered with 6,150 Kg. bombs. Several fires at the railway station Creil. Columns and illuminated camps were attacked with 3,000 machine gun shots from low elevations.

During the morning of May 30 and 31st, our aviators attacked gainful ground targets in the enemy's terrain with 140 Kg. bombs, and 100 machine gun shots. Our Pursuit planes shot down one airplane and one captive balloon of the enemy.

3. The following light signals will go into effect at 12 o'clock noon on June 3d:

Barrage: Red single star, to be fired in quick succession, until the barrage starts.

Annihilation fire: Red also, but with double star to be fired at regular intervals.

To lengthen range: Green.

To shorten range: Yellow. (Ic)

4. The following have been sent out today to:

82d Res. Div. - 15	maps, 1:25000	Traffic Routes	May 26,
25th Res. Div. - 15	"	ditto	1918.
30th Inf. Div. - 10	"	ditto	
82d Res. Div. - 2	"	1:80000 Situation Map of June 1,	
25th Res. Div. - 2	"	ditto	1918.
10th Res. Div. - 2	"	ditto	

The Corps Commander,
(Sgd.) Baron von Watter,
Official:

v. Kahlden,
Major.

Usual distribution.

(146)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.
Ia No. 2119 Operations.

June 2, 1918.

SECRET.

CORPS ORDERS.

(Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are extracts from Army Orders No.1, June).

1. No special events in the corps sector. The corps artillery engaged the railway depot at Gannes and Bacouel through the assistance of aeroplane observation and obtained several direct hits.

At the 3d Army Corps, a patrol enterprise against the Fingerwald passed without result. Its artillery again fired on the railway Amiens-St. Just and on the railroad depots Ailly and Breteuil. Very lively aviation activity of the enemy, bombs being thrown on Rosieres during the day.

At the 9th Army Corps, a patrol enterprise of the left flank Division had no result. The raiding troops were observed ere they had gained the enemy's entanglements and were attacked by strong forces. Its artillery continued to harass the railroad depot St. Just.

2. Aeroplane squadron No. 4, ascending twice, during the night of June 1st, between the hours of 11.15 and 4.50, engaged the railway depot Creil with 12,100 Kg bombs. Good direct hits were made resulting in two small fires. On the railway depots Estrees St. Denis and on a large town east of Creil, 1,200 Kg bombs were thrown. Illuminated billets in towns were engaged with 2050 M.G. shots. Bombardment squadron No. 1 engaged the railway depot Crepy en Valois, a very important point for the enemy, with 12,500 Kg bombs, through which the large ammunition dump southwest thereof was blown up, causing numerous and violent explosions illuminating the region far away like daylight. Due to the bright illumination, caused by the exploding ammunition and lasting for hours, good direct hits could be made on the numerous rolling stock in the railway yard, where, as in the city, a large fire resulted at each. During the same night the large railway depot and the city of Meaux was bombed with 3100 Kg, by two aeroplanes of Giant. Flight No. 500. One 50 Kg bomb caused a terrible explosion with a fire at the railway depot lasting a long time.

Our observation and combat planes during the day attacked enemy's columns and infantry and artillery positions with 78.5 Kg bombs, 81 fragmentation bombs and 9050 machine gun shots, spreading alarm and disorder among the columns. The bringing down of four enemy's aeroplanes and of one captive balloon was a further success of our aviators yesterday.

Lieutenant Kroll, pilot of aeroplane No. 24, won his twenty-fourth; Lieutenant Putter, pilot of No. 88, his twenty-sixth, and Lieutenant Menkoff, pilot of No. 72, his twenty-eighth air victory.

3. 19th Infantry Division takes position in the sector Ennemain Flez-Douvioux-Quivieres-Croix Maligneaux-Y-Buny-Voyennes-Rouy-Mesnil-Pargny-Falvy (all towns included.).

Commencing with today, dismounted troops will arrive at Ham, mounted troops on June 2-3, at their billets, by marching.

Line of Communication command No. 18, in conjunction with Headquarters of the 26th Reserve Corps, will arrange the billets. Subsistence will be furnished by Line of Communication Command No. 18.

The division is High Command Reserve and assigned under the command of the 17th Army Corps for training (as per telephone message sent in advance).

Note of the Corps Headers: Orders as to billets will follow.

4. 5th Reserve Division will, by extending the 75th Res. Div., be withdrawn by the morning of June 3d and ordered to proceed at once by marching to the 3d Army Corps, to relieve the 46th Reserve Division.

46th Reserve Division moves speedily as Army Reserve into the sector Curchy-Menicourt-Nesle-Langouvoison-Quiquery-Cressy-Omencourt-Solente-Champien-Gruny-Etalon.

3d Army Corps reports arrival of 5th Reserve Division.

8th Army Corps reports arrival of 46th Reserve Div. in the sector designated.

Billets for the 46th Res. Div. will be arranged by the 9th Army Corps in conjunction with the 26th Res. Corps. Subsistence through the 26th Res. Corps.

The Division remains Army Reserve (as per telephone message sent in advance).

Note of the Corps Headquarters: To be regulated directly.

5. On June 2, the following troops will be transferred to the 8th Army Corps: 2d Troop, Res. Horse Jager Regiment 1.

The Corps Commander,
(signed) Baron von Watter,

Official:

v. Kahlden,
Major.

Usual distribution.

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

Ia No. 2142 Operation.

(145)
June 3, 1918.

Secret.

Corps Orders.

1. In the Corps sector no special events. The German artillery conducted the usual harassing and again fired on the railway depot at Bacouel.

At the 3d Army Corps, a patrol of Reserve Infantry Regt. No. 1, succeeded in reaching the three row wire entanglement of the enemy in front of Fliegerhutwald and in damaging two of the rows. The rapid fire of the enemy forced the patrol to retire under rifle fire and hand grenade combat.

At the 9th Corps no special events. Inferior artillery activity on both sides. A patrol of Reserve Infantry Regt. No. 81, returned during the night of June 1st and 2d with a French soldier of Infantry Regt. No. 34 (36th Inf. Div.) who had but recently fallen northwest of Rollot.

2. During the night of June 2, 1918, the German bombardment squadron No. 1, attacked Paris and Crepy en Valois with bombs totaling 11900 Kg. A heavy explosion and several conflagrations

in Crepy en Valois were the results of this attack.

Gainful ground targets were obtained yesterday by our aviators in the back area of the enemy with 150 Kg bombs and 1200 machine gun shots. Lieutenant Menkhoff, pilot of aeroplane No. 72, with his echelon, shot down 4 of the 11 aeroplanes of an enemy's squadron and thus won his twenty-ninth air victory. A fifth aeroplane was shot down during the course of the day.

3. The following changes will be made in the occupation of sectors, during the night of June 3d - 4th.

46th Res. Div. will evacuate by 12 o'clock midnight the sector Mesnil-Nesle-Languevoisin-Quiquery and Quiquery.

19th Infantry Div. moves into the sector Mesnil-Languevoisin-Quiquery-Noyenne-Bethencourt-Flavy.

The movements will be made during darkness only.

