

AL-SHABAAB'S REIGN OF TERROR IN SOMALIA: UNDERSTANDING
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROUP'S LONG-TERM
SURVIVAL IN SOMALIA SINCE 2006

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2020

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2020		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2019 – JUN 2020	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Al-Shabaab's Reign of Terror in Somalia: Understanding Factors Contributing to the Group's Long-term Survival in Somalia since 2006			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Abdoulaziz Djama Ahmed, Captain, Djibouti Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, has actively terrorized East Africa as well as Somalia since 2006. In the group's infancy, Al-Shabaab seized most cities, including the capital city of Mogadishu, and led the population with an iron hand. The African Union and international community intervened and established a legitimate government to save the population from the radicalism in Somalia, and in the region. Mogadishu hosts more than 20,000 African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers and others from numerous western countries that are engaged in helping the Transitional Federal Government eliminate Al-Shabaab and its ideology, from Somalia. The radical Islamist group remains agile in Somalia largely because of state failure, socio-economic factors, and the unique methods Al-Shabaab employees in the country. More international community engagement is required to solve the Somali problem, which has endured for almost two decades. Successful elimination of Al-Shabaab from Somalia will save the next generation from the group's evil ideology and reign of terror.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS African Union, Al-Shabaab, Terror, African Mission in Somalia					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	87	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Captain Abdoulaziz Djama Ahmed

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AL-SHABAAB'S REIGN OF TERROR IN SOMALIA: UNDERSTANDING FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROUP'S LONG-TERM SURVIVAL IN SOMALIA SINCE 2006, by Abdoulaziz Djama Ahmed, 87 pages.

The terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, has actively terrorized East Africa, as well as Somalia, since 2006. In the group's infancy, Al-Shabaab seized most cities, including the capital city of Mogadishu, and led the population with an iron hand. The African Union and international community intervened and established a legitimate government to save the population from the radicalism entwined in Somalia and in the region.

Mogadishu hosts more than 20,000 African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers and others from numerous western countries that are engaged in helping the Transitional Federal Government eliminate Al-Shabaab and its ideology in Somalia.

The radical Islamist group remains agile in Somalia largely because of state failure, socio-economic factors, and the unique methods Al-Shabaab employees in the country. More international community engagement is required to solve the Somali problem, which has endured for almost two decades. Successful elimination of Al-Shabaab from Somalia will save the next generation from the group's evil ideology and reign of terror.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to the Almighty GOD for his mercies and grace, without which I could not achieve this work. First, I would thank my thesis committee chaired by Mr. Roderic Jackson, and my two readers Dr. William Kautt and Maj David Agora for the guidance, patience, and support I received from them to realize a meaningful research. I also would thank my Staff Group 7A, SGA LT COL Adam Cecil, SGA deputy Mr. Brian Gerling and the teaching group staff for providing an excellent environment for learning and the valuable knowledge.

Finally, I would like very much to acknowledge my heartfelt appreciation for my wife, Hawa, who has supported me this year, and took responsibility to raise our three sons, Ahmed, Djama, and Yonis.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia
ASWJ	<i>Ahlu Suna Wal Jama'a</i>
AU	African Union
CNRS	<i>Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique</i>
DA	Direct Action
GWOT	Global War on Terror
SFG	Somali Federal Government
SICC	Supreme Islamic Courts Council
SNIF	Somali National Islamic Front
SOMA	Status Mission Agreement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Court
UN	United Nations
USC	Union of Somali Congress

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

In late 2009, I was a company commander for Somali Army recruits in Djibouti; after their six-month basic training, I was responsible for taking them back to the airport. A few steps from the airplane, I asked one of the trainees about his future. I was shocked when he told me that he would either make a career in the Somali National Army (SNA) or simply join the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, emphasizing that all depended on the organization that will offer him more money.

Somalia, which is in East Africa, shares borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, with the longest coast in the region on the Indian Ocean (3025 km).¹ In the last three decades, since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the country has faced pirates, interior wars between warlords and their clans, and general, continued terrorism. In the book titled, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*, Lewis asserts the “general tendency was for every major Somali clan to form its own militia movement.”² The militias created a persistent state of terror, which encouraged migration from big cities to refugee camps in neighboring countries, or to various rural regions in Somalia, where the refugees could receive protection from within their clans.

¹ Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia,” accessed February 9, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_so.html.

² Ioan M. Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somalia Society* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994), 231.

According to Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph's book, *Inside Al-Shabaab The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Ally* explains, "By April 1991, warfare between the various rebel groups that had ousted Siad Barre, former president of Somali state, was spreading across Somalia."³ Said Barre's regime was expelled by two groups: the powerful United Somali Congress (USC) contingent led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid in the South of Somalia, and the Somali National Movement (SNM) rebel in the north of Somalia, later called Somaliland. Maruf and Joseph further mention that, "No single group had enough strength to seize control. Further attempts to form a new government failed. The north broke away completely, declaring itself the independent republic of Somaliland."⁴ Since Somaliland separated from Somalia in 1991, it the territory has remained in peace without worldwide recognition.⁵

The southern part of Somalia has remained a theater of war in one form or another under warlords from 1991 until 2004.⁶ In 2000, the president of Djibouti called for and convened the Arta conference. In that conference as Maruf and Joseph writes in his work cited earlier that "More than one observer has suggested giving up on the idea of a central authority and letting clans run Somalia by their own customs and rules. What emerged was something called the "the 4.5 formula," first applied in 2000 at a government-

³ Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018), 22.

⁴ Ibid., 20.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 35.

building conference in Djibouti.”⁷ The 4.5 means the four major clans in Somalia - Dir, Darod, Hawiye, and Rahanwayne - each takes sixty-one parliament seats, while the minor clans take thirty-one seats, which is half. The Djibouti conference, according to many Somalians who attended, was like a miracle in building peace among all Somali clans in the country, as well as, for parts of the diaspora. Attempts to resolve conflict and form a government failed because of the lack of warlord participation and Ethiopia. Afyare mention this failure in his book, *Understanding the Somali Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*, when he assesses warlords “rejected the outcome, arguing that the Arta peace process was incomplete.”⁸ Despite efforts of political compromise envisioned at the Arta conference and follow-on negotiations. Somalia implemented a “4.5” formula in 2000 to form the government, which defines the process for forming the parliament cabinet and selection of the president and the prime minister.

In 2004, after numerous initiatives, Mbaghati conferences were held in Kenya, that eventually produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. According to Maruf and Joseph, the TFG controlled regional affairs from its base in Baidoa, and while all cities in the center and south of Somalia were controlled by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).⁹ In 2005, the UIC and Al-Itihad Al-Islamiyah (AIAI) opposed the vague control construct, and instituted Islamic law (Al

⁷ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 10.

⁸ Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somali Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 99.

⁹ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Ally*, 35.

sharia) during the political vacuum; this development ended the reign of the warlords.¹⁰ When Ethiopia defeated the UIC and expelled them from the capital, Mogadishu, the head of the UIC's council, announced an insurgency against the Ethiopian Army. Indeed, Al-Shabab was the distinguishing group in this insurgency, In September 2007, the UIC participated in a meeting in Asmara hosted by the Eritrean Government, where the group was welcomed as the Alliance of Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). The extremist group, Al-Shabaab, was reestablished after its leaders boycotted the conference of Asmara, ending its connection to the UIC.

The Problem

In early 2008, Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The terrorist group, with new ideology, caused chaos in Somalia, instilling fear and unrest throughout the country, until the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) initiated operations to restore order. Failure of the Somalia state, socio-economic factors, and the Islamic radical ideology have sustained Al-Shabaab in Somalia since its establishment in 2008. Al-Shabaab's continued reign of terror in Somalia and East African countries continued to destabilize the region. The Government of Somalia, regional and international partners continue fighting Al-Shabaab with limited success. As the conflict has extended, so has state and partner fatigue increased. The ability for Al-Qaeda to persist under pressure from security forces plagues this author and keeps Somalia in a continual state of terror.

¹⁰ Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, "State Collapse: Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 13, no. 4 (2012): 513-527, DOI: 10.1080/21567689.2012.725659.

Purpose

The purpose of this research is to figure out the Al-Shabaab's methods and other factors that contribute to their long-term resistance. It will explore how Al-Shabaab has survived over time with Somali government and AMISOM security forces in constant pursuit. This study does not commend the terrorists' ability to survive. Rather, the study's focus is to better understand how to eliminate these armed groups and their ideas, from Somalia and East Africa. This research contributes to improve understanding on how terrorist groups operate in Somalia and East Africa. It explores the key areas that support these groups' survival as combined security forces work to eliminate their presence.

Primary Research Question

What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab's long-term reign of terror in Somalia? The primary research question will lead to understanding the elements which support the terrorist group's ability to survive over time with Somali government security forces and AMISOM constantly in pursuit. The primary research question provides an approach to the terrorism problem that is applicable to Somalia and other terrorism hotspots worldwide.

The research will answer the following secondary questions:

1. How does Al-Shabaab operate in Somalia?
2. How does Al-Shabaab impact Somalia's socio-economic status?
3. How does the government and the partners address the Al-Shabaab crisis?
4. How does Al-Shabaab finance its operations in Somalia?

The answers to these questions will frame the research to answer the primary research question. Additionally, the answers to these questions contribute to

understanding the operating environment Al-Shabaab uses to execute its reign of terror. This research will explore military, socio-economic, and political aspects of the terrorist group in Somalia.

Significance

Acceptance of recommendations developed at the end of this study are not compulsory for the Government of Somalia, nor its leaders. Nonetheless, the recommendations will assist national leaders, policymakers, ethnic leaders, Somali businessmen, and international community partners to strengthen their collective ability to fill security gaps and eventually eliminate insecurity originating from terrorist group activities.

Assumptions

To frame the topic and permit analysis of the factors in the thesis that contribute Al-Shabaab's long-term presence in Somalia, this author will establish several assumptions. The first assumption is that the Somali Central Federal Government and AMISOM will continue requesting United States (U.S.), regional, and international partner military support, especially Direct Action (DA) support.

The second assumption is that the U.S. and the European Union (EU) will continue supporting the counterterrorism fight in Somalia with military and economic support. In the military domain, continuing long-term training efforts are critical to eventually achieving overall security in Somalia. The U.S. also provides critical Direct Action (DA) support with special forces, and strikes by drones, operating in Somalia.

The third assumption is that Somali businessmen will continue operations with limited disruption throughout Somalia if the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), that replaced the TFG in 2012, or Al-Shabaab is in control. For example, telecommunications companies continue uninterrupted service in Somalia using a mobile money system without harassment.

The last assumption is that the Somali population will continue to cooperate with both FSG and Al-Shabaab, because of fear and self-interests. The strongest loyalty in Somalia is ethnic, which is manipulated by the ethnic leaders to support different clan interests.

Definitions

Direct action: short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile areas and which employs specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.¹¹

EVC Plus: is a unique option to transfer and receive mobile money. Now you can share mobile money as well as airtime between your friends and family, as you can send and receive mobile money through this option.¹²

¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018).

¹² Hormuud Telecom, “Personal Services,” accessed February 10, 2020, <https://www.hormuud.com/personal/services/evc-plus.aspx>.

