

BEYOND TRADITIONAL “CARROT AND STICK” FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS:  
EXPLORING ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO  
NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Art of War Scholars

by

BENJAMIN E. CHINSKY, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY  
B.A., Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 2008  
M.A., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 2019

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2020

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                    |                                   |                            | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188                  |                                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                    |                                   |                            |                                                     |                                       |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)<br>12-06-2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                    | 2. REPORT TYPE<br>Master's Thesis |                            | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)<br>AUG 2019 – JUN 2020 |                                       |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><br>Beyond Traditional “Carrot and Stick” Foreign Policy Options: Exploring Army Special Operations Support to Nonviolent Resistance Movements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                    |                                   |                            | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                 |                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   |                            | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                    |                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   |                            | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                          |                                       |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><br>Benjamin E. Chinsky, Major, U.S. Army.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                    |                                   |                            | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                  |                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   |                            | 5e. TASK NUMBER                                     |                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   |                            | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                |                                       |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College<br>ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD<br>Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                    |                                   |                            | 8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER                     |                                       |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                    |                                   |                            | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                    |                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   |                            | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)              |                                       |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                    |                                   |                            |                                                     |                                       |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                    |                                   |                            |                                                     |                                       |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br>U.S. joint military doctrine establishes a readiness requirement to support violent insurgencies, primarily through conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) by Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). UW doctrine describes basic models of resistance and UW informed by historical cases of resistance campaigns and guerrilla warfare. Recent research suggests nonviolent resistance techniques may be more effective than violent insurgent techniques, raising concerns about ARSOF readiness and strategic value in the international security environment. This thesis identified opportunities for ARSOF employment in a U.S. whole-of-government strategy for supporting nonviolent resistance movements. A case study analysis of outpour and civil resistance to Slobodan Milosevic was conducted through the theoretical lens of special operations as well as a crosswalk analysis of ARSOF capabilities through the theoretical lens of nonviolent civil resistance. This methodology resulted in two significant findings. First, U.S. foreign policy for conflict resolution focuses on “carrot or stick” approaches through diplomacy, sanctions, and military force, with inherent risk to long-term U.S. strategic interests. Second, ARSOF has the capability to support nonviolent resistance movements. These findings suggest that the U.S. needs to explore foreign policy options beyond the traditional approaches, and ARSOF support to nonviolent resistance is one such viable option. |                    |                                   |                            |                                                     |                                       |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS<br>Civil Affairs; Civil Resistance; Influence; Nonviolent Resistance; Otpor; Psychological Operations; Serbia; Special Forces; Support to Resistance; Unconventional Warfare                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                    |                                   |                            |                                                     |                                       |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES                                 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON       |
| a. REPORT<br>(U)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | b. ABSTRACT<br>(U) | c. THIS PAGE<br>(U)               |                            |                                                     | 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                    |                                   | (U)                        | 162                                                 |                                       |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Benjamin E. Chinsky

Thesis Title: Beyond Traditional “Carrot and Stick” Foreign Policy Options: Exploring  
Army Special Operations Support to Nonviolent Resistance Movements

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
LTC Christopher L. Schilling, M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
LTC Rafael E. Linera Rivera, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Kevin G. Rousseau, J.D.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2020 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Office of Degree Programs  
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

BEYOND TRADITIONAL “CARROT AND STICK” FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS: EXPLORING ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, by Major Benjamin E. Chinsky, 162 pages.

