

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTABLISH A
STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE FOR FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF?

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General Studies

by

BRIAN V. BAGGETT, MAJ, USA
B.S., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2008

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Name of Candidate: Brian V. Baggett

Thesis Title: Should the United States Department of Defense Establish a Standing Joint Task Force for Foreign Disaster Relief?

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Thomas E. Ward II, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Stephen W. Smith, MPH

_____, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Philip G. Hensel, M.A.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2020 by:

_____, Acting Director, Office of Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTABLISH A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE FOR FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF? by Brian V. Baggett, 81 pages.

The U.S. military regularly participates in foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations, however, there is no standing joint headquarters that specializes in FDR. Currently, joint task forces are created ad hoc to support FDR efforts once the U.S. military is requested to provide assistance. The ad hoc creation of these headquarters contributes to delays in establishing full operational capability during a crisis situation. The use of a standing joint task force (JTF) eliminates the need to establish an ad hoc JTF on short notice. This study found that although the existing system of utilizing ad hoc JTFs for FDR is adequate for most FDR missions, there are improvements that should be adopted for JTF-capable headquarters.

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ACRONYMS

ABC	Airborne Corps
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARSOUTH	U.S. Army South
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CFE-DM	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
CSF	Combined Support Force
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DJTfAC	Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DP	Displaced Persons
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FDR	Foreign Disaster Relief
GCC	Geographical Combatant Command
GoH	Government of Haiti
GoJ	Government of Japan
GoN	Government of Nepal
GoP	Government of the Philippines
GRF	Global Response Force
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

HQ	Headquarters
HuMOCC	Humanitarian-Military Coordination Center
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
JCC	Joint Command Center
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JHAST	Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
JHOC	Joint Humanitarian Operations Course
JPSE	Joint Planning Support Element
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Forces
JSF	Joint Support Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force Civil Support
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
MARFORPAC	Marine Forces Pacific
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stability Mission in Haiti
MiTaM	Mission Tasking Matrix
MNCC	Multinational Coordination Center
MNMCC	Multi-National Military Coordination Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

OSOCC	On-Site Operation and Coordination Center
PA	Primary Agency
SJFHQ	Standing Joint Force Headquarters
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UN DMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UN RC/HC	United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
U.S. AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
U.S. CENTCOM	United States Central Command
U.S. EUCOM	United States European Command
U.S. INDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
U.S. NORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
U.S. PACOM	United States Pacific Command
U.S. SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
U.S. TRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
U.S.C.	United States Code
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USG	United States Government
VOCO	Verbal Orders of the Commanding Officer

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The United States Government (USG) responds to an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries each year (USAID 2019). Of those, the United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD) provides support for to up to ten percent (CFE-DM 2020). From August 2009 to September 2018, the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) alone provided military support to 17 disasters in the Indo-Pacific region (CFE-DM 2020). This support ranged from airlifts of supplies and personnel by a small contingent force to large-scale deployment of personnel to conduct search and rescue, logistics, and medical support.

U.S. DoD support to foreign disaster relief (FDR) is not a first choice for the USG. The United States abides by the United Nations (UN) Oslo Guidelines, which state that:

Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need (UNOCHA 2007, 8).

As such, the conditions in which the U.S. military is employed to support FDR, include: 1) the military provides a unique service, 2) civilian response capacity is overwhelmed, and 3) civilian authorities request assistance (CFE-DM 2020). The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), part of the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID), serves as the USG lead for the management and coordination of FDR (USAID 2015).

Coordination between the affected nation of a disaster and the USG is through the U.S. embassy of the affected nation.

When requesting assistance from USAID/OFDA, the Ambassador issues a disaster declaration cable stating that the disaster has met the following USAID/OFDA criteria: 1) the Affected State requests, or will accept, assistance, 2) the disaster is beyond the ability of the Affected State to respond, and 3) responding is in the interest of the USG. That determination is usually made in consultation with USAID (DOD 2011, 2-2).

When a nation declares a disaster and requests international aid, USAID may (with the concurrence of the U.S. ambassador) deploy regional advisors, an assessment team, or a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the affected nation to assist in the coordination of the FDR effort (DOD 2011, 2-3). The DART's activities include "assisting in the coordination of the USG's relief efforts with the Affected State, other donors and relief agencies and, when present, other USG entities, including the US military" (DOD 2011, 2-4).

Assessments by USAID/OFDA personnel are critical for the initial USG response.

After the Disaster Declaration Cable is transmitted, USAID/OFDA and DOS [Department of State] commence determination of the level of USG assistance. If USAID/OFDA identifies a requirement within an Affected State that can be most effectively met by DOD, DOS will initiate a request through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (DOD 2011, 2-5).

Upon approval by either the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense to support FDR operations, the Joint Staff will then issue an Executive Order to the corresponding geographic combatant command (DOD 2011, 2-6).




Figure 1. Interagency Coordination for Request of U.S. DoD Support to FDR

Source: DOD 2011, 2-1.

U.S. military support in FDR occurs globally. Although U.S. military support is provided only when an affected nation's own emergency response assets are overwhelmed and adequate civilian assets are not available, it is not limited to developing nations. This is clearly evident by the U.S. DoD's massive response to the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in Japan.

The U.S. DoD has six geographical combatant commands (GCCs): United States Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM), United States Central Command (U.S. CENTCOM), United States European Command (U.S. EUCOM), United States Indo-Pacific Command (U.S. INDOPACOM) (formerly known as United States Pacific

Command, U.S. PACOM), United States Northern Command (U.S. NORTHCOM), and United States Southern Command (U.S. SOUTHCOM) (DOD n.d.). When a GCC receives a request for assistance, it tasks a subordinate unit headquarters with leading the response effort. Smaller response efforts may be headquartered by units that fall under a single service component (such as a U.S. Marine Corps unit under Marine Corps Forces Pacific, MARFORPAC). Larger response efforts often involve forces that fall under multiple service components (Army, Air Force, Navy), and require the leadership of a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.



Figure 2. Geographical Combatant Commands

Source: USTRANSCOM n.d.

When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, a commander of a unified command (such as a geographical combatant command or a functional combatant command), may establish a separate unified command to conduct operations on a continuing geographic or functional basis (CJCS 2018b, I-1). If capabilities are required from two or more Military Service Components operating under a single command, the newly established command is designated as a joint task force (CJCS 2018b, I-1). To establish a JTF:

DOD relies primarily on Service component HQ to adapt with little or no notice into a JTF HQ, often under crisis planning conditions. However, the newly designated JTF HQ typically requires additional resources that are not organic to the core Service HQ....To mitigate these challenges, CCDRs may designate one or more Service HQ from their assigned forces to become “JTF-capable” HQ and integrate them into CCMD planning efforts and joint exercise programs. A designated Service HQ can be considered a JTF-capable HQ if it has achieved and can sustain a level of readiness to transition, organize, establish, and operate as a JTF HQ and is acceptable to the establishing authority (CJCS 2018b, II-2).

A JTF-capable headquarters is typically designated from a Service Component Command headquarters such as an Army corps, a Marine expeditionary force, a Navy numbered fleet, or a numbered Air Force to form the base of the JTF staff (CJCS 2018a, IV-6). When called to support an operation, such as a largescale FDR mission, that staff is then augmented with appropriate maritime, air, or land component staff officers and additional functional staff officers (such as medical, logistics, and engineering) from within the GCC staff or from a supporting Service Component Command, based on a previously established joint manning document (CJCS 2018b, II-2). This newly established JTF deploys to the affected region and establishes an operational headquarters. Subordinate units are assigned to the JTF in order to accomplish the

tactical-level support mission. USDA/OFDA submits requests to the JTF for specific support requirements via a Mission Tasking Matrix (MiTaM) (DOD 2011, C-1).

The DoD has standing (permanently formed) JTFs for missions that require a task force headquarters that are designated to support operations in a particular geographical region or are designated to rapidly deploy in support of specialized missions. The use of a standing JTF eliminates the need to establish an ad hoc JTF on short notice. One such example of a rapidly deployable standing JTF is Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), based out of Fort Eustis, Virginia. As published on the JTF-CS website:

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a standing joint task force and subordinate command of U.S. Army North (USARNORTH). It is charged with providing command and control of Department of Defense forces deployed to support a Primary Agency (PA) managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRN) incident in the United States and its territories and possessions. When directed, JTF-CS will deploy to an incident site, establish command and control of Department of Defense forces, and provide military assistance and support to civil authorities by saving lives, preventing further injury and providing temporary critical support to enable community recovery (JTF-CS n.d.).

With the frequency of DoD support to FDR and the urgent nature of disaster response operations, one could conjecture that there is value in establishing a standing JTF for large-scale FDR missions.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question that this study endeavors to answer is: Should the United States Department of Defense establish a standing joint task force to lead military support for large-scale foreign disaster relief operations? Secondary research questions which will provide the supporting analysis include:

1. What is the comparative scope of large-scale FDR operations within the past 10 years?
2. Which operations concluded with a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR?
3. What conditions contributed to the recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR?
4. What advantages and disadvantages are there to establishing a standing JTF specific for FDR?

Assumptions

This study assumes that at least one large-scale FDR operation in the past 10 years concluded with a recommendation to establish a standing JTF for FDR. This study assumes that the Department of Defense is not planning to establish a standing joint task force for leading foreign disaster response in the near future. This study also assumes that the Department of Defense will continue support up to ten percent of U.S. Government foreign disaster relief efforts (with the remainder supported by other USG agencies and available NGOs).

