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N **19090.6-Q** **IIFFV**
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

AVX-SGS

14 JUL 1966

SUBJECT: C & GSC Questionnaires (U)

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TO: Commanding General
U.S. Army Vietnam
ATTN: ACofS, G3
APO 96307

AUG 26 1966

ACCESSION NO
PO REGISTR 16919

1. (U) Reference:

a. Letter, HQ, DA, ACSFOR, personal from Maj Gen Davison to Maj Gen Seaman, 22 June 1966 (Incl 1), with questions on U.S. operations in the Republic of Vietnam (Incl 2-7).

b. Message, CG USARV, AVC-DH 17246, DTG 081103Z, July 1966, subject as above.

2. (U) Forwarded herewith are the answers to the questions contained in reference 1a.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

7 Incl
as

ROBERT L. ALDERMAN
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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When Separated From
Classified Inclosures

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HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

22 June 1966

Dear Jack:

In preparation for my visit to RVN and in view of my forthcoming assignment to Leavenworth, I asked the College to prepare a series of questions the answers to which would improve the quality of instruction being given to students and, in turn, result in better prepared officers being available for assignment to headquarters and units in Vietnam. These questions are attached herewith.

I would very much appreciate your personal assistance in making the answers available. In addition, any pertinent documentation such as staff function manuals, SOPs and the like would be very welcome.

Please mail the response to me in care of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Sincerely yours,

MICHAEL S. DAVISON
Major General, GS
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development

1 Incl
as

Major General Jonathan O. Seaman
Commanding General, II Field Force
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96227

Incl 1

BACKGROUND: Reports from Vietnam indicate that the army field force headquarters are playing an increasingly active role in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. To correlate College instruction on the corps headquarters versus the army field force headquarters, it is necessary to determine the operational and combat service support responsibilities of army field force headquarters.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

a. Is the role of army field force headquarters equivalent to the role of a corps headquarters?

Answer: The role of the Field Force Headquarters is equivalent to that of a conventional corps headquarters, in that broad general missions are received from COMUSMACV. These broad missions are analyzed, and are the basis for more definitive missions issued to subordinate headquarters. Further, as with the conventional U.S. corps, Field Force exercises allocation control of combat support assets. At the present time the most critical asset is Army Aviation. Evaluation of planned operations and allocation of Army Aviation is a daily task. The same process would be necessary if there were a shortage of other combat support assets, e.g., artillery, ammunition, USAF fighter bomber support, or other assets normally allocated by a conventional U.S. corps.

There are, however, some differences in the role of the Field Force, as compared to a conventional U.S. corps. These differences exist primarily in the relationship between Field Force (U.S.) and ARVN units. The Field Force Commander is also the Senior Advisor to the III ARVN Corps Commander. The command relationship is that of two equal commanders directing operations of forces of similar composition, and with almost identical objectives, within the same geographical area. Coordination is necessarily precise and detailed, and is normally initiated by the commander involved in a particular operation. The Field Force Commander exercises no actual command over ARVN forces, but can exercise a degree of control through advice and persuasion with the ARVN Corps Commander, and through command over the allocation of U.S. resources used in support of ARVN operations.

Many civil affairs functions normally performed at Army level are routine matters at Field Force level in Vietnam. Coordination in these matters is effected directly with the ARVN Corps Commander, and other

U.S. governmental agencies concerned with civic action. This is a result of adapting to the environment, in that most of the counterpart activities by GVN representatives have been decentralized to the Corps Tactical Zones, or to the next geographical subdivision, the Provinces, and the U.S. coordination is effected with the GVN agency most responsive to the requirements.

b. What combat service support responsibilities are assigned to army field force headquarters?

Answer: Like the conventional U.S. corps, Field Force is primarily a tactical organization of execution, with responsibilities limited to the coordination and supervision of logistical support activities required to insure that materiel and services required for the performance of assigned missions are provided to assigned and attached units.

As in the conventional U.S. corps, the ACofS G4 in a Field Force is a staff officer, not an operator. Actual logistical support to attached units is provided on a direct relationship basis by the supporting logistical command.

The ACofS G4, in coordination with the ACofS G3, does act in the allocation of critical logistical resources. A prime example is the G4 action on transmitting USAF airlift requirements, based on tactical priorities, for all attached units.

BACKGROUND: Information from Vietnam indicates that U.S. and ARVN forces are conducting joint operations of up to brigade size.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

- a. What are the major problems of coordination?

Answer: Coordinated operations have been conducted at the division level, with one U.S. and one ARVN division acting in close coordination in the execution of a single tactical plan. While such operations may have striking success, they cannot be termed either joint or combined operations in terms of the accepted U.S. definitions. Actual coordination is accomplished at several levels of command, beginning with close cooperation and acceptance of common military aims by the U.S. Field Force Commander, who is also Senior Advisor to the ARVN Corps Commander sharing the same geographical area of responsibility, and the Commander of the ARVN Corps. When the two commanders are in agreement on common military objectives, the direction of the major tactical headquarters can be made along uni-national command lines. However, the spirit of cooperation and close coordination extends to each echelon of command, from division to company, where operations are coordinated by the respective commanders concerned. If the Field Force Commander and the ARVN Corps Commander find common ground on which to prosecute the common war against a common enemy, coordination and cooperation among subordinate commands of both nations will normally follow. The degree is dependent on the leadership exercised by each of the commanders concerned.

- b. How is coordination effected?

Answer: The mechanics of coordination have been outlined in the answer to the previous question. However, there are a number of details of particular significance in the operational environment of Vietnam.

The basic national "personality" of U.S. and ARVN officers differ. Generally, U.S. officers are well-trained, confident, aggressive, and have a sense of urgency in all of their activities. In many cases the ARVN counterparts have not yet achieved the same degree of confidence;

however, this will come with their continued tactical successes, and the gradual diminishing of enemy combat power. More obvious is the fact that the ARVN are not inspired to win the war in a twelve month period coinciding with the normal tour of U.S. personnel in Vietnam, but are conditioned to a longer term approach by the fact that they have been at war for twenty years and more. The difference in basic philosophies is clearly evident in this area. The best means of achieving the desired sense of urgency has proved to be through example. Where U.S. and ARVN forces have operated side by side, the ARVN have tended to become more aggressive.

Some difficulty in coordination of U.S. and ARVN operations has been encountered because of deficiencies in training and experience on the part of the ARVN leadership. This is particularly true in the more complex operations, where use of highly sophisticated equipment is standard, and where closely coordinated combined arms actions are conducted. On the more basic level of small unit tactics, other than the use of combined arms teams, the ARVN will in some cases excel the U.S. units; this is exceptional, but understandable in view of the wealth of battle experience which the surviving non-commissioned officers of ARVN may have acquired over a very long period of time.

Coordination between U.S. and ARVN forces is greatly facilitated by the system of assigning U.S. advisors to ARVN units. These U.S. personnel remain with their ARVN counterparts, know the forces they are assigned to, and have usually gained the rapport that comes from long association and mutual respect. Such an individual serves as an excellent point of focus for coordination, and contributes significantly to mutual understanding.

One mechanical device to assist in the coordination of operations involving the forces of both nations is the "Combat Support Coordination Center," an ad hoc grouping of key personnel with related command and staff functions, and adequate communications to exert their influence over both U.S. and ARVN units. Such ad hoc centers can be established at any level, and with any grouping required to resolve problems in coordination. The aim is to offer a place and a common medium for the exchange of information and ideas, which will, in turn, be translated into operational orders and requirements by the respective commanders.

Inclosures 1 and 2 to this inclosure contain a description of a highly successful operation of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division in coordination with the 25th ARVN Division.

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

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SUBJECT: After Action Report-Combat Support Coordination Center

1. Operation MAKIKI, 3-9 Jun 1966.
 - a. Control Headquarters: 25th US Division and 25th ARVN Division.
 - b. Command Headquarters: 2d Bde, 25th US Div, and 49 Regt., 25th ARVN Div.
 - c. Type of Operation: A coordinated S&D operation involving US and ARVN troops.
 - d. Area of Operation: Tay Ninh and Long An Provinces.
2. A Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) was established and co-located with the Fire Support Element of the 25th US Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center at 021400 June 1966 for Operation MAKIKI.
3. Organization of CSCC:
 - a. The CSCC was organized in accordance with Regulation Number 525-1, Headquarters 25th US Infantry Division. (See Tab A)
 - (1) Co-directors: Col. Williams, CO, 25th Div Arty, Major Khi, CO, 25th ARVN Div Arty.
 - (2) Co-director's representatives in CSCC: Lt. Col. Nicholas (US); Maj. Thi (ARVN), Maj. Richards (US), Artillery Advisor to 25th ARVN Div.
 - (3) Artillery Element: Maj. Davis (US), Lt. Duc (ARVN).
 - (4) G3 Air: Maj. Simonds (US), Lt. Thuan (ARVN), Capt. Mann, G2/G3 Advisor to 25th ARVN Div.
 - (5) G2 Air: Capt. Latour (US); Lt. Triam (ARVN).
 - (6) Tactical Air Control Party: Lt. Col. Jones, USAF Air Liaison Officer 25th US Div; Major Books, USAF Air Liaison Officer Advisor 25th ARVN, Cadet ASP Phu, Air Liaison Officer 25th ARVN Div.
 - (7) Army Aviation Element: Maj. Young (US). (ARVN does not have Army aviation but uses Air Force Air Liaison Officer to request Army air support.)
 - b. CSCC utilization of Maps:
 - (1) Four map boards 8'x8' with maps scale 1/50,000:
 - (a) US Artillery and ARVN Artillery each used a separate map to post arty positions and capabilities, location of friendly troop, Fire Coordination Lines, No Fire Line, and area of operations.
 - (b) The G3 Air US and G3 Air ARVN both used the same map for posting air strike location.
 - (c) The G2 Air US and G2 Air ARVN both used the same map to post surveillance plans and red haze, SLAR, and photo missions.

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(2) A map board 5'x5' map scale 1/50,000 of the area of operation was used by Army Aviation to plot flight routes for air mobile operations.

c. Communications:

(1) The 25th ARVN Div provided a communication team consisting of one officer and eight enlisted men. This team provided radio communications to ARVN artillery forward observers with 49th ARVN Regiment and to the ARVN Direct Support Artillery.

(2) The regular established telephone and radio communication in the FSE was used by both the US and ARVN working in the Combat Support Operation Center.

(a) The CSCC Artillery Element used one table where both US and ARVN officers worked. Six telephones provided communications to 25th Div (US) switchboard plus direct circuits to:

division artillery
II FFV FSE
25th ARVN TOC
5th ARVN TOC
1st Div TOC

(b) G3 Air used one table where both US and ARVN G3 Air and Air Liaison Officers worked. Five telephones provided direct circuits to:

2d Bde (US) TOC
Direct Air Support Center
1st Bde (US) TOC
3/4 Cav
IIFV G3 Air

(c) G2 Air used one table for both US and ARVN with a telephone to the 25th Div (US) Switchboard.

(d) Army Aviation Element (US only) used one table. Six telephones provided a circuit to the 25th Div (US) switchboard, plus direct circuits to:

25th Div air field
1st Bde TOC
2nd Bde TOC
S3 Operation Aviation Battalion
IIFV AAE

5. Operations:

a. The ARVN personnel arrived at the 25th (US) DTOC the day prior to the operation. They established radio communication with the ARVN Direct Support artillery. The ARVN artillery was in position to support the air landing portion of the airmobile assault by the 49th ARVN Regiment.

b. The US Artillery was also pre-positioned to give fire support in the LZ's for 2nd Bde.

c. Information was received by CSCC from ARVN Regiment and US Brigade. The information was jointly posted and dissiminated to other headquarters. A single daily journal was maintained entering information from both ARVN and US sources. An example of Combat Support Coordination Center operation follows:

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- [REDACTED]
- (1) At 041100 June 66, the 25th ARVN [REDACTED] requested a light fire team of two gun ships from 25th US Div to look for a reported VC platoon vic coor. XS 604 804.
 - (2) The fire team was dispatched to the target area by Army Aviation.
 - (3) At the same time, sensing that there was a potential TAC Air target, the US Co-director requested the ALO with 25th ARVN to also recon the area.
 - (4) The fire team was diverted to support operation HAWK by covering the extraction of a 25th US infantry company which was supported by 25th ARVN artillery.
 - (5) The FAC located an estimated VC platoon & directed a Vietnamese Air Force strike of 3 AIH into the target area. This was repeated with a second Vietnamese strike & then again with a third USAF F100 strike.
 - (6) Upon completion of the Air Strike, 25th ARVN troops searched the target area and reported 44 VC KIA (BC), one VCC, 1 M-79, 1 carbine, 1 shot gun and 1 pistol.

6. Miscellaneous Considerations:

a. Billeting of ARVN personnel must be a responsibility of the headquarters setting up a CSCC. The ARVN are short on tentage and the US should make every effort to be a good host. The required tentage should be set-up prior to the arrival of ARVN personnel.

b. ARVN personnel were briefed on the location of the latrines and where guards were posted around the DTOC. Guards were briefed that ARVN personnel were in the area and where they worked and slept.

c. The ARVN officers went to meals with their US counterparts, ARVN enlisted personnel were escorted to meals by a US enlisted man.

d. Language barrier: Language was no problem because three of the ARVN officers spoke and understood English well; the fourth ARVN officer's English was considered fair.

e. Coordination of fires: Fire Coordination Lines were used extensively throughout the operation to effect maximum safety. They were put into effect for different phases of the operations and terminated upon the completion of each such phase.

7. Conclusion:

a. The CSCC was highly effective.

b. The practical application of fire coordination between ARVN and US did much to instill confidence in both US and ARVN personnel.

c. The ARVN personnel were highly trained and functioned in a highly professional manner.

/t/BILLY B. NICHOLAS
Lt. Col., Arty
AFSC

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-1

20 May 1966

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Combat Support Coordination Center

1. Purpose: To establish policy and procedures for the organization and functioning of a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) of the 25th Infantry Division to be utilized for operations conducted in coordination with ARVN units at Division level.

2. General: A combined US/ARVN Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) will be established to effect coordinated use of all available combat support during the planning for and execution of operations to be conducted by the 25th Infantry Division in coordination with ARVN units at division level. Brigades of the 25th Infantry Division will organize CSCC's for use when conducting operations in coordination with ARVN units at regimental level.

3. Definitions: Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of Artillery, Air Force, G2 Air, G3 Air, Army Aviation and other Combat Support units. These representatives assist the commanders in planning for the use of and controlling all means of combat support available for a coordinated US/ARVN operation.