U.S. joint military doctrine establishes a readiness requirement to support violent insurgencies, primarily through conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) by Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). UW doctrine describes basic models of resistance and UW informed by historical cases of resistance campaigns and guerrilla warfare. Recent research suggests nonviolent resistance techniques may be more effective than violent insurgent techniques, raising concerns about ARSOF readiness and strategic value in the international security environment. This thesis identified opportunities for ARSOF employment in a U.S. whole-of-government strategy for supporting nonviolent resistance movements. A case study analysis of outpour and civil resistance to Slobodan Milosevic was conducted through the theoretical lens of special operations as well as a crosswalk analysis of ARSOF capabilities through the theoretical lens of nonviolent civil resistance. This methodology resulted in two significant findings. First, U.S. foreign policy for conflict resolution focuses on “carrot or stick” approaches through diplomacy, sanctions, and military force, with inherent risk to long-term U.S. strategic interests. Second, ARSOF has the capability to support nonviolent resistance movements. These findings suggest that the U.S. needs to explore foreign policy options beyond the traditional approaches, and ARSOF support to nonviolent resistance is one such viable option.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the supportive network of individuals and groups who aided me in pursuing and accomplishing this endeavor. My thesis committee members were each instrumental in providing guidance, access to resources, feedback, and mentorship throughout the research process. The Special Forces Doctrine Development Division at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School was an incredible source of knowledge and expertise to ensure this research was accurately rooted in doctrinal UW concepts and capabilities. The Art of War Scholars Program at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College provided an outstanding educational environment from which to frame this research in historical, social, and strategic context, as well as time and funding to pursue independent research and writing. Special thanks to all the friends, family, mentors, and fellow service members who spent long hours working through the challenges of the research process with me. Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to all the practitioners of popular resistance and the quiet professionals who support them around the world.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                               | Page |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ..... | iii  |
| ABSTRACT.....                                                 | iv   |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....                                         | v    |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....                                        | vi   |
| ACRONYMS.....                                                 | viii |
| ILLUSTRATIONS .....                                           | ix   |
| TABLES .....                                                  | x    |
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....                                  | 1    |
| Problem Statement.....                                        | 1    |
| Current and Future Security Environment.....                  | 3    |
| What is Nonviolent Political Action? .....                    | 7    |
| Topic and Research Questions.....                             | 10   |
| Assumptions.....                                              | 13   |
| Limitations .....                                             | 13   |
| Scope and Delimitations .....                                 | 14   |
| Significance of Study.....                                    | 16   |
| Qualifications.....                                           | 17   |
| CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....                             | 18   |
| Introduction.....                                             | 18   |
| Nonviolent Resistance Works.....                              | 19   |
| Theory .....                                                  | 22   |
| Nonviolent Resistance Theory .....                            | 22   |
| Theory of Special Operations .....                            | 26   |
| External Support .....                                        | 33   |
| Scholarship Perspectives on External Support.....             | 33   |
| DOD Perspective on External Support .....                     | 39   |
| Arguments Against External Support .....                      | 45   |
| Summary.....                                                  | 48   |
| CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY .....                                   | 50   |
| CHAPTER 4 DATA AND ANALYSIS.....                              | 56   |

|                                                            |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Slobodan Milosevic .....           | 56  |
| Background Information .....                               | 57  |
| Milosevic's Rise to Power .....                            | 59  |
| Popular Resistance Emerges .....                           | 62  |
| Milosevic Consolidates 'Legitimate' Federal Power.....     | 65  |
| Summary .....                                              | 66  |
| Civil Resistance and Otpor .....                           | 66  |
| Origins and Early Resistance .....                         | 66  |
| The Kosovo Conflict.....                                   | 69  |
| Operational Approach .....                                 | 70  |
| Unifying the Opposition .....                              | 73  |
| Milosevic's Final Ploy .....                               | 75  |
| The Power of Mass Mobilization.....                        | 77  |
| Pillars of Support Fall .....                              | 78  |
| Conclusion .....                                           | 79  |
| External Support .....                                     | 79  |
| Introduction.....                                          | 79  |
| Bosnia .....                                               | 80  |
| Kosovo .....                                               | 83  |
| Serbia .....                                               | 87  |
| Information .....                                          | 89  |
| Democracy Development.....                                 | 90  |
| Building Civil Resistance .....                            | 92  |
| ARSOF Capabilities and Activities .....                    | 95  |
| Introduction.....                                          | 95  |
| Special Operations and Irregular Warfare .....             | 95  |
| ARSOF and the "Resistance Profession" .....                | 99  |
| CAOs.....                                                  | 102 |
| MISOs .....                                                | 106 |
| UW .....                                                   | 109 |
| The Basic Resistance Model .....                           | 111 |
| The UW Model .....                                         | 115 |
| STR .....                                                  | 117 |
| Crosswalk Analysis of Case Study with ARSOF Doctrine ..... | 119 |
| CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....            | 131 |
| Findings .....                                             | 131 |
| Evolution of the Research Methodology .....                | 134 |
| Research Implications.....                                 | 135 |
| Recommendations.....                                       | 139 |
| GLOSSARY .....                                             | 142 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....                                         | 144 |