Limitations

This study only utilizes unclassified sources and will not incorporate any sources that are classified or designated as “For Official Use Only.” Additionally, this study only analyzes FDR operations within the past 10 years (from 2010 to 2020) in order to reduce the scope and ensure analysis is not skewed from major adjustments in DOD response procedures that may have been emplaced prior to 2010. This study is also limited to

foreign disaster scenarios caused by natural disasters (such as hurricanes/typhoons/ cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, etc.) and does not include FDR operations related to disease epidemics/pandemics, such as the 2014 Ebola support to West Africa. This study also does not include humanitarian assistance operations for complex emergencies, which are situations that develop because of or during human conflict (such as genocide, blockades/sieges resulting in starvation, etc.).

Delimitations

This study primarily utilizes case studies and lessons learned from major DOD FDR operations. For the purpose of this study, major FDR operations include those which involved multiple Services branches and multiple response capabilities (such as logistics, search and rescue, and medical), resulting in the establishment of a separate joint task force. Smaller DoD FDR operations that included primarily logistical support, such as JTF-Matthew's support to the 2016 hurricane in the Caribbean, or small operations that were managed by preexisting JTFs, such as JTF-Horn of Africa's operations in support of the 2019 Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, are not included. Based on that criteria, the following FDR operations are included in this analysis: Operation Unified Response (2010 Haiti Earthquake), Operation Tomodachi (2011 Japan Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Disaster), Operation Damayan (2013 Philippine Super Typhoon), and Operation Sahayogi Haat (2015 Nepal Earthquake).

Significance

This study seeks to determine if the current practice of establishing an ad hoc JTF headquarters for FDR is adequate in large-scale U.S. DoD support operations, or if a

standing JTF that is specifically designed and trained for FDR would be more effective. The results of this study may be used to help the U.S. DoD in future FDR operations, by establishing a new headquarters element that is specially manned and trained. Even if establishing a standing JTF for FDR is deemed unnecessary, the analysis from this study will formally identify the procedures most effective to incorporate for future large-scale FDR operations.

Summary

The USG provides aid for FDR to an average of 65 disasters every year. In up to ten percent of FDR operations, the U.S. military is requested to assist. Periodically, the military provides large-scale support to FDR, requiring the establishment of a joint task force to lead the U.S. military response effort. The U.S. DoD does not have a standing joint task force that is trained and ready to deploy rapidly in response to foreign disasters, as it does for other specialized, urgent scenarios such as CBRN response. This study uses comparative case study methodology to analyze evidence emerging from the case studies, and to subsequently determine if the U.S. DoD should establish a standing JTF for large-scale FDR or if the current ad hoc establishment of JTF headquarters is sufficient. The next chapter provides an overview of the sources of information that are included in the analysis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This purpose of this study is to determine if the U.S. DoD should establish a standing JTF for large-scale FDR or if the current ad hoc establishment of JTF headquarters is sufficient. This chapter highlights the principal literature sources reviewed in this study, and is organized in four parts. The first part provides an overview of the foundational doctrine (such as intergovernmental and government agency publications), DoD directives, and information sheets from government agency websites. The remaining parts provide an overview of literature (such as case studies, after action reviews, research reports, professional journal articles, and published interviews) involving each of the major FDR operations. The operations are listed in chronological order, beginning with Operation Unified Response (Haiti, 2010), followed by Operation Tomodachi (Japan, 2011), followed by Operation Damayan (Philippines, 2013), and concluding with Operation Sahayogi Haat (Nepal, 2015).

Foundational Doctrine, Directives, and Information Sheets

The 2007 revision of *Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, provided general recommendations for when and how foreign military and civil defense assets should be utilized in disaster relief operations (UNOCHA 2007). The guidelines recommended foreign military and civil defense assets be utilized as a last resort, when there is a lack of adequate civilian response capabilities to meet requirements (UNOCHA 2007, 8). The guidelines also

stated that the military and civil defense assets are to be used as a complement to the existing humanitarian response effort (UNOCHA 2007, 12). Much of the guidelines focused on the use of foreign military and civil defense assets that are under the control of U.N. agencies during response efforts, as well as coordination between foreign military assets and U.N. Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Teams. The significance of the Oslo Guidelines for this study is that U.S. DoD assets used for FDR operations, no matter how large or extensive, are still intended only to supplement the USG response effort, which includes other government agencies and coordination from non-governmental organizations.

The United States Agency for International Development's *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response*, provided detailed information for USAID personnel conducting disaster assessments (USAID 2005). Appendix F of the guide, entitled "Working with the Military in the Field," detailed much of how USAID personnel partner with the military for FDR. The guide identified that one of the most common means of support USAID's OFDA teams request from the military is point-to-point logistical support provided by military aircraft. This occurs when OFDA seeks to provide relief commodities from one of its stockpiles and commercial aircraft are not able to meet the delivery requirements (USAID 2005, F-2-3). The guide also briefly discussed other roles for which the military is often requested, to include "providing logistical support, transportation, airfield management, communications, medical support, distribution of relief commodities, or security (USAID 2005, F-3)." Although the guide provided insight into how USAID personnel make damage assessments, it did not provide much detail as to how the decision to request military support is made, nor did it

discuss the use of the military tasking matrix (MiTaM) when working with the military. This helps to explain why the U.S. military sometimes employs humanitarian assistance survey teams (HASTs) to work in conjunction with USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to conduct assessments and advise on military capabilities for large scale foreign disasters. This guide does mention that coordination with HASTs are key to successful operations with the military (USAID 2005, F-8).

The Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, provided a summary of the established policy on DoD support to FDR in accordance with sections 404 and 2561 of Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) (DOD 2012). The directive stated that DoD assets support FDR in support of USAID. The directive also explained the three specific instances when DoD components are permitted to provide aid. The first is at the direction of the President of the United States. The second is through a request from a federal agency at the approval of the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. In emergency situations, the Secretary of Defense may authorize DoD commitment in order to save lives without concurrence of the Secretary of State, but shall seek concurrence immediately after for continued support. The third instance involves military command authority for immediate life-saving response, in which the directive stated:

Nothing in this Directive shall be construed as preventing a military commander with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the host nation and U.S. Chief of Mission of the affected country before committing forces. Also, the Combatant Commander shall follow up as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations, to secure Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense approval for continuing assistance.... Such assistance during

the first 72 hours does not include the authority to provide military assistance that does not contribute to urgent life-saving efforts (DOD 2012, 2).

Understanding that large-scale FDR response is only possible by either the direction of the President, or by the concurrence of the Secretary of State, helps explain why there are instances when the military responds to FDR with a small initial force (activated by a geographical combatant commander for immediate lifesaving measures) and then sends a JTF headquarters days later to lead a larger support effort.

Joint Publication 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance listed detailed information as to how the military supports the U.S. government's efforts in FDR (CJCS 2019). Pertinent to this study, JP 3-29 discussed many of the tools global combatant commands (GCCs) may employ in response to foreign disasters. Highlighted were the crisis action/rapid deployment team, humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST), humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), and joint task force (JTF).

The publication stated that a GCC may utilize a crisis action or rapid deployment team to provide an initial assessment and response on behalf of the GCC headquarters (CJCS 2019, ii-21). This team coordinates with the Chief of Mission and country team in the affected nation and recommends priority issues such as medical support or supplies, as well as how to organize for response. This team may later serve as part of the headquarters element for the FDR effort.

The publication described a HAST is a team of functional experts (medical, engineer, logistics, communications, security) utilized by a GCC typically at the request of USAID to acquire information for planning (CJCS 2019, ii-22). The HAST is typically used to conduct assessments that can be utilized in addition to or in conjunction with assessments performed by a USAID DART. As stated in the publication:

Once deployed, the HAST, working with the country team and USAID, may be asked to assess the ability of the HN government to respond to the disaster; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment for force protection purposes; survey facilities and infrastructure that may be used to support FDR operations, including aerial port of debarkation, seaport of debarkation, and forward operating base; conduct health and medical assessments; and coordinate specific logistical support to assist with the relief effort (CJCS 2019, ii-22).

The publication outlined that, in order to assist with interagency coordination and planning, a GCC may establish a HACC (CJCS 2019, ii-23). The HACC is typically a temporary entity comprised of military staff planners and advisors, and is augmented with liaisons from various USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and HN agencies. The duties of the HACC are later absorbed by either a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or humanitarian operations center (HOC) once they are established.

The publication stated that a GCC will often establish a JTF as the headquarters element to lead military units in large-scale FDR missions (CJCS 2019, ii-23). The JTF typically operates at the operational level, with subordinate units working at the tactical level. Depending on the sensitivities of the host nation or other participating organizations, the JTF title may be replaced with “Joint Support Force” (JSF) or “Combined Support Force” (CSF) (CJCS 2019, ii-24).

Department of Defense Graphic Training Aid 90-01-030, *Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below)*, was a compendium of policy and doctrine governing DOD support for FDR (DOD 2011). In addition to summarizing the information from the sources covered previously in this chapter, the handbook discussed DoD assets suited to support FDR operations. Pertinent to this study was U.S. Transportation Command’s (U.S. TRANSCOM’s) Joint Enabling

Capabilities Command (JECC). U.S. TRANSCOM is a functional combatant command, which provides assets and capabilities which support the geographical combatant commands. The JECC, a subordinate command under U.S. TRANSCOM, provides “trained, responsive, and cohesive capabilities to assist in rapid establishment of a joint task force headquarters (DOD 2011, 10-6).” These capabilities include planning, public affairs, and communications support teams.