4. Responsibilities:

a. The Fire Support Coordinator will take the necessary action to establish a CSCC prior to any operation to be conducted in coordination with an ARVN unit of Division level.

b. The Division Signal Officer will establish the necessary communications for support of the CSCC.

5. Organization:

a. The 25th Infantry Division/ARVN Division CSCC will function on a codirector basis with the CSCC providing information and recommendations to both commanders.

b. The 25th Infantry Division Fire Support Coordinator will serve as the U.S. Codirector of the CSCC.

c. The CSCC will include the following U.S. elements:

(1) Fire Support Element.

(2) USAF Air Liaison Officer.

(3) G2 Air.

(4) G3 Air.

(5) 25th Division Assistant Aviation Officer.

(6) Other combat support organizations as required for a particular operation.

d. Every effort will be made to obtain paralled representation from the ARVN division level unit within its staffing capability. U.S. Advisors to ARVN units will be used as a connecting link. Where a language barrier exists, assets of the advisory group as well as the 25th Infantry Division will be used to provide necessary interpreters.

e. RVNAF personnel operating in the CSCC must be cleared for access to U.S. information of Confidential classification.

i. A division level CSCC will be established in the DIOC/FSE Facility.

6. Operating Procedures:

a. The US/ARVN CSCC will be established in sufficient time to prepare detailed fire plans to cover the schemes of maneuver of the participating units.

b. After initiation of an operation, combat support operations for both U.S. and ARVN units participating will be coordinated through the CSCC. Requests for support will be made and processed in accordance with existing unit Standard Operating Procedures.

7. Communications: A rapid and reliable system of voice communications will be maintained with the respective force commanders, higher headquarters, supporting artillery, Air Force and army aviation units. (AVTLOP)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS W. MELLERN
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

/t/Philip U Bondi
/s/PHILIP U BOND
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

Appendices


- I - CSCC Organization
- II - CSCC Communications Diagram

DISTRIBUTION:

A; C


CSCC ORGANIZATION

(25th Infantry Division - ARVN Division Level)



CSCC COMMUNICATIONS NET

(25th Infantry Division - ARVN Division Level)



BACKGROUND: Environmental improvement is regarded as a necessary corollary to successful internal defense operations. Military units participate through military civic action. In Phase II or III insurgencies short-term, high intensity programs are employed to gain maximum civilian support for military operations in the shortest possible time.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

a. Are US military units participating in the GVN environmental improvement program? If so, how are these programs coordinated?

Answer: US units do participate in the GVN environmental improvement program, through the Military Civic Action program. This program is a vital and integral part of the total US effort. Ultimate US agency responsibility for civic action type projects in RVN rests with the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Prior to beginning military civic action projects in a province, units coordinate with the local USAID Representative. Normally, civic action projects are not undertaken without the approval of the Provincial Committee, which consists of the Province Chief, the MACV Senior Advisor, and the USAID Provincial Representative. Unit commanders may deviate from this procedure in those instances where loss of time would detract from the favorable effects of the project, and where it is obvious that the project is of a type generally acceptable under the circumstances (e.g., medical assistance to civilians during a search and destroy operation).

b. Are the military civic action projects implemented by US forces of the short-range, high-intensity type?

Answer: The majority of projects are of the short-range, high-intensity type. However, there are exceptions. For example, in the II Field Force Vietnam area of operations, the 23d Artillery Group is building a model refugee village, complete with homes, school, churches, water supply, and a dispensary. The bulk of the funds for this project are being provided by the citizens of Gadsden, Alabama. The village is known as Gadsden, Vietnam. Other examples are contained in the attached weekly civic action report from the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (Incl 1 to Incl 4). However, all military units participate in this type of project, and this represents only a small sampling of the projects engaged in by all units under the operational control of this headquarters.

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c. What tangible results of military civic action can be observed in Vietnam; e.g., increase in reports of VC activity by civilians?

Answer: Most results of civic action are intangible, or at best difficult to measure with any degree of precision. The indications are expressed in the outward change in attitude of the people, from a state of indifference or hostility to one of friendliness after a US unit has remained in an area for any reasonable length of time. Examples of the results of civic action actions are frequent. One recent example was a child pointing out a Viet Cong booby trap to soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division during an operation near Cu Chi. During a recent operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division, 15 Viet Cong were captured as a result of information provided by local villagers. During the period 18-25 June 1966, the 25th Infantry Division reported three instances of children pointing out booby traps and weapons caches to US soldiers engaged in operations. Reports of this nature are received frequently from units under the operational command of II Field Force Vietnam, and indicate the definite military dividends that result from an aggressive civic action program.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO U.S. Forces 96250

CIVIC ACTION REPORT 19 June 1966 thru 25 June 1966

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
1.	Community Relations Boy Scout Troop	Phuc Hai/Duc Tu	1st Bn 503d Inf	3 Feb 66	Continuous
2.	Community Relations Soap, CARE package distribution	Binh Luc, Binh Hoa/ Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	4 Jan 66	Continuous
3.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Binh Toal, Cay Da, Binh Long, Binh Luc, Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	21 Mar 66	Continuous
4.	Education & Training English classes	Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	7 Apr 66	Continuous
5.	Construction Gate	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	19 Jun 66	75%
6.	Construction Well	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	12 May 66	75%
7.	Construction One classroom	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	17 Jun 66	25%
8.	Construction Playground equip	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	12 May 66	30%
9.	Construction Road repair	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	27 May 66	70%
10.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	1st Bn 503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous

Inc 1 to Inc 4

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
11.	Construction Fence	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	28 May 66	30%
12.	Construction Landscaping	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	24 May 66	40%
13.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous
14.	Community Relations Clothing distribution	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	23 May 66	Continuous
15.	Community Relations Big Brother program	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	24 May 66	Continuous
16.	Construction Sidewalk	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	22 May 66	50%
17.	Community Relations Food distribution	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	22 May 66	Continuous
18.	Community Relations Party	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1st Bn 503d Inf	22 May 66	100%

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

A Boy Scout meeting was held on 19 Jun 66. One load of fill was delivered to the Church. The MEDCAP team finished their first five-day week. They treated 239 persons, 59 of which were tooth extractions. Soap and CARE packages were distributed in conjunction with MEDCAP. Five bags of rice, one bag of flour, and 6 cans of oil were given out in the Binh Luc area. Lt Smith of Co B 1/503 donated two boxes of children's clothes for needy children in our civic action area of responsibility. English classes were given to the workers in Binh Luc. The construction of the one classroom has come to a halt because of lack of brick. However, we will have brick by the 26th of Jun 66. The construction of playground equipment has slowed temporarily. The Bn has no welding supplies. Three truck loads of fill were spread on the Binh Luc road. Two truck loads of fill were used for landscaping in the schoolyard.

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS (Cont'd)

Two truck loads of lumber were given to the villagers in the Binh Luc area. The gate at Binh Luc is almost finished. We have devoted a large percent of our time to the gate this week. One more man has elected to be a Big Brother to a child. The 1st Bn continues to employ 51 Vietnamese from the Binh Hoa area. The S-5 team purchased candy, gum and toys for a "Xmas tree" affair. The children, at a given time tore the tree down and kept the goodies. This affair was held in the Pagoda at Binh Luc.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPI.
19.	Construction One classroom	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	13 May 66	100%
20.	Construction Well	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	22 May 66	80%
21.	Construction Landscaping	Phuc Hai/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	20 Jun 66	100%
22.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	1 Jan 66	Continuous
23.	Construction Latrine	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	1 Jun 66	20%
24.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Tan Hiep, Tan Phuc, Tan Phong, Phuc Hai/ Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	14 Jan 66	Continuous
25.	Construction Church repair	Tam Thanh/Duc Tu	3d Bn 319th Arty	20 Jun 66	20%

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The schoolyard at Tan Phong was prepared for surfacing with laterite. The schoolyard at Phuc Hai was surfaced with laterite and the front of the school was painted. The S-5 team spent most of their time this past week repairing damage to the church at Tan Thanh. The MEDCAP team treated 180 patients. Our unit employs 35 Vietnamese.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
26.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Loi Hoa, Long Tan, Vinh Hiep, Xom Myong, Binh Thanh/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	15 Mar 66	Continuous
27.	Community Relations Food distribution	Vinh Hiep/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	24 Jan 66	Continuous
28.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Loi Hoa/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	17 Jan 66	Continuous
29.	Construction Refurbishing School	Loi Hoa/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	9 May 66	100%
30.	Construction Refurbishing Disp	Tan Phu/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	26 Apr 66	95%
31.	Construction Latrine	Loi Hoa/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	9 May 66	80%
32.	Construction Well	Loi Hoa/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	9 May 66	50%
33.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	173d Spt Bn	1 Jun 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT

The MEDCAP team treated patients at the following locations during the week 20 - 24 June 1966: Long Tan 61, Loi Hoa 65, Vinh Hiep 25, Kom Myong 89, for a total of 249 medical patients and 40 dental patients. In addition, the following food distribution was made during the week: 200 lbs of corn meal, 100 lbs of flour, 100 lbs of rice, 4 cases of oil, 50 lbs of salt, 100 lbs bulgar. Lumber has been obtained to complete the latrine at Loi Hoa. Also a fence around the school is in planning and will move forward as soon as the boundaries can be determined. Work at the dispensary has progressed this week despite two Vietnamese Holidays. Efforts are being made to speed up work on the dispensary and the people appear to respond. Our unit continues to employ 75 Vietnamese.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
34.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Tan Mai I, Buu Long, Tam Hiep, Tan Thanh/ Duc Tu	HHC Bde	9 Nov 65	Continuous
35.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Tam Hiep/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	14 Jan 66	Continuous
36.	Community Relations Magazine distribution	Hoi Nai/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	20 Mar 66	Continuous
37.	Community Relations Food distribution	Tan Mai, Tam Hiep/ Duc Tu	HHC Bde	18 Apr 66	Continuous
38.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Tan Mai, Tam Hiep/ Duc Tu	HHC Bde	18 Apr 66	Continuous
39.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	HHC Ede	1 Jan 66	Continuous
40.	Construction Dispensary repair	Tam Hiep/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	14 Mar 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
41.	Construction Teachers room	Tan Hiep/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	30 May 66	6%
42.	Construction Two classrooms	Khu V/Duc Tu	HHC Bde & III Corps Ranger Group ARVN	9 Jun 66	15%
43.	Health & Sanitation DENTCAP	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	HHC Bde Spt Bn	18 Jun 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The MEDCAP team treated 249 patients. One 2½ ton truck load of lumber was delivered to the Khu V area. Fifty-one magazines were distributed to the Boy Scouts in Hoi Nai. The painting in Tam Hiep is continuing. One hundred pounds of bulgar and sixty pounds of milk were taken to the widows and dependents of the Ranger Battalions in Bien Hoa. HHC employs 24 Vietnamese. Work has **not resumed** on the Tan Hiep teachers room construction. The two room school construction has progressed at a rapid rate. The completion date is set for 15 Jul 66. The DENTCAP team did not go out this past week, but it will resume its regular schedule next week.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
44.	Construction Three classrooms	Ngu Phuc/Duc Tu	Co A 82d Avn Bn 38th Arty Bn ARVN	1 Feb 66	89%
45.	Construction Latrine	Ngu Phuc/Duc Tu	Co A 82d Avn Bn	21 Feb 66	38%
46.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Van Coi, Hanoi, Khu V/Duc Tu	25th Med Det	1 Feb 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
47.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	Co A 82d Avn Bn	1 Jan 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Work progressed very well this week. The brick work is complete on the classrooms. The lattice is all in place. The doors and windows were delivered on the 24th of June. Unfortunately, they were not cut to specifications and will have to be recut. The doors and windows will be in place by the middle of next week. Plastering has started and it is coming along with fine results. The MEDCAP team treated 546 individuals. The unit continues to employ 45 Vietnamese.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
48.	Education & Training English classes	Vinh Cuu/Duc Tu	Co A (Admin)	30 Nov 65	Continuous
49.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	Co A (Admin)	1 Jan 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Attendance at both the adults' and childrens' classes was 14 and 18 respectively. The adults' class has completed book IV and is now conducting a review. On Friday the adults' class was introduced to the game of "Scrabble". This game was a great success and provided a welcome change of pace while, at the same time, increasing the student's vocabulary and spelling ability. The childrens' class was introduced to the game of "Anagrams" and utilized some newly acquired children's story books. We employ 17 Vietnamese who come from the Bien Hoa area.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No.	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
50.	Construction Three classrooms	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	172d MI Det	13 Nov 65	77%
51.	Community Relations Sponsoring Orphanage	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	172d MI Det	13 Nov 65	Continuous
52.	Education & Training English classes	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	172d MI Det	28 May 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

During the previous reporting period doors and shutters were bought and are now being painted. On Friday food was distributed to the orphanage in the following amounts: 100 lbs of flour, 100 lbs of salt, 75 lbs of rice, and 4 cases of Borax soap. The English classes are continuing. There are 40 students in attendance.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No.	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
53.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Bien Hoa/Duc Tu	3d MASH HHC Bde	7 Nov 65	Continuous
54.	Health & Sanitation Surgery program	Base camp/Duc Tu	3d MASH	23 May 66	Continuous
55.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	3d MASH	1 Jan 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

One operation (adductor tenotomy bilateral) was performed at the 3rd MASH on a quadriplegic 7 year old boy to correct severe hip contractions. Later procedures may be necessary. Child is doing fine. One operation (Sequestrectomy) done at Bien Hoa Provincial Hospital had good results. This week rounds were made at the Bien Hoa Provincial Hospital. Consultation on general surgery and orthopedic patients at the Special Forces Hospital begins and operations as necessary to be done with permission of Australian Medical Unit at Bien Hoa Provincial Hospital. 11 patients were seen at the 3d MASH. An operation is being considered for 3. Two patients were referred to the MD's in Ophthalmology & ENT at 93d.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
56.	Construction Refurbishing classrooms	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor III Corps Ranger Group ARVN	23 May 66	40%
57.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
58.	Community Relations Milk program	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
59.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
60.	Community Relations Food distribution	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
61.	Construction Well	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	20 May 66	10%
62.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	1 Jan 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
63.	Transportation Medevac	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
64.	Education & Training Distribution of school kits	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	20 Jun 66	100%

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

We finished pouring two 4 inch concrete floors in the school. We have painted the inside of both classrooms and have painted 3/4 of the outside. We should have completed refurbishing the school by the end of next week. Our MEDCAP team treated 626 patients. We took two patients to the Bien Hoa Hospital one for laceration of the right eye and the other for a foot infection caused by a nail. We gave 8 boxes of soap to the patients. We took a girl to a Saigon Hospital to get braces for her leg. We also took one boy to the 3rd MASH for an operation. We gave out a small amount of lumber this week; we plan to take a larger amount next week. Four bags of milk were delivered to the Hamlet Chief for distribution. We delivered 3 bags of corn meal, 1 bag of flour, one bag of rolled wheat, 3 bags of bulgar, 3 bags of rice, 2 bags of salt, and 3 cases of salad oil to the Dong Hai II Hamlet. We gave 300 CARE school kits to the Hamlet Chief for use in the hamlet schools.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
65	Construction Three classrooms	Hoa Binh/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	13 Jun 66	50%
66.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	17 Jan 66	Continuous
67.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Thanh Hoa, Hanoi, Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	18 Jun 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
68.	Community Relations Sponsorship of TB Hospital	Hanoi/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	3 May 66	Continuous
69.	Education & Training English classes	Tam Hiep/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	3 May 66	Continuous
70.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous
71.	Transportation Medevac	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	23 Jun 66	Continuous
72.	Community Relations Food distribution	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	7 Dec 65	Continuous
73.	Community Relations Sponsorship of Orphanage	Thanh Hoa/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	10 Jun 66	Continuous
74.	Community Relations Soan distribution	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	23 Jun 66	Continuous
75.	Community Relations Ceremony	Hanoi/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	24 Jun 66	100%
76.	Community Relations School supply distr	Hanoi/Duc Tu	2nd Bn 503d Inf	23 Jun 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The School in Hoa Binh has progressed slowly. The Hamlet Chief states he can not get workers because they are being hired to work at the Bien Hoa A.F.B. He also states he needs gravel and sand.

