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COPY

DEBRIEFING REPORT

OF

COMMANDING GENERAL, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

1. (X) Government Organization

The civil organization, authority, and responsibility appear to be adequate at the province level but vary from good to poor at the district and village level. District and province chiefs appear to be anxious to cooperate and learn but often lack the inherent ability and trained personnel necessary to implement new concepts and techniques effectively.

The authority of the province chief appears to be quite clear and strong, exercising control over virtually all civilian and military Vietnamese personnel within his province. The lack of clear lines of command over the multitude of separate units operating within a given province works to the disadvantage of effective command and coordination. In one case, Hau Nghia Province, a serious gap in understanding and cooperation exists between the Province Chief and the Province National Police Chief. This undesirable condition results in the rejection of many good innovations suggested by the National Police Chief and the Public Safety Advisor, more out of spite than good sense. It also places US personnel at a disadvantage in dealing with officials in this province because of the great care required to maintain good relations with both the Province Chief and the National Police Chief.

2. (X) National Police

The National Police suffer from lack of training, poor logistical support, lack of common sense and lethargy. Almost without exception, they choose the easiest, most comfortable method of operation, preferring to ride in covered, inadequately armed vehicles and refusing to perform checks on heavily laden vehicles that will require the expenditure of time and effort on their part. On occasion they have been known to allow vehicles to pass check points, above the protest of the QC or US military policeman operating with them, indicating some possible connection between the National Policeman and the operator of the vehicle. Their training is for the most part inadequate and with the exception of certain specific police chiefs, they show little semblance to a professional police force.

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Original signed by H L Mar
J. RICHARD SMITH, DAC
TS, Control Officer

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HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
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8 Nov 1967

AC... NO...
SUBJECT: Debriefing Report

TO: Commanding General
Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

In accordance with paragraph 2, AR 1-26, and paragraph 5a,
USARV Regulation 1-3, herewith debriefing report of Commanding
General, 18th Military Police Brigade.

1 Incl
as (5 cys)

/s/ H.L. Moore, Jr.
/t/ H.L. MOORE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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The distant relationship between the National Police and the people forces the National Police to live in enclaves and prevents them from living or operating in the hamlets during hours of darkness. Consequently, they are prone to establishing patterns in their mode of operation. This situation, when viewed in light of the long term objectives of the US Army, is incompatible with efforts to restore the security of Vietnam to the National Police eventually.

Recognition of police problems at the national level appears to be lacking. The National Police forces in the village of Tan An, Long An Province, operated for months with only two liters of POL per police vehicle per day, despite requisitions and protests by the local National Police Chief to his superiors.

In addition, there are significant indications of corruption in the police from the Can Sat on the street up to the highest levels of the National Police. This situation compounds the already suspicious nature of the oriental and postpones the eventual control of the populace by the National Police.

3. (S) US Military Police Operations

a. Missions:

The 18th Military Police Brigade supports the local government by participating in combined checkpoints and patrols; securing roads and keeping them open to civilian and military traffic through patrolling; maintaining the discipline, law, and order of US Forces personnel in order to maintain a favorable image and rapport with the Vietnamese people; conducting criminal investigations; providing security for installations, ships, harbors and billets; conducting combat support missions of logistical convoys, route security, traffic control and evacuation of Prisoners of War (PW) from combat unit collecting points to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) PW camps; assisting in refugee control and displacement; and participating in resources and population control operations.

b. Command and Control:

A command of this size, approximately 5,500 personnel, conducting operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam demands a high degree of mobility in order to command and control brigade operations effectively. In this connection, aircraft are urgently required. Currently, aircraft are available only on a non-priority basis. This severely limits coordination and staff supervision by the brigade headquarters, military police groups, and battalions.