Madarassa: a Muslim school, college, or university that is often part of a mosque.¹³

Limitations and Delimitations

One limitation for this thesis is that security and monetary reasons prevented on the ground research with businessmen and other key actors in Somalia on how Al-Shabaab finances its activities. Thus, this research is limited to scholarly works, which provide most of data used to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Two delimitations are worth noting. First, the research project concentrates on Somalia, even though Al-Shabaab executes operations in all East African countries. This delimitation will help to better analyze and study main problem, Al-Shabaab. A second delimitation is this study is restricted to exploring Al-Shabaab operations only, and not specific causes of the terrorist in Somalia.

Conclusion

The research will take a detailed look at the Al-Shabaab problem in Somalia, which has existed in a failed state status for longer than most countries, who have fallen into the failed state category. The study's focus is on better understanding how to eliminate these armed groups and their ideas, from Somalia and East Africa, and will improve understanding on how terrorist groups operate in Somalia and East Africa. Answers to the primary and secondary questions will help develop recommendations that could help improve the fight against Al-Shabaab. National leaders, policymakers, ethnic

¹³ Merriam-Webster, "Madrassa," accessed February 10, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/madrassa>.

leaders, Somali businessmen, and international community partners must strengthen their collective ability to fill security gaps, and eventually eliminate insecurity originating from terrorist group activities.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will explore literature related to the primary research question “What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab’s long-term reign of terror in Somalia?” The following literature review will help the author consider all available data on the problem, and will contribute to answering all the secondary questions. It will provide a background from all Al-Shabaab’s activities. Study of Al-Shabaab actions, socio-economic role, government’s reactions, and the behavior of the terrorist group can contribute to improving understanding of how best to confront the group. Greater understanding gained through this study can help improve security in Somalia and East Africa.

The secondary questions to be answered in this research are:

- 1-How does AS operate in Somalia?
- 2-How does AS impact Somalia’s socio-economic status?
- 3-How do the government and the partners address the AS crisis?
- 4-How does AS finance its operations in Somalia?

Somalia - State Failure

One of the most important successful constants for Al-Shahab, since 1991, is Somalia’s continued failed state status. Overall, the state failure is evidenced by two factors. The first is a lack of a strong central government since 1991. Second, Somalia does not have a powerful and professional national Army. The absence of a strong central government since 1991 has weakened the three branches of power: executive, legislative and judicial. The FSG has the authority to govern and acts like a government; however

competing clans and warlords that form the FSG run the government, ensuring group interests instead of national interests are prioritized.

According to Maruf and Joseph in their book, *Inside Al-Shabaab The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Ally*, that in January 1991, Siad Barre, the last president of Somalia before its collapse, resisted ouster in Mogadishu until USC fighters arrived at the gate of Villa Somalia (Somalia's presidential palace). The USC fighters forced the president and his government to flee the capital.¹⁴ After a failed attempt to return to Mogadishu by force, Barre left the country for exile.

Maruf and Joseph add that "By mid-February [1991], Somalia was engulfed in a multi-front civil war."¹⁵ This period marked entry into an era of anarchy. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi says in his article, "State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and legitimacy in Somalia," that "Somalia is a collapsed state and has had no functional government since the end of Siad Barre's rule in 1991, despite several attempts at establishing one. The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is an attempt that appears to have led to some semblance of a government."¹⁶ This indicates that no government, regardless of its composition, has gained complete control over all of Somalia, since 1991.

The collapsed Somali state became a beacon for terrorist groups who, according to many scholars, political scientists and national security experts, may have flocked to

¹⁴ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 20.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Mwangi, "State Collapse," 513.

Somalia because of ungoverned spaces in in the sanctuary state, formed after its collapse. Ungoverned spaces give terrorists the ability to prepare, prior to launching terrorist attacks.¹⁷

The U.S. increased cooperation with Somalia after 2001. The Horn of Africa, as well as other regions, were specifically mentioned in the 2003 U.S. National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. The document raised concern for the Horn of Africa and West Africa's risk for hosting terrorist groups in failing states in the regions.¹⁸ One direct consequence of state failure in Somalia is its impact on the rest of the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabab attacked a military base in Kenya on January 5, 2020 and killed three Americans.¹⁹ This attack is directly linked to spillover violence into Kenya from state failure in Somalia.

Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander, U.S. Africa Command, completed a two-day trip to East Africa [in February 2020] to personally assess the security situation at the Kenyan Defense Force installation at Manda Bay, Kenya, before continuing to Somalia to meet with senior Somali officials to discuss the impact of broader U.S. government programs taking place in Somalia.²⁰

¹⁷ James Piazza, "Incubators of Terrorism: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (September 2008): 469-488.

¹⁸ U.S. President, *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, 14 November 2003), accessed 29 November 2019, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf.

¹⁹ United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), "AFRICOM Commander Visits Kenya, Somalia, to Emphasize Partnership, Security," February 13, 2020, accessed February 15, 2020, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/32576/africom-commander-visits-kenya-somalia-to-emphasize-partnership-security>.

²⁰ Ibid.

General Townsend's trip to Kenya, prior to visiting Somalia, reassured the FGS of U.S. support and demonstrated the importance of partner support in helping Somalia rebuild. solve its problems. Without nation-building assistance in Somalia, surrounding countries will continued experiencing violent spillover attacks emanating from the Somali problem.²¹

Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)

The FSG has three branches: execution, legislature, and the judiciary. Despite the government's structure, law enforcement very weak; the government is plagued with corruption, lack proper arms to counter enemies and its military forces need reforming.²² Government appointments are based on a scale of merit and divided power among clans and government officials. The FGS is heavily dependent on partners for security. Due to the weakness of the Somali security, current forces cannot prevent Al-Shabaab from infiltrating and conduct operations in the capital. Lack of security allows for rampant violence that Al-Shabaab leverages to conduct illegal activities, assassinate rivals, and impediments to the group's operations.

When Somalia collapsed, the Somali National Army (SNA) disappeared, then private militias and clans emerged after Siad Barre's regime. The TFG tried to integrate militia members and former SNA solders into a new version of the SNA. On January 23,

²¹ AFRICOM, "AFRICOM Commander Visits Kenya, Somalia, to Emphasize Partnership, Security.

²² Sawe Elisha Benjamin, "What type of government does Somalia have," World Atlas, August 2, 2019, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-somalia-have.html>.

1992, the UNSC instituted an arms embargo on Somalia with Resolution 733. The embargo was established because of the bloody conflict that occurred after Somalia's collapsed in 1991.²³ The UN Secretary-General, on November 15, 2019, requested the UNSC renew the arms embargo on Somalia, which was approved with Resolution 2498.²⁴

One problem that has added to insecurity in Somalia is the relationships political parties have formed with clans. According to Maruf and Joseph,

From the start, nearly all political parties were tied to clans. The bigger clans used their clout to get members appointed to top jobs in the cabinet and military. The appointees then funneled tax money back to their groups, even putting clan mates on the payroll for nonexistent jobs. Distrust and resentment grew by the year.²⁵

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an African Union-approved and United Nations-sanctioned regional peacekeeping mission.²⁶ The African Union approved the mission on January 19, 2007. In February 2007, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1744 authorized the deployment of African Union forces in

²³ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Items Relating to the Situation in Somalia," January 20, 1992, accessed January 23, 2020, <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/733.pdf>.

²⁴ United Nations, "Security Council Renews Mandate for Panel of Experts, Sanctions Regime on Somalia, Adopting Resolution 2498," November 15, 2019, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc14021.doc.htm>.

²⁵ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 8.

²⁶ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), "AMISOM Background," accessed January 2, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/cache/page_enhanced/amisom-au.org/amisom-background/_index.html_gzip.

Somalia. AMISOM initially was charged to operate for six months under a Chapter VI mandate.²⁷

AMISOM troops are deployed in six sectors to maintain the security of the main regions. In addition to that, AMISOM supports the FGS's fight against Al-Shabaab, each sector supports a federal state in the war against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM also attempts to eliminate Al-Shabaab's influence in assigned areas; one example of success is a captured Al-Shabaab operational warning documents, recovered by Djiboutian forces in Hiiraan. The documents were later exploited by the force commander and incorporated into planning. Analysis was also used in UNSC reporting.²⁸

On February 20, 2007, the UNSC authorized AMISOM to continue its mission in Somalia until November 30, 2015. In August 2017, the UNSC issued resolution 2372 that outlined instructions for transferring security responsibility from AMISOM to the FSG.²⁹ Insecurity in the country has prevented the FGS from accepting full responsibility for security, which prevents AMISOM from withdrawing. AMISOM's current mandate is set to expire on May 31, 2020, which will result in an orderly withdrawal that began with

²⁷ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), SC/8960, "Security Council Authorizes Six-Month African Union Mission in Somalia," United Nations, February 20, 2007, accessed January 15, 2020, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8960.doc.htm>.

²⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2018/1002, Letter pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), United Nations, November 9, 2018, accessed November 29, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_1002.pdf, 96.

²⁹ AMISOM, "AMISOM Background."

19,626 soldiers in February 2020.³⁰ There is still doubt about the FSG's ability to manage the security situation in Somalia. During a conference in London on Somalia in March 2017, the military chief of AMISOM at the time, General Osman Nour Soubagleh of Djibouti, summed up the situation more bluntly, "I am afraid they [the Somali army] are not ready to take over the security right now."³¹

Socio-Economic Factor in Somalia

The socio-economic factor helps Al-Shabab remain a viable force in Somalia. This factor considers the effects of social issues such as clannism, lack of education, poverty and corruption. These are the main areas that facilitate Al-Shabaab's presence in Somalia and prevent the effective rebuilding of the Somali state. Taking another look at Maruf and Joseph's work, the authors assert, "The dispute that believed efforts to build a new government could be described as political, financial, and territorial in nature, but they all came down to one thing: a power struggle between clans."³² Any political decision in Somalia starts and finishes by clans' affairs. The clans are involved in everything in Somalia from power-sharing to blood money, which makes it impossible to for anyone or any organized activity to operate without dealing with clans.

Maruf and Joseph also state that "Clans are social units whose role in Somalia is so central, so deeply rooted, so part of the air that Somali breathe, that it simply cannot be

³⁰ European Country of Origin Information Network (ECOI), "The security situation in Somalia," May 31, 2019, accessed April 15, 2020, <https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/somalia/featured-topics/security-situation/>.

³¹ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 181.

³² *Ibid.*, 20.

escaped.”³³ These clans are not based on ethnicity, patriotism or social class. Rather, clan members are each affiliated with a male ancestor. Today’s clan leaders can trace their ancestry back to the tenth and eleventh centuries. According to Maruf, it is commonly accepted by the Somalian that the five biggest clans in Somalia and Somaliland are the Dir, Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn. Each of these clans are divided into many sub-clans.³⁴

Prior to independence, the clan system did not create many problems for Somalians like the country now experiences. “In the countryside, clans lived for centuries and each clan lived separately from the other.”³⁵ Somali clans have used their power to solve disputes among members as well as sub-clans. They solved their problems through culture and tradition (including blood money).³⁶ Now, the FSG rules five federal states: Galmudug, Puntland, Hirshabelle, Southwest Somali and Jubbaland. All states operate under the rule of one clan in each state, based on an arrangement agreed on at the Arta conference. This agreement has weakened state administration and facilitated government corruption.³⁷

³³ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 20.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The Federal Republic of Somalia, *The Federal Republic of Somalia: Provisional Constitution*, Mogadishu, Somalia, adopted August 1, 2012, accessed November 14, 2019, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Somalia-Constitution2012.pdf>, 27-32.

