

11 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Commandant, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, TX 79981-8002

SUBJECT: The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge

1. Thesis Statement. The tactics employed at the battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge lacked essential economy of force, objective, and offensive purpose. The battles were politically motivated to force a truce and to this end were successful.

2. Discussion. After the North Korean aggressors came across the 38th parallel, the United Nations began its political battle. The United States supported and controlled all operations for the United Nations. The United Nations, however, commanded the war from this point forward with political motivations. The United Nations Forces pulled back to near the 38th parallel, the original truce line. Here the United Nations decided to pressure the North Koreans to sign a truce by military pressure. The battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge forced the North Koreans to the bargaining table.

3. Conclusion. The forces committed to the battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge did not possess the force necessary to achieve a decisive victory. The United Nations did not want a military victory. It sought a political victory through the use of military pressure to force bargaining at the truce table. Politically the battles proved beneficial and successful. These battles prove the military war machine is often used for political gain and not for essential offensive purpose.

*where is the economy of force, objective and offensive purpose
maybe this should have been in the thesis?*

4. Haines Award. I ~~(do)~~ request that the Haines Award Selection Board consider this paper for the General Haines Award for Excellence in research. Writing Research Papers, Sixth Edition by James D. Lester, is the guide used in the preparation of this research paper.

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SEE LESTER, PG 198

The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge

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11 May 1994

Outline

Thesis: The tactics employed at the battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge lacked essential economy of force, objective, and operational purpose. The battles were politically motivated and to this end were successful.

Not the
same thesis.

I. Background

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- C. United Nations declarations
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C. Politics controlled the direction of combat

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The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge

On July 10, 1951, the first armistice meeting between the North Koreans and the United Nations opened in Kaesong. However, the only proposal was from the United Nations side. The North Koreans did not come to the table with any proposal for peace or desire to end hostilities. This then began the stalemate of forces. One side wanted peace, the other side wanted full and unconditional control of Korea. ^{LS} So to encourage the North Koreans to negotiate, the United Nations decided to use the troops as pawns for political gain. The direction from Washington to Ridgway gave little by way of clear objectives. The message stated, "Fight on, but don't fight too hard. Don't lose; but don't win, either. Hold the line, while the diplomats muddle through" (Fehrenbach 501). In other words, get soldiers killed while we play games at the table. The field commanders disliked these actions but had no choice but to follow through ~~as~~ ordered.

Who is Ridgway?


The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge happened during this very confusing period of stalemate. The battles had only one objective, to get the North Koreans back to the negotiation table. The ridges did not have any apparent military value, only political. In late October General Ridgway issued a new directive stating, "Fight the war, but don't get anyone killed" (528).

The battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge did not conform to the standards of military essential offensive operations. The ridge lines had very little to do with a military end to the war. The battles did, however, provide the necessary pressure on the

North Koreans to resume a negotiated peace. Otherwise, the North Koreans would have continued to receive reinforcements from China and become an overwhelming force. The cost of lives to the United Nations forces was much too high for the political end achieved.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, ~~X~~ justifying the intervention by United States and allied forces. Ancestors of the Korean people lived in what is now Korea, at least 30,000 years ago. Since ancient times other nations have often had strong influence on the peninsula. China controlled part of Korea from 108 B.C. until the early 300s A.D. (World Book Encyclopedia Vol. 11, 367).

The Japanese gained control of Korea in 1895 and made it part of Japan in 1910. The allies defeated Japan in World War II, 1939 through 1945. The United States and Soviet Forces moved into Korea after the war. Soviet troops occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel of north latitude, an imaginary line that cuts the country about in half. American troops occupied Korea south of the 38th



parallel. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly supported general elections throughout Korea to choose one government for the entire country. The Soviet Union opposed this idea and would not permit elections in North Korea. On May 10, 1948, the people of South Korea elected a national assembly. The assembly set up the government of the Republic of Korea. On September 9, 1948, North Korean communists established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both North and South Korea claimed the entire country, and their troops clashed near the border several times from 1948 to 1950.

The United States removed its last troops from Korea in 1949. Early in 1950 the United States indicated that Korea lay outside its main defense line in Asia (379).