4. Headquarters of the Army Group has telegraphed:

"The High Command directs: Monthly reports indicate that at some places ammunition columns are formed under an ammunition column commander by taking ammunition wagons from the batteries. I desire, that in the future such measures, which lead to the dispersement of organizations, be stopped." (signed) Ludendorff, II No. 87623 Operations."

Note: Report requested by June 9th, if this has been done by any organization serving under this corps command.

Note of the Headquarters of the Army. Artillery commanders will submit report by June 7, 1918.

The Corps Commander,

(signed) Baron von Watter,

Official:

Neitzel, Captain,
General Staff.

Usual distribution:

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

Ia No. 2126 Operation.

Secret.

(144)
June 4, 1918.

Corps Orders.

1. 26th Reserve Corps: No special events. Saulchoy received seven shots of heavy calibre. The German artillery harassed against the usual objectives and placed Ferrieres under fire. Movements of small troop detachments from Rocquencourt and Serevillers toward Cantigny indicating that troops were being relieved, gas raids were carried out against approach roads, and hollows between Cantigny and Villers-Tournelle and Cantigny, le Plessier, and enemy's batteries and infantry emplacements were engaged with destructive fire. Railway depot Bacouel was again placed under fire.

No special events at the 3d Army Corps. Reports were received subsequently of active air activity of the enemy and of an air attack on infantry positions, on barracks northeast of Braches and at le Hamel during the night of June 2-3d. Three railroad cars loaded with ammunition were destroyed through bombs at Omiecourt. Railway depot Chaulnes also received bombs but no damage occurred to materiel.

No special events at the 9th Army Corps. The patrol raids against the 2d Infantry Division during the night of June 2-3 were repulsed.

The switch-traffic at the railway station St. Just was fired upon.

2. Lieutenant Strub of Foot Artillery Battl. No. 98 has been assigned in charge of the administration of the artillery range of the 26th Reserve Corps at Liancourt. All requests having in view the use of this range will be addressed to him. (See Corps order of May 10, 1918, par. 3, Artillery).

The Corps Commander,
(signed) Baron von Watter,

Official:

Neitzel,
Captain, General Staff.

Usual distribution.

(143)

Headquarters, 26th Reserve Corps.

June 5, 1918.

Ia No. 2141 Operation.

Secret.

Corps Orders.

1. In the German Corps Sector heavy harassing during the night which slackened about 7.30 a.m.

The German artillery harassed against infantry emplacements, towns and batteries.

Railway depot Bacouel, as well as the railway plants at Tartigny were placed under fire.

At the 3d Army Corps, moderate activity on both sides.

At the 9th Army Corps, no special events.

2. During the night from June 2 to 3, our bombardment squadron No. 1, attacked the city and railway depot Crepy en Valois and the towns east thereof in repeated flights with 12000 Kg bombs, which started a fire in the northeast and southwest portions of the city and at the railway depot Crepy (numerous barracks). The street traffic was engaged with machine guns.

The German bombing squadron No. 4, covered the city and railroad depot Creil as well as the emergency objective, Compiègne, with bombs totaling 10,000 Kg. and the street traffic with 1500 machine gun shots. In spite of the aerial combats, the over-casting clouds and beginning fog, our aeroplanes accomplished their difficult missions.

While flying against the enemy, gainful ground targets were attacked during the day with 1000 kg. bombs and 1350 machine gun shots by our aviators. Lieutenant Menkhoff, pilot of aeroplane No. 72, with his echelon, shot down two aeroplanes of the enemy. In addition, one other aeroplane of the enemy was shot down.

During the night of June 4th, our bombing squadrons 1 and 4, in repeated ascension attacked the city and railway depot Creil and Crepy en Valois and as emergency objectives, Compiègne and the aviation station Plessis-Belleville with bombs totaling 20,650 Kg. Conflagrations were observed up to the morning in Creil, Plessis-Belleville and Crepy en-Valois as well as at the railway stations of these cities. In addition, numerous ammunition depots and dumps, which were made the main targets on the way, were exploded.

Illuminated ground objectives and columns were attacked with over 1000 machine gun shots.

3 aeroplanes of the enemy were shot down during the day.

Lieutenant Menkhoff won his thirty-first air victory.

The Corps Commander,
(signed) Baron von Watter

Official:

Neitzel,
Captain, General Staff.

Usual distribution.

C A N T I G N Y A T T A C K .

Daily Reports

Records of the 26th Reserve Corps,
from May 26 (evening report only) to June 5, 1918,
(incl.)
complete for the period covered.

Translation from a true copy of
the original on file in the
German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm.)

Evening Report of May 26, 1918.

(No. 80)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army,
Hdqrs., 3d Army Corps,
Hdqrs., 9th Army Corps.

Inferior harassing against combat positions and rear areas; 15 light mines against Cantigny. Our own artillery fired against enemy's supports and gave long-distance fire against Plainville, la Borde Ferme, Morliere, Sains-Morainvillers and examined into their special results.

Our own aviation activity is very stirring, that of the enemy slight.

Sight: clear at times. West wind.

The dead American brought in by the 25th Reserve Division and reported at noon of May 24, is an officer of the 26th U.S. Infantry.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Morning Report of May 27, 1918.

(No. 81)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army,
Hdqrs., 3d Army Corps,
Hdqrs., 9th Army Corps.

Moderate harassing against combat positions and rear areas. Our own artillery fired against towns in rear and traffic points and engaged with concentrated bursts of fire against objects in the enemy's zone. Morliere, la Borde Ferme, Sains-Morainvillers and Herelle were fired against with flat trajectory fire. Moderate aviation activities.

Sight: Good. Strong wind.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Noon Report of May 27, 1918.

(No. 82).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army,
Hdqrs., 3d Army Corps,
Hdqrs., 9th Army Corps.

During the remainder of the night moderate harassing against combat position and rear area. Long-distance fire against Guerbigny. Gas bursts on Courtemanche, Dom-stream valley and the terrain adjoining.

The gas and effective bombardment of our own artillery this morning took place as planned. The counter firing of the enemy's artillery was fairly heavy at the 82d Reserve Div., but inferior at the 25th Reserve Div.

The enterprises from "Tarnopol" and "Tannenberg" were accomplished.

Three raiding groups of the 82d Reserve Div. penetrated the enemy's position at Cantigny and took two American prisoners who were killed by the enemy's fire on the way back to the German lines. One machine gun was taken. The fallen Americans lie close in front of our obstructions and will be brought in this evening. Strong artillery defense from the northwest, apparently from the group at Anval. Losses thus far, dead 5, wounded 12. The raiding parties of the 25th Reserve Div. encountered an obstinate resistance, but the counter action of the artillery was inferior. One American prisoner and one light machine gun were captured. It is understood that four additional Americans were taken by a raiding party, which at this time is hiding in the line of posts

and is unable to return during daylight. A first-hand report has not yet been received. Our losses are considerable. Several officers wounded.

Destructive firing was carried out through ground observation, one each against trench constructions in map quadrangle 8110 and 8111.

Sight: Poor. North wind.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. - dead 1 officer, 4 men and 5 horses.
(Losses of May 26) wounded 5 officers, 22 men and 12 horses.

25th Reserve Div. - dead 8 men, 2 horses.
wounded 1 officer, 22 men and 12 sick in hospital.