The state failure has eliminated or hampered operations for important services in Somalia. Healthcare is one of the hardest hit areas; interruptions are noteworthy in basic healthcare services and educational. The only exceptions are private service providers that do not depend totally on state resources. According to the CIA World Factbook:

A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia's large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world's lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of the world's highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.³⁸

Lack of security and a functioning education system, adds to the difficulty of creating a viable economic system in Somalia. These two issues have a direct impact on the systemic poverty that Somalians face today. According to the Economy Investment Insurance of Finance Funding (EIIFF) website, 43 percent of Somalia's population lives under the poverty line. Without sufficient income, it is difficult to obtain suitable healthcare and a sound education with the poor administration of minimal public services in Somalia.³⁹ There is a vicious cycle where poverty propels the emergence of other social ills that contribute to deepening poverty, to the point that the government is overwhelmed and incapable of leading the state to recovery. In this desperate condition, Al-Shabab thrives as a substitute that fills the state's role of providing some goods and services to the population.

³⁸ CIA, "The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia."

³⁹ Eiiiff.com, "Poverty in Somalia," Maps of the World, March 5, 2015, accessed December 5, 2019, <http://www.eiiff.com/economy/somalia/poverty.html>.

The corruption has contributed to the chaos Somalia has experienced for such a long period. According to the annually evaluated data statistics by the Transparency International website,

Corruption occurs at all levels in both the public and private sectors, and is a visible and expected form of behaviour. It affects virtually every aspect of the Somali society: from public officials' misuse of public goods for private gain and the solicitation of bribes in exchange for basic services to the clan-based patronage networks used to obtain employment and political appointments.⁴⁰

In 2019, the corruption perception index rated Somalia as the worst country in Africa with a score of 9 out of 100. Somalia has remained at the bottom of the corruption list for the last decade. Also, judicial power is inferior and corrupt.⁴¹ The current order of merit method the FGS allocates government positions entrenches corruption in Somalia. The system leads to intense competition among powerful clans to win appointments to these distinguished that clansmen can used to government resources to support clan verse national priorities.⁴²

According to the CIA World Factbook, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees fled their homes because of clan warfare and the famine after state collapse in 1991. The

⁴⁰ Kaunain Rahma, "Somalia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption," Transparency International, December 7, 2017, accessed March 1, 2020, https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Somalia_2017.pdf.

⁴¹ Nisar Majid and Adele Harmer, *Collective Resolution to Enhance Accountability and Transparency in Emergencies: Southern Somalia Report 2016*, Transparency International, accessed November 22, 2019, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CREATE_Somalia_report_2016.pdf.

⁴² Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 20.

refugees were hosted in refugee camps in Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia. Today, Somalia is the third largest source of refugees in the world, after Syria and Afghanistan.⁴³

Despite a state of collapse since 1991, Somalia has generated several steady streams of income from agriculture, livestock, and telecommunications. Other sources of income that foster economic activity include remittances and the money transfer sector that facilitates these transfers. Agriculture is assessed as the most important sector. Livestock normally accounts for about 40 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP) and more than 50 percent export earnings.”⁴⁴ The majority of livestock earnings eventually end up in the coffers of terrorist groups.⁴⁵

⁴³ CIA, “The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia.”

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ J. Stig Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 91.

Figure 4: Federal map as of April 2017⁴⁵




Figure 1. Federal Map as of April 2017

Source: Bing, "Federal Map as of April 2017," accessed February 12, 2020, <https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=V5BZmbuh&id=C08D43C8713D9E712679E8DD0FC4B14561DE83D1>.




Figure 2. Somali Clan Territories

Source: Bing, "Somalian Clan Territories," accessed February 10, 2020, <https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=9WV0wnBY&id=9759A573C2756F6366CF272E16A51FCE4010D41C&thid=OIP.9WV0wnBYEJcVVigqwsS14wAAA&mediurl=http%3a%2f%2fbdeco.tripod.com%2fsomalia%2fclan.jpg&exph=544&expw=436&q=maps+of+world+somalia+clans&simid=608054728955662051&selectedIndex=0&ajaxhist=0>

The Religious Factor in Somalia

Assoweh O. Mohamed, in his research, *Understanding the Emergence of Al-Shabab in Somalia* (2011), asserts "In the Muslim world the emergence of Islamic militancy could be dated from the eighteenth century."⁴⁶ Most educated people at that time were religious men. When colonization came to Sudan, the Somalia religious leaders lead the revolution against colonial masters. In Sudan, the Mahdist movement ousted the

⁴⁶ Mohamed O. Assoweh, "Understanding the Emergence of Al-Shabab in Somalia," (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011), 16.

British conquest from Sudan, while Sayyid Abdallah Hassan's resistance movement in Somalia led to a model for nationalism in Somalia. Sayyid Abdallah, at the beginning of the twentieth century, inspired the people with his rhetoric of jihad and nationalism rhetoric.⁴⁷

After the failure of the Somali state in 1991, many warlords with militias emerged and plunged Mogadishu into chaos. Maruf and Joseph note that "But for residents closer to the city center, life is a daily high-stakes gamble. Rich people are kidnapped and held for ransom. Rich and poor alike must pay fees to get by the warlords' roadblocks."⁴⁸ In May 2006, the Mujahedeen, self-proclaimed Fighters of Islam, started to fight warlords and their private armies. The people in Mogadishu welcomed the Mujahedeen since they wanted peace and justice, regardless of their Islamic background.⁴⁹ The UIC Islamists were a group that inspired to free the population from warlord humiliation and transform the society to Islamic justice, based on Al-Sharia law.⁵⁰ People in Mogadishu thought their leaders would protect them from insecurity in Somalia. Ethiopia's entry into the Somali theater brutally ended the UIC's reign through military force.⁵¹ Al-Shabaab emerged after UIC's demise to start a new era of violence and intimidation that still exists today. U.S. ambassador to Kenya, William Bellamy, reported that the warlords' removal

⁴⁷ Assoweh, "Understanding the Emergence of Al-Shabab in Somalia," 17.

⁴⁸ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 11.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

from Mogadishu at the hands of the Islamists, although the populations supported this development, would have a long-term negative result.⁵²

Al-Shabaab Operations in Somalia and the Region

Al-Shabaab is the offspring of Al-Qaeda. The terrorist group intends to establish an Islamic state in the region and to fight against western interests. For the same reason, they fight against the legitimate government, as well as the UN and AMISOM, which represent the international community.⁵³

Al-Shabaab has three security forces: Al-Jabha, Al-Hesba, and Al-Amniyaat. These make up the terror group's shadow government. Al-Shabaab has used these three organs in Mogadishu, and throughout the country. Each organ is independent, and members of different organs do not know each other.⁵⁴

Research indicates that Al-Shabaab has at least six departments called Maktabas, that enable mission execution. The departments and their responsibilities include:⁵⁵

1. Da'wa: Preaching
2. Zakat: Taxation
3. Wilayat: Regional Administration

⁵² Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 32.

⁵³ Roland Marchal, "A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009): 381-404, accessed November 15, 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050903273701>.

⁵⁴ National Counterterrorism Center, "Counter Terrorism Guide: Al Shabaab," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed December 29, 2019, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/al_shabaab.html.

⁵⁵ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 64.

4. Amniyat: Security
5. Jabhat: Army
6. Garsoor: (Judgment and Justice)

The other five departments have less power such as General finances, Health, and Humanitarian Affairs. ⁵⁶Al Shabaab's leader commissions each Maktab commander to execute its government management function in support Al Shabaab operations.

To realize its objectives and to answer from the first subsidiary question, Al-Shabaab fights TFG and AMISOM military forces in their compounds and bases. Suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices (IED), and assassinations are used to counter the combined national and international. Maruf and Joseph assert, "Targets included government officials, civil servants, political activists, journalists, and people suspected of working for foreign nongovernmental organizations. Sometimes, Al-Shabaab went after individuals who simply visited government offices, to scare the populace into avoiding all contact with officials."⁵⁷

Ramadan is a preferred attack date for Al-Shabaab attacks against SNA and AMISOM bases. For example, on May 17, 2017, Al-Shabaab attacked AMISOM and Ethiopians at the Halgan base in Sector IV AMISOM in Somalia's Hiran region. In this attack, Al-Shabaab initiated its attack with vehicle-borne IEDs, then continued with an

⁵⁶ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 64.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

assault on AMISOM with Somali and foreign fighters. The terrorist group lost the battle and lost hundreds of fighters.⁵⁸

Al-Shabaab is famous for using IED suicide attacks, especially in Mogadishu, against TFG, UN, AMISOM and humanitarian aid providers, which are struggling to help reduce violence and help develop Somalia into a stable and secure state. To illustrate, on October 14, 2017,

“When a double truck bombing shattered the night in Mogadishu on Saturday, rescue workers began the grim search for survivors that has become all too common as Somalia battles an Islamist insurgency. They picked through burned-out cars and hunted as best they could in a collapsed hotel.”⁵⁹ The number of deaths were almost 600 people and the expulsion capacity was estimated to 1,200 kg TNT equivalence, which means it was the largest explosive device that Al-Shabaab had ever manufactured.⁶⁰

Al-Shabaab uses assassinations against national and international forces and leaders who work against its goal of replacing the legitimate government in Somalia. The violence spreads fear and insecurity throughout the country. For example, Harakat Al-Shabaab members assassinated Saado Ali Warsame, a former singer in the Somali

⁵⁸ ABC News, “Al Shabaab militants raid Ethiopian base in latest Somalia attack,” June 9, 2016, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-09/somalia-islamist-militants-attack-base-of-ethiopia-troops/7497408>.

⁵⁹ Hussein Mohamed, Eric Schmitt and Mohamed Ibrahim, “Mogadishu Truck Bombings Are Deadliest Attack in Decades,” *The New York Times*, October 15, 2017, accessed November 1, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/africa/somalia-bombing-mogadishu.html>.

⁶⁰ UNSC, S/2018/1002, 4.

Waberi group, she lived in the U.S. after the collapsed of Somalia and, in 2012, she went back to Somalia to represent her clan in the Somali parliament.⁶¹ Warsame was an open-minded activist who called for stability in the country that would benefit both the government and the people. Although Warsame was a famous singer in Somalia, Al-Shabaab did not like her opinions. The terrorist group warned her to stop raising social awareness, but she refused, which led to her death on July 23, 2014, in Mogadishu.⁶²

Al-Shabaab and Propaganda

Al-Shabaab's methods from the beginning leveraged media, welcomed the transnational terrorist environment, and violence against government loyalists as well as the international community. For almost two decades, the TFG, FSG and international partners have been able to mitigate the risk of Al-Shabaab's attack, although they have not unsuccessfully eliminated them.