The Korean War, 1950 to 1953, was a conflict between forces of the United Nations and forces of North Korea and communist China. The war began after the North Koreans attempted to topple the government of the south by indirect means. North Korea launched a surprise invasion of South Korea to gain control of the whole peninsula. General Douglas MacArthur commanded the United Nations forces sent to assist South Korea (The National Encyclopedia Vol. 9, 3118) ()

The Communists believed the time was right for military action. When North Korea invaded South Korea, the North Korean Army had about 135,000 soldiers. Many of the soldiers had fought for China and the Soviet Union during World War II. North Korea had airplanes, artillery, and tanks. The South Korean Army had about 95,000 soldiers, few planes or heavy guns, and no tanks.

The Korean War was the first war in which a world organization, the United Nations, played a military role. The Korean War was a major challenge for the United Nations that had come into existence only five years earlier.

When troops from communist ruled North Korea invaded South Korea, the United Nations called the invasion a violation of international peace. They demanded that the Communists withdraw from South Korea immediately. After the Communists kept fighting, the United Nations asked its member nations to give military aid to South Korea. Sixteen United Nations countries sent troops to help the South Koreans. Forty-one other United Nations countries sent military equipment or food and other supplies. The United States sent more than 90 per cent of the troops, military equipment, and supplies. China and the Soviet Union provided North Korea with personnel and military equipment (World Book Encyclopedia Vol. 11, 379).

At their greatest strength the South Korean and United Nations forces consisted of almost 1,110,000 soldiers. The North Korean Army grew to more than 260,000 troops during the war. China sent another 780,000 soldiers to help the North Koreans. On the day the war began, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution. The resolution demanded that the Communists stop fighting and retreat to the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union, member of the eleven nation council, could have vetoed the resolution. However, the Soviet Union was boycotting council meetings to protest nationalist China's membership on the council.

Therefore, the Soviet delegate did not cast his vote with the rest of the council that unanimously voted to intervene.

North Korea ignored the United Nations' demand. The North Korean troops reached the outskirts of Seoul, the South Korean capital, on June 27, 1950. That same day both President Harry S. Truman and the United Nations took action to halt the Communist advance. Truman ordered United States air and naval forces to South Korea, and the United Nations asked its members to aid South Korea. Truman ordered American ground forces into action on June 30, 1950. Congress supported Truman's actions and the United Nations policy, but did not formally declare war against North Korea (380).

On July 1, 1950, part of the United States Army 24th Infantry Division flew from Japan to Pusan at the southern tip of Korea. The next day, these troops began to move into battle positions near Taejon, about 75 miles south of Seoul. Troops from other nations began arriving in Korea shortly after the Americans. United States troops first fought the North Koreans on July 5, 1950, at Osan, 30 miles south of Seoul.

The Communists had already captured Seoul. On July 8, 1950, with the approval of the United Nations Security Council, Truman named General Douglas MacArthur Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. The command had authority over all the United States troops, South Korean troops, and the troops from other United Nations countries, MacArthur directed allied operations from his headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. On July 13, 1950, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, head of the 8th United States

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Army, became Field Commander of the combined forces in Korea. Units of the United States Army 1st Cavalry Division and 25th Infantry Division landed in Korea to aid the outnumbered soldiers of the 24th Division (381). } US

Several significant events happened in Korea before the Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge. General Walker lost his life in a jeep accident and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway took command on December 27, 1950. The Communists began to attack Seoul on New Year's Eve, 1951, and they occupied the city on January 4, 1951. The allies dug in about twenty-five miles south on January 10, 1951, and their retreat ended. General Ridgway quickly restored the confidence of the allied troops and they soon inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

The allies began to move again on January 16, 1951. In fifteen days they were able to fire on Seoul. General Ridgway ordered slower advances that would wipe out all enemy forces instead of bypassing some. The allies reoccupied Seoul on March 14, 1951, without a fight (382). By order of President Truman, General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of allied forces. General Van Fleet took over as Field Commander of allied forces. They advanced a short distance into North Korea by June 10, 1951, by then the war had changed. The two sides dug in and began fighting along a battle line north of the 38th parallel. Truce talks began on July 10, 1951, but fighting continued for two more years. Neither side made important advances, but they fought many bitter battles for apparently strategic positions. } Rons
During
This

period the United Nations concentrated on battles for hills, including Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge (382).