## ACRONYMS

|        |                                               |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
| ARSOF  | Army Special Operations Forces                |
| CA     | Civil Affairs                                 |
| CAO    | Civil Affairs Operations                      |
| CIA    | Central Intelligence Agency                   |
| FID    | Foreign Internal Defense                      |
| MISO   | Military Information Support Operations       |
| NGO    | Nongovernmental Organization                  |
| PSYACT | Psychological Action                          |
| PSYOP  | Psychological Operations                      |
| SF     | Special Forces                                |
| STR    | Support to Resistance                         |
| SOF    | Special Operations Forces                     |
| USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command |
| USG    | United States Government                      |
| UW     | Unconventional Warfare                        |

## ILLUSTRATIONS

|                                                                              | Page |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Figure 1. Spectrum of Outcomes from Nonviolent Political Action.....         | 9    |
| Figure 2. Scope of this Study .....                                          | 15   |
| Figure 3. Qualitative Case Study Methodology Visual Model .....              | 51   |
| Figure 4. Relationship between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare..... | 97   |
| Figure 5. The ARSOF “Resistance Profession” .....                            | 100  |
| Figure 6. CAO support to UW .....                                            | 103  |
| Figure 7. Relationship between Informational and Influence Activities .....  | 108  |
| Figure 8. Activities and Actions of a Basic Resistance Model .....           | 114  |
| Figure 9. Collaborative planning across USG agencies .....                   | 118  |

## TABLES

|                                                                    | Page |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Table 1. Episodes of Popular Resistance and External Support ..... | 120  |
| Table 2. Serbian Resistance and the UW Model .....                 | 124  |
| Table 3. Resistance Functions.....                                 | 127  |
| Table 4. External Support and ARSOF.....                           | 129  |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Problem Statement

The 21st century operational environment is different than the post-World War II operational environment. Challenges and threats to United States national security continue to emerge and evolve with changes in the global environment.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. uses its instruments of national power to counter and/or defeat these threats, and one could argue that providing support to foreign resistance movements through execution of unconventional warfare (UW) is one possible tool. UW is the principle task of Army Special Forces (SF), focused on core activities of subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, personnel recovery, intelligence operations, and preparation of the environment.<sup>2</sup> SF traces its UW lineage back to the activities of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II which conducted shaping operations throughout the European and Pacific theaters in support of the broader military campaigns to defeat German and Japan. This model of UW has continued to develop in the 75 years since. However, throughout these years there has also been another method of resistance used by oppressed populations which emphasized use of nonviolent resistance techniques. Recent research in the field of

---

<sup>1</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017).

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 5-1.

nonviolent resistance indicates that as a general trend, nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance.<sup>3</sup>

Within U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOFF) who conduct activities in support of, or in defense against, resistance forces are Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and SF soldiers. Additionally, UW is the “core activity and organizing principle of Army SF”<sup>4</sup> and is foundational to preparation and training for conduct of other tasks and activities. Joint military doctrine discusses typical operations and activities of the joint force, including support to insurgency through UW. Yet while there is a doctrinal requirement for ARSOFF to plan, prepare for, and execute UW core activities and specifically support an insurgency, there is no institutional requirement across the domains of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) that specifically directs ARSOFF to man, train, and equip forces to conduct support to nonviolent resistance movements.

One might argue that the definition of UW provides the guidance to ARSOFF by including the separate terms ‘resistance movement’ and ‘insurgency’. However, making updates to Department of Defense definitions has not translated into accompanying DOTMLPF-P updates to enable that capacity. If it is true that nonviolent resistance is

---

<sup>3</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 220.

<sup>4</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2014), 4-5.

more effective than violent resistance, then traditional UW and support to an insurgency might no longer be a suitable, acceptable, or effective capability for employment in the contemporary and future operational environment.