The fundamental reason Al-Shabaab has remained viable in Somalia is the fact that the group uses Islamic radical ideology that is well accepted in Somalia. The terrorist group focuses on internal and external propaganda campaigns that uses media to diffuse its ideology. A strong media propaganda focus in Somalia resonates with illiterate nationals and encourages other extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, to form alliances

⁶¹ British Broadcasting Company, "Somali musician and MP Saado Ali Warsame shot dead," July 23, 2014, accessed December 11, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28446489>.

⁶² The Guardian, "Somali singer and politician murdered by Islamist gunmen," July 23, 2014, accessed December 12, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/jul/23/somali-singer-politician-saado-ali-warsame-murdered>.

with Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has mastered the use of propaganda after effectively leveraging this tool to stymie the FSG's efforts to develop Somalia into a coherent state. According to Mwangi & Oscar Gakuo, "Related to the use of nationalism and xenophobia, as a means of acquiring legitimacy, is the use of propaganda. State collapse also creates an environment through which propaganda can thrive since it opens up new channels of political expression."⁶³

In Somalia, Al-Shabaab leverages media sources such as Al-Kataib, Horn Africa Radio, and Radio Al-Andalus to diffuse its messages as well as other legitimate non-related information on issues such as economics and politics. Al-Shabab produces many journals and videos emphasizing how the sovereignty of the country is in danger. Al-Shabaab also uses propaganda to threaten non-Muslims misusing texts of the Holy Quran.⁶⁴ Additionally, propaganda is used to produce videos that show military strength and toughness during attacks against AMISOM, which help encourage young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has extended its reach outside of Somalia, using media to spread the message of struggle in Somalia. According to Gartenstein-Ross and Daveed,

Al-Shabaab propagandist- released a new video, describing Somalia as one of the three main theaters for Al-Qaeda's mujahideen, along with Iraq and Afghanistan. The Al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Yahiya Al-Libi devoted an entire video to urging Muslims to join the Somali mujahideen. On November 19, 2008, Zawahiri responded to Nabhan's video with one in which he called Al-Shabaab "my brothers, the lions of Islam in Somalia." He urged them to "hold tightly to the truth for which you have given your lives, and don't put down your weapons

⁶³ Mwangi, "State Collapse."

⁶⁴ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 151-152.

before the Mujahid state of Islam [has been established] and Tawheed has been set up in Somalia.”⁶⁵

Al-Shabab realized early the need to share its struggles with other likeminded jihadists to leverage their capabilities and share best practices. The alliance Al-Shabaab has developed led to the implementation of the Al-Qaeda method for practicing Islamic ideology.

Al-Shabaab Finance

Al-Shabaab’s centric finance is a domestic one. On November 7, 2018, the Chair of the Security Council Committee wrote a letter to the President of the Security Council about resolutions 751 (1992) and 1901 (2009) that involved Somalia and Eritrea. This letter included updates on the current security situation Somalia and Al-Shabaab activities. The letter noted that “Al-Shabaab derives its revenue from a variety of domestic sources, primarily taxation on transiting vehicles and goods, business and agricultural taxation, and forced Zakat (alms) levies.”⁶⁵ All militias in Somalia, including Al-Shabaab, tax everything in the land it controls. Al-Shabaab established the Maktabat Al-Maliyah (the Ministry of Finance) and its governing council (Shura) to manage all financial matters in the country. One non-governmental organization (NGO) manager in Mogadishu told Hansen. J. Stig, on the condition of anonymity:

In the regions where the Shabaab has absolute control, they demand a percentage of the total project cost. It may range between 5 and 15 percent depending on the administration and the influence of the local partners implementing the project. Demand is also made on landlords [and] vehicle owners working under contact with the UN or international organizations. Around 15 percent of the rent must be paid to the Shabaab if you lease your property to an international organization of

⁶⁵ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab: Dimensions of Jihad,” *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 32.

the UN. Employees are also instructed to reimburse roughly 5 percent of their salary monthly.⁶⁶

Anywhere the FSG does not have full control, Al-Shabaab has established checkpoints to collect the taxes from vehicles carrying trade destined for cities. Al-Shabaab's most lucrative checkpoint lies approximately 160 km north-west of Mogadishu on the road to Baidoa, at Jameeco in Bay region. A senior Al-Shabaab defector – who was in command of the Jameeco checkpoint until March 2018 – reported that the checkpoint generated approximately \$30,000 per day (\$10 million annually).⁶⁷ The UNSC report mentions only one checkpoint; one can imagine the income generated from hundreds of checkpoints throughout country.

Telecommunication companies play the most important role in financing terrorists in Somalia. For example, Hormuud Telecom uses mobile money transfer services to overcome the geographical difficulty in transferring money from checkpoints to the state of Juba state, where Al-Shabaab's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri resides. UNSC assesses in a report on mobile money that “The EVC Plus mobile money service of Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. supports the efficient functioning of Al-Shabaab's financial system, allowing the group to transfer a significant percentage of its funds to its financial hub in Middle Juba region without the need to physically transport the entire amount in cash across hostile territory.”⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*, 91.

⁶⁷ UNSC, S/2018/1002, 26-27.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

In addition to the significance of taxation on trade and telecommunications in Al-Shabaab's financial architecture, agriculture, livestock, contractors, and all companies in large cities, especially Mogadishu, are forced to pay tax justified by invoking the religious-linked obligatory tax called the "Zakat." Al-Shabaab group taxes the farmers by the item in some commodities and is involved in the trade of imports or exports throughout the country, even in Mogadishu.⁶⁹ Many uncontrolled money transfer companies in Somalia facilitate the transfer of the illegally gained money, to terrorist groups. Contractors, businessmen, and other workers, especially in Mogadishu, pay the tax out of fear. One example of Al-Shabaab's violence occurred on June 4, 2018, in Qura'a Jome. Al-Shabaab killed six civilians and burned eleven vehicles loaded with products, because of unpaid taxes.⁷⁰ The FSG's inability to govern the country exposes civilians to constant violence and lawlessness.

The terror group receives limited transfers from individuals, organizations and other supporters such as Iran. Al-Shabaab once received huge income flows from charcoal transshipments until international watchdogs and the TFG reacted to the magnitude of these illegal transfer of funds. UNSC report mentions that:

In letters dated January 29, 2018, February 23, 2018, and August 15, 2018, the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) informed the Government of Iran that false certificates of origin were being used to transship Somali charcoal through Kish and Qeshm free zones, requested to visit Iran to meet with the relevant authorities and review documentation, provided photographic evidence and copies of Iran certificates of origin for review, identified multiple consignees suspected of transshipping Somali charcoal, requested an update regarding any

⁶⁹ Harun Maruf, "In Somalia, Businesses face 'Taxation' from the militants," *Voices of America*, December 3, 2018, accessed February 10, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-businesses-face-taxation-militants>.

⁷⁰ UNSC, S/2018/1002, 97.

investigations and sanctions enforcement, and requested copies of documentation.⁷¹

Finally, Al-Shabaab has succeeded in gaining money both from international and domestic sources. Taxation on trade is a major source of funding in Somalia, as a common practice, telecommunications, real estate and other businesses as well as imports are taxed. The UNSC report assesses that Al-Shabaab actively combats against financial corruption in its groups and uses a sophisticated system to collect and administer the group's finances. Strict guidance helps guard against taking liberties with Al-Shabaab's collected funds in controlled areas, the three photos below Al-Shabaab's warnings against corruption.⁷²




Figure 3. Principles Outlined in an Al-Shabaab Financial Ledger for Hiran Region, March 23, 2018

Source: United Nations Security Council, S/2018/1002, Letter pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), United Nations, November 9, 2018. accessed November 29, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_1002.pdf, 96.

⁷¹ UNSC, S/2018/1002, 146-147.

⁷² Ibid., 96.

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Date: / / الموافق

	Sub-totals	
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332 \$ Xodho		7'970 \$ Rst
57'749.7 \$ Dalag		1'970 EVC MI
77'913.2 \$ Tuntal		0000
750 Kaash. maxed saciid MI		
77'163.2		
18300 \$ EVC abaxasji-Milhuur	EVC Plus transfer	
58'863.2 \$ Rst		
54'070 \$ Kaash. abaxasji-Milhuur	Cash transfer	
4'793.2 \$ Rst		
4'793.2 \$ EVC abaxasji-Milhuur		
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Figure 4. Ledger, Summarizing Revenue from Belet Weyne District from February 12-21, 2018

Source: United Nations Security Council, S/2018/1002, Letter pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), United Nations, November 9, 2018. accessed November 29, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_1002.pdf, 103.



Figure 5. Badeeco (r) Receipts Issued by Al-Shabaab for a Fiat N3 Truck Carrying Cement, January 20, 2018

Source: United Nations Security Council, S/2018/1002, Letter pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), United Nations, November 9, 2018. accessed November 29, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_1002.pdf, 110.

Conclusion

The literature review addressed relevant literature and issues in Somalia that will assist in addressing the primary and secondary questions. Somalia remains in a state of collapse since 1991. The country's lack of governing capability, has transformed the state into a sanctuary for terrorists. The review highlighted how the failure of the state impacts the stability of the country, producing domestic violence and a lack of reliable public services, such as hospitals and schools. The shortcomings increase Al-Shabaab's attractiveness and facilitate the group's ability to maintain operations in Somalia. To understand Al-Shabaab in Somalia requires a deeper look at social, economic, and other factors like clannism and religious influences. Contributing to the "mystic" is Al-Shabaab's agility, command of terrain, control of the narrative in Somalia, and violence, that keep the terrorist group firmly in control, even as the SNA and AMISOM work to

eliminate insecurity in the country. This research will take a deeper look at the areas note above and fill knowledge gaps.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This research aims to understand the factors that contribute to Al-Shabaab's ability, since the group began operations in 2006, to inflict terror on non-combatants and destabilize Somalia. The objective of this chapter to discuss the methodology used to analyze information and data collected in this research.

In chapter one, the author provided a background review of Al-Shabaab, which included how it defected from UIC to become its own independent terror group. Chapter two examined literature that facilitates greater understanding of factors to address primary and secondary questions. Chapter three, as noted initially, discussed the methodology used in this thesis. Chapter four will address the analysis of the data collected by researchers over the world to answer from the primary research question, "What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab's long term reign of terror in Somalia?" as well as the secondary research questions. Finally, in chapter five, the author will provide numerous recommendations to solve the problem and eliminate the terrorists and their ideology from the country as well as the region. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to explaining the research methodology.

Research Type

This study will use qualitative methodology to analyze information collected and data interpretation to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The study

will also employ levels of analysis as an approach to ensure a systematic look at information from different aspects of the Al-Shabaab problem in Somalia.

Qualitative Methodology

The qualitative methodology is the best method for this study. The methodology permits the researcher to conduct an in-depth study on contributing factors that facilitate executing Al-Shabaab's long-term terrorist agenda in Somalia. Denis and Lincoln explain:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of an asset of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recording, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.⁷³

This method leverages the researcher's deep experience gained as a peacekeeper working throughout Somalia. It allows the author to better visualize different perspectives and data required to fully analyze the terrorist situation in Somalia that contribute to determining answers to the primary and secondary research questions, and developing recommendations.

