


UNITED STATES ARMY
IN THE
WORLD WAR
1917-1919

Policy-Forming Documents
American Expeditionary Forces



American Troops Parading Through Paris, July 4, 1917

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

POLICY-FORMING DOCUMENTS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

HISTORICAL DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON : 1948

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POLICY-FORMING DOCUMENTS, A. E. F.

The following documents were selected to show the development of policy in General Headquarters, A. E. F., as the operations of American troops abroad made necessary administrative arrangements from the High Command downwards.

Les Armées Françaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

Plan to Injure Germans by Attrition [Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

No. 17356

May 19, 1917.

For the Commanders of the Groups of Armies and the Armies Alone

Directive No. 1

The equilibrium between the opposing forces facing each other on the north and north-east front does not permit us, for the time being, to contemplate a breakthrough of the front followed by strategic exploitation. Therefore, what is important at the present time is to bend our efforts to wear down the opponent with a minimum of losses.

It is unnecessary, for the purpose of obtaining this attrition, to mount large-scale attacks in depth, with distant objectives. These attacks do not provide the advantage of surprise, because by reason of the numerous preparations they require, they are recorded on the terrain far in advance of the attack. They are costly because in them the attacker generally is used up more than the defender. They are hazardous, because, tending to the extension of the initial artillery preparation to take in the full depth of the organized zone, they risk, by diluting the fire in this manner, gaining but insignificant results on the whole and exposing the attack to the danger of breaking down against the first position which has not been completely destroyed.

It is advisable to give preference over deep attacks, to those with limited objectives which are abruptly released on a front as extensive as the number and characteristics of the various pieces of available artillery permit.

So that this plan may be realized the attacks should:

1. Be conducted economically as far as infantry is concerned and with the maximum of artillery means;

2. Operate by surprise which offers the opportunity of shifting from mass shock action to a normal status and of obtaining important results. It is expedient to note that surprise will be obtained only if the sector of attack, having been prepared for a long time, has been put to sleep for several weeks or even several months before the attack is made;

3. Be carried out one after the other at different sectors of the front, chosen among those that the enemy has the best reasons not to evacuate of his own accord;

4. Succeed each other as rapidly as possible in trail in order to fix the enemy and take away his freedom of action.

This manner of employing forces, based essentially on the mobility of the means to be used and on their sudden entry into action, presupposes a suitable organization of the front.

While endeavoring to wear down the enemy indefatigably, in the manner just indicated, it is advisable not to lose sight of the fact that in consequence of changes in the situation in other theaters of operations new reserves can become available to the enemy who can have them intervene with diversions wherever he wishes. Therefore, it is important to foresee these attacks and to prepare to meet them by constant improvement of the agencies of defense. The offensive organization of the front will already have contributed to the worked improvement of its defense which should be completed by a series of other measures, notably by setting up plans for moving supplies and reinforcements corresponding to the varying eventualities to be considered.

Lastly, it is absolutely necessary in the general distribution of forces that the groups of armies and the armies have relative autonomy and that they can manipulate their own reserves to carry out the general missions entrusted to them.

Such are, on the whole, the preparations to be made and the course to be followed during the present phase of war. They correspond to the situation of the opposing forces on the western front. If this situation were to change, commanders of groups of armies and of armies would receive new directives for the rest of the operations.

PETAIN.

Les Armées Françaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

Directives for Cooperation of American Forces with Allied Armies
[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,

No. 1

Aboard the Lorraine, May 20, 1917.

Subject: Report of the Mission

Marshal Joffre to the Minister of War

[Extract]

In your letter No. 53 of April 13, 1917, you defined the object of the mission entrusted to me by the government as follows: "To draw up immediately, and in their broader aspects, the directives for the cooperation of American forces with the Allied armies."

On May 14, at a recent conference with Mr. Baker, Secretary of War of the United States, and the American chiefs of staff, these directives were drawn up in very plain terms. I immediately submitted them to the French Government by telegram transmitted by Mr. Viviani, Minister of Justice and chief of the mission.

The purpose of the report which I have the honor to send you today is not only to submit the program adopted by the American Government and to furnish on the various chapters of this program, details and necessary information of a military nature, but to convey to you in addition the attitude of the men of the Government and the Army of the United States who have worked on the elaboration of this program and who will direct its accomplishment. It is important to be accurately informed on their ideas, their views, and their hopes, if prompt and uninterrupted results to the best interest of both the United States and France are desired.

With this in mind, a statement of the method of operation employed will permit me to furnish some useful information.

CHAPTER I

Method of Operation of the Mission and History of Negotiations with the American Government

1. Elaboration of a Program

The studies made on the voyage over led me to base the method of operation of the mission on the following considerations:

a. To concede from the beginning that the United States was capable of organizing a large army, that such was its desire, and that it would take any measures necessary to that end.

Events have shown that this was certainly the case; the Federal Government desires to create a large national army; the passage of the conscription law is the clearest proof of that.

b. To offer to the United States the aid of France, highly experienced after three years of war, in order to make easier the gigantic task it was undertaking. And so we offered ourselves, not as unskilled beggars in disguise or as pretentious instructors, but as friends desirous that their friends avoid errors and delays. This attitude was deeply appreciated.

c. To gain consent for the American army to fight beside the French army. It appeared possible to procure the immediate dispatch of an expeditionary force, and necessary to reach an agreement to the plan of successive shipments of large units of the American army, as their organization and facilities for transportation and supply would permit.

Thus, as early as 1917, an act would be obtained from the United States, which would be of considerable moral significance, and preparations would be made for actual cooperation, by 1918, between the American and French armies.

d. The preceding considerations inspired the wording of the program covered in Annex I; the intention was to deliver it to the American authorities to serve as a basis for formal conferences which would follow the preliminary conversations.

The text was concerned with gratifying and safeguarding American self-respect, and it is to that end that, abandoning the policy of sending small units to France (battalions and regiments), I agreed to the American division as the type of unit, as far as possible, to be transported to France. It is in the form of this large unit that the immediate dispatch of an expeditionary force was approved.

Discussion with the American General Staff soon revealed that it had decided beforehand to sanction only one solution respecting the autonomy of the American division and army in France; the method of instruction I proposed in Par. B of the program (See Annex I) gained the immediate assent of the American Government.

CHAPTER II

Minutes of the conference of May 14 with the Secretary of War, during which a definitive plan of cooperation was drawn up.

The purpose of the conference was to bring out clearly the intentions of the American Government.

To that end, a memorandum had been drawn up to serve as a basis for the discussion. * * *

It was approved entirely by the minister exactly as it appears here. Annex II. I informed Mr. Baker that I would send it in this form to the French Government. It constitutes a kind of agreement which the American Government has pledged itself to carry out.

* * * * *

1. Article I: The shipment of an expeditionary force calls for the following explanations:

* * * * *

It is very probable that the expeditionary force will take with it its full equipment of artillery matériel. Otherwise, it is understood that it will be completed with French matériel. It will likewise be expedient to supplement its infantry matériel. But it is believed that the United States will take pride in sending to France a very well-outfitted unit.

* * * * *

The dispatch of this expeditionary force, as well as of all other units, depends on transportation facilities. The secretary gives me to understand that, from now on, the efforts of the United States will be restricted only by transportation difficulties.

* * * * *

The commander of the expeditionary force has been designated: It is General Pershing, who is back from Mexico where he has proven himself to be a vigorous, active, and intelligent leader.

The designation of General Pershing is very well received in military circles. He was presented to me on leaving the conference. He made a good impression.

He was to leave America 8 days after us.

He will bring to France the American Mission designated to organize the American base. The Direction of the Rear had proposed the port of La Pallice. It is of the greatest importance that nothing be overlooked to make this organization satisfactory from every standpoint, and that the first impressions of the Government and the American army be good.

2. Article II: The organization and training of the American Army raises the following points:

* * * * *

4. The reading of the memorandum completed, the secretary declares his entire approval of the contents and I state that I shall transmit it to the French Government.

The secretary then asks me to what authority General Pershing should report on his arrival in France. I respond that he will present himself to the Minister of War who will regulate, between governments, his relations with the French command. I have, moreover, in all the conferences, laid down the principle that, from the standpoint of operations, the commander of the American division would be under the orders of the commander of the French Armies of the Northeast. But General Pershing, designated to become

the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces, will nevertheless have a task of organization to perform and will, in order to do this, be responsible to his government whose instructions he will take with him. The question of the relations of the American command with the various French authorities must be decided before his arrival. Mr. Baker indicates his intention to organize at once the future command of the American army, by asserting that General Pershing could not be placed under the orders of the French Government except for matters concerning operations.

* * * * *

CHAPTER III

To what extent will the plan thus adopted be carried out?

* * * * *

2. With reference to the organization* of a large American army, there is no doubt that it will be entirely successful. The enthusiasm and pride of the country demand this army and the necessity for it at this time is realized only too well. The enlightened persons see in it a means of better uniting the many peoples of the United States, of bringing more discipline into the family, and to the masses. In addition, the resources placed at the disposal of the President by law are considerable. * * * It would be a mistake to believe that it [the American army] cannot be strongly and solidly organized by 1918.

Will it be in France by that time? In part, certainly, but not in large numbers unless its transportation and supply are assured. That is a question of prime importance which will be studied in its entirety immediately.

At this point one may wonder if it would not be an advantage to contribute, if necessary, matériel of several French divisions to American units. We would thus gain men we shall be lacking in 1918 and the question of ammunition supply would be solved satisfactorily. Moreover, it is probable that the United States will have resources in men much more quickly than they will manufacture artillery matériel. * * *

Be that as it may, we should feel confident from now on that the American army can be an enormous contribution to the 1918 campaign and, by establishment of a comprehensive plan, we must take all necessary measures that it may play this great role.

No doubt should be entertained that the United States is eager to play it, very particularly with France. * * *

In any event, the Government, political circles, financiers, and military men, at this time, are obviously happy to make unlimited sacrifices of men and money for France. The watchword that has come to me from the lips of the highest authorities, the most prominent men, and the masses is: For France, to the last dollar, to the last man.

The country and the Government merit our complete confidence; we have no Allies who are such friends. There is no sacrifice we should refuse to make in order to have their army join ours on the French front.

J. JOFFRE.

ANNEX I

Program

France, convinced, first, that the military effort of the United States will be considerable and will be in proportion to its strength;

Second, that this effort is capable of hastening the victorious end of the war, expresses the following desires:

Immediately:

A. Dispatch of an Expeditionary Force

With a view to representing the American flag as soon as possible on the French

* It may be noted that the proposed organization does not conform completely to ours, but it appeared necessary not to be too exacting and to let the Americans have the advantage of continuing their existing form of organization in all instances where it did not seem necessary to change it.

front, dispatch of an expeditionary force * * * in the form of a division of 9 regiments and equipped with artillery and services corresponding to those of a French army corps, all or part of the armament possible to be furnished by France, if necessary.

The expeditionary force thus organized would be assembled in one or several camps in the zone of the French armies, where the American troops would find, from the moral as well as the material point of view, the most favorable conditions for completing their training with all the resources of the French front.

Concurrently:

B. Organization of an American army

1. Choice of type of large unit. It would be advantageous for the United States to adopt for the organization of their army a type of large unit (division) very similar to the type approved by all belligerents at the present time (division consisting of 3 or 4 regiments).

2. Organization and training of the army. It would be advantageous to have accepted the principle of organizing these large units and training them briefly in America, with the cooperation of a French mission, and completing their training in France, in close contact with the French front, under the direction of the American high command.

3. Appropriate measures: A group of preparatory measures, designed to facilitate the assembly on French soil and the training of American units, should be adopted immediately. Particularly:

a. Organization of a base (La Pallice, for example);

b. Cadres: Immediate dispatch of all officer personnel designated to learn present combat methods and later to be responsible for the command and training of the American army. A general officer of the American army (the commander of the expeditionary corps, for example) would have control of this training, for which he would draw up the program after consultation with the French command.

* * * * *

Annex II

Memorandum approved by the Secretary of War pertaining to the cooperation of the American army on the front of the Allied armies.

The studies made by the French mission with the Federal Government permit today the laying out of the following program, according to which the American army will be organized for the war.

I. Dispatch of an expeditionary corps

With a view to representing the American flag as soon as possible on the French front, the United States will send an expeditionary force, equivalent to a division, of all arms of 16 to 20,000 combatants, comprising basically 4 infantry regiments, 12 field batteries, 6 heavy batteries, and the corresponding services. This expeditionary corps, the shipment of which will begin about June 1, will be assembled in a camp in the French army zone. The American troops will find there, from the morale as well as material standpoint, the most favorable conditions for completing their training under the direction of the American high command, which will determine when they are able to take their place on the front.

II. Organization and Training of the American army:

a. The organization of the American army will be based on the adoption of a large combat unit similar to the type recognized as the best adapted to modern warfare; that is, an army corps with 2 divisions of 3 or 4 regiments each, possibly including, in addition, an infantry brigade as corps reserve. This latter arrangement would permit the utilization of the manpower resources of the United States, before even producing the corresponding amount of war matériel for these troops.

The large American units, after receiving preliminary training in the United States, will be shipped to France as they are organized, and according to a transportation

plan which will be sent to the French Government. They will complete their training in the camps of the French army zone in the same manner as the expeditionary corps.

b. The assistance to be given by France to the American army in embryo will aim principally at the training of staff and line officers.

The American Government will send at once to France a number of selected staff or line officers - some intended to teach later in the staff schools, the others to take up duties on the staffs of the American units, either in France, on their arrival, or in the United States before their departure.

It would likewise be advantageous, for training purposes, for general officers detailed to command large American units in process of formation, to make a preliminary tour of the French front for observation and study.

The Government, on the other hand, will send to the United States a military mission placed, we will say, under the direction of General Vignal, French military attaché.

* * * * *

Les Armées Françaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

Relations between French Authorities and American Command

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,

No. 2

Aboard the Lorraine, May 20, 1917.

Subject: Efforts to be made immediately to assure cooperation of the American army.

Marshal Joffre to the Minister of War

As an addition to the report I have the honor to send you separately, I believe that I must again insist on the necessity for regulating without delay the question of relations between the American command and the various French authorities.

It is, in my opinion, extremely important that the American command and Government, very inexperienced in military organization, not suffer any disillusionment which would turn them against us or discourage them.

To that end, it seems necessary that the American mission be placed, immediately on its arrival, in touch with an organization capable of helping and advising it in the accomplishment of its task.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding and delay, a similar military authority should centralize the study of all questions and serve as an intermediary between the American command and the various French authorities, with which a permanent liaison would be established.

The staff of this organization, composed of staff officers and specialists of the Service of the Rear and the Medical and Administrative Services, would prepare a general plan, the various parts of which would be put into effect when agreement is reached between the American command and the authorities or French services directly concerned.

Among the problems which must be solved immediately, I consider the following of importance:

1. Reception of the American mission.
2. Organization of a base (in agreement with the Director of the Rear and the department of transportation and supply).
3. Study (with General Pershing) of a plan for transportation, debarkation and supply.
4. Study of an installation plan. Particularly, it will be expedient, along these

lines, to take all the necessary precautions and disciplinary measures toward protecting the soldiers of the expeditionary forces from any contamination that might injure their health; failure to do so would be publicized in the United States to our detriment.

5. Assembly of a corps of interpreters, either by utilizing the resources of the French front or by recruiting in America through our military attaché.

6. Study of a training plan for American units in agreement with the American command and the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the Northeast.

7. Later, study of a plan of employment of American troops.

8. Formation and despatch of the French mission with proper instructions to direct its work.

The American Government and command approach us with utter confidence; this confidence must be fully justified from the beginning, under penalty of jeopardizing important results already obtained.

J. JOFFRE.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 682: Letter

Instructions to General Pershing

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, May 26, 1917.

From: The Secretary of War

To: Major General J. J. Pershing, U. S. Army

[Extract]

The President directs me to communicate to you the following:

The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached there for service with the army.

* * * * *

NEWTON D. BAKER.

Instructions to General Pershing

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, May 26, 1917

[Extract]

Dear General Pershing:

In compliance with the orders of the President, assigning you to command of the United States forces in France, the Secretary of War directs that you proceed, with the necessary staff, to Paris, France, via England.

* * * * *

Very sincerely,

TASKER H. BLISS,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

C-in-C Rept. File: Fldr. 18: Letter

Relations with French

3d Bureau A, General Staff

FRENCH MINISTRY OF WAR,

Advance Group

Paris, June 3, 1917.

No. 2,207 BS

From: Minister of War

To: Marshal Joffre

In acknowledging receipt of the report which you submitted to me on your return from the United States, I am happy to extend to you the thanks of the Government for the results which you have obtained.

On the other hand, when the American troops will land in France, it seemed to me necessary that you should continue the work which you were engaged in during your mission.

The moral authority of your own personality and high position, as well as your wide experience of the present war, will enable you, in accord with the American High Command, to give to the troops of our Allies the advice and information which they will require to prepare themselves morally and materially for the efforts which they will be called upon to make.

The chief of the general staff of the Army, having taken as a basis the conclusions of your report, has established the programme of the American cooperation and will carry it out - after agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and North-east and the ministerial departments concerned.

He will forward to you all information and documents which you may need to carry out

the mission of inspection with which you are charged.

I request you to kindly in turn send me your reports of inspection addressed
"Etat-Major Général de l'Armée - Groupe de l'Avant - 3ème Bureau A."

PAINLEVE.

Cable: P-1-S

Arrival of General Pershing and Staff at Liverpool

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 1.

Liverpool, June 8, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Number one. Report arrival my headquarters in Liverpool this date. *Baltic* sailed via Halifax. Was met four hundred miles west of Liverpool by U. S. Destroyer *Tucker* and *Rowan* which acted as escort through war zone. Cable care American Ambassador, London, to include ninth instant after that date, care American Ambassador, Paris.

PERSHING.

Cable: P-4-S

Arrival of General Pershing's Party at London

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 4

London, June 9, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Number four. Late arrival here Friday makes it advisable to remain until Tuesday. Reach Paris Wednesday and Board of Staff Officers leave tomorrow visit proposed base ports for full investigation and study. Our reception in England very cordial and very sincere.

PERSHING.

Arrival of General Pershing's Party at Paris

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 6

Paris, June 13, 1917.

The Adjutant General, Washington

Accompanied by staff arrived Paris today from London. Most cordial welcome extended at Boulogne and en route to Paris where practically entire populace filled street from Gare du Nord to Place de [la] Concorde, according party wildly enthusiastic reception and demonstrating the deep feeling existing among French people over our participation in this war.

PERSHING.

Hist. Sect. AWC: Important Letters File: Folder-1

Collaboration with French Government

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH REPUBLIC,

No. 18/M. A.

Paris, June 16, 1917.

MARSHAL JOFFRE

to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American army.

I have the honor to bring to your attention a copy of the letter [dated June 3, 1917] which was sent to me by the Minister of War. You will find defined therein the official mission to the American army in France, which the French Government has intrusted to me.

I draw your attention particularly to the fact that this mission is to be fulfilled "in agreement with the American High Command"; it is my intention fully to bring about this agreement, which is to grow out of the talks we shall have. In the course of these talks we can, when you consider it desirable, examine together, before you make a definite decision, all questions relative to the organization, training, and employment of the American army, and also any recommendations which might be made to you on this subject by the French Command. We can also discuss the proposals you will be called upon to present to your Government, if you deem it helpful.

The officers of my staff will always be at your service to prepare studies on all these questions with your staff. They will give the officers under your command any information you consider of value.

You will find me ready at all times to collaborate with you whole-heartedly for the complete success of the common mission which is intrusted to us.

J. JOFFRE.

*Communications Relating to the American Expeditionary Forces
to be Referred to Headquarters, A. E. F.*

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, June 17, 1917.

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE MINISTER OF WAR,

EXCELLENCY:

My attention has been called to the numerous requests which have been made on your department by various Americans, official and others, asking for facilities to visit the front and for special arrangement and privileges in order to carry out various missions. I desire to express to you my thanks and appreciation for the many courtesies you have already extended and my apologies for the resulting inconveniences to you. The time, I believe, has now come to centralize all these requests at my headquarters where they may be properly passed on before being transmitted to your department. I would be gratified if the necessary instructions be issued to your officers in order that no action be taken on any of these requests not passed on by my headquarters, and that all applicants be referred to these headquarters, or to such branch offices of these headquarters as may be hereafter created.

My attention has also been called to the inconveniences your officers have experienced in the past in submitting directly to the American War Department through your Military Attaché in Washington many questions which may be handled more expeditiously through my headquarters. I therefore request that in the future all matters relating to the organization, equipment and operation of the American Expeditionary Forces be handled directly with my headquarters.

I take this occasion to renew to you the expression of my highest regards.

I have the honor to be, Sir

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

*JOHN J. PERSHING,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commander-in-Chief,
Expeditionary Forces.*

Request that Missions and Officers Report to Headquarters, A. E. F.

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, June 18, 1917.

[Extract]

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

No. 8. British and French war office both complain of considerable annoyance by independent missions and individual officers who present requests from our War Department or from heads of our departments in Washington, often for same information. They desire that all such requests in future be made by these headquarters. Strongly approve their view, which will be complied with as far as possible here. Request that all officers sent to Europe in future for any duty be directed to report to these headquarters first where detailed arrangements with other armies will be made so that investigations by our officers may be coordinated.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Les Armées Françaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

Problem of Transportation of an American Army to France

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES,

No. 22

June 18, 1917.

Marshal Joffre

to the Minister of War (Army Headquarters, Advanced Group, 3rd Section)

Pursuing further the subject of my letters No. 4/M. A. of June 8 and No. 21/M. A. of June 18, I have the honor again to call attention to the necessity for bringing out very clearly and immediately the viewpoint of the French Government and the American Government in the matter of transportation of the American Army.

It appears to me that the following points should be kept in mind:

The goal to be reached is to have in France in April 1918, an American army of at least three or four hundred thousand men - 15 to 20 divisions - capable of launching a strong offensive.

The military organization provided for in the United States will warrant expecting even better results if difficulties of transportation and supply do not interfere.

The mass of this army will have to be transported from America to France from September-October, 1917, to April 1918.

Therefore it is necessary to specify for the transportation of the American army a fleet assuring monthly delivery of at least 2 to 3 divisions (supply included).

That is the problem to be solved, the study of which will have to be given priority by the Allies. The transportation of the American army will continue to be an American undertaking; the Allies will first endeavor to have the United States make up, with its own resources, the fleet necessary for the transportation and supply of its army; failing this, they will seek means for helping the United States, even at the price of agreeing to the sacrifice of transportation allocated to their own supply requirements.

If these combined measures are still not adequate, it would be necessary to give up the idea of having, by the spring of 1918, an American army capable of undertaking and sustaining an offensive operation by its own means.

JOFFRE.

Les Armées Francaises, Tome V, 2d Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Letter

Marshal Foch Makes Special Request for American Technical Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,

No. 3372/S

ADVANCED GROUP,

Paris, June 30, 1917.

The Minister of War

to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in France.

In the agreement of May 14 between Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, and Marshal Joffre, it was proposed to send to France American technical units of the various services as follows:

1. Railways
2. Brigade of Coast Artillery
3. Automobile Service
4. Road Repair Service
5. Main Artillery Parks
6. Medical Service
7. Forests and Waterways Service
8. Provisions and Forage Service
9. Military Telegraph Service

Total: about 50,000 men

According to information I have received, it seems that instructions relative to the constitution and despatch to France of these units have so far been issued only for railway regiments, the coast artillery brigade, and medical units.

For my part, I believe it would be highly desirable to have all proposed technical units sent to France as soon as possible.

In addition to rendering valuable assistance to our various services, the technical units would in fact at the same time be preparing for the entrance into line of the American army and would later form the first nucleus of the services of the rear of that army.

The transportation of these units could take place immediately after that of the first division, following, as far as possible, the order indicated in the above list, but so as to take full advantage of available tonnage at all times.

If you share my view, I should be very grateful if you would use your influence with the United States Government for the constitution and despatch to France of the technical units whose formation is proposed. I have every reason to believe that your intervention would add considerable weight to requests to that effect forwarded by the High Commissioner at Washington to the Secretary of War.

By order:

*FOCH,
General,
Chief of the General Staff of the French army.*

Cable: P-30-S

Plan for One Million Men

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 6, 1917.

[Extract]

* * * * *

Paragraph five. Plans [should] contemplate sending over at least one million men by next May. British estimate fifty per cent for replacements and forty per cent noncombatants in the zone of interior. This estimate would give practically half million men for trenches. In as much as question affects all allies whose common interests demand that we exert maximum military power consistent with transport problem suggest early agreement be reached among Allies which would provide requisite transportation for our regular use. Also recommend understanding among Allies that would limit sea transportation to food and military supplies and the exclusion of every kind of luxury as well as other supplies in excess of immediate needs of countries dependent upon oversea supplies.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

American Cooperation in Aviation

[Editorial Translation]

1st Bureau, Aviation, General Staff

MINISTRY OF WAR,

No. 3868 B. S.

ADVANCED GROUP,

Paris, July 10, 1917.

The General, Chief of General Staff,

to the Under Secretary of State for Military Aeronautics (Paris).

By letter No. 5598, dated May 6, 1917, the General, Commander-in-Chief, announced the number of aviation and balloon units it was advisable to request the United States to organize with a view to employing them on the French front:

1. Pursuit aviation: 30 groups of 6 pursuit squadrons of 12 planes each.
2. Bombardment aviation: 30 groups of 6 squadrons of 12 planes each.
3. Balloon companies: 16 groups of 3 balloon companies.

He indicated, in addition, that it was advisable to proceed first of all with the formation of:

1. First priority:
 - 5 groups of pursuit squadrons
 - 5 groups of balloon companies
2. Second priority:
 - 5 groups of bombardment squadrons

Now, the American aviation program, voted by the Congress, includes the formation of: 250 squadrons with 19 pilots and airplanes* composed of

- 120 pursuit squadrons
- 80 divisional squadrons
- 40 heavy artillery squadrons
- 10 cavalry squadrons

making a total of 4,500 pilots and 9,000 planes (including 4,500 in reserve).

From the point of view of number of planes in line, this program is slightly higher than that proposed by the General, Commander-in-Chief which calls for only 4,300 planes, reserves not included.

It differs from the latter only in number, type, and composition of squadrons.

But the American program has been set up only to permit the Congress to vote the necessary appropriation for its execution, and it remains understood that the final organization of 250 squadrons which it allows will be regulated in France by General Pershing in agreement with the French High Command.

In this connection it seems therefore that it would be desirable that a commission, made up of representatives of the Under Secretary of State for military aeronautics, General Headquarters, and the General Staff, study this program for the following purposes:

1. To adapt it to the necessities of the present war, resulting from three long years of experience;
2. To propose to the representatives of the American Government, with changes which would appear necessary, the order of priority to be followed with a view to its execution.

* In addition, a reserve of 18 planes per squadron is provided.

Consequently, I have the honor to ask, if you share my view, that you be kind enough to call together, as soon as you can do so, the representatives of the foregoing services, to study with them the different questions which arise in the execution of the program voted by the American Congress.

FOCH.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 510: Memorandum

Delivery of Letters of May 26, 1917, to General Foch

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Paris, July 10, 1917.

MEMORANDUM:

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, the original copies of the attached letters* were handed by me today in person to General Weygand, Assistant to General Foch, Chief of the French General Staff. When I presented the copies to General Weygand I told him I had been instructed to do so by the Chief of Staff. He informed me that that was the first time they had received official information as to the exact nature of General Pershing's orders and as to his functions while in France.

JAMES A. LOGAN,
Assistant.

Cable: P-40-S

Passports not Recommended for Families of Officers or Men

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 14, 1917.

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

Paragraph five. Question of feeding the people in Allied countries is sure to become very serious before the winter is over. British Government has found it necessary to return to Canada sixty thousand Canadians who followed Canadian troops over. Stringent rules should be established at once with reference to Americans coming to Europe.

* Letters of instruction to General Pershing, May 26, 1917, signed by Secretary of War and by General Bliss, published earlier in this volume.

Recommend no passports families of officers or men connected with expeditionary force be granted unless applicants are to be engaged in necessary and profitable employment.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Cable: P-45-S

Conference of Allied Powers to be Held

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 15, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Am officially advised by French Government that a conference of the Allied powers has been called for July 25, in Paris. Members of conference will include Commanders-in-Chief of different Allied armies. Important questions relating to military operations on various fronts for remainder of nineteen seventeen and probably for spring campaign of nineteen eighteen will be discussed. These questions will naturally involve consideration of the relative ability of interested powers to furnish men and means for their respective tasks. Understand certain governments desire to limit conference to discussion of immediate military problems only, leaving campaign of nineteen eighteen for later conference and omitting altogether any matter affecting political questions. Seems probable, however, that conference will assume very broad scope. Deem it extremely important that our participation in this our first conference be of such a character that our aims and purposes be clearly indicated so far as may be advisable. In view of the above, especially preceding sentence and of my general instructions from the Secretary of War to which attention is invited an early reply is requested.

PERSHING.

Participation in Conference of Allied Powers

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 20, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Reference confidential cablegram fifteenth instant, information came to me unofficially that French Government intended to invite commander American forces participate in conference. Was advised regarding probable discussion military questions as stated my telegram. Later when paying call M. Ribot [Premier of France] voluntarily stated that he had requested Washington to designate Mr. Sharpe and myself as American representatives. There was no expression on my part of desire to participate. Today M. Cambon of French Foreign Office asked me to meet him and he brought up the subject and showed me dispatches sent Washington and the answers received. He stated that his Government was very anxious to have representation by the United States and suggested the possibility of my urging it. He said intention was to discuss Balkan question only but probably military questions would be discussed also. Informed him that I could take no further action but must await instructions. I expressed no opinion to him one way or the other. However, after full consideration and consultation with Ambassador Sharpe, my own view is that if we participate in conference our discussion should be limited to military questions in which we are immediately interested and believe it wiser not to discuss any other questions at this time.

PERSHING.

Cable: A-49-R

General Pershing not to Attend Conference of Allied Powers

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 23, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCES, PARIS

1. Here follows cipher code. With reference to your number 55, dated July 20, Secretary of War approves and commends attitude taken by you in your interview with M. Cambon of French Foreign Office. Before receipt of your cablegram questions of participation by you and Admiral Sims in conference referred to by you had been received by the State Department through diplomatic channels. The President decided that this Government at the present time prefers not to take part in any War Conference at which all the Allies are represented. A second request was then received to allow the presence of yourself and Admiral Sims at the proposed conference for the purpose of participating in military discussions. After consideration by him, the President decided that the presence of yourself and Admiral Sims at the conference, even as visitors, could be misunderstood. You will be guided accordingly. End of cipher code.

McCain.

Cable: P-65-S

Officers of Full Mental and Physical Vigor Required

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 28, 1917.

AGWAR - WASHINGTON

1. For the Chief of Staff. My observation of British and French armies and most exacting arduous service conditions at the front fully convinces that only officers in full mental and physical vigor should be sent here. Contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation to officers concerned. General officers must undergo extreme effort in personal supervision of operations in trenches. Very few British French division commanders over forty-five or brigadiers over forty. We have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects. Strongly recommend conditions be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest that no officer of whatever rank be sent here for active service who is not strong and robust in every particular. Officers selected for appointment as general officer of line should be those with experience in actively commanding troops. Officers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home in training troops.

PERSHING.

Cable: P-66-S

Recommendation Concerning Headquarters, A. E. F. to be an Army Headquarters

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 28, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Present laws and Tables of Organization 1917, do not prescribe organizations of headquarters of an army leaving this matter to President. To provide such organization and define doubtful status of enlisted men now on duty at these headquarters recommend that these headquarters be designated as an army headquarters and that headquarters troops comprise following officers enlisted men and transportation: One captain, three first lieutenants, 35 sergeants-major including five sergeants-major from engineers, one first sergeant, four mess sergeants, four supply sergeants, two stable sergeants, eight sergeants, sixteen corporals, four horseshoers, four mechanics, three saddlers, ten cooks, two trumpeters, two hundred privates first class (89 as chauffeurs), 200 privates (120 as orderlies), one motor truck company, 70 motor cars, 30 motorcycles, 160 riding horses. Total enlisted 493. This is smaller than corresponding detachment at either British or French General Headquarters and is as necessary during period of preparation and organization as it will be later. Officers and enlisted men now on duty here as headquarters

detachment are as follows: One captain, five sergeants, four corporals, one saddler, 60 privates. Request that said headquarters troops be organized in United States and sent here with material as soon as practicable first deducting number of officers and enlisted men now on duty here as noted above and who should be transferred to said troop by War Department order.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Cable: P-69-S

Military Conference

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, July 30, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Informal conference Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies held Paris, July twenty-sixth, present Generals Robertson, Pétain, Foch, Cadorna, and Pershing. Steps to be taken in case Russia should be forced out of war considered. Various movements troops to and from different fronts necessary to meet possible contingencies discussed. Conference also weighed political, economic, and moral effect both upon Central and Allied powers under most unfavorable aspect from Allied point of view. General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy. To accelerate participation American forces and provide necessary transport for American army and movement of armies from secondary fronts, conference recommends that question of shipping be immediately taken up by interallied commission. However, consensus of opinion was that steps should be taken by Allies to determine part to be played by America, England, and France and possible Japan to support Russia with view to avoiding extreme eventualities. Have sent full report of conference by Major Frankforter, Reserve Corps who sailed twenty-eighth instant. Similar naval conference held Paris twenty-fifth instant of which report has been made to Navy Department by Admiral Sims, copies of proceedings in my possession.

PERSHING.

Cable: A-79-R

Passports for Wives of Officers not to be Issued

A. G. O. WAR DEPARTMENT,

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

Washington, August 5, 1917.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. The Secretary of War in concurrence with the Secretary of State and guided [by] your views as well as by the known wishes of the British and French Governments has adopted a rigid policy of declining passport for the wife of an officer ordered to France. So long as this policy is adhered to, the Secretary of War will make no exceptions. He will not permit the policy to be violated unless it should be entirely reversed and he thinks misgoverned reversal of it would result in very unfortunate consequences. * * *

* * * * *

McCAIN.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 655: Letter

Choice of Location for American General Headquarters

Paris, August 8, 1917.

C-in-C, A. E. F.

C-in-C, Armies of the North and Northeast

General

I have attentively examined the question of choice in the Zone of Armies of a place where I could install my headquarters.

After having carefully thought over it, and chiefly following our interview, I decided to install my headquarters at Chaumont.

I am sending several officers of my staff to Chaumont, towards the end of the week for the purpose of drawing up plans of different buildings we shall need, and I should be most obliged to you to kindly give the necessary instructions to the Commandant de la Place in order to facilitate as much as possible the work of said officers.

(Written in the General's hand)

Will you accept, General, the assurances of my most cordial sentiments.

JOHN PERSHING.

Information Furnished Germany by Wireless from Spain

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 10, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

The following was given me by the French General Staff having been intercepted by French Government between a wireless station in Spain and one in Berlin: "The German General Staff has been informed the fourth of August that in the port of Nantes there was a considerable movement of steamers and principally American steamers. Within a short time at St-Nazaire several transports have arrived with ten thousand soldiers from America. The American convoys seem now to take the direction of Quessant at the extremity of Brittany." Another from the same source: "The General Staff is informed of the departure on July 10, from New York of six American transports and eight British transports with American troops not instructed." Another from the same source: "St-Nazaire, Le Havre, Bordeaux are the ports which the German General Staff believe will be utilized as ports of debarkation for the American troops arriving in France." Admiral Sims informed.

PERSHING.

AG, GHQ, AEF; COR: 19: Letter

Reception and Movement of Incoming Troops via England from America

Administrative Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 15, 1917.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., L. of C.

1. It is the policy of our War Department to send to France via England a great many small organizations and detachments which finally arrive in France through the different channel ports. The orders for the organization of the L. of C. have created Base Sec. No. 3 of the S. S. and T. Ser., L. of C., which includes the various channel ports, viz: Cherbourg, Le Havre and Boulogne. Captain Liebman, Q. M. R. C., is at present at Le Havre and under your orders.

2. The C. G., L. of C., will make all arrangements at these ports for the reception and movement of incoming troops and arrange for their rail movement to the points indicated in orders received from Hq., A. E. F. These orders will either indicate that the troops or detachments are for service with the L. of C., or that they are to be attached to particular organizations or services in our (American) Zone of the Advance (see page 122, F. S. R.). In the first case, in the absence of specific orders to the contrary, you will determine to what point or points in the zone of the L. of C. these troops shall be sent, and make all necessary arrangements for the rail movement. In the second case,

following the orders issued, you will make all arrangements for the rail movement, supply, etc., up until the time of their delivery by the railroad to the designated railhead or regulating station.

3. The procedure under the new arrangements will be as follows, viz.:

(a) The Military Attaché in London will advise you by wire of the arrival in England of all American detachments and organizations, and will indicate in the same telegram the following information:

French port of arrival

Date and probable hour of arrival at port

Branch of service to which they belong

Number of officers

Number of enlisted men

Number of female nurses

Number of civil employees (with organizations to which they pertain)

Number of vehicles accompanying them (whether horse-drawn or motor-driven)

Tonnage of material accompanying them

Any splitting up of units, with all necessary details, which would affect in any way railroad arrangements for their prompt removal from the different French ports.

It is believed that the foregoing information will give you all the necessary data required for the arrangements at French ports and for the prompt evacuation by rail of these ports by the troops.

(b) The Military Attaché in London will notify the C-in-C, A. E. F. --- (at the same time that he notifies you as specified in (a) above) --- of the arrival of all detachments and organizations and of the date and port of their arrival in France, giving only details as to arm or branch of service to which they belong, and the total strength. This notification from the Military Attaché will serve as a basis for the issuance of orders from these headquarters to you as to whether the troops are to be sent to a particular destination in the Zone of the Advance or are for service with the L. of C.

4. If you so desire, you may communicate directly with the Military Attaché in London for the purpose of amplifying as far as you think necessary the information indicated in paragraph 3-a above.

5. These instructions will go into effect at once.

By command of Major General Pershing:

Adjutant General.

Official copy furnished Military Attache, London, England, with request that he follow the line of action indicated in this letter with regard to all detachments and organizations passing through England.

Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2292: Memorandum

Military Missions at French and British Headquarters

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Paris, August 15, 1917.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

1. The work falling upon our representatives at French and British General Headquarters is already great in both volume and importance and it will constantly grow in both respects. It is thought that, as this condition can be foreseen, steps should be taken now to meet it. The organization of such a mission and selection of suitable officers for its personnel will probably require some weeks.

2. Of course, having decided that it is desirable to send such missions, the first step is to enquire of French and British General Headquarters whether it will be agreeable to them to have us do so; at the same time letting them know that considerable delay in the complete organization of such a mission is to be expected.

3. Consideration of the arrangements that the French and British General Headquarters have made for dealing with each other leads to the belief that the United States should establish a military mission on similar lines at each of the French and British Headquarters.

4. In selecting personnel for such military mission it is of first importance that the officers selected be fully in sympathy with the people of the nation to whose headquarters they are sent.

Personnel for the French Mission should also be able to speak French fluently.

Any communication with reference to detailing personnel for such a mission should emphasize this point.

5. A suitable organization for such a Military Mission is shown in attached report, submitted by Major Frank Parker.

This organization generally corresponds to that now in use by the French and British General Headquarters for dealing with each other and appears to be suitable and necessary for us.

Subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 and the change of wording noted on the face of the diagram accompanying Major Parker's report, it is recommended.

J. McA. PALMER,
Lieut. Col., General Staff,
Chief of Section.

[Pencil notation] Approved. J. J. Pershing.

G. O. G.

S. P. No. 1

From: The Chief Liaison Group, G. O. G.

To: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F. (Through Operations Section)

Subject: Proposed organization of a Military Mission at French Headquarters.

August 11, 1917.

I. The following proposed organization of a Military Mission at these headquarters is based on the following principles:

1. A Military Mission must have an organization that corresponds in a general way to that of the headquarters to which it is accredited.

2. This organization must be clearly divided into:

A. Section of Operations, which will include (1) Operations (2) Matériel, Organization and Instruction (3) Information.

B. Section of Services, i. e., all matters pertaining to transport and supply.

3. Of these two, the operations section is the one in closest contact with the General Staff.

II. Therefore, a Military Mission must have a Chief (Lieut. Colonel or Colonel), whose duties are:

1. Relations with the Commander-in-Chief

2. Relations with Chief of Staff

3. Relations with Assistant Chiefs of Staff

and under him two sections:

1. Operations (Matériel, Organization and Instruction).

Personnel.

(1) First Assistant (Major) whose duties are:

a. Questions pertaining to Operations;

b. Questions of Organization, Instruction and matériel.

This Assistant is the Vice-Chief and should be kept in touch with everything.

(2) Second Assistant (Captain) whose duties are:

Relations with 2d Bureau (Information)

Order of Battle of the enemy, events on the fronts, visits of American officers to French war zone and vice versa, Press, etc. . . .

Note: The technical work of the 2d Bureau (detailed description of order of battle, identifications, etc.) may be done by telephone directly between the two 2d Bureaus interested without passing through this officer.

III. Section of Services: This Section deals with all the questions of Supply and Transport, i. e., the Services of the Rear; it should have:

1 Officer (Lieutenant Colonel) in charge (Supplies, Evacuation,
(Railroads, Auto Trans-
(port, etc.

1 Assistant (Major or Captain).

The Chief of Mission should have only a general supervision over this Section, which carries on its work directly with the departments concerned.

One French officer should be permanently assigned to each of the two Sections of the Mission.

IV. This report is based on careful study of the matter with the French Mission at British Headquarters and British Mission at French Headquarters.

The views of both these Missions are practically the same and the accompanying proposed organization is based thereon.

Note: Both the missions above referred to believe it wise to keep the rank of a mission down to that of lieut. colonel or colonel, at the highest, as almost all staff officers at French Headquarters are below the rank of colonel.

FRANK PARKER,
Major, Cav.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2292: Letter

Exchange of Military Missions with French Headquarters Proposed

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 18, 1917.

From: Chief of Staff*

To: Major Frank Parker, Cav., Liaison Officer, at French General Headquarters

1. The Commander-in-Chief is considering the desirability of having an exchange of military missions with French General Headquarters, and consequently wishes you to ascertain whether the sending of such a mission to that headquarters would be entirely acceptable.

2. You should exercise discretion in making inquiries and, in the first instance, should indicate no more than a desire to learn the views of French General Headquarters as to the desirability of such missions.

3. In the event of French General Headquarters entirely favoring the proposal, the Commander-in-Chief would be prepared to establish the mission at the French General Headquarters as soon as suitable officers become available. This time cannot be definitely fixed. Probable organization of mission enclosed. [Published in this volume with Operations Section Memo date August 15, 1917.]

4. The Commander-in-Chief would find it acceptable to have such a French Mission arrive at these headquarters soon after the move to a new location, which will take place about September 1.

J. G. HAREFORD,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

* An identical letter was sent the same date to Capt. J. G. Quekemeyer, Liaison Officer at British General Headquarters.

Transportation Overseas for American Troops
[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO UNITED STATES,

Washington, August 20, 1918.

HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

For the Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Marshal Joffre

During the course of a long interview with the Minister of War, the latter told me that his available transports would permit him to send to France from September 1, 5 divisions every two months. This figure is superior to that indicated in my Telegram No. 1010. Considering Mr. Baker's character and his habit of precision, I have full confidence, under reserve of unforeseen difficulties, in his [firmness?].

We took up several other questions, notably that of the 10,000 mechanical engineers. Baker promised me to do everything in his power. But I point out to you again that the sending of units not [destined] to the American army itself meets here with the most serious opposition. It is thought that their sending is contrary to the interest of preparedness and it is feared furthermore that conscription will be made unpopular in giving the newspapers the opportunity to say that American workmen are being taken away from the factories in order to permit the sending back of the French workman to theirs. I am obliged to take in series consideration this state of mind and act with caution.

In this particular case, however, I hope to arrive at a favorable result.

TARTEL.

Cable: P-119-S

Shipping Tonnage and Naval Action Needed

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 23, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. Reference my numbers 69, 74 and 101 and proposed meeting of shipping representatives Allied powers London September 4. American representatives will be confronted with question of shipping required by United States and should be strongly supported in demand upon Allies for sufficient commercial shipping to carry out army program outlined your confidential Cablegram No. 57 if not already assured. Any consideration of less tonnage should be opposed by our representative. As indicated in former cablegrams, the British and especially the French have reached absolute limit of manpower and any augmentation their military forces cannot be expected. Imperative hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your project in Europe for active service by May or June. Military activities of Allies on land should be strongly reenforced by combined navies and destruction U-boat bases accomplished if possible. High British army officers confidentially condemn waiting policy British admiralty, and regard British navy management as extremely inefficient and totally lacking in initiative. In view of gravity of shipping question recommend our government insist upon aggressive policy by combined

British and American navies. Generally conceded that our entrance saved the Allies from defeat. Hence our position in this war very strong and should enable us largely to dictate policy of Allies in future. Allies now fully realize dependence upon our cooperation and we need not hesitate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share Allied commercial shipping. Recommend American representative shipping conference be instructed accordingly.