30th Infantry Div. - 1 man killed and 2 wounded while throwing hand grenades.

1st Bn. Ft. Arty. Rgt. No. 112 - 1 horse killed and 1 wounded through bomb throwing at Goyencourt during the night.

26th Reserve Corps.

(83)

Station of Hdqrs., 26th Res. Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received, 6:20 P.M., May 27, 1918. - by Dienst
transmitted, 6:35 P.M., May 27, 1918. - Mte. Hof at Villers.
Telephone Message No. 66 from the field.
(Second copy)

Evening Report. May 27, 1918.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army (transmitted by Capt. Demuth).
3d Army Corps.
9th Army Corps.

Moderate harassing, partly through bursts of fire, against combat positions and rear areas.

Our own artillery harassed against enemy's trenches, approach roads, traffic points and towns and covered Sains-Morainvillers and Herelle with long-distance fire.

Sight: Dim. Moderate wind.

26th Reserve Corps.

Returned to Deputy Chief of Staff.

(84)

Station, 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received, 7:20 A.M., May 28, 1918. - through ?
taken up, 7:30 A.M., May 28, 1918. - " Lokz at V. St. Ch.
Telephone Message No. 100 from the field.

Morning Report of May 28.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted.
3d Army Corps,
9th Army Corps.

Moderate and partly increasing harass against combat positions and rear areas.

Our artillery covered the battery nests at Rocquencourt which were gassed yesterday and harassed against towns and roads as far in depth as inside the rear areas, and against the railway line at Bacouel and Gannes.

Sight: Good. North wind.

26th Reserve Corps.

Returned to Deputy Chief of Staff.

(85)

Station, 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received, May 28, 1918 - 7:10 p.m. through Wespenborn.
transmitted, May 28, 1918 - 7:33 p.m. " Kn A at Villers.
Message No. 148 from the field.

Evening Report of May 28.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - (transmitted by Capt. Demuth).
3d Army Corps,
9th Army Corps.

The Dom-stream valley was gassed very thickly during the morning hours. The activity of the Artillery kept up until 10 a.m. when it decreased its fire to a medium harass. Heavy gas attacks against the Dom-stream valley have been going on again since 4 p.m.

After heavy artillery preparation, the French, at 8:20 a.m., attacked our positions north, west and south of Cantigny. The attack was supported by a number of infantry aeroplanes and 6 tanks. The American enemy was repulsed with heavy losses in front of the right flank of the 25th Res. Div. Cantigny was taken by the enemy. The foe entrenched about 200 m. east of Cantigny. The front line is the same as previously indicated. The right flank covers the old line in map quadrangle 7910/20 c, thence to the southeast turning back to map quadrangle 8111/5d to the old line. () The counter attack to regain our former position is to take place at 6.45 p.m.

Our own artillery discharged annihilation fire repeatedly on the enemy's assembly points and harassed effectively against the enemy's batteries and traffic. Assemblies of the enemy in the Fontaine forest were placed under annihilating fire at 12 noon and 1.15 p.m. Lively aviation activity. Two flyers were shot down with machine-gun fire.

26th Reserve Corps.

(Sgd.) v. K.

(The following observations were made about 1 p.m. Tanks moving from Coullemelle to Rocquencourt, motor trucks from Serevillers to Villers. Reinforcements out of Broyes and out of the forest north of Broyes in a northeast direction, north of the Belle Assise Fe in map quadrangle 8210 and 8310. Riflemen advancing in direction toward the east and in the Zungenwald. (Reinforcements, a continuation of the enemy's attack not improbable.)

Returned to Deputy Chief of Staff.

Morning Report of May 29, 1918

(No. 86).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d Army Corps - 9th Army Corps.

Moderate harassing against Infantry and Battery positions and rear areas. The harass increases from time to time.

Under orders issued by the 82d Reserve Division, our artillery fired barrage and destructive fire against Cantigny and harassed lively against the enemy's infantry emplacements, and supports.

The counter-attack of the 82d Division which took place last evening at 6:45, brought about the gain of the old former positions up to 200 m. north of and 500 m. southeast of Cantigny. The losses were considerable. Raiding parties sent against strongly occupied town had no success. The foremost line in the north runs 200 m. north of Cantigny and in the east through the east edge of the manor-park.

A new counter-attack is being prepared.

26th Reserve Corps

(87)

Station, Hdqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received 6:45 p.m., May 29, 1918. - through ?
transmitted 7:17 p.m., May 29, 1918. - " LoKz at V. St. Ch.

Telephone message No. 205 from the Field.

Evening Report of May 29, 1918.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d Army Corps - 9th Army Corps.

Inferior artillery harassing against Infantry terrain, Downstream and batteries. Bursts of fire on our new lines east of Cantigny.

Our artillery harassed against enemy assembly points, Cantigny and enemy's lines east and west of the town. The active motor truck traffic on the road from Serevillers to Broys and Villers was taken under fire. The sight is good from the ground only. Light north wind. There is an enemy's balloon in each of the map quadrangles 8303/5c, 8605/18c and 8906/20b. There is but little aviation activity.

Headquarters, 26th Res. Corps.

Returned to Deputy C. of S.

Morning Report of May 30, 1918.

(No. 88).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d Army Corps - 9th Army Corps.

After a preceding heavy fire against infantry and battery positions, Airt woods and Fasanerie, reaching as far as the center of the 25th Res. Div., the enemy at about 5:30 p.m. formed for the attack. A well directed annihilation fire against the enemy stopped the development of the attack.

A heavy fire of the enemy against the trenches east of Cantigny, Framicourt and hollow south thereof and Fontaine was kept up until about 6:40 p.m. when it died down, only to increase again at about 8 p.m. to a heavy annihilation fire.

Assemblies in the enemy's trenches, reported by a flyer about 7 p.m., were broken up through our annihilation fire. The enemy attacked at about 8.50 p.m. in the direction of Height No. 104, but was repulsed, while his densely occupied trenches as well as Cantigny were kept under a heavy annihilation fire. The artillery activity on both sides was lively until about 11 p.m., at which time the enemy's fire slackened.

Our own artillery kept Cantigny and the enemy's trenches under a continuous fire.

Further attacks were not attempted.

Lively aviation activity on both sides. Bombardment flights during the night.

26th Reserve Corps.

(Sgd.) v. Kahlden.

Question: Was the gassing not carried out or will a later report be submitted regarding this? v. K.

Noon Report of May 30, 1918.

(No. 89).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Lieut. Glahn -
3d Army Corps - 9th Army Corps.

The enemy's fire started toward morning and from time to time covered, as a heavy annihilation fire, the sector of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 272. This fire also reached partly the right wing of the 25th Reserve Div. The fire slackened gradually. Since 9 a.m. there is only slight harassing against combat positions and rear areas.

Our artillery harassed against approach roads, supports and enemy's trenches, it gassed the east portion of Villers with mustard gas and at daybreak fired annihilation waves, against enemy's trenches north and east of Cantigny. Very little aviation activity. Sight fair. During the counter-attack against Cantigny on May 28, three Americans were made prisoners.