Analysis Approach

The thesis will examine different levels associated with the Al-Shabaab problem. Levels of Analysis is a qualitative methodology system used in political science related

⁷³ N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 3.

studies. Research on international security, globalization, economic development, terrorism, and the impact of ideology on a country, are suitable subjects for application of levels of analysis.⁷⁴ The study of different levels facilitates understanding of the unique behaviors that support Al-Shabaab's long-term presence in Somalia.

Levels of analysis can help researchers unpack the major themes of socio-economic problems and state failure in Somalia, linked to the primary research. John Creswell explains this approach as “multiple levels of abstraction.”⁷⁵ Creswell continues, “often, writers present their studies in stages (e.g., the multiple themes that can be combined into larger themes or perspectives) or layer their analyses from the particular to the general. The codes and themes derived from the data might show mundane, expected, and surprising ideas.”⁷⁶ The figure below outlines levels of analysis used in this thesis. Each level is explained in the data collection section that follows.

⁷⁴ Henry R. Nau, *Perspectives of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009).

⁷⁵ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publication, 2007), 46.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Data Collection and Analysis

Level	Analysis Factors
Terrorist Ideology	Media Da'wa (preaching) Maktab Role with False Interpretation of Islam Affinity for the Al-Qaeda network Terrorist Warfare Tactics Economic taxation and financing flexibility Al-Shabaab's Distinctiveness
Socio-Economic	Corruption Economics Public Services (Health and Education) Diaspora's Impact
Failure of the Somali State	Politics in Somalia Military and Paramilitary

Figure 6. Analysis of Al-Shabaab's Presence in Somalia

Source: Created by author.

The first step for this study is to collect data, which provides the information required to address primary and secondary research questions, then the author will categorize and analyze all data collected at three levels. This study relies heavily on secondary sources because of travel limitations and an inability to conduct interviews with Somali political leaders and businessmen that could contribute to a greater understanding of socio-economic and political impacts associated with terrorism. Although there are restrictions on access to primary data sources, there is enough access

to other useful sources through the Command and General Staff College Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Sources included in this thesis are books, scholarly articles, and other research materials with content on Somalia. Information from various online and media sources related to Al-Shabaab and the Somali government are also carefully evaluated and used in this thesis. The data collection process is essential to analysis, according to Creswell. He explains that “the researcher needs to collect extensive information about the participant, and needs to have a clear understanding of the context of the individual’s life.”⁷⁷ In the case the unit of analysis is not a person, rather an organization, Al-Shabaab.

The first level is terrorist ideology and its impact on terrorism’s long existence in Somalia. The factors for evaluation in this level include the media, false interpretation of Islam, and affinity for the Al-Qaeda network. False interpretations of the Islam religion is spread through media, which builds loyalty between citizens and Al-Shabaab. The final category in the first level, is affinity to the Al-Qaeda network. Since Al-Shabaab established operations in Somalia, the group has carefully cultivated a network of technical and moral support.

The second level explores the socio-economic level in Somalia. This level reviews social behaviors and their effect on economics in Somalia after two decades of terrorism. This is the most important level because the factors in this level are key in establishing a high enough level of human security that affords allows citizens to realize

⁷⁷ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2006), 93.

individual and societal goals. The author will explore corruption, economic, services, and infrastructure issues in this level and how they help Al-Shabaab persist in Somalia.

The third level is the state level. This level discusses factors that impact directly on Somalia's failed state condition and elaborates on the effects of terrorism on politics, military and paramilitary sectors in Somalia. Detailed analysis of multiple sources will ensure assessments are grounded in the most factual information available. This procedure will eliminate errors and bias on issues in this thesis.

Following data collection, there is a review of the factors and their impacts in Somalian and in the region. These analyses will highlight key takeaways related to the impact of terrorism ideology, socio-economic issues, and state failure. This analysis will inform answers to the primary and secondary research questions.

Conclusion

Studying how Al-Shabaab persists in Somalia requires a disciplined approach. Using qualitative methodology and levels of analysis will allow the author to analyze three different factors that contribute to Al-Shabaab's long-term reign of terror in Somalia. The three factors: terrorist ideology, socio-economic issues and Somali state failure, will guide this author through data collection and analysis. The research will point out negative impacts associated with Al-Shabaab on the government, as well as, the population. Assessments from analysis will inform responses to primary and secondary questions.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will analyze information collected, using the methodology outlined in chapter three. The objective of the analysis is to answer primary and secondary research questions. Using research questions as research drives, is consistent with Crowsell, who asserts, “the research question should drive the data collection and analysis rather than the reverse being the case.”⁷⁸ The literature review along with the study’s methodology will produce assessments that will lead answers for the secondary questions. Responses to the secondary questions will inform the answer to the primary research question, “What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab’s long term reign of terror in Somalia?”

Level I: Terrorist Ideology

Historical records on Somalia indicate religious leaders fought as a nation during the colonization period. Sayyid Abdallah Hassan’s movement against the British colony at the beginning of the twentieth century is one example.⁷⁹ He used jihad to compel the local population to declare war against unbelievers who arrived from overseas. Ethiopia’s

⁷⁸ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd edition. (London: Sage Publication, 2007), 211.

⁷⁹ Mohamed O. Assoweh, *Understanding the Emergence of Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 17.

invasion of Somalia and attacks in Mogadishu in 2007 is another example.⁸⁰ Christopher Anzalone writes in his article, “New on Al-Shabaab Media,” that

Since emerging in 2007 after the overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union (UIC) umbrella in the wake of the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion and occupation of parts of Somalia, Al-Shabab has established itself as one of the relatively few jihadi organizations to succeed in the capture, control, and governance of territory for a significant period of time.⁸¹

Al-Shabaab was severed as the extremist military wing that ended the UIC’s rule in Somalia. From the beginning, Al-Shabaab used Ethiopia’s invasion to declare its independence and establish itself as a leading authority, albeit illegal, in Somalia. The terrorist group solicited support to fight against its historical enemy, Ethiopia, using the power of religious persuasion preached in mosques and the media. Al-Shabaab leveraged its distinctly different ideology from local groups to unite as nationalists in the fight to free Somalia country from Ethiopia, the Christian country on its western border, and long-term enemy. Without Ethiopia’s invasion, Al-Shabaab would have not emerged as the leading terrorist organization that plagues Somalia today.⁸²

Media

Once independent, Al-Shabaab began to establish itself as a sovereign entity. The group recruited fighters using a banner of nationalism, religion and a regular salary for the poor young men in a country where high unemployment had plagued the country for

⁸⁰ Christophe Azalone, “News on Al-Shabaab media,” Hate Speech International, November 9, 2009, accessed November 20, 2019, <https://www.hate-speech.org/new-report-on-al-shabab-media>

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

years. Azalone assesses that the media was integral to increasing Al-Shabaab's power, noting that "As part of its broader governing and military strategy, Al-Shabab recognized the need for a capable media operations apparatus that would let it broadcast to and interact with multiple target audiences on a domestic, regional, and transnational/global scale."⁸³

Al-Shabaab used the first two years of its existence to build capacity. Group leaders recognized how the media was critical to success. Various media sources produced propaganda films to help in recruit fighters in Somalia. Foreign fighters served as inspirational brothers who lent their skills gained from other jihadist operations in the Middle East.

Da'wa (Preaching) Maktab Role with False Interpretation of Islam

The Da'wa (preaching) maktab is the most important of Al-Shabaab's six major departments. This maktab controls the version of the religion preached in Mosques and taught in madarassas (schools) in areas under Al-Shabaab control. Maruf and Joseph assert:

At the core of Al-Shabaab's mission sat the maktab of Da'wa. The Da'wa department was established to spread Shabaab's form of Islam and ensure the people maintained a strong, fervent belief in it. To that end, Da'wa officials reprogrammed mosques, libraries, media outlets, and other public institutions to reflect the group's fundamentalist point of view.⁸⁴

Overall, this maktab invests heavily in the people. The department uses the holy Al-Quran and hadith of prophet Muhammad to reduce friction between TFG members and

⁸³ Azalone, "News on Al-Shabaab media."

⁸⁴ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 64.

other government and non-government officials. The department leverages clans, Zakat taxation, and civilian loyalty to maintain positive and productive relations among all stakeholders and to ensure allegiance to Al-Shabaab.

Affinity for the Al-Qaeda Network

Affinity for Al-Qaeda is also one of Al-Shabaab's defining characteristic. Al-Shabaab announced its attachment to Al-Qaeda from the beginning of its reign, and to align with the parent organization's shared objectives and the possibility of receiving financial and technical support required to expand operations. Al-Shabaab's initial declaration was also a call to jihad for foreign fighters to flock to the region to assist religious and ideological brothers. This merger of internal and external jihadists opened a terrorism front in East Africa and widen Al-Qaeda's war against western countries, especially the U.S.

In 2009, Al-Shabaab released numerous films and written text. Al-Shabaab writers authored all the films and the other propaganda materials, in the group's official media branch, the Al-Kataib (Brigades) Media.⁸⁵ In February 2012, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda leaders Ahmed Godane and Ayman AL Zawahiri, respectively, publicly announced the merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 134-135.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Terrorist Warfare Tactics

Al-Shabaab clearly intends to establish an Islamic state with sharia law and stop western activities in the region.⁸⁷ To realize its objective, Al-Shabaab conducted an insurgency against Ethiopia and the TFG, using the media, the guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics learned from the foreign fighters. In 2007, Al-Shabaab began adopting tactics foreign fighters used in Afghanistan and Iraq. Al-Shabaab fighters used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), roadside bombs, and suicide attacks to target TFG officials and allies, namely AMISOM peacekeepers and non-governmental aid organizations.⁸⁸ These tactics were new and ushered in a new era of warfare. With the new tactics and fighters, Al-Shabaab successfully spread fear among the population and effectively established its absolute control.

Al-Shabaab Security Forces

Al-Shabaab has three different security forces: Al-Jabha, Al-Hesba, and the Amniyaat. Al-Jabha are the troops on the frontline fighting against SNA as well as AMISOM. Maruf asserts “the Jabhat would become the largest force in Al-Shabaab, numbering about five thousand men, some of them foreigners who had sneaked into Somalia after hearing Shabaab’s call to fight for jihad.”⁸⁹ Secondly, Al-Hesba works as

⁸⁷ Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters and Aly. S. Mohammed, “Al-Shabaab,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 10, 2020, accessed March 1, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/background/al-shabab>.

⁸⁸ Global Security, “Al-Shabaab the supreme Islamic Union Court(UIC)”, accessed March 1, 2020, [.https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-shabaab.htm](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-shabaab.htm).