During the truce talks the United Nations Command didn't seek military victory anymore. They didn't want to spend lives for nothing. They just wanted to come to an agreement about a settlement in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. There wasn't any significant progress at the truce talks, the Communists were stalling. Stalling allowed them to rebuild their force to continue the fighting. As summer ended, the hopes for peace slowly vanished in the green, muddy, and bloody hills of Korea. On August 17, 1951, the war began a new and terrible phase (Fehrenbach 499).


For all practical purposes the Korean War ended June 30, 1951. This is when United Nations Supreme Commander General Ridgway expressed a willingness to discuss truce terms with Communist forces. United Nations Command became convinced that the enemy was stalling. Therefore, applying a little judiciously placed pressure along enemy fronts could have a wholesome effect. These new attacks, although limited in zone and objectives, would erase the few bulges in defense lines (502).

"In no terms was it to open the door to a new major offensive. The war would settle down to a static war, where the troops would fight and die battles where they would create poetic names for their battle fields, Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge..." (Hoyt 441). However, the offensive at Bloody Ridge looked like a full scale attack on the enemy. The attack would serve no other purpose except to pressure the enemy into sincerity at the peace

tables. It would also help to keep the 8th United States Army combat ready. It was not an ambitious program, nor an unreasonable one. As it turned out, the only thing it lacked was the number of casualties the battle would produce.

The ridge had little value to anyone, except as a vantage point for superior observation over the defensive line. The battle of Bloody Ridge provided the Republic of Korea Army an opportunity to show the world its revitalized army. On August 17, 1951, orders arrived at the Republic of Korea's 36th Regiment, 7th Division to take the ridge. Bloody Ridge consisted of three hills, numbers 983, 940, and 773, with connecting ridges in a region known as the Punchbowl (Matray 33).

The 72d Tank Battalion, along with the American Air Force and the 2d Division Artillery, provided fire support. After heavy fighting the 36th Regiment took the ridge on August 25, 1951. However, it had to withdraw due to the North Korean pressure and counter-attacks. This two-mile wide and three-mile deep mountain mass would soon gain the name Bloody Ridge.



The preliminary assault on hill 983 was a day long concentration of artillery fire. The artillery fire gradually eliminated practically every trace of vegetation upon the ridge line. The Republic of Korea soldiers attacked frontally up the fingers leading to the peak (Alexander 440). The heavy artillery bombardments and air strikes eliminated trees and underbrush. They could not destroy the well built Communist bunkers or all the thick mine fields protecting the emplacements. The bunkers, constructed of heavy timbers covered with deep layers of rock and earth, were so massive that only a direct hit from the heaviest caliber of weapon could destroy them (440). As a result, the North Korean~~s~~ struck the Republic of Korea troops with automatic fire and clouds of hand grenades. This style of combat tactics generated a large number of casualties. The Republic of Korea soldiers were brave and tried hard. In ten days the 36th Republic of Korea Regiment reported a thousand killed and wounded.

Massive counter-attacks from the North Korean forces caused the Republic of Korea's 36th Regiment to withdraw. This caused the commitment of the 2d Division, 9th Infantry. The 2d Division went forward with confidence that somehow the Republic of Korea had managed to mess up another battle. On August 27, 1951, going into a maze of trenches and hidden bunkers, they ^{DV} were stopped cold. On August 30, 1951, 1/9 and 2/9 attacked the ridges frontally, determined to overwhelm the resistance quickly (512). They employed four organic battalions of the 2d Division Artillery, supported by three additional battalions, and two mortar companies. A regimental tank company stood in reserve for

support. In all, the artillery support fired 451,979 rounds in a very short period of time (513). However, even the massive bombardment could not eliminate the enemy reinforced bunkers.

North Koreans died by the thousands but conventional weapons would not dislodge the enemy from deliberately prepared positions. The only way to reduce the long ridge was bunker by bunker, at close range with rifle and grenade. Pushing against Bloody Ridge, the men of 1/9 and 2/9 sustained heavy losses and casualties.