This study is not investigating whether nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance and it acknowledges that there is still a requirement for ARSOF readiness to conduct support to an insurgency. However, this study does recognize that nonviolent resistance is an ongoing phenomenon in the twenty first century. Therefore, as the military's proponent for supporting resistance movements, ARSOF must ensure it has the capabilities to provide effective options to policy makers for addressing the challenges of today's complex global security environment.

#### Current and Future Security Environment

One could argue that the international political order has seen three major shifts since WWII reshaped the global system. First was the bipolar balance of power of the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union competed for expanding influence and relative power. Second was the unipolar post-Cold War period in which the United States held primacy in the international system. Third was the post-9/11 period which saw the rise of non-state actors as entities capable of disrupting the international political system. An enduring theme through each of these periods was the role of the United States in shaping world events in-line with its democratic values, morals, and national interests.<sup>5</sup> One could also argue that events in recent years suggest that the international political order may be entering a new phase in which the global system is maintained or

---

<sup>5</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

influenced by a multipolar dispersion of power between the United States, Russia, and China.

Though these three nations are geographically displaced across three different continents and are each pursuing prosperity in support of their individual national interests, there is an ideological theme reminiscent of the Cold War and that is the competition for ideological survival and prosperity.<sup>6</sup> In this regard, the major powers of today's international security environment are divided along ideological lines of democracy and authoritarianism. As the resurgent influence of authoritarian Russia and China expands, so too grows the risk to United States national security. A large part of securing domestic power for the Russian and Chinese regimes is their foreign policies which aim to protect against outside interference; enabling continuation of policies that involve repression against domestic political opposition, denial of internationally recognized human rights, and consolidating power in the hands of ruling elites. Russian and Chinese foreign policies spread authoritarian ideology, and support and protect other authoritarian regimes; all aimed at enhancing Russia and China's current and future ability to shape a new international order under which they will benefit, prosper, and maintain global influence.<sup>7</sup>

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes the role of authoritarian regimes in supporting each other, and offers assistance to societies that support

---

<sup>6</sup> Hal Brands, "Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict," *Survival* 60, no. 5 (October-November 2018): 65.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-83.

democratic ideological values similar to the U.S.<sup>8</sup> It reflects the policy of the United States to provide support and assistance to societies suffering oppression or denial of basic human rights, both out of moral necessity as well as to curb the challenge to U.S. national security. The strategy states that the U.S. will support “those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law”<sup>9</sup> and that the United States will use all possible tools “to isolate states and leaders who threaten [U.S.] interests and whose actions run contrary to [U.S.] values.”<sup>10</sup> Beyond the broader themes of American prosperity and defending the homeland, there is an underlying theme throughout the strategy that the United States is engaged in an ideological competition against authoritarian regimes and will support the civil populations under those regimes in their efforts to protect and improve their livelihoods.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates DOD’s strategy to compete, deter, and win in the complex, contemporary security environment.<sup>11</sup> Like the National Security Strategy, it recognizes the challenges to the international system’s status-quo brought by revisionist powers like China and Russia which aim to “shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.”<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 37.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

Additionally, rogue regimes are capitalizing on decreasing international stability to pursue policies and capabilities counter to international law, norms, and basic human rights. “Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.”<sup>13</sup> DOD’s strategic approach of compete, deter, and win aims to integrate all the elements of national power; diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement.<sup>14</sup> While the strategy emphasizes increased military lethality, it also recognizes the need for innovation and increased effectiveness in support of national security objectives. This focus on innovation is further reflected in the USASOC ARSOF Strategy which describes ARSOF priorities for manning, training, and equipping to meet the challenges of the current and future operational environment. The ARSOF Strategy specifically notes that ARSOF’s strategic value is “the ability to [1] *expand the options necessary for decision-makers to wield influence and manage escalation in the competition space*, and [2] *enable decisive operations by the joint force in war*.”<sup>15</sup> Current capabilities in UW and support to insurgency provide strategic value towards the second effort. Given the pervasiveness

---

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*.

<sup>14</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, 1-5. (Note: Joint Publication 1 Change 1 of 2107 and Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0 of 2019 recognizes four instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.)