The JECC information sheet, located on the JECC website, informed that the organization is comprised of a headquarters element, the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE), and the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) (JECC n.d.). “The Joint Planning Support Element rapidly deploys tailored, ready, joint planners, operators, logisticians, knowledge managers, public affairs and intelligence specialists in order to accelerate the formation and increase the effectiveness of newly formed Joint Force Headquarters (JECC n.d.).” This element can provide multi-service planners from across multiple specialties, to provide the augmentation necessary for a service component headquarters (such as an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force) to operate as a JTF headquarters.

The handbook also provided a succinct description of USG interaction with United Nations (UN) organizations in FDR (DOD 2011). Typically, when an affected state requests assistance from the international community, the UN assumes the lead for the coordination of foreign inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) in the support effort. The UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (UN RC/HC) serves as the lead for coordination of UN efforts with the affected state. During a declared disaster, the UN

RC/HC will typically establish a UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT) with UN agency leads that arrive or are preestablished (as the UN Country Team) to prepare a disaster management plan and coordinate relief efforts from amongst UN agencies. The UN Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) will typically provide additional resources to assist with the coordination of support. A UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) will often augment the UN DMT, providing assessments and additional coordination support. The UN support mission then typically establishes a coordination center, and organizes support requirements using the cluster approach. The cluster approach divides the disaster relief effort into sectors (clusters) under the leadership of a UN or other international organization. Contributing organizations (IGOs, NGOs) provide assistance in conjunction with coordination by each cluster lead in order to prioritize efforts and reduce redundancy.




Figure 3. The United Nations Cluster System

Source: CJCS 2019, 70.

The UN cluster leads do not have tasking authority over contributing organizations.

“They must meet requirements using coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and communication (DOD 2011, 3-8).” Thus, the coordination center is essential for adequate integration of all contributing organizations. As the USG’s lead federal agency (LFA) for

FDR, USAID/OFDA integrates U.S. non-governmental organization and governmental organization (including DoD) capabilities to fill needs in the response effort. Figure 4 provides an example of the relationship between U.S. military assets, USAID, and UN organizations during Operation Unified Response in Haiti.




Figure 4. USG Coordination with the UN for Operation Unified Response in Haiti

Source: DOD 2011, 68.

Operation Unified Response (2010 Haiti Earthquake) Literature

The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders, provided a detailed report of the military response effort (Cecchine et al. 2013). The study explained that the Haitian Government requested assistance from the United States Government on the same day the 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck. Two days later, U.S. SOUTHCOM established JTF-Haiti, staffed primarily by the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC). Two months later, U.S. Army South replaced the XVIII ABC as the lead staff element for JTF-Haiti.

The study produced four main findings from the U.S. military relief effort. The first finding from the report was that the DoD Directive for FDR, DODD 5100.46 (then dated December 4, 1975), needed to be updated (Cecchine et al. 2013, 63-64). The result was that U.S. SOUTHCOM did not have clear, updated information on the statutory authority provided by Title 10 of the U.S.C. for military units in FDR.

The second finding was that the use of VOCO requests by the JTF-Haiti commander resulted in the rapid commitment of personnel and resources early in the relief effort (Cecchine et al. 2013, 64). The benefit of this method was that relief commodities and personnel arrived quickly. The disadvantage of VOCO requests was that they resulted in a lack of tracking, thus these resources were not properly accounted for or efficiently managed until later in the operations when JTF-Haiti became more organized.

The third finding was that SOUTHCOM did not have a well-established existing plan for such a large-scale mission, and the SOUTHCOM staff was not initially organized to efficiently support such an effort (Cecchine et al. 2013, 65). During the time

of the earthquake, SOUTHCOM was still in the process of updating its FDR plans. SOUTHCOM was also undergoing staff reorganization. Prior to the earthquake, U.S. SOUTHCOM was structured to best support its narcotrafficking mission. It did not begin to restructure to resemble the other GCC's until the time of the earthquake. Additionally, much of the initial DoD support requested by JTF-Haiti was from a top-down push method, instead of a pull method based on assessments and prioritization. This resulted in significant inefficiency of resources early in the relief effort.

The fourth finding was that there were numerous factors that contributed to the success of the operation which were a result of serendipitous timing and not individual or organizational achievement (Cecchine et al. 2013, 65-67). Highlighted were the SOUTHCOM deputy commander's presence at the U.S. ambassador to Haiti's residence at the time of the earthquake; the functionality of the U.S. ambassador's communication equipment (when most of the capital region's communications were inoperable); and the personal relationship that existed between the U.S. SOUTHCOM deputy commander and the United Nations Stability Mission in Haiti (MINUSTUH) commander. These unique circumstances greatly benefited the success of the mission, especially during the initial response.

A Review of Operation Unified Response, the U.S. Military's Effort in Support of Haiti following the January 2010 Earthquake, gave an overview of the scale of the earthquake damage in Haiti, the reaction from the international community (to include the peacekeeping force of the United Nations Stability Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, that was already on ground during the time of the earthquake), and the U.S. military response (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6). The case study explained that the earthquake,

whose epicenter lay immediately southwest of the capital city of Port-au-Prince, destroyed much of the Haitian government offices and infrastructure. The resulting dissolution of much of the Haitian government led to the need for a more robust response effort from international partners such as the United States. Joint Task Force-Haiti, established by SOUTHCOM two days later, was manned primarily by XVIII ABC and the 82nd Airborne Division, SOUTHCOM, and staff from several other combatant commands. The JTF-Haiti response effort included logistical support, port opening, air traffic management, medical support, and security assistance.

This case study concluded with a listing of several lessons learned regarding the U.S. military response. One of the pertinent lessons identified from this case study was that U.S. SOUTHCOM's standing joint task force was not sufficiently manned and prepared to respond to a large-scale FDR mission (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 13). Another lesson learned was the importance of FDR training for JTF staff (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 13).

“Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,” provided observations from Lieutenant General Keen, the JTF-Haiti Commander, and three Lieutenant Colonels who served on his staff as part of JTF-Haiti (Keen et al. 2010). The article described the operational challenges that JTF-Haiti faced, and how it innovated and adapted to conditions in the longest and largest U.S. military FDR operation. Some of the authors describe that, due to personnel shortages within U.S. SOUTHCOM's SJFHQ, and the unavailability of ARSOUTH to staff the bulk of the JTF-Haiti staff, JTF-Haiti was largely created by piecemeal. The bulk of the JTF-Haiti staff consisted of the XVIII Airborne Corps, but “Southern Command, Joint Forces Command, Joint Enabling

Capabilities Command, Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Northern Command, European Command, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy elements, as well as numerous liaison officers, responded and filled the gaps (Keen et al 2010, 93).” The authors also warned of the importance of staffing either a standing joint force headquarters from the GCC or a rapidly deployable joint qualified headquarters (such as XVIII ABC while on its Global Response Force mission) with adequate personnel to conduct such operations in the future in order to avoid repeat scenarios of creating ad hoc JTFs sourced on immediate notice from so many different organizations (Keen et al 2010, 93).

“USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force-Haiti...Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force,” provided a very detailed account of how JTF-Haiti was established (Ryan, Goehring, and Hulslander 2010). The article described why the organizations which staffed JTF-Haiti were selected, as well as the reasons for delays in the JTF becoming fully operational. One of the enabling organizations that was identified as critical for augmenting the XVIII Airborne Corps and U.S. SOUTHCOM staff members was the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), which deployed planners, as well as members of the Joint Public Affairs Support Element and the Joint Communications Support Element (Ryan, Goehring, and Hulslander 2010, 7).

Another pertinent observation from the article was that JTF-Haiti struggled to determine requirements without having detailed assessments from specialized personnel on-site. The article stated that “most of the major force deployment decisions were made within the first 72-96 hours when the situation was still very unclear. As a result, the USSOUTHCOM and fledgling JTF staffs had to make some bold assumptions

about their expected requirements (Ryan, Goehring, and Hulslander 2010, 4).” Many of the DoD response assets were not requested by or coordinated through USAID, the lead federal agency.

Operation Tomodachi (2011 Japan Earthquake,
Tsunami, and Nuclear Disaster) Literature

Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region, provided a detailed overview of the scope as well as after-action recommendations from Operation Tomodachi (Maroney et al. 2013). One of the main findings from the study was that the initial DoD command and control relationship was hampered, and the operation was slow to establish a JTF (Maroney et al. 2013, 94). USPACOM initially tasked U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) with serving as the initial headquarters for FDR operations. As units were assigned to USFJ for the effort, USFJ was only given tactical control (TACON) over those units assigned. By not having operational control (OPCON) over the units assigned, there were limitations on how long units could be utilized for efforts as well as how assets could be committed to support. USFJ also was not designed or manned with a staff robust enough to manage FDR operations (Maroney et al. 2013, 94). Eventually, a JTF was established and renamed as a “Joint Support Force” (JSF) to lead the response effort, but command relationships (OPCON vs. TACON) were still not clearly indicated for all subordinate units.

USINDOPACOM Foreign Disaster Response in the Indo-Asia-Pacific: June 1991 – June 2019, detailed the U.S. military’s response to the 2011 Japan earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster named Operation Tomodachi (Japanese for “Friend”) (CFE-DM n.d., 62-67). The report discussed the scope of the disaster, as well as provided an overview of

the national and international assets involved in the response. In addition to the initial emergency response, the report also provided an overview of Operation Pacific Passage, which was the evacuation of U.S. military dependents and many civilian employees stationed in Japan to the continental U.S., along with specifics on the DoD's support to the Government of Japan (GoJ) in dealing with the nuclear crises. The report discussed the initial tasking of USFJ by U.S. PACOM as the operational command for the U.S. DoD FDR effort on 11 March. Each Service Component element headquartered in Japan was tasked to designate a supporting commander for the FDR effort. The report also informed that elements of the U.S. PACOM standing joint force headquarters, JTF-519, deployed to augment the USFJ staff on 19 March in order to form a JSF which assumed control over the FDR mission (CFE-DM n.d., 63).