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The MEDCAP team treated 214 patients. Captain Price of 4th Battalion 503d Infantry is assisting Major Colestrip of the 93d Evac Hospital in treating the patients. Milk was distributed to the Loc Lam Hamlet and the Orphanage of Thanh Hoa. Also, food was delivered to the TB Hospital and the Thanh Hoa Orphanage. English classes were held twice this week in Hanoi village. A Vietnamese boy was taken to the Hospital to check the progress of his eyes after his cataract operation. School supplies were taken to the school in Loc Lam Hamlet. The Bn continues to employ 25 Vietnamese.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is an insufficient amount of money available to build the three room school. The money for the third classroom which is a "self help" classroom has not been released.

No	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AREA/DISTRICT</u>	<u>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</u>	<u>DATE BEGUN</u>	<u>DATE OR % COMPL</u>
77.	Construction Two classrooms	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav 7th ARVN Abn Bn	7 Feb 66	90%
78.	Construction Latrine	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav	27 Mar 66	90%
79.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav	1 Jan 66	Continuous

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The base for the latrine has been set for the pouring of concrete. Lumber for the roofing of the school was collected. The roof should be erected next week. A target date for the completion of the school is set for 15 July 66. Our unit employs 11 Vietnamese.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AREA/DISTRICT</u>	<u>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</u>	<u>DATE BEGUN</u>	<u>DATE OR % COMPL</u>
	No projects	N/A	173d Engr Co	N/A	N/A

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

No Civic Action projects were undertaken by the 173d Engineer Company during the period of 6 June 1966 thru 25 June 1966.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Negative

BACKGROUND: Current doctrine as reflected in paragraph 8, FM 71-73 states: "At all levels, counterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through area security coordination centers (ASCC)."

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

a. Are ASCC in operation in Vietnam? If not, why not?

Answer: ASCC's have not been established. The functions of such a center are the same as those of a tactical operations center; i.e., to provide a control mechanism for the commander, through a grouping of key staff personnel who are capable of reacting within policy established by the commander, and coordinating operations as required. Such centers do not act independently of the commander, but for him. Since geographical areas of interest for security are centered on conventional tactical units, and these units have their normal tactical operations centers, the functions of the ASCC have been absorbed in the TOC.

The concept of establishing a "base camp" from which units move to conduct operations in another area as required, or react to an enemy threat, has created areas of geographical responsibility around all U.S. installations. The senior tactical headquarters will usually, but not always, coordinate security in such an area through the TOC. Coordination is effected with ARVN units occupying, or operating in, the area of responsibility, and with the Vietnamese National Police and other GVN officials.

b. To what extent do U.S. and/or their country units participate in the ASCC operations?

Answer: Operations that might be termed "ASCC operations" are considered an extension of normal tactical operations in the insurgency environment of Vietnam. Close coordination between all military and civil elements is normal and required.

Note: Amplifying data in this problem area is contained in Incl 1 and 2.

#15

INCL 5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

AVXC

4 June 1966

SUBJECT: Ground Forces Commander's Daily Situation Report (GDSR)
030001H to 032400H June 1966 (U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACCOC3
APO 96234

1. (C) OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

a. General:

(1) 1st Inf Div:

General: The 1st Inf Div continued seven major operations and the defense of the BINH HOA/LONG BINH area with seven infantry battalions, 1 cavalry squadron and 1 engineer battalion committed during the period.

(2) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: The brigade continued Operations ADELIDE I and II conducting extensive patrolling, S&D and security operations.

(b) 1/2 Inf: The battalion continued Operation ADELIDE II. Co A, conducting S&D operations in the SO, apprehended 1 VC vic XT943 424 at 0715H. Co B commenced a heliborne assault at 0820H on LZ vic XT972369. The LZ had been prepared by artillery and air strikes. The assault was completed by 0856H. Aircraft returning to the pick up zone received SA fire from the vic XT930385. Armed helicopters and Air Force fighters fired suppressing fire to eliminate the VC fire. Co B continued S&D operations in areas A2 and A5 without contact. The company was airlifted into an overnight position vic XT972369 closing at 1815H. Co C conducted S&D operations in areas B7 and B8. The company reported contact with an unknown number of VC in fatigue uniforms vic XT922392 at 1258H. The VC broke contact and fled to the SE. The company continued to search in zone without regaining contact

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

"RELEASABLE TO FWMFV
AND RVNAF"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED BY Has USA Vietnam
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS ON DEC. 31 72.

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and returned to overnight position vic XT912399 at 1718H. Co A established night ambush patrols in area A3 during the period without contact. B/1/4 Cav (-) reported 4 WIA and 1 APC damaged by a VC pressure anti-tank mine vic XT905406 at 1257H. At 1816H Co A observed 4 VC vic XT958361. Artillery fire was placed on the target with unknown results.

(c) 1/26 Inf: The battalion continued Operation LAMSON II under OPCON of 1st Inf Div Arty.

(d) 1/28 Inf: The battalion continued Operation ADELAIDE I conducting company size S&D operations from overnight positions vic XT971253 to vic XT936248 without contact. The battalion continued to secure engineer work parties with Companies B and C throughout the day. They returned to overnight positions vic XT936284 at 1701H without contact. The battalion ammunition convoy departed DI AN at 1600H and closed into the TF overnight position at 1755H. The bridge in the vicinity of XT919122 was damaged and a portion of the convoy returned to DI AN.

(e) B/1/4 Cav: The troop continued to support Operations ADELAIDE I and II. Troop B's tanks arrived in the overnight position vic XT936284 at 1050H.

(3) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: The brigade continued security operations vic of the RMK rock quarry, H4, II FFORCEV and in the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) TAOR without contact. 2/16 Inf continued Operation RENO I with the battalion forward CP and C/1/7 Arty moving by motor convoy from vic YT299099 to the BEARCAT base camp. Co A was airlifted from the vic YT240007 to vic YT316006. Co B conducted S&D operations from vic YT240007 and Co C conducted S&D operations from vic YT257014 without contact. 1/18 Inf continued Operation LEXINGTON III with Co B conducting S&D operations in vic YS032615. Co A remained in area BARRACUDA and Co C remained in area PORPOISE.

(b) 2/16 Inf: Operation RENO I continued with the battalion forward CP and C/1/7 Arty and supporting elements moving by motor march from vic YT299099 at 0910H to the BEARCAT base camp closing at 1100H. Co B

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continued S&D operations from vic YT255010. Co A, with a 16 man demo team attached, was airlifted at 1440H from the vicinity YT240007 to vic YT316006 to destroy a bunker complex discovered on 2 Jun. The move was conducted without contact.

(c) 1/18 Inf: Operation LEXINGTON III continued with Co B conducting S&D operations NW vic Y3032615. At 2115H Co B engaged 2 sampans at Y3015614 resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC), 2 SA captured and 2 sampans destroyed. Co A remained in base camp area BARRACUDA on 1 hour alert as RRF. The battalion recon element engaged a sampan at 1455H in the vicinity of Y3965588 resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC) and 1 weapon captured. Co C remained in area FORPOISE on 6 hour alert.

(d) 2/18 Inf: The battalion (-) continued security operations vic of the RMK rock quarry, H4, II FFORCEV and 173d Abn Bde (Sep) TAOR. Co A maintained RRF in support of brigade OPLAN FIREBALL. Co B conducted S&D operations in area GEORGLA and established 2 reinforced squad ambush sites in the vicinity of YT097063 and YT103062. Co C conducted S&D operations in area MASSACHUSETTS and established 2 reinforced squad ambush sites vic YT082152 and YT085156. HHC (-) continued to provide security for BALRCAT water point without contact.

(4) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: 2/28 Inf and elements of the brigade TAC CP continued operations in the LOC NINH area in conjunction with ARVN troops. 2/28 Inf patrols conducted patrolling operations without contact. 2/2 Inf continued Operation MUSKEGON. 1/16 Inf continued LAI KHE security operations.

(b) 1/16 Inf: Co A occupied 2/28 Inf LAI KHE base camp perimeter area, Co B the 1/16 Inf area and Co C the 2/2 Inf area with contact. The recon platoon secured Hwy 13 from LAI KHE to BEN CAT and provided security for the engineer civic action work site vic XT747342. Co A remained on 2 hour alert status for possible deployment to LOC NINH.

(c) 2/2 Inf: The battalion continued Operation MUSKEGON. Company B located and destroyed a small VC base camp vic XT790304 containing

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1000 feet of detonating cord and one 105mm dud. The battalion occupied an overnight position vic XT792327.

(d) 2/28 Inf: The battalion continued to defend the LOC NINH area in conjunction with ARVN forces. The battalion conducted 3 3&D patrols in the following locations: Co A vic XU722070, Co B XU750080 and Co C XU728102 without contact.

(e) D/1/4 Cav: The troop conducted extensive visual reconnaissance of the area around LOC NINH with negative results. At 1145H armed helicopter located a fortified VC village in the vicinity of XU618004 which had been reported by ARVN recon teams. 2 buildings had been destroyed and 3 buildings damaged. No activity was noted in the area. At 1915H 2 Delta teams were dropped into area SW of LOC NINH along the CAMBODIAN border.

(5) 1st Inf Div Arty:

General: The third day of PHU LOI pacification task force Operation in TAN PHUOC KHANH (XT883168) brought significant success. Throughout the day the 1/26 Inf (-) with attached A/1/4 Cav and 7th Co, 7th ARVN Regt continued to secure the hamlet area. At 0549H the road to PHU LOI was cleared (XT870159-XT876135). BINH DUONG Province Search Forces consisting of 2 RF Co's (262&265), a recon Co 5th ARVN and a National Police platoon entered the hamlet at 0615H and deployed throughout the eastern portion of the hamlet to search the area while residents assembled for the second day of the "Hamlet Festival". 7 VCS were located in various hiding places throughout the village from haystacks and tunnels to woodpiles and watch towers. Through the combined efforts of the National Police, Military Security Service, and US and Vietnamese Interrogation Teams, the VC political machinery in the village has been seriously disrupted.

(6) 25th Inf Div (-):

General: The 25th Inf Div (-) began Operation MAKIKI at 030822H Jun with a combine air-mobil and mechanized attack. 3 battalions of 49th Regt, 25th ARVN Div were airlifted into an objective vic XT400155 (center of mass) followed by airlift of 2d Brigade elements into an objective area vic

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XT435150 (center of mass). A joint Combat Support Coordination Center, consisting of the 2d Bde staff, 1 ARVN Liaison Officer, 2 US advisors and 2 ARVN EA, was established at the brigade forward CP. Five ARVN officers, 2 US advisors and 9 ARVN EA were colocated with 25th Inf Div staff personnel at CU CHI for coordination. Operation FORT SMITH began on schedule with 2/14 Inf closing in operational area XT5119 at 031245 without enemy contact. Ten air sorties were flown in support of Operations MAKIKI and FORT SMITH resulting in the destruction of 14 structures. 3/4 Cav participated in Operations MAKIKI and FORT SMITH, and secured Highway 1 for passage of resupply vehicles between SAIGON and CU CHI.

(7) 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div:

(a) General: 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div began Operation FORT SMITH, an operation designed to establish a base camp vic AP AN BINH (XT515193) and to assist in the pacification of the AO, at 030900H June.

(b) 2/14 Inf: Operation FORT SMITH started at 030900H with a tactical motor march to AP AN BINH (XT5119), closing at 031245H without contact. At 031030H, 5 VCS were detained vic XT512190 and were interrogated before being released to the District Chief. At 031540H, the battalion CP received small arms and rifle grenade fire from vic XT516204. A platoon from 3/4 Cav searched the area without contact. There was no further enemy contact during the day. The battalion CP was located vic XT515196 for the night.

(c) 4/9 Inf: 4/9 Inf continued to defend and improve the base camp perimeter. A platoon size patrol made two contacts with the enemy, one at 030700H and the other at 030730H. The patrol engaged 3 VC vic XT684168, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (Poss) and one tunnel destroyed. The patrol then engaged 3 VC vic XT685169 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC).

(8) 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div:

(a) General: Operation MAKIKI began at 030822H with a combined airmobile and mechanized assault. All airmobile assaults were completed by 031354H without enemy contact. All elements established blocking positions to prevent VC escape to the river which forms the western boundary of the operational area.

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(b) 1/5 (M) Inf: At the start of Operation MAKIKI, the battalion moved rapidly into the objective area without contact. At 031028H, the Recon platoon of 1/5 (M) Inf observed several armed VC running through rice paddies and marshland vic XT467157. The platoon attacked quickly and killed 2 VC (BC). As the attack progressed, 2 more VC were killed when they were run over by APC's. The platoon then conducted a thorough search of the area, uncovering 2 pistol belts and 2 Russian model 53 rifles in a water hole. As the search continued, the platoon killed an additional 7 VC (BC) and captured 19 VC. All enemy personnel were hiding underwater and were breathing through reeds. During the remainder of the period, 1/5 (M) Inf occupied blocking positions along the eastern edge of the operational area. Engagement with isolated groups of VC resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VCC and 4 VCS. The battalion CP was established in vic XT455150 for the night.