⁸⁹ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 67.

policemen, enforcing control and etiquette associated with the extreme lifestyle Al-Shabaab demands in Wilaayaat (states). The most important thing they are doing as police is to impose a kind of clothing for women and a specific style of shaving hair, for men.⁹⁰

The Amniyaat (assassination forces) is the most dangerous force in Al-Shabaab. The used intimidation and assassination in the Mogadishu and elsewhere Al-Shabaab is in control. Maruf says “The unit would occasionally fight alongside the Jabhat in emergency situations. But their main task was to carry out attacks to tip a battle in Al-Shabaab’s favor. According to Hersi, they were armed with shoulder-fired missiles, recoilless rifles, bazookas, and heavy machine guns.”⁹¹ Al-Shabaab leverages this force to successfully extract taxes owed from businessmen, politicians, and the organizations employees.⁹²

Economic Taxation and Financial Flexibility

Economically, Al-Shabaab started with a Zakat (alms) tax. Taxation has expanded to include exports, imports, urban businesses, agriculture, and livestock. Kidnapping is also taxed as well as capital invested in some businesses. Olivia McCoy in her article, “Al-Shabaab finances in terror,” asserts “In the past, Al-Shabaab had control of several

⁹⁰ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 67.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 67.

port cities on the coast of Somalia, including the city of Kismayo. The control over these cities allowed al-Shabaab to make millions of dollars in profits from charcoal exports.”⁹³

Economic flexibility is also important in Al-Shabaab financing. When Kenyan forces pushed Al-Shabaab out of Kismayo and the FSG expelled the group from the Barawe port, Al-Shabaab changed money making tactics. The group initiated smuggling operations and online taxation through mobile money technology. Al-Shabaab overcame economic difficulties associated with lost geographical control through agile adjustments, which afforded the group a significant amount of revenue and diminished, among Somalis, the perceived positive accomplishment of TFG and partner victories.⁹⁴

Al-Shabaab’s Distinctiveness

Al-Shabaab changed extremism in Somalia with its specific style. The group’s leaders are experienced jihadist with experience fighting in Afghanistan, and collaborating and working with foreign fighters. These leaders implemented those training and operational techniques they learned while fighting outside of the continent, in Al-Shabaab. Abu Talha al-Sudani, an Al-Qaeda member in charge of training and planning, said in propaganda video that “The reason the Shabaab youth mobilized themselves was that AIAI confined itself to da’wa (preaching) and learning and were opposed to jihad. The youth rejected this; those who returned from Afghanistan were

⁹³ Olivia McCoy, “How Al-Shabaab finance in terror,” Center for Security Policy, April 8, 2015, accessed February 20, 2020, <https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/08/how-al-shabaab-finances-terror/>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

instrumental.”⁹⁵ Obedience is another distinguishing Al-Shabaab characteristic. Group members obey orders from leaders in their chain of command regardless of the level of severity. Al-Shabaab adherents’ level of obedience far exceeds levels achieved by other extremists and warlords in Somalia.

Level I Conclusion

Al-Shabaab has overcome difficulties and managed to sustain its activities in Somalia for almost two decades. Level I factors have helped Al-Shabaab operate in Somalia and East Africa, although FSG and partners militaries are in constant pursuit. Al-Shabaab understood from the beginning the role of the media and how it could promulgate propaganda that would attract adherents and harmonize relations with Somali nationals. The importance of preaching remains the number one department in Al-Shabaab’s organization. Using the Da’wa (preaching) department, Al-Shabaab has selected extremist religious leaders to spread the Al-Qaeda version of Islam throughout mosques and madarassas, which aligns the population with Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab ideology.

Al-Shabaab recognized the utility to employ foreign fighters in Somalia. From the beginning, these fighters were used to instill discipline and teach a new form of warfare. These tactics have helped Al-Shabaab jihadist trained leaders to operate with flexibility and agility against its enemies. Tactics, weaponry, and leader obedience are several characteristics that distinguish Al-Shabaab from other extremists or jihadists in Somalia. These qualities also help attract and maintain fighter and loyal Somalia nationals.

⁹⁵ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 24, 64.

Economically, the group has demonstrated the same type of flexibility and agility as witnessed with the group's fighters. Disrupted funding streams nor limited funding from external sources have stopped Al-Shabaab's ability to continue fighting in Somalia.

Level II: Socio-Economic Factor

Somalia suffers from religious, ethnic, regional, and historical conflicts, which resulted in slow economic growth. The state collapse in 1991 is an example of the how a population can combat against a dictatorship. This chapter will explore and analyze how the failed Somali state impacts the socio-economic issues. This review will include examining corruption, economic issues, public services (health and education), and the diaspora.

Corruption in Somalia

Corruption is dishonest or illegal behavior. From a state perspective, powerful government officials and service providers, like the police, are susceptible to commit illegal behaviors through unlawful means, such as bribery or some form of leverage that is used against officials and service providers.⁹⁶ Corruption impacts public and the private aspects of Somalia because of instability and the lack of oversight of state affairs since 1991. Lack of oversight allows public officials to misuse public resources, at times diverting them to unsanctioned clan patronage networks, instead of using resources to optimize public good. At the commercial business level, managers mitigate tax burdens

⁹⁶ Merriam-Webster, "Corruption," accessed March 1, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption>.

using corrupt practices. Two examples of this practice are, selling expired food and drugs to avoid new taxes.⁹⁷

Somalia has a high level of corruption, with a score of nine out of one hundred, according to the 2019.⁹⁸ Transparency International Corruption Index. Somalia has registered high levels of corruption and has been at the bottom of the world since 2006.⁹⁹ The country's institutions are dysfunctional, and the courts are powerless and susceptible to corruption. Somalia has an anti-corruption commission, the National Anti-Corruption Commission; however, this commission has not achieved initial operating capability, as of 2020.¹⁰⁰ The tax system is inadequate and there is corruption in the official system and outside of the system. These inefficiencies cost the FSG needed revenue.¹⁰¹ Al-Shabaab has overcome much of the corruption problem, using fear and punishment inside the group and with clients it collects from, on a reoccurring basis.¹⁰²

Economics

The Somali economy is ranked number 148, according to the CIA world Factbook 2017. The lack of multiple income sources and the high corruption create an unfriendly

⁹⁷ Rahmann, "Somalia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption."

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² UNSC, S/2018/1002, 96-97.

business environment that produces few employment opportunities. A recent World Bank assesses that:

years of conflict and fragility have left Somalia's economy with a range of challenges, including population growth outstripping economic growth, acute poverty and vulnerability, recurrent external trade and climate shocks. Weak fiscal space and institutions, active insurgency and an incomplete political settlement have also affected the country's economic strength.¹⁰³

After the state collapsed in 1991, Somalia became a benefactor of the international community. Its budget depends on international community donations and small tax income streams collected from private companies. Despite the lack of overall state governance and resources, the private sector is operational. Telecommunications, companies, livestock, and remittance money transfer companies are several sources of tax income still available to the state. A potential larger source of income is linked to approximately 77 percent of the country that the government does not control.¹⁰⁴

According to the FGS's website, the budget for 2019 was estimated at 344.2 million dollars.¹⁰⁵ The CIA World Factbook lists Somalia's GDP at 20.4 billion dollars in 2017. The estimated population is 11,757,124 for 2020, derived from government documents in 1975, current reliable data is unavailable.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ The World Bank, "The World Bank in Somalia: Overview," March 23, 2020, accessed March 28, 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>.

¹⁰⁴ CIA, The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia."

¹⁰⁵ Federal Government of Somalia, "Citizen's Guide to the 2019 Budget," accessed March 3, 2020, <http://mof.gov.so/sites/default/files/2019-02/Citizen%20Budget%202019%20Website.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

The United States has remained a supporter of Somalia since the state collapsed. The U.S. donated around \$240 million from 2001-2008 to help Somalia “achieve greater stability, establish a formal economy, obtain access to basic services and attain representation through a legitimate, credible governance.”¹⁰⁷ Multinational institutions and individual governments finance almost half of Somalia’s budget. The other half is from the taxation.¹⁰⁸ This data indicates that Somalia has a long path to follow toward self-sufficiency.

Public Services

Since the state collapsed in 1991, leaders have neglected to adequately provide goods and services. The most important public services affected by the insecurity and the lack of strong government, are the hospitals and schools. This section will review those two important services in the several paragraphs.

Public Services - Hospitals and Public Health

After years of state collapse and fighting, most of the hospitals in Mogadishu are private. A weak economy, insufficient medical staff and medical equipment, forewarn of a large-scale disaster. United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reports that a good life starts with good health. Most Somali children are not afforded a chance to start a good life because of limited access to health care. Almost 4 out of 100 Somali children die during the first month of life. In addition, 8 out of 100 die

¹⁰⁷ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 186.

¹⁰⁸ Federal Government of Somalia, “Citizen’s Guide to the 2019 Budget.”

before their first year. One out of eight die before they reach five years of age, which equates to more than 60 percent of Somali children dying before they turn five years old. Mothers are also impacted, as evidenced with a death rate of one out of twelve pregnancies result in death.¹⁰⁹ Even if hospitals are available, it is likely beds are unavailable. There are roughly 8.7 beds per 1000 Somalis, more hazardous is the fact that there are only 0.02 doctors per 1000 Somalis.¹¹⁰

The data above indicates that the Somali society is seriously lacking in basic health service. Shortages have many secondary effects, to include unnecessary deaths, homelessness and other issues that contribute to the disintegration of society. Al-Shabaab takes advantage of this fragile social situation and even extends misery with continued attacks against Somalia institutions, international partners, and non-compliant Somalis. The chaos has allowed Al-Shabaab to substitute the FSG, to some extent, with a parallel type administration. “Each of the ten Somali regions where Shabaab eventually captured territory had an appointed Waali or governor. The governor oversaw all civil services in Shabaab-controlled areas, including welfare, road maintenance, and the regional offices of the Da’wa, Hisbah, and other departments, though not the army and security forces.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Somalia,” 2019, accessed March 6, 2020, <https://www.unicef.org/somalia/health>.

¹¹⁰ CIA, “The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia.”

¹¹¹ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 69.

Public Services - Education

Somalia has suffered the effects of civil war and terrorism. The FSG has not provided enough support to educate Somali citizens. After the state collapsed, public education, for the most part, ceased. Private and charitable educational services and schools filled the void. Education services are limited to large cities where limited conflict disrupts classes and people can more easily afford the associated costs. Approximately, over 75 percent of the schools in Somalia do not have the basic equipment, materials, nor infrastructure to properly educate citizens.¹¹²

Somalia's Ministry of Education is responsible for the education services that host unique curriculums at different schools across the country. Shortages noted at the end of the last paragraph and the cost of schooling have stopped more than 3 million children from attending school.¹¹³ A UNICEF report asserts that "In addition to poverty, long distances to school, safety concerns, social norms favoring boys' education, and lack of teachers, particularly female teachers, and the low availability of sanitation facilities, stop parents from enrolling children, particularly girls, in school."¹¹⁴ Al-Shabaab offers an alternative to education in Somalia.

To provide an education for children, Magnus Ranstorp asserts in his book, *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction*, that "In some Islamic countries, such as Somalia or Pakistan, poor parents send their children to

¹¹² Africa Educational Trust, "Our work in Somalia," accessed March 15, 2020, <https://africaeducationaltrust.org/somalia>.

¹¹³ UNICEF, "Somalia."