2. Confidential report to French General Staff indicates further domestic trouble in Russia. French expect to aid Russian army by sending French officers to help organize army. Considerable store placed in assistance of Americans in reorganizing railroads. Reported here that America will aid in this work.

3. Cable from High Commissioner Tardieu to French Prime Minister obtained through confidential sources indicates French pressure to divert United States from program of using all available shipping to land and supply an army in France. He reports difficulty in persuading Secretary of War to send units other than those destined for the army and that he is obliged to act with caution implying that further demands are to be made on us for men. This constant pressure for units outside of military requirements seems to be reversion to the original *plan de Nivelles** which contemplated our participation in the war should be to furnish laborers and technical troops. Suggest such requests receive very careful consideration and that own military requirements be given full weight. Attention invited to first paragraph this cable on necessity of using shipping for landing and supplying army. Suggest a review of memorandum of May 25, from General Bliss to Secretary Baker as to deliberate desire of French and English. My observations in France have confirmed impression stated in that memorandum.

PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2263: Memorandum

General Headquarters Move to Chaumont

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 24, 1917.

No. 70

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STAFF

General Headquarters will move to Chaumont on August 31.

An officer will be designated as post commander in Paris to command casals, military police, etc., with headquarters at 10 Rue Ste-Anne (under L. of C.).

The purchasing and disbursing officers connected with the General Supply Board, and such officers as may be designated by the C-in-C and C. G., L. of C., will remain in Paris. Each chief of staff department and each chief of general staff section will at once submit a memorandum of the personnel (commissioned and otherwise) which they desire to retain in Paris, and what liaison they propose, and reasons.

Arrangements will be made by the C. Q. M. for shipping to Chaumont all the records, etc., between the 27th and 31st. Office furniture will be provided at Chaumont.

The French system of billeting officers and installing *popottes* (messes) will be followed. Major Robert Bacon, Q. M. C., U. S. R., the representative of the C-in-C at Chaumont, will make the general arrangements for billeting and *popottes*. Each head of staff department will send a representative not later than August 27, to report to

* *General de Nivelles*, Commander-in-Chief of French armies.

Major Bacon. This representative will be accompanied by one cook and one waiter for each ten officers or less of his staff department. Arrangements will be made for equipping and starting the necessary messes.

Each head of staff department will submit at once a list by name of all officers accompanying him, and indicate his desire as to those who will live together, or as near each other as can be arranged; also the names of those who will mess together, but not to exceed ten to a mess.

Clerks will be quartered and messed in barracks, and will be furnished cots. Each head of staff department will furnish the number of his clerks.

Mail for headquarters or those on duty at headquarters will be addressed to Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, France, as heretofore.

By command of Major General Pershing:

BENJ. ALVORD,
Adjutant General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 681

Number and Location of Allied Divisions---Morale and Manpower of Germany

General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A)

Paris, August 28, 1917.

SPECIAL REPORT

The Allied troops in all zones of warfare outside of Africa are divided as follows:

FRANCE		
French	108	Div.
English	62	"
Belgium	6	"
American	1	"
Portugese	1 1/2	"
Germany 146 Div.		
ITALY		
Italy	61	Div.
Austria 31 Div.		
RUSSIA		
Russia	223	Div.
Roumania	10	"
German-Austrian 137 Div.		
MACEDONIAN		
French	8	Div.
English	7	"
Serbs	6	"
Russia	1	"
Italy	2 1/2	Div.
Greek	2	"
CAUCASUS-PRUSSIA		
	15	Div.

MESOPOTAMIA

5 Div.

SYRIA-PALESTINE

4 Div.

ARABIA

10,000 Men

- - -

Extract from a note to F. M. C-in-C., C. G. S. and O.

MANPOWER: The question of manpower is necessarily one about which there must be great divergence of opinion. On the one hand there are a large number of definite facts accepted by all, which tend to show great exhaustion of manpower. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly great resources of an empire of the size of the German Empire. Between these two extremes, there is a large amount of "No Man's Land" in which opinions must largely vary.

It can, however, now be definitely accepted that:

- (1) The 1918 Class as a means of supplying drafts to the field army is exhausted.
- (2) The 1919 Class is, in large measure, either in front-line units or front-line depots.
- (3) Combining has not been able to provide men to meet the losses of the Battle of ARRAS.
- (4) Company strengths are being steadily reduced.
- (5) The average expenditure in classes of German during the preceding years of war has been at the rate of 2 annual classes per year, and she has now her 18 year old boys in the field.

SUMMARY: The two vital factors which, from a military point of view, will be decisive in this war are clearly:

- (a) Morale, of which the evidence given above shows a steady deterioration in the German army.
- (b) Manpower, of which the figures given above show without doubt that even the resources of the German Empire cannot stand the strain of war on its population for more than a very limited number of months, providing the fighting remains at its present intensity.

- - -

NOTE REGARDING GERMAN MANPOWER CASUALTIES AND MORALE

MANPOWER: The 1918 Class is at present providing percentages of the total prisoners varying from 17 in certain divisions to 25 in other divisions.

Experience has shown that when a class furnishes more than 15 to 16% of prisoners, then that class has ceased to exist as a draft-furnishing source within Germany, i. e., it is exhausted as a means of replacing future casualties.

The 1917 Class first appeared in the front line in September of last year. It was not until six months after that date that it furnished a high percentage of prisoners and casualties. The 1918 Class first appeared in April of this year, i. e., after three months it is furnishing the highest percentage of prisoners of any class previously experienced during this war.

The evidence of prisoners is unanimous that the 1919 Class is now either actually in units opposite our front or in the field depots immediately behind the front. In spite of this, only a few prisoners of this class have so far been taken. The reason is almost certainly that the Germans are saving this class by putting it into the 4th Platoons of companies, which are used as ration carriers, and are by other means saving it from taking part in the fighting.

The 1920 Class, although it has been called up in almost all areas, will not have completed its training until the end of this year, and even then, judging by our experience of the 1918 Class, will be much too young to take its place in the firing line. It seems improbable that it will have matured sufficiently to fight until April of next year.

The fact that the 1918 Class has been called on to furnish drafts to replace approximately 80% of the casualties suffered in April and May is conclusive proof that, at the present moment, Germany has no other resources except this class and returned wounded to meet the casualties she is suffering. In other words, combat is at a standstill at the moment.

CASUALTIES: Twenty-four divisions have been withdrawn exhausted from the front in Flanders and in LENS. Thirteen more divisions have suffered heavy casualties in the Flanders area, although not sufficient to entitle them to be classified as fully exhausted. Four more divisions are now employed in the LENS front, and are known also to have suffered considerable casualties.

It may be estimated that a division which is withdrawn exhausted will have suffered approximately 3,000 casualties in its infantry and 200 casualties in its other services. Based upon this, it is estimated that the total casualties suffered by the Germans since the middle of July amount to:

Flanders-----	90,000
LENS-----	10,000

MORALE: The best evidence of morale is that by an army of the army immediately opposed to it.

The Fifth Army sums up on August 11, the general impression of the morale of the Germans as follows:

The impression made by the prisoners and the result of hostile counterattacks is that the general morale of the German soldier is undoubtedly lowered. Few cases are reported of protracted resistance, and counterattacks made have not been pushed home with determination.

Such captured orders as the following demonstrate the low morale:

Regimental Order, 226th Reserve Inf. Regt., 49th Res. Div:

From reports received from front line and support battalions, a large number of men, some pleading sickness, are leaving their posts without orders.

Regimental Order, 450th Inf. Regt., 233d Division:

Identifications by prisoners made have allowed the enemy to draw conclusions as to the quality of the troops of the 233d Division. The men are too young to make a long resistance in a critical situation. They have, however, done well on the whole. The unit cannot be described as fully efficient. It is only fit for trench warfare.

Numerous letters confirm these orders.

The following report was rendered by the officer commanding the 9th Co., 358th Inf. Regt., 214th Division:

Hand grenades issued this morning to the company - - - - -	120
At present in hand - - - - -	70

The remainder were partly left behind by the men, and partly thrown away by them during the march back today.

Accounts of incidents in the fighting still further emphasize the depreciation of the German morale. Two whole regiments of the 79th Reserve Division openly took to their heels on August 16. Seven officers of the same regiment were found hiding in dugouts and surrendered without fighting.

The Bavarian 6th Reserve Division, previously considered a good division, was in a state of indiscipline verging on mutiny on July 31, and had to be withdrawn from the front line prior to our attack.

Numerous cases are reported by prisoners of men of the 49th Reserve Division refusing to go into the line.

A captured battalion commander of the 5th Grenadier Regt. of the 36th Division, referred openly to the low morale of both the officers and men of his regiment.

Evidence appears to be conclusive that the morale of the German army opposed to us in Flanders and in LENS at the present moment is as low as that of the German army at the conclusion of the battle of the Somme, when the advent of the bad weather alone prevented the full results of the victory being obtained.

PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN DIVISIONS: An analysis of the German divisions at present on the western front shows that 79 have been engaged in battle since June 1 and have suffered such losses as to be at the present moment of greatly reduced value as fighting units. Of the remaining 67 divisions, 14 are Landwehr divisions, so that only 53 can be considered of full fighting value at the present moment.

J. CHARTERIS,
Brigadier General,
General Staff.

P Cables 133-S

Use of Marines

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, August 31, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

14. The 5th Marines, a fine regiment, arrived in June complete, and there has now arrived for it a fourth battalion with an extra headquarters and machine gun company evidently intended as replacement troops. The divisional supply machinery, trains, etc., are based on four regiments and the fifth regiment is an inconvenient addition. Its uniform, certain features of supply, inability to meet hospital expenses and this odd replacement organization do not assimilate with army organization. If Marines can be spared from the customary duties for which maintained, it is believed their force thus surplus should become a part of the army and that otherwise no more Marines be sent to France.

* * * * *

PERSHING

Supply Problems

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Paris, August 31, 1917.

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Ministry of War, General Staff of the Army, Forward Group, American Section,
Liaison

1. As I informed you in my letter yesterday, I am retaining an office in Paris at 31 Rue de Constantine, for the purpose of keeping in touch with you and, in addition, I am leaving Major General Blatchford, Commander of the Line of Communications, for the present with his headquarters at 10 Rue Ste-Anne. This service of the line of Communications corresponds generally to the 4th Bureau of your General Staff.

2. Brigadier General W. H. Allaire, Provost Marshal General of my headquarters, will also remain for the present, and be in command of such American troops and casuals as may be in Paris.

3. It has also been necessary to establish a General Purchasing Board with a General Purchasing Agent at its head, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Dawes, U. S. R. E., with office at 10 Rue Ste-Anne, who will be my representative in liaison with the various Allied purchasing agencies, and through whom all purchases of supplies in Europe will be made for the American army.

4. Colonel Jefferson R. Kean, Medical Corps, U. S. A., 10 Rue Ste-Anne, will remain in Paris in command of the American Ambulance Service, now on duty with the French army.

5. Major G. M. P. Murphy, Infantry, U. S. R., representative of the American Red Cross in Europe, 4 Place de la Concorde, and Mr. E. C. Carter, secretary of the Y. M. C. A., 31 Avenue Montaigne, will continue here in charge of their aid services under the general control of my headquarters.

6. In the organization and supply of the American forces, a number of other of my staff officers will have frequent occasion to consult and continue their relations with various bureaus of your ministry.

JOHN J. PERSHING.
Major General, U. S. Army.

*Recommended Arrangements for Transfer of American Citizens
in British Armies to the American Army*

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 31, 1917.

Mailed p. m., September 6, 1917

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Expeditionary Force

Dear Sir Douglas:

Applications have been received at these headquarters from a number of officers and soldiers (American citizens) in the Canadian and British armies, who desire to transfer for service with the American army. It is, of course, quite natural that these men should wish to join the American army and to serve with their own countrymen. Moreover, such of them as may be competent to instruct troops would really be of much use to us. These applications have been filed without action until the matter could be taken up with your headquarters.

I should like to suggest that, if entirely agreeable to you, some arrangement be made to enable these applicants to obtain release and enter our service. Possibly such men as your officers could recommend could be authorized to take a few day's leave of absence to visit Paris for examination. After completion of their examination, they could return to their stations in your service, and I could advise you in due time as to the names of those found qualified, so that the necessary steps could be taken to discharge them from the British service.

A list of the names of the officers and men who have made such applications is enclosed. [List omitted.] If you approve of this, perhaps these men could be granted permission to visit these headquarters for the purpose indicated. This subject is taken up in this manner in the hope of thus resolving the situation in the interest of both services. If this plan meets with your approval, perhaps you would kindly turn the matter over to the proper staff officer for action.

I may add that our War Department has ruled that all men who have entered the British or Canadian Service and have hence taken the oath of allegiance to the British Government have lost their American citizenship. Applicants for appointment as officers in our service should, therefore, produce an authenticated copy of the obligation they have assumed, in order that their status may be determined. Those men who desire to enlist as soldiers in the American army may do so without submitting evidence of citizenship.

With great respect and high esteem, I remain

Very sincerely,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

General Pershing Directs Study of Front Verdun to Switzerland

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 3, 1917.

I desire, at an early date, a study of strategical fronts, with special reference to the German Front from the Verdun front to the Switzerland frontier, with strategical questions involved in undertaking a campaign along that front. This should be prepared and necessary maps presented with the study.

J. J. P.

Cable: P-140-S

G. H. Q., Established at Chaumont

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 4, 1917.

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

General Headquarters established at Chaumont where accommodations very satisfactory and capable of expansion. Only such staff officers will remain in Paris as may be required to transact business there. Location of our headquarters should be held confidential.

PERSHING.

Cable: P-145-S

Policy Concerning Shipment of Bodies of Deceased Soldiers

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 7, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

11. Recommend that definite policy be adopted during continuation of war that bodies of deceased officers and soldiers will not be shipped from France to the United States. This decision would follow British announced policy this matter. Have organized burial corps and will arrange with French Government established cemeteries in France where dead may be buried. This corps charged with carefully recording graves and with proper arrangement of cemeteries. Transportation and other difficulties in shipping remains home will be practically insurmountable especially when operations begin. Understood that French do not permit disinterments in the army zone. Recommend that definite policy on the foregoing lines be adopted.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Cable: P-153-S

Corps Commanders not to be Designated at Once

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 9, 1917.

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

In connection with organization divisions and assignment of general officers it is deemed advisable in the interests of efficiency that assignments of corps commanders be delayed until after divisions shall have served in Europe long enough to test ability of division commanders in actual handling of divisions in the field. Otherwise, shall get officers who have never personally commanded such units in active service and who will lack experience in commanding divisions necessary for efficiency in commanding corps.

PERSHING.

Information Regarding Western Front

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

INTELLIGENCE SECTION,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 9, 1917.

MEMORANDUM I FOR OPERATIONS SECTION

(Information requested Operations Memorandum of September 4, 1917.)

ANNUAL DRAFT OF NEW MEN

GERMAN ARMY: The class of 1918, which normally would enter the army in October 1918, was drafted in October 1916, but was not called to the colors at the same time but taken by installments, for convenience in training, and drilled in recruit formations in November and December 1916, and January, February, and March 1917.

During the summer of 1917 many combed men from industries and from the lesser fit, have been called to the colors, but there is no evidence that the class of 1919 (18 year old) has yet been called out for instruction, although a few volunteers of that age have been captured. The following table shows the relative losses of the class of 1917 and 1918, during this year to include the month of July:

Class	Published losses in	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July
1918		0.1	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.4	2.4	4.7
1917		8.3	9.8	11.7	12.1	12.1	13.	12.5

From this table it would appear that the main portion of the class of 1917 has joined the colors in June 1917, and that the major part of the class of 1918 was still in recruit depots.

On the other hand, of 3,669 prisoners captured by the British during July 1917, 12 1/2% were of the class of 1917 and 17% of the class of 1918. I do not think, however, that this percentage warrants the conclusion that there is a larger proportion of the class of 1918 in the active army than of the class of 1917. Such recruits are sent rather indiscriminately to fill vacancies wherever they occur and it may be possible that the particular units in the front line where the attacks occurred had a larger percentage of this class than the average, while it is also possible that the younger men may have surrendered with less attempt at resistance, or less zeal to make their escape than the older men.

In considering the recruitment of the German armies during the summer of 1918, there must be taken into account the fact that in 1916 a considerable portion of the harvest was reported to have been lost through lack of men to gather it in in season. The German general staff took this into account in 1917, and not only refrained from calling to the colors men engaged in agricultural pursuits, during the summer, but sent back for work in the fields (temporarily) men of the older classes who were skilled agriculturalists.

The British estimated the German recruit reserves on the first of June to consist of seven hundred thousand men. Of this number, I consider that about 300,000 have been sent

to replace losses during the summer, leaving in the recruit depots on September 1, 400,000 assuming that the class of 1919 has not yet been called out.

It may be remarked that beginning September 1, a material augmentation in the size of units, and possibly the creation of new units, is to be expected owing to the return to the front of the agriculturalists which had been sent back for the harvest.

This fall will, however, see the high-water mark of the German army in numerical strength for the present war since every effort was made to turn out every available man fit for military service this year, and subsequent classes called to the colors cannot be expected to replace the annual losses although the reduction in numbers for the year 1918 will probably not be a very material one.

AUSTRIAN ARMY: The losses of the Austrian army have been far heavier than those of the German army. The data as to the number of prisoners captured by the Russians is very inconclusive, but it is probable that it is not less than a half million, whereas in the German army less than 100,000 have been captured by the British and less than 200,000 by the French during the entire war. No data are available on the number of Austrian reserves available, but the Austrian Government has shown far less enthusiasm than the German in the matter of combining, and it is not probable that the Austrian army has anything like the proportionate number of recruit reserves back of it that the German army has.

RAILROADS, ROADS AND CANALS: Maps showing permanent railroad systems of Germany and Austria.

The single set of these maps is on file in Intelligence Section A, and available for the use of the Operation Section when needed. It is noted that in the French and British Intelligence Sections a general staff officer devotes his entire time to the study of these systems and the subject cannot be handled satisfactorily unless an officer is available for this study in the A. E. F. Intelligence Section. If the Operation Section attempts to study the railroads of Germany and their military use without the assistance of a trained specialist in the Intelligence Section, it simply amounts to their detailing a man to engage in this branch of Intelligence Section work.

Information as to changes in the above systems which have occurred during the war.

There have been no important changes in the German railroad systems proper except the addition of switching facilities and additional trackage at junctions. To follow the changes and development of the German railways requires the study of the special intelligence officer mentioned in the paragraph above.

Maps showing the system of railways developed and used on the German western front during the war.

The German railroads on the British front are shown on special maps which are available for the study of the Operation Section in the western front room. German railroads on the western front opposite the French are shown on the *Plan Directeur* maps, a complete set of which is furnished herewith for the use of the Operation Section. As soon as we take over a section of the front, the Intelligence Section would have an officer who can devote his entire time to the study of the German front line railroads and light railroads, and the German supply service including location of supply depots, ammunition dumps, etc., of the front occupied and other parts of the front the taking over of which is under consideration. The study of this subject by the Operation Section without the assistance of such a specialist in the Intelligence Section, who devotes his whole time to the subject simply amounts, as in the case of (1), to the devoting of an Operations officer to the performance of Intelligence Section work.

Maps showing the system of roads existing and developed on the German western front.

Maps showing the system of canals available for use on the German western front.

Information of any nature of military value relating to the German transportation facilities, etc.

The information under these headings is shown for the western French front on the *Plan Directeur* maps furnished. The same officer of the Intelligence Section who studies

railroads behind the front is also charged with information as to roads and canals and the supply and ammunition services at the front.

TERRAIN: Taking the line for discussion from right to left, from the Swiss frontier north, 35 kilometers of the line is over rolling ground affording strong defensive positions but not unsuitable for active operations. This part of the line is at present lightly held by both sides.

From east of THANN north for 90 kilometers the line crosses the VOSGES Mountains. This is a rugged country difficult for either attack or for active operations on a large scale and is the most lightly held part of the line (by both sides) on the western front. These two sectors together comprise the sector held by the French Seventh Army.

Behind these two sectors lies the fertile Rhine Valley, varying from 30 to 40 kilometers in width and in which the Germans are prepared to fall back, in case of need, behind the Rhine between Basle and Strassbourg, holding the line extending from Strassbourg to Metz.

From Cirey to a point 15 kilometers east of St-Mihiel lies the sector held by the French Eighth Army. The southeastern part of this line is rugged, the middle part less so. Although this country is more favorable for active operations than the sector to the south and although this part of the line is at present lightly held by the Germans, more stubborn resistance to an attack is to be expected in this part on account of the successive prepared lines in rear of the front and on account of interference of the enemy's communications between Strassbourg and Metz, which would be interrupted by an Allied advance in this sector, and on account of the fact that an advance here unless made on a very broad front would find itself enveloped on both flanks. Nevertheless, an advance on this front as far northward as Saarbrücken would have the largest strategic consequences by throwing out of gear the railroad communications of the troops in the Metz-Verdun sector and might easily lead to the compelling of a general withdrawal of the entire southern part of the German line in France. A further advantage of the advance on Saarbrücken is that the advancing line would soon be on German territory where the Germans could not afford to destroy the country as they retreated as they did last year in France, and where the French would not have the same objection which they have in the line farther north, to destructions carried on in rear of the enemy's line by aeroplane and otherwise, and also to the baring of the arable soil by heavy bombardments. The moral effect of carrying the war into the enemy's country and at the same time the regaining of part of Lorraine would also be very great.

The importance of the St-Mihiel salient lies in the fact that: First it cuts the French communications between Verdun and Nancy and thereby seriously interferes with the shifting of the troops as well as with their supply. Second, that it affords to the Germans the means of an attack upon Verdun from the rear (south) as well as from the front (north). Third, that it furnishes a base for a concentric advance by the Germans against Nancy. Fourth, that its occupation serves to protect the Briey and Metz iron foundries against bombardment by long-range guns and against aeroplane bombing. This salient is technically a very strong position on account of the triple range of hills which prevents artillery cooperation between the Allied forces on the two faces of the salient. Nevertheless, a very slight advance on either side would render such cooperation possible and compel the evacuation of the salient. The fact is thoroughly appreciated by the Germans who have prepared a complete defensive system to fall back on in the rear of them. The natural and easy attack of this salient would be from the south, on account of difficulties of terrain (hills and forests) on its western face. This seems to offer an especially inviting first objective to the American army, one which is relatively easy of accomplishment and one the attainment of which would give it great prestige and produce a large moral effect both in Allied and hostile countries. It would not, however, pave the way for a further attack in the same locality, although its occupation would be equally favorable for supporting an advance northward from Verdun or northeastward from Nancy.

An advance northward from Verdun against Longwy and Sedan offers perhaps the quickest

and most efficacious means of compelling the evacuation of French territory to the West, by the German army in the west by cutting the railway lines absolutely essential to the supplying and munitioning of that army. It is probably that the fear of such an attack led in part to the decision to make the German attack on Verdun in 1916 to safeguard these necessary lines of communication by a further advance in that direction. This advance would, of course, have to be made in the valley of the Meuse; possession of the Argonne Forest naturally going to the possessor of the ground on either side of it. West of the Argonne Forest, in the Champagne district, an advance would be very difficult, would have to be made on a broad front, would be very costly, and would not be especially profitable.

GERMAN FORTRESSES: The German fortified areas prepared for all-round defense and as pivots of operation are at Metz, Longwy, and Strassbourg. Of these, Metz is the most strongly fortified and the best adapted for stubborn defense by reason of its natural situation. To attempt its capture without first cutting it off may be regarded as the most difficult task which could be undertaken.

ARSENALS, MANUFACTURES, SUPPLY CENTERS, ETC.: A great mass of information is available on these subjects in the files of the Intelligence Section. These are at the disposal of the officers of the Operation Section for study. Owing to the shortage of intelligence officers, no member of the intelligence staff is at present available to digest these reports and study these questions in detail.

It may be said in passing, however, that the chief center for the manufacture of munitions is Essen where probably 80% of the guns and ammunition are produced. 60% of iron ore used in the production of these munitions comes from the Briey---Metz---Luxembourg iron fields and smelters. These smelters constitute an important objective for air raids as they are very valuable and, once destroyed, would require a year to rebuild. Their destruction would, therefore, deal a heavy blow to the enemy's munition supply. The French ownership of some of these smelting plants is said to have interfered, in the past, with the execution of orders for their destruction.

The Germans have no central depot of manufactured munitions, but tranship them from the manufacturing plant to the various army bases from which they are distributed to advanced dumps.

*D. G. NOLAN,
Major, General Staff,
Chief of Section.*

Information Regarding Western Front

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

INTELLIGENCE SECTION,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 10, 1917.

MEMORANDUM II FOR OPERATION SECTION

(Information requested in Memorandum of Operation Section, dated September 4, 1917)

1. The British army has, in the theaters of war (except Africa):

France	62 Divisions	(1,500,000 combatants (1,000,000 service of rear
Macedonia	8	"
Palestine	4	" (X)
Mesopotamia	5	" (XX)
(X)	Reinforcements expected from Salonica.	
(XX)	"	" " India

The British recruit reserves are estimated to have been 400,000 on July 31; of these half have probably been used up during August, and the rest will be used up in the offensives, if continued, during September and October, after which troop units will have to be employed with reduced effectives.

The age of British recruits is not known, but it is believed that England has called to the colors all men who can be spared from work, over eighteen and under 40, of military effectiveness. It is probable, therefore, that the British army, like the German, has reached its maximum strength in 1917 and will not be able to increase (without conscription in Canada and Australia) its number of organizations for next year, and it is even doubtful if, on the same terms, it can maintain its present number of units and engage in effective offensive action.

2. The French army has in the theatres of war (except Africa):

France	108 Divisions
Macedonia	7 "

Its reported strength on April 1 (in France) was:

Combatant troops	1,322,000
Service of rear	800,000
Recruit reserves	400,000

This force represented the last combining possible of the military population down to include men 19 years old.

Since then the losses have been very severe, especially in the spring offensive in the Chemin-des-Dames and Verdun sectors, and the number of effectives per organization has had to be materially reduced in the French army. It may be said to be impossible for France to maintain its present number of organization at full strength and engage, either this year or next year, in any extensive operations involving large losses.

3. The Italian army has in the theatres of war (except Africa---where it has retired

to the coast line of Tripoli and abandoned all attempts at military control of the interior):

Italian Front	61 divisions
Albanian "	2 1/2 "

There are no data available on the number of recruit reserves but it may be said that both Government and people are lukewarm towards continuing the war, and excessive in their demands on England and France for coal and other necessities and that any further calling out of men or attempt to employ Italian forces in other theatres is not considered possible. If Italy can hold half the number of Austrian divisions on her frontier which she has there herself, as she is now doing, and not lose her present foothold, she will be doing as much as can be expected until Austria is much weaker than she is now.

4. The Russian army had in the theatres of war:

Russian-Rumanian Front	223 Divisions
Caucasus Front	15 "
Macedonian Front	1 "

However, through French sources, we have heard of the breaking up of one Russian army (sent south to reinforce the Rumanian front), which became so disaffected that it had to be amalgamated with others, while it is hinted that the enemy's advances at Tarnopol and Riga was due to the disintegration of the Russian troops opposed to them rather than to any well-organized German offensive.

It is doubtful if Russia has at the moment any recruit reserves which it can dispose of, due to the spirit of unrest and insubordination among the civil population. The only question is, therefore, how much of the present organized Russian army can the Government and army leaders hold together, and for how long. The answers to these questions depend largely upon the ability of the Government to feed, clothe, quarter, pay, and munition the troops; granted these conditions, discipline could undoubtedly be restored, but the transportation system of Russia, as well as its finance, industry, agriculture and manufactures, has been so thrown out of joint by the war and especially by the overthrow of all the machinery of government, such as it was, due to the revolution, that the solution of these basic problems appears now most difficult.

D. G. NOLAN.
Major, General Staff,
Chief of Section.

Cable: P-161-S

Shipping Difficulties

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 15, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

[Extract]

1. Reference my confidential Cablegrams 94 and 119 have received confidential letter today from General Robertson, Chief of Staff, British army. In substance letter states that shipping question becoming increasingly difficult account submarines; that British fear that transport our troops will be jeopardized; that British admiralty agree question of shipping is between England and America only as other Allies have no shipping worth considering. General Robertson suggests that Admiral Mayo and myself be sent to England with authority to discuss with admiralty arrangements for shipping needed for American troops during the next year. Recommend approval General Robertson's suggestion. Am not informed regarding details of shipping available for our use but if recommendation is adopted request necessary information regarding our requirements. Consider it highly important that we take advantage of this opportunity to arrange for shipping to meet our needs during the next twelve months.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Cable: A-183-R

Organization of Army and G. H. Q.

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 17, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

* * * * *

4. Mail your recommendations for organization in detail for headquarters of an army headquarters and for General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, including commissioned and enlisted personnel all grades and arms or branches and transportation. Desired for use in preparing tables of organization.

McCain.

*Proposal Concerning Transfer of American Citizens from British
Armies to The American Army*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,

September 19, 1917.

Dear General Pershing,

Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig has transferred your letter of August 31 to me for action.

While readily appreciating your desire to collect such of your own countrymen as would be useful to you from a military point of view, yet I am not sure that your proposal to have the applicants mentioned in your letter sent to Paris for examination is feasible. In the first place the majority of the officers and a considerable proportion of the men are in England, and it would not be expedient to fill up shipping space with men whose retention out here was not assured.

It might hence be equally as convenient to you to send one or two officers to see those officers and men concerned who are serving out here. I do not anticipate any difficulty in getting them collected at their respective army headquarters, those on the L. of C. being arranged for separately.

So far as we are concerned, we are only too anxious to help you in every possible way, but I believe the arrangement that has been entered into by the two War Departments concerned is to the effect that the American Embassy in London will take any necessary executive action as regards applying for the release of any individuals whose services are required by the American Government.

On receipt of a reply from you, I will inform our War Office of your desire in respect to the men noted on the lists accompanying your letter of August 31, but I think it would be convenient to be able to state that arrangements for any examination of the men will be such as to enable the examination to take place near where the men are serving.

Yours sincerely,

G. H. FOWKE.

Cable: A-190-R

Shipping

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 19, 1917.

PERSHING, A. E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

3. Reference your number 161, President of the United States says question of shipping is being looked after from here, and that arrangements now being made would be confused by such a conference as you suggest. Our shipping must necessarily be supplied by ourselves, and the shipping board here is in direct conference with British authorities controlling their shipping.

McCain.

Cable: P-175-S

Organization of Headquarters of Army and G. H. Q.

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 22, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 4 your number 183, your number 200 and my 172. Study is being made and will be forwarded promptly for organization in detail of army headquarters and for General Headquarters. This study when completed and contemplating presence here of full number of divisions will probably include rank of general officer for heads of sections of the general staff, not necessary, however, at this time.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

*Restrictions on Release of Information on Sailing of Military
Personnel*

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 24, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

* * * * *

Orders have been given that no information be communicated to any representatives, military or civil, of any foreign power, about the sailing of any military personnel to the theater of war in Europe until twenty-four hours after this information shall have been communicated to you. Please inform at once whether this is satisfactory. If, notwithstanding these orders, you learn of advance information being communicated to any French official, endeavor to ascertain the sources from which it came and report facts.

McCain.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 683-A: Memorandum

General Summary of European Situation

[Contemporary Translation]

General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A), G. S.,

September 25, 1917.

Russian Mission, Interallied Section

MILITARY INFORMATION

BULGARIA:

MILITARY OPERATIONS: It is reported from an authentic source that Germany, from the beginning of August, was attempting in every way to force Bulgaria to undertake an offensive on the Macedonian front. The Bulgarian General Staff refused absolutely to comply with this wish. After the Kaiser's trip to Sophia and Constantinople, the situation changed. The Emperor persuaded the Bulgarians that Germany and Austria-Hungary would again prove anew their military supremacy. This statement alluded to the Italian campaign, then under preparation. As a result he succeeded in persuading the Bulgarians to comply with his request in the following manner:

1. Assemble all available Bulgarian forces on the southern part of the Bulgarian front, laying emphasis on the historical hatred nourished by the Bulgarians against the Greeks. The military authorities are compelled to resort to every effort in order to incite the Bulgarian soldiers against the Greeks, assuring them of the occupation of Salonika and the remainder of Macedonia which Emperor William has solemnly promised the Bulgarians.

2. Consolidate in the best possible manner all the Thracian front for a defensive war, consent to remove from this front all available units near Constantinople (*elements de la garnison*) and develop all railroads as much as possible.

3. Mass the best Bulgarian forces in the southwestern part of Macedonia, especially in the OKHRIDA and PRESPA region. This section is designated as the starting point of the intended active operations.

4. Develop the railroads and build a railroad between Lakes OKHRIDA and PRESPA to secure direct communication between the cities of OKHRIDA and PRESPA (there is already a narrow-gauge railroad from SKOPIE to OKHRIDA).

In return, Germany promises to strictly fulfill all pledges made towards Bulgaria, namely:

1. To have 180,000 German troops on the Bulgarian fronts.

2. Cooperate with the Bulgarian engineers in the reinforcement of their line of defense.

3. Provide the Bulgarian army with arms of kinds in sufficient quantity necessitated by the technical personnel.

4. Strengthen the air fleet.

5. Force Turkey to renounce its claim to southern Thrace.

6. To straighten out the differences existing between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary.

7. To take necessary steps to guarantee Bulgaria's possession of the Dobroudja, all Macedonia, a part of Old Serbia, of Salonika, of Thassos Island, of the Chalcidique Peninsula, of Seros, Drama, and Cavalla.

8. Assume all military expenses.

The plan of the proposed offensive on the Macedonian front is the following: The principal Bulgarian forces should assemble in the OKHRIDA region. The offensive will be carried out in three columns, in three directions from the west, the south and the east, after that the invasion of Greece. It is proposed to start a revolt in Greece in favor of CONSTANTINE, in order to cut off all communication between SARRAIL and ATHENS. On all parts of the Salonika front active preparations are being made for this offensive, principally in the OKHRIDA section. There is no doubt but that the offensive on the Macedonian front will be carried out. The Bulgarian army has decided to undertake it because it is convinced that this drive will end the war and assure Bulgaria's possession of Salonika.

It is learned from other sources that a large number of German troops has been sent to Bulgaria. It seems that in early October as many as 2 German divisions arrived in Bulgaria.

COUNT IGNATIEFF II,
Colonel,
Chief of the Russian Mission.

Use of American Freight

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section

No. 8329 BS/3

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,

ADVANCED GROUP,

Paris, October 3, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF WAR

In his Telegram 2102 M. O., * * * the high commissioner of the republic to the United States reports difficulties he is having in obtaining the delivery of boats previously ordered.

He states that these difficulties stem from the present inclination of the Federal Government to retain solely for the transportation and supply of the American army all tonnage available to the United States.

Mr. Tardieu points out apropos of this, that an interallied conference, at which the United States would be represented, would be the only means of presenting the question on its true basis, the general interest of the coalition, and reaching the best solution for that interest.

Mr. Tardieu's suggestion seems to be entirely fitting and the sole means, in fact, of inducing the American Government to make the best use of its merchant fleet for the fundamental needs of the Allies.

It seems, however, that, before the assembly of the interallied conference in question, and as the high commissioner stated in the next-to-last paragraph of his telegram referred to above, it is advisable, first of all, to coordinate closely the various French needs and requests, that are seeking to obtain the use of American freight.

Up to this time, as a matter of fact, all requests could be sent for this purpose to the high commissioner by the various departments without having the Government determine by a joint study the actual seasonableness, or even the order of priority, of all these requests.

The army general staff (advance group) considers it the province of the office of the minister to submit this question to the council with a view to assembling shortly an interministerial commission, charged with determining:

1. What are the essential needs requiring the use of American freight by the different ministries;
2. The total tonnage necessary to meet them, with allotment of that tonnage to the departments and order of priority for each of them.

Then, it is the duty of the government to call the interallied conference in which French requirements, thus clearly determined, could be submitted.

FOCH,

General, Chief of the General Staff of the French army.

Movement of Troops to France via England

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

ADMINISTRATION SECTION, GENERAL STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 6, 1917.

From: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

To: Chief, French Military Mission

1. You are of course fully aware of the difficulties presented in procuring tonnage for the movement of troops of these forces from America to our various Atlantic base ports. To hasten the troops here, the American Government is making every effort to use the passenger carrying accommodations on Atlantic boats plying between England and America for troop transport. The effect of all this is that we have reason to expect that the number of troops coming to France may possibly reach an aggregate of 10,000 men per week, arriving through England.

2. It is understood informally that the disembarkation and expedition of those troops at the French channel ports present certain difficulties due to lack of port facilities, etc. On the other hand, any attempt to ship these troops after their arrival in England to base ports we are now using would require an amount of tonnage which we have not available; and in addition would subject the troops, it is believed, unnecessarily to enemy submarine attack.

3. Another difficulty presents itself in that the troops coming via England must of necessity bring with them a certain amount of supplies and equipment. This naturally occasions an additional load at the French channel ports. Up to the present time the amount of impedimenta accompanying American troops routed via England has been reduced to the very minimum. In certain cases with engineer troops much time has been lost awaiting the arrival of tools and equipment necessary to their work.

4. This matter is presented to you with the request that it be taken up with the proper French authorities so that we can arrive at some adjustment of the existing difficulties at the channel ports, to the end that the American Expeditionary Forces may not be delayed in their arrival in France. Both our governments are in accord as to the necessity of expediting the arrival of American forces, and an early reply will be appreciated.

By direction:

J. G. HARBORD,
Chief of Staff.

Schedule of Priority of Shipment of Personnel

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 7, 1917.

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. Herewith is a schedule showing the order in which shipment should be made to France of the troops called for in the following:

(1) A. E. F. General Organization Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated July 10, 1917.

(2) Service of the Rear Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated September 21, 1917.

(3) Tank Project forwarded to the War Department with letter dated September 24, 1917.

2. The following units are herein added to the Service of the Rear Project. These additions meet with my approval.

4 R. R. Telegraph Battalions	920 men
1 Regiment of Cavalry (dismounted) for guard on L. of C.	1600 "
4 Battalions railway operation	3200 "
3 " " maintenance of way	<u>2400 "</u>
	8,120 "

3. Troops already in France and en route are included in the schedule and should be checked off as already furnished. This does not, however, apply to railway, sanitary, forestry or other troops furnished the British and French which are not covered by this schedule. As far as practicable the notes show the troops on hand and en route.

4. Strengths of units given herein are in many cases only approximate. Replacement drafts are not included in the totals and shipping must be allowed for them separately. This schedule does not cover personnel for General Headquarters or L. of C. Headquarters, which will be requested as required.

5. This schedule has for its purpose to provide a proper balance between all the various elements of the expeditionary forces, aviation troops excepted. Aviation must be given a separate schedule of shipments for the reason that the aviation program, in order to lend the most rapid assistance possible to the Allied cause, has been made much larger than necessary for a properly balanced army. To carry out this plan the aviation program must provide personnel as rapidly as the material will be ready, irrespective of the rate of shipment of the rest of our forces.

6. This schedule was the subject of a careful study by the General Staff at these headquarters. The order and rate of shipment of personnel and organizations pertaining to the several staff departments was the subject of conferences with the heads of the respective departments at these headquarters and agreement was reached thereon. The schedule meets with my approval.

7. The existing situation is difficult on account of our not having Service of the Rear troops in France in adequate proportion to our combatant troops already here or expected in the near future. I request that future shipments of troops be made so as to correct this and bring the several arms, auxiliaries and Service of the Rear troops into harmony with this schedule. The fact is recognized that this may cause difficulties in

the United States. It is, however, clear that only by establishing and adhering to such a schedule can a well-balanced force be maintained. I, therefore, request that this schedule be approved and put into effect at once.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

American Expeditionary Forces Schedule of Priority of Shipments

PERSONNEL

SUMMARY

[Extract]

FIRST PHASE

Service of the Rear	83,482
Army Troops	7,200
I Corps	174,118
Army Troops	<u>10,400</u>
Total First Phase	275,200

SECOND PHASE

Service of the Rear	73,114
II Corps	178,114
Army Troops	<u>16,262</u>
Total Second Phase	267,490
Total to date	542,690

THIRD PHASE

Service of the Rear	52,124
III Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>17,054</u>
Total Third Phase	246,248
Total to date	788,938

FOURTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	40,951
IV Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>13,722</u>
Total Fourth Phase	231,743
Total to date	1,020,681

FIFTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	27,174
V Corps	177,070
Army Troops	<u>5,856</u>
Total Fifth Phase	210,100
Total to date	1,230,781

SIXTH PHASE

Service of the Rear	16,618
Grand Total (excluding aviation and replacements)	1,247,399

For items pertaining to the Service of the Rear and Tank Projects item numbers and units used herein are as given in those projects. For other items pertaining to the General Organization Project of July 11, 1917, item numbers have been assigned herein. * * *

NUMBERS

1 -100 items pertaining to divisions
101-200 items pertaining to army corps
201-300 items pertaining to armies
301-400 items pertaining to G. H. Q.
401-500 items pertaining to L. of C.

NOTE: All divisional units including those pertaining to base and training divisions are included under items 1- 100.

LETTERS

No letter---Nondepartmental troops regarding which all records are kept by the Adjutant General, A. E. F.

Q -Quartermaster Corps units regarding which records are also kept by Chief Q. M., A. E. F., who is responsible for recommending action necessary to the best efficiency and utilization of such units.

M - Medical corps units	)	
E - Engineer units	)	Chiefs of respective staff
O - Ordnance units	)	departments have same duties
S - Signal units	)	as above indicated in case of
A - Aeronautic units	)	Quartermaster Corps units.
P - Provost Marshal	)	

* * * * *

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3140: Letter

Recommendations Based on Experience of 1st Division

1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Gondrecourt, Meuse, October 8, 1917.

From: Commanding General, 1st Division

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in your communication of September 29, the following report is submitted as result of the experience of this division in France.

2. The following officers of a division should precede the division to France by at least two weeks: Division Commander, a General Staff officer, a Quartermaster, and a Surgeon. These officers should familiarize themselves with conditions over here---billeting, water, fuel, methods of supply, training, etc.

3. Before leaving the states, division headquarters should be completely organized as to officers, noncommissioned officers, and clerks. They should bring with them on deck the following: Typewriters, mimeograph, stationery, office supplies, orders, regulations, blank forms, and the latest pamphlets and publications on modern warfare. All schedules of instruction and training to be carried out on shipboard should be prepared and issued at the mobilization or concentration camp.

The automobiles, motorcycles, mounts, field trains, supply trains, and sanitary train should accompany the division to France. Each transport, particularly the boat carrying division headquarters, should have aboard, in the upper holds, automobiles and motorcycles. All transport should be assembled in the United States and every spare part and accessory provided before being loaded. Each automobile and motorcycle should have, packed with it, two extra tires, a full set of tools, chains, a certain number of important spare parts, etc. No dependence should be placed upon obtaining these extras during the first month in France.

4. Rail movements: French rolling stock for troops is made up in trains, usually according to a fixed standard for transporting an infantry battalion, a battery of artillery or a squadron of cavalry - about 50 cars. Our units, particularly infantry, do not fit these trains; our escort wagons are difficult to load and only one can go on a flat car, where two French carts can be loaded; our men have more baggage than the French soldier; etc. As a result the first experience of loading is rather hard. Officers and men are apt to try to have things done in American fashion which only results in misunderstandings and serious delays. The arrangements made by the French railroad officials should be carefully observed and any ideas regarding the American way of doing things subordinated for the time being.

5. Billeting: Immediately upon landing in France an advance party (already decided upon during the voyage) should proceed to the billeting area so as to arrive there at least three days in advance of the troops. A senior line officer should be in charge of the advance party. The latter should consist of:

a: Temporary Staff: Adjutant, Quartermaster, Inspector, Surgeon, interpreter, clerk and personal orderlies. 1 automobile and 2 motorcycles with drivers.

For each village: 1 officer, Town Major
1 Surgeon
1 interpreter
1 N. C. O. clerk
2 orderlies
1 motorcycle and driver

For entire area: Minimum of 1 motor truck company.

The transportation for officers is most important. Without it the efficiency of their work is seriously reduced.

(b) Regulations for Town Majors and billeting should be issued to all officers at the port of debarkation.

At the same time a leaflet should be issued to each soldier briefly describing the nature of life in billets, and pointing out the necessity for respecting the rights of property owners, avoiding women, not spending money recklessly and thus forcing up prices for ourselves and the poorer inhabitants, etc. Rustling of lumber, etc., should be expressly forbidden.

(c) In dealing with the inhabitants and local civil authorities, a degree of formality and courtesy not customary with Americans is essential if satisfactory results are to be obtained. The French stand ready and anxious to do whatever they can to assist us, but the assistance will be rendered in French fashion and not American.

(d) French troops should not be quartered in the same villages with American troops.