(c) 1/27 Inf (-): 1/27 Inf (-) conducted an air-mobil assault and established blocking positions vic XT415182 and XT408174. S&D operations conducted throughout the area resulted in 4 sampans destroyed, 5,500 lbs of rice evacuated and 17 mines destroyed. The battalion CP was established vic XT407181 for the night.

(d) 4/23 Inf (-): 4/23 Inf (-) conducted an air-mobil assault and established blocking positions vic XT420125 and XT436135. There was no enemy contact. The battalion CP was located vic XT431135 for the night.

(e) 2/27 Inf (-): 2/27 Inf (-) occupied a blocking position vic XT412156 and conducted local S&D operations. Elements of the battalion located and destroyed a CBU bomb vic XT412162. C/2/27 Inf captured 1 VC and detained 15 VCS vic XT450190. The battalion CP was established vic XT410160 for the night.

(9) 173d Abn Bde (Sep):

(a) General: The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) continued Operation HARDIHOOD, conducting S&D operations in the AO. At 030300H, a claymore mine was detonated vic YT052151 (brigade BIEN HOA training area) resulting in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Preliminary investigation reveals the incident was VC initiated.

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(b) 1/503 Inf: 1/503 Inf continued S&D operations vic Obj SHAD (YS480837) with very light contact. Companies B and C conducted platoon size patrols throughout the area. Several contacts were made resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 VC. 1/503 Inf (-) secured Obj SHAD for the night while A/1/503 Inf secured the forward fire support base on position SHARK (YS466780).

(c) 2/503 Inf: 2/503 Inf conducted S&D operations throughout the AO without contact. The battalion remained vic YS522839 for the night.

(d) TF SIGHOLTZ: TF SIGHOLTZ secured the route from VUNG LAU to the brigade fire support base for the passage of resupply convoys. There was no enemy contact.

(10) (FWGF) 5/RAR:

General: 5/RAR continued participation in Operation HARDIHOOD. At 030751H, D/5/RAR ambushed 8 VC vic YS460666 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), and the capture of 2 rifles, 1 sub machine gun and 2 grenades. Later on, at 031241H, D/5/RAR located and destroyed 11,000 lbs rice and 16 gal diesel fuel vic YS457670. 161st Btry RNZA, 105th Btry RAA and PWLH continued support of Operation HARDIHOOD.

b. Plans Summary:

(1) 173d Abn Bde (Sep) will cont Op HARDIHOOD with 1/503 Inf continuing S&D operations to Obj LOBSTER (YS480810). A/1/503 will remain vic of PSN SHARK to provide support from the forward support base. 2/503 Inf will remain vic Obj COD cond co size S&D operations. 3/319 Arty will continue to provide fire support from the forward fire support base. TF SIGHOLTZ will continue route security operations.

(2) FWGF 5/RAR will continue participation in Operation HARDIHOOD, and S&D operations in zone. 161 Btry RNZA and 105 Btry RAA will continue support of Operation HARDIHOOD. PWLH will continue route security in conjunction with TF SIGHOLTZ.

(3) 25th Inf Div (-): 3/4 Cav will continue to improve base camp security and provide convoy security between CU CHI and SAIGON. D Troop will conduct operations vic XT326080.

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(4) 1st Bde: Operation FORT SMITH will continue with 2/14 Inf conducting search and pacification vic AP AN THOI (XT5120). 4/9 Inf will provide security for recon by Det B-35, 5th SFG (Abn) at DUCHUE.

(5) 2d Bde: 2d Bde will continue Operation MAKIKI. 4/23 Inf (-), 2/27 Inf (-) maintain present blocking positions while Co A and Co C, 1/5 (1) conduct mtd sweep vic XT4211 and XT4116. Co B 1/5 Inf (M) conducts mtd sweep vic XT4515. 2/27 Inf (-) continues to occupy present blocking position and conducts S&D operations vic XT4113.

(6) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div: 1/2 Inf will conduct eagle flight operations with Co B landing vic XT972371 at 0645H with Co C orbiting areas J, L and G.

(7) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div: A/2/16 Inf will remain vic YT316006 to destroy a bunker complex and will be extracted by air at approximately 1730H. Co B will remain vic Obj 1 and secure arty. Arty will be extracted to BARRACUD base camp at 1800H. Co C will conduct patrols from vic YT257014. 1/16 Inf will continue Operation LEXINGTON III with Co A moving by sealift at 0700H from area BARRACUDA to vic XS987517 to conduct S&D operations NE along north side of RACH GANH HOA LEN. Co B will move by sealift at 0900H from vic YS037607 to area BARRACUDA and then at 1300H to area PORPOISE. Co C will move by sealift at 0800H from area PORPOISE to area BARRACUDA. 1/18 Inf will prepare LZ's vic XS471633, XS970641, XS987616 and XS999644 for future operations. Daisy cutter bombs will be dropped by Air Force aircraft. 2/16 Inf will provide security for 173d Abn Bde (Sep) TACR, H4, II FFORCLV, RMK rock quarry and maintain a RRF in support of 2d Bde CPLM FIREBALL. An agent report (C-3) on 3 Jun provided information that there were 200 VC located vic YS250950. VR indicated that there had been recent activity in this area. Based on this report, Co C 2/16 Inf at 0930H will be lifted from vic YT243005 to the reported VC location. Upon arrival vic YS250920 Co C will conduct aggressive patrolling to the southeast. This is a continuation of Operation AENO I.

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(8) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div: 2/2 Inf will continue Operation

MUSKOGON exploring the area in and around the base camp discovered 3 Jun.

1/16 Inf will continue to defend the LAI KHE perimeter with the recon platoon again providing security for the engineer Ca group. 2/28 Inf will continue to improve the defensive positions around the LOC KHE airfield and conduct extensive patrolling. D/1/4 Cav will continue extensive visual recon over the area, conduct armed recon, fly starlight missions and support the Operations of Delta teams. The brigade TAC CP remains at AN LOC.

(9) 1st Inf Div Arty: 1/26 Inf will continue to seal TAN PHUOC KHANH. At 0639H the 262 RF Co will re-enter the hamlet to conduct raids on suspected enemy locations.

c. Major Unit Operations:

(1) Operation LEXINGTON, 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 1 KIA, 8 WIA.

2 Equipment: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 55 KIA (BC), 5 KIA (Poss), 10 VCC, 11 VCS.

2 Equipment captured: 28 SA, 1 bag documents and 1

motorized sampan.

3 Equipment destroyed (corrected figures): 12 base camps, 31 huts, 25 tons rice, 2.7 tons salt, 23 sampans, 27 gren, 5 SA, 4810 rds SA ammo, 1 mine, 20 lbs TNT, 40 lbs G4, 1 hospital complex, 1 bunker, 1 demolitions factory and 73 booby traps.

(2) Operation LAM SON II, 1st Inf Div Arty, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 3 KIA, 30 WIA.

2 Equipment damaged: 2 APC.

3 Equipment destroyed: None.

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(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 7 KIA (BC), 10 KIA (Poss), 21 VCC, 74 VCS, 2 VC Cadre captured.

2 Equipment Captured: 6 SA, 1 pistol belt, 1 60mm mort base plate, 13 60mm mort rds, 2 bicycles and misc documents.

3 Equipment destroyed: 4 tunnels, 12 hand gren, 1 tunnel complex, 53 rds SA ammo, 3 105mm rds, 5 huts, 3 wells, 2 mines, 3 lambrettas, 15 uniforms, 5 gal gasoline, 1 qt oil, 110 lbs rice, 10 lbs demolitions, 4 4.5 V batteries and several booby traps.

(3) Operation ADELAIDE I, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 8 KIA, 29 WIA.

2 Equipment damaged: 1 APC.

3 Equipment destroyed: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: (corrected figures) 6 KIA (BC), 1 KIA (Poss).

2 Equipment captured: 2 SA.

3 Equipment destroyed: 9 tons rice, $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons salt, 7 mines, 3 bicycles, 1 tunnel and 1 bunker.

(4) Operation ADELAIDE II, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 4 WIA.

2 Equipment damaged: 1 APC.

3 Equipment destroyed: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 1 KIA (Poss), 4 VCS.

2 Equipment captured: 2 SA.

3 Equipment destroyed: 1 base camp, 3 huts, 1400 lbs rice and 2 sampans.

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(5) Operation RENO I, 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 15 VCS, 1 VCC, 2 draft dodgers.

2 Equipment captured: None.

3 Equipment destroyed: 4 base camps, 13 huts, 95

bunkers and 30 foxholes.

(6) Operation MUSKOGON, 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 2 KIA, 7 MIA.

2 Equipment: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: None.

2 Equipment captured: None.

3 Equipment destroyed: 1 base camp, 1000 ft det cord, 1

105mm rd and 5 booby traps.

(7) Operation EL PASO II, 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES: None.

(8) Operation HARDIHOOD, 173d Abn Bde (Sep), continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 21 KIA, 97 MIA.

2 Equipment damage: 1 APC.

3 Equipment destroyed: None.

(b) FVGF LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 1 KIA, 1 MIA.

2 Equipment: None.

(c) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 45 KIA (BC), 30 KIA (Poss), 1 VCC, 78

VCS.

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2 Equipment captured: 21 SA, 862 rds SA ammo, 25 magazines for 7.62mm SMG, 8 pair sandals, 2 gas masks, 2 homemade gas masks, 8 canteens, US web equip, 4 entrenching tools, 1 helmet, 20 field packs, several VC uniforms, 12 black pajamas, 604 documents, 6 school bks, 1 packet heroin and 135.2 tons rice.

3 Equipment destroyed: 33.6 tons rice, 2 tons salt, 55 gal oil, 46 gal diesel fuel, 45 gal kerosene, one 1/2 ton trk, 46 gren, 11 DH-10 mines, one 40 lb shaped charge, 6 AT mines, 5 arty rds, 174 bldgs, 200 lbs clothing, 288 med items, 2 general stores, 1 mess hall, 1 dispensary and 15 bundles of punji stakes.

(9) Operation MAKIKI, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, (1/5 (M) Inf, 4/23 Inf (- Co B), 1/27 Inf (- Co C), 2/27 Inf, 1/8 Arty (Ds), Plat from B/65 Engr), S&D, 030805H Jun, HAU NGHIA - XT420150, to capture and/or destroy VC and VC material, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 14 KIA.

2 Equipment damaged: 1 UH-1B.

3 Equipment destroyed: None.

(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 13 KIA (BC), 1 KBA (BC), 4 KBA (Poss)

25 VCC, 19 VCS.

2 Equipment captured: 5,500 lbs rice, 4 SA, 2 pistol belts.

3 Equipment destroyed: 3 tunnels, 4 sampans, 11 bldgs, 25 booby traps, 4 AT mines, 7 AP mines, 1 CBU bomb and 5 bunkers.

(10) Operation FORT SMITH, 2/14 Inf (-), 25th Inf Div (2/14 Inf (- Co B), 3d Plat of A/65 Engr), S&D, 030900H Jun, HAU NGHIA-XT519195, to capture and/or destroy VC and VC material, continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 1 KIA.

2 Equipment: None.

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(b) ENEMY LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 5 VCS.

2 Equipment: None.

2. (C) Statistical Summary of Operations:

Part I US Forces:

C. Objectives:

	<u>Province</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Init/Term</u>
C1	RUNG SAT	YS000580	S&D	LEXINGTON	170700H Apr/Cont
C2	BINH DUONG	XT875145	S&D	LAM SON II	230915H May/Cont
C3	BINH DUONG	XT931281	S&D	ADELAIDE I	300700H May/Cont
C4	BINH DUONG	XT921421	S&D	ADELAIDE II	312030H May/Cont
C5	LONG KHANH	YT301098	S&D	RENO I	300630H May/Cont
C6	BINH DUONG	XT789321	S&D	MUSKEGON	020555H Jun/Cont
C7	BINH LONG	XU735089	S&D	EL PASO II	021430H Jun/Cont
C8	PHUC TUY	YS533675	Clearing S&D, Scty	HARDIHOOD	160500H May/Cont
C9	HAU HGHIA	XT420150	S&D	MAIKIKI	030805H Jun/Cont
C10	HAU HGHIA	XT519195	S&D	FORT SMITH	030900H Jun/Cont

D. Forces:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Obj</u>	<u>Contact</u>	<u>Init/Term</u>	<u>Init Spt</u> <u>by</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>NGFS</u>
D1 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div	C1	031455H, D/032115H	Frd	0	No	
D2 1st Inf Div Arty	C2	0/0				
D3 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	C3	0/0				
D4 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	C4	030730H, D/031845H	Frd	F100 (USAF)	No	
D5 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div	C5	0/0				
D6 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div	C6	030926H, D/031155H	Frd	0	No	
D7 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div	C7	0/0				
D8 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	C8	031040H, D/031825H	Frd	0	No	

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D9 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div (1/5 (M) Inf, 4/23 Inf (-) 1/27 Inf(-), 2/27 Inf. 1/8 Arty (DS), Plat from B/65 Engr Bn) 09 030927H, 0/032200H Frd A1 (VNAF) No A1 (USN) F5 (USAF)

D10 2/14 Inf (-), 25th Inf Div (2/14 Inf (-), 3d Plat of A/65 Engr Bn) C10 030900H, D/032300H Frd 0

K Losses/Damage

K1 Enemy:

Unit	Size/ID	KIA/VCC	Wpns	Ammo
D1	unk/unk	9(BC)/0	3 SA	0
D4	unk/unk	1(Poss)/1VCS	2 SA	0
D6	unk/unk	0/0	0	1000 ft det cord, 1 105mm rd, 5 booby traps
D8	unk/unk	0/0	1 SA	0
D9	unk/unk	13(BC)/25VCC 1KBA(BC)/19VCS 4 (Poss)	4 SA	25 booby traps, 4 AT mines, 7 AP mines
D10	unk/unk	0/5VCS	0	0

K2 Enemy

Unit	Size/ID	Structures Dest/Dam	Material Dest/Dam/Cptrd
D1	unk/unk	0/0	3 sampans/0/0
D4	unk/unk	1 base camp/0	0/0/0
D6	unk/unk	1 base camp/0	0/0/0
D8	unk/unk	0/0	0/0/0
D9	unk/unk	3 tunnels/0 11 bldgs	4 sampans/0/5,500 lbs rice 2 pistol belts
D10	unk/unk	0/0	0/0/0

K3 Friendly:

Unit	Size/ID	KIA/WIA/Cptrd/MIA	Wpns	Ammo
D1	unk/unk	0/0/0/0	0	0
D4	unk/unk	0/4/0/0	0	0
D6	unk/unk	2/7/0/0	0	0
D8	unk/unk	1/1/0/0	0	0

