The Normandy Campaign, D-Day
Abstract
The Allied invasion of Normandy France was one of enormous proportion that forever changed the course of history. It would involve a mass of forces put together by the Allied nations unified under a single common goal and a single command for operation. The relationship of the overall Allied commandant commander, General Eisenhower with his subordinate combatant commanders was a formula for success. On the opposing side of the Allied forces was a Gennan force equally prepared to defend against the invasion. The Achilles heel for the Gennan defenders was the inability of their Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to have the flexibility of maneuvering his forces. Unlike the Allied force commanders, who were able to adjust the plans issued according to the enemy situation, Rommel and his commanders could not. Rommel would not be allowed to counter the Allied strikes has they occurred due to a system of command directives that separated Gennan forces and required permission form Higher Headquarters in Berlin before repositioning. This process caused took time away, allowing the tactical advantage to be on the side of the Allies. This paper will focus on the success of the Allied invasion while the Gennan counter focuses on Rommel having the ability to freely maneuver his forces like his Allied counterparts.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 17, 2005
- Accession Number
- AD1121552
Entities
People
- Christopher W. Pickett
- David N. Swaine
- Janos Gervai
- Mark A. Pickett
- Sean M. Brewer
Organizations
- United States Army Sergeants Major Academy