“Chronology of Operation Tomodachi; March 11–April 8, 2011” provided an extensive day-by-day recap of the activities undertaken by the U.S. military and the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSFD) during Operation Tomodachi (Zielonka n.d.). The chronology detailed when units were activated to support, the number of personnel supporting, and specifics on the type of support provided (logistical support, debris clearing, radiological monitoring).

“Operation TOMODACHI: A Model for American Disaster Response Efforts and the Collective use of Military Forces Abroad,” described the coordination relationship for U.S. military forces in the disaster response effort (Wilson 2012). Unique to Operation Tomodachi, the USG support was coordinated directly with the Government of Japan (GoJ), and not as part of a broad international assistance effort (Wilson 2012, 2). The USAID DART collaborated directly with GoJ's emergency management agency through

a Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell. Due to the already available U.S. military assets in Japan, the rapid deployability of other DoD forces in the Pacific, and the enduring relationship between the USG and the GoJ, the U.S. military was able to contribute substantially to the relief effort. The article stated:

In total, the US delivered more than 3 times the amount of food and 20 times the volume of water than did the GoJ.... The establishment and swift implementation of the JTF-519 as the US lead military response command authority proved to be an effective command and control strategy. US Forces Japan did not have sufficient manpower to handle response activities (Wilson 2012, 6).

Operation Damayan (2013 Philippines Super Typhoon) Literature

An Inside Look into USPACOM Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan, identified five primary lessons learned (Parker et al. 2015). Four of the five lessons learned dealt with command and control, and planning. Pertinent to this study was the phased headquarters establishment. Super Typhoon Haiyan (known as Yolanda in the Philippines) made landfall in the Philippines on 6 November. On 9 November, the Philippine government requested assistance from the U.S. Government. USPACOM initially tasked Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) with leading the DoD FDR effort. MARFORPAC, in turn, tasked 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3 MEB) with serving as the tactical command for the DoD FDR effort. 3 MEB established a forward command element on 10 November 2013. USPACOM immediately augmented the 3 MEB forward command element with a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). This cell was instrumental in providing joint, regional, and interagency expertise in planning and managing operations. On 18 November, JTF-505 was established to take over the DoD tactical response effort. The JTF reached full operational capability on 20 November. Most of the initial response requests were

completed by the time the JTF was fully operational, and on 26 November the JTF announced that the emergency phase of the operation was finished (Parker et al. 2015, 8-9). Since the decision to establish a JTF was not made initially, the use of the DJTFAC until JTF-505 was established proved to be an essential stop gap. An excerpt from this report entitled “The U.S. Pacific Command Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan,” was included in *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 82 (Parker et al. 2016).

USINDOPACOM Foreign Disaster Response in the Indo-Asia-Pacific: June 1991 – June 2019, outlined the U.S. military’s support to the Philippines for Super Typhoon Haiyan (CFE-DM n.d., 74-78). The report mentioned that on 10 November, two days after landfall, both the lead elements of the 3 MEB headquarters, as well as the U.S. PACOM DJTFAC arrived. Additionally, Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (SOTF-P) began providing assistance that day. SOTF-P personnel conducted surveillance of key infrastructure such as roads, ports, airfields, as well as gathered information essential for search and rescue operations, which greatly aided the overall recovery effort (CFE-DM n.d., 76). The preexisting bilateral Visiting Forces Agreement was also key to the early deployment of U.S. military forces for the response.

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model, provided an overview of the Philippine national disaster response framework (Flint et al. 2017, 113-137). The report described the Philippine military capabilities and roles in national disasters, as well as the systems used when coordinating with NGOs, foreign government agencies, and foreign military assets. It also included a short case study of the 2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan response. The case study focused on the importance of the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC), and the establishment

of an On-Site Operation and Coordination Center (OSOCC) co-located with the national government Emergency Operations Center (EOC) by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), in integrating the international civilian and military relief efforts (Flint et al. 2017, 113-137).

Operation Sahayogi Haat (2015 Nepal Earthquake) Literature

USINDOPACOM Foreign Disaster Response in the Indo-Asia-Pacific: June 1991 – June 2019, outlined the U.S. military's support to Nepal, named Operation Sahayogi Haat (Nepali for "Helping Hands") (CFE-DM n.d., 85-90). This report detailed the scope of the disaster, the Nepalese government response, and the U.S. military response. The Nepalese Army quickly established a Multi-National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) in order to coordinate the relief efforts of donor nation's militaries, to include the U.S. military assets. The report highlighted that U.S. PACOM deployed of a 20-person Joint Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team (JHAST) led by the 3 MEB Commander, Brigadier General Paul Kennedy, in order assist with coordinating the appropriate military response capabilities for the mission (CFE-DM n.d., 88). U.S. PACOM tasked Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to lead the FDR effort in Nepal. MARFORPAC established JTF-505 with 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) serving as the bulk of the main headquarters element. JTF-505 split its operations with 300 members of JTF-505 Forward operating in Nepal, 280 personnel at an intermediate staging base (ISB) in Thailand, and 320 personnel operating from JTF-505 Main in Okinawa, Japan (CFE-DM n.d., 88-89). The JTF conducted logistical support (transporting relief supplies), personnel transport, and casualty evacuation.

The U.S. Pacific Command Operation Sahayogi Haat Joint After-Action Report Executive Summary provided a summary of findings of the U.S. military's response effort to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake (CFE-DM 2016). The report stated that although the U.S. military provided a critical role in filling gaps during the crisis, the bulk of the coordination and response was still handled through the Government of Nepal. The MNMMC, established by the Nepalese Army, served as the primary agency in which the Government of Nepal coordinated the relief effort, especially during the first week following the initial earthquake. Beneficial to the success of the U.S. military's effort was multi-year pre-disaster planning conducted by the III Marine Expeditionary Force's Command Element (CFE-DM 2016, 2).

A Brief Review of Military Response to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake: A Nepalese Army and U.S. Pacific Command Perspective, provided an overview of the Nepalese Army response (to include establishment and operation of the MNMCC), civil-military coordination, and the U.S. DoD response (CFE-DM n.d., case study 1). This case study provided details as to the scope of military personnel and assets deployed to assist with FDR operations. The study also described how JTF-505 coordinated with USAID and other U.S. government agencies, and collaborated through the MNMCC for coordination and prioritization of relief efforts. From this case study, there were two key findings that were consistent with both the Nepalese Army and USPACOM. The first was the importance of establishing bilateral agreements (such as Status of Forces Agreements, Logistics Support Agreements, or Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements) prior to a disaster that would enable faster military response (CFE-DM n.d., case study 1, 14). The second finding was the importance of the supported nation establishing a MNMCC.

According to the study, "...The Nepal Army's Multinational Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) was the primary mechanism for coordinating the Nepali government and the international disaster response efforts during the chaotic first week after the earthquake struck (CFE-DM n.d., case study 1, 14)." The success of the MNMCC concept was attributed to it being incorporated in Nepal's national disaster response framework.

"Interview with U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Paul J. Kennedy, Commanding General of Joint Task Force 505 Forward During Operation Sahayogi Haat in Nepal" provided insight into the establishment of the JTF and the relationship of MARFORPAC with the Nepalese Army (LIAISON Staff 2016, 26-28). Brigadier General (BG) Kennedy stated:

The 3d MEB is the standing Air Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or crisis response force, for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The command is ready to go 24-hours a day in three echeloned movements. When the earthquake hit, we stood up a crisis action team both at III MEF and 3d MEB, anticipating activation. This is a mission we had trained for and had trained with the Nepal Army back in 2013. 3d MEB typically is the lead element of, or forward command element, of JTF-505. Once USPACOM received the request from the U.S. Embassy in Nepal, the assistant chief of mission was sent by C-130 aircraft through Thailand to Kathmandu. Our mission was tasked to support USAID/OFDA, not to lead the U.S. effort (LIAISON Staff 2016, 27).

Additionally, BG Kennedy mentioned in the interview that another key to the success in JTF-505's response was the training that the III MEF and 3 MEB leadership had received, such as the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC). BG Kennedy stated, "Unlike Haiyan, every actor had been schooled in (USAID/OFDA's Joint Humanitarian Operations Course) and most had worked together in exercises or previous responses. This common working relationship allowed the JTF to operate close to instantly and seamlessly" (LIAISON Staff 2016, 28). This previous training ensured all

key members of the staff were clear in the JTF's role as a supporting element to USAID's overall USG coordination effort.

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model, provided a detailed overview of the Nepalese national disaster response framework (Flint et al. 2017, 87-112). It described the Nepalese military capabilities and roles in national disasters, as well as the systems used when coordinating with NGOs, foreign government agencies, and foreign military assets. The report also included a short case study of the 2015 Gorkha earthquake response. The case study focused on the importance of the MNMCC, and the establishment and co-location of a civilian-led Humanitarian-Military Coordination Center/Joint Command Center (HuMOCC/JCC) (Flint et al. 2017, 108-109).

Summary

The principal sources utilized in this study provided detailed insight into how the USG responds to foreign disasters, and the requirements for U.S. military assistance. For each of the four disaster operations studied, case studies and research reports were the principal sources utilized. These studies and reports provided detailed information as to the steps taken by each headquarters responding to the disasters, timelines, and scope of the operations. Additionally, published interviews with senior leaders of Operations Unified Response in Haiti and Sahayogi Haat in Nepal were reviewed.