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c. Combat Support:

Although the Military Police Corps is classified as a combat service support element, current operations being conducted by the 18th Military Police Brigade, to include convoy escort and security, PW handling, route security, refugee control and displacement, and operational control of a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), illustrate the increasing emphasis being placed upon combat support missions. To further military support to the combat elements, the Brigade has established a list of mission priorities, headed by combat support and PW evacuation, which is used by subordinate commands in determining the priority to be placed on newly assigned missions.

d. Shortage of School Trained Personnel:

There is a serious shortage of school trained and experienced personnel in MOS positions of clerks, company armorers, mechanics, and communications personnel, necessitating the use of school trained military policemen to fill these positions, thus resulting in a shortage of military policemen for military police duties.

e. Armored Jeeps and the V-100 Commando Armored Car:

The M151 Armored Jeep has been used with great success on road runner and convoy escort operations. Although the armored jeep has presented a maintenance problem due to the additional weight of the armor plating and sandbags, this modification of the vehicle has provided additional protection for the military police. The maintenance problem can be alleviated by the use of the modular kit which provides armored plating and appropriate springs and shock absorbers in one package. The V-100 Armored Car has established itself as a suitable vehicle for military police operations in the RVN, and is far better suited for military police operations than a tracked vehicle. It has proven to be extremely effective and adaptable to varied missions and terrain, and has successfully completed an evaluation program resulting in an urgent request for an increased number to support Brigade operations.

f. Utilization of Patrol Boats, River (PBR's):

The lack of PBR's to support Brigade port and vessel security operations has hampered Brigade efforts to reduce the vulnerability of these facilities to sabotage and pilferage. Hopefully, this deficiency will be corrected in the second or third quarter, fiscal year 1968, with the arrival of a PBR company in-country to support the Brigade.

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4. (X) Criminal Investigation Activities

Action is being initiated to make the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional) a TOE unit rather than provisional. Included in this action was the recent acquisition of operational control of USAHAC CI elements under the MP Group (CI) (Prov). This centralization of CI units provides a more efficient, country-wide CI program.

The US Army CID works in close cooperation with the National Police, particularly in the fields of narcotics investigation and customs. The combined raids conducted by the CID and the National Police are presented as National Police raids, with the CID accompanying only to apprehend any US personnel involved and to recover any US Government property found in the raids. Actually the areas are selected and the raids are planned by the CID, with members of the National Police observing the methods and techniques. This procedure results in the National Police receiving valuable training from the US Army CID.

Despite CID efforts, narcotics are becoming available in ever increasing quantities. There is need for much greater control of marihuana and opium by the Vietnamese National Police. Marihuana can be purchased throughout the country in cigarette or bulk form. Opium can also be purchased in either liquid or solid form.

There is little or no control exercised by local VN authorities over prostitution. Some of the houses sell prophylactics but most take no measures to prevent the spread of venereal disease. Pornography is readily available at most shops or roadside stands.

Many bars engage in the sale of American beer and whiskey and accept Military Payment Certificates (MPC) for purchases. They are willing to purchase PX beer or whiskey and most of the liquor bottles still bear the PX price markings.

5. (X) Confinement of US Personnel

Due to the tactical situation in Vietnam and the distance and dispersion of units from the confinement facility, prisoners to be confined are often flown directly from the field to the stockade with incomplete or improper records accompanying the person. Further, prisoners are not paid promptly and are not visited by unit commanders monthly. The pre-trial population within the stockade is too high, with delays ranging from 15-25 days for Special Court Martial cases and 25-60 days for General Court Martial cases. Only those persons whose offenses involved moral turpitude or who are repeated offenders or who are considered a threat to the maintenance of law and order should be placed in pre-trial confinement.

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6. ~~(X)~~ Combined Police Activities

a. Conduct of Operations:

The 18th Military Police Brigade is currently operating over 50 combined patrols and several combined checkpoints throughout Vietnam. These patrols and checkpoints have been highly successful in establishing rapport between US and FWMAF Police as well as increasing overall police efficiency. The Brigade is presently expanding this program and every effort is being directed toward making all off-post patrols combined patrols.