Losses - 82d Reserve Division, being a supplementary report to the Noon Report of May 28 -

Infantry - dead - officers 1, men 13; Wounded - officers 13; men 20;
Artillery - " - " 0 " 1; " - " 1; " 11.

The Infantry losses which were not mentioned in yesterday's and today's noon reports are as follows:-

25th Reserve Division - without those of the 83d Regiment and 3d Battalion, 168th Regiment:-

men - dead 2; wounded 22; sick 8. 6 horses wounded.

Losses in Reserve Infantry Regt. No. 83 and 3d Battalion, Res. Regt. 168, on May 28 and 29, reported up to now:-

Officers - wounded 4. Men, dead and wounded 208; sick 3 (reduced in report of June 2d).

30th Infantry Division - 1 man dead and 1 wounded, the latter having been wounded during hand grenade practice.

26th Reserve Corps.

v. K.

(90)

Evening Report of May 30

- received 5:45 p.m.
transm. 6:07 p.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Lt. Broesicke -
3d Army Corps, 9th Army Corps.

Moderate harassing against combat positions and rear areas. Our own artillery harassed against Cantigny, infantry emplacements, supports and approach roads and delivered destructive fire against enemy's trenches east and north of Cantigny and laid down two annihilation waves of fire in front of the right sector of the 25th Reserve Division.

Sight moderate. North wind.

26th Reserve Corps.

v. K.

Morning Report of May 31, 1918.

(No. 91).

To: Comdg. Gen. 18th Army - transmitted at 6 a.m. - 3d and 9th
Army Corps.

Moderate enemy's harassing against combat positions and rear areas. A feint bombardment started by us at 7:30 p.m. was answered by the enemy with a heavy fire against our trenches and height No. 104. The enemy also placed barrage several times.

Our own artillery kept up destructive firing on the new trenches of the enemy at Cantigny and on the approach trenches leading thereto, and harassed against supports and traffic and swept the rear areas with shrapnel. 30 shots were fired on the railway station at Gannes. Sight good. Weather clear.

Assignment of the forces of the 82d Reserve Division:-

In the front line: 1st Bn. Rgt. 270, 2d Bn., Rgt. 270,
3rd Bn. Rgt. 271, 1st Bn., Rgt. 118.
In support: 3d Bn., Rgt. 270, 2d Bn. Rgt. 271.
In reserve: 3d Bn., Rgt. 99, 2d Bn. Rgt. 143.

Withdrawn for rest: 1st, 2d and 3d Bns. of Rgt. 272 (less Rgtl. Hdqrs).

1st Bn., Rgt. 271, 2d Bn., Rgt. 83.

The 3d Bn., Rgt. 271, will also be withdrawn during the night of May 31st and June 1st.

26th Reserve Corps.

New Report of Senior Adjutant with reference to remarks of Comdg. General.

Noon Report of May 31, 1918.

(No. 92).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army, transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

During the remainder of the night moderate harassing. Commencing with 7 a.m. heavy artillery firing against the sector of the 25th Res. Div. and south thereof and partly reaching as far as the 82d Res. Div. One of our flyers observed from a great height, sharply outlined firing against Mesnil, hollow south of Mesnil, Grenade forest and Fontaine and at first requested annihilation and then barrage fire. No attack has been reported by the infantry up to this time. The fire in the sector of the 25th Res. Div. slackened about 7:30 a.m. but increased against the right flank of the 9th Army Corps. The fire against the 82d Res. Div. slackened shortly after 8 a.m., but increased once more and with vehemence at 8:20 a.m. against a portion of the front of the division and rear area.

Weak fire against the 25th Res. Div. since 8:30 and against the 82d Res. Div. since 9:15 a.m.

Our artillery harassed against forests, hollows, batteries, roads and towns, discharged barrage and annihilation fire and swept the enemy's trenches at Cantigny and Cantigny itself, with destructive fire.

Sight misty. Northwest wind.

The surroundings of Curchy were bombed during the night. No damage. xLieut. Berkemeyer of Res. Rgt. No. 118 returning from a raid, brought back two severely wounded men of Res. Inf. Rgt. No. 83, pertaining to the "Tannenberg" enterprise, which were found lying close in front of the enemy's obstruction.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. - dead 6, wounded 15 men.

25th Res. Div. - (less 83d Res. Inf. Rgt.) wounded
1 officer, 13 men - sick in hospital 3.

30 Inf. Div. - none.

26th Reserve Corps.

x The names of this officer and his men submitted with recommendation for awards.

Evening Report of May 31, 1918.

(No. 93).

received at 6 p.m.

transmitted at 6:15 p.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Moderate harassing against combat position and rear areas. The south slope of Height No. 104 and the forest of Fontaine, were at times under individual fire, of medium and, according to statements made, also of heavy calibre. The firing at 2.15 p.m. revived suddenly against the right sector and especially against Mesnil. Down-stream valley and batteries of the division also were under a heavy fire.

Normal harassing again since 3.15 p.m.

Our artillery harassed against enemy's trenches, hollows, supports and approach roads and discharged two annihilating fire waves in front of the 25th Reserve Division and covered the enemy's trenches at Cantigny with destructive fire. It also supported with its fire the 1st Reserve Div.

Approximate losses of the 82d Reserve Division on May 28th and 29th.

Officers - 14 dead, 17 wounded. 1,280 noncommissioned officers and privates dead, wounded and missing.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Morning Report of June 1, 1918.

(No. 94).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Capt. Demuth
3d and 9th Army Corps.

From time to time rapid firing against our combat position and rear area. The enemy answered the feint operation of the 25th Res. Div. which took place at 6 p.m., with a rapid fire against our trenches and towns.

Our artillery harassed against Cantigny and trenches at Cantigny and conducted concentrated bursts of fire against enemy's trenches and batteries and placed the railway depot and railway building, etc., of Bacouel under fire.

Sight good. Weather clear.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Morning Report of June 1, 1918.

(No. 95)

received 10:55 a.m.

trans. 11:20 a.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Comparatively slight artillery activity of the enemy during the night. At daybreak our own harass covered the right and middle sector of the 25th Res. Div. Inferior artillery firing only since 5 a.m.. Our own artillery harassed against Cantigny and trenches around Cantigny, also against approach roads leading thereto and covered the railway station north of Bacouel with 17 shots.

A German captive balloon drifted over our lines at 5:30 a.m. in the direction of Ayencourt. Our artillery fired on it without success. The inmate (observer) landed by parachute at Etelfay.

Guerbigny and surroundings were strewn with 12 air bombs during the night.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. - men - 6 dead, 23 wounded.

25th Res. Div. - officers 1 dead; men 16 dead; 55 wounded, 9 hospital sick. 1 horse killed, 1 wounded.

30th Inf. Div. - May 28 - wounded 1 man.

May 29 - None.

May 30 - dead 2, wounded 23 men.

May 31 - dead 4, wounded 4 men.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Evening Report of June 1, 1918.

(No. 96).

Received 5:20 p.m.
trans. 5:30 p.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army -- transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Slight harassing against infantry and artillery positions. From time to time a more rapid harass against rear areas. Our artillery harassed against approach roads and supports and assisted by aeroplane observation covered the railway station at Gannes with 30 shots, several hits being noticed. With the aid of balloon observation and the flash ranging section, it obtained the range of four enemy's batteries and carried out destructive firing against the trenches at Cantigny.