The literature review identified several key findings for further use in the analysis. For Operation Unified Response in Haiti, manning shortages resulted in an ad hoc JTF comprised of staff members from nearly a dozen separate commands. Also, the lack of a military assessment team to work in conjunction with the USAID DART resulted in the

JTF-Haiti staff initially requesting a large push of relief assets, without adequate control and direction for those resources.

The literature sources for Operation Tomodachi in Japan revealed that a separate JTF (in this case designated a JSF) is required for large-scale FDR missions. This operation was also unique, in that coordination between the USG relief assets and the GoJ was largely bilateral, and not through an international coordination headquarters. Literature also revealed that the GoJ was very organized and efficient in its handling of the response effort. As such, it was selective on what nations it received assistance from and when the assets were to be employed.

The references reviewed for Operation Damayan in the Philippines revealed that, the use of the U.S. PACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) was essential for establishing the initial JTF. The employment of the DJTFAC to augment the 3 MEB until III MEF arrived to stand up JTF-505 was so successful, that most of the major requests for support through the MiTaMs were complete by the time JTF-505 was fully operationally capable. The literature also revealed that the Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (SOTF-P) played a pivotal role in providing information used in the initial assessments for the DoD response effort.

For Operation Sahayogi Haat, a Joint Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team (JHAST) was employed which assisted in coordinating the appropriate military assets for the response. The staff members of the JHAST and JTF were trained in FDR operations. The U.S. military response effort was organized in a manner in which only the most crucial elements were forward deployed to Nepal, and most of the remaining personnel

involved in coordination and logistical support were located at either the intermediate staging base (ISB) in Thailand or at the JTF-main headquarters in Okinawa, Japan.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In determining if the current practice of establishing an ad hoc JTF headquarters for FDR is adequate in large-scale U.S. DoD support operations, or if a standing JTF that is specifically designed and trained for FDR would be more effective, this study utilizes comparative case study methodology to analyze evidence emerging from the case studies. James Creswell defines the case study approach as a qualitative research method which provides a “detailed description of the setting or individuals, followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues” (Creswell 2009, 184). This study analyzes the four large-scale U.S. military FDR operations conducted within the past 10 years.

This chapter describes how data will be presented and analyzed in Chapter Four, and is divided into seven sections: an Introduction, Disaster Scope Analysis, Standing JTF Response Recommendations, JTF Response Conditions, Advantages and Disadvantages to Establishing a Standing JTF for FDR, Trustworthiness, and a Summary. The first section after the introduction, “Disaster Scope Analysis,” identifies how the comparative scope of large-scale FDR operations within the past 10 years is analyzed. “Standing JTF Response Recommendations” describes how operations which concluded with a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR are identified. “JTF Response Conditions” identifies how conditions that contributed to the recommendation for establishment of a standing JTF specific for FDR are analyzed. “Advantages and Disadvantages to Establishing a Standing JTF for FDR” identifies the criteria for

applying and analyzing advantages and disadvantages of establishing a standing JTF specific for FDR. “Trustworthiness” addresses the trustworthiness of the methodology.

Disaster Scope Analysis

Analyzing the scope of the disasters and the resulting DoD response efforts is critical to understanding the similarities and differences in each operation. It allows for greater understanding of the extent of each disaster, along with visualization of the number of U.S. military personnel involved in the response and support activities involved (search and rescue, logistics, medical). The scope analysis also identifies outlier conditions that a particular operation may have when compared with the other three. This scope analysis looks at four factors, described in the following paragraphs.

Disaster Descriptions

The first part of the disaster scope analysis provides a detailed description of the damage effects for each disaster. This is followed by a description of the extent of the U.S. military response effort. These descriptions provide context for the comparison of the disasters and the disaster response efforts.

Disaster Scope Comparison

The second part of the disaster scope analysis is a comparison of the disasters along major categories. The categories include number of people dead, number of people displaced, and the effects of damage on national-level government/infrastructure, as depicted in Table 1. The number dead includes the reported number and the percentage of the population that represents. The number displaced includes the reported number and the percentage of the population that represents. The effects of damage on the national-

level government/infrastructure is recorded in terms of minor degradation, moderate degradation, or massive degradation.

Table 1. Comparative Scope of Disasters (Template)

Disaster	Number Dead	Number Displaced	National-Level Government / Infrastructure Effects
Haiti, 2010			
Japan, 2011			
Philippines, 2013			
Nepal, 2015			

Source: Developed by author.

Disaster Response Comparison

The third part of the scope analysis is a comparison of the U.S. military response to each disaster. These results are recorded under the categories of peak size of DoD force, services provided, and duration of support, as depicted in Table 2. The peak size records the largest size of the DoD force deployed in response to the relief effort at one time, not the total number of personnel deployed over the entire duration of the relief effort. The services provided records general categories of services provided, instead of individual missions. The duration of support is recorded in days of organized U.S. military support, beginning when the initial headquarters elements arrive and ending when the joint task force officially deactivates.

Table 2. Comparative U.S. Military Disaster Response (Template)

Operation	Peak Size of DoD Force	Services Provided	Duration of Support
Unified Response (Haiti)			
Tomodachi (Japan)			
Damayan (Philippines)			
Sahayogi Haat (Nepal)			

Source: Developed by author.

Standing JTF Recommendations

The next part of the analysis is identifying which operations concluded with a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR. A scan of the lessons learned, case studies, after-action reports, and research reports identified in the literature review provides the source this finding. This information assists in the overall analysis, as it helps determine if the recommendation is a trend (indicated by presence following multiple operations), if it the recommendation was mitigated by procedural changes (indicated by observation in earliest response efforts and not observed in later response efforts), or if the recommendation is limited to significant outlier conditions (such as a relief effort of comparatively enormous scope).

JTF Response Conditions

Important to understanding the rationale behind a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR is understanding the conditions that may have led to such a recommendation. To analyze these conditions, four criteria are compared for each relief effort, as depicted in Table 3. First is the category of principal headquarters staff, where a

listing of the units which comprised the principal staff of each JTF is compared. JTFs with the larger number of contributing units comprising the staff indicates greater challenges in establishing full operational capability, whereas JTFs with a smaller number of contributing units comprising the principal staff indicates fewer challenges in establishing full operational capability. The second category is whether a DoD assessment team (such as a JHAST or HAST) was utilized. The use of an assessment team indicates thorough connection between the humanitarian assistance gaps identified by USAID DARTs and identification of appropriate military capabilities. This identification then translates into planned and sequenced assets requested and managed by informed JTF headquarters. The third category is foreign disaster relief training of staff. This determined by scanning literature for evidence as to whether the majority of JTF staff members received formal FDR training. The fourth category is whether the corresponding GCC staff were operating with updated FDR contingency plans.

Table 3. DoD Large-Scale Response Conditions (Template)

Operation	Units Comprising Principal HQ Staff	Use of DoD Assessment Team	FDR Training of Staff	Updated Contingency Plan
Unified Response (Haiti, 2010)				
Tomodachi (Japan, 2011)				
Damayan (Philippines, 2013)				
Sahayogi Haat (Nepal, 2015)				

Source: Developed by author.

Advantages and Disadvantages to Establishing a Standing JTF for FDR

Listing the major advantages and disadvantages of establishing a standing JTF for large scale FDR is important to analyzing whether the U.S. DoD should do so.

Comparing the primary advantages and disadvantages helps to reduce bias the analysis.

Comparison of advantages and disadvantages also fosters critical thought regarding the issue.

In order to provide a comparison of major advantages and disadvantages for the establishment of a standing JTF for FDR, there has to be an assumption of what that JTF would resemble and how it would be implemented. For the purpose of this study, the JTF would be created similar in structure to the current joint certified headquarters used in large-scale FDR missions (such as an Army corps, Marine expeditionary force, Navy fleet, or numbered Air Force) minus many of the sections used for kinetic operations, but with a well distributed mixture of Sister Service staff members. It is also assumed that this standing JTF would still require augmentation of regional experts from the corresponding GCC upon deployment to a disaster region.

Trustworthiness

In maintaining credibility of the research, the principal sources of information regarding the FDR operations are case studies, research reports, and after-action reviews. Case studies provided facts and timelines associated with each operation, without opinion or bias. Research reports provided relevant facts, then presented findings and recommendations from an outside source. After action reviews provided findings and recommendations from the personnel involved. With regard to information quoted from published interviews and professional research articles, only interviews and articles from

senior leaders involved with each of the response efforts are included, and often corroborate information discussed in after action reviews.

In ensuring the results of the analysis are not affected by any personal bias of the author, the secondary research questions provide an opportunity to view the effectiveness of current ad hoc JTF system and the findings of both outside sources (from research reports) and inside sources (after action reviews and senior leader interviews). Any recommendations of establishing a standing JTF for large scale FDR operations will be evident if recorded from multiple separate operations. Additionally, the comparison of operations in chronological sequence assists in observing procedural changes/improvements in U.S. military FDR support.