<sup>15</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, October 2019), 6.

of ideological conflict and nonviolent political action throughout the current global security environment, perhaps there is opportunity for ARSOF to expand its strategic value in line with the first effort by providing options to United States Government (USG) decision-makers for conflict intervention and resolution through support to nonviolent resistance movements.

### What is Nonviolent Political Action?

According to Gene Sharp, the proverbial ‘father’ of modern nonviolent political action, the basic political assumption of nonviolent action is that “when people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power.”<sup>16</sup>

Nonviolent action is a categorical term that encompasses active methods of protest, noncooperation, and intervention without the use of physical violence.<sup>17</sup> These methods are usually employed outside of the established institutional procedures of the state because the population was unable to adequately address its grievances through the existing political and social institutional methods.<sup>18</sup> Sharp proposed 198 methods of

---

<sup>16</sup> Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973), 64.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Kathleen G. Cunningham, “Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 294.

nonviolent action as tactics that can be employed during the conduct of a civil resistance campaign. These methods were divided amongst three categories of nonviolent protest and persuasion, nonviolent noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention, and involve acts of omission (i.e., refusal to do what is normal, expected, or required by law), acts of commission (i.e., doing what is not normal, unexpected, or illegal) or a combination of both.<sup>19</sup>

Successfully employing these nonviolent political actions in a calculated strategy can result in what Sharp terms ‘mechanisms of change’; conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.<sup>20</sup> Conversion is when nonviolent action leads to the regime leadership changing its mind and addressing the population’s grievances. Accommodation is when regime leadership has not changed its mind, but nonviolent action still leads to the regime addressing the population’s grievances. Nonviolent coercion is when the regime is forced into action, or inaction, by removing its ability to act effectively yet still maintain its position as the recognized regime. Disintegration is when nonviolent action has removed the regime’s sources of power so completely that the regime collapses, and there no longer is a government to be coerced. These mechanisms of change represent a spectrum of outcomes which can result from strategically planned and synchronized nonviolent political action (see figure 1).

---

<sup>19</sup> Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 68-69.

<sup>20</sup> Gene Sharp, with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 60.

### **Spectrum of outcomes from nonviolent political action**




Figure 1. Spectrum of Outcomes from Nonviolent Political Action

*Source:* Created by author.

Within the discipline of population-based political opposition movements, the term ‘civil resistance’ is often used synonymously with the employment of nonviolent political actions under all conditions, including the environmental condition itself. For example, a civil opposition movement may employ ‘civil resistance’ techniques of nonviolent political action as a literal tactic of civilian resistance against its own domestic regime. Other movements may use violent political action techniques as a literal tactic of ‘civilian resistance’. These same nonviolent and violent techniques may be used as part of a literal tactic of ‘civilian resistance’ in support of ‘civil defense’ to enhance national deterrence and defense against a foreign regime, such as during a foreign occupation. The terms ‘civil resistance’ and ‘civil defense’ have different meanings to practitioners, supporters, and policy makers (as well as geographic and historical context).

To mitigate this confusion, this research will use the term ‘civil opposition’ as an umbrella term for population-based political opposition movements. Civil opposition includes 1) ‘civil resistance’, which refers to popular or civil opposition to that population’s own regime, and 2) ‘civil defense’, which refers to popular or civil

opposition to a foreign regime. Based on these definitions, both civil resistance and civil defense may include the use of violent and/or nonviolent resistance techniques. There is ongoing discussion within the scholarship on nonviolent resistance as to what defines violent and nonviolent resistance. This is an important discussion within the discipline that results in ever-evolving definitions. Rather than propose new definitions, this research will extract them from Jonathan Pinckney's definition of nonviolent discipline, which is "refraining from the use of physical violence or the threat of physical violence directed at persons or property"<sup>21</sup>. Under this definition, nonviolent resistance tactics include Sharps 198 methods of nonviolent action (and possibly others), and violent resistance tactics include threat of or actual armed conflict, sabotage, destruction of property, and other forms of physical violence.