6. Interpreters: Much trouble has been experienced with interpreters. It is particularly difficult to secure an interpreter who will convey the full meaning of one's remark to the person addressed. It is also hard to be certain that the interpreter understands what you mean. Whenever an important matter is being adjusted the question or decision should be written in English, then given to an interpreter to translate into French; then retranslated into English by a second interpreter in order that one may be sure that the exact meaning desired has been expressed. The French version, after being satisfactorily corrected, should then be delivered to the French official concerned. In this way many serious and entirely unnecessary misunderstandings can be avoided. An American who speaks French is the most satisfactory interpreter, but even his work should be checked in very important matters.

7. Training:

(a) The training in France is carried on in camps within the billeting areas. A camp is a section of land set aside under a special provision of the law, within which

trenches may be dug, firing with certain, specified weapons carried on in specified directions, etc. Ordinarily, troops may drill or maneuver on any farm land so long as growing crops are avoided. A French officer is permanently in charge of each camp and lives in some village adjacent thereto.

(b) Training in conjunction with French troops is slow and we have found that after one or two demonstrations by French organizations it is difficult to keep our soldiers interested. The principal assistance we can derive from the French or English will be from officers and specially selected noncommissioned officers of those armies acting as advisors and critics.

Our officers are not sufficiently familiar with trench warfare conditions to draft good problems and both the officers and men fail to visualize the possible effect of hostile artillery and trench mortar fire. Consequently dispositions of troops, liaison arrangements, et cetera, which seem satisfactory to us frequently meet with severe and absolutely correct criticisms from the French officers observing the exercises. They will quickly explain to our satisfaction how impossible or dangerous the dispositions, liaison arrangements, et cetera, would be under battle conditions.

We have made the most rapid progress since adopting the following arrangement:

French officers prepare a series of company, battalion, and regimental problems involving all the various phases of trench warfare and give a setting on the centers of resistance which each regiment has prepared (entrenchments, barbed wire, etc.). Our officers take these problems, state them in American fashion if necessary, and proceed to prepare the necessary orders. The problem is then gone over on the map, rehearsed on the ground and corrected, and, finally, the unit or units concerned carry out the orders on the ground. French officers observe the work of the troops and are called upon in the critique to criticize all mistakes observed. The problem, with the orders and a summary of the critique, is then forwarded to division headquarters and a general summary of all the mistakes noted during the week is prepared by selected officers (instructors in the Unit Commanders School of the division and members of the Operation and Intelligence Sections of the division staff).

(c) It has been found that the work in the specialties (bayonet, musketry, machine gun, auto rifle, grenade, etc.) develops very much faster than the instruction in tactics proper and liaison matters.

(d) It is difficult, in France, to obtain the longer ranges and material for target practice. It is recommended that target practice, especially at the longer ranges, close order and disciplinary drills, be had, as far as practicable, in the United States.

(e) A French and a British staff officer should be attached to each division headquarters immediately upon its arrival in France to assist in organizing and instructing our staff. This is regarded as of the utmost importance as the work of the staff in this war is of a most detailed and comprehensive nature, requiring very special and careful training for its successful accomplishment. Staff work in trench warfare is far more complicated and difficult than in open warfare and our recognized weakness has always been our undeveloped and untrained staff personnel. Poor staff work at division headquarters will more than nullify the work of the best trained regiments.

WM. L. SIBERT,
Major General, U. S. A.

Movement of Troops to France via England

[Contemporary Translation]

4th Bureau

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH AMERICAN ARMY,

No. 11,121

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 20, 1917.

General Ragueneau, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American army
To the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Corps, G. H. Q.

In reply to your letter of October 6, 1917, I have the honor to inform you that after agreement with the British military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has judged it possible to receive some American troops in the ports of the English Channel occupied by some English Bases, up to a strength of ten thousand men per week.

The British authorities only express the desire that there be disembarked not more than 250 officers per day, on account of the difficulty there is in lodging a greater number of them.

All dispositions will be taken by the French authorities to assure the transportation of the effectives announced by railroad to their point of destination.

F. REBOUL,
Colonel, Director of Services.

Cable: P-242-S

Shipping Situation

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 21, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. British report that owing to the fact cross-channel cargo service is being worked to its full capacity at present any additional transport of stores, et cetera, via England would meet with serious delay. State that transport horses, guns, mechanical transport equipment, et cetera, including baggage, should not pass through England but be landed directly in France. Also state it very unlikely any greater assistance for transporting troops across channel can be given by British ships owing to shortage of tonnage. State some action necessary on foregoing as maximum number American troops that can be handled via England is 600 per day on average with limit for bunching of 5,000. French place number of men they can handle at channel ports at about same figure as British.

a. British report regarding very big ex-German liners of *Vaterland* type that it will be impossible to handle these ships in Liverpool. They state Gladstone Dock will in all probability be used for repairing large steamers and cannot be counted on. This will leave only landing stage and buoys. Under these circumstances they propose we not use Liverpool except in exceptional cases and that every effort be made by us to have these vessels proceed direct to France.

b. British Admiralty while pointing out danger in use of large ships *Vaterland* type on account of being big target for submarines states that if military situation requires risk they recommend such alterations be made as will enable these vessels coal in

United States for round trip. They suggest economy in coal be obtained by proceeding at reduced speed say nineteen or twenty knots for vessels of twenty-three or twenty-four knots except in areas where submarines may be expected to be active. They also suggest in cases where it is necessary to take any large amounts of coal ships be taken to Southampton after disembarkation, this especially in case of ships which it is not possible to coal at Brest.

c. In view of necessity of transforming cargoes by lighters to shore at Brest it would be advantageous to send such of these ships as do not draw too much water to ST-NAZAIRE, La PALlice or BORDEAUX so as to utilize full cargo space which would not be possible at Brest without undue delay in turnaround.

d. French have always interposed objections to our extended use of Brest on grounds of already congested dock facilities and limited rail evacuations. Have so far been unable to get definite statement from them as to maximum amount tonnage that may be evacuated by rail from this port. They, however, offer to evacuate fairly large personnel if not bunched. Water supply on shore very short necessitating holding troops on ships until a few hours before evacuation of troops by rail. In view of draft of our available ships it is believed we must use this port to its maximum. Adequate number of lighters to handle debarkation not available in France and must be sent from America before arrival first troops. Will endeavor to make French state definitely maximum number of troops and tonnage that can be evacuated by rail from Brest and will report this. Lighters, however, must be sent.

e. Am informed that American Line steamers at present plying between English and American ports not being operated to maximum war advantage. If this is so believe corrective steps be taken by government. Recommend study be made of situation with view of determining possibility of withdrawal of American Line steamers from English ports and their diversion to our French ports.

f. In view of the foregoing request you cable results study of this situation in America and also approximate number of men and tons of supplies that would have to be handled at Brest to utilize to fullest advantage shipping we have which is of too great draft to operate in our other ports, also number of lighters that could be sent before arrival troops. This information necessary to enable us to push French.

c. Reference your Cablegram 293 [not printed] regarding desire to ship largest possible number of troops through England have appointed Lassiter [Brig. Gen. Wm. Lassiter, Military Attaché, London] on board to confer with British authorities. All above based on correspondence with British previous your telegram. Doubt whether British will be able to do more than set forth above.

PERSHING.

Representation on Supreme War Council

No. 407

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 22, 1917.

For Chief of Staff, Secretary of War

Pending decision as to permanent representation on Supreme War Council and in order to aid in reaching conclusion as to the value of this council in securing cooperation among Allied Armies, recommend that a temporary appointment be made from our forces here. Members of council are anxious that we should be represented. Mr. Frazier who is attending meetings for United States suggests that he is not conversant with military affairs, and is therefore not in position to participate in deliberations on military subjects. All matters involving military questions are now referred by him to me. If authorized to designate an officer as suggested would select General Liggett* provided he would be acceptable to the War Department.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Cable: LR 279: Telegram

Transport of American Troops Across Channel

L. R. No. 279

LONDON, October 29, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

Definite statement in writing not yet secured, but indications from conference yesterday are that British Government will inform us it is impracticable for them to transport American troops across Channel except in very small detachments. This is due to greatly increased number of British soldiers---leave during the winter months and consequent great demands on cross-channel traffic. If we could provide additional boats to move our troops across British will receive troops in England and furnish huttled accommodations for 28,000 men and stores. But Admiralty has investigated matter and does not believe that boats of required type can be had in United States. They have sent additional cablegrams on the subject. Moreover, the post and railroad accommodations at La Havre are probably not equal to large increasing demands. As it looks as if movements of American troops through England will thus be very greatly restricted, board requests you telegraph whether large movements of our troops through England is vital your plans and if we shall so represent matter. In this connection it would be important for board to be able to show what monthly rate of arrivals in France is to our plan, what proportion of to be sent direct to France, and hence serious objections remain for shipment through England. In any case board recommends immediate steps to enlarge to their fullest capacity accommodations at all ports France available to us. Board further recommends that

* General Pershing's Diary for January 24, 1918 contains this entry, "Had dinner with General Bliss, who has returned from Washington to be our military representative on the Supreme War Council."

Washington be notified that large additional numbers American troops should not be sent via England until question of cross-channel transports has been settled.

BARTLETT.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2185: Memorandum

Recommended Coordination in Headquarters Operation

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

COORDINATION SECTION, GENERAL STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 2, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The working of the Hq. A. E. F., has reached a stage where it is time to take stock and look ahead and determine exactly how the machine is to function in the near future. I believe it is self-evident that the supply and transportation departments must operate through the G. S., because unity of action is essential and can only be obtained by coordination on all points. The only coordinating heads now recognized by those departments are the C. of S., or the C-in-C, because they only can make final decisions. It is only a question of time, however, until they will be forced by more important duties to delegate this authority to someone. The task of coordination is going to be difficult at best, and it will be an almost impossible one if it is suddenly turned over to the G. S., after it has grown to such proportions that the C-in-C and C. of S., are forced to drop it by its very size. On the other hand, if the work is now turned over to the sections of the G. S., which are to handle it ultimately, they will have an opportunity to grow up with the job and both will reach maturity at the same time.

2. Today the chiefs of the Supply and Transportation Depts. go to the A. G., C. of S., and the C. G. to have certain questions settled, whereas certain other questions are sent to sections of the G. S., for their consideration, usually the Coordination Section or the Administrative Section. This makes five different agencies which handle similar subjects and sometimes decisions are not known until a long time after they have been made by the highest authority. These decisions are frequently verbal and not of record, thus giving rise to misunderstandings as to what the intent of the question or the decision actually were. Such conditions cannot lead to efficiency for it is manifest that the Coordination Section administer unless all questions on these subjects are handled by them and not simply the minor questions, while the more important ones are taken elsewhere for decision.

Since Major Logan and I are members of staff corps ourselves, we can hardly be looked upon as enemies of these corps, and we both are firmly of the opinion that the administrative methods must be changed before efficiency can be obtained.

I have no desire to aggrandize the G. S., nor to minimize the importance of the Supply and Transportation Departments; my sole desire is to have the staff a machine which will work with the maximum efficiency and the minimum of lost motion, and my conviction is that all questions arising in these departments should be handled through the Administrative and Coordination Sections of the G. S.; that power should be given to those two sections after consultations with the chiefs of the services concerned to settle ordinary questions; and that only questions of considerable importance should be brought to the

C. of S.; and only those of very far-reaching results should ever go to the C-in-C. All questions should be first taken up with the chiefs of those G. S. sections and only brought to higher authority when in the judgement of the chiefs of those sections the importance of the question necessitates it, the chiefs being responsible to the C. of S., for the accuracy and correctness of their decisions. If the chiefs of those sections make too many mistakes, then new chiefs of sections should be obtained, but the method of procedure itself will not have been proven wrong.

The present staff bears the same relation to an efficient staff that an All-American football team does to a good college team. They are all stars in their own lines, but they have never worked together; they have no policy of action, and there is no teamwork. Consequently as now organized, the individual ability of the separate members amounts to but little in the final result.

The technical staff of these headquarters undoubtedly contains the best men available in the various staff services which they represent, and their one desire is to perform their functions in the best possible manner, but they are all accustomed to doing things, not talking about them, and are men who have always been used to obtaining prompt decisions on their proposals, or, in fact, of making such decisions on very important matters themselves. It is, therefore, only natural that they should desire to obtain prompt action on their proposals and not to waste time discussing matters with subordinates whose action is not final. I think this is the crux of the whole matter.

Decisions on all such objects ought to be made by the G. S., but it would be ridiculous to have junior officers, possibly reserve officers, pass on the accuracy or correctness of men like the chief staff officers, A. E. F. The work should be conducted by these chiefs themselves and decisions made after interviews with them. But in order to have these chiefs satisfied to work this way, the chiefs of the G. S. Sections must be authorized to act as well as talk.

If the C-in-C will delegate authority to make final decisions to certain G. S. officers, the business of the staff departments can be conducted promptly and smoothly. In delegating such authority he must be prepared to uphold the decisions made by his delegate, with the understanding that such delegate will not decide questions concerning which there is any doubt as to the wishes of the C-in-C and that the chiefs of sections will keep the C. of S. informed daily as to their action on various subjects.

3. I, therefore, proposed in construing G. O. No. 8, that all questions regarding policy enumerated in Table II-A, prescribing the functions of the Administrative Section, G. S., including all questions of personnel, leaves of absence, and replacements of men and animals be handled through the Administrative Section; that all questions regarding the subjects enumerated in Table II-E prescribing the functions of the C. S., G. S., including all questions having to do with transportation by rail or automobile; supply of organizations; distribution of labor and labor troops; evacuations and means of communication be handled through the C. S., G. S.; that all questions on these subjects shall be taken up originally with the chiefs of the A. S. and G. S. Sections, G. S., respectively; that the chiefs of those sections shall be given authority to settle all questions arising in their sections after full conference with the departments concerned.

A representative of each staff or transportation department should ultimately be assigned to each of the two sections G. S., not to pass upon the projects of the chief of his corps or department but for information as to how projects of other departments affect the interests of his own, to keep the chief of his corps fully informed on subjects under consideration, and for technical use in the sections.

4. I believe that if the foregoing policy be adopted, many difficulties will be avoided and that a degree of efficiency will be obtained which is impossible under the present method.

5. The foregoing plan is that outlined by the C-in-C when he decided upon the existing organization of the G. S. It is only a question as to whether or not the time is ripe to put his plan into full operation and I believe that it is.

W. D. CONNOR,
Colonel, 13th Engrs., N. A.,
Chief of Section.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: Report

Movement of American Troops via England

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN TROOPS IN ENGLAND,

London, November 3, 1917.

From: Board convened by S. O. 131 Hq. Amexforce, Oct. 19, 1917.

To: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, France.

1. The written instructions of the board required it to determine the possibility of securing shelter in England for 28,000 American troops.

The board has conferred with the British Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, and is informed officially by him that hut camps now in existence for the use of British troops will be put at our disposal in sufficient numbers to shelter 28,000 men. Accommodations for 16,000 men are now available and those for 12,000 will be available if we give the necessary notice.

2. Lord Derby also informed the board, however, that there are serious limitations on the matter of transporting our troops across the Channel from England to France. This is caused by the congestion of cross-channel traffic. At the present time only 600 of our men per day can be transported across the Channel. But when the increased leave privileges for the British army are put into effect, no American troops can be taken across the Channel by British transports; and the intention is to grant these additional privileges to British soldiers at a very early date.

As the board deemed it necessary that the authorities at Washington should know at once what numbers of American troops, if any, can continue to be sent via England, Lord Derby was asked for a definite statement as to how long it would be before increased leave privileges for the British army would stop our use of the British cross-channel boats. He mentioned December 1 as a tentative date. Asked then if we were to understand that no American troops could be sent via British boats across the Channel after December 1, he said he was not prepared to make such a statement; that getting troops across the Channel was an Admiralty question and that we would have to see the 1st Lord of the Admiralty.

As the matter thus became a Naval one, Admiral Sims has been asked to take it up and he is doing so.

Even if we could get our troops by our own boats from Southampton to Le Havre, the French railways cannot move more than 5,000 men per week for us from that port, as per official statement made to the Commanding General of our Line of Communications.

Hence if we are to have a large flow of troops via England to France it looks as if we must establish our own ferry service across the Channel from Southampton, not only to Havre but also to such ports as Cherbourg and Brest. This will require bringing over a number of fast, roomy and very seaworthy vessels from the United States; and it will also mean providing the destroyers for a separate convoy service across the Channel.

Arrangements of this kind will take time; they certainly cannot be effected by December 1.

It is probable that Admiral Sims will be able to arrange with the Admiralty some working plan whereby the two navies will succeed in maintaining a constant flow of our troops across the Channel. The board believes this will be done since it does not think the British Government will want to be in the position of declining altogether to help in getting our troops to France. But as negotiations will take time, the board thinks it best to submit its report now so that the other information contained in the report may be available at once. In the meantime the board recommends cabling to Washington that no more than 15,000 troops per month are to be sent via England and that no heavy baggage, no wagons and no mechanical transport are to come this way.

It may be that the British Government will have to be strongly urged to assist in making provision for moving through England American troops in far larger quantities than they now regard as feasible. But in order to do this successfully, it will be necessary to show the British Government what number of troops we expect to move by given dates, what number we can direct to France by ships we provide ourselves, and what number remain to come via England on British ships.

3. The board deems it of first importance to formulate at once a comprehensive program for moving our troops, based on conditions existing not only in America but upon those which exist in France and England. There is much evidence to the effect that the conditions in France and England are not appreciated in the United States. With a view to representing certain of the conditions existing on this side of the Atlantic, the board submits what follows, and does this in view of the Commander-in-Chief's verbal instructions to the board through General Lassiter to go into this whole subject rather fully.

Major Wilgus, U. S. Engineer Reserve Corps, who has been directed to report to the board, has been of great service in this matter.

4. Tonnage Requirements: High British authorities have several times inquired of American army officials in London, as to how we expect to solve our tonnage problem. To get to Europe the troops and supplies called for by our ambitious program, a great deal of tonnage will be required, and they do not see where it is to come from unless we dislocate traffic already of vital importance to the conduct of the war.

With a view to showing how our tonnage requirements look from this angle, the statement prepared by Major Wilgus, is submitted. This is necessarily a rough synopsis of our needs. A complete statement cannot be made without detailed knowledge as to proportions of animals, motor transport, etc., which we intend to send over, and of the characteristics of the ships available. But the figures given are based on recent British experience and may be taken as giving a good picture of our shipping requirements.

For moving troops it is estimated that we need 1,150,000 tons in service at once, if we expect to maintain arrivals at the rate of 500,000 men half-yearly. In this connection it may be said that the fleet of passenger vessels, 16 in number, taken from the Germans comprises only 280,000 tons.

For moving munitions of all kinds, representing current needs, 130,000 tons of shipping for every 100,000 men in France are estimated as necessary.

For building up within a year's time a reserve of supplies for 1,000,000 men a fleet of 300,000 tons must be in constant service, and immediately available.

Our progressive tonnage requirements may be stated as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Men</u>	<u>Gross Tonnage</u>
	100,000	1,580,000
March 1, 1918	300,000	1,840,000
Mid-May, 1918	500,000	2,100,000
Sep. 1, 1918	800,000	2,490,000
Dec. 1, 1918	1,000,000	2,750,000
Dec. 1, 1919	2,000,000	4,050,000

5. Port and Rail Facilities in France: According to Major Wilgus' statement herewith, the berthing space for ships and the railway rolling stock now at our disposal in France are sufficient for dealing with a force of 300,000 men; moreover, enlargements are in train, which will care for a force arriving at the average rate of 500,000 men every six months.

But it is questionable whether troops are not even now arriving at a faster rate than their indispensable stores and munitions, and whether shelter for men and stores is being provided at an adequate rate.

Certainly it must be kept in mind that the whole scheme for enlarging ports, rail facilities, warehouses, hospitals, camps, etc., to meet our increasing needs is predicated upon the timely arrival of labor, material and tools.

It is a matter for examination and decision whether the flow of troops should not be checked until adequate supply arrangements have been made.

6. Ports and Vessels: In order to get our troops and supplies to France, we will probably have to make use of every vessel and every port that is available to us. But it would seem that we should exhaust the possibilities of the direct route to France in addition to availing ourselves of the circuitous route via England. The possibilities of the route via England are at present strictly limited; those of the route via France are also limited, but they can be greatly enlarged if we will promptly provide the necessary labor, material and tools.

It is thought that the importance of the following should be impressed on our authorities in the United States:

(a) The port of Brest is the only French port which will receive our largest ships. But such ships cannot get up to the docks; they must lie in an open roadstead and be lightered. All authorities agree that heavy baggage cannot be handled in the Brest roadstead and that troops coming into Brest on big ships must bring only light baggage with them; that their heavy baggage must come to the more southerly ports. Moreover, the water supply at Brest is limited and of poor quality so that a rest camp could scarcely be established there, and it will be necessary to keep our troops on the ships until they can be lightered ashore and entrained for the journey to their permanent camps. Another difficulty is that of coaling large ships. They cannot recoal at Brest. If they cannot bring coal for the return trip they must go to Southampton or Liverpool, thus prolonging their stay in dangerous waters and increasing the time required for a round trip.

However, with all these limitations, it appears that we must use Brest and must send the necessary tugs and lighters there at once.

(b) It is important to route our troops to ports as near as may be to the camps they are to occupy, so as to avoid unnecessary rail traffic. Troops are now coming via England which might be landed within 50 miles of their training camps in France.

(c) It is of vital importance for our officials on both sides of the Atlantic to have closer touch with one another's plans and difficulties. To this end a shipping commissioner thoroughly posted as to affairs at home should be sent at once to France to explain what ships are to be employed, at what rate and according to what program both troops and supplies are to arrive; and to see for himself the capacity, the limitations, and the needs of the situation on this side so that he can promptly and intelligently supply the officials in the United States with the information which they now lack. Close and constant communication should then be maintained between the shipping manager on this side and the one at home so that adaptations may be made to meet constantly changing requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the War Department be informed that accommodations may be secured in England for 28,000 men, but that due to congestion on the British cross-channel boats and on the French railways leaving Le Havre, not more than 15,000 can be moved per month from England to our camps in France. That, unless the British and French arrange to do more

for us, the only way for us to improve the situation is to provide our own boats for the trip from Southampton to French channel ports, and our own Naval convoys for these boats. Furthermore, that no heavy baggage or animal or mechanical transport should accompany troops coming via England.

2. That studies be made at once of Brest and the railway leading therefrom with a view to determining the number of troops that can be received there, and moved away daily by the railway; likewise the number of lighters, tugs and other facilities needed. That as soon as arrangements can be made to receive troops at Brest the War Department be notified of the fact, with statement of limitations as to coal, as to baggage and as to the number of troops which can be daily moved by the railways. The necessity of feeding troops on shipboard until railways can transport them should also be pointed out.

3. That similar studies be at once made of Cherbourg and any other available French channel ports with a view to determining their capacity to receive our troops coming from England, and to determine the capacity of railroads to move these troops.

4. That cable request be made for shipping commissioner to come at once to France to explain the plans of the authorities at home, and to see for himself the needs of the situation in France so that he can at once provide the authorities at home with the information they lack.

5. That the War Department be advised of the estimate here made of our tonnage requirements as based on British experience, so that these figures may be used to check those made in Washington.

That based upon exact information as to shipping and port capacities a program be arranged with the Washington authorities as to the times and the order in which both troops and stores will arrive, so that all necessary arrangements may be made.

6. That examination be made of the question of whether we are to receive supplies and munitions for our fighting troops and labor, tools and material necessary for receiving, forwarding and sheltering the same, at a rate equal to that of the arrival of troops.

7. That consideration be given the idea of conferring with the British Government as to the best way of allocating existing shipping and supplies. We may not want to pool either shipping or supplies, but a conference with the highest members of the British Government on this subject might serve to show each party how they could help the other with advantage to the general cause. We are seeking many things from the British and they from us. It would seem that there should be a clearing house where these claims could be passed upon, with the requirements of the Allies as a whole in view.

GEO. T. BARTLETT,
Major General, U. S. N. A.,
President.

WM. LASSITER.
Brigadier General, U. S. N. A.,
Member.

H. F. RETHERS,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A.,
Member.

Operations Section Directed to Study the Effects of Events in Italy

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 5, 1917.

For: The Operations Section

Will the operations section please confidentially consider the possibility of the A. E. F. being compelled by events in Italy to take a place in line at once?

1. In some part of the front now occupied by the French, replacing units of the latter.

2. To be used south of Switzerland.

What units could we use in such an emergency?

Which theater would be preferable?

Please give this prompt confidential consideration.

J. G. HARBORD,

Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1853: Letter

Authority Requested to Send American Liaison Officers to Italy

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 6, 1917.

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief of French Military Mission

1. In view of present circumstances in Italy, it would seem of great importance that the American General Staff be represented on the staff of the French army there.

2. If this suggestion is concurred in by the French Commander-in-Chief, it is requested that authority be granted for two or more members of the General Staff of the United States Army to be attached to the Staff of the French army in Italy.

By direction:

JAMES G. HARBORD,

Chief of Staff.

Possibility that Events in Italy May Force A. E. F. into the Line

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 6, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. No units of the A. E. F. are at present in proper condition to be employed in the line for other than training purposes.

2. Only such conditions as would justify a belief that France or England in addition to Italy was in the act of collapsing could make it advisable for the A. E. F. to engage in active operations (other than in quiet sectors for training) until a reasonable number of trained divisions are available. This time will not arrive before the coming spring.

3. There is no present prospect of England collapsing and the French morale appears to be much better than it was 6 or 8 months ago.

However, possible events in Italy may have very serious effects both materially and morally on France.

4. The Italian power has been definitely reduced, but only the utter collapse of Italy would give the enemy such a definite superiority (including the possibility of countries now neutral joining the central powers) as might enable him to undertake an offensive gravely threatening France; and even so a considerable time must elapse before such an offensive could be developed.

Such a collapse of Italy is possible but not yet probable.

5. It is reasonable to suppose that even the present events in Italy somewhat disturb the French morale. The A. E. F. might assist in counteracting this by propaganda in the French press, concerning the aid now being furnished France in matériel and money as well as concerning the presence of our troops in the trenches for training purpose.

6. A threatened collapse of France during the next six months or more would be a threatened Allied defeat which would become a reality should the collapse become complete. Should the indications of such a collapse become unmistakable, every available man of the A. E. F. should be employed, with the sole remaining hope of assisting in averting the evident catastrophe.

7. It is not believed that a catastrophe is probable, but should it occur before the coming spring it would be impossible to employ our troops as an independent force. For the next two months only the 1st Division could be employed as a divisional unit. All other troops could be employed as a desperate measure by battalions.

8. Only the actual breaking of the French line or a marked failing in morale of a portion of the French army would be a positive indication of a French collapse. Only such an indication would justify the desperate measure of employing our troops before they are ready. Such an employment could only hope to assist in restoring the failing morale - by the presence of American troops amongst those affected. The places at which our troops should be so employed would depend upon the nature and place of the French failure, and such places cannot, therefore, be exactly located in advance.

9. The bulk of the forces now operating against the Allies in Italy (or which are likely to operate in that region) are Austrian. The United States is not at war with Austria and this alone seems sufficient to exclude the south of Switzerland for the employment of our troops under conditions which should now be considered. Moreover, any emergency action should consider the eventual employment of our troops in the regions recommended in the strategical study made by this section. The conclusions therein are believed to be sound and it is believed that the emergency employment of our troops south of Switzerland would decidedly interfere with the ultimate realization of those conclusions. Conditions of terrain and possibilities of hostile offensives seem to render it inadvisable to employ our troops in the Vosges.

10. Should the necessity of employing our troops before the spring of 1918 become inevitable, it would be necessary to attach our troops to French organizations and the replacing of larger French units by our forces would not be advisable.

11. Conclusions:

(a) It does not now appear probable that the employment of our troops before spring will be inevitable.

(b) Under our present plans our troops are well placed for any eventuality.

(c) Unless and until we declare war on Austria, no conditions can now be reasonably foreseen which would justify employing our forces south of Switzerland.

(d) Our forces should not be employed in the Vosges.

12. Recommendations:

(a) That we continue our present program and resist any tendency toward the premature employment of our forces unless and until such employment is necessitated by a threatened collapse of France; a collapse appearing by actual events.

(b) Definite plans for the emergency employment of our forces should not be decided upon until the place and nature of a collapse justifying such employment are known.

(c) That the Intelligence Section, General Staff, prepare and carry out in the French press a program of advertising the aid now being rendered France and the presence of units of the A. E. F. in the line for training.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, Inspector General,
Acting Chief of Section.

RAPALLO, November 7, 1917--4 p. m.

[Extract]

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS, HELD AT THE NEW CASINO HOTEL, RAPALLO, ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1917, AT 4 p. m.

Fifth Session*

FIRST SESSION OF SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

PRESENT

England

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P. Prime Minister.

Lieutenant General the Right Hon. J. C. Smuts, K. C.

General Sir W. R. Robertson, G. C. B., K. C. V. O., D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.

Italy

Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

France

M. Painleve, President of the council

M. Franklin-Bouillon, Minister of State and Member of the War Committee

M. Barrere, French Ambassador, Rome.

General Foch, Chief of Staff.

General Gondrecourt

General Weygand

Secretaries

Lieutenant Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary, British War Cabinet.

Count Aldrovandi, Chef de Cabinet to Baron Sonnino.

Commandant Helbronner, C. M. G., D. S. O., M. C., Secretary, French War Committee.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had discussed with his colleagues the question of the place at which the Supreme War Cabinet was to meet. Though anxious to fall in with the views of the French Ministers, particularly in view of the fact that they were supported by Baron Sonnino, he did not feel able to do so. He had had an informal conversation with M. Painlevé and had asked him to select some town outside Paris, and he understood M. Painlevé had consented. If it was found impossible to work in these conditions, it would be necessary to consider the matter again. He desired, however, above all things, that the Supreme War Council should be independent, and further should give an impression of

* The Supreme War Council was formally constituted at this meeting, and the new organization took its first decisions (Annex II). Consequently this was the first meeting of the Supreme War Council.

independence. He understood that the French Government favoured Versailles, and he recalled the historical fact that the German Empire had been built up at Versailles, and he hoped equally that Prussian domination might be broken down at the same place.

M. Painlevé said that he was anxious to show the spirit in which the French Government approached the organization of this Supreme War Council, and consequently, although adhering entirely to the views he had already expressed in regard to the advantages of Paris, he and his colleagues were willing to assent to the establishment of the Council at Versailles.

M. Franklin-Bouillon supported M. Painlevé's views. He still remained convinced that Versailles was not the best choice, but in order to create an atmosphere of unanimity he was willing to accept Versailles. There were so many great matters to discuss that he did not wish to lose too much time over what was a matter of detail.

Mr. Lloyd George thanked the French Government. He then proposed the text of the document constituting the Supreme War Council, and nominating the Generals representing the three powers, which was adopted. (Annex I)

Baron Sonnino asked that the agreements should be published simultaneously, the Italian Parliament would meet on Monday, and the Italian Government would make its declaration on that day.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he and M. Painlevé could make the declaration at the Parliamentary *déjeuner* on Monday.

M. Franklin-Bouillon said the French Government accepted this proposal.

Baron Sonnino read the terms of reference given to the military representatives by the Supreme War Council, which was accepted. (Annex II)

He said that the Italians had decided to send immediately to the front the whole of the 1899 class, which would represent about 200,000 men. They would anticipate the calling up of the 1900 class. To call up fresh classes now, when sowing had to be done, would only increase dissatisfaction in the country and lower its morale. Included in the previous classes which were already under arms were men born in 1874.

Mr. Lloyd George said that General Robertson had something to ask concerning the Italian divisions in Albania and in the Salonica armies.

Baron Sonnino said that we had learned that some German troops passing along the islands along the Dalmatian coast were to be disembarked at Durrazzo.

General Robertson said that we had just asked the French Government to ask General Sarraill to send reports on the actual situation and in future to send them in a regular manner.

Mr. Lloyd George asked that the Supreme War Council should concern itself with all the fronts where the Allied armies were fighting in common.

M. Painlevé said that he absolutely agreed in this.

Baron Sonnino also agreed in this proposal, which was adopted by the conference. (The conference approved the publication in the Italian Press of an announcement proposed by Baron Sonnino.)

Annex I

DECISIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS ASSEMBLED AT RAPALLO ON NOVEMBER 7, 1917.

I. The representatives of the British, French, and Italian Governments assembled at Rapallo on November 7, 1917, have agreed on the scheme for the organization of a Supreme War Council with a permanent military representative from each power, contained in the following paragraph.

Scheme of Organization of a Supreme War Council

II. (1) With a view to the better coordination of military action on the western front a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a member of the government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decisions of the governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution and reports thereon to the respective governments.

(3) The general staffs and military commands of the armies of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective governments.

(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the governments, ensures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

(5) Each power delegates to the Supreme War Council one permanent military representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the council.

(6) The military representatives receive from the government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) The military representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces, and of the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places as may be agreed upon, according to circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.

III. The permanent military representative will be as follows:

For France.	General Foch
" Great Britain	General Wilson
" Italy	General Cadorna

Rapallo,
November 7, 1917.

Annex II

Supreme War Council

Terms of Reference to the Permanent Military Representatives

1. The Supreme War Council, assembled at Rapallo on November 7, 1917, directs its permanent military representatives to report immediately on the present situation on the Italian front. In consultation with the Italian General Headquarters they should examine into the present state of affairs, and, on a general review of the military situation in all theatres, should advise as to the amount and nature of assistance to be given by the British and French Governments, and as to the manner in which it should be applied.

2. The Italian Government undertakes to instruct the Italian Supreme Command to give every facility to the permanent military representatives both in regard to documentary information and movements in the zone of operations.

Rapallo,
November 7, 1917.

Handling Troops Through Great Britain

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 9, 1917—1 p.m.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

[Extract]

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1A. Special reference subparagraph A your above cable. Bartlett president of the board detailed under instructions contained in your 293, advises results of conference with British indicate it will be impracticable for them to transport American troops across channel except in very small detachments, this being due to greatly increased number of British crossing channel on leave during winter months. Bartlett states if we could provide boats to move our troops across channel, British will receive troops in England and furnish hut accommodations for 28,000 men and stores. He states British Admiralty has investigated matter but does not believe that channel boats required type can be obtained in United States and that docks and railroad accommodations at Le Havre are probably not equal to large increasing demand. This latter agrees with French statements. Bartlett believes previous reports of maximum average of 600 per day and not exceeding 5,000 at one time is practically all we can get through England and even with this number we may have some difficulty. Recommend while utilizing British movement we place main reliance on Brest for our deep draft transports.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 681-III-IV: Memorandum

Transportation for Troops in Divisional Areas

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 9, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. It is thought that the strategical situation of the A. E. F. is likely to become dangerous through lack of mobility of troops in the forward areas. This is based on the following considerations:

(a) It is the German policy to smash a new enemy before he is ready to become desperately engaged.

(b) It takes a long time to establish a training system in any given area. Hence, it would greatly embarrass us and thus aid the enemy should he attack and destroy our training area when it is full of partly trained and equipped troops.

(c) The Russian and Italian situations indicate Germany may have troops available for this purpose. She could probably assemble 30 additional divisions on this front within 60 days.

(d) It is, therefore, a fair presumption (one of several possible enemy plans) that such an attack may occur about February 1, as a winter campaign, when we would have 9 or 10 divisions in the training areas, or as an early spring campaign.

(e) The result of the present campaign in Italy plainly shows that troops without full field transportation that are close to the front that is attacked are so immobile that they are sure to suffer disaster.

2. It is realized that constant efforts in this direction have already been made but in view of the danger it is urged that these efforts be redoubled.

FOX CONNER.
Colonel, Inspector General,
Acting Chief of Section.

Cable: P-279-S

Request that Units Sent to France be Equipped with Transportation

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.

Adjutant General, Washington

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. For Chief of Staff. Request that all divisions and other units sent to France be completely equipped with authorized transportation, both mechanical-driven and animal-drawn, and organized before leaving America. Various division commanders temporarily in France state War Department staff departments advise them motor transportation, wagon trains, harness, et cetera, will be furnished in France where their equipment is to be completed. So far this is not the case, therefore, recommend that chiefs of staff departments and divisional and other commanders embarking for France be directed to complete the combat, field, supply, ammunition, sanitary, engineer trains before departure. If personnel of units be sent via England or Brest necessitating sending transportation units via other bases it is very important the transportation arrive here before the troops so that transport units completely organized with its personnel may be dispatched to billeting areas to provide transportation facilities for the troops upon their arrival. At present time one division dispersed in billeting area some ten miles long by five miles wide, with one railhead in area has only two motor trucks available for its supply. French are helping out, otherwise there would be a breakdown but their ability to assist is limited. Recommend all division and other commanders of units coming to Europe and the various staff services be advised that organization and equipment of transportation units are vital to efficient operation. * * * Again recommend that divisions be assembled at or near port of embarkation in plenty of time to complete their organization and equipment before sailing.

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PERSHING.

*Organization of General Staff, Headquarters, Line of
Communications Ordered*

Administrative Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Commanding General, Line of Communications

1. The C-in-C desires that you proceed at once with the organization of the General Staff, Hq. L. of C. The General Staff at these hq. will be organized on the same lines as the G. S., Hq. A. E. F., as follows: Chief of Staff, an Administrative Section, an Intelligence Section, an Operations Section, and a Coordination Section.

2. The C-in-C desires that the general staff functions as described in G. O. No. 8, these hq. be put into effect in each one of these sections, and that the general staff control as indicated in this same order be put into operation as rapidly as possible in the L. of C.

3. It is the purpose to decentralize, as far as possible, the general staff functions being exercised by A. E. F., Hq., General Staff, and to place much of the detail now being carried on by the A. E. F., Hq., General Staff, in the corresponding sections of the general staff attached to the Hq. L. of C.

4. As soon as the General Staff, L. of C., begins to function, it is the desire of the C-in-C that the officers of the various sections of the General Staff of the L. of C. maintain constant contact with the corresponding sections of the General Staff, A. E. F., to the end that there is a frequent interchange of ideas, explanations, etc.

5. Everything that can possibly be done to strengthen the control of the C. G., L. of C., over the operations of the L. of C. will be done by these hq. In this same connection, it is believed that the formation of a strong general staff with the L. of C. will considerably aid the C. G., L. of C., in his operations. Incidentally, the desired result of making it possible to decentralize, and place with the L. of C. much of the work at present being carried on by these hq., and the various sections attached to it, will be accomplished.

6. Officers will be assigned to report to you for duty as chiefs of the various sections of your general staff. You are also authorized to detail any officers at present under your command for duty with these sections.

7. In view of the fact that various officers of the general staff act under delegated authority, there is no requirement that the chief of staff should be senior in rank to the chiefs of the various sections.

8. The D. G. T. will be directed to assign an officer of his dept. in direct liaison with your hq. In this manner the movement of troops and personnel may be quickly and promptly handled.

9. In principle, all communications coming to the hq. of the L. of C. from the various C. O.'s of the S. S. and T. Service Sections, L. of C., will be handled directly by your general staff, as well as all communications coming from these hq.

By command of General Pershing:

DAVIS,
Actg. Adjutant General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1853: Letter

American Liaison Officer to go to Italy

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 6,154/3

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917.

From: General Ragueneau, Chief of French Military Mission at American Hq.

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F. (Operations Section)

(Reply to letter No. 8501 ASK of Nov. 6, 1917)

The Commander-in-Chief this day advises me by telephone that your suggestion is accepted, relative to sending officers of the Staff of the American Army to the Staff of the French Army in Italy.

I have the honor to request that you kindly communicate to me as soon as possible the names of the officers that you will designate and the date on which they will be ready to leave.

(Unintelligible)

Cable: P-280-S

Vigorous Division Commanders Required

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 10, 1917—12 p. m.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For: General Biddle and Secretary of War

[Extract]

Reference subparagraph B, your 379, earnestly request that only division commanders who have strong mental and physical vigor be sent here as observers. Division commanders who are in any way unable to stand continuous work actually in trenches under conditions found on western front are useless here. Consider it imposition on Allies to send officer not fit in every particular.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

Relief, Promotion, and Assignment Policy Regarding Officers

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., November 12, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

With reference to your 280 every effort will be made to send you suitable division commanders. In sending over those already gone it had been hoped they would be able to do the work until such time as the efficiency of the younger officers had been determined. You will be thoroughly supported in the relief of any officers that you care to relieve and any recommendations made by you as to promotion or assignment will be given greatest weight. If you cannot make use of the officers behind the lines return them to the United States. Secretary of War desires particularly for you to understand that he will give full support to anything you may do or recommend in that regard.
Biddle.

McCAIN.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 8059: Memorandum

Preparation of 1st, 2d, and 26th Divisions for Operations

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 20, 1917.

For: Chief of Staff

1. In order to prepare the above divisions for operations and for possible emergencies in the spring, indicated in papers submitted by this section, it is recommended that, as far as practicable, steps be taken to place these divisions at full strength and also that all absent units now in France join their divisions. The 42d Division (replacement division) is partially available for the above purposes. The release of absent units especially those on the Line of Communications, can be facilitated by utilizing therefor the 2d Brigade of the 42d Division, upon its arrival in France.

2. The steps necessary to accomplish the foregoing include:

(a) The relief of all detachments in the 1st, 2d, and 26th Divisions, that are now absent on duty with the Line of Communications, etc.

NOTE: A number of combat troops of these divisions have been detached from their divisions for Line of Communications purposes without any information thereof being furnished this section. In order to insure proper administration, training and readiness for operations, it is believed that no combat units should be detached from their regular organizations without giving this section an opportunity to express its opinion concerning the same.

(b) Increasing the strength of the divisions named to that authorized by Tables of Organization.

(c) Replacing in the divisions named, officers now absent as permanent instructors, etc., at schools.

3. In this connection the following organizations have been definitely requested by the training section for school purposes. It is recommended that these units be furnished as indicated below:

(a) For each army corps center of instruction.

1 battalion of infantry	To be taken from the first replacement division of each corps. Recommend that for the present these be limited to 2 companies.
1 battery of field artillery 75-44	To be taken from the 3-inch regiment of the first replacement division of each corps.
1 battery of field artillery 155-mm. or 6-inch howitzers	To be taken from the 6-inch howitzer regiment of the second replacement division of each corps. This unit to be temporarily supplied from the 3d Regiment of the first replacement division of each corps.
1 squadron of cavalry for I Corps center of instruction	To be supplied from cavalry regiments of the I Corps, temporarily from the 3d cavalry.

(b) For the army center of instruction at Langres.

1 battalion of infantry	To be taken from the second replacement division of the I Corps. For the present this to be limited to two companies, taken temporarily from the first replacement division of the I Corps.
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150 mounts to be supplied by staff departments.

NOTE: Training section has been consulted in connection with the foregoing and concurs except as to the reduction of the infantry to be supplied the I Corps center of instruction and army center of instruction. The training section believes that the full number of one battalion to each school should be furnished at the present time. Operations section believes that this should be done but in view of the necessity of bringing the combat divisions to near their authorized strength it is unable to see where the required number of men may be secured at the present time.

4. Under the organization project of these headquarters, the commander of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, 42d Division, will perform the duties of Chief of Artillery of the I Corps and for this purpose should have the following additional staff officers:

- 1 officer as chief of staff for corps artillery
- 1 officer in charge of heavy artillery duties
- 1 officer in charge of light artillery duties
- 1 officer in charge of trench and antiaircraft artillery duties
- 2 officers for information duties.

Recommend that the above officers be detailed as soon as practicable. The first course of the field artillery school of instruction at Saumur will be completed on January 1, 1918. Several officers suitable for junior staff positions will be released at that time.

5. If the recommendations contained in the foregoing paragraphs are approved it is

recommended that this communication be referred to the administration and coordination sections to arrange the necessary details.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Chief of Section.

Cable: A-426-R

Authority Granted to Discharge Officers Except from Regular Army

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., November 22, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

1. Paragraph 9, your 288. Authority granted you to discharge by order of the President inefficient officers of all branches of the service without citing statute or general orders. This includes all officers excepting those holding permanent commissions in regular army or officers given temporary promotions in regular army. It includes a discharge of regular officers from their national army commissions, also officers holding temporary appointments in regular army as distinguished from officers who have been given temporary promotion. This replaces instructions in our number 362, paragraph one. Cable this office action in each case.

* * * * *

McCAIN.

Sector for the American Expeditionary Forces Recommended

Operations Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 24, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. In confidential studies submitted by this section it has been stated that, assuming no great change in the general situation, the A. E. F. will find its natural employment during 1918 on the front immediately west of Pont-à-Mousson. Further study confirms these views.

2. It is, of course, not impossible that there will be a totally different general situation before our troops are ready. Such a change is, however, not yet evident.

3. Preparation to meet the present conditions on the western front requires far more time than would arrangements to meet a more mobile form of war.

4. Should it be determined to employ our troops in a small offensive west of Pont-à-Mousson, it is estimated (based on all previous experience of our Allies) that in the present form of the war nearly four months be required in preparation. Thus, if we intended attacking in June, we should have to begin preparations in the immediate rear of the sector soon after February 1.