Summary

This study utilizes comparative case study methodology to analyze evidence emerging from the case studies to subsequently determine if the U.S. DoD should establish a standing JTF for large-scale FDR or if the current ad hoc establishment of JTF headquarters is sufficient. The analysis is divided into four sections. The first section analyzes and compares the scope of the disasters and resulting U.S. military relief efforts. The second section identifies which operations concluded with recommendations to establish a standing JTF specific to FDR. The third section identifies the conditions that contributed to the recommendation for a standing JTF specific for FDR. The fourth section lists and compares advantages to establishing a standing JTF specific for FDR.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This purpose of this research is to determine if the current practice of establishing an ad hoc JTF headquarters for FDR is adequate in large-scale U.S. DoD support operations, or if a standing JTF that is specifically designed and trained for FDR would be more effective. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is a comparison of the scope of disasters. This section is further subdivided into three areas of disaster descriptions, disaster scope comparison, and disaster response comparison. The second section identifies which operations concluded with the recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR. The third section lists conditions that would contribute to the recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR, and compares the presence or absence of those conditions in each operation. The fourth section compares the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a standing JTF specific for FDR.

Disaster Scope Analysis

A comparative scope of the DoD response to the four disasters in this study is critical to understanding the level of commitment of the U.S. military. The size of the force involved is indicative of the size of the headquarters staff needed to plan and coordinate activities. The services provided are indicative of the variety of headquarters staff members with the expertise to plan and coordinate activities. The duration of

support provides insight into the ability of the host nation government and supporting NGOs to resume control over providing essential services and managing recovery.

Disaster Descriptions

Haiti, 2010

“At 4:53 pm local time on January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck 25 km west of the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 4).” The earthquake killed more than 316,000 people, injured 300,000 others, and displaced more than 1 million people (Cecchine et al. 2013, xi). Particularly devastating to the nation was the effect of the earthquake on the Haitian government and infrastructure. The earthquake destroyed the presidential palace and 14 of 16 government ministries, and also claimed the life of the head of mission of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) along with his primary deputy (Cecchine et al. 2013, xi). “Approximately three million persons, one-third of the population, were affected by the quake....

Hundreds of government officials lost their lives, to include nearly 20% of the police force” (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 4). The CFE-DM case study also stated:

Alongside the massive loss of life, the earthquake devastated critical transportation infrastructure, in particular roads, bridges and seaports. This damage would seriously hamper aid delivery in the coming weeks and months, dictating in large part the nature and mechanisms of the disaster response, in particular that of the U.S. military. Telecommunications infrastructure fared no better, with no landline and cell phone connections able to function following the earthquake. In addition, the vast majority of radio stations went off the air, hindering any communications regarding the extent of the damage as well as preventing any public service announcements such as where to go for shelter, medical aid, or food and water (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 5).




Figure 5. Haiti Earthquake Damage Map

Source: USAID 2010.

The dissolution of much of Haiti's government, along with the scale of the disaster in proportion to the size and population of the nation resulted in the massive amount of international assistance required. According to the RAND study, "the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake was the largest international DR effort in history, and the U.S. military was the single largest contributor to the overall effort in terms of personnel and capabilities" (Cecchine et al. 2013, xiii). The study further mentioned, "Not only was the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the largest HA/DR operation ever conducted by the U.S. military, it was the largest international humanitarian response to a natural

disaster in history. More than 140 countries and more than 500 NGOs contributed to the Haiti earthquake relief effort” (Cecchine et al. 2013, 43).



Figure 6. The Collapsed Presidential Palace of Haiti

Source: DOD 2011, 97.

At the peak of the U.S. military's response, JTF-Haiti included over 22,200 personnel from all branches of service (Cecchine et al. 2013, 40). Upon establishment of the JTF-Haiti headquarters, the following Mission Essential Tasks were identified:

- 1) Conduct Command, Control, Planning, and Coordinate the Response/Relief Effort in support of USAID as Lead U.S. Agency
- 2) Open and Manage the Airfield; Repair and Open the Port
- 3) Support Search and Rescue Operations
- 4) Provide Emergency Medical Assistance
- 5) Support the Distribution of Water and Food
- 6) Provide Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons (DP) Camps
- 7) Provide Engineer Support to UN and NGOs. Clear routes, rubble, structure assessments, IDP camps (CFE-DM n.d., case study 6, 8).

The U.S. military's mission lasted 139 days; from 13 January 2010 until 1 June 2010. Due to the massive upheaval of government and infrastructure, the U.S. military presence lasted significantly longer than any of the other FDR operations in this study. The initial response of the operation (which focused on the immediate preservation of life) lasted from 13 January 2010 to 4 February 2010. From 5 February 2010 to 14 March 2010, the operation focused on providing relief to internally displaced persons (IDPs). From 15 March 2010 onward, the operation focused on preparing countermeasures for floods and mudslides that were anticipated during the upcoming rainy season. The mission was declared complete on 1 June 2010 (Cecchine et al. 2013, 42-43).

Japan, 2011

The CFE-DM report on USINDOPACOM FDR stated:

On March 11, 2011 a massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck 130 kilometers off the coast of northeast Japan, triggering large tsunami waves, and causing

widespread devastation. Tsunami waves reportedly reached up to 30 meters high and inundated some 433,000 square kilometers of land. Around 15,891 people were killed and 2,579 people went missing. Around 17,000 homes and buildings were destroyed and another 138,000 were damaged. The disaster forced the evacuation of some 492,000 people in total (CFE-DM n.d., 62).

The tsunami damaged three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, which resulted in the leakage of radioactive material, resulting in the evacuation of 700,000 people living within a 30-km radius of the plant (CFE-DM n.d., 62).




Figure 7. Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Damage Map

Source: USAID 2011.

The disaster triggered a worldwide offers of support. “Three days after the tsunami, 91 countries and nine IOs had already offered their assistance” (Moroney et al. 2013, 89). The GoJ limited much of the support that was offered, however. For example, “more than 68 search and rescue teams from 45 countries were willing to intervene, but the GoJ, at least initially, requested only the presence of those teams from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States” (Moroney et al. 2013, 89). The GoJ later permitted teams from a total of 17 nations (Maroney et al. 2013, 102). With regard to military support, “the bulk of the foreign military response was provided by the U.S. military, however, Israel provided a medical team comprised of military personnel and China also sent a military search and rescue team to assist” (CFE-DM n.d., 63).

The primary reason Japan was able to limit most of the international support to a few countries was due to the extensive disaster management capabilities within the nation. “During the first week of the response, it deployed more than 100,000 personnel, more than 500 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, and 60 ships to the affected areas” (Moroney et al. 2013, 89). One of the reasons behind the large USG support to Japan was due to the large number of U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, and Japan’s importance as a partner in USG foreign policy. At the time of the disaster, “nearly 40,000 U.S. troops from all four services were stationed in Japan and located at some 85 facilities in Honshu, Kyushu and Okinawa” (CFE-DM n.d., 63). The U.S. military response effort lasted a total of 50 days.

The U.S. military support provided during Operation Tomodachi was quite extensive. According to the CFE-DM report on USINDOPACOM FDR:

U.S. efforts focused on transport of relief supplies, JSDF [Japan Self-Defense Forces] personnel, equipment, surveillance, and the restoration of critical infrastructure in order to sustain operations. In addition to immediate relief assistance and support to Japanese self-defense forces, the U.S. military delivered more than two million gallons of water, 189 tons of food, 11,960 gallons of fuel and 100 tons of relief supplies as well as medical assistance, search-and-rescue support, and heavy lift assistance. Operation Tomodachi concluded May 1, 2011 (CFE-DM n.d., 66).

Philippines, 2013

Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was one of the strongest storms ever to make landfall in recorded history, with winds up to 200 mph (320 km/h) and wind gusts up to 225 mph (360 km/h) (Parker et al. 2015, 6). Haiyan swept through the central Philippines, damaging nine of seventeen regions in the country. According to the CFE-DM report on the USPACOM response, an “estimated 6,293 individuals [were] reported dead, 28,689 injured and over 4 million displaced. The number of damaged houses totaled to 1,140,332, of which more than half, 550,928 were totally destroyed” (Parker et al. 2015, 6). The report also explained, “Haiyan destroyed critical infrastructure that was essential to support relief operations including airports, seaports, roads, communication systems, power distribution networks (electrical and fuel), and other key resources” (Parker et al. 2015, 7). The regions of Leyte and Samar were the worst hit, with 90% of the infrastructure in Tacloban City (Leyte’s largest city) destroyed (CFE-DM n.d., 74).

Complicating matters worse, the super typhoon hit in November, just after the Philippines was recovering from conflicts that had just ended in the southern island of Mindanao in September, and after a 7.2 magnitude earthquake had just struck the central Philippines in October (in the same path as Super Typhoon Haiyan) (Parker et al. 2015, 6). Due to this, much of the nation’s prepositioned relief supplies were already exhausted.




Figure 8. Typhoon Haiyan Damage Map

Source: USAID 2013.

In addition to civilian emergency service personnel, the Armed Forces of the Philippines mobilized nearly 24,000 service members to respond to the incident. 21 other foreign militaries provided assistance to the Government of the Philippines for the disaster (CFE-DM n.d., 75). The U.S. military deployed more than 13,400 troops for Operation Damayan (Tagalog for “help”) who delivered relief supplies, transported and evacuated personnel, assisted with damage assessments, and helped restore municipal water services (CFE-DM n.d., 77). Major U.S. military support operations were

completed by 26 November 2013. On 1 December 2013 Operation Damayan officially ended, with all U.S. military forces redeploying, for a total of 22 days of relief support.

Nepal, 2015

The CFE-DM case study of the Nepal earthquake reported:

On April 25, 2015, a powerful 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, leaving over 8,700 people dead, over 21,000 injured and destroying over 600,000 houses. The epicenter was located in Gorkha district, around 81 km (50 miles) northwest of the capital, Kathmandu with a depth of 15 km (9.3 miles). The quake affected 22 out of 75 districts in the country, as well as Kathmandu. On May 12, another strong 7.3 magnitude aftershock struck near Chilankha village in Dolakha District, causing additional damages and leaving at least another 150 people dead. Out of the country's 22 affected districts, the Government of Nepal (GoN) classified 14 districts as being severely affected and in need of urgent assistance (CFE-DM, n.d., case study 1, 1).