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D9	unk/unk	0/14/0/0	0	0
D10	unk/unk	1/0/0/0	0	0

K4 Friendly:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>Structures Dest/Dam</u>	<u>Material Dest/Dam</u>	<u>Loc</u>
D1	unk/unk	0/0	0/0	0
D4	unk/unk	0/0	0/1 A.C	0
D6	unk/unk	0/0	0/0	0
D8	unk/unk	0/0	0/0	0
D9	unk/unk	0/0	0/1UH-1B	0
D10	unk/unk	0/0	0/0	0

K5 Total friendly initiated small unit actions w/o contacts: 46

K5A Friendly initiate small unit contacts: 2

<u>K5B Prov/coord</u>	<u>K5C DtG</u>	<u>Frd unit/ K5D Losses</u>	<u>Enemy Unit/ K5F Losses</u>	<u>type K5F action</u>
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BINH DOUNG

XT685169	030710H (D)	C/4/9 Inf/14IA	5KIA(BC) unk/1KIA(POss) 1 tunnel	ambush
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HU NGHIA

XT674134	031430H (D)	B/3/4 Cav/14IA	unk/3 huts 5 tunnels	S&D
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Part II F/GF

C. Objectives:

<u>Providence</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Init/Term</u>
C1 PHUCC TUY	YS533675	Clearing, S&D, Sety	HARDIHOOD	160500H Day/Con

D. Forces:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Obj</u>	<u>Contact</u>	<u>Init/Term</u>	<u>Init by</u>	<u>Air Spt</u>	<u>NGFS</u>
D1 5/RAR	C1	030715H, D/031230H	Frd	0	No	

K Losses/Damage

K1 Enemy

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/In</u>	<u>KIA/VCC</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>Ammo</u>
D1	unk/unk	3/0	3 SA	2 grenades 172 rds SA ammo

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K2 Enemy:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>Structures</u> <u>Dest/Dam</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Dest/Dam/Cotrd</u>
D1	unk/unk	0/0	16 gal diesel/0/5.5 tons rice, fuel 61 documents, 2 gas masks, 3 mag for 7.62 Chicom SMG

K3 Friendly:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>KIA/WIA/Cotrd/MIA</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>Ammo</u>
D1	unk/unk	0/0/0/0	0	0

K4 Friendly:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>Structures</u> <u>Dest/Dam</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Dest/Dam</u>	<u>Loc</u>
D1	unk/unk	0/0	0/0	0

K5 Total friendly initiated small unit actions w/o contact: 1

K5A Friendly initiated small unit contacts: 0

SEAMAN
Maj Gen

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

For *Hayes* 4/c
LYNCH
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II F FORCEV
LONG BINH
061 200H June 66

PERINTREP No. 12

Period Covered: 290001H May to 042400H June 1966

References: Map, Vietnam 1:50,000

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DOD DIR 5200.10

1. (C) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

Enemy initiated activity during the week was characterized by harassments and fierce small scale attacks, primarily against Popular and Regional Force outposts in III CTZ. On 2 June, elements of the 1/28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, encountered an estimated platoon sized VC local force unit in fortified positions near XT 928270. VC losses after this brief but intense firefight were 6 KIA (BC) and 14 KIA (Possible). Operation Makiki, commencing on 3 June, began auspiciously when the Recon Platoon 1/5th (M) Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, quickly swept through a 400 square meter area in western Hau Nghia Sector, vic XT 467157, killing 11 VC (BC) and capturing 19. This operation, conducted astride one of the main VC commo-liaison routes, probably dealt a serious blow to enemy resupply operations in this area. Shortly before midnight on 4 June, two VC platoons fiercely attacked Loc Ninh with small arms fire and an estimated sixty rounds of 81mm mortar fire. Artillery, a light fire team, and four airstrikes supported the defenders. VC losses are unknown. RED HAZE emissions during the week indicated possible significant main force VC activity in west central Binh Long Province. RED HAZE emissions in other areas were too widely scattered to be conclusive. SLAR reports indicated continued activity along the Cambodian border in the western portions of Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces, suggesting intensified VC resupply activity in these areas. VC initiated incidents, such as harassing fires, mortarings and road interdictions continued to be most numerous in Binh Duong Province.

2. (C) ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD:

a. Strengths and Dispositions.

See Annex A.

b. Based on analysis of reports available to this headquarters the probable locations of VC divisions and main force regiments normally operating in III Corps Tactical Zone are:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
All dates as of 042400H June 1966.	5th Division	Phuoc Tuy Province
	9th Division	Southwestern Binh Long Province vic XT 5989
	Dong Thap II Regt	Vic XS 4496
	101st NVA Regt	Vic XU 8320
	141st NVA Regt	Northeastern Phuoc Long Province
	165A (AKA Capital Liberation Regt)	Vic XT 6130

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
All dates as of 042400H June 1966.	250th (AKA Bac Son Regt)	War Zone D
	271st (AKA C56, Q761)	Vic XU 6312
	272d (AKA C58, Q762)	Vic XT 6677
	273d (AKA C59 Q763)	Vic XU 5603
	274th (AKA 94th Dong Nai Regt)	Vic YS 3585
	275th (AKA 5th)	Vic YS 7884

(Comment: Several reports mentioned the possible presence of other regimental size forces in or near III CTZ. These include a regiment, coded 17, of the 14th NVA Division, location unknown, the H17 Regiment, located vic XT 225645, elements of the "Good Warrior" NVA Regiment, vic XS 2882, and the F-900 Battalion of the VC "Winter" Regiment, YU 1736.)

c. Reserves and Reinforcements: The regimental-sized units, mentioned in the above comment, should be considered as reinforcements to VC units normally operating in III CTZ.

d. thru g. omitted.

h. Air Defense.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>TYPE FIRE</u>	<u>HITS</u>
XT 750160	232215H	UH-1B	1000 feet	SA	1
YS 519847	290745H	L-19	Not reported	SA	0
YS 435788	290920H	L-19	Not reported	SA	0
XT 126656	291337H	O-1E	300 feet	SA	1
XT 624308	291422H	UH-1B	1000 feet	SA	0
XT 655412	291630H	UH-1D	Not reported	SA	Not reported
XT 670345	291635H	UH-1B	1200 feet	SA	Many
XT 921367	300650H	UH-1B	Not reported	SA	0
XT 873117	300805H	UH-1B	Not reported	SA	0
XT 895295	301015H	2UH-1D's	50 feet	SA	2
XT 887292	301015H	UH-1D	500 feet	SA	0
YS 469677	301115H	UH-1D	8 feet	SA	0
XT 885107	301215H	O-13	600 feet	SA	0
XT 370050	301315H	L-19	Not reported	SA	Several
XT 934279	301355H	UH-1D	1000 feet	SA	0
XT 8432	301530H	UH-1D	Not reported	SA	1
XT 694118	301545H	UH-1D	1300 feet	SA	0

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>TYPE FIRE</u>	<u>HITS</u>
XT 68 5112	301640H	UH-1D	50 feet	SA	0
XT 970348	301640H	L-19	Not reported	SA	0
XT 9130	301710H	UH-1D	100 feet	SA & AW	Not reported
XT 657314	301716H	UH-1D	1200 feet	SA	1
XT 790448	301730H	UH-1D	1200 feet	SA	1
YT 910230	210715H	2UH-1D's	25 feet	AW	2
YT 910230	310715H	UH-1D	100 feet	AW	1
XT 488189	311330H	UH-1D	500 feet	SA	0
XT 702244	311630H	UH-1B	800 feet	AW	0
XT 739118	311930H	UH-1D	2500 feet	AW	0
XT 657175	312050H	UH-1B	2000 feet	SA	0
XT 820125	312130H	UH-1D	3500 feet	SA	0
XT 641145	312200H	UH-1D	300 feet	SA	0
XT 923128	010900H	UH-1B	1400 feet	SA	Not reported
XT 724237	011050H	UH-1B	400 feet	AW	0
XT 920140	011200H	UH-1D	2000 feet	SA	1
XS 433714	021035H	UH-1B	700 feet	SA	1
XT 715565	021430H	UH-1B	200 feet	SA	1
XT 917252	021430H	UH-1B	Not reported	SA	0
XT 336044	021645H	UH-1B	1000 feet	SA	1
XT 915251	021700H	UH-1B	Not reported	SA	0
XT 921332	021735H	UH-1D	150 feet	SA & AW	2
XT 164053	030830H	UH-1B	10 feet	SA	2
XT 399105	030930H	UH-1B	500 feet	SA	2
XT 394105	031030H	UH-1D	20 feet	SA	2
XT 395104	031230H	UH-1D	40 feet	SA	1
XT 415156	031500H	UH-1D	20 feet	SA	2
XT 513192	031540H	UH-1D	100 feet	SA	0
YS 480836	031822H	UH-1B	Not reported	SA	0
XT 668268	032100H	C-47	4000 feet	AW	0
XT 574288 to	032230H	C-47	4000 feet	AW	0
XT 585309					

l. thru n. omitted.

o. Guerrilla.

(1) On 23 May 66, VC guerrillas forced a large number of people living in the area of Bau Co (XT 2766), Bau Tram (XT 5075), and Ben Cau Village (XT 2330) to help a VC labor team move a large amount of paddy rice for husking. The Central Intelligence Organization reported that the rice was supplied to Zonal Main Force units on a 10-day mission in Hieu-Thien. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.)

(2) A 5th Special Forces Group agent reported on 29 May that local guerrilla forces, estimated strength 100, were located in the Bao Sen Hamlet at XT 271480. The agent said the guerrillas were teaching local people military courses in an attempt to develop an organization similar to the GVN Reserve Forces. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

(3) During the reporting period, agents for the 5th Special Forces Group reported guerrilla units operating in these areas:

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(a) Guerrilla platoon, estimated strength 40, in Bau Go (XT 208300) and Suc Khuat (XT 285305). Mission: To collect taxes and food. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

(b) Guerrilla platoon, estimated strength 30, at YT 492012 and YT 494015. Mission: To collect taxes. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

(c) Guerrilla company, estimated strength 80, at An-Vieng Hamlet (YT 242008). Mission: To control workers at the An-Vieng rubber plantation and arrest strangers. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

(d) Guerrilla unit, estimated strength 55, in the area of XT 411157 and XT 414157. Mission: To urge local people to build barricades and lay mines on the route to Hau Nghia. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

p. thru s. omitted.

3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS:

a. thru f. omitted.

g. Enemy Defenses, Minefields, Fortifications, Barriers, Obstacles and Other Defensive Works:

(1) The Central Intelligence Organization reported that on 26 May the Tay Ninh Provincial Committee ordered its subordinate district committees to forbid travel on these axes: From Suoi Da (XT 336575) to Bau Nanh intersection (XT 258500); from Xom Vinh intersection (XT 146570) to Trang Sup (XT 170540); and from Ba Mountain (XT 255560) to the intersection at Lam Vo Bridge (XT 214530). The agent said the VC would lay automatic mines on these routes to weaken the activities of the GVN bases at Suoi Da, Ben Co and Trang Sup by isolating them, thus facilitating the VC's reconnaissance activities in the area before large scale attacks. (C.I.O. Agent B/2; II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.)

(2) III Corps reported enemy fortifications in scattered areas of the CTZ during the week. VC tunnel complexes were located at YS 608668 and YS 590690 on 31 May. On 1 June, a III Corps agent said a VC unit (Song Cau 761) had dug many trenches and foxholes at Nuoc Ngot (YT 489513) with the intention of operating in the area. (III Corps agent C/4; II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

(3) The VC continued to use roadblocks and blow up bridges to interdict major highways in the III Corps CTZ, set up ambushes, collect taxes and harass friendly troops. The roadblocks were cleared and the bridges either bypassed or repaired, except on Interprovincial Route 2 where a quarter-mile stretch of road cuts and a roadblock near YS 463820 made the road impassable at the end of the reporting period. Extensive mining also was done by the VC on Route 2 earlier in the week.

h. Administrative Installations and Support.

10 May	The Binh Thuan VC Provincial Party Committee was operating a 400 bed dispensary in Binh Tuy Province. Eight buildings, each about twenty meters long and five meters wide, concealed by trees, were located at the base of a large mountain. The dispensary was guarded by two	YT 960448
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antiaircraft guns (vic ZT 002458) and an unknown sized regular North Vietnamese unit, located on the opposite side of the mountain from the dispensary. Agent F/6 (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

19 May VC ammunition storage point, consisting XS 424863
of a trench three meters long, three meters wide and six-tenths meters deep, covered by two roofs, camouflaged with foliage. Storage point is guarded by small group of VC. Agent F/6 (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

26 May VC are operating a Regional provisions XS 354957
depot at Giong Mat Cat, consisting of nine houses, six meters long, three meters wide and two meters high. Three thousand bags of unhusked rice are stored at the depot. After grinding, the rice is supplied to VC units of Military Region VI. Security of the depot is provided by a VC company. (SMIAT uneval)(II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

i. omitted.

j. Weather Summary.

(1) There was a noticeable trend during the week toward higher maximum temperatures. The daily weather pattern showed ceilings near 1,200 feet between 0500H and 1000H with visibilities from one-quarter mile to five miles in patchy ground fog and haze. Showers and thunderstorms began between 1100H and 1600H, however, the mean starting time was 1300H. Thunderstorms became isolated by 2300H. Weather stations briefly reported lowest conditions with ceilings near 800 feet, visibilities near one mile, and winds gusting to near 25 knots. Surface winds during the week were generally light and variable. The mean maximum temperature in the CTZ was 94 degrees. The mean minimum temperature was 75 degrees. Rainfall amount for the week was below normal. Soils were dry to moist and locally wet in areas where the heaviest rainfall occurred. Traction varied according to local rainfall amounts.

(2) Effect on Friendly Forces. Sixty-eight photo, RED HAZE and SLAR aerial reconnaissance surveillance missions were adversely affected by weather. In addition, the 25th Inf Div was delayed one hour in support of Operation MAKIKI due to weather.

k. Captive, Returnee, and Refugee Report.

See Annex B.

l. omitted.

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[REDACTED]

4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. omitted.

b. Espionage.

A SMIAT agent reported that on 18 May a group of VC held a propaganda lecture near XT 274035, in which they appealed to women to participate in their intelligence task of obtaining information from U.S. forces. Pretty women were to be employed as bar maids or mistresses of Americans. Unattractive women were to be employed as house maids. Children of mixed American and Vietnamese blood would be supported by the Revolutionary Government. The VC stated that the people's participation in these intelligence tasks would contribute to the war against the GVN, and that the women's actions would make them heroines. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

c. omitted.

d. Political.