Sight good. Northeast wind.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Morning Report of June 2, 1918.

(No. 97).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army -- 3d and 9th Army Corps.

With exception of a more rapid harass from time to time in the left sector of the division, the night passed without special events.

The bombardment of the Bacouel railway station was continued.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Noon Report of June 2, 1918

(No. 98)

Received 10.45 a.m.
Trans. 10.55 a.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army -- transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Slight harassing against combat positions and rear areas. Our artillery harassed against Cantigny, trenches at Cantigny, and enemy's batteries, supports, approach roads, rear areas and railway plants at Bacouel. Together with the flash range section, it secured the range against batteries 8308 g.u. and 8408 g-. Against the latter it continued with an effective bombardment. Lively aviation activity.

During the night bombs were cast on Villers - les Roye.

Sight, misty. Northeast wind.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. - 1 man wounded.

25th Res.Div. - 7 men killed, 31 men wounded - 7 men sick in hospital. 15 gassed by carbon monoxide, through a direct hit in a field dressing station. 1 horse killed, 1 wounded.

30th Inf.Div. - No losses.

26th Reserve Corps.

(99)

Station 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
Received 6:45 p.m., June 2, 1918. - through ?
Transmit. 6:52 p.m., June 2, 1918. - " Mte. at Villers.

Telephone Message No. 486 from the Field.
Evening Report of June 2, 1918.

To Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Inferior firing against combat positions and rear areas. The 7th Battery 72d Regt. was fired upon by two heavy guns from the direction of Rocquencourt.

Our artillery harassed against enemy's supports and Cantigny, accomplished destructive firing against trenches at Cantigny and through the assistance of aeroplane observation engaged two enemy's batteries.

Sight, misty. Northeast wind.

Returned to Deputy C. of S. 26th Reserve Corps.

Morning Report of June 3, 1918. (No. 100)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

On both sides inferior harassing. The 4th Battery Res. Rgt. No. 25 was engaged with 300 shots of medium and heavy caliber. Our artillery harassed against Cantigny and Zungenwald and fired on railway station Bacouel.

Lively aviation activity on both sides. The enemy's flyers, at 6:30 and at 11:30 p.m., attacked the front line of the 82d Res. Div. with machine guns from low elevations.

Machine gun defence? v.K. 26th Reserve Corps.

Noon Report of June 3, 1918. (No. 101)

Received 10:50 a.m.
Trans. 11:10 a.m.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted by Capt. Demuth.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Inferior harassing, partly in the form of bursts of fire against infantry and battery positions and rear areas.

Our artillery harassed against supports, forests and Cantigny. The railway plants north of Bacouel were placed under fire during the night at irregular periods.

Two destructive fires against enemy's batteries. One destructive fire against trenches at Cantigny. One destructive fire against emplacements in the Zungenwald.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. wounded 3 men and 2 horses.

25th Res. Div. wounded 11 men. Also six gassed by carbon monoxide through hits in an artillery dug-out.

30th Infantry Division - 1 noncommissioned officer dead. Killed himself by shooting through carelessness. Detailed report follows.

26th Reserve Corps.
v. K.

(102)

Station - Hdqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received 7 p.m., June 3. by Zimmermann.
transmitted 7:30 p.m. June 3. Kn Gmt at Villers.

Telephone Message No. 544 from the Field.

Evening Report of June 3

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Very little firing by the enemy. Our artillery harassed against Cantigny and trenches east thereof, fired on the railway station of Bacouel and tested barrages. A patrol of the enemy of from 12 to 15 men, which advanced during the night against a picket on the right flank of the 25th Res. Div. was driven away. Sight dim. Northeast wind.

Returned to Deputy C.S.

26th Reserve Corps.

(103)

Station - Hdqrs. 26th Reserve Corps. Telephone Section No. 726.
received 6:55 a.m. June 4. through Wespenborn.
trans. 7 a.m. June 4. " Mte at Villers.

Telephone Message No. 583 from the Field.

Morning Report of June 4.

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted.
3d and 9th Army Corps.

Inferior enemy's fire against combat position and rear areas. Saulchoy received between 7:30 and 8 p.m. seven shots of heavy calibre (apparently 24 cm.). No losses or damage. 7th Bty. Res. Rgt. No. 15 and 1st Bty. Rgt. No. 98 were engaged in a systematic manner.

Our artillery harassed against the usual objectives. It obtained the range against recognized batteries and placed Ferrieres under fire.

Sight fair. Light wind.

Returned to Deputy C.S.

26th Reserve Corps.

has been seen by Comdg. General. Noon Report of June 4 (No. 104) has been seen by C. of S.

To Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d Army Corps and 9th Army Corps - trans. by Capt. Demuth at 11 a.m.

Inferior enemy's harassing. As the advancing of small detachments from Rocquencourt and Serevillers to Cantigny seemed to point to the relief of troops, the hollows between Cantigny - Villers - Tournelle and Cantigny - le Plessier were gassed, while the terrain near Cantigny was covered with bursts of fire. Railway plants at Bacouel were placed under fire. Two destructive firing against enemy's batteries and two against infantry emplacements were accomplished.

Sight misty. Northwest wind.

Losses: 82d Res. Div. - men - 1 dead, 9 wounded.
25th Res. Div. - men - 3 dead, 9 wounded.
30th Inf. Div. - men - 1 wounded.

26th Reserve Corps.

Evening Report of June 4.

(No. 105)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d and 9th Army Corps.

Slight enemy's harassing, partly in the form of bursts of fire against our positions and rear areas.

Our own artillery harassed against infantry emplacements and Cantigny and covered the railway depot north of Bacouel with fire. With the assistance of the flash range section, our artillery obtained the range against battery 8307/19c/24 bf. It was noticed at 11:45 a.m. that a company was marching, in two sections, from Coullemelle to Quiry le Sec.

Minor aviation activities. Sight misty. Light northeast winds.

26th Reserve Corps.

Morning Report of June 5.

(No. 106).

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - 3d and 9th Army Corps.

Toward evening and during the night a more lively harass against our positions and rear areas than on preceding days. The fire slackened at about 3.45 p.m. and has been moderate ever since.

Our artillery harassed against enemy's infantry emplacements and towns and conducted concentrated bursts of fire against hollows, assembly points and batteries. Railway depot Bacouel was again taken under fire. Lively aviation activity. Sight good. Northeast wind.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Noon Report of June 5

(No. 107)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army - transmitted. 3d and 9th Army Corps.

During the late evening hours the enemy aimed destructive fire against the supports on the slope between Framicourt and Courtemanche. During the remainder of the night lively harassing against combat positions and rear areas. The west edge of the manor park and hollow east of Fontaine were gassed.

Since 7:30 a.m. the enemy's fire is only slight. Our artillery harassed against enemy's infantry emplacements, communicating trenches, supports and approach roads. The railway depot at Bacouel as well as the railway plants at Tartigny were fired upon.

One destructive firing against Battery 8307/19c/24b.

One destructive firing against trenches at Cantigny. Sight dim. Light northeast wind.