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

madrasas and Qur'anic schools because they are heavily subsidized or free of charge.”¹¹⁵

In Somalia, an alternative to not receiving an education is allowing children go to study in Al-Shabaab madarassas, using its approved curriculum. The madarassa education system increases the risk that students may become future Al-Shabaab members. In areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, the youth are forced to join the jihad organization. As explained in the literature review, the maktab (department) Al-Da'wa (preaching) is responsible for the madrassa school system, which incorporates the extremist Salafi version. This version focuses on jihad and how to rule the country by Sharia law, denying the western countries and their allies.¹¹⁶

Diaspora's Impact

Somalia's diaspora continues to grow daily, currently there are one million Somalis living in the diaspora. The Somali diaspora contributes significantly to the Somali economy through remittances. The diaspora also contributed humanitarian aid and contributes to recovery and rebuilding efforts. The UNDP and other international organizations recognize the importance of the assistance Somalis in the diaspora provide to support nation-building in Somalia.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Magnus Ranstorp, *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (London: Routledge, 2007), accessed December 5, 2019c <https://www.routledge.com/Mapping-Terrorism-Research-State-of-the-Art-Gaps-and-Future-Direction/Ranstorp/>, 96.

¹¹⁶ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 65.

¹¹⁷ Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy, *Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and Its Role in Development*, United Nations Development Programme, March 2009, accessed March 10, 2020, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/docs/undp_report_onsomali_diaspora.pdf.

The current president of Somalia is a U.S. citizen and studied at the University of Buffalo, where he obtained a master's degree in political sciences and international relations.¹¹⁸ The vote in Somalia is exercised by the members of parliament who are basically appointed by the 4.5 formula, as mentioned in the literature of review. The current politicians in Somalia's diaspora represent almost 60 percent of the TFG FGS, since 2000. According to the World Bank studies in 2005, the diaspora's remittance was estimated between \$1.3 billion to \$2.0 billion. According to the Food and Agriculture organization's (FAO's) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU), "without remittance one third of Somali people would not be able to fulfill their basic needs like food, shelter, and medicine and education access for their children."¹¹⁹

The civil war and famine forced vulnerable families to flee to neighboring countries in search of assistance, now approximately two-thirds of displaced Somalis live in Kenya and Ethiopia. These two host states host close to 500,000 and 470,000 refugees, respectively, as reported in 2016. Europe and the U.S. both host refugees, Europe hosts about 280,000 and the U.S., roughly 150,000, as reported in 2016.

¹¹⁸ Shmuel Yosef Agnon, "Who is Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo?" *Strategic Intelligence*, February 9, 2017, accessed February 23, 2020, <https://intelligencebriefs.com/who-is-mohamed-abdullahi-farmajo-background-on-somalias-newly-elected-president/>.

¹¹⁹ Osman Hassan, "The Impact of the Somali Diaspora on Somalia from the Perspectives of Political Engagement, Economic Development (Remittances) and Humanitarianism" (Master's Thesis, University of London, December 2016), accessed January 3, 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331311777_The_Impact_of_the_Somali_Diaspora_on_Somalia_from_the_perspectives_of_Political_engagement_Economic_development_Remittances_and_Humanitarianism.

Conclusion

The socio-economic level in Somalia's issues reflects corruption, a weak economy, inadequate public services, and the impacts of the diaspora. According to the International Transparency Index, Somalia has registered at the bottom of the world, since 2006. The corruption allows public officials to misuse public resources, at times diverting them to unsanctioned clan patronage networks, instead of using resources to optimize public good. Based on the World Bank Report in 2020, the lack of multiple income sources and the high corruption create an unfriendly business environment that produces few employment opportunities. On the other hand, public services such as education and health, have been affected negatively by the insecurity and the lack of strong government. Finally, with the remittance of the Somali diaspora, a third of the population fail to secure basic needs such as food, shelter, education, and medicine. All these factors favor Al-Shabaab, when taking taxes or taking advantage of the weakened state.

Level III: State Level Failure

The collapsed Somali state became a beacon for terrorist groups who, according to many scholars, political scientists and national security experts, may have flocked to Somalia because of ungoverned spaces in the sanctuary state formed after collapse. Ungoverned spaces give terrorists space to prepare prior to launching attacks.¹²⁰ The U.S. recognized increased threats in Africa in 2001 after attacks from Al-Qaeda in America. The Horn of Africa, as well as other regions, were specifically mentioned in the

¹²⁰ Piazza, "Incubators of Terrorism," 469-488.

2003 U.S. National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. The document noted that the Horn of Africa and West Africa were at risk of becoming hosts for terrorist groups operating in failed and failing states in the regions.¹²¹ The strategy denounced the practice of sponsoring and supporting regional terrorist groups. Finally, the strategy pledged U.S. cooperation with at-risk states in areas of security, capacity building, and nation-building.¹²²

Good governance is required to build a strong state, especially after collapse, and is also crucial for state and society development. Thus, many scholars have concluded that good governance is essential for economic growth, peace, reliable public administration, progressive civil society development, and socioeconomic investment.¹²³ “More concretely, to policymakers, good governance refers to the ability of governments to administer policies effectively and transparently, honor human rights and rule of law, and adopt democratic principles.”¹²⁴ Somalia is a textbook example of a state void of the type of governance outlined at the beginning of this paragraph. One of the biggest impacts of Somalia’s lack of governance is constant insecurity since 1991. Other effected areas include: an unstable political culture with endemic corruption, societal decay and ungoverned spaces that allow predatory transnational terrorists that sustain insecurity, while profiting from Somali nationals.

¹²¹ U.S. President, *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism*.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Doriina A. Bekoe, *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 11.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Politics in Somalia

Somalia has experienced civil war since 1991. Successive administrations have governed in a climate of high political violence, while much of the violence is attributed to the fact that militias and warlords form part of the government. Alex P. Schmid in his book, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, asserts “Political violence is a heterogenous term covering a wide variety of phenomena.”¹²⁵ State collapse produced different types of violence that stemmed from clan rivalry and other selfish interests.

Resolutions from the Arta conference in Djibouti in 2000 established clannism as a pillar of power-sharing in Somalia. The power-sharing solution established to rebuild the state failed to provide for merit-based appointments to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which inherently adds clan preferences to government calculations. The Somali constitution establishes the president as head of the state and the prime minister as lead government administrator.¹²⁶ Since 2000, the president and the prime minister are alternately selected from two of the four major clans (Hawiye and Darood).

Clans will never fully accept the current power-sharing agreement because of engrained cultural and societal norms. Clans representatives seek to maximize benefits for their clans, this myopic policy is contrary to maximizing benefits for all of Somalia, and adds difficult to nation-building efforts in Somalia. Maruf and Joseph explain the situation stating that, “In a country where virtually everyone shares the same religion,

¹²⁵ Alex P. Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 160.

¹²⁶ The Federal Republic of Somalia, *The Federal Republic of Somalia: Provisional Constitution*, 27-32.

language, and ethnic ancestry, clan affiliation is the main trait that makes one person distinct from another.”¹²⁷ The authors make the link between clans and power, and assert that “It’s also the main thing that Somalis fight about when it comes to the distribution of power.”¹²⁸

Somalia’s political environment continued evolving after the Arta Conference in 2002. In 2012, the eldest clan members were appointed as members of the parliament. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud won the presidential election and the TFG officially transformed into the FGS, the former president of the TFG, Sheikh Sharif, declared the vote fair and acknowledged the defeat.¹²⁹ Somaliland declared their independence without international community recognition and continued managing their respective. The new FSG administration initiated three new geographical jurisdictions that were established and operational by July 2015: Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA), Interim Juba Administration (IJA), and the Interim South West Administration (ISWA).¹³⁰

Somali National Army (SNA) Forces in Somalia

The primary responsibility of SNA is to secure the sovereignty of Somalia. The older version of the SNA disintegrated into chaos that followed state failure in 1991 at

¹²⁷ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 20.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Global Security, “Somalia-Politics,” accessed March 10, 2020, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/somalia/politics.htm>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

the end of the Said Barre Regime,¹³¹ and successive governments have not succeeded in establishing a strong professional army. Paul D. Williams explains some of the challenges the FSG and SNA leaders face today as he writes, “There were fewer frontline personnel than previously estimated (on average battalions had only 63 percent of their authorized strength), there were inconsistent recruiting standards, and most battalions lacked basic equipment, including weapons, ammunition, communications kits, and vehicles.”¹³²

There are some trained remnants from Said Barre’s SNA, but many are not capable of serving today. A portion of those capable of serving belong to clan militias. Many countries and multilateral organizations have funded hundreds of millions of dollars and equipment to strengthen the capabilities of the SNA, but all these efforts have failed markedly to improve the SNA.¹³³ As the corruption is widespread throughout the country, SNA has not escaped this problem, hindering the rebuilding of the armed forces.

The continued UN arms embargo on Somalia since 1991, deprives Somalia of arms it requires to legally defend itself.¹³⁴ SNA soldiers do not consistently receive pay, and this negatively affects morale, which translates into reduced enthusiasm required to

¹³¹ CIA, “The World Factbook: Africa: Somalia.”

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/2498 (2019), Resolution 2498 (2019), United Nations, November 15, 2019, accessed November 30, 2019, [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2498\(2019\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2498(2019)).

fight against Al-Shabaab.¹³⁵ Lacking salaries and equipment could translate into a recruiting tool for Al-Shabaab.¹³⁶

Paramilitary Forces

The paramilitary consists of all security agencies excluding the military forces, such as SNA; the primary task is to assist military forces maintaining the peace in Somalia among citizens. There are two paramilitary organizations in Somalia, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the police. According to the Global Security.Org, “NISA agents routinely carried out mass security sweeps, despite having no legal mandate to arrest and detain suspects. NISA held detainees for prolonged periods without following due process and mistreated suspects during interrogations.”¹³⁷

The police in Somalia are divided by two areas or responsibilities. The Ministry of Security controls one half of the police. The Banadir State Governor controls the other half. “National, federal and state police are responsible for protecting lives, property, peace, and security.”¹³⁸ National Federal Police are under the Minister of National Security. Police operating out in the regions work under the authority of regional leaders,

¹³⁵ Global Security, “Somali National Army (SNA)-personnel,” accessed November 30, 2019, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/somalia/personnel.htm>.

¹³⁶ Azalone, “New on Al-Shabaab media.”

¹³⁷ Global Security, “Somalia-Politics.”

¹³⁸ Ibid.

while the regions ones it belongs to the authorities of the regions. The police in Somalia are generally judged as ineffective.¹³⁹

Conclusion

Somalia remains in a failed state status. The state is void of a viable system of governance. The TFG and TSG have had to govern in a sensitive political environment with varying alliances filled with political crime. One of the biggest problems is clannism that is enshrined in the current power-sharing arrangement. Clans owe their allegiance to their clans. This give Al-Shabaab influence with the clans through ideology, services provided and patronage. This intertwined mix of stakeholders fails to maximize Somalia's ongoing nation-building project. The SNA remains a work in progress, and has only limited skills and equipment to face Al-Shabaab on a reoccurring basis, or to wage a strategic campaign against the terrorist group. Inability to rid the country of Al-Shabaab, jeopardized the nation-building project and the wellbeing of Somali nationals.

¹³⁹ Global Security, "Somalia-Politics."

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Throughout this thesis, the author has researched factors that contribute to Al-Shabaab's ability to sustain its disruptive activities in Somalia and in the region. Somali nationals live with a constant lack of security in the country, societal decay continues and the economy remains marred in rampant corruption. The current condition of the state is further afflicted by destructive ideology that Al-Shabaab spreads throughout the country. This chapter will answer the following questions:

Primary Research Question: What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab's long-term reign of terror in Somalia?