5. Various questions concerning the location of troops and establishments are constantly arising. Studies of possible operations should now be undertaken, but the available personnel does not permit completing a study of each possible contingency. These questions and studies would be more satisfactorily settled and conducted were we working toward a definite operation while at the same time making our preparations to be ready for any eventuality.

6. Instructions to the chiefs of sections of the general staff would, for the present, suffice to coordinate all efforts.

7. It is recommended that chiefs of section be informed, confidentially:

(a) That our present plans contemplate placing our troops in the sector immediately west of Pont-à-Mousson during the spring and summer of 1918.

(b) That during 1918 it is planned to conduct a limited offensive in the region mentioned.

(c) That the necessary studies, with a view to formulating detailed plans for such an operation, will be made in each section.

(d) That, while all decisions as to location of troops, etc., will be made with a view to carrying out the offensive in question, no arrangements will, for the present, be made which will interfere with our freedom in changing our plans.

8. It is further recommended:

(a) That, provided no great change in the general situation occurs, a definite proposition to prepare the Pont-à-Mousson---Seicheprey sector for our troops be taken up with the French about January 15, 1918.

(b) That, in the event a definite decision is reached, about the middle of January, to take over the sector considered, the chiefs of supply and transportation services be notified of such decision not later than February 1, 1918.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Chief of Section.

[Pencil note below signature reads: "Accepted by C-in-C, Dec. 15, 1917."]

Notes of a Conference held at Paris on November 25, 1917.

HOTEL de CRILLON,

Paris, November 25, 1917.

[Extract]

1. Yesterday afternoon Mr. House received a note from M. Clémenceau requesting Mr. House and General Bliss to meet M. Clémenceau and General Pétain at the former's office in the Ministry of War at three o'clock this afternoon for a conference on a subject not mentioned in the note. The conference terminated a few minutes before four o'clock. After our arrival and the exchange of usual courtesies, M. Clémenceau said that he would get straight to business and discuss the subject of the conference, to wit, the effective force of the French army in its relation to the arrival of American troops. He then requested General Pétain to make a general statement.

2. General Pétain began by saying that there are now 108 divisions of competent French troops at his disposition, including all troops on the immediate front and those which are held in reserve. He said that the French losses have been approximately 2,600,000 men, killed, died of wounds, permanently incapacitated, and prisoners. This is in addition to all men on the lines of communication and in the general service of the rear. Eight of these divisions, by about the beginning of the new year or soon thereafter, will have been transferred to northern Italy, leaving 100 for service in France. As these divisions are not more than eleven thousand men strong each, this will give him a disposable force of not more than eleven hundred thousand men. He stated that the English have in France and Flanders sixty divisions which, as their divisions approximate twenty thousand men each, gives them a force of approximately twelve hundred thousand men.

3. He further stated that the English with this force of twelve hundred thousand men are occupying a front of about 150 kilometers, and M. Clémenceau then added that the French with their eleven hundred thousand men were occupying about 500 kilometers.

4. General Pétain estimated that on the German front there was an equal number of troops but that there were no means of determining with accuracy how many disposable men the latter had in the rear. He thought it possible that the Germans might be able to transfer from the Russian front as many as 40 divisions if they were not held there by active operations on the part of the Russians and Roumanians.

5. He seemed to think that the preliminary instruction of American troops in the trenches was not proceeding as rapidly as it might. I shall make no further note of this part of his statement until I can confer with General Pershing because, I think, General Pétain's view was based upon a misconception of the troops now actually with General Pershing and available for the instruction in question.

6. General Pétain, in reply to the question as to how many American troops he desired to have available at a fixed date, replied that as many as possible should be there as early as possible but that they must be soldiers and not merely men. It being explained to him how desirable it was that we should have an approximate definite number by a fixed date in order to make our negotiations with those who must provide the necessary tonnage, he stated that we must have a million men available for the early campaign of 1919, with another million ready to replace and reinforce them. Asked, how many we should have in France for a campaign in 1918, he said that this was answered by fixing the number for the campaign of 1919 since, in order to have this number for the latter campaign they would have to arrive at a fixed rate from this moment and extending throughout the year 1918; the number that would thus have arrived at any fixed date in the year 1918 was all that he would ask for that date. He explained that for the campaign of 1918 he would utilize the American troops in holding those parts of the line on which he would not make an offensive, thus relieving the French troops now there and making the latter available for

an offensive elsewhere. In order to carry out this plan, he stated that we should move troops to France at the rate of two divisions complete per month with corresponding service of the rear troops, until about the first of May when the rate should be increased to three divisions a month and continue thus through the calendar year.

7. It will be noted that at this rate, including the four divisions now in France, there would be there at the end of the year a total of thirty divisions. Since the American division as now organized consists of 27,000 men, these thirty divisions would be equivalent to seventy-three French divisions of 11,000 men each.

* * * * *

No notes were taken during the conference between three and four p. m. of this date but the foregoing was dictated by General Bliss as his best recollection of it immediately after returned to his hotel.

[*UNSIGNED.*]

Cable: P-318-S

Recommended Rate of Forwarding Replacements

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 26, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

B. As approximately one-half of the first phase, priority schedule, is here now, replacement drafts should be arriving at approximately one-half the rate indicated note on page 9 of priority schedule; that is we should now be receiving about 2,000 men per month as replacement drafts in addition to those which are being sent to fill up the divisions, corps, army and service of rear troops to authorized strength. In this connection see paragraph 18, my Cablegram 212, and paragraph 4 E, my Cablegram 287. Pershing.

C. It is of vital importance to the efficiency of our forces here that the system of regular shipment of replacement drafts be established as soon as possible and maintained at approximate rates called for in priority schedule notes on pages 15, 21, 27, and 32, that is 2 per cent per month of the total strength in France. Question of portion of replacement required for various arms of the service is being carefully watched and you will be advised from time to time as to any modifications necessary in rate of shipments. In the meantime please ship replacement drafts as indicated in this cable. Request information as to when you can begin such shipments as this is very important in working out our plans for handling replacements. Pershing.

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PERSHING.

Cable: P-322-S: Cablegram

Request to have Priority Schedule Followed

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 27, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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2A. For Chief of Staff. It would save a great deal of cabling and much uncertainty on part of all concerned here if you could cable that our priority schedule of October 7, is being strictly followed and if you would give a forecast of the dates on which various units necessary to complete the first phase will be organized and when they will be shipped. Again strongly urge that all necessary steps including use of the draft be taken to put our priority schedule into full effect.

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PERSHING.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 11: Memorandum

Operation of the Priority Schedule Program

3d Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 29, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, OPERATIONS SECTION, GENERAL STAFF:

In compliance with instructions of November 28, the following data regarding the above subject are furnished.

1. During the latter part of July or early August 1917, an embarkation service was organized at the War Department, the function of which was to effect the shipment of forces overseas. General Kernan was first appointed Chief with Colonel C. B. Baker, Q. M. C., his principal assistant. When General Kernan left, General C. B. Baker, Q. M. C., became Chief, with Major F. T. Hines (C. A. C.), General Staff, his principal assistant.

2. The first priority of shipment schedule was drawn up by an officer of the Operations Committee, War College Division, General Staff, after consultation with the office of the embarkation service. The tonnage available and in sight was divided into five fleets, the tentative dates of sailing of which with man-carrying capacity, are given below:

FLEETS	DATES OF SAILING	MAN-CARRYING CAPACITY
A	Sept. 6, 1917	6,800
B	" 6, 1917	4,000
C	" 15, 1917	10,500
D	" 30, 1917	8,000
E	Oct. 1, 1917	36,000

plus 7,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in September.

A	Oct. 13, 1917	6,800
B	" 13, 1917	9,000
C	" 22, 1917	13,000
D	" 30, 1917	14,000

plus 10,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in October.

E	November 8, 1917	36,000
A	" 20, 1917	6,800
B	" 20, 1917	9,000
C	" 29, 1917	13,000

plus 10,000 to be shipped on commercial liners in November.

3. The original priority of shipment schedule was amended and amplified about September 16. It was also based on the fleets available indicated in paragraph 2, above. This schedule was the principal guide in shipment. However, as the chief of staff directed that but one copy of this schedule should be made, and as after it had been received by him it was not turned over to the embarkation service, the latter was more or less handicapped by not knowing sufficiently in advance the entire program. This priority of shipment schedule follows:

Priority of Shipment Schedule

<u>September:</u>	<u>Strength</u>	
1. 7 Replacement Battalions	8,400	(these are the provisional recruit bns. for infantry and artillery of 1st Div.)
2. 6 Machine Shop Trucks and 1 Motorcycle Co.	124	
3. Aero Squadrons Nos. 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 11th Tele- graph Bn.	1423	
4. 2 Bakery Cos. (for 26th and 42d Divisions)	200	
5. Ordnance Auxiliaries for Ammunition Depots, Storehouses and Advance Repair Shops	1349	
6. 2 Base Hospitals (for 26th and 42d Divisions)	500	
7. Such Stevedore Units not ex- ceeding 4 bns. as may be ready to go in advance of any other	4,000	
8. 26th Divisions (Nat. Guard)	27,152	
9. 2,200 Reserve Officers	2,200	
Total for September		45,348

At the request of air division, aviation section, signal corps, there was added to above as item,

3 1/2 5 officers and 175 men to Italy
12 squadrons to England for Mechanics
12 squadrons to France for Mechanics,
to go in French transportation
which was never forthcoming

Total additional for September	3,780
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October

1. Remainder of 26th Division (Nat. Guard)		
2. Remainder of 2d Div. (Regular)	10,000	
3. 42d Division (Nat. Guard)	27,152	
4. 4 engineer service battalions	4,000	
5. 41st Division (National Guard)	27,152	
6. Auxiliaries up to 14,000, including those shipped on commercial boats	14,000	
Total for October		82,304

November

1. 33d Division (Nat. Guard)	27,152	
2. All corps troops for I Corps	15,310	
3. Auxiliaries up to 32,000 in- cluding those shipped on commercial boats	32,000	
Total for November		74,462

4. It will be noted that space for 14,000 auxiliaries was left in October. It became necessary to specify in detail the units which were to comprise these 14,000. General Pershing's Cable No. 150 giving desired priority of shipment of auxiliaries was taken as a guide and the Operations Committee, War College Division, arranged a schedule of shipment for auxiliaries up to 14,000 for October, consisting of labor troops, highway troops, forestry troops, railroad troops, stevedores, etc. It was found, however, that these troops were not organized nor [sic] equipped except partially, as in some cases they were waiting for voluntary enlistments, and there were other factors of delay. The chief of engineers was, therefore, ordered to have ready for shipment overseas on specific dates in October, a certain number of forestry troops, a certain number of labor troops, etc. It was more or less of a physical impossibility for these troops to be organized and equipped by the dates indicated but it was the only way to get things started; and by asking the impossible, a great activity and concentration of effort was obtained.

5. Consideration of the organizations which have thus far arrived in France show that the embarkation service has not been able to keep up with the shipping program laid down by the Operations Committee, War College Division, which was based on the fleet schedules given in Paragraph 2, this report.

The reasons for this may be summed up as follows:

(a) On account of delays at ports of embarkation and debarkation, the length of turnaround has been increased so that fleets have not sailed on the dates indicated in paragraph 2 of this report.

(b) The man-carrying capacity of fleets given in paragraph 2 was dependent upon certain ships being turned over to the embarkation service by the Navy Department on certain dates. There have been delays in turning over the ships; also there has been a shrinkage in the estimated man-carrying capacity of certain ships. For example: The *Vaterland*, now the *Leviathan*, was to be turned over ready for service at a certain date but a delay of over a month has occurred in doing so, and its estimated man-carrying capacity has shrunk from 10,000 to 8,000.

(c) Units scheduled to go are not ready because they have not complete personnel and equipment.

6. Subparagraph (c) above needs explanation.

The general policy of priority and supply of clothing and equipment is as follows:

(a) The Secretary of War ordered under date of September 16 that personnel of

the aviation service under orders for service abroad should be equipped with clothing, etc., regardless of any delay that this might cause in completing the equipment of other forces.

(b) Next to be supplied are troops ordered for service overseas.

(c) Next, the troops of the national army stationed at northern cantonments.

(d) Other troops stationed in the north.

The policy included a six months' reserve supply for troops in France and for troops under orders therefor.

7. Now, the elaborate program of the aviation section for shipment of units abroad, which has been approved by the Secretary of War, demands considerable clothing; and this fact, taken in conjunction with the demand for clothing and equipment in northern cantonments which must be met in the interests of health, and the fact that until recently organizations scheduled for service overseas were notified of that fact only a short time before they were due to sail, when clothing and equipment was low, has caused delay.

8. In the matter of personnel several organizations have been required to recruit by voluntary enlistment which has not met with rapid results, and the transfer of drafted men to fill up these organizations has only been made at the eleventh hour.

9. To ameliorate the situation the following plan has now gone into effect. On the 22nd of each month, the Chief of the Operations Committee, War College Division, reports to the Chief of Staff for the orders of the Secretary of War as to the shipments he desires made during the three months following the month subsequent to the date the Chief of the Operations Committee reports. The operations committee then draws up and submits for approval about the first of the month following the 22d above mentioned, a general schedule of priority of shipment for the ensuing three months, giving the space available for auxiliaries each month. An itemized list of units scheduled to go in the space for auxiliaries is then prepared, based on cables from General Pershing, and on an adjustment of the conflicting requests of the various staff departments. Copies of this schedule when approved are then furnished the board of priority of equipment (General Baker, Lt. Col. J. R. McAndrews, and Major W. K. Wilson), who give the organizations selected a place on the priority of clothing and equipment schedule; and the embarkation service, which, when they are ready to receive the organizations for shipment at the port of embarkation, calls upon the Adjutant General of the Army for appropriate orders to get them there.

In this way it has become possible to get organizations for overseas service equipped in time without resorting to the hand-to-mouth methods which have heretofore obtained.

Intelligent teamwork and cooperation become possible, even at the expense of a certain degree of secrecy and at the risk of the dislocation of the arrangements due to political pressure to have certain national guard organizations sent before others appearing on the list.

10. The above system went into operation on October 22. A general project for shipment for the months of December, January and February was then drawn up after consultation with the chief of staff and was submitted and approved as follows:

<u>December</u>	<u>Strength</u>
3d Division(regular)	27,658
31st Div. (Nat Guard)	27,658
Auxiliaries	<u>11,414</u>
Total	66,730

<u>January</u>	
35th Division (N. G.)	27,658
4th Div. (Regular)	27,658
29th Div. (N. G.) (Part)	13,074
Corps Troops and Auxiliaries	<u>13,410</u>
Total	81,800

February

29th Division (N. G.) Remainder	14,584
32d Div. (N. G. part)	13,074
Corps Troops and Auxiliaries	11,142
Total	<u>38,800</u>

Grand Total

187,330

11. When the undersigned left Washington on October 29, 1917, the operations committee was at work drawing up a schedule of shipment of auxiliaries for November and December, based on conflicting demands of staff departments for space which was not sufficient for all, the staff departments basing their requests on General Pershing's cables.

12. In conclusion it should be noted that the tonnage or man-carrying capacity of the fleets given in paragraph 2 herewith, is not sufficient to put one million men in France by June 1, and keep them supplied, even if that rate of transportation, given in paragraph 2, could be maintained. The paramount problem is tonnage and every exertion should be made to get the shipping board to obtain and turn over more ships to the embarkation service. Representations from this end would have great weight as Washington is trying to comply with all cables from General Pershing.

WALTER S. GRANT,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: 431: Letter

Order of Battle to be Furnished British Headquarters

Administration Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, November 30, 1917.

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Chief, French Military Mission

1. In reply to your communication No. 9,508, of November 20, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief directs me to state that a copy of the Order of Battle of the American Expeditionary Forces will be furnished from these headquarters to the British Headquarters.

2. In this connection it will be of value if arrangements can be made for furnishing regularly to these headquarters a copy of the French Order of Battle.

By direction:

JAMES G. HARBORD,
Chief of Staff.

Number of American Troops Required by the End of June

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 2, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Secretary of War and Chief of Staff

1. With the apparent total collapse of Russia and the recent success of the Central Powers in Italy, German morale is undoubtedly much improved and the probability of a serious offensive against the western front is greatly increased. In fact, information indicates German concentration in the Vosges opposite Nancy and also near the Swiss frontier. It seems probable that such an offensive may begin this winter. French military authorities are of this opinion and are actually moving troops to meet further developments at both above points. While it is not probable that the Central Powers can concentrate their full strength on the western front for some months, yet their resumption of the offensive clearly points out their purpose to push the war here before the Americans can bring over a large force.

2. With Russia out of the war it is possible for the Central Powers to concentrate 250 to 260 divisions on the western front and still leave a certain number on the eastern front and 26 divisions to hold the Italians. They could do this without interfering with status quo at Salonika, and these estimates do not take into account the possibilities of using Bulgarian or Turkish troops on western front. Against these German and Austrian divisions the Allies have 169 divisions some of which are under orders for Italy. This relative strength would give the Central Powers about 60% advantage and make it difficult to hold them. The Allies have had about 30% advantage all summer. Details set forth in letter to Secretary of War now en route.

3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four army corps or twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon General Bliss and other American members of the conference. Generals Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of, and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the number allotted to other than army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to two million tons by May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak and we must come to their relief this year. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of these requirements will be sent later.

5. As to heavy artillery and ammunition it is now probable, after full consideration and investigation that the French and British will be able to make up our deficiencies.

6. The question of both sea transportation and artillery are under further discussion by the Allies and full report and recommendation will be made in few days.

PERSHING.

Priority Schedule is being Followed

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., December 3, 1917.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, FRANCE

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. With reference to paragraph 2A, your 322: Priority schedule of October 7, is being followed as rapidly as units can be organized and equipped. Shipment made in order asked for except in cases of units first on schedule not ready while others lower down are ready. This is done to prevent delay in shipping and to utilize shipping to full capacity Forecast of completion of first phase later. Biddle.

* * * * *

McCain.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1943: Study

Military Geography of the Western Front

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 4, 1917.

MAIN FEATURES OF THE TERRAIN

The battlefront crosses several general areas which one must appreciate in order to obtain an understanding of the conditions along the western front. Taking up these various areas from northwest to southeast they are:

(a) All of Belgium north of the line Liège---Namur---Maubeuge may be spoken of as the plain of Flanders. If this line be extended west to the sea, the part of France thus set off is of the same general character. This area is low, some parts being only a few meters above sea level. It has some small undulations of terrain with no large forests. It is given both to agriculture and industry. Before the war, it supported a very dense population. It is well supplied with both roads and railroads and offers facilities for the employment of very large masses of troops. Both combatants here employ denser lines than anywhere else, sometimes as many as 11 men to the yard. Measured straight across the area, without counting minor bends, this part of the battle front has a length of about 75 miles.

(b) Following the general direction of the battle front a broad open belt of rolling country, about 20 to 30 miles wide, runs in a southeasterly direction from the area just described under (a). In this belt lies the valley of the Aisne and the upper portions of the Oise and the Somme. For a distance of about 120 miles the battle front lies in this

general belt, which is open, slightly rolling, agricultural country, well supplied with roads and railroads. It is not so thickly inhabited as the plain of Flanders. South of this belt there is a large wooded triangle with its base on the belt and its apex at Paris. Northeast of this belt, the large general area Mayence---Thionville (Diedenhofen) ---Cambrai---Namur---Liège---Cologne is hilly and wooded. East of the Rhine this hilly wooded area extends well into Germany. Compared with the surrounding areas it is not well provided with roads or railroads and is also less densely populated. It is unsuitable for the employment of large masses of troops. On account of the location of this area the German armies of this part of the front are supplied over roundabout routes and in part over some routes that are used for supplying other sectors of the battle front. As a result, Germany here employs battle lines that are much less dense than those in Flanders. The Allies hold it in a strength proportionate to that of the enemy as a general attack by them here would not threaten any vital part of the German system.

(c) From St-Menould on the Aisne east to the Moselle just south of Metz, we cross first the narrow strip of lower land on the east bank of the Aisne, then rise sharply to the higher wooded region of Argonne. The latter extends almost to Verdun. In the vicinity of Verdun is the narrow valley of the Meuse. East of the Meuse the ground is higher, but soon descends to a plain, called the plain of the Woëvre, rising again in the hills to the west of the Moselle. In this latter locality and just north of the battle front lies the Lorraine iron area. Excepting the salient of St-Mihiel this district is well provided with roads and railroads, and, in addition, canals from here connect with the inland waterways in all directions. With the exception of the forests of the Argonne, this country is agricultural and industrial. The German possession of St-Mihiel cuts both canal and railroad at that place and greatly embarrasses the French transportation system.

Excluding all the smaller bends, the general battle front in this sector has a length of 80 miles. The part about Verdun is strongly held. The remainder is held more lightly by both sides.

(d) From the Moselle to a point about 15 miles east of Lunéville, there is a stretch of comparatively open ground well supplied with transportation facilities and suited to military operations. This sector of open country has a breadth of about 45 miles. At the beginning of the war, the Germans made a determined advance here, but were checked on the heights of Le Grand Couronne, northeast of Nancy. There has been no very heavy fighting in this sector since that time. The inland waterways may be best described by regarding Nancy as the center, though this city must not, for that reason, be considered as the metropolis on which this system converges. In peacetime waterways existed from Nancy east to connections with those of the Rhine and the Saar; north to Metz and the navigable waters of the Moselle; northwest, to Verdun, to the frontiers of Belgium; west, to Châlons, Paris and Le Havre; southwest, to Nevers, Orleans and St-Nazaire; south, to Marseilles; and southeast, to Belfort and Basle (Switzerland). Events of war have decreased the traffic over these waterways but they are still in use by both sides, though, of course, not right up to the front.

(e) The sector of the Vosges mountains is rough, wooded land and is rather sparsely inhabited. It is reached by railroads from both the French and German sides, but these are branch routes and do not cross the battle front. Thus it is comparatively easy for either side to supply itself on this front, but these conditions would change to its disadvantage were either side to make advance. These mountains are easily defended and offer no advantageous objective for a powerful attack. This has resulted in both sides holding the line very thinly. The battle front in this sector, excluding bends and turns, is about 50 miles long.

(f) The gap at Belfort between the Vosges and the Jura mountains of the Swiss frontier is an open valley, largely of an agricultural nature, and has a breadth of about 25 miles. From the German side it is reached by both railroad and water transport routes through the upper valley of the Rhine. One main railroad and one canal pass through this gap into France and there connect with the French systems. Moderate-sized armies can pass

through this gap from either side to the other, but exceedingly large masses so operating would be cramped for room and, after a short advance, would be isolated from the rest of their whole force by the Vosges area. Either side might use this route for the advance of a secondary force, but could hope for great success only after a considerable advance (France to Strassburg - Germany to Gray and Dijon) which could not be effected through this cramped valley unless the opponent was so fully occupied elsewhere that he would be unable to spare the troops to properly oppose such an offensive.

SWITZERLAND

There are two main routes across Switzerland from west to east. One runs from Lake Geneva, through the valley which is behind the Jura mountains, eastward into Austria and south Germany. The other runs from Lake Geneva southeast to Milan (Italy). Both are tortuous and unsuitable for the supply of very large forces. This probably explains why Germany did not violate Swiss territory as she did that of Belgium.

RELATIVE RAILROAD SYSTEMS

The heart of the French railroad system is Paris. From that place the main routes radiate like the spokes of a wheel. Distinct main routes, not so clearly defined as the statement below would indicate, lead from Paris as follows:

- 4 to the north coast of France
- 3 to the west coast, one continuing on south into Spain
- 2 to the south coast, one continuing south into Spain, the other by two branches southeast into Italy
- 3 towards Alsace-Lorraine; one now cut by the battlefront
- 4 towards Flanders

These are tied together by many lesser routes and by several cross routes towards the circumference of the wheel.

For military purposes the German controlled railroads center in two localities, namely, the triangle, Liège---Brussels---Maubeuge, and the area about Saarbrücken. These two areas are connected with each other and the whole front unified by two distinct lateral 2-track railroads (called *Voies de Rocade*) that extend in the rear of and generally parallel to the whole German western front. The first area is connected with north Germany through the narrow space north of Liège, which is on the north edge of the hilly wooded area called the Ardennes and south of the Dutch border. The second is connected eastward with south Germany and Austria. Back of the two *Voies de Rocade*, the main connection between these two vital railroad areas is the Rhine Valley, which is an inland waterway and has a double-track railroad more or less closely following each bank.

MINERALS

IRON

Four-fifths of the iron of Continental Europe lies in the small area shown west of Metz (which may be roughly located on the map by the quadrilateral Metz---Thionville (Diedenhofen)---Longwy---Conflans). In addition to this iron area, Germany has access to the iron of Sweden, exchanging coal therefor. This Swedish iron is of a very superior quality and is also valuable because neutral miners furnish the manpower for its extraction.

In French possession there is a small iron area about Nancy.

COAL

In southern and western France there are numerous small coalfields.

In the area roughly indicated (shown N. W. of Saarbrücken) in German-Lorraine, about 15 million tons of coal are produced annually. This area is connected with the iron area above described by two inland waterways and by rail. Iron ore is hauled to the coal and coal returned to the iron mines. There are smelters in both iron area and coal area. Also inland waterways and railroads connect both these areas with the great German industrial area and coal field surrounding Essen. On account of its location the above described coal area is of the greatest industrial importance, but in quantity of production it is only one-tenth as great as the main coalfield which will be next described.

The largest coalfield of Europe begins in France not far from Bethune and extends as a long narrow strip on the line; Mons---Namur---Liège---Aix-la-Chapelle, and then widens into a broad area in Germany where it may be roughly located as the area: Aix-la-Chapelle---Cologne---Essen, though it extends well north of this. The part of this area that lies in Germany produces more coal than the remainder of this and all the remaining fields of western Europe combined.

SALT

(Source of Chlorine Gas)

About Nancy in France there is a large saltfield. About Château Salins, in German Lorraine, there is also a large saltfield, with a similar one not far away at Saarlouis.

There are other sources of salt in Europe, but these are the principal ones that lie close to the western front.

CRUDE OIL

There is an oil field at Pachelbronn, about 30 miles north of Strassburg. It now produces about one-twentieth of Germany's oil, and is the only field in western Europe. The Galician and Roumanian fields are Germany's other sources of supply.

ZINC

Before the war both Belgium and Germany were exporters of zinc. Germany attempts to make use of this excess of zinc by employing it for purposes to which it is not well suited but where it will save other metals of which she is short. Her greatest shortage is copper.

OTHER MINERALS

Small quantities of copper and manganese are found all along both sides of the western front. There are no important centers and these workings do not furnish a major part of the supply of either combatant. Small deposits of other minor minerals are found at various places along the western front. They are not of great military importance.

LeROY ELTINGE

Conference in London; Military Situation; Need for Tonnage

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,

No. 10-SWC

London, December 4, 1917.

The Adjutant General, Washington

For the Acting Chief of Staff

All military authorities here since my arrival in England have represented with growing urgency the grave possibilities of the military situation early in 1918. This culminated in a conference between the British and French Chiefs of Staff and General John J. Pershing and myself immediately after the first session of the interallied conference held in France on November 29. As a result of this conference I have submitted to the committee on maritime transportation, appointed by the interallied conference, the following communication.

At a conference between General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff of the American army, General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff of Great Britain, and General Foch, Chief of the General Staff of the French army, the military situation on the western front and its requirements as to manpower from the United States was carefully considered. As the result of this conference it was unanimously agreed that the United States should, as its minimum effort send to France, as rapidly as possible, 4 complete corps of 6 divisions each or 24 divisions in all, the last divisions to arrive not later than the end of June 1918.

In order to accomplish this program, and after making every possible reduction in the personnel of the divisions, in the number of animals to be transported, and the amount of reserve supplies to be on hand in France not later than June 1 next, it is estimated there must be added to the tonnage now available for the transportation of American troops, 1,500,000 gross tons by January 1, 1918, 300,000 gross tons by March 1, 1918, and 200,000 gross tons by June 1, 1918, or two million gross tons in all. The foregoing is presented to the committee on maritime transportation with the earnest request that it receive immediate and most careful consideration. For any assistance that they may be able to give, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss and General John J. Pershing place themselves at the disposal of the committee. Tasker H. Bliss, (General) Chief of Staff of the American army.

I assume that the transportation thus made available will continue to bring troops until at least the V Corps, making a total of at least 30 divisions, shall have arrived in France by the end of the summer. The military situation for 1918 is undoubtedly critical and grave. All chiefs of staff of the armies of the western front and the representatives of the commanders in the field at the conferences here urge that the United States must be prepared to make a great effort as early in the year as possible. With this end in view and in order to insure the equipment with artillery and ammunition of the American troops as fast as they arrive in France, the Minister of Munitions of France and England and Perkins* representing the United States, have exhaustively examined the situation and adopted the following resolutions for their respective governments.

*Thomas N. Perkins, War Industries Board.

The representatives of Great Britain and France state that their production of artillery (field, medium and heavy) is now established on so large a scale that they are able [to] equip completely all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918 with the best make of British and French guns and howitzers. The British and French ammunition supply and reserves are sufficient to provide the requirements of the American army thus equipped at least up to June 1918 provided that the existing 6-inch shell plants in the United States and Dominion of Canada are maintained in full activity and provided that the manufacture of 6-inch howitzer carriages in the United States is to some extent sufficiently developed. On the other hand the French and to a lesser extent the British require as soon as possible large supplies of propellants and high explosives and the British require the largest possible production of 6-inch howitzers from now onwards and of 8-inch and 9.2-inch shells from June onwards. In both of these matters they ask the assistance of the Americans. With a view, therefore, first to expedite and facilitate the equipment of the American armies in France and second to secure the maximum ultimate development of the ammunition supply with the minimum strain upon available tonnage the representatives of Great Britain and France propose that the American field, medium, and heavy artillery be supplied during 1918 and as long after as may be found convenient from British and French gun factories and they ask (A) that the American efforts shall be immediately directed to the production of propellants and high explosives on the largest possible scale and (B) Great Britain also asks that the 6-inch, 8-inch and 9.2-inch shell plants already created for the British service in the United States shall be maintained in the highest activity and that large additional plants for the manufacture of these shells shall at once be laid down.

In this way alone can the tonnage difficulty be minimized and potential artillery developments both in guns and shells of the combined French, British and American armies be maintained in 1918 and still more in 1919.

With regard to very heavy artillery and certain special classes of long-range guns the representatives of France and Great Britain recommend a separate and original manufacture by the United States. They also recommend that the existing production of 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers equipment in the United States shall be continued.

Finally if the above general principles are approved by the governments of the three countries the precise measures of manufacture and supply with programs and timetables shall be concerted by a technical commission composed of representatives of the three great powers concerned.

3. The situation will be quite different in 1918 from what it has been in 1917. In 1917 the British and French guns and howitzers output has been below the ammunition supply. In 1918 the reverse will be true. The situation as to guns and ammunition supply and capacities now are as follows. The French can and are willing to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota of 75-millimeter field guns and with adequate supplies of shells for this size provided that the United States furnish raw materials, propellants, and explosives in advance. The British have capacity to manufacture 6-inch howitzers sufficient to supply their own needs and to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota if United States can supply 400 carriages for such howitzer. The British have not sufficient 6-inch shell capacity to supply their own requirements to say nothing of American requirements unless the supply of such shells which they have been obtaining from United States and Canada is continued at least to the extent available before United States entered the war. That is to say the British have relied upon getting this shell from United States and Canada and have concentrated upon increasing their supply of this howitzer and need this shell to carry out the 1918 program. The British have reserves of propellants and explosives sufficient to complete United

States full quota 6-inch shells if American army should adopt that howitzer provided that United States can replenish those reserves beginning July 1, 1918. The French capacity for making 155-millimeter howitzer and shells is sufficient to enable France to supply the American army as it arrives in Europe with its full quota for 1918 of both howitzers and shells of this size provided that the raw materials for both howitzers and shells and propellants and explosives are furnished in advance by United States. Inventory shows requirements due to recent losses must, however, be met either by British or French to a very substantial amount. The British can furnish 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer to equip the American army for 1918 as it arrives. They urge continuance American activities in the manufacture of howitzers and shells of these sizes. I am satisfied that only by co-ordination of all available capacities in the three countries can American troops here and troops of British and French be fully equipped for the great effort necessary in 1918 and urge that development of independent American program be subordinated to the making of this effort.

4. Specifically it is recommended that (A) sufficient 75-millimeter field guns and ammunition be purchased from the French to equip the first 30 divisions sent to France. The home program for manufacture of this material should be continued. The home output for 1918 will probably all be required for equipping and training of troops at home. The home manufacture of 75-millimeter ammunition should be expedited as far as possible and troops in France supplied from home as soon as home production is on an assured basis. (B) That the factories of the United States and Dominion of Canada heretofore engaged in the manufacture of British 6-inch howitzer ammunition be continued indefinitely and extended if necessary to meet British requirements. This is of vital importance as these shells are essential to 1918 campaign from every point of view. Serious consideration should even now be given to the question of our adoption of the British 6-inch howitzer in place of the French 155-millimeter howitzer. The answer must depend to a large extent upon the extent to which American program for manufacture 155-guns and shells has advanced. British and French are agreed that 1 howitzer is substantially as easy to make as the other. French are confident we shall have no difficulty in manufacture of shell. British have had difficulty in making French shell and fear that we will, whereas they point out that we have been making British shell for several years with great success and have men as well as plants that have proved they can turn them out. We cannot urge too strongly the importance of producing the largest possible amount of shells of this size and recommend that the amount of shell which can certainly be produced be given great weight in determining type to be adopted. Subject to your decision as to type we recommend that sufficient howitzers of the type selected be purchased from the French or the British to equip the first 30 divisions to arrive in France. We have bought 260 [155] howitzers from the French and must start with these. Home manufacture of the piece selected and its ammunition should be continued, the 1918 output being used for the equipping and training of troops at home. When the home output of ammunition is on an assuring basis troops in France should be supplied with ammunition from home sources. If the British 6-inch is adopted provision should be made also for developing the manufacture of British 6-inch howitzer carriages in the United States to the extent of 400 for the year 1918. (C) Sufficient (155 millimeter) Filloux guns and ammunition for the first 50 divisions to arrive in France should be purchased from the French. Home manufacture of this piece and of the 4.7-inch guns and of ammunition for both these pieces should be developed energetically. No guns of these calibers are obtainable from British sources. (D) Concerning heavy howitzers of the 9.5-inch type the outright adoption of the British 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer is considered imperative. These calibers are of great and increasing importance. There is no hope of home production of 9.2-inch howitzer before 1919. Sufficient 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers can and should be obtained from British sources to equip the first 30 divisions to arrive in France. The existing capacity for manufacture of British 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzer in the United States must be continued and existing plants for the manufacture of ammunition for these pieces must be maintained and others laid

down in order to insure a sufficient supply of ammunition not only for our own needs but to provide a part of the needs of the British. Present plans for the manufacture of 9.5-inch howitzers should be entirely subordinated to the preceding. Boxes of trench mortar ammunition, of 3-inch Stokes, 6-inch Newton Stokes, and 240-millimeter type are obtainable from the British and French sources to meet American demands until these demands can be supplied from home sources. Particular efforts should be made to develop home manufacture of 6-inch Newton Stokes ammunition and 240-millimeter trench mortars and ammunition.

(F) With regard to super heavy artillery great efforts should be made for home production of railroad mounts for 12-inch mortars and 10-inch, 12-inch, and 14-inch seacoast guns. It is imperative that sufficient number of these calibers be withdrawn from seacoast forts to supply our armies in France and if necessary to assist the British and French.

5. The whole question as to how England, France, and the United States can put forth their maximum efforts during the critical year of 1918 has been considered in great detail by the Minister of Munitions of Great Britain and France and by Perkins representing the United States and by their technical assistants and the preceding plan was fully and cordially agreed upon by all parties.

6. It is most urgently recommended that the plan as outlined above be adopted by the United States and that existing plans be subordinate where necessary for the purpose of carrying out these specific recommendations and especially that all plans for the development of an independent program by the United States be subordinate to the idea of the strongest possible joint effort and that, in every instance where we have established capacity and ability to manufacture, no experiments be tried.

7. You will see that the foregoing leaves everything in the hands of the Americans and British who must furnish the necessary tonnage. The commander in the field wants our troops as fast as they can come. If you accept program of supply proposed by Allied Minister of Munitions then troops can be equipped as fast as they come. As to the necessary tonnage, the interallied conference at final session afterwards adopted a resolution of its committee on maritime transportation as follows:

The Allies, considering that the means of maritime transport at their disposal, as well as the provision(s) which they dispose of, should be utilized in common for the pursuit of the war, have decided to create an interallied organization for the purpose of coordinating their action to this effect and of establishing a common program, constantly kept up-to-date, enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops.

8. But to secure results there must be continued insistence by our War Department.

BLISS.

Shipments, Priority Schedule, Reduction in Service of Rear Troops

Administrative Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 8, 1917.

MEMORANDUM:

1. The C-in-C directs attention to the following extracts of cables sent and received:

No. 322, Par. 2-A, 11-27-17. For Chief of Staff. It would save a great deal of cabling and much uncertainty on part of all concerned if you could cable that our priority schedule of October 7, is being strictly followed and if you would give a forecast of the dates on which various units necessary to complete the first phase will be organized and when they will be shipped. Again strongly urge that all necessary steps, including the use of the draft be taken to put our priority schedule into full effect. *PERSHING.*

No. 474, Par. 8, 12-5-17. With reference to paragraph 2-A your 322. Priority schedule of Oct. 7, is being followed as rapidly as units can be organized and equipped. Shipments made in order asked for except in cases of units first on schedule not ready while others lower down are ready. This is done to prevent delay in shipping and to utilize shipping to full capacity. Forecast of completion of first phase later. Biddle.

2. Attention is also directed to Memo. dated Oct. 16, 1917 * * * indicating how any questions of alteration in the schedule of priority of shipments should be submitted. Changes in the schedule should not be requested unless there is a decided advantage to be gained by asking the particular change desired. It is, however, very desirable to communicate to the War Department any special information which will show the organization and equipment of units called for in the schedule but not already covered in tables of organization and equipment manuals.

3. As the tonnage situation will probably in the near future require a reduction of about 30% in the service of the rear troops the C-in-C desires that you submit promptly a statement giving the 30% of the service of the rear troops pertaining to your department which can be omitted or reduced in number with least detriment to your department. The list should indicate the order in which the troops can best be spared.

By order of the C-in-C:

*J. A. LOGAN, JR.,
Chief, A. S. G. S.*

Cable: 360-S

Aviation Tonnage

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 11, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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2. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 5 your Cablegram 431 not considered advisable to increase program construction night bombers at present.

a. Account tonnage situation and very large estimates just completed of tonnage required to bring over and maintain aviation program, it seems clear that no increase above the existing program as shown in service of rear project of September 17, should be considered at present. Unofficial reports received here indicate plans being urged on War Department to greatly increase aviation program. Recommend War Department disapprove any such increase pending completion investigation which I am having made as to extent of air program which strategical situation and tonnage situation considered together and with Allies will warrant. Will advise you promptly as to air program recommended, and recommend that in the meantime work on air program be limited to present approved plans.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

GHQ, AEF: General Orders

Method of Supply of American Troops

GENERAL ORDERS

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 73

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 12, 1917.

[Extract]

1. The supply of American troops in France is divided into three phases: The first is the procurement of such supplies; the second is their care and storage; the third is their transportation. The responsibility for the first lies with the chiefs of various supply departments, A. E. F.; for the second with the C. G., L. of C.; for the third with the D. G. T. The general supervision of all is exercised by the general staff, as a rule through the coordination section. [For details of operation see complete copy of orders in this series.]

* * * * *

Recommended System of Promotion

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 14, 1917.

ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

[Extract]

* * * * *

1A. With reference to General Orders No. 132, your office system of promotion therein enunciated while satisfactory for national army and national guard, seems inapplicable to regular army in commands wholly or partially regular. Also system of lineal promotion in regular army involving units as widely separate as America, Europe, and Philippines cannot be applied in present emergency and should give way for time being at least to promotion by selection. Conditions of active service will in a short time force interchange of officers between regular, national guard, and national army divisions. To promote officers to national army and carry them in new grades attached to the regular army or national guard and likewise with officers of national army or national guard attached to regular would involve endless paper work and would probably in the end substantially result in transfer regular commissioned list to national army. Believe better consolidate all forces on one list for period of war according to date of present commissions securing rights of regular officers as to retirement, and proper place in reorganization at close of war. Following is suggested as substance of law which it is recommended be asked of Congress as an emergency measure:

On and after January 1, 1918, and for the period of the present emergency the regular army and all forces raised by draft, enlistment or appointment under the act of May 18, 1917, shall constitute one force which is hereby designated as the United States Army. Appointments to all vacancies occurring among the commissioned officers of said force shall be made by selection based on merit and efficiency and under such regulations as the President may prescribe. Provided, that appointments to the grade of 2d Lieutenant in the regular army shall continue to be made under existing law so long as the total number of regular army officers on the active list does not exceed that now authorized by law. Provided further, that on the termination of the present emergency each officer now holding a commission in the regular army and each officer hereafter appointed therein shall be appointed to the grade in the army or corps and with the rank therein that he would have attained had this act not been passed. Provided further, that nothing in this act shall deprive any regular officer of his present commission or of his right of retirement under existing law with the grade he would have attained had this act not been passed.

PERSHING.

Contingent Intervention of American Forces in Italy

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

No. 14534

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

December 14, 1917.

The General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To the General, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army at Chaumont

The president of the council sent to me, and you also, copy of telegrams 679 and 680, from Washington, and 12,505 BS/3 from Paris, on the subject of possible intervention of American forces in Italy.

I desire to convey to you my point of view in this matter:

1. My opinion is that the American divisions should not be engaged in Italy. The most that may be contemplated is the possibility of employing, for a time, some elements of American communications troops in that theater of operations.

2. The exigencies of the situation on the northeast front may force us to utilize American troops in France before their training, in the case of organized divisions, is adequate. Therefore I consider it necessary for you to endeavor to accustom the American High Command to the idea that American regiments, indeed even American battalions, could well be called upon to serve as separate units, in the cadre of a large French unit and under the orders of the French command.

PETAIN.

Attacks with Limited Objective

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

December 15, 1917.

Memorandum on the attacks with limited objective.

[Extract]

I. In the month of April 1917, the French army put forth a very great effort.

It was not possible to contemplate a second effort of such magnitude, in the same year, and the problem confronting the Commander-in-Chief was to reach the end of the year with an army in full vigor, that is, well armed, trained, and confident, capable of a general offensive in 1918.

The method adopted harmonized with the attitude of preparation and waiting.* * *

By this method of course one cannot see it possible to gain a decision; attacks with limited objectives can result only in attrition and seizure of ground.

The Commander-in-Chief selected portions of terrain whose capture was a valuable gain: Liberation of Verdun and the *rocade** of the Chemin-des-Dames. He waited for the most favorable tactical conditions in order to produce the greatest attrition. But never did he count on these operations leading to a decision.

He attained the objective he had set himself: He now has at his disposal an army in good shape whose armament is considerably increased and whose training has been perfected.

* * * * *

III. What can we see ahead for 1918? That depends naturally on the plan: What plan, then?

The defection of Russia brings back to the western front the main forces of the two sides. On both sides these bodies form a whole; that of the Austro-German is organized, that of the Entente inevitably will end by being so.

We do not conceive that the English, French, Italian, American, and Belgian armies will give battle independently of each other; that is, that they will decide to fight separately. It is the province of the governments to define the powers of a single head charged with coordinating the actions and exercising supreme direction.

It is that head who will draw up the 1918 plan along broad lines.

The French Commander-in-Chief naturally has had certain probable elements of the offensive plan worked out by his staff, but it is impossible for him to establish a plan without taking cognizance at least of the presence in the same theater of operations of the British, American, and Belgian armies. What will these armies do? How will they co-operate with the French army? Only supreme direction can determine that.

* A railroad generally paralleling the front for the lateral movement of troops and supplies.

While waiting for this plan, the French Commander-in-Chief has prepared a certain number of offensive operations with limited objective. These objectives have been selected with a view to facilitating later operations on a broad scale which can be undertaken with the cooperation of the Allied armies or in order to take advantage of opportunities.

There again the purpose of these operations is that of waiting; they do not hope for a decision.

In the case of the defensive plan, the defense can always be prepared for the strongly occupied front and that plan is made, but, to tell the truth, that is only a preliminary part of the plan, the precaution of the first days.

A large-scale attack on one or several portions of the front affects the entire front. Then what course should be followed? Should there be passive resistance with request to adjoining units to send their reserves to support the attrition? Or should a counteroffensive be organized somewhere else? And, in that case, in what zone? At what time?

The course to be followed in case of attack is the second part of the defensive plan; the supreme command alone can draw up its general lines.

The Allies won the defensive battle of 1916 because the defense of Verdun was combined with the Franco-British counteroffensive of the Somme by a higher direction.