Other events before the attack contributed to the high casualty rate. First, the rotation schedule for many seasoned veterans sent the battleline experience home. The replacements did not have any combat experience or extensive combat training. Only in Korea could the soldiers learn the lessons they needed to fight and survive this war. With the rotation, the complexion of the Army changed. The second reason for the dramatic loss of life and the high casualty rate is the lack of essential equipment. The neutralization of bunker emplacements required the use of flamethrowers and hand to hand combat. The 8th United States Army lacked both the flamethrowers and the experience to use them. Training and experience takes time, and with that the casualty and death statistics continued to rise.

On September 5, 1951, having lost an estimated 15,363 men, four thousand of them dead, the North Korean Army voluntarily relinquished Bloody Ridge. The battle cost the Republic of Korea's Army more than one thousand men. The 2d Division lost almost three thousand to secure the insignificant ridge (515).

After a summer of hard fighting, the Second United States

*2d used in
44th 11/2/51*

Division moved to new positions. They saw before them a dark mass of rock and rubble soon to be known as Heartbreak Ridge. The main ridge ran north to south for about seven miles. It included three principal peaks. Hill 894 at the southern terminus commanded the approach from Bloody Ridge, three miles to the south. Thirteen hundred yards to the north of Hill 894 rose the highest peak of the three, Hill 931. Twenty-one hundred yards to the north of Hill 931 stood a needle-like projection, Hill 851. These distances were well within the range of infantry weapons. Thus, the North Korean defenders could lay down supporting fires from one hill to the other. Extending from Hills 894, 931, and 851 were many spurs that ran down into the Sataeri and Mundungni valleys (Hinshaw 7-10).



Map 6
The bastions (hills) surrounding Heartbreak Ridge

The enemy had built elaborate fortifications on Heartbreak Ridge. Mostly on the reverse or western slope facing Mundung-ni }
 Valley. They had dug deep bunkers covered over with timber, then }
 hardened on top by dirt and rocks. So strong were they that one }
 of these bunkers could resist a direct hit by a 105mm howitzer }
 shell. Anything less than a direct hit by a 250 pound bomb could }
 not destroy the bunkers. They were also well camouflaged. The }
 North Korean 6th Division, commanded by General Hong Nim, manned }
 the fortifications on Heartbreak and covered the approaches from }
 Sataeri Valley. The 6th was backed up by its sister division the }
 12th Division. The North Korean 12th Division, entrenched on the }
 hills west of Shipchon River, covered the Mundungni Valley. Both }
 6th and 12th Divisions were in the North Korean V Corps, as }
 designated in official United States Army histories. Major Le }
 Mire, Deputy Commander French Battalion, described the enemy's }
 tenacity on the defensive as extra-ordinary. "The North Koreans }
 only give up terrain foot by foot" (10-11).

The order went out on September 8, 1951, from Van Fleet to Major General Clevis E. Byers, the new X Corps commander. Take the high ground north of Bloody Ridge. Indianhead Division was the choice of X Corps to carry out this difficult mission. No one envisioned just how difficult the task would be. Indianhead, the 2d United States Infantry Division, was a typical triangular division having three infantry regiments, the 9th, the 23d and the 38th. The 37th Field Artillery under Colonel Linton S. "Buster" Boatright was in direct support of the 23d. They positioned their


105mm howitzers three miles southeast of the principal ridge. The 38th Field Artillery positioned its 105mm howitzers with the 503d Field Artillery Battalion's 155mm howitzers, southeast of the ridge. Also, in general support was the 96th Field Artillery's 155mm howitzers located about seven miles south of the main ridge. Battery C of the 780th Field Artillery fired its eight-inch howitzers, with 200-pound projectiles, from positions near Yack'on-Ni, about eleven miles to the south. Colonel John M. Lynch's 9th Infantry would give fire support to the 23d.

Afterward they made an attack on Hill 728 lying 2,000 yards to the west and a little south

of Hill 894. The predawn hours of Thursday, September 13, 1951, saw the first attack upon the hill mass that would rightfully earn its name, Heartbreak Ridge. The 23d, 2d, and 3d Battalions shared the dubious honor of this first attack. From Hill 702 the column descended through the gray fog

hanging over Sataeri Valley to a point near Samtaedong. This was their designated line of departure (24-26).