A SMIAT agent reported that the VC have decided to increase their anti-government movement and create confusion among various political circles. The VC will train their outstanding cadre and send them to various towns to induce the people to stage anti-government demonstrations, and spread dissension among various religious sects and political parties. They will also pay the people to shout anti-American slogans. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

e. omitted.

f. Miscellaneous.

On 29 May, a source reported that an unknown number of VC occasionally occupy the forests on both sides of Highway 1 between Bien Hoa (XT 9910) and Thanh Hoa (YT 1312). Further east along Highway 1, VC continuously occupy the forests. The village of Trang Bom (YT 2013) is occupied by VC to such an extent that small groups of Americans would not be safe there. (II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.)

5. (C) ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES:

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Friendly operations during the week have possibly reduced somewhat the enemy's attack capability, but this capability remains quite substantial in certain areas, as illustrated by the attack on Loc Ninh on 4 June, mentioned in paragraph 1. Captured documents indicate a diminishment of VC morale and an increase in logistical problems in some areas. Despite these limitations, VC main force regiments, as disposed in paragraph 2a, still have the ability to attack objectives in several areas within III CTZ.

(a) The 271st, 272d, and 273d Regiments of the 9th Division, reinforced, possibly, by the 101st and 141st NVA Regiments can attack targets in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Binh Duong Sectors.

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(b) The possible dispositions of the 101st and 141st NVA Regiments extend the enemy's attack capability to Phuoc Long and northern Long Khanh Provinces.

(c) The possible location of the 250th NVA Regiment in War Zone D and the proximity of the 5th Division present the possibility of a coordinated multiregimental VC attack in Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, and Bien Hoa provinces.

(d) The Dong Thap II and 165A Regiments, together with local force units, provide the VC with a large scale attack capability in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.

(2) The enemy's reinforcement capability remains essentially the same as indicated in Perintrep No. 11. The Dong Thap I Regiment (MR8) and two separate battalions, the 186th and the 840th (MR6), are known main force units capable of reinforcing VC elements in III Corps Tactical Zone. The possible activation of the Q766 and Q767 Regiments also places these units in this category, if not committed in the zone. The 6th Regiment, reportedly moving from North Vietnam through Kien Thuong and Long An Provinces, should also be considered as a possible reinforcing unit. In addition, the units mentioned in the comment of paragraph 1, should be added to this list, along with the 145th Artillery Battalion (possibly in MR6). Reinforcing elements could be available within five days.

(3) The VC can defend their bases and so-called safe areas with all or part of the forces mentioned in paragraph 5a(1) and (2) above.

(4) The VC can also withdraw or avoid contact within or outside of III CTZ after exercising any one of the above capabilities.

b. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Attack Capability.

(a) The most seriously threatened areas for possible large scale VC attack by the 271st, 272d and 273d Regiments continue to be Loc Ninh (XU 7208), An Loc (XT 7488), Minh Thanh (XT 6407) and Chon Thanh (XT 7662). The 4 June VC attack on Loc Ninh emphasized the seriousness of this threat. The flexibility of the threat was demonstrated by VC assassination teams operating during the attack, killing a village chief, police chief, assistant hamlet chief and two other civilians in Loc Ninh and two nearby villages. The VC ability to emplace mortars rapidly and achieve accurate mortar fire indicates a high level of weapons training. If the enemy had chosen to follow this mortaring with a multiregimental attack, he might well have won a significant victory. Operation El Paso II and CIDG long range patrolling in this area possibly have kept the VC somewhat off balance and disorganized. RED HAZE emissions this week to the west, north, and south of Loc Ninh indicated increased VC activity in the threatened area. The enemy will likely adopt his attack capability in this area again during the southwest monsoon season.

(b) Recent CIDG operations around Song Be (YU 1709) and Bu Dop (YU 9729) have possibly hampered the enemy attack capability in Phuoc Long Sector. The suspected dispositions of the 101st and 141st NVA Regiments and their proximity to the Cambodian base and the known infiltration routes, however, still pose a possible threat to these areas. The threat is reinforced

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by the locations of the 186th and 840th Battalions vic ZU 1441 and YU 5854, respectively. A captive's report that the F-900 Battalion was located at YU 1736, if true, also enhances this enemy capability.

(c) There are indications that the VC in Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces are having morale problems. A document captured by elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Phuoc Tuy Province pointed out that personnel shortages, poor physical condition of personnel, lack of a source of personnel replacement, and preoccupation with agricultural production due to food shortages, have all adversely affected VC troop morale in this area. These indications reduce the likelihood of immediate attack by main force elements in Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy and Long Khanh Sectors. Notwithstanding, the two attacks on Cam Tam (YS 372998) on 28 and 30 May were possibly made by elements of the 274th Regiment, which, according to documents, is in a high state of combat readiness. A captive's report of the 860th Battalion (local force) operating near YS 4666 tends to confirm the possibility that VC local forces and guerrillas are those being contacted by friendly units in Operation Hardihood, while main force units are concentrating their efforts on resupply and training activities. These local forces and guerrillas are likely to continue their interdiction efforts along Routes 2 and 15.

(d) Operations conducted by the 25th US Infantry Division in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces have possibly lessened the VC attack capability in these areas, even though contact with main force VC elements has not been made. The VC are likely to continue their harassments and small scale attacks against Regional and Popular Force outposts in Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces.

(e) The VC sustained their interdiction efforts during the week by erecting numerous roadblocks along National Highways 1, 13, 15, and 20, and along Interprovincial Routes 2, 16, and 1A. Possibly their intention was to disrupt friendly resupply missions, and to divert friendly attention from other areas. It seems likely that the VC will continue these activities.

(2) Reinforcement Capability. Agent reports continue to mention the infiltration of company and battalion sized units, in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 1, into III CTZ. These reports indicate that the VC will continue to reinforce their III CTZ units while preparing for their expected southwest monsoon offensive.

(3) Defend Capability. VC initiated incidents continued to be primarily harassments and small scale attacks. The VC is likely to exercise his defense capability, however, when surprised or when attacked in his sensitive areas.

(4) Withdraw Capability. Most of the week's VC incidents, with the possible exception of the attack on Loc Ninh, seem to have been borne by local force and guerrilla units, while the main force units avoided contact. This exercise of VC withdrawal capability will probably be continued until the VC adopts his attack capability.

c. Relative Probability of Adoption.

(1) Local forces and guerrillas will continue to conduct diversionary attacks and acts of terrorism in GVN controlled areas, along Routes 1, 13, 15, 16, and around US installations.

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(2) The 9th Division will likely attack and harass Loc Ninh, An Loc, and the SF camps at Minh Thanh, Chon Thanh, and Soui Da during the southwest monsoon season. Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and Phu Loi, along with ARVN outposts in Binh Duong Province will probably be harassed and mortared by local and guerrilla forces. Mortar attacks should be expected, at the same time, against Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut airbases.

(3) Reinforce the 9th Division with NVA replacements and possibly the 101st or 141st NVA Regiments. Continue the reorganization of the 5th Division, probably with the addition of the 250th Regiment.

d. Vulnerabilities: See II FFORCEV Perintrep #10.

6. (C) Conclusion: The most likely area where the enemy will initiate attacks in the coming week is Binh Long Province.

CONTENTS OF THIS PERINTREP ARE RELEASABLE TO RVNAF AND FWMAFV.

Acknowledge.

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ANNEXES: A - Strengths and Dispositions
B - Status Report

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II FFORCEV STAFF-16
I FFORCEV-3
SA, IV Corps-1
SA, II Corps-1
SA, CMR-2
SA, HOP TAC-1
1ST INF DIV-15
DSA, III Corps-5
HQS, 1STATF LOGSPT GP-2

25TH INF DIV-24
173D ABN BDE-4
C DET, 5TH SFG-1
12TH AVN GP-1
525TH MI-2
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1st ATF-10

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219TH MI-5

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ANNEX A (STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS) to II FFORCEV PERINTREP No 12.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
24 May	C 65th Company	XT 807257 XT 808262 XT 815265	5th SFG Agent C/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
24 May	100 VC	YT 230090	Bien Hoa Police Agent C/1. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
24 May	1 VC Regt	XT 190770	SMLAT Report II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: A heavy gun battalion of the U 80th Artillery Regiment was reported in the same area.)			
26 May	C 13 Long An Province Mobile Company.	XS 724659 XS 726661	5th SFG Agent F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
27 May	317th Bn	XT 962582 XT 962587 XT 962594	5th SFG Agent C/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
27 May	Mobile Company of the Phu Loi Bn	XT 898306 XT 891296	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
27 May	C 306th Company	XT 777499 XT 777491 XT 782487 XT 732471	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
27 May	C 800th Company	XT 789499 XT 791491 XT 790484 XT 790477	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
27 May	1 U/I Bn	XT 371140	25th Inf Div (US) Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
27 May	1 NVN Regular Bn	XT 340900 XT 350902	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
27 May	302d Bn	YS 619822 YS 621826 YS 605834 YS 608832	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
28 May	2 Companies of the 261st Bn	Cai Lay District, My Tho Province (IV Corps)	5th SFG Agent F/2. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.

(Comment: On 26 May, these companies were located in III CTZ at XS 401716, XS 403718, XS 406720, and XS 405723.)

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
28 May	506th Bn	XS 802548 XS 803545 XS 802543	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
28 May	C-800th Bn	YT 068362	Eastern Directorate Na- tional Police Report C/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
28 May	516th Bn	XT 160315	5th SFG Agent C/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
28 May	Chon-Thanh District Local Company	XT 685514 XT 691517	5th SFG Agent F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
29 May	Estimated 1 Bn	YS 305875	III Corps Agent F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: No battalion-sized units have been reported in this area recently. However, on 19 May, agents located the 28th Company at YS 304935.)			
29 May	303d Bn	XT 999296	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
29 May	1 Company of the R 900th Regt	YT 117229 YT 118222	5th SFG Agent F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
29 May	2 companies of the 267th Bn/DT 2 Regt	XS 664837 XS 667838 XS 667835	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
29 May	H 17th Regt	XT 225645	5th SFG Agent C/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: On 26 May, a 5th SFG agent reported that a regimental-sized unit, coded 17, of the 14th NVA Division, infiltrated into III CTZ from Cambodia to re-inforce units in Hau Nghia and Ca Mau (IV Corps).)			
30 May	2 U/I Bns	XS 490950 XS 530920	III Corps Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: The battalions reportedly withdrew to these positions after the attack on Duc Hue District seat on 27 May.)			
30 May	Estimated 1 Bn	XS 570777	924th Spt Gp (ARVN) F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
30 May	D-82d Bn	YT 472378 YT 476381 YT 481384	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
30 May	U/I Mobile Bn	YS 302692	III Corps Agent C/1. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.

(Comment: This unit allegedly intends to stage attacks along National Highway 15.)

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
30 May	210th Bn	XT 015727 XT 015723 XT 028728 XT 027732	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
31 May	1 U/I Bn	YS 464845	ARVN Officer (unevaluated). II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: RED HAZE emissions were noted in the same vicinity on 28 and 29 May.)			
31 May	1 VC Regt	XT 620430	5th ARVN Div Agent (unevaluated). II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
(Comment: On 31 May, 3d Bde, 1st Div (US) reported that the 307th Cuu Long Regt was at XT 6242.)			
31 May	1 Bn of the Phu Loi Regt	XT 892326	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
31 May	Cuu-Long 1 Bn	XT 185658 XT 188657 XT 187652	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
31 May	306th Bn	XS 792708 XS 792705 XS 788694 XS 782692	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
31 May	548th Bn	XT 442838 XT 443841 XT 447845 XT 456840	5th SFG Agent F/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
31 May	320th Bn	XT 565293 XT 514306 XT 512342	5th SFG Agent B/3. II FFORCEV EVAL F/3.
1 June	C 62d Company	XT 899261 XT 899251	1st Div (US) informer F/6. II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
1 June	1 VC Regt	XT 9885	MACV ARVN Advisor (unevaluated) II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.
1 June	Estimated VC Bn	XS 940720	ARVN Visual Recon II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.

(Comment: On 31 May, an U/I Bn was reported by Rung Sat Special Zone at XS 912710.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1 June	VC Bn	XT 605760	5th SFG Agent C/3. II FFORCEV F/6.
2 June	2 companies of the 445th (D 860th) Bn	YS 5864	Dat Do District Chief II FFORCEV EVAL F/6.

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ANNEX B TO PERINTREP NO 12 II FFORCEV
CAPTIVE, CHIEU HOI, REFUGEE STATUS REPORT
Period covered: 0001 hours, 29 May to 2400 hours, 4 June.

Number captured or acquired during reporting period	CAPTIVES		SUSPECTS	RETURNEES	REFUGEES
	NVA	OTHER			
1st Inf Div	0	1	33	0	0
25th Inf Div	0	22	35	0	0
173d Abn Bde	0	0	1	0	0
PRESENT LOCATION	1-Bao Trai 1-Evacuated through medical channels after interrogation 1-Cong Hoa Hospital, Saigon.		1-Baria (Phuoc Tuy District). 5-Trang Bang District. 11-Cu Chi District. 18-Bau Trai. 7-Phuoc Vinh National Police. 1-Ben Cat District. 19-Xuan Loc District. 4-Binh Duong National Police. 2-Released.		
Status of Interrogation	3-Completed		68-Completed	Completed	Completed
Total held at end of period	20		1	NONE	NONE

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BACKGROUND: At Appendix 1 (Inclosure 1) is a list of intelligence indicators used in College instruction to predict enemy capabilities. These indicators pertain to a more conventional force and situation than found in Vietnam. Consequently, the applicability and validity of the indicators to the Vietnamese situation is unknown.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: Are intelligence indicators listed in Appendix 1 (Inclosure 1) valid in Vietnam? If not, what specific additions or deletions are required? Comments on each of the indicators, keyed to Inclosure 1 are as follows:

ATTACK

1. Not valid. Assassinations and abductions are to facilitate VC control and further deplete the limited GVN resources of leadership.

2. A valid indicator.

3. Indicator has some validity. Most sabotage is designed to impede commerce, which in turn is designed to preclude GVN distribution of goods.

4. A valid indicator.

5. A weak indicator. VC infiltration from out of country appears to meet enemy requirements for weapons and ammunition, based upon sustained firepower the VC have been observed to apply in pitched battles. Captured documents indicate that the VC are successful in raising funds for in-country purchase of items from normal wholesale and retail outlets.

6. A weak indicator. VC inspired demonstrations are apparently designed primarily to discredit the GVN. Demonstrators protest high prices, low wages, and shelling and air attacks on hamlets and agricultural workers.