Losses: 25th Res. Div. 7 men dead, 27 wounded, 6 sick in hospital. 2 horses killed.

82d Reserve Div. 3 men dead, 6 wounded.

30th Infantry Div. - none.

26th Reserve Corps,
v. K.

Evening Report of June 5

(No. 108)

To: Comdg. General, 18th Army -- 3d and 9th Army Corps.

Inferior harassing by the enemy against combat positions and detached bursts of fire against rear areas.

Our artillery harassed against enemy's supports and with assistance of aeroplane observation obtained the range against enemy's batteries. It accomplished a destructive fire against infantry emplacements in the Machine Gun Woods and tested barrage and annihilation firing.

Sight good. Northwest wind.

26th Reserve Corps.

v. K.

GERMAN LOSSES
FOR THE
OPERATIONS OF
May 27, 28 and 31, 1918.

Note: The two reports differ. The greater losses reported by the division are apparently correct as it covers the losses of troops not under the Brigade (Group) command.

Translator.

Report of Commander of Infantry Brigade
at noon of June 1 - 1918, to the
Commanding General 82d Reserve Division.

x x x x x

Losses on May 28 to include the morning of May 30 - 1918.

		Killed	Wounded	Missing
270 Res. Infy. Rgt. - officers		1	0	0
	- men	27	72	1
271 Res. Infy. Rgt. - officers		7	11	6
	- men	52	219	325
272 Res. Infy. Rgt. - officers		5	11	2
	- men	79	303	154

Losses during the morning of May 31, 1918.

270 Res. Infy. Rgt. - officers		0	0	0
	- men	1	13	0
271 Res. Infy. Rgt. - officers		0	0	0
	- men	3	7	0
272 Res. Infy. Rgt. -		0	0	0
Total		175	636	488

Total all losses - 1299

Extracts from appendix of the War Diary of the
82d German Reserve Division
for the period June 1st to 5th - 1918 -

CANTIGNY AFFAIR.

Report of Commanding General 82d Reserve Division to Com-
manding General, 26th Reserve Corps, dated June 1, 1918.

x x x x x x

Losses		Killed	Wounded	Missing.
May 27, 1918	- officers -	1	0	0
	- men -	3	51	17
May 28-30, 1918	- officers -	15	23	8
	- men -	177	633	480
May 31, 1918	- officers -	0	0	0
	- men -	6	23	0
May 27 to 31	- Total	202	730	505
Total all losses			1437	

CANTIGNY ATTACK OF MAY 28, 1918.

Extracts from
War Diary of the 272d Reserve
Infantry Regiment.

From May 27 to June 6, 1918.

Translation from the original on
file in the German Reichsarchiv.

(Translation by Major Harm.)

May 27, 1918. - At 7 A.M. the assault of the front line units took place. Two squads advanced against the southwest and two against the northwest corners of the orchard and one squad against the northern drainage ditch of the trench square. Despite our strong artillery and Minenwerfer preparation, the assaulting units encountered strong enemy resistance, especially machine gun fire from the orchard, so that the southern detachment could not penetrate the enemy trenches. The other two detachments entered the enemy trenches, captured one light machine gun and made two prisoners who were killed by enemy fire while being transported to the rear.

28-5-18. - During the night relief took place - the III Battalion became combat battalion, the II support Battalion and the I rest battalion. After exceedingly powerful artillery preparation the Americans, assisted by tanks and attack planes, attacked the regimental sector at 7:45 A.M.(x) Report of the progress of the combat will be found in the appendix. The enemy succeeded in forcing back our lines, capturing Cantigny and establishing himself about 200 meters east of Cantigny. For location of his lines see sketches in appendix.

29-5-18. - At 3:30 A.M. the (our) battalions again counter attacked, without artillery preparation. The attack was well executed on the right flank - 2 prisoners were brought in. The left flank (battalion von Lingenthal) can not progress beyond hill 104 as powerful fire opposition from Cantigny and the Park of Cantigny made it impossible. At 9:30 A.M. the attack was stopped. The battalions were ordered to reorganize; the positions attained were to be held; companies were to entrench. At 8:30 P.M. very heavy enemy fire of destruction was delivered on our new front line. At 8:45 the Americans attacked along their entire front in dense waves. Our protective barrage promptly descended, brought this attack to a halt and inflicted on him heavy losses. During the night the enemy delivered repeated heavy fire concentrations some on our front line, some on our back areas.

30-5-18. - At 6:30 A.M. battalion Bohnstedt (270 Regt.) returned and became support battalion. During the day the enemy was quiet. At 7:20 P.M. our own artillery made a feint attack (fire) on Cantigny. At 8:30 P.M. the relief order was received. The three battalions were relieved during the night of the 30-31st. Regimental staff remained in the position. The II/270 and $\frac{1}{2}$ III/99 were placed under the orders of the regiment.

31-5-18. - At 3:30 A.M. the III/99 has taken over and become support battalion. Between 3:50 and 4 A.M. the relief of our three battalions is completed. The II/270 as combat battalion occupies the front line of the sector, holding subsector a with the 7th Co., subsector b with the 8th Co., subsector c with the 6th Co. and has the 5th Co. 270 Regiment as reserve company. By direction of the battalion commander the P.C. is transferred to strong point Essen. During the progress of the day the enemy infantry was quiet. Enemy artillery placed heavy fire concentrations upon our front lines and rear areas, especially in the afternoon. Our artillery retaliated by strong fire on Cantigny. At 4:00 P.M. the regimental staff 272 regiment was relieved by the staff of the 270 regiment so that now the entire regiment (272) is in rest as division reserve.

1-6-18. - During the night the enemy was quiet. Moderate searching fire was delivered on the whole sector. In the early morning hours the artillery of both components became more active only to die down again during the day. At noon the commander goes to his P.C.

(x) In May and June, 1918, German time was one hour earlier than Allied time. (Translators Note).

2-6-18.- (Camp in woods S. of Arvillers)

Day of rest for the regiment. The 3 Minenwerfer detachments were consolidated into a company under the command of the Minenwerfer officer at Regt. Hdqrs.

3-6-18. - 8:30 A.M. regimental assembly for his Excellency von Watter (Note: Corps Commander) who distributed 1 Iron Cross, 1st Cl. and about 15 Iron Crosses 2d Cl. to NCO's and privates.

At noon regimental staff of the 272 regiment relieved the regimental staff 270 regiment and took over their sector headquarters. During the night the III and the I/99 were relieved by the III and the I/272 in such a manner that the III/272, without machine gun company, was located in the "cow ravine" and the northern edge of the "Deutz" woods and the I/272 in Framicourt and the eastern edge of the "Deutz" woods. The relief was accomplished without losses. During the day as well as the night the enemy was noticeably quiet.