### Topic and Research Questions

This purpose of this study is to identify if there is a role for ARSOF in a United States whole-of-government strategy for supporting nonviolent resistance movements. If such a capability exists in ARSOF, it would provide additional options to USG foreign policy makers.

The USG supports political opposition movements in support of democratic ideology, human rights, and national security objectives. Support to violent opposition movements is primarily through a combination of efforts by the Central Intelligence

---

<sup>21</sup> Jonathan Pinckney, "Making or Breaking Nonviolent Discipline in Civil Resistance Movements," (monograph, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington, DC, 2016), 16, accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICNC-Monograph-Making-or-Breaking-Nonviolent-Discipline.pdf>.

Agency (CIA) and/or DOD. For example, in 2001 the CIA and DOD worked together to support the Northern Alliance efforts in Afghanistan against the Taliban,<sup>22</sup> and again in 2002-2003 when they partnered with the Kurdish population of northern Iraq against the regime of Saddam Hussein.<sup>23</sup> USG support to nonviolent opposition movements has been rare, but has included support provided through a combination of various departments and agencies. For example, support to democratic efforts in Poland in the 1980s was provided by the CIA, Department of State, U.S. Agency for Global Media, USG supported workers unions, and others.<sup>24</sup>

Over 30 percent of full-time USG employees are active-duty DOD service members, suggesting DOD has significant capacity to contribute human capital toward whole-of-government strategies.<sup>25</sup> Within DOD, USASOC is the proponent for conducting resistance activities, and ARSOF forces are provided by the 1st SF Command (Airborne) which in 2018 had approximately 22,000 personnel supporting operations in approximately 70 countries.<sup>26</sup> As a point of comparison, the Department of State in 2020 has approximately 24,000 foreign service and civil service employees supporting

---

<sup>22</sup> Will Irwin, *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2019), 170.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 28-33.

<sup>25</sup> Congressional Research Service (CRS), *Federal Workforce Statistics Sources: OPM and OMB*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 24 October 2019), 6, accessed 13 May 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *ARSOF Fact Book 2018* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2018), 5, accessed 13 May 2020, <https://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html>.

diplomatic requirements in 195 countries.<sup>27</sup> These numbers suggest that ARSOF has significant capacity to contribute human capital toward USG foreign policy options.

These factors lead to the primary research question for this study: What can ARSOF contribute to a United States whole-of-government strategy to support nonviolent resistance movements? There are numerous secondary questions which must be addressed to answer the primary research question: What has USG support to nonviolent resistance looked like in the past? Does ARSOF have the capability to provide support to nonviolent resistance movements? Lastly, should ARSOF conduct these activities?

These questions will be addressed through a qualitative case study analysis and crosswalk with DOD doctrine. The historical case study for this research is the Serbian Otpor movement from 1998-2000. Lessons from this case will be compared with ARSOF doctrinal capabilities to support resistance movement; derived from current, unclassified ARSOF doctrine and capabilities. Analysis and comparison of these sets of data will answer the research questions and determine the validity of this study's thesis.

One could argue that focusing on unclassified ARSOF doctrine and capabilities will fail to produce a credible, cohesive scholarly assessment. Much of ARSOF doctrine and capabilities related to supporting resistance movements is classified and/or compartmentalized, and by excluding it there may be a significant gap in this research. The intent of this research is to educate policy makers, practitioners, and scholars about

---

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Department of State, "GTM Fact Sheet: Facts about Our Most Valuable Asset – Our People," Factsheet, Department of State Human Resources, 31 March 2020, accessed 13 May 2020, [http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/0320\\_state\\_dept\\_hr\\_factsheet.pdf](http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/0320_state_dept_hr_factsheet.pdf).

the potential role of ARSOF in supporting nonviolent resistance movements. Research findings must be unclassified and publicly available to facilitate public access to the findings.

### Assumptions

There is a growing body of literature related to civil resistance, support to resistance (STR), and ARSOF roles and capabilities, which will be described in chapter two of this study. However, the literature that explores the role of military activity in supporting nonviolent resistance movements is limited to theoretical exploration, most likely because none of the literature specifically references a historic example of military support to a nonviolent resistance movement. Additionally, the author of this study has been unable to find an unclassified example of a USG military operation to directly support a nonviolent resistance movement to conduct civil resistance. Therefore, this study assumes that there is no such case available for study.