Thus, for 1918, the French Commander-in-Chief has set up a defensive plan (1st part); he is prepared to set up speedily the 2d part of the defensive plan, as well as his offensive plan, as soon as he has the necessary directives for, let it be said again, he cannot make his calculations unless he has the directives of the Allied Armies which are acting in the same theater of operations.

In the defensive plan (1st part) are included offensives with limited objective for liberating the parts of the front attacked which might be situated in the vicinity of organized terrain. These would be, correctly speaking, large-scale counterattacks.

IV. Under these circumstances, what are the anticipated losses for 1918?

If the Germans have the initiative of the offensive, the defensive plan will be put into effect and we cannot make any estimate of losses. They will depend on the intensity of the German effort and the support our Allies give us.

* * * * *

V. Just what the value is of the method of limited objectives can be seen.

It may be added that its tactical characteristic has been the employment of an enormous proportion of artillery and the attempt to effect surprise.

It is probable that in 1918 the increase in our armament and weapons of all kinds will permit us to modify some of its features by steering us more in the direction of surprise.

Methods of Decentralization

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 15, 1917.

From: The Adjutant General, A. E. F.

To: The Inspector General, A. E. F.

1. There is evidence of a tendency on the part of staff departments to centralize at these headquarters much work which should not be handled here, tendency which, if unchecked, will produce serious consequences as the A. E. F. grows. The result will be the establishment of a set of administrative bureaus here, the building up of an unwieldy clerical and official personnel, expensive and unnecessary.

2. As indications of the above, there is noted a desire to place auditors offices in the departments here, a tendency to centralize the remount service and motor transport service here; a proposal to create a water supply and electrical service administered from G. H. Q.; and the establishment in each staff department of what is actually a small Adjutant General's Office but which is called a Personnel Branch.

One can easily see the evils of such tendency. A concomitant of this is the meddling with transportation, personnel, etc., that pertain to the Line of Communications and to divisions.

3. In order to put a check on such improper expansion of the technical and administrative staff department offices at these headquarters; to prevent the creation of bureaus modeled on those of the War Department and insure the carrying out of the policy of decentralization desired by the Commander-in-Chief, he directs that you investigate and report as to what work now being handled here can be decentralized to the Line of Communications or other subordinate headquarters and other classes of same which would be centralized in particular offices at these headquarters.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Conduct of Operations for 1918

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

No. 22759

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

December 22, 1917.

Directive No. 4 for the Groups of Armies and Armies

[Extract]

The conditions of the conflict on the western front are modified for the time being because of the Russian defection: The conduct of our operations therefore, must take on a new direction.

The purpose of the present directive is to define that direction.

I. The Entente will not recover superiority in manpower until the American army is capable of placing in line a certain number of large units: Until then, we must, under penalty of irremediable attrition, maintain a waiting attitude, with the idea firmly fixed in mind of resumings as soon as we can, the offensive which alone will bring us ultimate victory.

The exigencies of this passing necessity are met by the arrangements that have not been decided upon for the general disposition of forces, the distribution of heavy artillery, and for the maneuver of reserves in rear of the front.

* * * * *

II. In case of an enemy offensive on a broad scale, the commanders of armies and groups of armies will conduct the battle, being guided by the following controlling ideas:

To hold the first positions so as to crush, or at the very least, to slow up and disorganize the first dash of the enemy there.

Initially, however, assign to the defense of these first lines only the means necessary to assure a good return from the consolidation of the position that has been effected and, in any case, to assure the movement of the mass of the troops to the second positions and the switch positions;

To make secure under any possible circumstances, the second positions and the switch positions;

To employ their reserves, not only in counterattacks in the zone of enemy penetration, but also in counterthrusts directed either against the flanks or against a part of the front adjoining that zone.

G. H. Q. reserves can introduce either:

As reinforcement of the armies attacked;

Or as an attack launched at an opportune time on terrain and in a direction, considered favorable.

It will therefore be incumbent on the high command to take the proper steps to limit to the loss of our first lines, if the latter cannot be held, the consequences of a powerful attack executed by surprise, and to retain all its initiative toward the enemy by giving to the defense a clearly aggressive character.

III. The application of the methods described above depends on the energy which the armies will expend on organizing the ground.

This consolidation includes:

On the one hand, improvement of existing defenses and creation of new positions;

On the other, preparation of certain parts of the front with a view to offensive operations.

* * * * *

V. Commanders of groups of armies will insist, in the orders they are called on to issue for the application of the present directive, on the following points:

Liberty of action of the French armies, either in the period of waiting upon which we are entering or when that period reaches an end and the Commander-in-Chief decides to pass to general offensive operations, will depend essentially on the results obtained in the offensive preparation of the front;

Remunerative local attacks constitute the best means of preserving the combative value of our troops, figuring out the enemy's plays, and consequently providing beforehand against surprise;

In the waiting situation which is imposed on us, it will be to the advantage of the enemy to increase his threats or feints at attack and, as soon as he has resolved to pass to the offensive, to strike at several points so as to cause a dispersion of our efforts, which will favor his maneuver;

It is therefore of the greatest importance that the armies not lend themselves to this game and that they maintain, in the interpretation of indications or intelligence brought to their attention, an attitude sufficiently cautious to avoid expending their reserves prematurely.

VI. By imparting to their operations the characteristics just described, the commanders of groups of armies must bear in mind that the Commander-in-Chief is determined to let no favorable opportunity escape during the year 1918, to impose his will on the enemy by bringing the enemy to battle when he so elects.

They have the duty of maintaining constantly at the highest level the moral and physical state of the troops and to supervise personally the development of the training of the large units.

PETAIN.

Les Armées Françaises, Tome VI, 1st Vol., Annexes, 1st Vol.: Report

Training of American Divisions for the Front

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

December 23, 1917.

Résumé of interview of December 23, 1917 (General Pétain - General Pershing)

General Pétain: Necessity of expediting training of American units which we need as soon as possible on the front. Prospect of a battle in the early future in which the Germans will make a most violent effort.

Proposals: To continue training of the American 1st and 26th Divisions as planned, but adoption of a new method (amalgamation) for the other divisions. Insertion of American regiments into French divisions.

The 1st Division would go to the front as soon as possible. The 26th Division would join it after a tour of two months, by regiment, in French divisions and after having been assembled for its combined training as a division. The nucleus of the autonomous American army would thus be formed.

General Pershing: The training of the 1st Division is not finished, the cadres have been broken up through the necessity for satisfying the needs of the schools and various positions. The original officers have been almost entirely replaced by new ones who have had no training. The division commander has just been changed. Basic infantry training is lacking.

If the division were to be sent to the front, it would be at the cost of training. But it is understood that, if events necessitate it, the 1st Division would enter the front to relieve French units. It would be well if this did not take place before February 1.

General Pétain: Declares his intention of taking advantage of the offer to have the 1st Division go into sector if necessary. As far as possible that measure will not be resorted to until after February 1. It is understood that the American units would be employed only to relieve French units on defensive fronts and would not go into combat.

General Pershing: Asks if the point where the 1st Division will enter the front corresponds approximately to the future American sector.

General Pétain: Replies that the 1st Division will enter the future American sector, but that the other divisions, before completing their training, can be placed anywhere on the front.

Takes up again and discusses further the question of amalgamation. Refers to the telegram from Washington on the subject. [Not selected]

General Pershing: Says he has not yet any knowledge of that telegram. The "Jusserand" telegram is read and translated to General Pershing who states that is a reply to recommendations he made in the event the situation became so grave that American forces in France would have to be employed immediately. But that does not provide for the present case and the training of the troops.

General Pétain: Emphasizes the training benefit American units would derive from amalgamation. In 4 months, a regiment would be fit to enter the front line, while the regiments of the 1st Division are going to require 8 months to obtain the same result. Necessity for speedy intervention for the sake of French morale.

General Pershing: Appreciates the importance of the moral side of the question. Stresses his desire to see American forces on the front as soon as possible, but does not concede our point of view. Brings out difficulties encountered in training. American troops are not yet thoroughly organized; they are groups of civilians whom it is necessary to militarize, the ground is not ready to receive training by French troops. Necessary to adopt an American training method. He has sent to the United States a training program which, he hopes will expedite the molding of the troops before their arrival in France. The schools which have just been organized will produce results. When the regiments are trained according to his idea it will perhaps be well to place them in French divisions. He will think over that solution.

General Pétain: Urgently requests that amalgamation be tried. General Anthoine observes that the French I Corps is fully qualified to receive American units.

General Pershing: Reserves his reply and turns to another subject. Installation of the divisions to come in the training areas of the interior.

Suggestions from Marshal Haig concerning amalgamation. American troops routed by way of England. Training of American troops by the English. Entrance of American troops on the front at the present junction of the French and British armies. Asks General Pétain's opinion on training of Americans by the English.

General Pétain: Gives his opinion of the British methods and his estimate of the British troops.

The question of diverting a portion of the American forces to the English zone is the province of the Government.

There can be no thought given to Americans' entering the front at the junction of the British and French armies. This entrance can be made only on the French front.

1st Ind.

Hq. A. E. F., O. I. G., Jan. 6, 1918 - To the A. G.

Report of investigation ordered herewith.

A. W. BREWSTER,
Major General, N. A.,
I. G., A. E. F.

[Inclosure]

December 31, 1917.

From: Maj. Gen. A. W. Brewster, N. A. I. G., A. E. F.

To: The Commander-in-Chief

1. In conformity with your commands contained in the letter from the Adjutant General, A. E. F., dated December 15, 1917, subject "Methods of Decentralization," the following report of an investigation made by me as to what work now being handled by staff departments at these headquarters can be decentralized to the L. of C. or other subordinate headquarters, is submitted:

2. It is my purpose to deal with the question by departments.
3. Adjutant General's Department.

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Miscellaneous)		8	
Correspondence)	1	2	
Mail and Records)		31	7
Cable	1	9	
Officers	1	4	
Enlisted	1	2	
Orders and Printing	3*	9	17*
Statistical	5	28	7
Reserve)		4	
Property)	1	3	4
Permit Office	1	1	
Code Office	3	9	
	17	110	35

* Two officers and sixteen men Q. M. C., are in the printing office.

Conclusions: I cannot see how any of the work of this office at present can be decentralized. Later on as our force grows it is believed that as much of the statistical work as possible should be removed to the L. of C., as when this force reaches its maximum strength the burden of maintaining all the necessary personnel for this bureau would be too great a strain on these headquarters, and I believe that this question should be taken up by the proper Bureau of the General Staff with a view to determining what class of statistical work they deem advisable to keep in the Office of the A. G. at these headquarters, and that the rest should be sent to the A. G. O., L. of C. I believe that all statistics relating to personnel of all the bureaus which it is necessary to keep here should be handled in the A. G. O. at these headquarters; in other words the A. G. O. should be the library of statistical information at these headquarters. Special lists regarding recommendations for promotions of higher officers or special commendation lists of rating, I understand, are to be kept in the Office of the Secretary of the G. S. for the information of the C-in-C which is considered proper.

4. Quartermaster Department.

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	FIELD CLERKS	CIVILIANS
Chief Quartermaster	1			
Executive Officer	1			
Administrative Division	1	6	1	1
Personnel Branch	3	12		4
Records Branch		9		2
Telegraph and Cable Br.		13	1	3
Contract and Lease Br.	1			
Finance Division	11	11	1	
Accounting Division	21			
Graves Registration Ser.	2	5		
Supplies Division	8	11	2	1
Motor Transport Service	21	21		2
Remount Service	4	5		1

Lt. Col. H. E. Wilkins, Q. M. C., with station in Paris, temporarily with Purchasing Board. Maj. J. P. Castleman, Q. M. C., temporarily with Purchasing Board, Capt. F. T. Hill, Q. M., U. S. R., Asst. to Lieut. Col. Wilkins, on special duty in connection with supply of fuel.

Administrative Division: It is believed that the Personnel Branch of this division duplicates much of the work already done in the Statistical Division of the Adjutant General's Office.

In the technical and supply branches information as to prior occupation and personal history which is not kept in the A. G. O. is necessary in order to secure the assignment of officers to that class of duty for which they are best fitted. It would seem that the best place to put in operation information cards of this character would be at depots where representatives of the various departments could carry it out and could fill calls for assignment of personnel.

Finance and Accounting Division: I see no reason why the accounting could not be done at Headquarters, L. of C.

Graves Registration Service (Burial Department): It is believed that this service should be turned over to the L. of C.

Motor Transport Service Division: Much of the work of this division is research,

getting up tables of the supplies, and catalogues of material, spare parts, etc., drawing up forms and pamphlets of instruction, arranging plans for the handling of salvage for the various units, and outlining plans and instruction for the organization of reserve and other parks. This, it is believed, is necessary for the proper information of the chief quartermaster and should be performed in his office. This office has done a great deal of pioneer work. It was not done in the L. of C. or any other place, and it was necessary to take up many questions which might have been handled in the L. of C. The process of organizing and supplying the M. T. S. starts in this office and is done through the chiefs at the various troop commands and the L. of C. On account of shortage in motor transportation and its personnel, the distribution of motor vehicles has been made in this office; also the locating of shops and various agencies necessary for the proper functioning of the service.

At present all the motorcycle vehicles are received here at these headquarters and distributed; distribution of gasoline and oil are also made from these headquarters.

I believe that the planning of the organization of the service should properly be done in this office, but all transfers of personnel, assignment and distribution of vehicles and supplies should be transferred to the L. of C., and I am informed it is the intention of the chief quartermaster to do this. There is no reason why it shouldn't be taken up now and put into effect. While the L. of C. distributes the transportation, there must be always an authority higher than the L. of C. who can instruct him as to the assignment and distribution of vehicles and supplies outside of his own command, and that should be done by the C. S., G. S.

The movement and supply of motor transportation in connection with troop movements should be, in my opinion, operated from the proper bureau of the general staff, and not the office of the C. Q. M. It is believed that the operation of all motor transportation, including that of the Q. M. C. elements, should be in the hands of organizations to which it is assigned and the L. of C. I believe that chiefs of M. T. S. at various headquarters should report to the office of the C. Q. M. statistics regarding the operation of motor transportation and supplies used, in order that the office of the C. Q. M. can intelligently make up his requisitions and purchase orders.

This office also keeps in touch with the motor transport offices at the various bases and supervises the forwarding of spare parts to Nevers; this should be done more or less automatically. If they were properly marked and labeled at home the officer at the base would know where to ship it without any instructions from these headquarters, and the C. Q. M. office is endeavoring now to have that done. This office charges itself with seeing that supplies are not hoarded by individual units but this is a matter of proper distribution and belongs to the regulating officer. At present all requisitions are supervised in this office; this should be done in the office of the C. of M. T., L. of C., but it does not seem that at present his office is equipped to handle this. I am informed in the office of the C. Q. M. that it is planned that when the entire system of requisitioning and supply, as now planned, is completed, requisitions from organizations in the service of the rear will not go through this office at all but will be filled through the office of the C. Q. M., L. of C., who will forward them to the motor transport depot.

The records of the registration of all motor vehicles in the A. E. F. are secured by this branch. It is reported that the record is for the purpose of identification and providing data from which the supply branch can provide their estimates for purchasing spare parts, tires, etc. I believe this information is necessary for the requisitioning and purchasing branch here.

The maintenance branch which has to do with the establishing and maintenance of repair shops should be transferred to the L. of C., although this office will always have to figure on the upkeep and operation of such establishments. It would seem that all instruction relating to the M. T. S. should be transferred to the L. of C. but this office should supervise with a view to suggestion and improvement.

The foregoing shows the centralized condition existing in the M. T. S., which as has

been shown was due to present conditions as to shortage of vehicles and supplies. As soon as practicable a radical change with a view to decentralization should be effected. This would probably ultimately result in the removal of the Chief, M. T. S., from the office of the C. Q. M., these headquarters, to the C. Q. M., L. of C. With the system of automatic supply functioning properly from Base M. T. S. Groups to Advance M. T. S. Groups, the function of movement and distribution of units of the M. T. S. should pass from the M. T. S. to the C. S., G. S., A. E. F., and to the C. S., G. S. of the various armies.

Remount Service Division: This division has charge of the entire question of remounts, including the distribution of the same. Also the procurement of forage. I believe that the distribution of animals should be placed under the charge of the L. of C., and the procurement of forage in the Supplies Division, Office of C. Q. M.

Salvage: This question is now being taken up and plans for putting it into effect on a large scale are being made. While it is quite proper to plan for the future, it must be remembered that at present our sea transportation limits us to the carrying of men and matériel for the fighting line rather than men and matériel for the purpose of saving material, i. e. money---and that it will be some time before this work can be undertaken on a large scale.

As regards this office, while the policy of decentralization has not been carried out and as I have pointed out there is much work done here that was intended to be done by the L. of C., it must be said that the administration of the office is well organized. I find no work here that is not necessary, and all were busy. Work that could have properly been done in the L. of C. was not undertaken by them, and had the chief quartermaster not taken hold himself unsatisfactory results with respect to supplies and transportation would have followed. I believe that this office should be charged with the general plans for all enlargement of quartermaster activities to meet the growing necessities of our army.

There is a branch post office in this department whose function is to distribute all mail for the personnel of the Q. M. C. on duty in France. The only mail that should be received here is mail for employees of the Q. M. C. stationed at these headquarters.

Another matter that apparently requires attention is this: The chief quartermaster should be informed that the post quartermaster and all officers, clerks and soldiers of the Q. M. C. on duty with the post quartermaster are not under his control but are absolutely under the control of the Commandant, H. A. E. F.

5. Office of the Chief Engineer

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Engineer	1		
Clerical Section		17	6
Administration Division	1		
Personnel Section	5	4	2
Military Information Sec.	1		
Transportation Sec.	1	1	8
Accounts and Contract Div.	2	8	
Operations Division	1		
Water and Sewage Section	15	5	13
Electrical and Mechanical Sec.	4		
Forestry Section	4		
Technical Military Eng. Sec.	1		
Office Engineering Sec.	1	3	4
Construction Section		1	
Geological Section	3		
Supply Division	1	3	
	41	42	33

Personnel Section: The work of this section is subdivided into four classes: (a) Gathering data relating to engineer personnel from telegrams, cables, orders, and correspondence; (b) the compiling, filing, and cross-indexing of all data gathered; (c) gathering information regarding the wants of the various engineer services and making recommendations for the supplying of their wants; (d) handling of correspondence relating to the engineer personnel and drafting all orders.

It is believed that most of the work of this section can be decentralized to the L. of C., providing that the policy of assignment of officers of the engineer corps is changed and assignments made at a depot of the L. of C. by the engineer representative there instead of as at present in the office of the chief engineer, these headquarters.

The engineer department maintains a branch post office in charge of two clerks who get and distribute all mail for the various engineer regiments and personnel on duty in France. As the office of the chief engineer is the only one which has the addresses of the organizations and members of the engineer corps, this cannot be changed at once, but when the records of the personnel are removed to the L. of C., they should attend to the distribution of mail and only the mail intended for persons serving at these headquarters should be sent here.

Transportation Section: This office has its own automobile transportation, why I do not know, but it was necessary for them to have automobiles when they arrived and they purchased their own with engineer funds rather than wait until the quartermaster could furnish cars. There are six automobiles, I am informed.

Accounts and Contract Division: At present this is a very small section, but it could be removed, it is believed, to the L. of C.

Operations Divisions: **Water and Sewage Section:** This section is practically the office of a consulting engineer, an expert on the water supply. They perform no administrative function at present. It involves geological study and research. Later as corps and armies are formed it is proposed to assign much of the work to the various headquarters of those commands. The water question is so closely allied to troop movements and areas occupied by troops, that it is believed for areas outside of the L. of C. the question of

water supply should be handled in the office of the chief engineer at G. H. Q. and army and corps headquarters.

The other sections of the operations division exercise no executive control.

6. Office of Chief Ordnance Officer.

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Ordnance Officer	1		
Assistant to Chief Ord. Officer	1		
Attached to Gas Service	2		
Attached to A. S., G. S.	1		
Supervision of matters pertaining to Gen. Staff and Staff Depts.	2		
Equipment Division	1		2
Automatic Arms Division	4		4
Trench Warfare Division	3	1	
Field Artillery and Antiaircraft Division	6		8
Heavy Artillery Division	6		4
General Supplies Division	7		11
General Utility Orderlies, care of property, kitchen police, etc.			5
Office and Records Division	3	2	12
Personnel Division	1		7
	38	3	53

Personnel Division: The duties performed by this division are as follows: Special orders relating to assignments and movements of all officers of this department on duty at these headquarters; service record cards are kept in triplicate; special orders, H. A. E. F. and L. of C., and telegrams effecting station of personnel are noted on cards; reports to C. O. O., A. E. F., by ordnance officers, ports of debarkation, of all officers, soldiers and civilians of the ordnance department upon arrival in France, as required by par. 1, G. O. 24, H. A. E. F., are kept in this division; also monthly reports by all officers of the ordnance department commanding depots, subdepots, detachments or units of the ordnance department relating to officers, soldiers and civilian employees; also a card index system showing business experience, qualifications, knowledge of foreign languages, etc., for all officers, soldiers and civilians, ordnance department; all correspondence relating to personnel and money papers, and to supplies, such as stationery, forms, returns, etc., for the Office of C. O. O.; also all personnel on duty at these headquarters.

When the system of automatic replacements is put into effect it is believed that much of the work of this office will pass to the L. of C., especially that part of it which keeps the record cards of personnel.

There is a post office here in which is distributed all the mail arriving in France for the personnel of the ordnance corps and department, officers, soldiers, and civilians. It is believed that immediate steps should be taken to have the mail distributed elsewhere and that only mail for those on duty in the ordnance department at these headquarters should come here.

Automatic Arms Division, Trench Warfare Material Division, Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Material Division, and Heavy Artillery Division: As much of the work of these divisions has to do with research, all technical questions including repair, maintenance, etc., and data concerning the consumption of ammunition, it is not believed at this time

that any of these divisions could be decentralized without impairment of efficiency. It would seem that at present the questions concerning the supply of artillery and ordnance material of all classes are too closely associated with plans of certain sections of the general staff to move the bureaus which handle these matters from these headquarters.

General Supplies Division: It is believed that the foregoing remarks apply as well to this division which has charge of the actual requisitioning and placing of purchase orders for all ordnance supplies. It keeps record of all supplies on hand and required, and sees that the necessary supplies are obtained and delivered to the L. of C. While not actually making purchases of material in Europe, it places orders with the chief purchasing officer, ordnance department, its representative on the General Purchasing Board. This division keeps record of all supplies on hand in the different storehouses of the L. of C., and also keeps track separately of all ammunition supply.

I believe that the chief ordnance officer should have personal supervision over all matters relating to equipment of all kinds, including artillery, and all research work and study connected therewith.

7. Office of the Chief Surgeon:

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISION	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief Surgeon	1		
Personnel	5*		10**
Hospitalization	5		3
Supply	2		2
Sanitation and Statistics	2		10
Records and Correspondence	2	4	18
Dispensary	2		9
Dental Office	2		2
	21	4	54

* 2 Veterinary Corps (temporary duty)

** 3 Sorting mail

Personnel Division: This division keeps record of all the personnel of the Medical Corps: All officers, regular or otherwise, hospital corps sergeants, and nurses, on duty in France. Most of the records concerning personnel are kept on cards; these cards give name of college; date of graduating; whether medicine, dental, or veterinary surgery; previous military service and date of appointment and call into active service; and special character of professional work; also specialty and ability to speak or translate French. These cards are made out in cases of all medical reserve corps men. All medical personnel arriving in France are now assigned to duty from this office. When the system of automatic replacements is put into effect this work should be decentralized to the L. of C.

Hospitalization: This division handles all questions relating to the establishment of hospitals in France. The selection of sites is passed upon by the general staff at these headquarters after conference with the French Mission. It is not seen how this can be divorced from the office of the Chief Surgeon. The actual building and plans, etc., are now decentralized to the L. of C.

Sanitation and Statistics: All reports concerning sanitation, sick, and wounded, etc., from the medical sections of all units, come to this office. Statistics and reports are made up concerning them; also the weekly report to the Commander-in-Chief. If the statistical bureau is established at these and other headquarters, it is believed with [the] representative of the medical department serving thereat that most sanitary reports and reports of sick and wounded could come to this bureau.

There is a certain amount of data, though, which should, in my opinion, come to the Chief Surgeon, who after all is responsible for the evacuation of sick and wounded and their care, and it is believed that in case of heavy casualties or epidemic the Chief Surgeon at these headquarters should receive the necessary data in order to enable him to understand the situation. Practically, the evacuation of sick and wounded will be automatic, but in times of emergency, the Chief Surgeon may have to act and exercise supervision over situations, and he must be kept informed as to the general situation. It is not necessary for him to have all the information in detail that is required for final reports to Washington. Data required for furnishing reports to the Commander-in-Chief should come to the statistical bureau at these headquarters. Others which are only required for the Chief Surgeon's Office in Washington could be sent to the statistical bureau at the Headquarters, L. of C., it is believed.

Records and Correspondence: When the automatic replacement is put into effect much of the records and correspondence work will naturally go from the Chief Surgeon's Office to the depots on the L. of C.

There is a post office here in which is distributed all the mail for the personnel of the medical department serving in France. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to have the mail distributed elsewhere, and that only mail for the personnel on duty in the medical department at these headquarters be forwarded here.

8. Office of Chief of Air Service

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Chief of Air Service	11	10	16
Supply Department	16	11	3
Operations Dept.	14	5	2
Headquarters Detachment	3	0	43
	44	26	64

The Chief of Air Service is now engaged in a radical reorganization of his service and it is believed that it would not be in the best interests of the service to interfere with the organization of his headquarters at the present time. It is possible, however, when he has effected his reorganization that it may be found advisable to decentralize his administration to some extent. At present it is believed he should be given every latitude in order to reorganize his service and place it on a firm working basis.

9. Office of Chief of Gas Service

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Administrative	2	1	
Intelligence	3		
Offensive	1		
Defensive	2		
Supply	1		
Ordnance	2		
All sections		8*	2
	11	9	2

* Includes draftsman.

It is believed that the work of the gas service is so intimately connected with the troops serving in the line that for the present at least, no change should be made with respect to decentralization.

10. Office of Chief Signal Officer

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

DIVISIONS	OFFICERS	CLERKS	SOLDIERS
Service of the Front	2		1
Administrative Division	1		
Telegraph, Motor and Time			
Distribution Division	1		16
Personnel Division	1	1	1
Records Division	1	7	5
Liaison Division	1	2	1
Engineering Division	5	1	22
Property Division	1	2	1
Special Services			
Radio Division	3	1	3
Photographic Division	1		2
Pigeon Division	1		1
Meteorological Division	-	-	-
S. C. Intelligence Division	1	1	8*
Research and Inspection Div.	-	-	-

* 2 French.

Personnel Section, Administration Division: At present this is the only part of the administration division which it is believed should be decentralized, which will naturally take place when the system of automatic replacement is put into effect.

Otherwise the service of information of the Signal Corps is so interwoven, the front with the rear, that it is believed it should be under one head, and that head should be at these headquarters; I believe this to be necessary for the best interest of this service. I can see no other decentralization which at present should take place in this department. The maintenance of proper information is closely allied with operations and it is believed that the chief and his principal assistants should be here for the convenience of the operations section of the general staff.

The photographic division, meteorological division, and research branch of the research and inspection division, are all in Paris. They are administered from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer who points out to them the line of work desired. I do not think that it would serve any good purpose to put these divisions under the L. of C. They are decentralized as far as their administration is concerned.

11. Judge Advocate's Office: The personnel of this office comprises six officers, four clerks, and one soldier detailed as messenger from the headquarters troop.

With respect to this office no decentralization is recommended.

12. Office of Inspector General: The personnel of this office comprises four officers, four clerks, and one soldier detailed as messenger from the headquarters troop.

The work of this office is entirely decentralized with the exception of inspections of money accounts which I decided to begin here for these reasons: First, I wished to see how these officers, who were expert accountants before they were commissioned in the national army, performed their duties; second, I wished an entirely independent examination made of all money accounts in France without any previous notification. The various inspectors were inexperienced as such, and do not understand the necessity of

making these inspections unannounced. When these first inspections are finished I shall recommend that one of these inspectors be sent to the L. of C. The other I shall wish to keep in my office in order that he may be available to make such thorough examination as I deem necessary in case of any investigation I may have with respect to the conduct of affairs by disbursing officers or any investigation where the question of money responsibility arises.

A. W. BREWSTER.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1880: Memorandum

Requisites for Base Division Areas

Operations Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 17, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. Referring to your memorandum of December 11, and a memorandum from this office of December 9, the following is submitted;

2. It is recognized that it would be advantageous to have base divisional areas established on the Line of Communications. However, such areas must afford facilities for training and it is believed that the railroads must meet the necessities of training rather than the stations of troops meet the necessities of the railroads.

The areas on the main Line of Communications at Périgueux and near Blois might be utilized for such training as is necessary in base divisional areas. It is to be remembered, however, that all of the divisional areas on the Line of Communication may be necessary for the temporary accommodation or billeting of combat divisions, should the tonnage question be solved in the first six months of 1918. The Commander-in-Chief has directed the establishment of Le Corneau as a base divisional area. It is recognized that La Courtine is more or less inaccessible from the great lines of railways. On the other hand, La Courtine offers ample accommodations for a division, and moreover, is an excellent training camp for a base division. It is believed that we should retain La Courtine as a base division camp. It is not thought that once a division is installed there the railroad question will be of great importance; this for the reason that movements to and from the camp will be of personnel rather than of complete matériel for a division. The base divisional areas to the north of St-Nazaire would, it is recognized, involve an amount of construction which would seem to be more or less impracticable in view of the tonnage situation.

3. All things considered it is believed that the best solution of the present problem would be as follows:

Retain La Courtine as a base divisional area. Retain Le Corneau for the reason that construction has already begun there and that the Commander-in-Chief has personally occupied himself with this area. Utilize the billeting facilities at Périgueux and near Blois as base divisional areas. This would provide for four corps; the provision for the fifth corps can well be made at a later date, after the various ports are developed and the number of ships arriving in the several ports has become more certainly fixed. The solution thus proposed would leave six areas on or near the Line of Communications in which troops could be billeted in emergencies. If you agree with the above proposed

solution this section will prepare the necessary memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Chief of Section.

GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 193-a

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

December 19, 1917.

General Pershing had a frank interview with Prime Minister Clémenceau this date in which he emphasized the necessity of frankness and directness in the dealings between French and Americans. He referred in detail to the complaints made to the House Mission by M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions, regarding the supposed raising of prices of American purchases, which complaints had never been brought to his attention. He also pointed out that General Pétain had criticized the American training in an interview with Colonel House, and yet, notwithstanding their many opportunities and the importance of such matters to us, had never mentioned his criticisms to General Pershing. He emphasized the necessity of closer cooperation in their mutual relations and took up in detail the matter of the Franco-American Purchasing Board, designed to coordinate French and American Purchases in adjoining neutral countries, to prevent competition, and secure best results for all concerned. M. Clémenceau agreed entirely with General Pershing on the matters presented and expressed chagrin and surprise that the Pétain-House interview had been without previous discussion between Generals Pétain and Pershing.

G-4, GHQ, AEF: 748-7: Memorandum

Channel for Requisitions for Supplies

Administrative Section

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 19, 1917.

MEMORANDUM:

1. Hereafter all requisitions for supplies on the United States, on European Government Agencies or requisitions for purchases in Europe, including those through the G. P. B., with the exception of those noted in par. 2, will be submitted for the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Administrative Section, General Staff.

2. These instructions will not apply to requisitions on European Government Agencies or for purchases in Europe involving less than 100 cubic tons (40 cubic feet per ton), unless they require replacement in kind or of raw materials by shipments from the United States, in which case they will be submitted for approval irrespective of the cubic volume thereof.

By order of the C-in-C:

JAMES A. LOGAN, JR.,
Chief, A. S. G. S.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952 B: Decree

Decree Creating Central Office of Franco-American Affairs

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, MINISTER OF WAR,

Paris, December 19, 1917.

The President of the Council, Minister of War, in accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917 [not printed], defining the functions of the Undersecretary of State for War, attached to the Presidency of the Council;

In accordance with the decree of November 19, 1917, providing for the nomination of a Councilor of Franco-American affairs;

In accordance with the articles of November 22 and 23, 1917;

DECREES: Articles 4 and 5 of this decree, taken from the copy in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., are given here as being pertinent to the present subject. They were not in the above extract of the decree. Article 4 [see below].

* * * * *

Article 3. A Central Office of Franco-American Relations is established under the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council.

This office is charged with coordinating, under the authority of the Undersecretary of State, requests made by the American authorities in France, for the purpose of supplying the needs of their troops; it will transmit them to the departments concerned and will see to it that they receive prompt attention.

It receives requests addressed to the various ministerial departments by the Office of the Missions and refers to the Undersecretary of State those whose fulfillment requires an examination of the matter by the various services concerned.

This office is authorized to carry on ordinary correspondence that pertains to the same subject and demands immediate attention.

* * * * *

Done at Paris, December 19, 1917.

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU.

Article 4. Departmental decisions will determine the composition of the missions to be created with the American territorial organization for the purpose of providing and maintaining liaison with the central office.

The Chief of the French Mission with the Commander-in-Chief of the American armies is, with that general officer, the only representative of the French Government and of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

For all matters relating to the interior, he comes under the jurisdiction of the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council.

However, the personnel of instructors, technical advisors and translators attached to the troops and schools of the American army in France, in the zone of the interior as well as in the zone of the armies, remains under his authority; he will issue its general directives for training and will submit to the Minister or to the General in Chief, as the case may be, all matters relative to this personnel, especially those concerning transfers and promotions.

Article 5. The Paris section of the French Mission with the American army is attached to the central office of the Franco-American affairs.

The mission of the Minister of War with the American army is abolished. Direction of control of all questions of administration raised by the presence of American troops in France and coming within the province of that mission is vested in the Ministry of War. An administrative office is created with the French Mission with a view of centralizing, for the General Commanding this Mission, questions of an administrative and controversial nature and to establish liaison with the control direction.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL,

UNDERSECRETARIAT OF STATE OF WAR,

Paris, December 19, 1917.

General Instructions on the

Organization and Operation of the Franco-American Liaison Services

Article 1:

(a) A special Franco-American service is established in each of the Ministerial Departments, in each of the Undersecretariats of State, and with the General Staff of the army (Advanced Group and Group of the Interior).

(b) Franco-American sections are established in all services of these departments that are particularly concerned, and especially in the various sections of the General Staff of the army, in the administrative directorates of the Ministry of War, in the General Staffs of the regions which have relations with the American authorities, and in certain services of those regions which are more particularly concerned.

Article 2: These services or sections are exclusively charged with the direct study, on behalf of the authorities with whom they are accredited, of all Franco-American questions which are transmitted to them and the following up of these questions until their final solution.

Article 3: The strength of these services or sections varies according to the importance and the volume of Franco-American affairs which are within their province.

* * * * *

Article 11: Permanent liaison agents, preferably selected from the American officers attached to the Franco-American sections or services will insure speedy transmission and will daily ascertain the status of problems under consideration. They will report both to the French and to the American authorities.

Article 12: These reports are periodically communicated to the Undersecretary of State of the Presidency of the Council (Office of Franco-American relations). Delays are immediately reported to him.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

Counselor of Franco-American Affairs

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,

Paris, December 19, 1917.

The President of the French Republic

On a report of the President of the Council, Minister of War, in accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917, defining the functions of The Undersecretary of State for War attached to the Presidency of the Council.

DECREES:

Article 1: M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador, is attached to the president of the council in the capacity of counselor of Franco-American affairs.

Article 2: He centralizes all information necessary for the unified cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the French Republic.

Article 3: He determines, in accord with the Allied authorities and the ministries concerned, the general directives to be supplied to the executing services. He communicates these directives upon approval by the Undersecretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council, who alone is charged with the direction of the general coordinating services.

Article 4: He has authority to examine all matters concerning Franco-American co-operation.

Article 5: The President of the Council, Minister of War, is charged with the execution of the present decree.

Done at Paris, December 19, 1917.

R. POINCARE.

By the President of the Republic:
President of the Council, Minister of War,

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3952-B: Decree

Head of Office Named

[Editorial Translation]

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, MINISTRY OF WAR.

Paris, December 20, 1917.

In accordance with the decree of November 21, 1917 [not printed], determining the functions of the Undersecretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council;

In accordance with the decree of November 23, 1917 [not printed], designating an official of the control office to assure the General Direction of the Services of the Undersecretary of State with the Presidency. In accordance with the order of December 19, 1917, providing for the organization of the Undersecretariat of the Presidency of the services charged with the coordination of the affairs relating the the Franco-American liaison.

ORDER:

* * * * *

Article 2: M. Ganne (Jean-Maurice) Professor of the Central School of Arts and Manufactures, Inspector General of Instruction, Captain of Territorial Artillery, on leave without pay, former Director of the Service of War manufactures to the French High Commissioner to the United States, of the Mission of the Undersecretary of State with the President of the Council, is designated to head the Direction of the Central Office of Franco-American Relations.

Article 3: The Undersecretary of State with the President of the Council will be responsible for the execution of this decree.

Paris, December 20, 1917.

GEORGE CLEMENCEAU.

Shipments of Troops behind Schedule

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 20, 1917.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire I Corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December, January, and February, contemplates that the shipment of the II Corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a program be carried out as per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion army troops and auxiliaries in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the I Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions and many corps troops. It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by General Bliss. Investigations are now being made at these headquarters with a view to paring down existing requirements for tonnage and for cutting down time occupied in turnaround at this end, but I again urge the immediate acquisition of an additional one million five hundred thousand tons of gross tonnage which should not be postponed on that account, and it is also necessary that steps for the further acquisition of still more tonnage at an early date be taken. With a view to making intelligent cuts in requisitions for exceptional supplies, quantities of which in many cases are dependent on our total strength in Europe, such as material for harbor facilities, railroad rolling stock, and so forth, request to be informed of approximate dates when additional tonnage asked for will enter service; and approximate dates when the different phases of the priority schedule will probably be completed, in order that supply and transportation situation may be kept balanced with number of troops in Europe and their transportation requirements.

PERSHING.

HS British Files: 900-32.9: Note

Amalgamation of American Forces with French and British

No. 19

E. L. S. 1403

NOTE FOR COLONEL FAGALDE

French Military Attaché in London

AMERICA:

From French Ambassador, Washington, received December 20

The United States Secretary for War has wired to General Pershing that, in compliance with request of Great Britain and France prompted by the expectation of a strong German offensive, the President agrees to the American forces being, if necessary, amalgamated with the French and British in units as small as the company. General Pershing is to make the final decision in this matter after consultation with the British and French Commanders-in-Chief. It is suggested to him that it might be suitable for the American forces to be placed close to the point of junction of the British and French armies so as to enable them to be used wherever their assistance can be most useful; this is, however, left to General Pershing's judgment.

HS Brit. File: 900-32.9: Minutes

General Pershing Given Authority to Amalgamate Forces

No. 18

WAR CABINET, 304

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE

WAR CABINET HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET, S. W.,

ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1917, AT 11:30 a. m.

* * * * *

AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

0.1/135/388

12. The Prime Minister read a decipher of a telegram just received from Sir C. Spring-Rice, Washington, dated December 20, containing a paraphrase of the telegram sent by the American Secretary of War to General Pershing, giving General Pershing a free hand regarding the decision to be come to concerning the amalgamation of American forces in French and British divisions.

The War Cabinet requested Lord Milner to see General Pershing in Paris, and to urge him to accede to the representations made in regard to this matter by the British Government and by the general staff.

* * * * *

MEM: 17: Memorandum

Relations between Heads of Staff Departments, A. E. F., and Line of Communications

No. 148

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

MEMORANDUM

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 21, 1917.

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires to clear up in the minds of all concerned the relations that should exist between heads of staff departments, A. E. F., and the L. of C. Ordinarily the control by heads of staff departments should be limited to such supervision and instruction of their own subordinates as, when once assigned, may be necessary to insure efficiency, and to the allotment of matériel in general to the L. of C.

Troops, individuals and matériel assigned to the L. of C. should be considered as at the disposition of the Commanding General, L. of C. and it therefore follows that orders affecting the L. of C. should be given only through the recognized channels for such communications. This view will apply equally to the D. G. T. and to division, army and corps commanders.

The foregoing is dictated in order to carry out the spirit of our organization, and to obtain supervision and instruction of personnel of the different departments and to insure the procurement and allotment by the Staff departments, of matériel and supplies through its personnel. The object is to secure coordination and cooperation in every detail between the staff departments themselves and in their relations to the general staff, which, under the Commander-in-Chief, must be supreme.

2. As viewed by the Commander-in-Chief, the efficiency of various staff and administrative departments referred to must be maintained by their respective chiefs, and proper coordination with other departments, as far as necessary for the smooth working of their organization is enjoined.

In order to keep themselves entirely familiar with their departments, the respective chiefs should make frequent visits to their various units and investigate the efficiency with which the duties are being administered.

By command of General Pershing:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Priority Schedule

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

No. 553-R

Washington, D. C., December 22, 1917.

PERSHING AMEXFORCE HAEF

1. The following auxiliary troops of the first phase of your priority schedule of October 7, and the additional troops called for by you are now on equipment schedule here and will be forwarded as shipping is available. Enlisted strength only is given. Engineers, all combined 38,600 field signal and telegraph battalions, 2,000 quartermaster auxiliary, 16,300 ordnance detachment (s) 1,000, 2 brigades six and eight-inch guns, 11,000 medical units, 2,950 replacement draft, 3,600 1st Division train 930, 4 reenforcement recruit battalions, 3,000, and in addition to first phase motor mechanics 1,400, crane operators 250, 3 colored infantry regiments, 1,050, airplane and balloon squadrons 12,800.

2. Aggregate auxiliary and additional troops approximately 120,000. Last division of first phase---abroad soon. Do conditions warrant a modification of your schedule of priority of shipments of October 7, so as to call for divisions of second phase before the entire first phase is forwarded to you? Should you desire any modification of your shipping schedule, state definitely which auxiliary you wish displaced to meet conditions, also when field artillery should come. At present rate of shipping, approximately two months will be required to complete shipment of first phase including troops mentioned above. Bliss.

McCain.

Visit to King Albert Suggested

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, December 22, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

[Extract]

1. I understand that the Germans are doing their best to win over little Belgium. The Belgians are a little disgruntled with their British and French Allies. They still like us, and Minister Whitlock stands well with them. They are likely to wobble if America does not hold them on the track. I suggest you pay an early visit to King Albert by appointment and then ask him to return the visit. He is very highly considered in America and the fact that America has done as much as it has for the Belgians makes us feel close to them. I think the exchange of visits, or rather King Albert's visit to you and your troops, would make good press propaganda at home.

2. I believe we should have a good officer attached to the Belgians as soon as practicable. * * *

J. G. HARBORD,
Chief of Staff.

HS Brit. Files: 900-32.9: Note

Use of American Forces

No. 22

December 24, 1917.

E. L. S. 1441

NOTE FOR COLONEL FAGALDE

FRANCE:

General Foch informed General Pétain by letter dated December 23, that President Wilson agrees to American troops being employed as isolated units with French units if necessary.

* * * * *

*Question of Amalgamation of American Forces with French and British
Confused*

WAR CABINET 307

No. 27

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE WAR

CABINET, HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET, S. W. ON

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1917 AT 3:30 p. m.

* * * * *

American Military Assistance

01/135/388

4. In reference to War Cabinet 304, Minute 12, the chief of the Imperial General Staff stated that the question of the amalgamation of American forces with French and British divisions had become rather confused owing to the intervention of the French.

The War Cabinet decided that: The discussion of this matter should be deferred until the return from Paris of Lord Milner, who had been requested to interview General Pershing on the subject.

* * * * *

G-4, GHQ, AEF: 19: Memorandum

Role American Aviation can Play

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

AIR SERVICE,

December 29, 1917.

From: General Pétain, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. in France.

My dear General:

Your Chief of Air Service, General Foulois, asked me, in the course of his last visit, my opinion concerning the part which aviation will be able to play in the coming battles.

Concerning the assistance which America might give French aviation in view of the large operations which are to be expected in the very beginning of 1918.

And concerning the relative importance which should be given aviation as compared to other branches.

I have the honor to advise you of the substance of the replies which I made to these questions, as follows:

I. Rôle of the Aviation in the Coming Battles: I consider that in the coming battles aviation will play the following important parts:

A. It will participate in the action of the other branches of service on the battlefield:

(1) By observing artillery fire.

The importance of counterbattery fire and of isolating fire has caused the ranges of guns to be increased; this in turn has considerably increased the necessity for airplane observation.

(2) By carrying out infantry and liaison missions. In this way aviation will very largely facilitate cooperation of infantry and artillery, and the conducting of the battle by the command.

(3) By direct action; attacking with bombs, machine guns, and cannon the reserves of the enemy.