4-6-18. - In the early morning hours the enemy, for the first time, employed rifle grenades in subsectors of a and c companies. During the day the artillery of both opponents delivered moderate fire on batteries and rear areas with guns of light and medium calibre. Hostile artillery more active late in the afternoon and during the night. The left flank company was heavily bombarded with hostile light field guns. The artillery fire delivered gave the impression of a veiled registration fire which might precede an enemy attack. During the night the II/272 relieved the II/270 as combat battalion and the II/270 passed to support, relieving the III/272 which went to rest camp in the woods south of Arvillers. The combat train of the regiment was changed during the forenoon from its former billet at Erches to the camp in the woods south of Arvillers. The reconstruction of trenches was continued with all means at our disposal. With the much depleted personnel there are however, great difficulties to progress. It is contemplated to gradually establish a continuous trench by joining up shell craters by connecting trenches. In addition to galleries and dugouts, obstacles must be constructed and outpost positions must be wired. Great difficulties are encountered in bringing material forward. However, by utilizing the mining platoon of the engineer train and the scout detachment enough material is brought forward.

5-6-18. - The heavy artillery fire continued to sunrise. The enemy employed some gas. During the day there was little artillery fire on rear areas and the "Deutz" woods but toward evening it became more intense. The "Deutz" woods were strongly gassed between 11 and 12 at night. The enemy is busily engaged in establishing his trench positions; his trench system is being extended in depth. In the early morning hours the regimental commander proceeded to the front lines to arrange for the relief of the last company II/270 by the II/272. The relief is accomplished in the night. At 8 A.M. G-3 arrives and accompanies the commander to the front lines.

CANTIGNY ATTACK OF MAY 28, 1918.


Appendix to War Diary of the
272d Reserve Infantry Regiment.

Extracts for the period May 27 to June 6, 1918,
both dates inclusive.

Translated from the original on
file in the German Reichsarchive.

(Translation by Major Harm).

DISPOSITION OF FORCES OF SECTOR "B."
 FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE 12TH TO
 THE 28TH MAY, 1918.



272 Res. Inf. Regt.

7718

Holtzmann

582 Res. Inf. Brig.
Figneres

6

8118


Scale = 1:25000

R.Y.R 272

Situation of Companies

28 May '18. A.M.

16




A.
270

B.
272

C.
271

Withdrawn:
2/-, 3/-, 4/-
Not yet put in
6/- and 3 M.G.K.



Bygrothe

1:25000

Lessons deduced from the attack on Cantigny.

Of the lessons which each man gained on May 28, 1918, for future application, I desire to emphasize the following:-

1. Endurance under enemy artillery fire, even when it assumes the proportions of drum fire, must be demanded without question of every unit which is well in hand and lays a claim to good discipline. The men in the forward trenches must be made to understand that they jeopardize not only their own lives but the lives of their comrades in rear, whenever, due to the intensity of the enemy fire, they interrupt, even for a very short period of time, their indispensable observation. This duty of honor to safeguard the detachments in rear, to allow them time to prepare for a counter-attack, must be deeply impressed upon the mind and heart of even the least qualified soldier. Every man in the forward line, who, even for a moment, fails in his duty of constant observation of the enemy, sins not only against himself and those dear to him but against his comrades and his regiment. On his conscience rests the blood of his comrades. Through his carelessness and his mistakes the honor and reputation of his regiment suffers heavily.

2. B.C. telescopes, periscopes and similar instruments for observation must be considered by persons to whom they are entrusted as things sacred, never to be permitted to fall into enemy hands. Every observer, even though under the most intense fire, must retain enough judgment, resolution and strength to give the barrage signal with his Very pistol; for this there will always be sufficient time, if the observer keeps his head and with clear eye and steady glance notes the movement of the enemy. He can not then fail to observe the movements of the enemy, when he assembles in his forward trenches and when he starts to advance from them.

3. Machine Guns. The value of light and heavy machine guns is not yet thoroughly appreciated. In the position occupied the machine-gun company has machine-gun nests which, acting from localities in rear of the front lines, have the mission of holding up the enemy's penetration until an effective counter-attack can be launched. This mission of the machine guns must be known and understood by the infantry in the forward trenches as well as by the troops held in readiness for the counter-attack and must be observed and lived up to by every machine gunner. If this is done it will be an unheard-of act for a machine gunner to leave his position on the approach of the enemy or to attempt to render his gun unserviceable by removing the bolt. Not even tanks should so terrorize him as to make him resort to such wrong and desperate measures. Rather, conscious of his high mission, he will stay with his machine gun and fire coolly and calmly upon all enemies that approach him. Only then can he aid the counter-attack so effectively that it will succeed.

4. The assistance rendered by the fire of the heavy machine guns must be made much more notable and noticeable. It is their mission when our infantry attacks to hold down the enemy. To accomplish their purpose they must be rapidly installed in new positions by keen, resolute commanders, shoot and hit.

5. The light machine guns appear in many cases to have been employed improperly and in many others not employed at all. The fact that by means of the light machine guns a tremendous fire power has been given to the company, does not yet appear to be appreciated by the men; if it were we should not witness the spectacle of large numbers of serviceable machine guns abandoned on the field.

In a short time I shall expect to note a better understanding and an increased knowledge of the employment of light machine guns on part of officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

Abandoning or throwing away light machine guns is a crime. Every man whose heart is in the right place will admit this. In one battalion out of 24 light machine guns only 7 were brought back. This is serious.

6. It has been demonstrated that the preparations for ammunition supply did not receive adequate consideration. In order to insure the functioning of this supply in combat, it is the duty of every individual who goes from the front to the rear, to bring with him to the combat battalion (hdqrs.) or regiment, empty ammunition belts or boxes that these may be refilled and returned to the front. In addition it is essential that belt-filling machines be provided at the most important machine-gun nests and at the combat battalion (hdqrs.) and regiments so that loose ammunition may at all times be placed in belts.

Every man in the company must be convinced of the necessity and the importance of bringing to the rear all ammunition belts and boxes. This is a matter of discipline and training as well as sound common sense. The demand for ammunition in belts in battle is always greater than can be met unless every man does his part by bringing to the rear ammunition belts and boxes which he has emptied.

7. Light minenwerfer. I shall expect better results in the unified employment and utilization of this new weapon in the future. Their value constantly increases.

8. Means of communication stand in need of constant consideration and improvement in order that they may not fail at the critical moment. I shall cover this more in detail at a later time.

9. Mistakes were made at many places in the regiment and elsewhere. We will not repeat these mistakes and thereby insure success in future.

And therefore I will again emphasize that the high opinion extended the troops by higher authority and by myself remains unchanged - that thanks and appreciation for the gallant behavior of our brave troops - living and dead - continue undiminished.

Distribution:

Each Bn.	2	M.G.O.	1		von Grothe.
Regt.	1	M.W.O.	1	Total 10.	

Relief Order

30-5-18 10 P.M.

1. The infantry companies of the 272d Regiment without staff will be relieved on the night of the 30-31 May, the Minenwerfer and machine gun companies on the night of 31 May - 1 June. Distribution after relief as follows:-

Regt. Sector B - Command Regt. 272.

II/270 - Combat battalion.

III/99 - with 2 Cos. in support. (with Bn. Staff).

" 2 Cos. in div. reserve.

M.G. Co. with Cos. in support.

2. Regt. 272 marches to rest-shelter (Woods south of Arvillers). Command of regt. Capt. von Hertzberg with his staff; to his command is added the staff of the 2d Echelon at Erches (remaining there). The Pioneers, the scouts and the engineer train remain at my disposal in their present location.