Personnel from the 18th Military Police Brigade work with the National Police and Quan Camh at the lowest level. Functions performed include combined mobile resources and population control checkpoint operations, combined police patrols performing discipline, law, and order functions within built-up areas, combined police patrols committed to the securing of major highways, and combined criminal investigative activities. Inherent in these operations has been the rendering of advice, specialized training, and conduct of English language classes to the National Police. The program is providing a long range fringe benefit to all concerned in that combined operations have proved to be a valuable training device for the Vietnamese police. They are learning established US procedures through day-to-day contact and cooperation.

Through combined operations, familiarization of an area of operations is accomplished much faster. The Vietnamese knowledge of their own language, people and customs, combined with US Military Police expertise, provides the necessary tools to assist in accomplishing the police mission.

b. Problem Areas:

Many times what is agreed upon by higher ranking Vietnamese officials with their US counterparts is not implemented or accomplished by lower echelons in the manner agreed upon. It is also evident that the Vietnamese at times do little planning and conduct little or no follow through.

One of the most obvious deficiencies is the lack of training on the part of VN police officers. All too often it is necessary to guide Vietnamese policemen in basic techniques when conducting combined operations.

c. Lessons Learned:

(1) US and Vietnamese personnel should work as a coordinated team on the same operation. There should be a unit-to-unit,

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man-to-man program developed as in the Katusa program in Korea. More attempts must be made to create understanding and common interests between US and Vietnamese personnel through small social events and integrated training.

(2) Combined operations of every possible type should be encouraged. Through such operations, the probability of success of virtually every operation is increased. In this way, the National Police are continually exposed to proper operating procedures and the professionalism of the US soldier, which is certain to improve their overall ability. It also has the side effect of increasing US and Vietnamese respect for each other and limits criticism of the US effort by Vietnamese civilians who are subject to the operation.

(3) Combined population and resources control operations should be offensive in nature and with two prime objectives: first, to intercept logistical resupply of VC/NVA forces, and second, to interdict the operations of VC/NVA forces. Offensive operations take the initiative from the enemy and deny him the complete freedom of movement he possesses when static, defensive checkpoints are employed. Checkpoints must achieve the element of surprise by appearing swiftly and unexpectedly, completing our activities rapidly but thoroughly, and by displacing to new locations before the enemy can muster the force necessary to attack the checkpoint or establish bypass routes. Such mobile operations have the side effect of forcing the VC to expend time and effort to avoid the operations, thus reducing their morale and effectiveness.

(4) The VN National Police are a centralized type police force modeled after the European police system, and tend to operate on military lines. US Military Police advice is therefore considered to be more closely allied to their background. An overall police advisory system closely allied with centralized military concepts rather than the American decentralized civil police concept would be more beneficial to the long range development of VN Civil Police Forces. As brought out in paragraph 8 below, this is an area in which US advisory assistance is deficient. Civilian advisors to the Vietnamese Civil Police are using American civilian police organizational concepts which have little in common with the Vietnamese police organization.

7. (Q) Jurisdiction

There is no comprehensive program of police jurisdiction and enforcement in Vietnam. By agreement, FVMAF police their own forces, RVNAF Military Police(QC) police RVNAF forces, and the National Police (Canh Sat) handle indigenous civilians. Competition and jealousy exist

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within GVN as to authority and jurisdiction between their enforcement agencies. RVNAF senior officers do not recognize any authority of the National Police over Vietnamese military personnel, and at the same time, do not support their own QC in enforcement efforts - particularly in cases involving officers.

US and other FWMAF do an effective job in policing their own military forces, but a hiatus exists in law enforcement efforts regarding non-indigenous civilians. With a few minor exceptions, the National Police have avoided the issue of authority and jurisdiction over US and Third Country nationals. Since the authority of Military Police is limited to military personnel (and direct hire and certain contract US civilians) there is a certain class of personnel who have been at liberty to ignore currency directives, flaunt the national curfew, and behave in a less than circumspect manner. This group includes some correspondents, some tourists, some businessmen, some merchant seamen, and some US Government employees.