B. It will attack the Lines of Communication.

This rôle could be decisive, if carried out with sufficient means. The factor which, in present conditions of warfare, prevents the exploitation of an initial success is the quickness of the transportation of the enemy, who is able, through immediate concentrations, to parryendeavours to break through the front.

Aviation would bring about a decision if it were able, for a certain time, to paralyze a large part of the traffic of the enemy's lines of communications.

This preponderant and decisive part can only be played by aviation if we give it the maximum power achievable in the lapse of time at our disposal before the end of the war.

C. Aside from operations for the purpose of breaking through the enemy's front, aviation is the branch which will enable us to attack at its very sources the industrial and financial power of the enemy, and to cause panics and demoralization far to the rear of the lines. This rôle is also of great importance in present conditions of warfare, as the morale of the troops and of the population in the rear are essential factors in the struggle.

D. Finally, aviation is the only branch capable of fighting against enemy aviation, of preventing it from flying over our lines, and of destroying it even on its own grounds.

These important rôles will be played by aviation on a constantly increasing scale.

The number of observation airplanes must be proportional to the size of the other branches. But there is no limit to the number of fighting airplanes. Thus both sides are always obliged to aim at the maximum development of this special branch.

Furthermore, the efficiency of this branch will increase as the war goes on; there will be improvements in the methods of using airplanes, in their power, in their speed, in their armament, in the power and number of their projectiles, etc.; the powerful airplane of tomorrow will be to that of today what the heavy long-range gun is to the 75-mm. or to the 120-mm. gun.

II. Assistance which the United States can give to French aviation in view of the large operations which are to be expected in 1918: There is one important and pressing question. It is probable that the year 1918 will be marked by violent efforts on the part of the Central Powers in view of obtaining a decision prior to the entry into the line of large American forces.

What is the quickest and most effective way America can help us?

I consider that it is in the domain of aviation and of effectives that the United States can bring us the greatest help in 1918. Aviation is the branch which the United States will be able to prepare most quickly, with the help of France.

The United States could help us in the following ways, some of which would have an immediate effect:

(1) Immediate shipment of all tools, raw materials, and labor for the purpose of continuing in France the building of material for the benefit of both the French and the American Air Services.

(2) Employment of a large number of men for laying out and organizing aviation grounds (sheds, barracks, roads, etc.). A large number of good aviation grounds constitute the basis of every aviation maneuver, for they are necessary for concentration. At the present time, we have not yet, on our front, the number of aviation grounds necessary for the aviation concentrations demanded by the coming important operations. Thus the American army would bring us valuable assistance were it immediately to start organizing a large number of aviation grounds. Indeed, these grounds could, in case of necessity, be used by our own aviation prior to the employment of the forces of the U. S. Air Service. Furthermore, the American army would thus be preparing the way for its own aviation.

(3) Immediate sending of officers, N. C. O.'s, and working personnel to the important organs of the French Air Service; parks, warehouses, repair shops, training centers, schools. This personnel would increase the numerical strength of the French aviation and would at the same time obtain experience which would enable it efficiently to run similar American formations when they are formed.

(4) Immediate sending of the personnel and material necessary for the creation, within a short time, of the American Air Service's supply and repair formations. This would free French aviation from a great burden.

(5) Cooperation of American aerial units in the operations of French and English aerial units.

a. On the active front, the fighting units and some of the bombing units would participate in the destruction of Lines of Communication.

b. On the quiet fronts, the remaining bombing units would actively attack the enemy's sensitive points and keep in the vicinity of these points an important part of the enemy's fighting airplanes, thus helping to clear the active front.

III. Relative importance which should be given aviation as compared to other branches: Finally, a more general question arises: What relative importance should America give aviation as compared to other branches? On the solving of this question depends the orientations to be given to a large part of America's industrial effort and the proportion of tonnage to be reserved for the transportation of aviation material from America to France.

We have already stated that there is no limit to the number of fighting airplane units and that *priori* this number should be increased as much as possible.

But to answer this question one may further ask what will be the relative efficiency of America's effort in the different branches of service, and how effective will be her effort in aviation.

We consider that the Central Powers could obtain a marked numerical superiority on the Franco-English front. Nevertheless we feel certain that this superiority is not large enough to enable the enemy to obtain a decision.

Thus, if we wish to defeat the Central Powers by a wearing out battle, we would be obliged to achieve an even greater numerical superiority. This would mean that we would have to ask the United States for a considerable number of divisions and heavy artillery batteries.

The difficulties attendant upon the transportation and supplying of these forces are self-evident, as also is the length of time which would be necessary; in this matter the assistance which the United States can give us is unhappily limited.

How efficient can America's effort in aviation be?

The effort which the United States can make in America in the domain of aviation is very great, as everyone appreciates; furthermore, it is evident that Americans are apt at waging aerial warfare.

If properly handled, this effort on the part of the United States would not suffer very much from transportation difficulties: Indeed the tonnage necessary for transportation of air service material, etc., will always be well within the limits of available transportation, however great may be the development of the aviation branch.

Thus America's assistance could enable us to obtain a great numerical aviation superiority over the enemy; this superiority might be of 3 or 4 to 1, for example.

It would then be possible to destroy or neutralize a large part of the enemy's aviation; this would considerably increase the effectiveness of the Allied aviation.

Were aviation to be developed to such a degree, it is a question whether it would not become the decisive branch of the army, by rendering the enemy blind, paralyzing his communications, and lowering his morale.

Thus it would seem logical for the United States to concentrate a large part of their effort on the branch which is the most efficient, which has the smallest volume, and which is complete in itself, as it fulfils the functions of all others. It seems evident that it would be advantageous for the United States, in order to increase their efficiency in the present war, to cause as much fighting as possible to be carried out in the air.

At all events, if it be desired that American aviation play the part which is demanded by public opinion, we must remember that very great means must even now be placed at its disposal: Large industrial resources should be devoted to its work, much labor should be placed at its disposal in France, all the tonnage which it may need for its proper development should be placed at its disposal, and its orders and needs should be given precedence by all services, both French and American.

This matter concerns the American command, and even the American Government. I can but say that I, personally, would approve such measures.

PETAIN.

Cable: P-432-S

General Staff Officers in Division Increased

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. For Chief of Staff. Have found it necessary to increase the number of general staff officers for a division to four with following distribution: Chief of Staff one; operations one; administration and coordination one; intelligence one. Chief of Staff should have rank of colonel and others should have rank of lieutenant colonel or major. Request change in organization accordingly including divisions at home and cable acknowledgment. Pershing.

* * * * *

PERSHING

Cable: P-432-S

Need to Expand Headquarters Troop of A. E. F.

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

* * * * *

B. To avoid confusion later when it may become necessary to divide expeditionary force into separate armies recommend designation these headquarters as General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces which corresponds British and French practice. Pershing.

* * * * *

PERSHING

Use of American Companies or Battalions in British or French Divisions

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 433-S

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.

For Chief of Staff

Reference confidential Cablegram 558 from Secretary of War. Do not think emergency now exists that would warrant our putting companies or battalions into British or French divisions, and would not do so except in grave crisis. Main objections are first, troops would lose their national identity; second, they probably could not be relieved for service with us without disrupting the Allied divisions to which assigned, especially if engaged in active service; third, the methods of training and instruction in both Allied armies are very different from our own which would produce some confusion at the start and also when troops return for service with us. Attention should be called to prejudices existing between French and British Governments and armies, and the desire of each to have American units assigned to them to the exclusion of similar assignment to the other. Also each army regards its own methods as best and they do not hesitate to criticise each other accordingly. We have selected what we consider best in each and added to our own basic system of instruction. After consultation with both French and British commanders, have arranged to take every advantage of aid from both Allies in pushing forward our instruction as rapidly as possible and are availing ourselves of additional instructors and units to assist. Shall probably place first division in trenches by brigades about middle of January for further trench experience and training. This will permit continuation of special training by brigade not in trenches. Period of time to be kept in lines not yet definitely determined, but will be followed by active assignment to temporary sector as circumstances may dictate. Other divisions will follow as rapidly as their progress in training will warrant. Believe that this action will stimulate morale of French and will satisfy clamor for our entry into lines which has become very persistent. Sector scheduled for this training quiet now and full cooperation with adjacent French troops arranged to prevent serious mishap. Will wire definite location of sector in separate cable. Further conference with French and British Commanders-in-Chief being arranged to determine definitely eventual American sector, and manner of employing American troops in general.

PERSHING

Location of an American Sector to be Studied

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 1, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CONNER:

Please have operations make a confidential study of the best place to employ the A. E. F. on the western front. Heretofore we have approached this subject on the understanding that we were limited to some sector far enough to the east to permit of the employment of much of the French armies between the A. E. F. and the B. E. F. Without the limitation please now study the question not only from the standpoint of strategy but including political considerations; the installations we already have in the intermediate section of the L. of C.; and the necessary continued use of our present base ports. When you have reached a conclusion, then consider as a factor the possibility that in addition to our priority schedule for personnel, the British might be induced with their own shipping to land at channel ports one or more of the high-numbered divisions of the national army, and permit them to be trained in areas already prepared behind the present B. E. F. lines. The study will be needed within a week.

J. G. HARBOURD,
Chief of Staff

HS: Brit. Files: 900-32.9: Letter

Acceleration of the Arrival of American Troops

C. I. G. S.

LONDON, January 3, 1918.

0153/3081

The Field Marshal,

Commander-in-Chief

British Armies in France

• With reference to my telegram No. 48732 of December 26, 1917, concerning the acceleration of the arrival of American troops, the matter has become somewhat complicated owing to the fact that several different proposals have been put forward. I think it advisable, therefore, to restate the case.

First Proposal: The Prime Minister made a proposal to Colonel House for using any infantry which may be surplus to those which can be formed into completely equipped divisions under General Pershing, by incorporating them temporarily by small units in the British army. The proposal was that they should be brought over as soon as possible from

America and be trained and equipped in either England or France, and that they should then be used as companies of battalions to reinforce British divisions. It was made quite clear that we did not wish to delay the formation of General Pershing's army in any way. This proposal Colonel House undertook to recommend to President Wilson on his return to the United States.

Second Proposal: On December 26, a telegram was received from the British Ambassador stating that President Wilson had accorded to General Pershing full authority to use the forces under his command for amalgamation with French and British forces by regiments and companies, after consultation with you and General Pétain. This is an entirely different proposition to that made to Colonel House. It would result in delaying the formation of General Pershing's army, and this I consider inadvisable, even if General Pershing should be willing to carry it out.

Third Proposal: I understand that as a result of a meeting with General Pershing on December 28, you have now put forward a 3d proposal for accelerating the arrival of certain units of General Pershing's army, for attaching these units to British formations for training, with a view to the ultimate conversion of a certain number of British formations into American formations. This amounts to accelerating the formation of General Pershing's army.

2. The War Cabinet are very desirous of carrying out the first proposal, as it undoubtedly offers the best prospect of making additional American troops available quickly.

The board of trade have submitted to the war cabinet a scheme for removing 200,000 tons of shipping from the carriage of foodstuffs and using it to bring over 200,000 American infantry during the next four months, over and above any numbers which are being transported in accordance with the American programme for General Pershing's army. The object of this proposal is to provide immediate reinforcements in manpower, and the scheme is contingent on General Pershing's agreement to the incorporation of these men by companies or battalions in the British army until they are sufficiently trained to be collected into larger units.

I hope to proceed to France shortly to discuss the matter with General Pershing, and will inform you as to the result.

3. The adoption of this proposal need not interfere with any arrangements which you may make with General Pershing for assisting him in the training of the American troops under his command.

W. R. ROBERTSON,
General,
C. I. G. S.

AG: GHQ, AEF: 3952C: Letter

Creation of a Central Office for Franco-American Relations

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 3, 1918.

From: The Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: The President of the Council, Ministry of War

1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 31, 1917, from the Undersecretary of State of the Presidency of the council enclosing copy of a decree from the President of the Republic, dated December 19, naming Mr. Jules Cambon, Ambassador, with the functions of Counselor of Franco-American affairs, and certain other papers.

2. In reply, permit me to express my thanks for the interest which the President of the Council has shown in facilitating the cooperation between the French Government and the American Expeditionary Forces. There can be no doubt that the establishment of this bureau with such a distinguished diplomat as Mr. Jules Cambon at its head will contribute very greatly to the expeditious transaction of business in which France and America are mutually interested.

3. I am in thorough accord with the principles set forth in Article II of the general instructions for the organization and the working of the Franco-American services of liaison. Suitable officers will accordingly be carefully selected as representatives of the American forces in the different services.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army.

Cable: P-441-S

Use of Southampton for Deep-draft Troop Ships

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 4, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Chief of Staff

With reference to your Telegram 588 and my Cablegram 433, have discussed with British possibilities of using Southampton for discharging our deep-draft troop ships, having in view expediting arrival American forces and giving quicker turnaround to big boats. British have made tentative offer to handle such troops through Southampton and provide cross-channel transports. They would allot us training areas in Amiens region. They propose to place our troops there and provide rations while training, other matters of supply to be subject of future agreement. Sole object of this on my part is to expedite arrival and training our troops. Project would include assistance of British divisional staffs of skeleton divisions for instruction if desired, also opportunity to train higher

commanders and staffs by actual command of British units in the field. Command in areas would be exercised by our officers and the training of troops would be our responsibility. Conference leading to this contemplates no change in our present plans of priority schedule which would be carried on as now through same ports and using all tonnage available for such ports. But it is thought that discharging our deep-draft vessels at Southampton where they could coal quickly and return to states without delay would be advantageous. British offer to ration them would obviate aggravation of supply situation, where, through delays of supply or embarkation authorities in America, troop and supply shipment do not balance. In the discussion with British they promised also to consider the possibility of aiding us in transporting troops by using additional British tonnage not now availed by us. Question of manpower and supply so important and our shipping program so far behind that opportunity should not be lost if on further study British conclude they can handle Southampton project and especially if they can provide any additional tonnage. It is imperative, however, that all this be regarded as strictly supplementary to our own regular program, and not as a substitute for any part of it except such changes as may be necessary in using Southampton instead of Brest. Prompt information of feasibility of plan from your standpoint is requested.

PERSHING

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1824: Letter

French Mission with Headquarters, Line of Communications

Administration Section, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 4, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: French Military Mission

1. The Commanding General, Line of Communications, advised that he has just been informed by the local French mission now attached to the Line of Communications in Paris that, owing to the limited number of officers with that mission and the fact that so much of their business is performed with the Purchasing Board in Paris, it will be impracticable for them to detach any officers to go to Tours when the Headquarters, Line of Communications, are changed to that place on or about January 10.

2. In view of the foregoing information, it is requested that your government kindly consider the question of establishing liaison with the Headquarters, Line of Communications, at Tours. You are fully aware of the importance of this agency of the Expeditionary Force at Tours, so it does not appear necessary to go further into this question in this letter.

3. Will you please advise as promptly as possible of the action taken on this request?

By direction:

J. A. LCGAN, Jr.,
Chief, A. S., G. S.

Inexpediency of Cabling to Washington on Certain Subjects

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

January 5, 1918.

President of the Council

Ministry of War

Paris

Dear Mr. President:

Permit me to quote the following cablegram from the War Department at Washington:

The French Ambassador called on Secretary of War today and read to him a dispatch from M. Clémenceau to the effect that General Pershing and General Pétain had conferred as to the wisdom of seasoning of American troops by attaching their regimental units to French divisions before committing a part of the line to an American division made up of troops not so accustomed to actual front conditions.

M. Clemenceau's cablegram stated that General Pershing had reported himself and General Pétain in substantial agreement after conference on this subject; but General Pétain conveyed to M. Clémenceau an opposite opinion.

The French urge the action outlined above as being safer for the American troops than it would be to give them at once an independent place in the line, and urge very strongly that the Secretary of War here accept their view and commend it to you. This the Secretary of War is not willing to do, desiring to leave the matter wholly within your discretion after full consideration of the important elements of the matter.

May I not suggest to you, my dear Mr. President, the inexpediency of communicating such matters to Washington by cable? These questions must all be settled here, eventually, on their merits, through friendly conference between General Pétain and myself, and cables of this sort are very likely, I fear, to convey the impression in Washington of serious disagreement between us when such is not the case.

With cordial sentiments of high personal esteem and regard, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

Situation at Base Ports

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 5, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff

1. The general situation at our ports is becoming serious. We are not able to handle transports quickly enough to get full service from the limited amount of tonnage that up to the present seems available for military use. There are several reasons for this state of affairs.

A. The first is the failure of supply departments to provide sufficient material long since and frequently requested for the construction of our port facilities, the larger proportion of such material having been so much delayed that completion of docks is now three to four months behind our expectations.

B. The second is the shortage of railroad rolling stock in France and Italy. The deficiencies already existing in France have been emphasized by the demands for the transportation of troops and supplies to Italy during November and December. This situation may improve some during the winter but there is also a possibility of its becoming much worse.

C. Another difficulty arises from our inability so far to control the destination of transports which has resulted in serious congestion especially at St-Nazaire. At one time there were 26 transports there and there are 16 at this date, with only 3 at Brest and 3 at Bordeaux. If transports could be more evenly distributed it would prevent delay in unloading, and also cut the time now required for vessels to make the turnaround, also enable us to dispatch troops and cargo to destination instead of piling things up at ports.

D. There is much delay on account of lack of ballast for returning transports and little prospect of early improvement in this regard.

2. A. To meet the first difficulty the French may be able to increase at all ports the number of berths available for our use. This will help us tide over our own deficiencies as to berths, although all these ports sadly lack facilities for handling cargo and we shall need to improve their facilities as rapidly as possible. And port construction must be pushed vigorously at a somewhat later date after the car situation is relieved.

B. To meet the shortage of railway cars it is proposed to defer temporarily the shipment of timber for port construction and ship over railway cars instead. However, will give further particulars later. In addition to this expedient, every effort is being made to repair French cars now useless of which there are some ten thousand in France that could readily be repaired. We are also pushing repairs on Belgian locomotives. Railway car repair troops with tools should be expedited with all possible haste. As a precaution against just such a contingency have selected several areas near the ports for use in training in order to save rail transportation and thus temporarily relieve any congestion that might occur.

C. Controlling the destination of transports presents a most serious problem. Under present arrangements, see paragraph 13 my Cablegram 224, cargo is supposed to be loaded for a particular port of debarkation according to cargo, but in practice transports hitherto have nearly always been directed to St-Nazaire. As shown in cablegram this date number 441 an effort was made to divert transports from point of rendezvous to desired ports but the navy now reports that this will be impossible because of limited number of destroyers available. Admiral Sims' representative at Paris still seems to think navy could divert cargo boats where we want them but thus far they have not favored taking

transports to Bordeaux. From this it appears imperative that we have greater number of destroyers set apart for service with our own convoys. Nothing can possibly be more important than the rapid movement of our transports under proper protection and enough destroyers should be taken from service with British fleet or elsewhere without delay to service fully our own needs. Request that this be taken up with the navy department at once.

In the meantime am in communication by telegraph with Admiral Sims seeking a solution.

D. We are trying to get the French Government to undertake the solution of this ballast question by themselves handling sand barges. Will make further recommendations later. Water ballast may be the only solution.

3. After setting forth the above brief outline of the situation your attention is invited to my cablegram number 441 regarding the dispatch of troops by our deep-draft vessels at Southampton.

PERSHING

Cable: P-452-S

Information Concerning Military Missions

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 5, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 7 your cablegram 536, the French army receives at its headquarters a British mission consisting of 6 officers, an American mission consisting of 5 officers, a Russian mission consisting of 2 officers, a Belgian mission of 3, Japanese mission of 2, Roumanian mission of 1, Serbian mission of 1, and Italian mission of 2 officers. These missions, with the exception of the American and British missions, which have actual work in connection with the operations of the American, French and British armies in France, are really observers in every case. Pershing.

A. It is the practice of the British Headquarters to have no missions accredited to it in France, except the French and American missions, which are with it for purely business purposes. The British practice is for missions from Allied and neutral governments to be received and quartered in London, giving permission to the officers to visit the British front from time to time as guests of the British army. Pershing.

B. The American Headquarters in France has now attached to it a large and growing French mission, and a small but growing English mission, for the purpose of coordinating the work of our forces. Our situation here largely parallels the British situation and the same reasons which have impelled the British to refuse to have foreign observers or foreign missions permanently attached to their headquarters in France, except they represent armies fighting on this front, apply with equal force to our own army. Pershing.

C. It is recommended that all missions from Allied and neutral countries be taken care of in the United States, as is now done in England, and that the only missions that are permanently assigned to these headquarters be composed of these Allies whose forces are actually employed with our forces in the fighting on this front.

* * * * *

PERSHING

Alleged Disagreement between Pétain and Pershing

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH REPUBLIC,

No. B-4450

Paris, January 6, 1918.

My dear General:

I hasten, without losing a moment, to reply to your letter dated January 5, 1918. I found myself under the necessity of cabling to the Ambassador of France at Washington, because the two contradictory answers which I had received from General Pétain and yourself, when you did me the honor of calling on me, compelled me, in the interests of the common cause, to seek an arbitration between the two Commanders-in-Chief.

I need not conceal the fact that I placed full confidence in this regard in the American Government. However, it was not to the American Government that I addressed myself. I cabled to the Ambassador of France, as was my right and duty, in order to give him directions for the conversations which might take place either with the Secretary of War or the President of the United States.

It might very well have happened that I would have addressed myself to the American Government later on, but I insist on the point that I did nothing of the sort. I had not authorized the Ambassador of France to read all or part of my despatch to the Secretary of War. I regret that he did so, but I do not disavow anything of what I wrote.

So I am giving you here the explanation which I owe you, and I shall exercise all the patience of which I am capable in awaiting the good news that the American commander and the French commander have finally agreed on a question which may be vital to the outcome of the war.

With the assurance of my feelings of high esteem and of respect for you personally, I beg you, my dear general, to believe me.

Sincerely yours,

CLEMENCEAU

Cable: P-454-S: Cablegram

Details Concerning Priority Schedule

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 6, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

1. For the Chief of Staff. With reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 553 [Dec. 22, 1917], thorough consideration of conditions shows inadvisable to modify priority schedule of October 7. Request first phase be carried to completion before beginning shipment of divisions of second phase except those divisional elements which should arrive one month in advance of their divisions as indicated in divisional shipping schedule page six, priority schedule note c.

A. To limit number of animals to be brought over ponton train item E 105 and one of corps cavalry regiments item 131 should be sent without animals.

B. Above action essential to completion of lines of communications facilities for our I Corps. It need not, however, interfere with possible movements referred to in my confidential cablegram 441 [Jan. 4, 1918] if latter movements can be arranged to make no demands on tonnage allotted or to be allotted to carry out our program.

C. With regard to numbers of service of rear troops still due on first phase our figures correspond closely with yours, total about 60,000. With regard to other troops included in the 120,000 mentioned in your cablegram to be shipped January and February following points should be noted.

D. Replacement drafts and recruit battalions should be shipped without fail each month as scheduled, as first and most important thing is to keep all our forces up to authorized strength.

E. Total number of motor mechanics for French service is 12,000 instead of 14,000. Of these only 3,000 are to be transported by our shipping, remaining 9,000 to be transported by the French if possible. See separate cable this subject.

F. The two brigades of army artillery referred to in paragraph 3 your Cablegram 522 [Dec. 16, 1917] should be shipped in January and February, all to arrive by March 1 as requested in paragraph 1D [Dec. 20, 1917] our Cablegram 425.

G. Under existing program aviation and balloon personnel required amounts to about 8,000 per month coming of which the larger number will go to England in accordance with agreement for training 15,000 mechanics there. Air personnel to come direct to France in our shipping should not exceed about 3,000 monthly during the next few months.

H. With regard to four colored regiments referred to in Adjutant General's confidential letters of November 28 and November 30, of which one regiment and about two-thirds strength is already here, and three regiments are to be shipped as stated in your cablegram 553, these regiments will serve as infantry pioneers and will cover item Q 104 first phase page six priority schedule and item Q 208 second phase page ten priority schedule. As the three regiments you are about to ship will thus belong to the second phase they can be used temporarily as a substitute for certain troops of first phase intended for work on lines of communication, just as we have been forced to use other combatant infantry. In view of the above, if these three colored regiments amounting to 10,500 men are shipped with first phase it will be satisfactory for the same number of men pertaining to quartermaster personnel for service on lines of communications item Q 418 page one priority schedule be postponed so as to arrive with early elements of second phase, as was intended for the three infantry pioneer regiments item Q 208 page ten priority schedule. Advise whether above understood and satisfactory.

I. Summary of situation. 60,000 service of rear first phase including 10,500 colored troops from second phase. Additional to arrive January 6,600 replacements about 5,500 coast artillery about 3,000 air service personnel to France and 3,000 motor mechanics for French. Also 5,000 air service mechanics to England. Additional to arrive February about 5,500 coast artillery and 3,000 air service personnel to France. Also 5,000 air service mechanics to England. Grand total 96,600. Above is exclusive of automatic replacements for February which should arrive here by February 1.

J. In order to insure complete understanding between War Department and these headquarters as to shipments made and to be made in accordance our priority schedule, requested you mail first day of each month statement of exactly what troops have been shipped up to that date with reference to phase and item number, number of officers, men, animals, et cetera. Also similar detailed statement as to prospective dates of shipment of units ready to come during next month. In addition request that when advising of departure of troops by cable you give phase and item number for each unit shipped in addition to information you are now cabling. At present it is often impossible identify organizations from descriptions given.

PERSHING

Situation on Western Front

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF,

No. 316 BS/3

ADVANCE GROUP,

Paris, January 6, 1918.

To the Supreme War Council

The letter of January 1, 1918, No. 84 BS [selected], sent by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme War Council, has demonstrated the necessity to be ready to meet a possible enemy offensive by a combined Franco-British counteroffensive.

It specified that combining this counteroffensive was the responsibility of the Supreme War Council, while its preparation devolved upon the Commanders-in-Chief.

The conditions of the future execution of the counteroffensive for disengagement thus conceived and prepared remain to be determined.

As soon as the enemy offensive is launched it will be necessary:

To hold out at all costs the counteroffensive for disengagement;

To take from the available resources of the coalition no more than the forces strictly necessary to meet the enemy offensive of attrition;

To decide the moment and the conditions under which the counteroffensive will be launched.

This triple mission can be entrusted neither to the Commanders-in-Chief who are prevented by their very functions from judging with the necessary impartiality the needs of that part of the front for which they are not responsible and who cannot at one and the same time perform the duties of commanders of their armies and of the over-all command; nor to the Supreme War Council, an organ of consultation and studies, but unsuited, by its very composition and the intermittent character of its functioning, for decision and swift action.

This mission can be entrusted only to an agency of supreme command, alone capable of constantly defending the general plan against special tendencies and interests, of making quick decisions and putting them in execution without loss of time.

With this in view, it would seem indispensable to appoint, at least for the front located between the North Sea and Switzerland, a military authority exercising, for the coalition and in conformity with the views of the Supreme War Council, its directing action on the whole of this front, managing the common reserves, holding back the counteroffensive for disengagement, ordering it at the desired moment.

This authority would begin its functions on the date the enemy himself would choose for his offensive; moreover, it could be agreed that, once the operations are terminated, it would be dissolved.

For obvious reasons this temporary supreme command should be French.

It is therefore logical to think that the French Chief of Staff would naturally be qualified to assume the duties of the contemplated mission.

Finally it is recommended that there be submitted to the decision of the Supreme War Council:

1. The idea of creating, for the whole Franco-British front, a temporary organ of supreme command, acting as delegate of the coalition for the execution of the latter's plans;

2. The appointment of the French Chief of Staff for this post.

Personnel Bureau to be Established

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

Please establish a personnel bureau under the Adjutant General and place Colonel James A. Shannon in charge of it. The idea is that this will develop into a bureau which will handle confidentially all matter relating to the personnel of officers as far as it is necessarily of record at these headquarters. As such it will be a special section of the A. G. O., not connected with the statistical bureau nor with the ordinary routine of the Adjutant General's office, but under it for convenience and good administration. The A. G. O. will provide the necessary clerical assistance. Its duties will be:

1. To collect all official information regarding officers, such as reports and recommendations from superiors, etc.
2. To prepare efficiency blanks for distribution, upon which the efficiency of officers is to be recorded.
3. To keep lists of officers available for various classes of duty in the several staff departments and their qualifications for command.
4. To keep track of personnel of divisions and other units, and to see that they are correctly balanced according to organization tables and with officers of proper rank.

The most stringent rules will be put in force by the Adjutant General, confining the information of the personnel bureau to the officer in charge and selected subordinates and clerks, all of whom will be charged with the necessity of absolute secrecy in guarding these records.

J. J. PERSHING

Cable: P-460-S

British Policy Regarding Passports to Wives and Relatives

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 7, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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8. For Chief of Staff: With reference to paragraph 4 your Cablegram 541 British War Office issues passes to wives and relatives only on recommendation from Surgeon Base Hospital that visit is necessary. It is a matter of a few hours only to travel from England to the patient. Relatives are made to leave promptly when emergency ceases. Owing to length of time it takes to travel from United States to France strongly recommend that no passports be issued wives or relatives of wounded officers or soldiers except upon special request of these headquarters.

* * * * *

PERSHING

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

January 7, 1918.

NOTES

received at G. H. Q., A. E. F. from Col. LeRoy Eltinge

The 3d Bureau - Operations part - is organized as follows:

1 colonel chief of section (not chief of 3d Bureau)

1 lieut. col. subchief (acts like a chief of staff for a commander).

Assignment and movements of army artillery:

1 major.

Liaison:

1 major with American mission (connection with Ragueneau).

1 major with British and Belgian missions and French corps on British front.

1 major with North Group of Armies and Second Army.

1 major with Third and Sixth Armies.

1 major with Fourth and Fifth Armies and with tanks.

1 major with Seventh Army and Eastern Group of Armies.

1 major with Eighth Army.

Secretaries: (Like Maj. A. S. Kuegle, Sec. G. S., G. H. Q., A. E. F., except their office is in same room as chief of operations section).

2 captains.

As I told you yesterday there is also a subchief for aviation and one for dealing with civil and political authorities. Also a section for making maps, etc., as Maj. Xenophon H. Price does.

They make a great point of the liaison which works as follows:

Take for example the major liaison officer for Eighth Army. He has a file of maps of all information of enemy on front of Eighth Army. Also he has one of daily situation maps of Eighth Army. He keeps up to date on these. Every order issued by Eighth Army and every letter from that army is put in a special basket. At 11 a. m. he goes to this basket and goes through it. In the same room are the baskets for other liaison officers. Each glances through the papers in all the baskets and makes a study of those in his own. In an order coming up from the Eighth Army there appears something that does not conform to General Pétain's orders. The liaison officer takes a copy of it and looks up to see if there is any special reason (special condition) that warrants the Eighth Army in not conforming to said order. If so - all right. If not he takes an automobile and goes to Eighth Army where he says that General Pétain has noticed this discrepancy and wishes to know what is the special condition that caused the failure to carry out the order or whether the language of the order was not clearly understood by Commanding General, Eighth Army. On his return the liaison officer reports the facts to chief operations section who either accepts the explanation or carries it to the Chief of Staff as facts warrant. While at Eighth Army this officer would also take a look around, both in the office and at front and report on that also.

Meanwhile each Tuesday the commander of each army or a deputy sent by him reports to Pétain in person. A general conversation ensues in which each army or group of armies presents a statement of orders they have received that were not wholly workable on their front and why; these concern most important matters only. Pétain then outlines his views of the situation and what he considers will be done next. These officers then depart and each visits his liaison officer on the operation section of 3d Bureau. Here he tells his

troubles in detail and an understanding is arrived at for all the questions that were not sufficiently general to be presented to Pétain.

They make a great point of friendliness and courtesy between the liaison officer and the army to which he is assigned and try to develop good relations and mutual confidence and respect.

Now an order from Pétain to the commander of eastern group would be written about like this (drawn of course by Chief, 3d Bureau):

I desire two divisions from the Eighth Army to be ready to entrain at Blank on Blank date for transportation to Fifth Army.

This will be shown to the major liaison for Eighth Army who says, "Eighth Army has no divisions that have been fit for battle lately. If they are to be used for attack a period of training will be necessary. The divisions that most likely to be selected are X and Y. These are now located (see map). The entraining point selected is inconvenient for them and it had hell bombed out of it night before last. Such and such entraining points are more convenient and in better working order."

The points he brings up are considered. Finally the order in two or three lines is written and dispatched to eastern group, which goes through a similar process and forwards it changed by, perhaps, specifying a desire that a certain part of the Eighth Army front be not unduly weakened.

Eighth Army on receipt selects the particular divisions to go and issues necessary order.

Meanwhile order as soon as written was communicated to the director of service of rear who has his main arrangements made and is ready to talk specific points to director of service of rear for Eighth Army by time the order reaches him.

Such orders are usually sent by motor car messenger (liaison officer of that army) but wire is used if in great hurry.

This is all logical and you probably know it all before I write it out. I am doing so only as a sort of review that may bring a point or two out in your mind so it will not be overlooked later. If this sort of running notes bores you say so, and I will choke them off.

Sincerely,

ELTINGE

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1917: Memorandum

Opinion on Personnel Bureau by G-3, G. H. Q.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. For the first time in our history these forces are developing a general staff which is becoming a real agency of the several commanders in all that pertains to planning, coordinating, supervising, and executing.

There can be no doubt but that these are the proper functions of the general staff. The execution of plans is largely dependent upon the choice of commanders and general staff officers of all grades. In exercising the choice of commanders and of general staff officers it is impossible to admit any agency other than the higher commander and his general staff. If any other officers (such as those of the Adjutant

General's Department) are better qualified to exercise this choice, then those officers are out of their proper sphere and should replace less competent officers on the general staff.

Instructors at schools are in a sense officers of the general staff and should be selected as are general staff officers.

2. The exercise of control over promotions and details to the general staff does not necessarily imply that the agency exercising such control must be the office of record. At the same time it is to be remembered that the centralization of all records in one office delays the transaction of business and may render it impossible. Each office must have records of some sort; this is a necessity that cannot be avoided, however, it may be camouflaged. Yet, it is perfectly possible that an officer may make extracts or abstracts from original records and return such records to a central office for file.

3. Answering the first question of the chief of staff specifically, it is believed that all original records relating to promotions, selection of general staff officers, and of instructors for schools should come to the general staff. After the general staff has made the necessary extracts or abstracts the original records should be returned to the Adjutant General. All recommendations for action should be made by the Chief of Staff.

4. A separate bureau for considering promotions would be advisable only if such bureau depended directly on the Chief of Staff.

The Commander-in-Chief is unusually vigorous, both physically and mentally, but it is believed that he is already carrying too great a load and to attempt to regulate promotions, etc., by a bureau reporting directly to him would be a vicious solution.

5. It is believed that at these headquarters the Secretary's office is the most convenient location for handling matters of personnel.

At army corps and division headquarters the administrative section of the general staff would appear to be the proper agency.

6. With reference to Item 4 of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum, it is believed that the administrative section is the proper agency for the performance of the duties named.

7. It is recommended:

(a) That promotion and general staff and school details be handled by the general staff; at these headquarters by the secretary's office or by a bureau directly under the Chief of Staff.

(b) That replacements, including balancing of rank, etc., be handled by the administrative section, general staff.

(c) That all other personnel matters be handled by the Adjutant General.

(d) That, in order to decentralize, the general staff of the various headquarters have duties as indicated in general outline below.

1. General Headquarters:

(a) All G. S. details.

(b) All promotions to any assignments of general officers.

(c) All promotions of officers not under other hq.

2. Army Headquarters:

(a) Promotions and assignments of regimental commanders.

(b) Promotions and assignment of officers of all army troops not under army artillery commander.

3. Army Corps Headquarters:

(a) Promotions and assignments of officers of corps troops.

(b) Supervision of promotions and assignments made by division commanders.

4. Division Headquarters:

(a) Promotion and assignment of officers junior to colonel.

5. Army Artillery Headquarters:

(a) As for corps and division headquarters.

6. Commanding General, L. of C.:
(a) As for division commanders.
7. Director General of Transportation:
(a) As for division headquarters.

*FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Section.*

Cable: P-465-S

Commander-in-Chief Requests to be Consulted Concerning Promotions

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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1D. In carrying out the department's promotion policy as outlined in G. O. 132, all promotions to be based on demonstrated efficiency, there is sure to be lack of coordination if officers on duty in France be promoted by the department without ascertaining first their demonstrated fitness here. Many officers who have had most excellent records in peacetime have shown themselves utterly unfit for war service in France. In view of this I request that before any promotions are made either in staff or line of officers on duty in France that I be given an opportunity to state the result of experience here.

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PERSHING

P Conf. Cable: 1-500

General Pershing's View on Breaking up Divisions

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 467-S

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.

For Chief of Staff

Reference your Cablegrams 558 and 588, am in conference and communication on subject mentioned. French have not been entirely frank, as unofficial information indicates they really want to incorporate our regiments into their divisions for such service in the trenches as they desire. As to our instruction, a certain amount of work with French

troops is beneficial and this we are having and expect to have. We are following closely latest developments and are using French and British instructors as we think best. Our men are working hard and instruction is progressing favorably. Have expressed a willingness to aid in any way in an emergency but do not think good reason yet exists for us to break up own divisions and scatter regiments for service among French and British, especially under the guise of instruction. As we are now at war ourselves the integrity of our own forces should be preserved as far as possible. Shall see M. Clémenceau Wednesday the ninth instant and expect to hold joint conference with Field Marshal Haig and General Pétain within a few days. Shall have frank discussion of the whole subject. The President and the Secretary of War may depend upon it that every endeavor will be made to arrive at satisfactory agreement consistent with maintenance of our own national military identity.

PERSHING

G-3: GHQ, AEF: 1706: Letter

Conditions at Ports of Debarkation in France

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 8, 1918.

President of the Council
Ministry of War
Paris

Dear Mr. President:

In view of the prime importance of expediting in every possible way the movements of our transports, may I take occasion to call your attention briefly to the conditions at ports assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces, and set forth some of the difficulties that call for a speedy remedy, if we are to get the results expected of the very limited sea transportation at our disposal for bringing American troops and supplies to France, as well as personnel and material for the French Government.

At the outset, and very soon after my arrival in France, the Bureau of Transportation of the French Government, in discussing the question of dock construction, gave encouragement to the idea that we could obtain in France all necessary material, including piles and heavy timber, required for these works. Later on, in the month of August, it was learned that there was no available material here of the character required. Notwithstanding our cable requests to the states asking that the material be supplied, the delays incident to sawing and shipping timber from Oregon leaves us with our orders only partially filled and docking facilities of our own incomplete. Unless arrangements can be made to meet the emergency that now exists there will be further and more serious delays to our program. Already we have had as many as twenty-six ships at one time at St-Nazaire and Nantes, and because of the excessive delay in unloading, our vessels are unable to make anything like schedule time on their trips. It is calculated that an average of fifteen days is lost to every ship.

It is not to be understood that this situation is entirely due to lack of berths. There are other reasons, such as lack of cooperation on the part of certain French officials, inefficiency due to duality of control, inadequate means at French berths of handling heavy cargo, and there is delay because of shortage of ballast. On our own account, there is not sufficient naval escort. The deficiencies of rail transportation have already been made the subject of a separate communication.

This question of tonnage is absolutely vital to the success of the Allies. So that in order to get the greatest use of our limited tonnage I wish to emphasize our difficulties in the strongest terms, and impress upon you the importance of early action, if we are to avoid unnecessary delay, and get the quickest possible dispatch of our ships.

As a beginning in the solution of the question, the first thing I would suggest is for the French Government to authorize us to use and control the entire docking system at St-Nazaire with all its accessories. After several months' trial, it is believed that transports cannot be successfully and quickly handled under the present arrangement. Without ample port facilities that can be utilized to the full capacity, our efforts in this war may come to nothing.

Summarizing the difficulties, we find:

1. Great lack of docking space for transports.
2. Insufficient facilities for handling cargo at such berths.
3. Shortage of storage space at or near ports in which cargo can even temporarily be stored.
4. Failure of cooperation on the part of certain French port officials.
5. Shortage of ballast for returning vessels.

Allow me to present the following summary of remedial action recommended:

1. That the French Government turn over the whole system of docks and storehouses at St-Nazaire to the American Expeditionary Forces, under the same conditions accorded the British at Le Havre.
2. That as many berths as can possibly be spared at Bordeaux, La Pallice and Brest be placed under control of the American Expeditionary Forces.
3. That the facilities for the quick handling of cargo from transports be increased to the fullest extent as early as possible.
4. That all available storage space in port towns that can be spared be set apart for our use, in order to save construction and, what is more important, save the transportation of material for such purposes.
5. That the most competent and reliable French officers be selected for command at all the above ports, each to have a working staff whose duty it shall be to hasten the discharge of cargo from our transports and expedite its transfer to the railways.
6. That each of the ports of St-Nazaire, Bordeaux, and La Pallice be placed in *état de siège* in order to enforce through military means, a strict compliance with every rule and regulation that will aid in getting men and supplies quickly handled.

I am appealing to you in this manner as I know you will give this matter very serious personal consideration. I have presented the situation personally more than once to the Ministry of War and have sent my representatives to urge action, but the results so far are not satisfactory.

My dear Mr. President, I sincerely trust that you will understand my attitude on these questions. We have drifted along here now for several months without being able, for the various reasons set forth above, to organize our ports, and we are now confronted with a situation that demands the immediate application of certain correctives which no one can apply except yourself.

With the highest official and personal regard, and a full confidence of complete cooperation, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

J. J. PERSHING

Plans for the Campaign of 1918

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

No. 8358*

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

January 8, 1918.

The letter of January 1, 1918, addressed to the Supreme War Council considers it eminently desirable to have the armies of the Entente assume the offensive:

1. In the form of powerful counteroffensives for disengagement if the enemy attacks, or
2. In the form of operations with limited objectives to dominate and wear the enemy down if he does not attack.
3. These procedures having in either case the object of bringing us to a combined offensive seeking a decision.

The principle is incontestable.

But whatever our desire to resume the initiative in the operations we must submit to what is patent and base our plans not upon abstract notions but upon realities. The American effort cannot make itself felt in the battle before 1919 and until then Franco-British forces will have to be husbanded with a prudence which leaves only the smallest possible part to chance.

A concrete case will demonstrate immediately the situation that the Russian collapse is creating for us in 1918.

Let us suppose a major German attack in Champagne on a 30-km. front occupied by 5 divisions between the Aisne and the Suippe, for instance, and a secondary attack in Lorraine on a 20-km. front from Arracourt to Arnaucourt, held, let us say, by 3 infantry divisions. (The enemy is able to launch these two operations simultaneously on a front totaling 50-km. before March 1.) What will this cost us in divisions in the first fortnight?

In Champagne, the plan of reinforcement which doubles the number of the divisions in line will absorb 5 divisions. Then, to plug the gaps and to launch counterattacks, a force estimated at 1 division per 2 1/2 km., or a total of 12 divisions will be needed immediately; subsequently an equivalent force will be needed to relieve the divisions thus engaged, the rapid attrition of which must be anticipated. Total: Approximately 30 divisions. These effectives cannot hope to do anything more than block the enemy attack.

In Lorraine 4 reinforcing divisions will be needed. The enemy offensive being limited it can be admitted that it will not be necessary to relieve in a short time the elements which will have come to reinforce the front nor the elements which were already holding the front, and that one division for each 2 1/2 km., or 8 divisions, will be sufficient. An anticipated total of 12 divisions.

Putting together the needs of the 2 sectors we reach a grand total of 42 divisions.

That is the first outlay: The system of rotation of reliefs of the large units between the active fronts and the fronts which have remained quiet will then have to be established. Now, after the relief of the Third Army by British forces, French reserves will number 39 divisions. The operation of the plan of reliefs without replacement on fronts not under attack will bring this number to 44.

* Handed to General Gramat, Chief of Staff of the French Army, to General Anthoine, Chief of Staff, French G. H. Q.

When all that is done, we shall finally have at our disposal a reserve pool of 2 divisions to assure the rotation of reliefs, a number altogether insufficient. Therefore we may be obliged to have part of the first group of reorganized divisions participate in the relief.

Suppose even that we can operate our system of rotation of reliefs. The first 42 divisions coming from the front will have to be organized, some of them in sector. At an average rate of 3,000 men per division, they will absorb then a reinforcement of more than 125,000 men, which represents about double the resources we will have at hand in February and March (including the class of 1918) for the maintenance of the combat infantry units. In a word, after the first outlay of 42 divisions, we will almost immediately find it impossible to replace the losses suffered by the large units which will enter the fight.

What would we use for powerful counteroffensives for disengagement? We do not even mention the combined offensive to seek a decision, the preceding figures forbid considering it.

Even if we have to bear the weight of only one of the above mentioned attacks, it will be very difficult to have reserves at hand to undertake operations other than to block the enemy's way or to help our Allies.

And this reasoning leaves no room for a false move on our part. Still it is a contingency which cannot be ignored. How, indeed, can we distinguish from the beginning between the main attack and the secondary one? The one and the other will probably assume the same initial form, but the main attack will subsequently be fed by the flow of the mass of reserves; the other one, limited in its scope, will be equipped only to jolt our troops on an extended front but to a relatively small depth.