Before crossing the line of departure, Major Craven, 3d



HEARTBREAK RIDGE AND
SURROUNDING HILLS
 → Attack by 9th Inf
 → 23d Inf
 → 38th Inf
 ○ Objectives
 schematic - not to scale

Battalion Commander, called for planned artillery fires to soften up the enemy. Thousands of shells from the artillery's 105mm, 155mm, and eight-inch howitzers rumbled throughout the early morning air. This continued for forty-five minutes for the attacking troops and their commander. When daylight broke on September 14, 1951, heavy enemy mortar and artillery concentrations on the attacking units of 23d Regiment continued throughout the morning. This inflicted heavy casualties on the regiment. In midafternoon, L Company, with I Company following, attacked up the finger leading to the ridge connecting Hills 931 and 851. After two days of fighting, 23d Infantry Regiment with its attached French Battalion sustained seventy-five battle casualties (26-31).

The 23d Regiment made repeated unsuccessful assaults against Hills 931 and 851. Colonel Lynch's 9th Infantry Regiment, positioned southeastward of the main hill mass, 851, 931, and 894, was near Piari. The 9th's mission was to move onto Hill 728, located about 1,800 meters southwest of Hill 894. Brigadier General de Shazo's initial plan was for the 9th to move on Hill 728 after the 23d had secured its assigned objective. This would conclude the 2d Division's hold of the whole rocky range. Colonel Lynch moved his 2d Battalion, less F Company, against Hill 728. They had fire support from the 4.2 inch mortars and the attached tanks from B Company, 72d Tank Battalion. Moving forward under moderate long-range fire from the enemy on Hill 894, the battalion reached the southeast slope of 894 about 1,300 meters southwest of

Samtaedong. Battle casualties that day in the 23d Regiment were as follows: 1st Battalion, 29; 2d Battalion, 13; 3d Battalion, 23; and the French Battalion, 3 (33-43).

On September 19, 1951, the 2d Infantry Division's new Commander, General Robert Young, arrived at the division command post. General Young began making an assessment of the current situation on Heartbreak Ridge. He knew the battle for Heartbreak Ridge had already cost the division too many casualties (Hinshaw 82).

After nearly two weeks of trying to take Heartbreak Ridge, the command decided to try a new plan. The new plan, codenamed Touchdown, would broaden the offensive to include assaults on key adjacent hills. Thereby, forcing North Korea to spread its forces and leave few reserves to reinforce Heartbreak (Matray 135). } FTR

General Young rehearsed his battalion commanders constantly. Every battalion submitted fire plans showing how it intended to employ tanks, automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars in Touchdown. Sand table models of Heartbreak Ridge sector allowed the division to see how the fire plans would look in action. The division could then adjust the plans as necessary (Craven 134).

Target day for Operation Touchdown was October 5, 1951. All three regiments of the 2d Division would launch concentrated and coordinated attacks. Two powerful armored thrusts would supplement the advance of the regiments. One attack up the Sataere Valley. The second armored thrust was a tank and infantry drive up the Mundungni Valley (Aiken 45). The 23d Infantry had the task of securing hill 931. On order, the 23d Infantry would } FTR

attack hill 728 or help the 38th Infantry capture it. The 23d Infantry also would take hill 520, west of Heartbreak Ridge (92).

The 9th Infantry would advance on the western side of Mundungni Valley and seize hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040. The 9th Infantry moved on the left flank of the Division, tied in with the 7th Infantry, Republic of Korea forces (92-94).

The 38th Infantry would move up the Mundungni Valley and secure hill 485, southwest of Heartbreak Ridge, but east of Mundungni valley. They also would provide infantry support for the 72d Tank Battalion.

The 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry was the Division reserve. General Young, Division Commander, was the only one authorized to commit this battalion into the battle (93). The 38th Infantry had a battalion of infantry from the Netherlands attached to it. This gave the 38th Infantry Regiment three battalions.

To protect the division right flank in the Sataere Valley area and to distract the enemy was Task Force Sturman. Task Force Sturman consisted of the 23d Tank Company, 2d Reconnaissance Company, a French Engineer Platoon, and one infantry company from the divisional security forces. Task Force Sturman had additional missions to destroy enemy bunkers on the east side of Heartbreak Ridge. Also to act as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from the 23d Infantry soldiers on Heartbreak Ridge.