7. Occasionally valid indicator. Most of the VC advertised attacks do not occur. However, the VC do occasionally warn the populace to keep away from places frequented by Americans, and subsequent to such warnings have occasionally employed mines and demolitions at restaurants and living quarters.

#17

INCL 6

8. Valid dual indicator.
9. Valid indicator.
10. A high rate of defection probably would invite a VC attack.
11. Valid indicator.
12. Valid indicator.
13. Occasionally valid indicator. There have been examples where the enemy did not defend base areas of great value to him. One such base area not defended contained over 1,500 tons of rice.
14. Valid indicator. Captured documents indicate that offensive operations frequently are used to raise morale. The documents indicate that offensive operations conducted for morale building purposes are against easy targets.
15. Indications applicable to conventional forces are also applicable to guerrilla forces in Vietnam.

DEFENSE

1. Valid indicator.
2. Valid dual indicator.
3. Valid indicator.
4. Valid indicator.
5. If ambushes were conducted for the primary purpose of obtaining arms and ammunition, then such ambushes would have to be considered valid indicators of subsequent VC attack and VC defense. However, the apparent purpose of ambushes is a defeat of the ambushed force, and destruction of their equipment and transport.
6. Valid indicator.
7. Valid indicator.
8. Valid indicator.
9. Valid dual indicator.

10. Valid indicators.

CONTROL

1-10. All are valid indicators.

Additional questions and answers

a. Information is needed on the criteria applied in establishing intelligence collection mission responsibilities between the Army and other services; doctrinal criteria applied in the operational employment of ground or aerial systems, ground and aerial systems.

Answer: Field Force Headquarters experience is inadequate to provide a complete answer to this question; this being a joint headquarters function, and Field Force being a unilateral Army headquarters. Collection requirements and responsibilities beyond Field Force capabilities are supported by other US services and GVN and other US resources, as required. Within the Field Force area of responsibility collection mission requirements are based on known capabilities.

b. What battlefield information requirements are satisfied by other services:

Answer: All battlefield information requirements are satisfied in whole or in part by Army. Air Force supplements with aerial photography, infrared and visual aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. Navy supplements, on a voluntary basis, with information collected incident to their offshore and inland waterway operations. The primary supplementary sources are the US Army advisors to GVN ground forces, and US Special Forces, both of whom pass to Field Force and subordinate units that information collected from Vietnamese military, police, and political elements.

c. What are the movement rates, maximum and normal, of enemy elements?

Answer: Based upon captured documents and statements by captives and ralliers, the maximum movement rate is 3 to 3 1/2 miles per hour, and the normal movement rate is 2 1/4 miles per hour. Both rates are for battalion and company units. No specific data has been collected relating to simultaneous movement of all elements of a regiment.

ATTACK

1. Systematic assassination and abduction of government officials, including health, agricultural, and educational officers.
2. Abduction of young men. Frequently seemingly unimportant persons are abducted for a source of information. Others are abducted for training and indoctrination, etc., as well as for a labor source.
3. Increased sabotage activities in a particular area.
4. Sudden absence or increase of guerrilla activity and/or the civilian population.
5. Shortage of a particular type of supply, e.g., ammunition, medical supplies, footgear, etc., frequently indicates attack on friendly installations stocking the item short in supply.
6. Demonstrations by minority groups.
7. Increased propaganda in a certain area. Guerrilla forces will frequently issue propaganda to include the general time and date of a forthcoming attack. This is a positive indicator of the actual attack. Such actions serve to build up the guerrilla image; therefore, assist in control of the population.
8. The local population to include children in a particular area will not talk or associate with the US forces or the forces of the host country. This is a dual indicator, of guerrilla control and/or attack.
9. Concentration of local watercraft or other modes of mobility, especially if an attempt has been made to conceal them.
10. High rate of defection of regular and paramilitary forces of the host country.
11. Visits in villages, towns, etc., by strange women, men, boys and girls.
12. Disappearance of suspected insurgents, who normally spend all of their time in one particular area.
13. Friendly attack, of a guerrilla secure area, supply dump, or the destruction or capture of key guerrilla personnel of great value to the guerrilla force. Normally this will indicate that the guerrilla will initiate an offensive act of his own.
14. Low morale. This is not a positive indicator of attack; however, frequently guerrilla commanders will use the attack as a vehicle to boost the morale of his force.
15. Additionally, many indications applicable to conventional forces are applicable to guerrilla forces, e.g., increased reconnaissance and radio traffic, demonstrations, feints, massing of forces, change in location of headquarters, medical facilities, and other supporting forces.

DEFENSE

1. Detection of high proportion of heavy weapons among guerrilla forces.
2. Establishment of "combat or fortified villages." This is a dual indicator of defense and control.
3. An increase in kidnapping and the capture and retention of prisoners.
4. Gradual withdrawal of guerrilla units from aggressive action against the counterguerrilla force.
5. Supply ambushes designed to obtain arms and ammunition. This is a dual indicator of attack and defense.

Figure 44. TYPE INDICATIONS GUERRILLA WARFARE.

INCL 1 TO INCL 6
#17 (PART OF)

6. Presence of foot-traps, spikes, etc., in the area.
7. Establishment of agricultural areas.
8. Location of large, permanent type field headquarters, training areas, etc.
9. Presence of infiltration routes in the area. This is a dual indicator of defense and control.
10. Additionally, many indications applicable to conventional forces are applicable to guerrilla forces, such as: road blocks, canal blocks, occupation of good defensive terrain and stockage of supplies.

CONTROL

1. Failure of village officials to take strong precautions against being kidnapped or murdered as an indicator that an agreement or compromise has been made with the guerrilla force.
2. Refusal of the local population to furnish intelligence to government forces.
3. Evidence of foodstuffs being stocked for and delivered to the guerrilla force. Close observation of the local population will normally reveal some unusual behavior, such as: failing to do their daily chores; returning from work at odd hours; and returning from work without their food baskets being full.
4. Inability of the constituted government to collect taxes.
5. Cessation of guerrilla raids on inhabited areas.
6. The population continues to work but carefully moves away from the counter guerrilla force, i.e., plows or hoes their way out of the field.
7. New homes, newly cultivated fields, new roads, trails, and canals in areas other than those controlled by friendly forces.
8. Agricultural equipment, including animals left unattended.
9. Absence of people but signs of inhabitation, such as smoldering fires, smoke, foodstuff, and footprints.
10. Imposition of taxes on plantation owners or operators.

Figure 44. TYPE INDICATIONS GUERRILLA WARFARE (Continued).

BACKGROUND: In leadership instruction at the College, emphasis is placed on the differences that exist between leadership at low and high levels of command. In dealing with high command, the College stresses the responsibility for making decisions involving moral and ethical factors. In considering the environmental and cultural background of Southeast Asia, certain contradictions exist between oriental and occidental philosophy. Consequently, commanders can be faced with problems requiring the utmost in moral courage and integrity.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

a. What are the most perplexing leadership problems involving moral and ethical issues which commanders in Vietnam face?

Answer: Probably the most perplexing problem involving moral and ethical issues confronting the commander in Vietnam is the requirement to defeat the enemy, yet eliminate or minimize the loss of life and property to innocent noncombatants. This is not a new problem in military operations, but it is greatly accentuated in Vietnam by the very nature of the conflict. This problem is a matter of grave concern from the highest level to the lowest commanders conducting small tactical operations. The principal decisions made, and the techniques used in solving this problem are set forth in Inclosures 1-3, USMACV directives governing this matter.

#12

Incl 7

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

MACV DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-3

7 September 1965
(MACPD)

Effective until 6 September 1966 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

COMBAT OPERATIONS
MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT BATTLE CASUALTIES

1. PURPOSE. This directive prescribes policy designed to minimize non-combatant battle casualties and the impact of those which may occur.

2. GENERAL.

a. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is engaged in a fight for its survival against the communist Viet Cong (VC) supported and reinforced by the forces of the DRV. It is the objective of the VC to seize control of the hamlets, villages and towns by a combination of military action, terrorism, political action and subversion. It is the objective of the GVN to resist this process and where it has occurred, to reverse it. This means that the battle for Vietnam flows backward and forward across the homes and fields of the hapless rice farmer and the small town inhabitant. Whether, at any one time, he lives in a VC or a GVN controlled hamlet depends to a large extent upon factors and forces beyond his control. Eventually, of course, the GVN plans to regain control over all of the hamlets and all of the people.

b. The use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the VC will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the VC, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and more costly.

c. The circumstances described above call for the exercise of restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders at all echelons must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish their missions with due regard to the safety of their commands and the high importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the non-combatant populace.

d. The VC exploit fully incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF and US combat forces. Their objectives are to foster resentment against GVN and the United States, and to effect the permanent alienation of the people from the Government.

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Incl 1 to Incl 7

7 September 1965

3. APPLICATION.

a. US Forces - Commanders at every echelon are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

(1) Commanders will consider both the military and psychological objective of each operation. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive in the long run.

(2) Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties.

(3) The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.

(4) Forward air controllers and armed helicopter commanders will be briefed on areas to be avoided because of the presence of friendly or potentially friendly population. Such information must be sought from local officials at province and district level.

(5) With due regard to security and success of the mission, whenever possible the people will be warned of impending air strikes or operations by leaflets and broadcasts. Blame for military action in the area would be shifted to the VC.

(6) A civic action plan should be developed to support each operation even if the area has been controlled by the VC.

(7) Free strike zones should be configured to eliminate populated areas except those in accepted VC bases.

(8) Operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from US combat forces conducting operations in a particular province should be positioned at the sector headquarters for coordination. The sector advisors must perform this function in the absence of liaison.

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7 September 1965

(9) Assignment to US combat forces of qualified RVNAF liaison officers from appropriate RVNAF commanders is essential and should be arranged between US commanders and advisors for each significant operation. These liaison officers through their knowledge of the area of operation and the population can assist in identification of friend from foe and can help to insure close coordination with all Vietnamese forces. In this connection, the participation of Vietnamese forces in operations should be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a US action against the Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation should be sought at US battalion or even company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information, and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

(10) Established rules of good military conduct and discipline must be enforced.

(11) It is absolutely essential that US forces establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout SVN and to defeat any VC force encountered. This reputation for invincibility will produce innumerable psychological benefits and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same forces must constantly demonstrate their concern for the safety of non-combatants -- their compassion for the injured -- their willingness to aid and assist the sick, the hungry and the dispossessed.

b. US Advisors - US advisors will make every effort to convince Vietnamese counterparts of the necessity for preservation of the lives and property of non-combatants. Counterparts must be encouraged to promulgate and implement parallel instruction.

4. IMPLEMENTATION. Implementing instructions and SOP's will be issued by major subordinate commanders and senior corps advisors. Annex A provides additional guidance for incorporation in the instructions.

5. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 95-2, dated 2 July 1965.

b. Letter, COMUSMACV, Subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties, to SA and US Commanders, dated 7 July 1965.

1 Incl
Annex A - Psywar/CA

W. C. Westmoreland
W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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7 September 1965

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(9) The purpose of this directive is to ensure that all US forces in Vietnam are kept informed of the progress of the war and the status of the enemy. It is the policy of the US in Vietnam to maintain the highest level of security and to ensure that all US forces are kept informed of the progress of the war and the status of the enemy. It is the policy of the US in Vietnam to maintain the highest level of security and to ensure that all US forces are kept informed of the progress of the war and the status of the enemy.

(10) Established lines of good military conduct and discipline must be maintained.

(11) It is absolutely essential that US forces establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout SVN and to defeat any VC force encountered. This reputation for inviolability will produce an unbreakable psychological barrier and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same forces must consistently demonstrate their concern for the safety of non-combatants -- their compassion for the injured, their willingness to aid and sustain the sick, the hungry and the disabled.

(12) US Advisors - US advisors will make every effort to coordinate Vietnamese commitments at the necessary level of responsibility of the US and property of non-combatants. Commanders will be encouraged to promulgate and implement detailed instructions.

IMPLEMENTATION: Implementing instructions and SOP's will be issued by major subordinate commands and higher echelon advisors. Annex A provides additional guidance for implementation in the field.

REFERENCES:

MACV Directive 52-5, dated 1 July 1965

1. Letter, COMUSMACV, Saigon, 10 September 1965, Subject: Maintaining High Command
2. Letter, 1st AF, 1st AFHQ, 10 September 1965, Subject: Maintaining High Command

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UTILIZATION OF PSYWAR/CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCES

1. Commanders will utilize G5/S5 and Psywar staff officers to:
 - a. Assure that, where feasible, each operational plan contains a Psywar/CA annex and that all concerned are familiar with its provisions. Fragmentary orders should include reference to SOP's on minimization of non-combatant battle casualties.
 - b. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate non-combatants from the Viet Cong (VC).
 - c. Utilizing appropriate psywar techniques, explain to the people that the GVN and the US understand that in many cases villages and hamlets are, unfortunately, under temporary VC domination; that this condition will not for long prevail; and that in due course the GVN will restore law and order. In the meantime, the populace should shun the VC and protect themselves against battle damage.
 - d. Where feasible, follow each operation with a Psywar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future non-combatant casualties.
 - e. Following each operation wherein non-combatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the province chief concerned on prompt indemnification of those affected. Consideration should also be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

2. Civic Action:

As the situation dictates, operation plans will provide for utilization of all available assets, to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies; transportation and distribution of emergency rations; medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation; and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

CHANGE 3
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

9 May 1966
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY
AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965,
is changed as follows:

* * * * *

a. Add the following subparagraph:

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

* * * * *

2.

* * * * *

d. (Added) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter or transport crew.

* * * * *

b. Make the following pen and ink changes:

(1) Paragraph 4a: Delete the words "2d Air Division" and insert "Seventh Air Force."

(2) Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 2: Delete the word "Such" and insert "Except in emergencies, such."

CLASSIFIED BY Ng(3) 11/24/84 Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 6, 7, and 8: Delete the word "ground."

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Change 3, MACV Directive 95-2 (Cont)

9 May 1966

(4) Paragraph 7a(3), line 2: After the words "or village," insert the words "whenever possible."

(5) Paragraph 8d(2), line 4: Delete the words "2d Air Division" and insert "Seventh Air Force."

(6) Paragraph 7a(1)(a)1d: Delete the words "MSQ-35, Ground Directed Bombing System" and insert "AN/MSQ-77, Bomb Directing Central Radar."

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- A - HQ MACV
- 30 - CG, USARV
- 30 - CG, III MAF
- 30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 30 - CG, FFORCEV
- 30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 150 - Cdr, 2AD
- 20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
- 50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
- 2 - SA, CMR
- 2 - SA, Abn Bde
- 2 - SA, RF/PF
- 150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
- 10 - CTF 115
- 20 - FWMAC
- 1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
- 300 - MACAG-ARP
- 2 - MACAG-AO

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[REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

CHANGE 2
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

7 March 1966
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY
AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike Aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

1.