Can it be positively stated, even, that in the enemy's intention one of these attacks shall be decreed *à priori* to be the main effort and the other secondary? Will not the character of the one and the other be determined, rather, by the extent of the initial success, the reserves being lavished on the army or armies which have obtained the most promising results at the first impact?

In connection with this subject it is proper to remember that the collapse of the Russian front does not liberate only German divisions and probably 25 Austrian divisions; it makes available large resources in commanders and staffs of army corps and armies which assure to enemy reserves the solidity and flexibility of operation propitious to the calculations of the high command.

These perspectives and the precarious situation of our effectives oblige us to observe great prudence in the use of our means if we want to hold out in 1918 to reach, without excessive and irremediable attrition, the moment when our American Allies will be in a position to give appreciable help in the battle.

Of course the form the German offensive will take may be different than the one contemplated in this letter. It is possible that, for various reasons, the enemy may attack on narrower fronts, bringing about a smaller initial outlay on our part. In this hypothesis various counteroffensives are planned for the purpose of replying to the enemy's action or disengaging from his attacks, and the work of preparing the terrain was begun long ago. But we must realize that these counteroffensives cannot be powerful; their effect will perforce be local and transient, for we will have to think of the continuation of the operations. Now, if the Germans attack on a narrow front or fronts, it is because they are not seeking a swift decision and that they are starting on a battle of attrition. We would be playing into their hands if we were to throw our cards on the table at the very start.

Finally, if our front is attacked on a total extent of more than 50 km., we have not even the strictest minimum of forces to meet the attack and it is absolutely necessary for the British to come to our help.

To sum up, the battle of 1918 will be a defensive one on the Franco-British side, not through absolute choice of the command, but from necessity. Our lack of means is the cause. It is better to realize it now and to get organized accordingly.

Directive No. 4, the instructions issued for the offensive as well as the defensive organization of the terrain and for the distribution of means, is written with this problem in view.

PETAIN

Cable: P-471-S

Attachment of General Staff Officers to The Polish Army

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 9, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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2A. With reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 589. In view of fact that Polish army is now being formed in France under French general staff and in accordance with French organization, believe best military practice dictates complete French staff organization. Would be unwise for us to mix up in the details of this matter. Our intervention now in matter suggested am satisfied would only result in our being charged with our proportionate burden of the supply of this army which for many reasons do not believe desirable we should assume. Finally as previously reported, we are very short of general staff officers for our own units. Pershing.

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PERSHING.

Cable: A-619-R

Routing of Deep-draft Vessels to Southampton

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., January 10, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

With reference to your Confidential No. 441 Operations, navy taking up with Admiral Sims question of routing deep-draft vessels to Southampton. Transports *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* have been offered through British Embassy here. This offer is acceptable and British authorities here communicating with their government relative to method of operation, and question of landing additional troops for transportation through England being considered. Project of using Southampton should be considered, it is thought, in connection with use of these large vessels as well as Brest group (s). Unable at this time to give total troop-carrying capacity of the two British vessels named as they are now being refitted for such service. Believe plans entirely feasible and suggest that you press negotiations with this in view, in cooperation with Vice Admiral Sims. Bliss.

McCAIN

Cable: P-484-S

Possibility of Attaching a Liaison Mission to the Polish Army

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 12, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

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C. With further reference to paragraph 2 your Cablegram 589, our reply paragraph 2A our Cablegram 471, on account of possible political effect believe advisable that we give support and sympathy to Polish army now being organized by French from Poles and Czechs. For reasons stated our cablegram not advisable to assume responsibility for organization by formally attaching general staff officers, none of whom are available, but can arrange to attach mission of liaison which would serve desired purpose without involving us in details which French better able to handle. If approved such mission will be created and as much publicity as possible given to this action. Pershing.

* * * * *

PERSHING

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1801: Letter

Diversion of Transports to the Different French Ports

AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,

No. 01

London, January 12, 1918.

My dear General:

I am very much indebted to you for sending me your aides to acquaint me with your needs in the matter of diverting transports and supply ships to the different French Atlantic ports.

They have acquainted me fully with your needs, and I shall take immediate steps to arrange the operation of our naval forces so that your wishes can be fully met.

Very truly yours,

WM. S. SIMS
[Admiral, U. S. Navy].

Diversion of Transports to French Ports

HEADQUARTERS BASE SECTION NO. 3.,

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS, A. E. F.,

London, January 12, 1918.

From: Colonel R. E. Wood

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. After an interview today with Admiral Sims, the navy has agreed to the diversion of troop transports to any port we may designate on the coast of France.

2. They have asked us, however, for the next thirty days, until they have better organized their destroyers, to divert as few ships as possible to the port of Bordeaux.

*R. E. WOOD
Colonel, N. A.*

Les Armées Françaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Report

Summary of Conversation of January 11 between General Pétain and General Pershing

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

January 13, 1918.

Subjects Discussed:

- A. Employment of American Units with the French Army.
- B. Employment of American Units with the British Army.
- C. Horses
- D. Aviation
- E. Ports

A. Employment of American Units with the French Army: Reading of reply No. 11,318, January 11, to the letter of January 6 of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Then, upon request of General Pershing its different points are discussed successively.

1st Division: Complete understanding: General Pershing approves General Pétain's proposition to put the division in sector again with brigades side by side after it has been there by successive brigades.

26th Division: General Pétain proposes putting its 4 regiments in sector at the rate of one in each of the 4 divisions of General de Maud'huy's army corps behind the Ailette.

General Pershing, after asking and having been shown, the exact location of this sector, answers that he agrees.

Upon the request of General Pétain, he gives as date of entry in sector the early days of February. He will give the exact date in writing.

It is agreed that the division headquarters shall be either beside that of an infantry division of the French corps, or divided between several headquarters, or will go from one to the other. General Pétain specifies that the choice is left to the American command.

2d Division: No discussion. General Pershing indicates that he is going to expedite its reassembly and training.

42d Division: Was the subject of a prolonged discussion.

General Pétain refused definitively to try out the experiment proposed by General Pershing (to keep 2 regiments training under the present conditions, the 2 others being entrusted exclusively to the French command during this time).

He says that his refusal is based upon the fact that this procedure is not taking into account the necessity of training the command and the staff, training which is more important still and more difficult than that of the troops.

He suggests returning the entire 42d Div. into the hands of the French command. Thus the American command will be able to compare the results obtained in this division with those obtained in another division training according to present methods.

General Pershing maintains his viewpoint, justifying it by the necessity for the staff of the 42d Inf. Div. to observe the training of its 2 brigades and to compare the result of the methods followed by each of them.

Finally, he closes the discussion with a last recommendation to follow the same method for the 42d Inf. Div. as for the 26th Inf. Div.

General Pétain replies that he prefers this procedure to the one which was proposed, and the matter is thus settled.

Colored Troops (4 regiments): General Pétain asks for information as to their value.

General Pershing replies that he is fairly sure of the value of 2 of the regiments (those of Illinois and of New York), these regiments having served a long time on the Mexican border. However, it must be taken into account that they include a large proportion of recruits incorporated last September. The large majority of the officers are white, the noncommissioned officers are colored. He does not have exact information on the other 2 regiments but will send it in shortly.

Incidentally General Pershing expresses the idea of announcing in the press the entry of American troops into sector.

General Pétain answers that he thinks it would be better to wait for the entry into sector of the regiments of the 26th Inf. Div. (danger of a strong raid which the Germans would attempt on the 1st if its entry into sector were published at the time when it is the only one with elements in the front line; advantage there is in keeping the enemy in the dark).

General Pershing adopts this point of view.

During the conversation General Pershing mentions several times that the detaching of American units to French divisions is essentially temporary.

He thinks that the American I Army Corps will be formed toward April or May, and that at that time the American army will take charge of a sector which will be selected according to the military situation of the moment and which may be located either in the region where the American 1st Inf. Div. is in line at present or in any other part of the front.

General Pétain agrees completely.

B. Employment of American Units in the British Army: General Pershing announces that Sir W. Robertson has asked him to attach some American battalions to British units.

He asks the advice of General Pétain on this subject, it being understood that these battalions would be brought to the British front from shipments passing through England, that not a single man would be taken from shipments now enroute to the French

front; therefore, it would be only a question of bringing extra infantry forces to the western front.

General Pétain replies that, with these reservations, he sees only advantages in acquiescing in Sir W. Robertson's request.

C. Horses: General Pétain expresses the opinion that the formation of the large American units might be delayed by the shortage of horses. He says that the French army now has 700,000, that this number is the extreme minimum necessary, and that he is concerned over the question of oats.

General Pershing offers spontaneously to send a wire to Washington immediately requesting the shipping of oats to France.

General Pétain replies that a survey of the situation will be forwarded to him shortly and asks him to withhold sending his telegram until he has received it.

D. Aviation: General Pershing expresses misgivings over the situation of French manufacturing; he attaches great importance to its acceleration.

He has asked his government for intensified shipping of raw materials, of automobile mechanics for the relief of French specialists. He is ready to do everything General Pétain could suggest in that line.

General Pétain replies that it is a fact that past orders very much exceed the output to be expected from French manufacturers. He thinks that we must pool our resources, in raw materials as well as in personnel. He tells General Pershing that he will send him shortly a detailed memorandum on the subject.

E. Ports: In closing General Pershing hopes that General Pétain will explain to the French government the capital importance of taking radical measures to remedy the present situation in the ports serving the American army, particularly at Saint-Nazaire where this situation is truly alarming.

General Pétain answered that he is informed on the subject and he is going to see what he can do about it.

The interview ends at that time.

Troops to be Embarked Prior to March 1, 1918

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,

No. 639-R

Washington, D. C., January 14, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

At request of French Military Attaché the following information is forwarded to you to give the French General Staff if you see proper. French Military Attaché was requested not to send any similar information directly to French General Staff:

In addition to the troops now in France it is expected to embark prior to March 1, the personnel of the divisional artillery for two more divisions, and six regiments of coast artillery troops to handle six-inch guns and eight-inch or 9.5 howitzers, the material to be furnished by France and England. Between March 1 and July 20, it is expected to embark the personnel of the divisional artillery for 11 divisions and 12 regiments of coast artillery, and three regiments of field artillery for army troops. The artillery material to be furnished by the United States includes 28 5-inch and 92 six-inch guns to be delivered in April 1918. Delivery of carriages and eight-inch guns are expected to begin in August. Field artillery material for the troops to be sent during the next six months is expected to be furnished by our Allies. Besides the troops above mentioned, there are in process of organization, training and equipment, 26 divisions and a fair proportion of army troops with the authorized complement of artillery. The organization and equipment of all troops proceeding as rapidly as practicable and is expected to be completed in ample time for embarkation. Bliss.

McCAIN

AG, GHQ, AEF: 3925G: Letter

Liaison with Central Office for Franco-American Relations

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 14, 1918.

From: C-in-C

To: Major H. J. Harjes

[Extract]

1. You are hereby designated as chief liaison officer between these headquarters and the headquarters of the central office for Franco-American relations.

* * * * *

J. G. HARBORD,
Chief of Staff.

Personnel Bureau

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 15, 1918.

There is no reason for:

1. Thinking of the possibility of building up in the Adjutant General's Office any powerful agency through the personnel if handled as I have indicated. [See Fox Conner's Memo. to C. of S., Jan. 8, 1918, printed in this volume.]

2. I have not now nor have I had any idea of personally handling the personnel bureau. It would be under the general staff in the sense that all departments or bureaus of service supply, etc., are under the general staff.

3. If the Adjutant General's Office controlled, as I have indicated in my memorandum, the general staff would be freed from a lot of detailed work that is not naturally a part of its role.

4. Naturally the general staff would be called on for recommendations from time to time, but this does not make it necessary that the records in question be kept in whole or in part by the general staff (nor does the above preclude consultation with any other department chief or office regarding promotions).

5. The instructions contained in my original memorandum will be carried out except as to replacement control which as now will be with the administrative section.

6. The general plan laid down by the operations section will be followed with the understanding that it shall be the duty of the personnel division to keep a close scrutiny over all promotions made by subordinate commanders.

7. The chief of the personnel division will handle these matters there under the Adjutant General instead of under the secretary of the general staff and will furnish the Chief of Staff data or recommendations of records when called for, and follow generally the line of action in handling personnel that may be indicated by the C-in-C or the C. S.

J. J. PERSHING

AWC Library: General Order

General Headquarters, A. E. F., Established

GENERAL ORDERS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

No. 11

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 17, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to authority contained in War Department Cablegram (No. 636-R), these headquarters will hereafter be designated as General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, abbreviated G. H. Q., A. E. F.

* * * * *

By command of General Pershing:

*JAMES G. HARBORD,
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff.*

Cable: P-504-S

Authority to Organize Army Corps Requested

GENEPAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 17, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

[Extract]

1. For Chief of Staff: In view of provisions of Defense Act approved June 3, 1916, request President's authority be cabled to organize army corps in France as the number of troops and circumstances justify, including assignment of necessary staff, et cetera. Corps commanders will at first be given only temporary command of corps.

* * * * *

PERSHING

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 1338: Report

Meeting of Military Representatives on General Reserve

S. W. C. (M. R.) 12

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,

Versailles, January 19, 1918.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE MILITARY
REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN THE COUNCIL
CHAMBER, VERSAILLES, ON SATURDAY,
JANUARY 19, 1918, AT 11 a. m.

PRESENT

FRANCE

General Weygand

GREAT BRITAIN

General Sir H. Wilson

ITALY

General Cadorna

IN ATTENDANCE

Major Pagezy

Maj. Gen. Sackville-West

Col. Bianchi

d'Espinosa

Lt. Col. Pintor

SECRETARIAT

Major Decrais

Lt. Duhamel

Lt. Col. Storr

Captain Wright

Major Martin

Franklin

Lt. Gallerati

Scotti

CHAIRMAN

FORMATION OF
A GENERAL
RESERVE

1. General Weygand acted as Chairman.
2. General Wilson put forward a draft resolution on the subject. General Weygand expressed the opinion that no general reserve was possible without a single Commander-in-Chief for all armies

to deal with it. General Wilson contended that such a Commander-in-Chief was impossible, but, a general reserve being highly desirable, it was equally desirable to find some other arrangement so as to be able to deal with it.

No decision was arrived at.

AG: GHQ, AEF: 211.39: Letter

Supplementary Instructions to Chief Liaison Officer

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 19, 1918.

From: The Commander-in-Chief

To: Major. H. H. Harjes

1. Supplementing instructions of January 14, and with a view to defining further your present mission, it should be understood that, as chief liaison officer, you are for the time being attached to the person of the *Conseiller de Affaires Américaines près du Président du Conseil*, who, as understood by these headquarters, is in complete charge of the study and solution of all questions affecting the cooperation of the United States in France.

2. You will, in accordance with his instructions, work with *Office Central des Relations Franco-Américaines* and any other Franco-American or French Bureau with which he is connected, in order to devise and establish the best kind of liaison to the end that the relations of the American Expeditionary Forces with all French administrations be placed on the most amicable and efficient footing.

JOHN J. PERSHING

Recommended Responsibility for Arrangements for Putting Troops into the Trenches

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 19, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

1. After conference between the chiefs of the respective sections, the operations and training sections recommend:

(a) That recommendations as to what troops are to go into the trenches for training purposes be made by the training section.

(b) That after the decision is reached as to the troops which are to go into the trenches, the operations section be responsible for all preliminary arrangements and for all action that may be necessary during the time that such units are in the trenches.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Operations Section.

PAUL B. MALONE
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Training Section.

[Note in ink: App. by direction J. G. H., C. of S.]

*Les Armées Françaises, Tome VI Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Memorandum
Extension of the British Front; Campaign Plan for 1918; Single Command*

[Editorial Translation]

French Section
No. 105/91 bis

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, January 19, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

(Handed by General Weygand to General Foch, January 20, 1918)

Concerning the next meeting of the Supreme War Council

[Extract]

Extension of the British Front

The military representatives have come to a decision concerning the subject; it forms the subject of joint memorandum No. 10* handed to the governments. But this decision will have an executory value only on the day it is adopted by the Supreme War Council in plenary session.

Now, the relief of that part of the front on which the Commanders-in-Chief had previously agreed (Barisis-aux-Bois) will be completed toward February 3. For the uninterrupted continuation of the relief in the remaining sector south of this point so as to have it completed February 20, in accordance with General Pétain's request, the Supreme War Council must decide and announce its decision soon enough for the Commanders-in-Chief to have time to take appropriate measures (preparation of the relieving troops, etc.), that is to say, about January 25.

This is all the more necessary because we must give the British command no excuse whatever for a delay and because * * * the military representative has been advised that the War Cabinet has postponed the examination of joint Memorandum No. 10 pending completion of a complementary study motivated by new reports of Marshal Haig and General Robertson. Everything would therefore be discussed again after having agreed, however, to leave it to the decision of the military representatives.

From a more general point of view, the meeting of the Supreme War Council is indispensable in the very near future for the following reasons:

1. To decide on a plan of action.
2. To assure the execution of this plan, that is to say, settle the question of command.

Today, under the threat and on the eve perhaps, of the most powerful effort that the enemy has yet attempted against us, there is as yet neither an overall plan nor a chief.

1. Even if we have decided on the defensive, a plan of action is indispensable; the defense has to be directed. If it is simply accepted, it places us at the mercy of the enemy.

The defense has at its command defensive organization of terrain, troops to defend it, reserves. It requires coordination of purely defensive actions, of counter-attacks, of offensives for disengagement, etc. in which these various elements have to play their role.

* Memorandum No. 10, not selected, was drafted for the Supreme War Council January 10, and besides discussing the limiting point between the British and French fronts, recommended studies be made with a view to furnishing mutual assistance in the event of a major attack against either front.

They can do it only if these operations have been prepared, in a word, if there is a plan of action. Of course this plan of action must exist in each of the Allied armies. But the combinations having to be anticipated, not only within each of the Allied armies but for these armies as a whole, it is necessary for this plan to be an overall plan decided by an authority superior to the commanders of these armies.

* * * * *

The creation of a general interallied reserve administered by the Supreme War Council would perhaps assure, for a certain time, a smaller expenditure of our reserves. But on the fateful day when the employment of this reserve will have to be decided upon without delay, the problem will still be unsolved. When it is a question not of deliberation but of action, a council, whatever its composition may be, will not be able to take the place of a chief.

* * * * *

To sum up it seems indispensable to the French military representative that the Supreme War Council meet without delay and decide on the three following points: Extension of the British front, establishment of a plan of action, organization of a supreme direction of operations, and that this meeting be preceded by a complete agreement on these points between the government, the chief of the general staff, and the French Commander-in-Chief, an agreement set down in written memoranda, stating the French point of view and intended to serve as a basis of discussion.

It would be necessary also to forward to the governments belonging to the Supreme War Council the agenda of the meeting.

WEYGAND

*Les Armées Françaises, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Report
Use of American Units with British and French*

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

January 20, 1918.

[Extract]

SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 19, 1918 BETWEEN
GENERAL PETAIN, MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, GENERAL PERSHING

Subjects Discussed:

- A. Employment of American Units with the British Army
- B. Speeding up of Shipments of American Units to France

* * * * *

A. Employment of American units with the British Army: General Pershing recalls that he was handed a request by General Robertson for the purpose of attaching to British units American battalions which will be transported to France on British ships, about 200,000 tons having been allocated to this transportation.

Nothing will be diverted from the flow of shipments already planned or to be planned, bound for points in the present American zones by means of American or French tonnage; therefore it has only to do with an increase of the total number of American troops to be directed to France.

General Pétain informed him that he approves of this project. Washington has been apprised of the approval. Secretary of War Baker, General Bliss, General Biddle are also in favor of the idea.

There is also a second question to be settled, that of the American units to be transported to the rear zone of the British armies to be trained on terrain now available there. This would in no way indicate that these units would be attached to British divisions after completing their training.

Sir Douglas Haig observes that General Bliss raised this last question.

General Pétain, intervening, says that there is a distinction to be made between the two questions.

He approves entirely of the first one, but sees serious problems where the second is concerned.

After American units have completed their training in the rear zone of the British armies, they would have to be transported to the present American zone, skirting Paris on the northeast. Now, in spite of the double tracking in progress on the belt lines around Paris, the railroad lines available for the purpose would be blocked in case of a German attack in the general direction of Paris. It would then be necessary to establish for these American units a north-south route, passing west of Paris and meeting the present line of communication Tours-Bourges; hence operating problems, bad use of rolling stock, etc. Moreover, the zones available for the training of American units behind the French armies are at present far from being occupied to their maximum capacity. Let us wait until they are before tackling the problem.

Sir Douglas Haig approves and says that as soon as American battalions are placed at his disposal, he intends to send them directly to British army corps which have their own training grounds.

General Pershing declares himself in entire agreement.

Sir Douglas Haig observes that it seems impossible to have more than 2,000 men per day in transit through Southampton-Le Havre. This flow of shipments would therefore seem to be absorbed for the major part by the shipment of American battalions on their way to the British front.

B. Speeding up of the Shipping of American Units to France: General Pershing announces that he has sent officers to England and to French ports (Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest), to study the possibility of making the best use of large-draft ships available in the United States. As soon as he knows their findings he will pass them on to General Pétain and Marshal Haig.

With regard to Saint-Nazaire he renews his request to General Pétain for his help in obtaining additional capacity and a larger American share in the exploitation of the port.

General Pétain asks General Pershing to send him a memorandum with all particulars concerning the question and promises to attend to it.

General Pershing replies that this memorandum shall be sent to him at once.

In the course of the conversation the three Commanders-in-Chief declare themselves several times in complete agreement concerning the absolute necessity of accelerating by all possible means the shipping of American units to France.

In closing General Pershing announces that the shipping board estimates that for July 1918, it will be able to send to France the complete artillery of 3 army corps (18 divisional artilleries with their heavy artillery).

This indication, supplied by individual best qualified in matters of maritime transportation, warrants the estimate of 18 divisions for the American forces which will arrive in France in July.

* * * * *

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 12: Memorandum

Promotion Policies Announced

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 21, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEFS OF GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS:

The following policies regarding promotions have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief:

1. Promotions should be for demonstrated efficiency in the service. That is, an officer should not be promoted simply because of the fact that he has been an expert in civil life in the line in which he is now working in the military service. It is assumed that all of his qualifications were taken into consideration when he was first commissioned.
2. Promotions may be given in special cases on account of the position of the officer. That is, an officer who is in command of or directing the work of other officers should, where practicable, be senior to them.
3. Promotions in the line should be in combat divisions, and not in replacement divisions.
4. Transfer of an officer from a replacement to a combat division should be considered a promotion and should be given to the most efficient officer of the replacement division in the particular grade.
5. It is believed that the question of promotion at the front as compared with promotion at the rear will adjust itself when casualties begin to appear.

6. It is not necessary or desirable to lay down a rule as to adjusting or equalizing promotions between the line and the staff, but the general policy should be that promotion in staff corps or departments should, in general, be no faster than promotion in the line for officers of equal length of service. The point is that the whole army should know that no officer will be favored in the matter of promotion by being away from the front, whether it be at headquarters or elsewhere.

7. For the present, the policy should be to hold back on promotions, especially in the senior grades in staff corps and departments. Line troops should be kept filled up with officers for the sake of discipline and efficient training. In order that this may be done, an unassigned list should be started at once, and authority therefor has been requested from the War Department. Officers detached from their organizations for duty which will probably last more than six weeks should be at once placed on this list and their places in their organizations filled.

8. Replacements in combat divisions should be made automatically according to a policy already approved.

9. I believe that the above considerations should be given as a policy, not to provide promotions, but to get the right officer in the right place with suitable rank for the exercise of the office.

JAMES A. SHANNON,
Major, N. A.,
Coordination Section, G. S.

G-1, GHQ, AEF: 1: Letter

Report on British Camp Facilities and Cross-Channel Traffic

HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT, ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE,
January 21, 1918.

From: General Superintendent, Army Transport Service

To: Commander-in-Chief, G. H., A. E. F. (Through Military Channels)

1. Captain Ryan and myself held two conferences at the Ministry of Shipping while in London. Sir Joseph Maclay was present at one, and Sir Thomas Roydon, with Messrs. Warner and Foley, assistants of Sir Joseph Maclay, present at the other. I also held conferences with our own naval authorities, with a representative of the director of movements, and with other British transportation authorities.

2. While in London, General Bartlett showed me a cablegram which had been received from Washington, which requested him to find out whether additional camp facilities near Southampton could be found. Our authorities are assuming that there will be a largely increased movement of troops through England and especially to the port of Southampton.

3. I find that the English authorities are working to a certain degree at cross purposes and with different objects. The object of Sir Joseph Maclay is to eliminate all cross-channel transportation, and he, personally, wants to send the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* direct to French ports. In addition, he wants to send some of the smaller Cunard liners, which now carry American troops to Liverpool, direct to French ports. His idea is to load the ships with cargo for the French Government and troops for ours, and expects the French to release the British cargo carriers that have been loaded by the British.

4. The English transportation people are working on the idea of eliminating the railroad haul across England, i. e., Liverpool to Southampton. It is immaterial to them whether Southampton or French port is selected.

5. The military authorities are evidently not particularly concerned about either cross-channel transportation or railroad facilities, their object being to get troops in their areas and on the front.

6. Our own naval authorities are much opposed to sending troops or troop ships to Southampton on account of the increasing danger of cross-channel transportation. * * * As far as our own ships are concerned, all of them with the exception of the *Leviathan* can be discharged at Brest or other French ports. The *Agamemnon* and *Mount Vernon* are the only ones so far that have been coaled at Southampton on the return trip. This was done on their first voyage when they brought only enough coal for the single trip. However, they are better equipped than the Cunard boats, and I am advised by the navy that they can carry coal enough for the round trip, or almost enough for the round trip, and there is no reason, if we so desire, why these boats and all our other converted German liners used as troops ships cannot continue to go to Brest.

7. I have been able to obtain reliable data on the Port of Southampton. The White Star Dock will take the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, and *Olympic* without any difficulty whatever. It will probably take the *Leviathan*, as the water at low tide is 40 feet and the vessel draws 41.

8. Sir Joseph Maclay was of the opinion that the four large ships can be discharged at Brest and possibly at Cherbourg. After a conference with the Cunard Line officials, and with their marine superintendent, I do not believe this is possible due to the coaling situation. The *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* cannot carry enough coal for the round trip; the first three named need 6,000 tons of coal for a single trip. Even lying at anchor in the harbor they have to keep up steam all the time and require 200 tons of coal a day. The *Mauretania* and *Aquitania* have to be coaled from side ports. Unless special arrangements can be made the process of coaling is a very slow one. I do not believe, under present conditions, we can put in over 300 or 400 tons of coal daily at Brest unless we can make special arrangements, which will take some time. I consider Brest out of the question for these ships. I have made an appointment with the marine superintendent of the Cunard Line to meet him at Cherbourg this week. We can then decide whether this port can receive any large ships, either Cunard or converted German liners, but from the data that I have so far received, I consider it doubtful.

9. The question as to whether we should continue to send our own large troop ships to French ports or to Southampton, as to whether the Cunard boats should go to Southampton, Liverpool, or French ports (assuming that they can get into French ports) hinges on the general policy you desire to adopt.

10. If American troops are to be sent to British training areas as units or reinforcements of British units, all such troops should go to England and be taken from Southampton or other British channel ports to Le Havre or other French ports by the existing English cross-channel transportation. If on the other hand, the American troops are to continue to be sent to the present American army front in France, they should be sent direct to French ports. We know all of the large ships with the exception of the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* can be discharged at Brest. It is barely possible that some of these four can be sent to Cherbourg, or, if we can make special coaling arrangements, ultimately send them to Brest. Such coaling arrangements will take a great deal of time.

11. If some of the American troops are to be sent to the British front and others to the present front, the portion to the British front should be sent to Southampton and the cross-channel transportation handled by the British.

Summarizing, I would recommend:

1. That if American troops are to be sent to British areas, the *Mauretania*, *Aquitania*, *Olympic*, and *Leviathan* be sent to either Southampton or Liverpool with such

troops; that the British handle these ships from New York to England, conveying them at their own risk and furnishing cross-channel transportation to France.

2. That the present service of Cunard ships to Liverpool be continued whether the troops carried on these ships go to British training areas or to the American front in France.

3. That all present American troop ships except the *Leviathan* be sent direct to French ports, and that they carry troops intended for the American front in France.

4. That the British authorities be advised that it is impracticable to carry American troops to French ports when such troops go to British training areas.

5. That where some go to the British front and others to the American front, that the ships be loaded in accordance with transportation arrangements recommended above.

R. E. WOOD,
Colonel, Inf., N. A.
General Supt., Army Transport Service.

SWC: 1339: Joint Note

Joint Note No. 12

VERSAILLES, January 21, 1918.

Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by the Military Representatives

1918 CAMPAIGN

To: The Supreme War Council

[Extract]

The military representatives have the honor to inform you that at their meeting held on January 21, 1918, they passed the following resolution:

1. In submitting to the Supreme War Council their advice on the military action to be undertaken during 1918, the military representatives think it necessary to place before the Supreme War Council in the briefest possible manner the grounds on which their advice is based.

2. Looking out over all the theaters of war, they examined the state of affairs both in the main theaters and in the secondary theaters, first of all from the point of view of the security of the fronts in those theaters, and then from the point of view of the opportunities which may present themselves for gaining a decisive or, at any rate, far-reaching success in any of those theaters.

3. It was assumed that the United Kingdom was safe from all serious invasion and that the necessary measures, both naval, military, and air for its defense against the contingency of an attack, involved no interference with the operations of the British forces overseas.

4. It was agreed, after the most careful and exhaustive examination, that the safety of France could also be assured. But in view of the weight of attack which the enemy can bring to bear upon this front, an attack which may possibly, in the opinion of the military representatives, attain a strength of 96 divisions, exclusive of roulement, they feel obliged to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, viz.:

(a) That the French and British forces in France are continuously maintained at their present total aggregate strength, and receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions a month.

(b) That there shall be a substantial progressive increase in the total Allied equipment in guns of all calibers, in machine guns, in aeroplanes, and in tanks, with the personnel necessary to man them, and the most effective coordinated employment of these and all other mechanical devices.

(c) That every possible measure shall be taken for strengthening and coordinating the Allied system of defenses, more particularly in the sectors most liable to a heavy attack.

(d) That the rail transportation be improved and coordinated.

(e) That the whole Allied front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action, and that the disposition of the reserves, the periodic rearrangement of the point of junction between the various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should be dominated by this consideration.

5. It was agreed that Italy was safe, but again under certain conditions, viz:

(a) That the Italian army be reformed, trained, and reequipped with artillery before May 1, and that several positions in rear of the present line be constructed on modern principles.

(b) That the power of rapid rail transport be increased both in the interior of Italy itself, and between Italy and France in order to secure strategic unity of action over the two theaters.

(c) That, in addition to the necessary measures taken against pacifism by the Italian Government itself, the Allies should assist Italy by the provision of coal, wheat, and other necessities, as well as financially, in order to prevent the creation of economic conditions which would diminish the strength of the interior resistance of the country.

6. If the assumptions in pars. 3, 4, and 5 are accepted, then we have got this far in our examination of the problem, viz: That the enemy cannot in 1918 gain a definite military decision in the main theaters which would enable him to break finally the resistance of any of the Allied powers.

7. If the enemy cannot gain a final decision against the Allies, the question arises whether there is any opportunity in the course of 1918 for the Allies to secure, in the main western theaters, a final, or even a far-reaching decision, against the enemy. The military representatives are of the opinion that, apart from such measure of success as is implied in the failure of the enemy's offensive, or may be attained by local counterstrokes, and leaving out of account such improbable and unforeseeable contingencies as the internal collapse of the enemy powers, or the revival of Russia as a serious military factor, no such decision is likely to be secured during the fighting period of 1918. Neither the addition of the American troops in view during this period, nor such reinforcements as could be secured for any one of the main theaters by withdrawing from the secondary theaters any margin of troops that may be available above the necessities of local defense, would make a sufficient difference in the relative position of the opposing forces to justify the hope of attaining such a decision. This should not prevent the Allied General Staffs closely watching the situation in case an unexpected favorable development should furnish an opportunity for vigorous offensive actions for which they should always be prepared. In any case the defensive on the western front should not be of a merely passive character, but be worked out definitely and scientifically, with the intention of gaining the maximum advantage from any opportunities offered in this theater. A detailed consideration of the nature of the measures that should be envisaged is given in a paper which is appended as an annex to this note.

8. The Allies are, therefore, confronted with a fundamental, though not permanent, change in the conditions upon which their strategy has to be based as compared with the conditions existing or anticipated, as long as the Russian armies kept the field. They are accordingly obliged to consider how that strategy must be modified in order to take the fullest advantage out of such opportunities as remain open to them during the phase of deadlock on the western fronts. In other words, pending such a change in the balance

of forces as we hope to reach in 1919 by the steady influx of American troops, guns, aeroplanes, tanks, etc., and by the progressive exhaustion of the enemy's staying power, it remains to consider what action can be taken against the enemy, elsewhere than in the main western theaters, which may enable us to secure a decision far-reaching in its effect upon the political situation in the near east and in Russia, both during and after the war, and valuable in paving the way towards a subsequent definitive decision against the enemy's main armies. To allow the year to pass without an attempt to secure a decision in any theater of war, and to leave the initiative entirely to the enemy would, in the opinion of the military representatives, be a grave error in strategy apart from the moral effect such a policy might produce upon the Allied nations.

* * * * *

WEYGAND,
Military
Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.

HENRY WILSON,
21.1.18 General,
Military
Representative,
Supreme War Council.

L. CADORNA,
Military
Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

ANNEXURE TO JOINT NOTE NO. 12

(Paper referred to in Section 7)

In its sitting of December 1, 1917, the Supreme War Council instructed its military representatives to study in detail the whole of the situation and the report on the military operations which should be undertaken.

The military representatives after having carefully considered the situation are of opinion that:

(1) On the western front, the desertion of Russia, increasing to a menacing extent the numbers on the side of the central powers, imposes an expectant attitude on the Armies of the *Entente*, for the first months of 1918 and that up to the time that the American army can really come into line.

This attitude, far from being passive, involves, on the contrary, for these armies the necessity of taking advantage of every occasion offered to impose their will on the adversary and also involves the idea of taking the offensive, which alone is capable of leading to victory, as soon as possible. With this object these armies should:

(a) In case of any attack by the enemy, not only stop it and counterattack on the very ground of this attack, but also make extensive counterattacks as a diversion on ground selected and prepared beforehand for as rapid an operation as possible.

(b) In case the enemy does attack, find itself in a position to take the initiative in military operations with a limited objective, for the purpose of dominating the enemy, wearing him out, and maintaining the fighting spirit of the troops.

(c) In both cases, to be able ultimately to engage the whole of their forces in a combined offensive as far as our effectives permit, so as either to stop the enemy if he attempted by a violent and obstinate effort to bring about the material and moral exhaustion of one of the Allies, or to obtain a decision, if the losses suffered by the enemy, or any other favorable fact in the general situation, brings such a result within reach.

It is therefore necessary that, as soon as possible, the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and Italian armies should:

(i) Organize grounds of attack corresponding to the conditions outlined above in subsections (a) and (b), and take all necessary steps for launching these attacks rapidly if they are decided upon.

(ii) Prepare plans of joint operations corresponding to the conditions outlined above in subsection (c), which would involve:

So far as the Commanders-in-Chief of the British and French armies are concerned, the drawing up of a plan of a combined offensive on the Franco-British front;

So far as the chief of the general staff of the Italian army is concerned, the drawing up of a plan of an offensive as extensive as possible on the Italian front.

The governments will have the plans and schemes sent to the Supreme War Council which will assure the coordination of this combined action, and will be entitled to take the initiative in any proposals with this object.

[UNSIGNÉ].

Les Armées Françaises Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes Vol. 1: Letter

General Interallied Reserve

[Editorial Translation]

French Military Representative

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,

No. 103 a

Versailles, January 22, 1918.

To the President of the Council

INTERALLIED RESERVE AND SINGLE COMMAND

[Extract]

In a defensive situation, to decide on a plan of action is not the most difficult thing to do; to execute that plan in spite of the enemy, that is the big difficulty.

Who will make certain that it is executed in the face of an enemy who is attacking where and when it suits him? Who will take care that the reserves do not rush prematurely to the point where enemy action calls them, that the will to counterattack persists in spite of partial checks, that the necessary means are at first held out and then put to work? Who will direct one of the Allied armies to attack so as to disengage the other, etc.?

Only a chief can do that, a chief who sees the entire picture, who is responsible, invested with the necessary authority.

The ideal conception is that of a generalissimo commanding all the armies of the Entente, but it seems that multiple reasons prevent its realization.

Considering the importance attached, especially in the defensive, to a proper economy of reserves, the creation of a general interallied reserve proposed by the military representatives would be a step in the sense that it would assure for a certain time a smaller expenditure of reserved forces.

But who will be responsible for the employment of this reserve? The Supreme War Council? Even admitting that this body is in a position to accept or reject the request that might be submitted to it by the Commanders-in-Chief for its partial or total use, would the council be able to take the initiative for its use in operations that have been decided upon? Evidently not, since according to the terms of the Rapallo agreement the Supreme War Council may not interfere in the conduct of operations. Finally on the day when a crisis arrives, when speed is necessary in decision and action, a council, whatever its composition may be, cannot take the place of a chief. The problem therefore is still unsolved: The creation of an interallied general reserve does not take the place of a chief, it calls for him.

Therefore, faced by this necessity which, answered or not, can be heavy with consequences, a formula must be found which will give a chief or at least a superior direction. It seems that the heads of government responsible for the conduct of the war could increase the scope of the functions of the Supreme War Council with regard to the general conduct of operations and give it the right to delegate its powers even for a limited period to one of the chiefs of the general staff, making him responsible for the general interallied reserve. An unassuming title and the temporary character of the duties would, of course, be such as to avoid wounding any susceptibilities.

Inclosed herewith is a draft of a resolution, drawn up along the lines of the ideas developed above.

RESOLUTION PROJECT

A general interallied reserve is constituted, composed of:

a. 4 French infantry divisions taken from the front of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

3 British infantry divisions taken from the British front in France.

2 Italian infantry divisions taken from the Italian front.

b. The British and French divisions now in Italy:

5 British infantry divisions.

6 French infantry divisions.

For administrative purposes, discipline, training, and instruction, these troops will remain under the control of the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and Italian armies.

They will be stationed near the railroads paralleling the front: The French divisions west of the Châlons meridian, the British divisions south of the Somme.

For tactical control, they are placed under the control of the general designated for this purpose by the Supreme War Council.

* * * * *

WEYGAND.

HS AS: 77: Letter

Organization

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 22, 1918.

From: Col. Carl Boyd, A. D. C.

To: Chief, Air Service, A. E. F.*

The Commander-in-Chief directs me to send you the following:

The present organization of general headquarters has been in operation now for some months, and it is presumed that all officers concerned have had an op-

*This was a circular letter all staff officers.

portunity to make a thorough test of its soundness. It is, however, my belief that no organization is so perfect that it cannot be improved upon. The single purpose of this organization is to have the duties of each staff department, including the general staff, so simply defined and so thoroughly coordinated that it will meet the requirements of direction and supply both in the preparation for and in the actual conduct of active operations.

Having this in view, it is requested that you set forth, fully and frankly, as indicated below, your views with such detailed suggestions for improvement as may appear necessary:

For heads of administrative and staff services.

1. Please define the duties of your department, as you understand them, including control of personnel and supply of matériel.

2. Give your idea as to the relationship that now exists between the general staff and your department.

3. Set forth, in detail, your notion as to the cooperation between your department and other administrative and staff departments (not including the general staff).

4. Make such recommendations as may be considered advisable in the light of experience under the present organization.

5. A very frank and full discussion is requested, especially as regards your relations with the general staff and the direction that should prevail as applied to your department.

For chiefs of sections in the general staff.

1. Discuss briefly and make recommendations as you desire upon the present organization of the general staff.

2. State your views of the relations that should exist between the supply departments and the general staff.

For commanders of divisions and brigades.

1. Please state your views of the present organization of these headquarters, especially as it affects your division.

2. Submit any recommendations that you may care to make as a result of your experience.

3. Submit any recommendations you may care to make with reference to the organization of your own division staff, including the general staff.

J. J. P.

Please give the above your early attention and send your reply to the undersigned.

CARL BOYD,
Colonel, A. D. C.

Replacement Division

Administration Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 23, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum showing our situation today relative to replacements. I believe the factor of officers need not be so seriously regarded as is the question of men, in view of the fact that we have actually here in France many student officers, all of junior grade, but nevertheless sufficient in number to approximately fill these units.

2. This statement shows very clearly our situation today, which is that our combat units are all short of men, and that we are not now in a position to make good this shortage. Even assuming the arrival of the 13,600 replacements now ordered, we would then only have our base division theoretically full, plus a surplus of 111 men. It is problematical whether these replacements will come in any reasonable time. We are in addition filing another cable today asking for additional exceptional replacements. The item "Troops ordered up as replacements to divisions," will be reduced to about 3,800 men when those under orders are actually sent forward. The 41st Division has just telegraphed that they cannot maintain their cadres of the different units if we order any further men away and reduce the division below approximately 3,800 men.

3. We expect to get into contact very shortly with the enemy, and we must expect big losses. If at the time of our entry into combat we have not adequate replacements behind the line, our units (accepting the present large strength of our divisions as sound) will shortly look curious. The whole history of this war and the history of our Civil War has clearly demonstrated the fact that the only effective way is to have enough manpower behind the fighting troops to maintain them always at their full fighting strength.

4. The 20,000 men we are asking for as exceptional will only cover the minimum number of noneffectives who will be continually in hospitals. This factor alone might under a vigorous offensive by ourselves or by the enemy aggregate as much as 20%.

5. For the reasons above given I believe we will have a much more homogeneous fighting unit if we use our next division as already contemplated for the replacement division of the I Corps rather than to attempt to use it as an additional combat division.

If we do not attain our Italian labor, we must call for additional thousands of labor troops from America, which will only result in reducing the flow of combat troops, which will directly reflect itself on the number of replacement troops we can bring over.

6. I therefore urgently recommend that we use the 33d Division as a replacement division.

*J. A. LOGAN, Jr.
Chief, A. S., G. S.*

Pencil note at bottom of document: Note: In artillery replacements the 41st Division cannot furnish enough. Two of its F. A. regiments are corps artillery, the third only

is replacement. Of the next replacement division, 1 regiment becomes army artillery, 2 regt., replacement.

J. G. HARBORD.

[Inclosure]

41st DIVISION (BASE DIVISION)

	OFFICERS	MEN	OFFICERS	MEN
Authorized Strength	906	26,405		
Shortage upon arrival in France			227	2,420
Troops ordered for Service, L. of C.			212	7,844
Troops ordered for Service at Schools			150	2,544
Troops ordered up as Replacements to Divisions			0	5,662
Present shortage in Division	589	18,470	589	18,470
Troops Remaining in Division	317	7,935		
Replacements required for all divisions in France	329	13,489		

Antiaircraft Defense

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, January 24, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, L. of C.

1. It can be assumed that the enemy will attempt to anticipate the U. S. aviation program and that bombing raids on a far larger scale than formerly will be a part of any offensive program. The actual damage caused by a raid is generally small, but any locality raided that has not a definite plan of defense known by all will suffer severely morally in addition to the actual damage that might have been prevented.

2. From time to time a limited number of antiaircraft guns and machine guns will become available for use at important advance depots. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you be prepared to indicate the location of those assigned to your command. They can be quickly installed, provided emplacements and intercommunication have been prepared beforehand. In fact, such a mobile defense is the only one that will meet the conditions.

3. The Commander-in-Chief further directs that you cause the commanding officers of all billets, depots, and camps within your command, which, on account of their location, importance, or size, are liable to be raided, to prepare and execute a local plan of anti-aircraft defense and publish the necessary instructions along the following lines:

4. Antiaircraft guns and machine guns tend to prevent daylight raids and keep the night raiders high in the air. This last, and being under fire, affects the bomber's aim. On the other hand, the falling fragments and noise increase the confusion. The following measures require forethought, considerable inconvenience, and work, but are efficacious even without the use of antiaircraft guns:-

5. Billets, depots, and camps should not be concentrated so as to form one target. When practicable, landmarks that will be sharply defined at night such as railroad yards, water, very prominent buildings, etc., should be avoided. Large towns are easily located and their buildings and pavements increase the effect of the bombs.

6. When conditions oblige the above locations, all available bomb-proof shelters should be marked with suitable signs. Sandbag ramparts must be prepared as additional protection to localize the effect of the bombs and all the military personnel must be assigned their places. Their conduct during a raid must be prescribed; if optional, lack of discipline results and the morale is lowered.

7. Arrangements should be made with the local authorities to receive prompt notice of an impending raid, to post observers, to have communications to include any anti-aircraft guns. A suitable alarm for extinguishing lights, and a general alarm, not to be sounded until a raid is reasonably certain, should be prescribed.