### Limitations

There are numerous limitations that must be acknowledged in the conduct of this research. Credible resources with which to construct a cohesive scholarly analysis may be classified and unavailable for inclusion in this study. This study may replicate existing classified research but constructed with unclassified resources. No known unclassified historical cases of DOD operations to support nonviolent civil resistance are available for study. Further limitations include the constrained timeline in which to conduct this research, as well as the time-horizon constraint. Most USG documents generated since implementation of President Reagan's policy of providing STR movements have not yet

been accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration. A limited number of documents are available through the Freedom of Information Act; however, these documents do not provide a comprehensive review of USG assessments, decisions, and policies from the time periods in question.

### Scope and Delimitations

The body of existing research indicates that nonviolent resistance works. Therefore, it is the obligation of those that provide support to opposition movements to continue to examine how best to employ these nonviolent methods. The body of research is generally broken into two categories of grievance-generating actors: internal and external. This aligns with doctrinal UW which distinguishes between resistance to the sovereign government and resistance to an occupying power. The scholarship is also generally divided into two types of civil opposition: civil resistance and civil defense. Civil resistance is about conducting active, nonviolent tactical action, whereas civil defense is about increasing resiliency and deterrence through proactive capacity building to conduct civil resistance. If resiliency and deterrence fail, then civil defense transitions to the active conduct of civil resistance.

This research will be limited in scope to nonviolent civil resistance to internal grievances (see figure 2). This scope is based upon the body of scholarship which recognizes nonviolent resistance as an effective tool against internal grievances, and current global trends which indicate internal grievances, in the form of authoritarian regimes, are a threat to U.S. national security.

|                             |                                         | Forms of Civil Opposition |               |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|
|                             |                                         | Civil Resistance          | Civil Defense |
| Grievance-Generating Actors | Internal Grievance<br>(Domestic Regime) | X                         |               |
|                             | External Grievance<br>(Foreign Regime)  |                           |               |

Figure 2. Scope of this Study

*Source:* Created by author.

To make this research feasible, this study will include the delimitation of focusing on the role of the three ARSOF branches that conduct UW: CA, PO, and SF. These branches were chosen because of their roles as the primary contributors to the ARSOF resistance profession.<sup>28</sup> An additional delimitation for this study will be a focus on activities by state actors to provide external support to nonviolent civil resistance. External support from non-state actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or intergovernmental organizations is outside the scope of this study, as is civil opposition to non-state entities with governance-like power such as the Taliban or Islamic State. These delimitations were chosen because of the current global trend of authoritarian regimes oppressing their populations, and the implications for U.S. national security interests outlined in the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy.

---

<sup>28</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, xv.

### Significance of Study

This study is significant because it attempts to bridge the phenomena of violent and nonviolent resistance under the overarching construct of USG STR activities applied through the military instrument of national power. Research results may provide the foundation for recommended DOTMLPF-P changes to ensure ARSOF and DOD maintain a relevant and capable STR capacity and capability in support of USG national security objectives. This is critical for the United States to maintain its competitive edge in the contemporary operating environment, and the insight gained through this study has potential for immediate contribution to national security objectives. This research will provide a lasting contribution to both the fields of civil resistance and military art and science. For the former, this study will further explore the role of external support from state actors, specifically exploring the potential for military support. For the latter, this study will contribute to military institutional knowledge on nonviolent conflict which has previously been minimally explored by scholarship.<sup>29</sup> The ideas that emerge from this study will shape a new cognitive approach to military art that can be applied by military leaders and national security practitioners, while the findings of this research will direct impact military science by proposing new tactics, techniques, and procedures for military readiness and conduct of operations.

---

<sup>29</sup> For other works, see Dennis Blair, *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions*, vol. 1, *Overview and Action Plan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); Will Irwin, *How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters to SOF)*, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2019).