Mission support came from the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. The road along the Mundungni Valley was rough track, unsuitable for Sherman tanks. Craters clotted the ground and the North

Koreans had planted mines along the way. The engineers blasted the neighboring cliff walls for the rock to provide fill for the craters. The engineers also removed all the mines in the roadway. They placed chain blocks of tetranol at fifty foot intervals on both sides of trail and then set them off. At times stream beds became roads or trails because of intense mines and craters. Bit by bit, they advanced the road northward up the valley (92-93).

While the engineers prepared the trail, the 2d Division Regiments received replacements to bring them up to full strength. They also ^{resupplied} resupply food, equipment, and ammunition for the upcoming operation. The division established supply points forward of line ^{where} Kansas. This insured the division's weapons employment in the most effective locations (92).

Execution of Operation Touchdown started on October 4, 1951. Forty-nine fighter bombers worked over the division sector. Task Force Sturman force ⁷⁻¹ raided the Sataeri Valley. The other units of the 2d Division underwent final rehearsals for the attack scheduled for 2100 the next night. Fire support teams, usually consisting of a combination of mortars, machine guns, rifles, and automatic weapons, were established. The infantry directed the use, movements, and operations of the teams as the battle progressed (Alexander 445).

Late on October 5, 1951, the artillery preparation opened on the enemy positions, the 9th and 38th Regiments stood by in the Mundungni Valley for orders to move forward. Air strikes by Marine Corsairs sent napalm, rockets, and machine gun bullets into the North Korean lines before the main attack that night (445).

From the west, 9th Infantry pressed on toward Hill 867 in the Mundungni Valley area. By October 7, 1951, they secured the hill with only light resistance. They swung northwest toward hill 960 and hill 666 and after a bayonet assault took possession on October 10, 1951. The following day the Republic of Korea forces, 8th Division, took possession of the Kim II Sung range west of the 9th Infantry (446).


The 38th Regiment made good progress especially when they discovered that the enemy had abandoned Hill 485. On October 6, 1951, they advanced on Hill 485 and 728 against light resistance. Another element from the 38th deployed up the Mundungni Valley and attacked Hill 636, which fell on October 7, 1951. Possession of these three hills furnished cover for the 2d Engineers, who could now finish the road. On October 7, 1951, the 38th Regiment gained essential firepower with the attachment of the 72d Tank Battalion. The 38th Regiment also received three new objectives. Their objectives, all the high ground west of Mundungni Valley to } ^{Free} Kim II Sung range (Hermes 94).

The 23d Regiment, under the cover of night and the distractions provided by the rest of the division, moved out. Enemy fire came in quick on the 2d Battalion, but the North Koreans could not concentrate upon the assault. To preserve the element of surprise, there was no artillery preparation. The 37th Artillery Battalion bombarded all known enemy mortar positions as ^{P-1} identified during the assault. The countermortar fire was very effective. The 23d Infantry closed in on the North Koreans with only light losses. By 0300 the 2d and 3d Battalions had control

of the southern half of Hill 931. The United Nations troops repelled the expected enemy counterattack with ease. By noon Hill 931 belonged to the 23d Infantry (Alexander 446).

The 3d Battalion of 23d Infantry pushed on to join the 1st Battalion in its assault. This was the last objective on Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 851. In the Sataeri Valley, Sturman's tanks sustained their daylight raids. They continued to blast away at the bunkers on the eastern side of Hill 851 (Hermes 95).

In the west, in the Mundungni Valley, the 72d Tank Battalion waited for the go ahead signal from the engineers. On October 10, 1951, the engineers finished the road. The 72d Shermans and a company from the 38th infantry, began to rumble north up the valley (95). The North Koreans were in the middle of relieving their elements in the Heartbreak sector. The tank thrust, with the general forward movement of the rest of division, caught the Chinese enroute to new positions. The 72d Tank Battalion raced to the town of Mundungni and beyond, inflicting heavy losses upon the Chinese soldiers. This action also cut the



Figure?

supply and replacement routes up the western side of Heartbreak Ridge (95).

During the next two days, the 23d Infantry and the French Battalions inched north toward the objective, bunker by bunker. The United Nations soldiers took very few prisoners in the bitter fighting. The enemy would not surrender and fought bravely to the death. On October 13, 1951, the French troops stormed the last peak. After thirty long days of intensive fighting, Heartbreak Ridge was in the possession of the 23d Infantry (96).