Recommendations have been made and studies are continuing to establish a police policy and coordinating council and to provide a "clearing house" or "police central" for the exchange of information regarding criminal cases and police matters. This would be particularly useful in currency cases, blackmarket and customs matters, narcotics and smuggling.

Within the US community, a dichotomy in police matters exists between the Public Safety Division, CORDS, and the military enforcement agencies.

8. (X) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS):

The Brigade has had considerable contact with personnel of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Such contacts have been primarily in the realm of combined police operations. The CORDS personnel have displayed a great deal of optimism and desire, but many Public Safety Advisors lack vigor and the professional ability to do an effective job. Too often, the Public Safety Advisors are young men who have served on a metropolitan police force for two or three years and are now advising the National Police on how to operate a police force in a rural area under the adverse conditions presented by the insurgent environment. Conversely, other Public Safety Advisors to the National Police are old men who are retired from state or local US police forces. These men, because of their age, have become set in their ways, unresponsive to encouragement by US Military Police personnel, and lethargic in their accomplishment of their advisory missions.

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9. ~~(S)~~ Post Exchange Security

The nature of exchange merchandise is such that it is extremely attractive as an object of theft, thus necessitating physical protection. Depots as well as exchange outlets are targets for large scale pilferage. A prime example of this was pointed out in a review of the Military Police Reports, Headquarters Area Command, Saigon, for the period 16 January 1966 through 9 November 1966. This review disclosed that seventy-nine losses, with a total dollar value of approximately \$54,391.82, were reported by the Army and Air Force Exchange Depot, Saigon. In addition to the above reported losses, the files of Headquarters Vietnam Regional Exchange, APO 96243, reflect sixteen losses with a total value of about \$14,355.46, for the same period.

In Vietnam, the problem of who should have the mission of exchange security and where the resources should come from has been a subject of constant concern. Early planning in this regard is of the utmost importance. It must be accomplished well in advance of the start of operations. Experience has proved that a piecemeal approach is costly in pilfered merchandise.

The policy established by USARV to secure the Army and Air Force Exchange facilities in the Saigon metropolitan area has been one requiring joint participation by the Army, Air Force and Navy. To provide adequate protection to the A&AFES facilities in this area, it was decided in December 1966 to use a composite guard force, utilizing personnel from the three services mentioned. Levies were made based on their percentage of the total assigned strength in the area. The Air Force did not provide personnel as requested and to date has declined to do so. This example typifies the need for extensive prior planning and executive supervision.

As early as March 1966, meetings were held to plan for security of exchange merchandise, to include intransit and storage security, improved item accountability and specific delineation of responsibility. Representatives of HQ A&AFES, HQ PACEX, and HQ VNRE, relying on USARV Reg 60-5, have contented themselves by pointing out that "physical security of exchange property is the responsibility of the (local) commander". Little effort has been made to include security aspects into operational (sales and merchandising) planning. USARV has placed two field grade officers, several investigators and some senior NCO's into a Security Office at VNRE HQ. Their capabilities are, in part, wasted as they are not brought into planning - they merely react to physical security situations. As of this report, no validation of security spaces for VNRE has been accomplished.

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The Exchange accountability system inhibits the recovery and identification of pilfered or lost items. From supplier to wholesaler (depots) to retailer (outlets) all transactions are in terms of dollar amounts. Inventories at each level are equated to dollar value. Listing of specific quantities of categories of merchandise is unobtainable, and controlled items (refrigerators, watches, radios, etc.) cannot be identified if recovered unless these items have been resold by a bona fide purchaser and can be specifically matched up with a sales slip. Diversion, loss, or pilferage of bulk items (from depot to retailer, for example) cannot be validated by item, serial number, or other identification. As a result, much recovered property cannot be put back into stocks.