* * * * *

d. (Added) MSQ-35 Ground Directed Bombing
System.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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Change 2, MACV Directive 95-2 (Cont)

7 March 1966

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- A - HQ MACV
- 30 - CG, USARV
- 30 - CG, III MAF
- 30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 30 - CG, FFORCEV
- 30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 150 - Cdr, 2AD
- 20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
- 50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
- 2 - SA, CMR
- 2 - SA, Abn Bde
- 2 - SA, RF/PT
- 150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
- 10 - CTF 115
- 20 - FWMAO
- 1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det

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APO San Francisco 96243

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

17 January 1966
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY
AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

2. (C) DEFINITIONS.

* * * * *

b. (Superseded) FAC, as used in this directive, refers to an airborne Forward Air Controller (known as a Tactical Air Coordinator, Airborne, in the United States Marine Corps) or a Forward Air Controller operating from a ground position.

* * * * *

Make the following pen and ink changes:

a. Paragraph 5b, line 21: After the abbreviation "FAC", insert the words "when appropriate."

b. Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 2: Delete the word "airborne."

c. Paragraph 8b(5), line 1: Delete the words "All pilots" and insert the words "The controlling FAC."

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
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Change 1, Directive Number 95-2, HQ MACV (Cont)

17 January 1966

DISTRIBUTION:

- A - HQ MACV
- 30 - CG, USARV
- 30 - CG, III MAF
- 30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
- 30 - CG, FFORCE V
- 30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
- 150 - Cdr, 2AD
- 20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
- 20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
- 50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
- 2 - SA, Capital Military Region
- 2 - SA, Abn Bde
- 2 - SA, RF/PF
- 150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
- 10 - CTF 115
- 20 - FWMAO
- 1 - SA, Rail Security Det

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

20 December 1965
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY
AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

1. (C) PURPOSE. To establish guidance, procedures and restrictions on the employment of United States (US) military air delivered firepower in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (C) DEFINITIONS.

a. Areas of operation previously referred to as "Free Bomb Zones" or "Free Strike Areas" are hereby redesignated as "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES." These zones are further defined as those areas where strikes may be made without further approval by the province chief.

b. FAC as used in this directive refers to an Airborne Forward Air Controller.

3. (C) GENERAL.

a. The mission of all US military aviation in RVN is to provide support for the counterinsurgency effort of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) by both supplementing the Vietnam Air Forces (VNAF) in support of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and by supporting US ground forces. In order to effectively accomplish the task of augmenting RVNAF or US ground force endeavors against hostile targets and to minimize casualties among friendly forces and non-combatants, necessary guidelines and procedures for air strikes are established in this directive. It is extremely important that priority emphasis be placed on the reduction of incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatant casualties, and civilian property damage.

b. While restraints and procedures designed to minimize losses among friendly forces and non-combatants are necessary, the objective to obtain the full productivity of US air capabilities without inhibiting

*This directive supersedes directive number 95-2, 2 July 1965

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responsiveness or flexibility remains. US personnel operating under the terms of this directive retain, at all times, the inherent right to defend themselves against hostile attack. When possible, coordination with the unit ground commander and the appropriate Direct Air Support Center (DASC) should be obtained prior to initiating an air strike. In the case of fire suppression in an approved target area where all friendly locations are known, the strike may be accomplished immediately at the FAC's discretion.

4. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commander 2d Air Division will:

(1) In his capacity as the US MACV Air Force Component Commander, act as coordinating authority for all US tactical air operations and VNAF activities (insofar as practicable) in the MACV area.

(2) Establish and operate, in conjunction with the RVNAF, a Tactical Air Control System (TACS) for command and control of USAF/VNAF and for the coordination of USMC/USN strike aircraft.

(3) Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

b. The Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam (USARV) will:

(1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support offensive and defensive ground operations, as appropriate, in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

(2) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System operated in conjunction with RVN agencies, by the 2d Air Division.

c. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), through his Tactical Air Commander the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing, will conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

5. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. A TACS has been established in RVN for use as both an operational and a training vehicle. Allocation and control of USAF/VNAF air resources and coordination of USMC/USN aircraft are exercised through the elements of this system. Aircraft and units operating under the TACS are controlled and scheduled by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) to

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support specific missions within the Corps Tactical Zones. USMC strike sorties not used for USMC operations are provided for mission planning and use by the TACC.

b. In-country mission requests for USAF/VNAF air support are processed according to category - immediate or preplanned. Immediate requests are handled on a priority basis and normally constitute requests from friendly elements in contact with the enemy or from an airborne observer who achieves positive enemy identification. Any request requiring ordnance delivery within three hours after initiation is handled as an immediate request. Preplanned missions are developed at any echelon of command from the analysis of intelligence that has been acquired. Except for preplanned close support missions, preplanned targets are normally permanent or semi-permanent. They are reviewed and analyzed at each level in the chain of command through the Corps and require approval by the Province Chief or higher ARVN authority. Necessary GVN/Div Commander approval is required prior to nomination of targets to the appropriate DASC. Submission of requests to the TACC is considered tantamount to approval. Because selection and validation of targets by the GVN/RVNAF agencies are presently largely a matter of individual judgement, mission requirements may be developed sometimes against targets which do not meet US targeting criteria. The decision to strike is based, therefore, on many factors: number of non-combatants, number of VC, tactical situation, local intelligence of the area, and the actual estimate of the target subsequent to reconnaissance by the FAC. US/Free World Force Divisions and separate Brigades insure that ALO/FAC personnel are included in the planning of all operations in which aircraft may participate. Ground Liaison Officers (GLO) assist in planning air missions for strike aircraft and are located at the TACC and each supporting air base when personnel and equipment requirements are met. G2/G3 Air Officers are to perform this function when GLO's are not present.

c. US ground force aviation resources are allocated to Corps and/or separate Division Senior US Advisors for employment of ARVN/US/Free World Forces operations. Aviation resources so allocated are assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of divisions and zones. Allocations may be made on the basis of operational control, direct support, or general support in accordance with concepts of US ground forces. An Army aviation element is collocated with each corps DASC and each division Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to insure coordination of US/VNAF air activities supporting ARVN, US or Free World Military Assistance Forces operations.

6. (C) TARGET PLANNING.

a. Priorities.

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(1) For planning purposes, available air support in RVN will normally be committed in the following order of priority:

- (a) Troops engaged with the enemy in combat.
- (b) Units on major ground operations (pre-strike and air cover, relief convoys, and spray aircraft escort on crop destruction missions).
- (c) Air cover for trains, convoys, ships and aircraft.
- (d) Other targets.
 1. Targets directly affecting current operations.
 2. Lucrative perishable targets.
 3. Lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time.
 4. Others.

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike Aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

1. USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:

- a. US FAC/TAC(A)/ALO.
- b. VNAF FAC/FAO.
- c. USMC ASRT (TPQ-10).

2. Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the following personnel may designate the target for an aircraft except where restricted by paragraphs 7a(1)(a) and 7a(1)(b):

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20 December 1965

a. The commander of a ground unit engaged with the Viet Cong.

b. US Advisor to a ground unit engaged with the Viet Cong.

c. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a or b above, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify all friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

3. ALO/FAC or other controller on close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops are known and the information passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits, the controller will be briefed on the ground scheme of maneuver, and friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strike.

4. Close air support missions in support of US or Free World Forces will be coordinated, when possible, with the unit's Vietnamese Liaison Officer, when one is assigned, to make certain that other friendly troops or civilians are not attacked.

5. Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages always must be controlled by an airborne FAC. Such an attack will be executed only after US - GVN - RVNAF approval, as appropriate. Obtaining this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(b) Interdiction. Missions not directly involved in support of ground forces and against targets not in a "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE" will be struck only after approval by the Corps Commander or his designated representative. These strikes will be controlled normally by an ALO/FAC aircraft with a Vietnamese observer aboard. An ALO/FAC may direct a strike against targets without a Vietnamese observer only after every effort has been made to secure one. If the target involves an area that is populated with non-combatants such as a hamlet or village, prior approval for the attack must be obtained through the appropriate US - GVN - RVNAF channels even though light fire is received from the village or hamlet, and the strike must be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC. Obtaining

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this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. The inhabitants must have been warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems sufficiently in time to evacuate the area in advance of the strike.

(c) The above restrictions pertaining to firing upon non-combatants in populated areas such as villages and hamlets also apply to artillery and naval gun fire, as outlined in MACV letter number 011448, 7 November 1965.

(2) JETTISON AREAS. Certain areas within a specified strike zone are designated as jettison areas for the purpose of jettisoning munitions. Ordnance will be jettisoned only in these areas. Ordnance drops made in these areas during day VFR conditions will be monitored by radar whenever possible. Night or IFR jettison drops in these areas will be made under positive radar control. All other ordnance released will be under the control of an agency listed in paragraph 7a(1)(a)1 above, as appropriate.

b. The preparation of "Backlash" (special incident) reports, in cases of air attacks on hamlets and villages, will include sufficient data to permit a detailed analysis of the incident.

c. Air Commando Aircraft. The mission of air commando squadrons includes combat operations in support of RVNAF/US Forces and, as necessary, in support of VNAF. Air Commando aircraft will be marked with USAF insignia. Combat operations are authorized with all-US crews aboard.

d. US Army and US Marine transport helicopter. The weapons on these aircraft are installed for defensive purposes. Fire may be initiated on enemy targets that are positively identified and present a clear threat to the safety of the helicopter or crew.

e. US Armed Helicopters.

(1) US Army and US Marine armed helicopters will be marked "US Army or US Marine", as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commander's discretion.

(2) The primary mission of armed helicopters is the escorting of transport helicopters in heliborne operations and/or the providing of direct air to ground fire support of ground maneuver elements.

(3) If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US - GVN - RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew. Obtaining this

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20 December 1965

approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. If the attack on the village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US - GVN - RVNAF approval is required. If the attack is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operations, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

f. US Army OV-1 Aircraft. The OV-1 may be armed for defensive fire while on surveillance missions. Armament will not be utilized to initiate fire on any target. In situations where light fire is received from a populated area, early withdrawal from the area is the action to be considered. This aircraft will not be used as a strike aircraft. OV-1's will be marked with US insignia and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commander's discretion.

g. Ranch Hand Aircraft. Ranch hand aircraft flying crop destruction missions in RVN will be marked with VNAF insignia and will be manned by mixed USAF and VNAF crews.

h. Excluding Arc Light forces, strike aircraft supporting operations in RVN will be launched from CVA's or bases from within RVN.

8. (C) BORDER RESTRICTIONS.

a. General.

(1) Aircraft-helicopters conducting assigned missions in RVN will not cross the demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV.

(2) The best available maps, mosaics, and photographs will be available to pilots and units operating in the vicinity of the border.

(3) Joint USAF-VNAF operations and intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and post strike debriefings will be conducted for all aircrews conducting strikes within 5000 meters of the border, when practical.

b. Cambodian Border Restrictions:

(1) All strike aircraft conducting air strikes within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under positive control of an FAC. Selection criteria will insure assignment of targets which can be tactically struck without overflying the border.

20 December 1965

(2) Any request for US strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be brought to the attention of the TACC Deputy Director when it is received at TACC.

(3) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft on missions within 5 km of the border within equipment capability.

(4) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border will have posted in operations a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked on the RVN side to a depth of 5 km.

(5) All pilots on strike missions within 5 km of the border will have in their possession a 1:50,000 map of the target area.

c. Border outposts. Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary within the outpost area provided they do not cross or fire across the border.

d. Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Surveillance Missions.

(1) Operational restrictions place upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RVN/Cambodian border, for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RVN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate the immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived, on a case-by-case basis.

(2) Reconnaissance requests for coverage in areas which present a danger of an overflight or border violation will be forwarded to the ACofS, J-2, MACV. Upon determination that a waiver is justified, ACofS, J-2, will approve the waiver and forward the request to 2d Air Division for execution. In the event of particularly sensitive complications, COMUSMACV will be the final determining authority.

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Directive Number 95-2, HQ MACV (Cont)

20 December 1965

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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ASCV (7 Jul 65)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, VIETNAM, APO US Forces
96307, 14 July 1965

TO: The Officers and Men, United States Army Support Command, Vietnam

1. I am forwarding a letter from the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to you in its entirety. I desire that each officer and non-commissioned officer in our chain of command read, study and ponder the full implications of General Westmoreland's message.

2. We will "Win in Vietnam". This is a certainty and the purpose of our presence here. However, to make victory lasting, we must also help the Vietnamese to understand the meaning of liberty and freedom. We are fighting for their rights of life and property; let each of us respect them.


3. To do this, we must follow these simple rules:

a. Know your enemy. Destroy only him.

b. Never fire your weapon until you are certain of your target.

c. Do not willfully damage private property unless it is necessary to disclose or rout the enemy.

4. I expect all soldiers of this command to follow these rules, to respect the lives of non-combatants and to refrain from wanton property damage and destruction. Only in this way will we be sure to win the people and win the peace as well as the war.



JOHN NORTON
Brigadier General, US Army
Commanding

INCL 3 to INCL 7

UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office Commander
APO S 96243

LACJ332

Serial No 2815
7 JUL 1965

SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

TO: Commanding General
U.S. Army Support Command
APO U.S. Forces, 96307

1. Reference MACV Directive 95-2, Operational Restrictions on Military Aircraft in RVN, dated 19 June 1964.

2. The number of non-combatant casualties resulting from combat air and ground operations is a matter of concern. These casualties have an adverse effect on the rural reconstruction effort and the attainment of the GVN national goals.

3. With the increase of US Forces and their participation in combat operations, this area becomes one of vital concern at all levels. I have every confidence in the discretion and judgement of our personnel, however, I feel this problem is worthy of increased command emphasis. It is imperative that all our officers and men understand the importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties whenever possible.

4. It is not my intent to infringe upon the inherent right of an individual to defend himself against hostile attack, however, in the exercise of this right, the utmost in discretion and judgement must be used in the application of firepower. Some points which deserve particular consideration are:

a. Discriminate use of artillery and weapons capable of causing mass casualties. Firing on targets in populated areas should be restricted whenever possible to close support missions and to clearly identifiable targets.

b. Reconnaissance by fire should be resorted to only when other means of reconnaissance are not possible and when it is essential to safe movement.

140J332

7 JUL 1965

SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

5. You will give this problem your continual thought and frequently impress upon your troops the need for prudence and good judgement in the employment of fire power.



W. C. WESTERLAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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