Figure 9. Nepal Earthquake Damage Map

Source: USAID 2015.

As part of Nepal's national disaster response framework, the Nepalese Army took the lead in the overall disaster response effort. Nepal's police forces also served a significant role in the response effort. Due to the extent of the damage, the Government of Nepal (GoN) requested international assistance. The CFE-DM report on USINDPACOM FDR support stated that "along with the international humanitarian community, which included the United Nations (UN), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and 34 assisting nations from across the globe, at least 18 foreign militaries helped respond to the earthquake" (CFE-DM n.d., 85).

A total of only 900 U.S. military service members from all branches participated in the response effort. Of that 900, only about 300 worked in Nepal under the leadership of the forward joint task force. 280 personnel worked from an intermediate staging base (ISB) in Thailand, and the remaining 320 personnel worked from the main joint task force headquarters in Japan. Personnel in the main headquarters and the ISB provided mostly logistical support with moving relief supplies into the disaster area. Those individuals in Nepal distributed supplies, transported personnel and equipment, conducted casualty evacuations, and conducted assessments and some engineering support. The JTF deactivated on 26 May 2015, bringing the U.S. military relief effort to only 28 days of operation.

Disaster Scope Comparison

In viewing the four disasters, there is a clear difference in the scope of the events. With regard to the number of people who died in each event, Super Typhoon Haiyan had the smallest toll of total personnel and percentage of the nation's population. The storm did cause significant displacement of the populace (4 million; approximately 4.11% of

the nation's total population). Japan's disaster claimed more total lives than both the Philippine and Nepal disasters, but displaced far fewer people (less than 500,000; approximately 0.383% of the population). Haiti's disaster is orders of magnitude larger than the other disasters when viewing it in terms of effects on the population. The Haiti earthquake claimed the lives of 11.3% of the populace, and displaced more than one third of all Haitians. Additionally, Haiti's earthquake destroyed much of the capital city of Port-au-Prince, whereas the other three disasters mostly spared damage to their capital cities (with the Nepal earthquake causing minor to moderate damage to the capital city of Kathmandu). From this perspective, it helps explain why the nation of Haiti was so overwhelmed and why Government of Haiti required such a large response from the international community to assist in disaster relief efforts.

Table 4. Comparative Scope of Disasters

Disaster	Number Dead	Number Displaced	National-Level Government / Infrastructure Effects
Haiti, 2010	316,000 + (11.3% Pop.)	1,000,000 + (35.7% Pop.)	Massive Degradation
Japan, 2011	15,891 (0.0124% Pop.)	~ 492,000 (0.383% Pop.)	Minor Degradation
Philippines, 2013	6,293 (0.00647% Pop.)	4,000,000 + (4.11% Pop.)	Minor to Moderate Degradation
Nepal, 2015	~ 8,850 (0.0329% Pop.)	~ 2,600,000 (9.66% Pop.)	Moderate Degradation

Source: Developed by author using population estimates from Population Pyramid 2019.

NOTE: Haiti Population (2009 estimate) – 2,798,046

Japan Population (2010 estimate) – 128,542,349

Philippines Population (2012 estimate) – 97,212,639

Nepal Population (2014 estimate) – 26,905,982

Disaster Response Comparison

The smallest U.S. military response in terms of DoD personnel numbers was to Nepal's earthquake. The response effort also lasted less than one month. The response to the Philippine super typhoon also lasted less than a month, but had a force almost fifty percent larger involved. The Japan earthquake/ tsunami/nuclear disaster involved the largest number of military personnel of all of the disasters, with the Haiti earthquake following a close second. The high numbers of U.S. personnel assisting in Japan is due in part to the amount of U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, as well as the desire of the U.S. government to maintain a strong relationship with the Government of Japan. Due to the extent of the damage in the Haiti, and the threat of further disaster from the impending rainy season, the U.S. military response in Haiti lasted the longest.

Table 5. Comparative U.S. Military Disaster Response

Operation	Peak Size of DoD Force	Services Provided	Duration of Support
Unified Response (Haiti)	22,200	Evacuation/transportation of personnel, food/water/relief item delivery, medical care, emergency shelter, assessments and engineering services, airport/seaport opening	13 JAN 10 – 1 JUN 10 (139 days)
Tomodachi (Japan)	24,000	Evacuation/transportation of personnel, food/water/relief item delivery, medical care, assessments and engineering services, search and rescue	12 MAR 11 – 1 MAY 11 (50 days)
Damayan (Philippines)	13,400	Evacuation/transportation of personnel, food/water/relief item delivery, engineering services	10 NOV 13 – 1 DEC 13 (22 days)
Sahayogi Haat (Nepal)	900	Evacuation/transportation of personnel, food/water/relief item delivery, assessments and minor engineering services	29 APR 15 – 26 MAY 15 (28 days)

Source: Developed by author.

With regard to large-scale U.S. military support to FDR, the response to Nepal can be viewed as an outlier. Although it involved the establishment of a joint task force comprised of all Service branches, the size of the force involved was very small in comparison—especially when considering that only 300 U.S. military servicemembers were actually in the country of Nepal providing assistance. With the remaining three operations each involving well over 10,000 personnel, the lessons learned regarding establishing a JTF for those operations carry more weight.

Standing JTF Recommendations

In identifying which operations concluded with the recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR, the case studies, lessons learned, after-action reviews, and research reports were all scanned. The RAND study on the U.S. military response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake had as one of its recommendations the establishment of a DoD-level standing joint task force for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Cecchine et al. 2013, 70). The purpose of this task force would be to eliminate the need to establish an ad hoc JTF headquarters by GCCs. The standing JTF would form the main headquarters staff for a large-scale response effort, and would only need to be augmented by planners with regional expertise from the respective GCC or service component command within the affected region.

Recall that with the Haiti disaster, U.S. SOUTHCOM was unable to deploy a functionally manned standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) with expected minor augmentation from the U.S. TRANSCOM JECC due to manning shortages. This resulted in a truly piecemeal JTF with the initial members composed of 82nd Airborne Division,

XVIII Airborne Corps, SOUTHCOM, and JECC staff, with additional augmentation from the other Service Component units.

Reports and lessons learned from the 2011 Japan earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster focused on the confusion from command and control issues prior to the establishment of a JTF, but did not recommend a standing JTF specifically for FDR. Reports and lessons learned from the 2013 Philippine super typhoon stated that the establishment of the U.S. INDOPACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to augment 3rd MEB as the original headquarters was essential until 3rd MEF staff replaced the 3rd MEB staff and officially established the JTF. The main critique was that by the time the JTF was fully operationally capable on 20 November 2013, most of the U.S. support mission was complete (with the TF declaring end of mission on 26 November 2013 and disestablishing on 1 December 2013). There was no recommendation for a standing DoD JTF to support FDR in any of the reports or case studies referenced following the 2015 Nepal earthquake.

JTF Response Conditions

In order to better understanding the rationale behind a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR, it is important to identify the conditions that contributed to such a recommendation. Based on the information learned from the literature, four criteria were selected for comparison from each relief effort. The four categories are: units comprising the principal headquarters staff, use of a DoD assessment team, level of FDR training in staff, and whether the GCC staff had updated contingency plans to work from.

The first category is “Units Comprising Principal Headquarters Staff.” JTF-Haiti had the largest number of contributing units comprising the staff. This is indicative of greater challenges in establishing full operational capability. Operations Tomodachi, Damayan, and Sahayogi Haat each had principal staff comprised of three or fewer donating units. Viewing the Operations Tomodachi and Damayan indicates a shift from U.S. INDOPACOM establishing the bulk an FDR response effort with a SJFHQ to augmenting an existing joint certified headquarters (such as III MEF) with a rapidly deployable augmentation package from the U.S. INDOPACOM staff (the DJTFAC). This seemed to provide the faster response by deploying a postured headquarters and augmenting it with a smaller package of regional experts. In the most recent of the studied operations, Operation Sahayogi Haat, the headquarters element was the smallest. It was comprised of the III MEF staff without significant augmentation, and the forward JTF was comprised primarily of 3rd MEB. This can primarily be attributed to the small size of the force committed (300 personnel forward on-ground in Nepal; 900 total personnel).

The second category is “Use of DoD Assessment Team.” This indicates that there was a thorough connection between the humanitarian assistance gaps identified by USAID DARTs and the identification of appropriate military capabilities to fill those gaps. JTF-Haiti did not utilize any DoD assessment teams. JTF-505 (for both the Philippines and Nepal disasters) did utilize assets for assessments. In the Philippine disaster, the JSOTF-P provided limited surveillance and assessments. In the Nepal disaster, a Joint Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team (JHAST) was deployed to conduct initial assessments in conjunction with USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response

Team (DART), in order to advise on the DoD's capabilities, provide reach back to the combatant command with specific information requirements, and establish a footprint for the JTF to follow. JTF-519 (Japan disaster) did not utilize a formal assessment team, however, USFJ (the original headquarters for the FDR response) had a significant population of U.S. military assets on ground from which to gather information.