By command of General Pershing:

DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Report of Meeting at Compiègne, January 24, 1918

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

Compiègne, January 24, 1918.

Minutes of the Conference Held at Compiègne
French G. H. Q., Jan. 24, 1918.

PRESENT:

FRANCE

General Foch
General Pétain
General Anthoine
General de Barescut
Colonel Desticker

ENGLAND

Marshal Sir D. Haig
General Sir W. Robertson
Major General Sir H. A.
Lawrence
Major General Davidson
Col. W. M. St. G. Kirke
Lt. Col. Spiers

UNITED STATES

General Pershing
Colonel Boyd

General Pétain gives the floor to General Robertson.

General Robertson states that he and General Foch have asked for this meeting in view of their responsibilities to their respective governments. They would like to know, in a general way, the plans prepared by the Commander-in-Chief and to get from them a general statement of the situation with respect to the following matters:

- (1) Mutual support of the Allied armies.
- (2) Situation in the matter of reserves and formation of a general reserve.
- (3) Withdrawal of the Allied forces in Italy.
- (4) Questions of the shipment of American troops and the facilities placed at their disposal in France.

General Pétain, in reply to the first question, states that the French army, because of its limited means, will await the German attack, remaining on the defensive. The diminution of our effectives has already forced us to inactivate 5 divisions. Our resources in the zone of the interior do not permit us to keep our front supplied later than the beginning of April, even without battle. From then on we shall be forced to inactivate more units. Indeed we have to face the necessity of dissolving 20 divisions by the end of 1918. To this diminution of effectives we must add the losses resulting from battle.

We will therefore remain on the defensive, operating on successive prepared lines. However, we have organized 4 offensive battlefields, which we will use if circumstances are favorable.

Furthermore, we have made preparations to move available reserves by rail. They will be employed on the French or British front for relief or to check the enemy on a threatened front.

General Robertson asks how important the offensive operations are that have been prepared.

General Pétain replies that these operations are prepared on 4 army fronts, each involving the employment of 15 divisions.

Sir D. Haig remarks that the English have adopted the same line of procedure as the French. One-third of his divisions are in reserve or will be after February. Generally speaking, his troops have three lines available on which to offer resistance.

General Foch asks for information concerning the offensive battlefields prepared on the British front.

Marshal Haig states that he has prepared 3 battlefields, one near Gonnellieu, the second around Lens, the third near Gheluvelt-Becelaere, and that it is planned to engage 5 divisions on each of them.

General Foch states that the best way to stop a powerful and sustained hostile offensive, an offensive of attrition and desperate stubbornness, is to open a powerful offensive of one's own.

The German offensive at Verdun was checked, not by our resistance at Verdun, but by our offensive on the Somme.

But such an operation is possible only if it is anticipated and prepared. And with what will it be carried out? With whatever French and British forces may be available.

Therefore the entire Franco-British front must be considered and not the French front or the British front independently of each other. What we need is not two separate plans, but one joint plan, looking toward and preparing for offensive action at the chosen moment and on a common battleground of all available Allied forces.

General Pétain makes the observation that in 1916 the Germans attacked at only one point and that they had only 125 divisions. They will now have 170, 180, possibly 200 divisions and will attack in three places simultaneously or successively; at each point the attacks can be more violent than at Verdun.

In that case, when shall we launch our reserves? If we engage them in an offensive, we shall find ourselves stripped in the face of an enemy attack following the first.

General Foch replies that our combined offensive must be launched with the objective for which it was planned. It is impossible *a priori* to determine the exact time. The attack on Verdun began February 21, and the Somme offensive was not launched until July 1. But it is certain that this offensive, which had a decisive effect on the campaign of 1916, could not have been staged, if several months had not been devoted to planning and preparing for it. We do not want to forget this in 1918.

General Pétain declares himself to be substantially in agreement with the foregoing but again observes that the inactivating of 20 French divisions in 1918 results in our not having troops available to enable us to take the offensive.

General Robertson remarks that in the discussion thus far we have assumed that the Germans would start several powerful offensives simultaneously. It is nevertheless possible that their attacks may have neither the severity nor the multiplicity attributed to them.

Moreover we have been talking about attrition of our effectives. But does anybody know what the attrition of German effectives is?

General Pétain replies that the Germans still have the means to refill all their divisions once, whereas we cannot do it.

Marshal Haig observes that he is ready to launch a counteroffensive. The business of picking the troops who will have to execute it still remains, but the work of equipping the selected sectors has been completed.

General Robertson inquires whether General Foch is inclined to more offensive action in the conduct of the operations.

General Foch replies in the negative but again observes that nothing in our plans concerns the final battle, when every last available Allied man, French, British, and American, will be used.

He requested then that no more battlefields be organized but that preparations be made for the employment of the Allied forces that are available at any given moment.

General Pétain replies that in 1917 French forces went to the assistance of the British army (French First Army in Flanders, French divisions sent toward Cambrai). He

adds that he would render our Allies the same assistance again if the situation should arise, and that he counts on reciprocity.

General Robertson observes that it seem essential to point out specifically those parts of the front on which withdrawals may be made and those where it is necessary to fight in place at all costs.

General Pétain says that the parts of the French front that he considers sensitive are: Alsace, the Nancy region, Champagne, the region between the Aisne and Reims; and that the region between Arras and St-Quentin seems to him the most sensitive part of the British front.

On the French front there can be no falling back in the Nancy region nor in that around Reims.

Marshal Haig states that the whole British front is sensitive. Nowhere can there be any falling back, unless it might be in the zone immediately south of St-Quentin.

General Robertson says that it is not certain that the Germans will attack at as many points and in as much force as has been thought. How are we to count on winning the war? It cannot be won if we remain always on the defensive. We must therefore take the offensive at some time or other. Could General Foch explain how and where he thinks this offensive might be undertaken?

General Foch replies that he has not been charged with the study of a combined offensive plan and could not therefore indicate in what region this plan could be put into effect. But he points out insistently that we have only prepared palliatives for the enemy offensive. We have no large-scale, vigorous parry. The offensive that must be prepared must be greater and of a joint nature.

General Robertson is of the opinion - concurring with General Foch - that a good strong offensive would be an excellent thing, but states that he cannot see how, where, or with what means it is to be executed. We cannot, he adds, win the war by staying on the defensive.

Marshal Haig remarks: "Let's bring back the troops from Salonika, and we'll start offensives."

General Foch replies: "We're not talking about offensives but about counter-offensives."

General Pétain says that on this basic idea there is complete agreement, but that the means are lacking unless we can count on the Americans in 1918.

The Somme region seems, furthermore, the best for a joint offensive.

Employment of French and English reserves on a common battleground will be covered by an understanding, General Pétain being entirely agreeable to supporting Marshal Haig by sending him his reserves if he [Pétain] has any.

General Robertson declares: "As I see it, reciprocal support of the French and British armies amounts to this: Either by making reliefs to assist each other, or by sending reserves to the threatened point, or by starting counteroffensives. What more can be done?"

Cooperation of American Forces

General Pétain replies: "Nothing, without the Americans."

General Robertson then inquires concerning the extent of American cooperation then being planned on the French front.

General Pétain says: "We expect that in the month of May one American army corps of four divisions will be in line. But these four divisions will not yet be ready for an offensive.

"To hasten the time when American aid will really be of use to us, it would be highly desirable to amalgamate the American forces in the French divisions, at the rate of one American regiment to the French division, this regiment being considered as part of the division, not only for training but also for employment." This procedure would be applied until such time as the American army is strong enough to be independent.

General Robertson dwells upon the necessity of the rapid arrival of American forces.

General Pershing says that this arrival depends on shipping, over which he has no control; everybody is familiar with the tonnage situation and its problems.

As to the employment of American troops, he declares that on the day that offensive action is required of American troops, the American army must be independent.

He declared that he is opposed to amalgamation of American troops with Allied troops, except for training; that amalgamation with French troops presented further special difficulties because of the difference in languages.

Amalgamation of American and Allied troops for battle could not take place except in case of absolute necessity.

General Pétain observes that language differences being no obstacle to joint training, they should not prevent joint employment.

General Robertson inquires whether, in this matter of the arrival of American troops, French port and railroad capacity does not contribute a greater problem than the present insufficiency of shipping.

General Pershing says that difficulties have been encountered due to the lack of liaison between the army and the navy, to questions of ballast, to the number of officials to whom it is necessary to go at the ports, and to the lack of rolling stock.

These difficulties have been reported to the ministers of war, Messrs. Painlevé and Clémenceau and to Mr. Claveille.

General Pétain and General Robertson inquire whether General Foch cannot see to it that the difficulties reported are removed.

General Foch replies that he will very willingly apply himself to that effect when the problem is referred to him. But he adds that the speed of the arrival of American troops depends not only on debarkation facilities, but also on departure conditions.

General Pershing replies to a question by General Pétain, that departures from America are under the direction of the Secretary of War, acting in conjunction with the shipping board, and that he, General Pershing, can do nothing except to expedite debarkations.

General Robertson asks General Pershing whether, in case sufficient shipping were immediately available, it would be possible to count on finding in the United States at this date, ten divisions absolutely ready and prepared to leave.

General Pershing replies: "No. Our plan is to ship or embark some 12 to 13 divisions from now to July, which will make a total of about 18 divisions around that date. Of course, once these divisions reach France, they will still need more training."

General Robertson asks whether the different divisions have about the same value in quality and training.

General Pershing says that it is difficult to answer this question. The National Guard was organized [sic] in August and after some time devoted to getting it located, it began its training. Generally speaking, its officers are not of the best, but the majority of the enlisted personnel composing it have already received a certain amount of training. As for the draftees, they belong to the first category to be called and the first of them entered the service last October. They are, General Pershing states, men of very high military value.

Withdrawal of Allied Forces in Italy

General Robertson states that inasmuch as there appears to be no reason to fear an enemy offensive in Italy before the month of May, the time would seem opportune to bring the Allied forces back to France from Italy, especially since the German attacks on the Franco-British front may be launched well before the month of May. He requests the opinion of General Foch on this point.

General Foch replies that if, as a matter of fact, an enemy offensive in Italy is not to be expected before the month of May, still it is necessary to leave a certain number of troops in Italy, because of the need further to strengthen the Italian army and to go ahead with its reorganization and training.

Nevertheless a part of these forces could be withdrawn right away, if it were necessary.

Plans should also be laid to ship all of these forces back to France. It should be noted that the movements from Italy to France will be much speedier than movement in the opposite direction, because it will be unnecessary, at least initially, to pay any attention to the shipment of food and munitions.

SWC (MR) 14: Joint Note

Formation of a General Reserve Proposed

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES,

Versailles, January 25, 1918.

JOINT NOTE NO. 14

Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by its Military Representatives

THE GENERAL RESERVE

To: The Supreme War Council

The military representatives have the honor to inform you that at their meeting held on January 23, 1918, they passed the following resolution:

The military representatives are of opinion that the formation of a general reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the western front, both in France and Italy, is imperative.

The military representatives recommend that in view of its urgency the creation of this reserve should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council, and, so as to prepare for this decision, the governments should inform the military representatives as soon as possible of the views of their chiefs of the staff and Commanders-in-Chief on this subject, in particular with regard to the number, situation, and command of this reserve.

WEYGAND,
Military
Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council.

HENRY WILSON,
25.1.18 General,
Military,
Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council.

L. CADORNA,
Military
Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

Organization of Communications for the American Army

[Contemporary Translation]

4th Bureau

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,

No. 3771/TR

Postal Sector No. 10, January 25, 1918.

From: General Ragueneau, Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To: The General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

[Extract]

* * * * *

During their last interviews General Pershing and General Pétain have considered the conditions under which the American army might possibly be employed upon any part of the front.

It is in accordance with these considerations that the present study has been made. Two hypotheses may be considered:

1st Hypothesis, The American troops occupy any part of the front between Belfort and Reims: In this case the supplies destined to be forwarded to the American troops may be directed from the depots and stocks around Is-sur-Tille and the regulating station charged with supplying the American troops.

This regulating station would be, according to the exact location of the American troops, either Liffol-le-Grand or the French regulating station (Connantre, St-Dizier, or Cray), assigned to the American army in exchange for Liffol-le-Grand.

2nd Hypothesis, The American troops are engaged in the part of the front between Reims and l'Oise: In this case the American troops could be resupplied, according to their exact location, by one of the regulating stations of Creil, Bourget, or of Noisy-le-Sec, which the French army would turn over to the Americans in exchange for Liffol-le-Grand.

However, the depots and supply dumps of Is-sur-Tille are too far away from these regulating stations, which could only be reached by following one of our lateral lines of maneuver railroad, to be able satisfactorily to serve as depots midway between the bases or the depots of the interior and the regulating stations. Under this assumption it would be necessary to create between Les Aubrais and Juvisy an installation similar to that at Is-sur-Tille. The region Toury-Angerville appears to be well placed for this installation. Is-sur-Tille would then function as an annex of Toury-Angerville.

Conclusion: Under the first hypothesis it is necessary to continue the work at Is-sur-Tille and to complete it as rapidly as possible in accordance with the original plan and therefore to undertake immediately the work on Liffol-le-Grand.

Under the second hypothesis it is necessary to finish up as above the works at Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand, and in addition, to study the installation of the new depots, etc., between Angerville and Toury.

I have the honor to ask you to be kind enough to inform me as to your opinion on this subject, inviting your close attention to the urgency which there is in any case to push very actively the work at Is-sur-Tille and at Liffol-le-Grand.

By order:

*(Signature illegible),
Chief of the General Staff.*

Cable: A-697-R

Use of French Liners for Transportation of American Troops

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., January 26, 1918.

GENERAL PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. Question of using French liners for transportation American troops now being considered with French High Commissioner. These vessels land at Bordeaux necessary to obtain permission[will it be practicable]to perfect arrangements for handling approximately 2,500 troops per month through this port? Your recommendations desired. Biddle

* * * * *

McCAIN.

AG, GHQ, AEF: 9110-A28: Memorandum

Instruction Governing the Casual Officers Depot at Blois

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS, A. E. F.,

Tours, January 26, 1918.

MEMORANDUM TO: C. O., Blois

[Extract]

The following general instructions are furnished for your information and guidance:

1. The C. O. is charged with all duties connected with reception, classification, and forwarding of all casual officers and enlisted personnel at Blois.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Kernan:

F. A. WILCOX,
Adjutant General.

Authority to Organize Army Corps in France

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., January 26, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE

[Extract]

* * * * *

13. With reference to paragraph 1 your 504 under the provisions of Section 3 Act of Congress approved June 3, 1916, President of the United States authorizes you to organize army corps in France as recommended by you.

* * * * *

SWC: 3d Session: Minutes

Utilization of American Forces

[Extract]

January 30, 1918.

* * * * *

M. Clémenceau suggested that the Supreme War Council should first consider Note 12 of the military representatives dealing with the general plan of operations for 1918.

Mr. Lloyd George concurred and suggested that the note should be given what in English Parliamentary procedure would be called a second reading, i. e., that its general principles should be accepted, subject to such amendments or alterations in detail as might emerge as a result of subsequent discussion.

The Supreme War Council having accepted the note in principle, M. Clémenceau invited General Foch to open the discussion in detail.

General Foch said that he was in agreement with the note that the Allies would have to be on the defensive on the western front from Nieuport to Venice, at any rate in the opening stages of the campaign of 1918, but that this defensive might, according to circumstances, be converted into an offensive, as indicated in the plans annexed to the note. It was necessary to envisage the possibility of attacks for the purpose of which the enemy would have absorbed large forces brought over from Russia. The Allied plan must take account both of the defensive organization of each of the armies and, in the event of a really important attack, of the necessity of a general reserve. A general reserve which could be moved from one part of the front to the other was a necessary feature of a plan of defense involving so long a front with limited resources. He summed up the fundamental bases of the Allied defense for 1918 as, firstly, the complete arrangements on the front of each army, and, secondly, the possibility of an appeal to the total reserves of the coalition in order to meet a very heavy attack. He presumed that the respective chiefs of staff and Commanders-in-Chief would work out their plans on these lines.

Signor Orlando expressed the view that the arrangements for the defensive and the constitution of the general reserve were intimately connected.

Sir W. Robertson agreed with General Foch that it was necessary to have arrangements for an offensive combined with the defensive. The offensive was, in fact, the best form of defensive. General Foch, however, proposed an offensive on a bigger scale than he thought possible. It was all a question of means. He suggested that the opinion of the Commanders-in-Chief should be asked as to the means at their disposal.

General Cadorna said that the principles expressed by General Foch and Sir W. Robertson were the same as those upon which the military representatives had based their plans. The only question was carrying those principles into execution.

General Bliss said that he was in full concord as to the necessity for a general defensive in 1918, coupled with preparations for making use of every opportunity afforded for a counteroffensive. In his opinion, the formation of a general reserve was an essential part of the general plan.

Sir Douglas Haig agreed with General Foch and Sir William Robertson as to the necessity for acting on the defensive to begin with, and if possible passing over to the offensive later. He doubted, however, if means for the latter were available. He had prepared three sectors on the front for an offensive, and General Pétain had, he understood, four similar sectors. The idea was to attract the enemy's reserves, but it was always possible, or, indeed, probable, that the enemy would take countermeasures, and that these local attacks might fail to draw away many of the enemy's reserves. In fact, we cannot hope, with the small means at our disposal, to secure very great results from these offensives. On the other hand, a large offensive such as had been indicated by General Foch was not, in his opinion, practicable. He considered that if the enemy attacked in force the situation would be very serious by the autumn. In the case of the British army the normal excess of recruits coming in over casualties was about 5,000 a month. It was necessary to admit the possibility of a loss of 500,000 men, equivalent to the loss of 33 divisions, by November in the event of heavy fighting, or, deducting for the normal excess of recruits coming in for the nine months, for a net loss of 30 divisions. The present strength of the British army was 57 divisions and even after allowing for the addition of American units of a total strength equivalent to 8 divisions, that would mean that by the end of October the British force would have sunk to about 35 divisions.

As regards the American forces, our own experience had been that our new divisions required nine months' home training and six months' training in France before they were fit for hard fighting, though they could be put into quiet sections of the line before that. Nor could one expect that the American divisions could be placed in the line together in any number without inviting a heavy German attack. He consequently did not consider the Allies could expect the American force, as a force, to be of effective support this year.

General Pétain agreed with the principles expressed by the previous speakers in favour of combining the measure of offensive with the defensive. He had already organized schemes for the offensive, and the whole of the plans, both for the defensive and for the preparation of sectors for local attacks, had been completed between Sir Douglas Haig and himself. He would have an army ready to support Sir Douglas Haig in an emergency, and he knew Sir Douglas Haig would be ready to assist him in the same manner. With regard to the question of effectives, he agreed with Sir Douglas Haig that the situation was very serious. The French nation had made all the effort it could make, and could go no further. Men of fifty years of age were with the colours, and every man who could dig or handle an instrument of any sort was in the trenches. He had already been compelled to suppress 5 divisions, and though he would be able to fill up the gaps in his army up to April 1, he would be compelled between that date and October 1 to suppress 25 divisions more, bringing the army down to something like 75 divisions, simply in consequence of the normal losses along the front, and without any heavy fighting. If there were a big battle the losses of that battle would involve still further reductions.

As regards the American army, he agreed entirely with the conclusions arrived at by Sir Douglas Haig. In fact, in his opinion, the American army, if it wished to retain its

autonomy, would be of no use to the Allies in 1918, except, perhaps, along some quiet section of the front. There was only one way in which the American army could really participate in the operations of 1918, and that was by amalgamation with the British and French armies. In his opinion, the entry of American troops by battalions or regiments into French or English divisions, not only for training, but also for fighting, was much the greatest assistance that the United States could give the Allies, and would furnish the solution of the crisis with regard to effectives. It would also mean a saving of tonnage if the United States concentrated on sending over their infantry in the first instance, and leaving the artillery, horses, etc., to come later. The suggested amalgamation, of course, was only temporary. The American army would get back its units afterwards and become fully autonomous. Unless this were done the reductions in divisions foreseen by him and by Sir Douglas Haig would certainly come into effect, and the war would enter into a very critical period.

* * * * *

(The Supreme War Council adjourned till 3 p. m. on January 31.)

SWC: 3d Session: Minutes

American Attitude Toward Amalgamation of Troops in British and French Units

In regard to the question which had been twice asked by Baron Sonnino as to whether the American Government would allow the minor units of each division to be amalgamated with British and French divisions, in order that they could most effectively perform their part in the emergency which was assumed to be approaching within the next few months, General Bliss stated in substance as follows:

To ask the United States formally to declare now and in advance of the emergency that it will permit its units to be amalgamated with British and French divisions is to make unnecessarily difficult the solution of the problem which you are studying, i. e., the most effective utilization of American manpower under present conditions. Everything possible is now being done to prepare for this effective utilization of American manpower without the formal declaration by my government which Baron Sonnino appears to desire. Yesterday the British Government agreed to bring over six American divisions, with the understanding that they would train the infantry battalions of these divisions on the British front. If the German attack finds these battalions on the British front they will fight to the extent of their capacity wherever the attack finds them. Also, General Pershing entered into an agreement with General Pétain by which the organizations of his divisions will receive their final training on the French line. It goes without saying that neither our battalions on the British front nor our other organizations on the French front can be withdrawn for the purpose of forming complete American divisions under their own officers while the German attack is being made or is being prepared. If the crisis should come the American troops will undoubtedly be used in whatever way their services will be most effective, either in defense or offense, with the British and French troops with whom they are at the time serving. It is to be clearly understood, however, that this training of American units with British and French divisions, whether behind the lines or in actual combat on the line, is only a stepping stone in the training of the American forces, and that whenever it is proper and practicable to do so these units will be formed into American divisions under their own officers. Such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment.

*Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Third Session
of the Supreme War Council held at the Trianon Palace, Versailles
on Thursday, January 31, 1918, at 3 p. m.*

[Extract]

* * * * *

M. Clémenceau, as chairman, put forward the Joint Note 12 submitted by the military representatives on the 1918 campaign.

* * * * *

M. Clémenceau expressed his disapprobation of the eastern plan of the Joint Note, and insisted that the security of the western front overrode all other considerations. The treason of Russia (he used the word deliberately) had exposed the Allies to the greatest danger they had yet run in the war, but the accession of America to the Alliance would counterbalance it. This was his plan to hold out this year, 1918, till the American assistance came in full force; after that America would win the war. All he asked was, hold out on the western front this year. He protested against embarking on this eastern adventure, when so dreadful a danger was imminent near to Paris itself. He proposed to accept the first part of the note, and, without in any way questioning Great Britain's right to engage in a campaign in the east, to reject the second.

Baron Sonnino proposed, as it was agreed that no further resources in manpower could be found among the western Allies, to ask the Americans what their views on the proposed embodiment of American units in the French and British armies were; the adoption of this proposal might considerably accelerate the usefulness of the American help.

Mr. Lloyd George in answer to the last remarks of M. Clémenceau, urged the Supreme War Council not to lose sight of the importance of the east, and insisted that, on the figures prepared by the general staffs, the Allies were in the west taking risks considerably less than had been taken by the Germans on the same front during the war. He asked whether M. Clémenceau proposed we should retire from Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Salonica. He pointed out that we would not get more than two divisions out of the abandonment of the eastern offensive campaign; that was all even that Sir Douglas Haig hoped for.

A general discussion to which Generals Bliss, Pershing, and Pétain, and other members of the Supreme War Council contributed, then followed. It was ascertained how the American troops were to be embodied, and at what rate they would become an effective combatant force.

General Bliss explained that the principle on which he calculated his effective combatant forces, after the spring of this year, was to take the total number of American troops on French soil at a given date and to deduct from it the number of troops that had arrived during the three months previous to that date at the rate of two divisions a month. At the end of September he would have 24 divisions on French soil, and 18, therefore, effective combatant divisions.

In order to expedite their training, some of the American troops would be attached as battalion or regimental units to the Allied forces for purposes of training; when undergoing this training they would, of course, do their duty and take part in any engagements in which they might find themselves involved, if judged capable to do so. But when this period of training was over, they would be assembled in purely American divisions under their own commanders.

(The meeting adjourned at 6:45 p. m. to 10 a. m. the following day.)

Headquarters I Army Corps Organized

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

January 31, 1918.

Return of the Headquarters I Army Corps for the month of January 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

RECORD OF EVENTS

I Army Corps organized January 20, 1918, under provisions of G. O. 9, H. A. E. F., 1918.

* * * * *

*H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.*

SWC: 3d Session: Resolutions

General Reserve Established

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,

Versailles, February 2, 1918.

Resolutions passed at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council,
January to February 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

BRITISH TEXT

* * * * *

Resolution No. 13

1. The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of a general reserve for the whole of the armies on the western, Italian, and Balkan fronts.

2. The Supreme War Council delegates to an executive committee composed of the permanent military representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with General Foch for France, the following powers to be exercised in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies concerned:

(a) To determine the strength in all arms and composition of the general reserve, and the contribution of each national army thereto.

(b) To select the localities in which the general reserve is normally to be stationed.

(c) To make arrangements for the transportation and concentration of the general reserve in the different areas.

(d) To decide and issue orders as to the time, place, and period of employment of the general reserve; the orders of the executive committee for the movement of the general reserve shall be transmitted in the manner and by the persons who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose in each particular case.

(e) To determine the time, place, and strength of the counteroffensive, and then to hand over to one or more of the Commanders-in-Chief the necessary troops for the operation. The moment this movement of the general reserve, or of any part of it, shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commanders-in-Chief to whose assistance it is consigned.

(f) Until the movement of the general reserve begins, it will, for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the executive committee.

3. In case of irreconcilable differences of opinion on a point of importance connected with the general reserve, any military representative has the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

4. In order to facilitate its decisions, the executive committee has the right to visit any theater of war.

5. The Supreme War Council will nominate the president of the executive committee from among the members of the committee.

Resolution No. 14

The Supreme War Council designate General Foch as president of the executive committee for the general reserve.

* * * * *

SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

Two Divisions per Month Required

No. 19-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Paris, February 2, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Acting Chief of Staff

1. As stated in my number 16 the British have agreed to bring over in their own tonnage the personnel of six complete American divisions the last troops arriving not later than June. We have now in France five organized divisions. Yesterday the Supreme War Council adopted a resolution addressed to the four governments stating as an absolutely necessary condition for the safety of the western front during the year 1918 that American troops must arrive at the rate of not less than two complete divisions per month. This rate of movement must begin at once. If it can be done we will have here 21 divisions by about July. It is of vital importance that this be done. Can you do it? It requires only a moderate increase in troops.

BLISS.

SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

General Military Policy

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, February 3, 1918.

No. 21-S

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Acting Chief of Staff

1. The third session of the Supreme War Council began Wednesday, January 30 and continued till final adjournment at noon, February 2. It considered 14 joint notes of the military representatives and two separate resolutions the full text of which will be forwarded by confidential hands. The action on those of essential importance is indicated below.

2. The approved joint notes numbers seven, eight, nine, and thirteen created as sub-agencies of the Supreme War Council Interallied Commissions on aviation transportation tanks and supply.

3. All that follows to be held in absolute confidence;

Joint Notes number one and number twelve were on the subject of general military policy for 1918 and general plan of campaign for 1918 respectively. The general military policy approved by the Supreme War Council for 1918 involves a general defensive attitude combined with readiness to take advantage of any opportunity for the offensive. The general plan of campaign for 1918 is to be one of general defense on the western, the Italian, and the Macedonian fronts. The English insisted upon an offensive campaign in Asia Minor with a view to detaching Turkey from alliance with the Central Powers. This was supported by the Italians. The French strongly objected. Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner said that this offensive campaign would be conducted by British forces now in the eastern theatre and would not divert troops from the western front. The British Military

Advisor supported this position. The British Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff opposed it. The final action of the Supreme War Council was as follows:

The Supreme War Council accepts Note 12 of the military representatives on the plan of campaign for 1918, the British Government having made it clear that, in utilizing in the most effective fashion the forces already at its disposal in the eastern theatre, it has no intention of diverting forces from the western front or in any way relaxing its efforts to maintain the safety of that front which it regards as of vital interest to the whole alliance.

In Note 12 the arrival in France of at least two American divisions each month is stated as an essential condition on which the plan of campaign is based and is *sine qua non* to the safety of the western front. This imposes on us the obligation to provide this monthly minimum and necessary tonnage must be obtained from our own resources.

4. Joint Note Number 14 was on the subject of an interallied general reserve for the campaign of 1918 for use according to circumstances on the British, French, Italian, or Macedonian fronts.

5. By the adoption of the first paragraph of Note 14 the Supreme War Council decided to establish a general interallied reserve. A special executive consisting of General Foch, chairman, and Generals Wilson, Cadorna, and Bliss, military representatives with the Supreme War Council of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States was created and was charged with the duty of determining the composition and strength of the general reserve and the contribution of each nation thereto; the selection of localities in which the general reserve is normally to be stationed; the decision and issuance of orders as to time, place, and period of employment; the determination of the time, place, and strength of the counteroffensive and the transfer to the proper Commanders-in-Chief of the troops necessary for the operation.

BLISS.

NOTE: All the above joint notes were prepared before the arrival of American military representative and were not signed by him. Copies furnished to Gen. Pershing.

SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

Creation of the Interallied General Reserve

No. 22-S

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, February 4, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For Acting Chief of Staff

At their meeting today the military representatives of the Supreme War Council adopted the following resolution: "The military representatives wish respectfully to draw the attention of the governments represented on the Supreme War Council to the undesirability, for military reasons, of any public discussion in the press or otherwise, of the arrangements now being taken in hand for the creation and employment of an interallied general reserve." The foregoing resulted from a message received today from Mr. Lloyd George calling attention to the grave embarrassment that would result from publicity especially in the British and American press.

BLISS.

Loading of Troop Transports

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 5, 1918.

PERSHING, AMEXFORCE, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. Advise your views on the following recommendations made by Vice Admiral Sims.

a. That the army authorities be directed to give troop transport preference in unloading.

b. That freight carried on troop transports be of such nature that it can be readily handled in any of the French ports that is it should contain no heavy weights; no material difficult to handle.

c. Troop transports destined to France should have minimum of freight.

d. Deep-draft vessels should be operated in the same group if practicable.

Recommendations made in (b) now in effect full cargo capacity troop transports being utilized for troop equipment, subsistence, and clothing which is necessary at this time.
Biddle.

* * * * *

McCAIN.

Interallied Reserve

[Editorial Translation]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

Versailles, February 6, 1918.

No. 2 C/E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN ARMIES

The Supreme War Council has decided upon the creation of an interallied general reserve and, after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief, has delegated to the executive committee the mission of organizing it, of determining its location and of deciding upon its employment.

Concerning the first two points, alone considered in this memorandum, the executive committee is of the opinion that:

(1) The general reserve should be made up of a sufficient number of divisions to make it possible directly to meet the immediate needs of the defensive, as well as to undertake a powerful counteroffensive on a rather extensive front. This means temporarily allocating some thirty divisions to it.

This figure represents only about a seventh of the total number of English, French, and Italian divisions, a proportion smaller than the proportion generally allowed for reserves; it is therefore a minimum, to lower which would mean giving up a general reserve really capable of swaying the issue of battle.

(2) The committee is of the further opinion that it is necessary to determine the contribution of each of the Allied armies toward the formation of this general reserve of 30 divisions according to the following table:

	English Army	French Army	Italian Army
English Front	6 or 7*		
French Front		9 or 10**	
Italian Front	3	4	7
	<u>9 or 10</u>	<u>13 or 14</u>	<u>7</u>
	[Total] about 30		

* This last figure, provided in the reorganized Belgian army can extend its front to the general vicinity of the LANGE-MARCK Railroad, which would free about 2 English divisions.

** Including inf. divs. held in reserve in the Dunkirk region.

In this distribution, the following has been taken into account:

(a) The proportion of one-seventh of the forces indicated above.

(b) The fact that the 11 French and English divisions now in Italy must be considered as a part of the interallied general reserve, placed in November at the disposal of the Italian High Command.

The necessity, from the standpoint of morale and for the sake of close comradeship between the Allied armies, of initially keeping some of these French and English divisions in Italy.

(3) It is also the opinion of the committee that the divisions of each army designated to be part of the general reserve should be quartered as a rule in the zone of their army:

(a) The French and English divisions on the Franco-British front at such distance from the front as to permit rapid intervention: Whether on the French front in

the case of the English divisions, or on the English front in the case of the French divisions; and prepared for an immediate move to any point on the Italian front.

(b) The Italian divisions on the Italian front in the zones lending themselves both to rapid intervention on the Italian front and to movement to the Franco-British front.

(c) The French and English divisions on the Italian front widely distributed so as to be able to cope with the following different eventualities:

(1) Reinforcement of the Italian front.

(2) Protection of the Italo-Swiss frontier in case of violation Swiss territory by the enemy.

(3) Employment on the French front. (These considerations would result in effecting a distribution on both sides of the Alps, of the divisions of the general reserve taken from the English and French divisions of the Italian front; on one side, in the region of MILAN-NOVARE, on the other side, in the LYONS region. In that case, their distance from the different fronts would create difficulties in the training of these divisions, such as the rotation of units for service at the front, etc. The commanders are requested to make known their opinions on this subject.)

* * * * *

The executive committee requests the Commanders-in-Chief to examine without delay the inquiries that have been submitted to them.

In presenting the remarks suggested by these inquiries they are requested to state the exact quartering zones they recommend and the number of divisions of the general reserve located in each of these zones, as well as the units of heavy artillery and aviation which in their opinion should enter into the composition of the general reserve in addition to those belonging organically to the divisions or army corps designated to make it up.

It is of the utmost importance that the interallied general reserve be organized without delay.

<i>Representing France, President of the Executive Committee</i>	<i>British Military Representative to the Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Italian Military Representative to the Supreme War Council</i>	<i>American Military Representative to the Supreme War Council</i>
<i>FOCH, General.</i>	<i>WILSON, General.</i>	<i>CADORNA, General</i>	<i>BLISS, General.</i>

For General Foch,
President of the Executive Committee of the Supreme War Council.

*WEYGAND,
General.*

Location of an American Sector

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 6, 1918.

1. The memorandum of the operations section is very exhaustive.
2. The question of building up an American sector between St-Mihiel and Pont-à-Mousson has been practically decided by agreement between General Pétain and myself. As to the extension of the line to the east or west, it is likely eventually to be extended in both directions, beginning probably by extension toward the west.
3. Therefore we should begin to make plans to carry out necessary construction leading up to what is to become the American sector.

J. J. PERSHING.

GHQ, AEF: War Diary: Item 242-1-t

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 6, 1918.

3-727-R. Following is substance of communication received from British Ambassador at Washington and which is approved by Secretary of War:

British military authorities have represented that an emergency might occur such as imminence of raid or invasion by enemy, in which it would become necessary to employ British and Allied troops in England in combined operations. In case of such emergency they request that the officer in command of American troops in England be instructed to receive his orders from the senior combatant British officer present who could act as mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief of the command in which such troops are employed. From military standpoint consider it very desirable that an understanding as to command be reached previous to any emergency.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 681-IV: Memorandum

American Sector

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel W. D. Connor

The Commander-in-Chief made a tentative decision yesterday to adopt the present section occupied by our 1st Division and to extend our line to the left. The understanding was that this decision would only be tentative until an opportunity was had to make a study of it.

General Ragueneau suggested that a combined study be made by French and American officers. General Pershing desires you, representing the supply end of it, and Colonel Fox Conner, operations, to represent us in this study.

Please call on General Ragueneau to name the French officer or officers to accompany you and take the necessary action. The idea was that our railhead would be at Sorcy-sur-Meuse and that our supplies will take the line Gondrecourt-Sorcy.

Colonel Fox Conner is at the headquarters of the 1st Division, but you can communicate with him and have him meet you wherever you desire.

J. G. HARBORD,
Chief of Staff.

SOS: Gen. File No. 14: Letter

Labor Troops

Coordination Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 7, 1918.

From: C-in-C

To: C. G., L. of C.

1. Authority has just been obtained from the C-in-C for a certain draft on the next troops to arrive in France for construction purposes. The entire situation as regards labor has been presented to him and he has approved a definite program for the next three months.

2. In order to make a satisfactory distribution of labor it is desired that you submit, as soon as practicable, a program to cover your needs for the next month and that a similar program be submitted on March 1 covering the month of March. These programs should be in detail and should show the number of men required for the different places, in order that some order of priority can be established and should include your needs for depot troops and other purposes.

3. Similar programs will be called for from the D. G. T. and based upon these programs labor will be assigned for the best interests of the service.

By order of the C-in-C:

W. D. CONNOR,
Colonel, General Staff, N. A.,
Chief of Section.

Employment of Combat Troops as Labor Troops

Operations Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 8, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The attached communication[omitted] authorizes the employment of the troops of the next division to arrive in France on the line of communications and in the transportation department.

2. The question involved has a special significance in the relation to the employment in the near future of the combat divisions of the I Corps.

3. We have taken over a sector of the line and made public announcement thereof. For reasons of morale, if no other, we will probably have to retain troops in this sector. We cannot expect the 1st Division to perform this duty indefinitely, another division should be available for this work in March.

The situation on the western front is liable to become active at any time. There seems to be every assurance that this situation will be acute if not critical by spring, that is, April or May. There can be little doubt but that the I Corps will be called upon to play some part in these operations. While it may start its operations in an inactive sector, the uncertainty of the whole situation makes possible rapid tactical changes. Once the corps occupies a sector, we can hardly expect its relief therefrom during the period of actual operations. There are then, possibilities of the I Corps becoming involved in a permanent sector for a long time, and also of having to undertake operations therein resulting in serious losses.

4. Every effort should be made to prepare for the above contingencies. Our divisions are now undergoing intensive training and their supply is gradually being perfected. However, the replacement system is not functioning. The four combat divisions of the I Corps are now short approximately 8,500 officers and soldiers. The only replacement division (41st) is short on paper about 4,500 officers and soldiers. Practically, it cannot furnish any replacements, as the existing personnel has not been trained and is now employed as labor troops and at schools. We have, therefore, no trained replacements in France available to meet the losses we may expect in the near future. At the same time we have no replacements in France undergoing training for this purpose. With the class of soldiers now arriving in France, individual training requires a minimum of two months before these men should be used as replacements in combat divisions.

5. The urgency for replacements and their training is evident. The urgency of the construction, etc., on the line of communications is also appreciated. However, the relative value of these two urgencies should be weighed on the scale of operations. It does not seem desirable or practicable and it may not be possible to keep the I Corps out of operations this spring. In an emergency, we can utilize French Lines of Communication facilities. It therefore appears more practicable to delay, if necessary, the line of communication's plan than to delay the preparation of the I Corps for its use in the coming operations.

6. It is therefore strongly recommended that:

(1) No line troops, especially infantry, of the next division (32d) to arrive in France be diverted for the line of communications or transportation department work.

(2) That all engineer troops and any other detachments of the combat divisions of the I Corps now employed under the coordination section, A. E. F., be returned to these divisions with the least practicable delay.

7. If the foregoing recommendations are put into effect, we will have by early spring at least one corps ready for operations. This corps will be a complete tactical unit with sufficient trained replacements to insure a strength necessary for operations and to maintain the desired morale.

If necessary, the arrival of combat troops of the second phase should be delayed in favor of labor troops. Such a policy seems to be wiser than one which prevents the complete organization, etc., of the only tactical unit available for certain active employment.

LeROY ELTINGE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Chief of Section.

AG, GHQ, AEF: File 341: Letter

Study on Staff Reorganization

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 8, 1918.

From: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

To: Colonel Johnson Hagood, Chief of Staff, L. of C.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has selected you as the senior officer of a board which he wishes to consider the desirability of any changes in the present organization of the Headquarters A. E. F., including a revision of G. O. 8 and Memorandum 129, these headquarters, 1917.

As a basis of the study to be made by your board, there are placed at your disposition the replies to the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of January 22 which invited comment and criticism on our organization from the chiefs of sections, general staff; heads of administrative and staff services; and the commanders of divisions and brigades; also a report by the Inspector General on the several staff departments at H. A. E. F.

Your board need not, however, confine its recommendations to the subject matter contained in these papers.

In general, the organization of the H. A. E. F. is working satisfactorily but it is realized that it is necessarily imperfect and that there is no doubt some overlapping of duties in some cases, and lack of clear definition as to the powers and duties of the several departments.

In general, the organization of the H. A. E. F. is working satisfactorily but it is necessarily imperfect and that there is no doubt some overlapping of duties in some cases, and lack of clear definition as to the powers and duties of the several departments.

2. The officers to be associated with you on this study are:

Colonel A. D. Andrews, Transportation Department
Lieut. Col. Frank R. McCoy, General Staff
Lieut. Col. Robert C. Davis, Adjutant General
Major S. P. Wetherill, Q. M. O. R. C.

3. While the Commander-in-Chief desires that this study be very carefully made,

it is desired that it have the exclusive command of your time until completed, and that it be expedited as much as possible.

J. G. HARBORD.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1868: Memorandum

Classification and Use of Troop Areas

Operations Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A. E. F.,

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 9, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION:

1. Due to the many changes which have recently taken place in the offices charged with the procuring and developing of the areas in which troops are to be placed, it is thought advisable to draw up the following memorandum on the different troops areas as they exist today with as accurate a prediction as possible with regard to their future use.

Troop areas may be divided roughly into the following classes:

Combat divisional areas, of which there are 13

Corps troop areas, of which there are at present 3

Replacement division areas

Base division areas

Billeting areas in proximity to the L. of C., and artillery instruction camps

Combat Division Areas

There have been, up to date, reconnoitered and turned over for our use by the French, thirteen combat division areas. Of these areas, the first has been almost entirely temporarily turned back to the French, the fifth has been entirely temporarily turned back to the French, the sixth has been temporarily turned back to the French with the exception of the aviation camp at Colombey-les-Belles, and the French have signified the possibility of our having to turn back the second area, now occupied by the 26th Division. The tenth divisional area has been designated as the replacement division area for the replacement division of the I Corps (32d Division). (Note: Verbal information has just been received that this has been changed to the seventh area); and the twelfth divisional area, in which the II Corps schools are now being located, will, in all likelihood, become the replacement divisional area for the replacement division of the II Corps when that corps is formed.

Corps Troops Areas

Of the three corps troops areas, the third has been designated as the area for the corps troops of the I Corps.

Replacement Division Areas

Of the thirteen areas selected for combat divisions, five of the most southerly will eventually be selected for the placing of the replacement divisions of the five corps.

Base Division Areas

The areas of St-Rivoal, Malestroit, Landes-de-Bagaron, La Courtine, and Castlejaloux were originally requested from and reconnoitered by the French as base division areas,

but due to the way in which matters have developed, La Courtine is the only one of these areas which is likely to be used for the purpose for which they were first intended. These areas should, however, be kept available for future use as rest areas, prison camps, or divisional training areas.

It will be seen later under the heading "Billeting Areas in Proximity to the L. of C." how two of these areas have developed into base division areas. It is thought that the final development of the base division areas for the five corps will be as follows: La Courtine, St-Aignan-des-Noyers, Périgueux West, Le Corneau, and a combination of the two artillery instruction camps now at Coëtquidan and Meucon, this latter proposition under the supposition that by the time the last corps has arrived these two camps will have served their purpose as artillery instruction camps and can be turned for use by the base division of the last corps to arrive.

Billeting Areas in Proximity to the L. of C.

These consisted originally of the following areas:

The St-Aignan-des-Noyers area

The Chinon area

The Ruffec area

The Pons area

The Périgueux West area

The Périgueux East area

The Marmande area, and

The Agen area

They were asked for originally with the idea of providing spillways or reservoirs into which troops could be put for a short time upon arrival in France, in the event of congestion in the divisional areas or on the L. of C.

With this end in view, areas were asked for in which a complete division could be billeted with the absolute minimum of necessary construction. In the course of development, two of these areas, the St-Aignan-des-Noyers area and the Périgueux West area have developed into base division areas for the base divisions of the I and II Corps respectively. It is thought that the remainder of these areas should ultimately serve the purpose for which they were originally intended.

Artillery Instruction Camps

The field artillery instruction camps are as follows: Le Valdahon, Coëtquidan, Meucon, and Souge. Of these camps, Le Valdahon is for one brigade, Coëtquidan is for two brigades, Meucon is for two brigades, and Souge is for two brigades. Of these camps, Meucon is not yet completed. It was stated to an officer of this section about the middle of January, by the American engineer officer who was at Meucon watching the progress of the work the French are doing there, that with good weather, Meucon should be ready for the reception of one brigade of field artillery by February 1 and complete for the two brigades by March 1. The officer of this section who was at Meucon is inclined to increase this time limit by about a month from what he observed during about a half hour's stay at Meucon.

2. The above cannot be taken as a definite plan for the future use of all these different classes of areas; but is given as a short summary of the history of the various areas up to date, and of their future possibilities as seen under existing circumstances.

LeROY ELTINGE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Chief of Section.