DOD SUPPLY CHAIN: Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms
Abstract
Why GAO Did This Study. Counterfeit parts--generally the misrepresentation of parts' identity or pedigree--can seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, harm weapon systems integrity, and endanger troops' lives. In a November testimony (GAO-12-213T), GAO summarized preliminary observations from its investigation into the purchase and authenticity testing of selected, military-grade electronic parts that may enter the DOD supply chain. As requested, this report presents GAOs final findings on this issue. The results are based on a nongeneralizable sample and cannot be used to make inferences about the extent to which parts are being counterfeited. GAO created a fictitious company and gained membership to two Internet platforms providing access to vendors selling military-grade electronic parts. GAO requested quotes from numerous vendors to purchase a total of 16 parts from three categories: (1) authentic part numbers for obsolete and rare parts; (2) authentic part numbers with postproduction date codes (date codes after the last date the part was manufactured); and (3) bogus, or fictitious, part numbers that are not associated with any authentic parts. To determine whether the parts received were counterfeit, GAO contracted with a qualified, independent testing lab for full component authentication analysis of the first two categories of parts, but not the third (bogus) category. Part numbers have been altered for reporting purposes.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- AD1122947
Entities
People
- Barbara Lewis
- Cindy B. Barnes
- Dennis Fauber
- Gary Bianchi
- Jeffery Mcdermott
- Kimberly Perteet
- Maria Mcmullen
- Ramon Rodriguez
- Richard J. Hillman
- Timothy Persons
- Timothy Walker
- Virginia Chanley
Organizations
- United States Government Accountability Office