The third category is "Foreign Disaster Relief Training of Staff." Brigadier General Kennedy (who participated in both Operations Damayan and Sahayogi Haat) confirmed that the principal TF-505 staff involved in Operation Sahayogi Haat had all attended the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), whereas not nearly as many of the staff in Operation Damayan had received such training (LIAISON Staff 2016, 28). The literature reviewed for Operation Tomodachi did not identify how much of the staff from either USFJ or JTF-519 were trained in FDR. For Operation Unified Response, the XVIII Airborne Corps staff was not identified as having FDR training, but did have either training or experience in stability operations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom scenarios (Cecchine et al. 2013, xix).

The fourth category is whether the corresponding GCC operated from an "Updated Contingency Plan." U.S. PACOM regularly participated in both small and large-scale FDR operations, and maintained updated contingency plans for Operations Tomodachi, Damayan, and Sahayogi Haat. For Operation Unified Response, U.S. SOUTHCOM was in the process of updating their contingency plan, and did not have a current plan that templated assets and time phased force deployment data (Ryan, Goehring, Hulslander 2010, 4). Recall that other military resources for FDR, such as DODD 5100.46, *DoD Directive for FDR*, (then dated December 4, 1975), were also

outdated (Cecchine et al. 2013, 63-64). After Operation Unified Response in Haiti, the Department of Defense compiled and published DoD GTA 90-01-30, *Department of Defense Support to Forward Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below)*. This reference was promulgated 13 July 2011, and was available for both Operation Damayan in the Philippines and Operation Sahayogi Haat in Nepal.

Table 6. DoD Large-Scale Response Conditions

Operation	Units Comprising Principal HQ Staff	Use of DoD Assessment Team	FDR Training of Staff	Updated Contingency Plan
Unified Response (Haiti, 2010)	XVIII Airborne Corps / U.S. SOUTHCOM SJFHQ / U.S. TRANSCOM JECC // Later transition to ARSOUTH	None	Majority of staff not trained	No
Tomodachi (Japan, 2011)	USFJ transitioning to U.S. INDOPACOM SJFHQ	None deployed, however, significant DoD population already in country	Training level of staff not identified	Yes
Damayan (Philippines, 2013)	3 rd MEB transitioning to III MEF / U.S. INDOPACOM DJTFAC	JSOTF-P assets conducted limited surveillance and assessments	Some (but not majority) of staff JHOC trained	Yes
Sahayogi Haat (Nepal, 2015)	3 rd MEB transitioning to III MEF	JHAST deployed	Majority of staff JHOC trained	Yes

Source: Developed by author.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Establishing a Standing JTF for FDR

There are several advantages to establishing a standing JTF for large-scale FDR missions, but two stand out. One advantage is that it ensures that a singular staff comprises the bulk of the headquarters, with only minor augmentation by regional experts from an affected area's GCC. The second advantage is that it ensures the staff is trained in FDR operations and that contingency plans remain updated to support the JTF's primary mission.

There are disadvantages to establishing a standing JTF for large-scale FDR missions. The first is that the creation of a new JTF headquarters staff would result in each of the Service Components having to fill the staff slots from their existing allowances. This would require cuts from existing organizations to fill the new organization. The second disadvantage is that the newly established JTF headquarters would still require some augmentation from the corresponding GCC in the affected disaster area, so creation of a standing JTF for FDR does not necessarily reduce the burden of FDR support from GCCs. A third disadvantage is that the creation of a singular JTF for FDR limits the response capacity to one major disaster at a time. In the event that two major disasters occur simultaneously in different GCC areas of responsibility, the FDR JTF would only be capable of responding to one.

Of the two advantages identified, both are comparatively weak. Operation Damayan is a clear example of a singular JTF-capable headquarters (III MEF) augmented by regional experts from the GCC (in this case the DJTFAC), which provided the same benefit of a standing JTF HQ with minor augmentation from the corresponding GCC. For even larger FDR operations, additional staff augmentation can be provided by the JECC.

Regarding training, the JTF-505 staff (comprised of III MEB personnel) that responded in Operation Sahayogi Haat were nearly all trained in USAID's Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC). This course is only two days in duration, and can easily be included as part of the initial training requirements for JTF-capable headquarters. This demonstrates that the benefit of a standing JTF prepared specifically for FDR operations can be achieved by any JTF-capable HQ with a very minimal training investment.

Summary

The four operations in this study range in scope from Operation Unified Response in Haiti serving as the most comprehensive, to Operation Sahayogi Haat in Nepal as the least comprehensive. Operation Tomodachi in Japan had the largest DoD personnel response, but was not the most devastating event. The large U.S. military personnel numbers were due in part to the number of U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, as well as Japan's importance as a partner nation in U.S. foreign policy.

Of the four operations, only Operation Unified Response recommended the establishment of a standing JTF for FDR. This was determined by a scan of case studies, lessons learned, after-action reviews, and research reports associated with each operation. The recommendation was identified from the 2013 RAND study on the U.S. military response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake.

There are several conditions that contributed to the recommendation to establish a standing JTF for FDR at the conclusion of Operation Unified Response. These conditions include a largely piecemeal staff from multiple organizations, lack of a DoD assessment team, lack of staff members trained in FDR, and lack of an updated contingency plan (and other references) for FDR. The other three operations analyzed each had

increasingly more organic staff with only minor augmentation, use of DoD assessment teams, FDR-trained staff members, and updated contingency plans.

With regard to advantages and disadvantages to establishing a standing JTF specific to FDR, there were more disadvantages identified than advantages. Also, the identified advantages were weak when compared to the disadvantages. A JTF-capable headquarters with augmentation by regional experts from the GCC (such as a DJTFAC) provided the same benefit of a standing JTF HQ with minor augmentation from the corresponding GCC. In addition, the benefit of a standing JTF prepared specifically for FDR operations was achievable by a JTF-capable HQ with a very minimal training investment.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This study provided analysis to answer the primary research question: Should the United States Department of Defense establish a standing joint task force to lead military support for large-scale foreign disaster relief operations? This final chapter interprets the results of the analysis, and is divided into two sections. The first section provides conclusions to the findings from Chapter 4. The second section provides recommendations for action and further study.

Conclusions

The results of the analysis in this study indicate that the U.S. DoD should not establish a standing JTF to lead military support for large-scale FDR operations. The answers determined from the secondary research questions support this answer. When comparing the four large-scale FDR operations in this study, only Operation Unified Response in Haiti concluded with a recommendation to establish a standing JTF specific for FDR. When looking at contributing factors as to why, this operation had the most piecemealed staff, most of the staff members were not trained on FDR, and the staff was working with outdated plans and references. This operation also did not benefit from the use of a DoD assessment team working with a USAID DART to determine the best assets to help meet humanitarian shortages. Also challenging to this operation, was the scale of the U.S. military response required, which dwarfed two of the other three operations in comparison. The other three operations in this study provide evidence that the current

practice of establishing an ad hoc JTF headquarters for FDR is adequate for largescale DoD support missions.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Action

There are three recommended procedures to ensure the conditions that hampered JTF-Haiti in Operation Unified Response are not repeated in future operations. The first is the establishment of a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) for all six GCC's. U.S. INDOPACOM's development and deployment of this team to augment a JTF-capable headquarters proved to be instrumental to providing a quickly deployable augmentation team that contained the regional expertise needed for large-scale FDR operations. The DJTFAC should be entirely staffed by previously identified members of the GCC headquarters, itself. The DJTFAC used for Operation Damayan in 2013 was based on a 33-member manning plan from U.S. PACOM (Lawson 2013, slide 7).

The second recommendation is the establishment of Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams (JHASTs) from among forces assigned to or aligned with each GCC. This ensures that as a USAID DART identifies gaps in the humanitarian response effort, a DoD assessment team is able to advise on the DoD's capabilities, provide reach back to the combatant command with specific information requirements, and establish a footprint for the JTF to follow. U.S. INDOPACOM's utilization of a JHAST during Operation Sahayogi Haat resulted in an efficient operation where DoD assets and resources were controlled in an organized pull system.

For GCC's that have forces permanently assigned to them, such as U.S. INDOPACOM and U.S. EUCOM, this can be accomplished from tasking the assigned units to fill this requirement. U.S. INDOPACOM currently has three HASTs filled by units in USARPAC (Howell 2015). The command also has a HAST filled by units in MARFORPAC (Hollenbeck 2016). Upon augmentation from Navy and/or Air Force personnel, these HASTs are then designated as JHASTs. For GCC's that do not have significant forces permanently assigned to them, such as U.S. SOUTHCOM, U.S. CENTCOM, and U.S. AFRICOM, this becomes more challenging. A potential solution is for U.S. TRANSCOM to staff JHASTs that can be requested by those GCCs.

The third recommendation is to ensure JTF-capable headquarters staff members receive training in FDR. One training course acknowledged as beneficial from this study is the two-day USAID Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC). Another two-day course, Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART), is offered by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM).

Recommendations for Further Study

There are two recommendations for further research. The first recommendation is to examine whether GCCs which do not have permanently assigned forces such as U.S. SOUTHCOM, U.S. CENTCOM, and U.S. AFRICOM, should each have a JTF-capable force aligned to them for contingencies, such as for large-scale FDR. The second recommendation is to examine whether U.S. TRANSCOM's JECC should serve as a JTF-capable headquarters for FDR for GCC's which do not have permanently assigned forces. This may require a manning increase for the JECC.

For both of these recommendations, a DJTFAC would still be recommended to provide regional expertise. These recommendations would help alleviate the need for these GCCs have to vie for the Immediate Response Force (IRF) headquarters and assigned units to lead an FDR mission, and free the IRF for use in other contingency operations. The example from this study was U.S. SOUTHCOM's reliance on the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division (who comprised what was then known as the Global Response Force) for Operation Unified Response in 2010.

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