Secondary Research Questions:

1. How does Al-Shabaab operate in Somalia?
2. How does Al-Shabaab impact Somalia's socio-economic status?
3. How does the government and the partners address the Al-Shabaab crisis?
4. How does Al-Shabaab finance its operations in Somalia?

The author will use the DIME paradigm to characterize the Al-Shabaab situation in Somalia. Next, the author will answer each question with a narrative response and then offer recommendations related to reducing Al-Shabaab's ability to disrupt Somalia and the region. Finally, the author will conclude with suggestions for future studies related to the thesis topic.

Al-Shabaab Problem Review – DIME Paradigm: Al-Shabaab - Diplomacy

Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001. This allowed Al-Shabaab to gain technical and financial support from the parent organization, which was critical to extending operations. The affiliation was also a call to foreign jihadists to come fight in Somalia. Al-Shabaab does not enjoy the power of legitimacy associated with an official state, but it does control more land in the central and the south of Somalia than the FGS. Al-Shabaab has managed to deal with the clans in areas it controls. Contrary to the FGS, which suffered from power-sharing limitations and competition among the big clans, Al-Shabaab rules with intimidation and fear. Al-Shabaab preaches an extreme version of Islam, but it faces some challenges. For Al-Shabaab, part of the challenge is linked to the extreme suffering Somalians have endured. The suffering obligates Al-Shabaab to administer government related goods and services, which eases some misery and improves loyalty to Al-Shabaab, or at least reduces resistance.

Al-Shabaab - Information

Early in its occupation of Somalia, Al-Shabaab realized that it needed a strong media campaign to influence the Somalia population, as well extremists, throughout the world. Maruf and Joseph assert “The Somali jihadi group was also a trailblazer in the use of media, establishing a strong presence on Twitter and other social media platforms, and running a multilingual foreign propaganda campaign along with a domestic messaging operation aimed at Somalis.”¹⁴⁰ Al-Shabaab has used media for recruiting new soldiers, propaganda, and to influence through information. Influence has proven effective,

¹⁴⁰ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 6.

especially gory media such as videos before and after suicide attacks. Videos like one that features a true accounting of a dead smiling high school senior who was shot trying to escape Al-Shabaab, honors the victims as martyrs.¹⁴¹

Al-Shabaab - Military

Al-Shabaab uses Al-Jabha, Al-Hesba, and the Amniyaat as military forces in Somalia. These forces fight against FGS, AMISOM, and other forces operating in Somalia. The force has over 5,000 men, with a mix of Somalian and foreign fighters. In addition to fighting against opposing forces, the military police intimidate and assassinate less than cooperative individuals, mostly businessmen. Military forces are generally better equipped and trained than the SNA, especially the foreign fighters who have experience in Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq. These forces are likely involved in attacks that destabilize the east Africa region.

Al-Shabaab - Economy

Al-Shabaab understands the importance of the economy and how it facilitates long-term success in Somalia. The Zaka taxation funds a significant amount of Al-Shabaab operations, the group collects the Zaka and, with a combination of intimidation and execution, resistance is minimal. Al-Shabaab taxes the ports, telecommunication and money transfer companies, livestock, agriculture, contractors, and individuals. Taxation is quasi omni-present. Al-Shabaab has mastered collecting taxes throughout Somalia in person or electronically via mobile money systems used in the country. Tactics and

¹⁴¹ Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 61.

techniques associated with taxation ensure Al-Shabaab is sufficiently financed to execute operations in Somalia and throughout the region. Eliminating terrorist financing is a key area that could weaken Al-Shabaab.

Response to Research Questions

Primary Research Question: What are the factors that contribute to Al-Shabab's long-term reign of terror in Somalia?

The three factors which contribute to the Al-Shabaab's long-term reign of terror in Somalia are: the terrorist ideology, socio-economic factor, and the failure of the Somali state for almost in three decades.

The ideology of terrorism is the main weapon in the hands of terrorists. The ideology constitutes the youth's main strength. As I mentioned in chapter four, Somalia was full of Islamist groups while Al-Shabaab came, but the obvious difference between these groups is the ideology of jihad. The young people who chose to break away from UCI Had experience of jihad in Afghanistan. which facilitated the opening of camps and spreading ideology among Al-Shabaab. Maruf asserts that: "The new ones promoted Al-Qaeda's ideology and plans for a regional Islamist regime as envisioned by Ben Laden, who was emerging as the international jihadist movement's most recognizable and powerful leader"¹⁴² The Ethiopian military intervention against UCI in Somalia Al-Shabaab chose to resist and rallied in the south and countered the Ethiopian intervention in the name of resistance against the colonizer. Al-Shabaab in this resistance introduced the concept of jihad for Somalia, taking advantage of the sympathy of the Somali people

¹⁴² Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab*, 25.

inside and outside the country.¹⁴³ To eliminate the terrorism's ideology, it is important to focus on the education and teach the moderate Islam version instead the extremist one.

The Socio-economic factor is the foundation on which both FGS and Al-Shabaab operate. The Somali people and their social and economic situation have an active role in aggravating the situation. Poverty, clannism, nepotism, corruption, and the destruction of the Somali infrastructures (schools and hospitals) make the government fragile, helping young people infiltrate the government and control tribes and private companies in one way or another. Fighting the corruption and imposing the audit in the government's administration and finance will enhance the good governance.

Somalia suffered the fall of the central state in 1991. These three decades have been full of civil war and the proliferation of weapons among every tribe, fueling warlordism and terrorism. The federal government located in Mogadishu and the five regions states are currently weak. The appointment of technocrats in Somalia's administration is not based on merit, but on the "4.5 formula." All of these facts expose the weak government to a failed government due to the competition for power among the tribes. On the other hand, the army needs real reform to take its national responsibility away from tribal quotas. The lifting of the UNSC arms import ban in 1991 will contribute to enhancing the SNA's strength and tightening its control over the entire country.

The nation-building process is the most important solution towards a strong Somali state. Nation-building will enable a long but assured recovery from the state's chronic weakness. Somalia needs international community's support economically and

¹⁴³ Bronwyn E. Bruton, *Somalia: A New Approach* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010), 8.

morally. A strong central government with a powerful military is the unique solution to help Somalia overcome terrorism and clannism. To realize that, the Somali central government should develop and consolidate good governance to get the confidence of the international community and, with the support of the clans and the religious scholars, it could eliminate terrorism in Somalis as well as the region.

Secondary Research Questions:

1. How does Al-Shabaab operate in Somalia?

Al-Shabaab controls an area through a system of Islamic governance by maktab (Departments), which run as a government. Thus, they influence the areas outside of its control by one form or another. The terrorist group has three security forces Al-Jabha, Al-Hesba, and Al-Amniyaat. The most dangerous one to the population is Amniyaat, which its role is to kill the targeted people for Al-Shabaab in the FGS. Al-Shabaab does not have enough forces for frontal attacks, but they use insurgency tactics in its operations.

2. How does Al-Shabaab impact Somalia's socio-economic status?

The clans 4.5 formula has a negative impact on the governance in Somalia. Al-Shabaab does not recognize that in the group, but they use the clannism in its favor. On the other hand, by smuggling and double taxation, the people are in bad situation in the economic aspect.

3. How does the government and the partners address the Al-Shabaab crisis?

The FGS and the partners operate Al-Shabaab's influence in their areas of operations. In addition to that, they organize joined and separated operations to free some areas from the control of Al-Shabaab. The international group supports the FSG and the AMISOM, but the mission still needs to eliminate Al-Shabaab from its area of control.

4. How does Al-Shabaab finance its operations in Somalia?

Smuggling and taxation are the most important aspects of Al-Shabaab's financial security. Taxing the goods, companies, businessmen, and individuals results in enough money to support the group's operations. Investing in the country and eliminating the corruption and the nepotism will help convince the population to support the government.

Recommendations

The recommendations in this research are for the policymakers in Somalia and in the international community, employing these recommendations will help Somalia free itself from terrorists and terrorism. The recommendations represent true investments in Somalia that will ensure corruption, nepotism, and power-politics never hold the Somali nation captive again in the future, and the country can continue its nation-building project.

1. Somalia needs to prioritize nation-building. Nation-building and good governance is the most significant solution for the Somali state. As explained in the literature of review and chapter 4, Somalia is weak and fragile because of weak law enforcement. This characteristic attracts transnational terrorists. Somalia needs collective efforts from the international community to help it recover from the chaos, to take back control of the country.

2. Building the SNA is a key to liberate Somalia from the terrorists. Governments in Somalia have failed to pay the SNA regular salaries, and lack of arms and proper equipment hinders effectiveness and likely discourages participation in a military that does not take care of its soldiers. This is especially troubling because Al-Shabaab has a history of never failing to pay a salary, contrary to the TFG and FGS. To secure the territory of

Somalia, reforming the Army is crucial for ensuring sovereignty and improving legitimacy.

3. To fight terrorism as an ideology, it is important to think about education. Unifying school curriculum at grade schools and the universities will mitigate the effects of preached terrorism ideology in learning environments. Emphasizing the study of a moderate form of Islam and removing extremist influencers from Somalia, is a required step that supports the eventual elimination of terrorism in the country. Somalia should recruit moderate scholars to fight intellectual terrorism in schools and mosques.

4. Somalia's different forces must collaborate with clan militias and the population to overcome terrorists. Launching a project with the slogan of "free Mogadishu from terrorism is free Somalia for all" would sensitize the population and reduce reluctance to cooperate with the government and international community efforts to free Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab interference.

5. Somalia and its partners must eliminate funding sources terrorists now enjoy. One suggestion is to create a UN sponsored blacklist of people and businesses that assist Al-Shabaab, regardless of their intentions. Without the money, Al-Shabaab will lose its advantage and ability to withstand against an improved Somalia that operates with good governance principals and support from the international community.

Suggestions for Future Study

In this research, I did not get a chance to travel to Somalia to interview politicians from the FGS, former officers of Al-Shabaab, or Somali businessmen. Making these interviews would answer and add more clarity to the secondary research questions.

Regarding the long period of the failure of the Somali state, it is necessary to go to the battlefield due to the lack of raw data.

The Republic of Djibouti has had good relations with Somalia since the operations for the independence of Djibouti, and was the first country to take steps for the Somali resolution. Thus, the shared language, religion, and culture are significant in this relationship. After he was elected in 1999, President Ismail Omar Guelleh called for the resolution of Somalia. On 22 September 1999, President Ismail Omar Guelleh used the opportunity of his scheduled contribution to the General Assembly debate to call for the Somali resolution in his country, and he requested the support of the international community. The result was the Arta Conference in 2000 in Djibouti. In addition to that, the Djibouti contingent in AMISOM has gained the trust of the local population in its area of operations, which made Djibouti an appropriate country to get a larger role in the Somali peacekeeping.

The international community, led by the UN, has supported Somalia in the security and development aspects. The country situation is improving, but still needs more to build the nation and restore the governance. The collaboration of the neighboring country in each phase of development is crucial to save Somalia, as well as the region, from terrorism.

Finally, I suggest future researchers to go to the battlefield. The aspect of society that supports Al-Shabaab and its causes is important. AMISOM and SNA's role in the security and the development in their area of operation is important too. Finally, the governance in Somalia needs to be an area of research, because everything is related to politics.

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