The casualty rate for this limited war was very high. The North Korean forces did not give up any territory easily. They fought to the very last man and then came back again harder and stronger (Rees 461). It is important to note that over half of the killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action occurred after the truce talks began. Even though the truce talks continued during the last two years of the war the fighting continued to be intense.

The loss of life already was

United States

| | Total | Army | Navy | USMC | Air Force |
|----------------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|-----------|
| Total casualties | 142,091 | 109,958 | 2,087 | 28,205 | 1,841 |
| Deaths | 33,629 | 27,704 | 458 | 4,267 | 1,200 |
| Killed in Action | 23,300 | 19,334 | 279 | 3,308 | 379 |
| Wounded in Action | 105,785 | 79,526 | 1,599 | 24,281 | 379 |
| Died | 2,501 | 1,930 | 23 | 537 | 11 |
| Other | 103,284 | 77,596 | 1,576 | 23,744 | 368 |
| Missing in Action | 5,866 | 4,442 | 174 | 391 | 859 |
| Died | 5,127 | 3,778 | 152 | 391 | 806 |
| Returned | 715 | 664 | 13 | 0 | 38 |
| Current Missing | 24 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 15 |
| Captured or interned | 7,140 | 6,656 | 35 | 225 | 224 |
| Died | 2,701 | 2,662 | 4 | 31 | 4 |
| Returned | 4,418 | 3,973 | 31 | 194 | 220 |
| Refused repatriation | 21 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

(Source: Office of the Secretary of Defence.)

Table 1
Battle casualties of the Korean War

ROK

According to an UN release of 23 October 1953, ROK casualties in the Korean War totalled 1,313,836, including about a million civilians. No definitive breakdown of the ROK military casualties has ever been reached, but the following figures are approximately correct: Killed, 47,000; wounded, 183,000; Missing and POW, 70,000; Total: 300,000.

United Nations

Apart from the US losses, the battle casualties of the other UN contingents of the UNC are calculated to have been as follows:

Dead: 3,194
Wounded: 11,297
Missing and POW: 2,769
Total: 17,260

(Source: UN release, 23 October 1953.)

Of this total the Commonwealth casualties killed, wounded and missing were 7,268:

| | Killed | Wounded | Missing/POW | Total |
|--------------|--------|---------|-------------|-------|
| Australia | 261 | 1,034 | 37 | 1,332 |
| Canada | 294 | 1,202 | 47 | 1,543 |
| India | | 4 | | 4 |
| New Zealand | 22 | 79 | 1 | 102 |
| South Africa | | | 1 | 1 |
| UK | 686 | 2,498 | 1,102 | 4,286 |
| Totals | 1,263 | 4,817 | 1,188 | 7,268 |

(Source: Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division*. 1,036 prisoners were repatriated by the Communists.)

more than the United States could justify for a police action. The public pressure on Washington showed during the presidential election when Truman lost. General MacArthur said all along that ^{quoted} if politics directs a war then it's a war we can't win, and he was right (528).

The only positive to come from these battles is the cooperation of military branches to achieve a goal. The infantry, artillery, armor, and engineer team did succeed in controlling the ridges (Craven 24). However, the indecisiveness, misdirection, and unclear objectives cost the lives of many of America's young men needlessly. The United Nations did achieve a political peace, but at a very high cost in lives. The United Nations and United States did not prepare the battle plans effectively or efficiently - ^{show vs} to achieve the political end. Only during Operation Touchdown did all the firepower, personnel, and support become concentrated to successfully gain the objective. Still, because of the Communist ^{force} enemy, at a very high cost in personnel and equipment.

No matter how just the cause or how morale ~~the~~ the conflict, political motivations can not win a war. To play a political game of chess with the lives of our soldiers will not win popular public support. In The Korean War, and these two battles in particular, popular support did not appear. Therefore, the battles proved costly to American soldiers and did not achieve a military advantage. There is not honor - only irony - to being the last man killed in any war fought for any reason (Fehrenbach 501). Neither side gained territory, yet neither side lost face. The world was now a far more dangerous place. The signing of the

armistice on July 27, 1953, meant peace would prevail again
(Chevprime 127).

where does the lack of essential economy
of force, objective, and offensive power
fit in the conclusion?

With the right thesis statement
and focus, this could have been a good
paper.

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