3. The relief of the Minenwerfer and machine guns 08 (heavy machine guns) will take place as follows:

These positions will be occupied on the night of 31 May - 1 June: M.W. - 2 M.W. of the II/270 the present M.W. position at combat battalion (hdqrs) Hertzberg.

M.G. 08 - Combat Bn. M.G. nest 21; M.G. nest in the middle of the valley in the sector line; M.G. nest 26 (Essen); 7th M.G. in reserve at Combat Bn. Hdqrs.

Support Bn. M.G. nest between Essen and Dusseldorf; nest 48 and 2 machine guns in reserve at Support Bn. Hdqrs.

4. Regt. Sector A - retains Regt. 270.

Regt. Sector C - Command Regt. Staff 271;

Troops Combat Bn. III/271 on the right, I/118 on the left. Support battalion II/271 - Reserve Bn. II/143.

5. $\frac{1}{2}$ III/99, II/143 and I/118 are placed under the orders of 82d Reserve Infantry Brigade.

6. The commander of the combat battalion must have in his hand a compact reserve, to be taken from the combat battalion. The battalions must be strongly echeloned in depth. They will report to the Reg. Staff at 8 AM tomorrow and day after tomorrow, distribution of troops with sketch. (Inf. M.G. M.W.).

7. The two companies of the III/270 (now under the orders of Combat Bn. Bohnstedt) will return to their own battalion, after relief by III/99.

8. Immediately upon receipt of this order, the battalions will dispatch installation detachment X (reconnaissance party) for taking over the position.

9. Signal supplies, Very pistols recently received (not unit supply of the battalion) will be taken over; also subsistence stores and ammunition dumps.

10. The transfer of P.C.'s of Combat Battalions and Support Battalions will include all maps, sketches, memorandums, reconnaissance and observation reports there on hand. I invite attention to the taking over of strong points Essen and Dusseldorf as artillery protective positions. An artillery observer will be at strong point Essen. Connection will be maintained with neighboring sectors.

11. Detachments from Regt. 272 will remain in the positions 24 hours after relief of their battalion for orientation of their successors; in subsectors Ba, Bb, Bc each 2 N.C.O and 6 men, intelligent, reliable, brave men.

12. Completion of relief to be reported in each case, in writing and code telephone message. All uncoded telephone conversation is forbidden. Only messages concerning enemy attacks and calls for barrage may be transmitted uncoded.

13. Intelligence platoon of the regiment and all means of communication will remain in line for the time being. Orders will issue later for their relief.

14. The relief must be concealed from the enemy. The position will be strengthened by adequate trench construction.

(Signed) von Grothé.

F d R d a.


Odenbreit,

Lieut. and orderly officer.


x - This consisted of several staff officers, each representing a department, G-2, G-3, G-4, medical, etc. They thoroughly familiarized themselves with the situation so that when the commander arrived the transfer was effected without loss of time. (Translator's Note).

SITUATION IN B SECTOR
FOR THE PERIOD 28TH MAY TO THE 2ND JULY, 18.

P.Y.R. 272



20











Scale = 1:25000



CANTIGNY OPERATION

Documents pertaining to German Raids (May 27, 1918)
and American Attack and Capture of Cantigny (May 28, 1918).


Selected Documents of:

18th Army.
XXVI Reserve Corps.
82d Reserve Division.
272 Reserve Inf. Regiment.

-  --- ESPECIALLY COVERED WITH ARTY. FIRE
-  --- GASSED AREAS (YELLOW)
-  --- FRIENDLY PATROL OPERATION
-  --- HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE ATTACKS
-  --- TRAIN TRAFFIC
-  --- COLUMN TRAFFIC
-  --- BOMBING FRIENDLY
-  --- BOMBING HOSTILE



-  AREAS OF HOSTILE FIRES (RED)
-  OWN FIRES (BLUE)



A.O.K. 18.
 HQ. 18TH ARMY
 AT FORESTE









EXTRACT OF
 97 SITUATION MAP
 OF THE
 18TH ARMY
 CONDITION: 28 MAY, 18 AT NOON
 NO. 4
 VERY SECRET!
 SCALE: 1:80,000.


EDITORS NOTE: This map is Item No. 29 in Annexes to War Diary 18TH Army for the period 28-31 May, 1918. See pages 2 & 28 to 37 of the Cantigny Documents translated by Major Harm and published in Vol. I. P.L.R.


 --- ESPECIALLY COVERED WITH ARTY. FIRE
 --- GASSED AREAS (YELLOW)

 AREAS OF HOSTILE FIRES (RED)
 OWN FIRES (BLUE)

 --- FRIENDLY PATROL OPERATION
 --- HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE ATTACKS
 --- TRAIN TRAFFIC
 --- COLUMN TRAFFIC
 --- BOMBING FRIENDLY
 --- BOMBING HOSTILE









AVIATORS



 A.O.K. 18
 HQ. 18TH ARMY
 AT FORESTE




EXTRACT OF
 98 SITUATION MAP
 OF THE
 18TH ARMY
 CONDITION: 29 MAY, 18. A.M.
 NO. 11
 VERY SECRET!
 SCALE: 1:80,000.

EDITORS NOTE: This map is Item No. 29 in Annexes to War Diary 18TH Army for the period 28-31 May, 1918. See pages 24 28 to 37 of the Cantigny Documents translated by Major Harm and published in Vol. I. P.L.R.

-  --- ESPECIALLY COVERED WITH ARTY. FIRE
 -  --- GASSED AREAS (YELLOW)
 -  --- FRIENDLY PATROL OPERATION
 -  --- HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE ATTACKS
 -  --- TRAIN TRAFFIC
 -  --- COLUMN TRAFFIC
 -  --- BOMBING FRIENDLY
 -  --- BOMBING HOSTILE
- } AVIATORS


-  AREAS OF HOSTILE FIRES (RED)
-  OWN FIRES (BLUE)


A.O.K. 18
 HQ. 18TH ARMY
 AT FORESTE



EXTRACT OF
 99 SITUATION MAP
 OF THE
 18TH ARMY
 CONDITION: 30 MAY, 18. A.M.
 NO.13
 VERY SECRET!
 SCALE: 1:80,000


EDITORS NOTE: This map is Item No.29 in Annexes to War Diary 18th Army for the period 28-31 May 1918. See pages 2 & 28 to 37 of the Cantigny Documents translated by Major Harm and published in Vol. I.
 P.L.R.








ORDER OF BATTLE. NOON JUNE 1, 1918.
See page 58 of Cantigny Documents translated by Major Harm in Vol. I.
Note: Troop symbols outlined by dotted lines are in pencil on original.
P.L.R.

SITUATION ON 1 JUNE, 18. P.M.
Scale
1:25 000



1 Bn. Froilles 
 2'' Bontoire 

1 13  I.A.K.

MONTDIDIER

150

DETAILED DISPOSITIONS
 SECTOR OF 82^e RES. DIV.
 (See page 122, Translations of
 Cantigny Documents by Major Harm, in Vol. I)

NOTE: Troop symbols indicated by
 dotted lines are in pencil on original.

F.L.R.

Scale 1:25000