Recommend:

- a. The validation of a Security Division of VNRE, to include staff and supervisors down to depot level.
- b. Assignment of the security mission to the Chief, VNRE.
- c. Refinement of accountability procedures in VNRE to facilitate reports of loss and identification of property.

Physical security requirements must be included in initial facility planning, which must include funding for physical barriers, protective lighting, security communication systems, and alarm systems, as well as guard personnel.

10. Detainee/Prisoner of War Program

Due to the tactical and political considerations, conventional US Military Police detainee/PW doctrine has not been applied in the Republic of Vietnam. This necessitated the establishment of new, untried procedures which have now been in effect for 14 months. Although many problems were encountered and resolved, three significant problems still exist.

Of primary importance is the great inaccuracy which exists in the area of PW accountability. Both the MACV Provost Marshal and the USARV Provost Marshal maintain records on US captured PWs. Records of the total number of US captured PWs are virtually identical, but they vary considerably concerning the internment location. For example, on 5 October 1967, USARV records indicated 1,471 US captured PWs in the Pleiku PW Camp, while the MACV records indicated 841. This difference is primarily due to changes in PW status which occurred after internment in ARVN PW camps. Information pertaining to deaths, reclassifications and transfers which occur after internment is not readily available to the USARV PM office; however, it has the

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responsibility for reporting these changes to DA. This lack of information flow and the resultant inaccurate records will present serious consequences in the event of a PW exchange. I attribute this breakdown to the dichotomy of mission which exists between the MACV and USARV PM offices. In September 1966, my office was tasked with supervising and accounting for all US captured detainees from the point of capture to the point of release of custody to the Government of Vietnam. The MACV PM was tasked with supervising and accounting for all allied forces captured PWs after their internment in ARVN PW camps to include staff supervision of the US advisors in the PW camps. This mission, which is so critical in terms of international political impact, should not have been divided between two headquarters.

The second problem is the Phu Quoc Island PW complex. This could easily become another Koje-do. All of the elements are now present, i.e., a "hard core" prisoner population, an island location. PWs experiencing better living conditions than the guards and their families, and a limited capability for the identification of leaders. The resultant effect could be a requirement for the diversion of sizeable elements of US resources.

The Third problem is the GVN civil defendant program. At the present time, captured members of the infrastructure are confined in the national prison system. Because these prisons are seriously overcrowded, an important member of the infrastructure may be released after serving a relatively short sentence, simply to make room for new arrivals. Return of these people to the Vietnamese society serves only to prolong the war. Planning is now under way which will establish a civil defendant prison and eight civil defendant camps throughout the Republic of Vietnam. When this program becomes operational, captured members of the infrastructure will be isolated for the duration of the war. This program is parallel to the PW program, but to date there has been no indication of any coordination between the two programs. As a result, the two programs are in direct competition with each other for the same financial and material resources.

Organization of two ARVN PW Commands, patterned after US TOE 19-252, each with an attached ARVN Branch PW Information Center patterned after US TOE 19-503, would provide a solution for all three problems. One command could operate the PW program and the other command the civil defendant program; similar to the manner in which the US PW Command is designed to concurrently operate PW and civil internee programs. This would provide a unity of command over the country wide detainee/PW program which would result in considerable savings in money, manpower and material. The Branch PW Information Center could provide accurate, readily available information from a single source to any outside agency.

Records on all US captured detainees/PWs from the point of capture to point of repatriation should be maintained in one headquarters -USARV. In order to maintain continual effective liaison with the

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information center and the PW camps, and administer the required staff supervision over the US captured PWs, it is necessary to transfer the US advisory effort in the PW camps to USARV control.

This relatively simple solution is the only manner in which the US can avoid serious embarrassment and loss of international prestige in the event of a PW exchange.

/s/ H.L. Moore, Jr.
/t/ H.L. MOORE, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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Original signed by HLMR.

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TS, Control Officer