Improving the "Front-End" of the DOD Acquisition Process

Abstract

This research builds on previous work by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) into the causes of acquisition program cost growth in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The previous study confirmed that much of the cost growth observed in eleven important DOD acquisition programs emanated from weaknesses in the processes at the start of the programs - that is at the "front-end" of the process. This study examines that front end for several programs expected to become MDAPs. The study team conducted its investigations via non-attribution interviews with participants and former participants in the "front end" processes of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff, as well as through document reviews. The study also considered the implications of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, which, together with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2008, prescribed major changes to the DOD acquisition process, including the front-end.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 2011
Accession Number
AD1123878

Entities

People

  • C. V. Gordon
  • Gene H. Porter
  • R. R. Jr Kneece

Organizations

  • Institute for Defense Analyses

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Business Administration
  • Combat Vehicles
  • Combatant Commanders
  • Cost Estimates
  • Ground Vehicles
  • Infantry Fighting Vehicles
  • Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
  • Iraqi-War
  • Law
  • Management Personnel
  • Military Acquisition
  • Military History
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Systems Engineering
  • Test And Evaluation
  • Unified Combatant Commands
  • United States Strategic Command
  • United States Transportation Command
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management