### Qualifications

The author is an Army SF officer and has participated in numerous UW training courses and events. He has also served as the lead special operations planner at the Joint Readiness Training Center, responsible for designing, resourcing, and conducting UW training and validation events for ARSOF units. The author studied global security, national security, and international relations at Johns Hopkins University, including coursework in nonviolent resistance and engagement with leading scholars in the discipline. Most recently, he completed a research study focused on the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance techniques in anti-occupation campaigns. The author will be returning to a SF unit following the Command and General Staff Officer Course and will be responsible for unit readiness, planning, and leading a range of ARSOF activities, including UW and STR.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research is to explore the ARSOF role in a U.S. whole-of-government strategy for supporting nonviolent resistance movements. The following literature review is organized into three sections. The first section discusses the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance methods. This study does not intend to prove that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance. However, it does accept that methods of nonviolent resistance work and can be an effective tool. Therefore, it is necessary to provide sufficient scholarly support for this assertion. The second section addresses theoretical perspectives which influenced the author's selection of the research topic and will provide the theoretical framework for the research design. The sub-section on nonviolent resistance theory explores the evolution of modern nonviolent resistance techniques and thought. The sub-section on special operations theory explores the still-evolving scholarly perspectives on special operations. There currently is no widely accepted theory of special operations. However, scholarly exploration towards that end provides valuable insights with which to frame this research. The third section of this chapter explores literature on state-sponsored support to nonviolent resistance and is broken into three sub-sections. The first sub-section explores external support from existing scholarship in the nonviolent resistance discipline to identify general themes and trends. The second sub-section focuses on existing DOD perspectives on external support as that is the focus of this research. The third sub-section highlights scholarship which argues against external support to showcase where there is conflicting scholarly thought.

The literature reviewed in this chapter will expose common themes which this research can build upon and will identify the gap in existing scholarship which this research will seek to address.

### Nonviolent Resistance Works

Many scholars have explored the efficacy of nonviolent resistance, examining cases of successful and unsuccessful nonviolent resistance campaigns to determine if it works and what combination of variables result in the outcome. Using select case studies, scholars concluded that not only does nonviolent resistance work, it may actually be a more effective method of popular resistance than using violent methods.<sup>30</sup> Advocates of violent resistance could argue that these studies include selection bias, are not comprehensive studies of the field of resistance, and do not actually prove that nonviolent resistance is effective against all opponents under all circumstances. They may point to the commonly held perception that violence has had a place throughout history in conflict resolution, and that while successful nonviolent resistance would be an ideal goal, it is

---

<sup>30</sup> Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experiences of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2009); Maciej J. Bartkowski, ed., *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).

unachievable in the majority of popular opposition campaigns due to the repressive nature of oppressive and/or military regimes.<sup>31</sup>

The author of this study discussed the first truly comprehensive comparison of violent and nonviolent resistance in a previous research study:

Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan conducted the first comprehensive analysis of nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns and their outcomes. Through a quantitative analysis of 323 [civil opposition] resistance campaigns from 1900-2006, Chenoweth and Stephan concluded that nonviolent resistance is a more effective strategy than violent resistance to achieve a resistance campaign's maximal goal of either anti-regime, anti-occupation, or secession. Their conclusion was built upon the argument that mass participation is necessary for civil resistance campaigns to be successful, and that nonviolent resistance campaigns allow for larger popular participation than violent resistance campaigns. Therefore, nonviolent campaigns are likely to mobilize more support than violent campaigns, and it is due to those circumstances that nonviolent resistance is more successful than violent resistance.<sup>32</sup>

Through statistical analysis of over 100 nonviolent resistance campaigns and over 200 violent resistance campaigns from the twentieth and early twenty first centuries, Chenoweth and Stephan found that nonviolent campaigns have succeeded 53 percent of the time compare to 26 percent success for violent campaigns.<sup>33</sup> These findings are revolutionary in the study of popular resistance because they indicate that nonviolent resistance campaigns have more than double the success rate of violent campaigns. The

---

<sup>31</sup> Ackerman and DuVall address effectiveness of nonviolent resistance to repressive regimes in *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*.

<sup>32</sup> Benjamin Chinsky, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Anti-Occupation Civil Resistance Campaigns" (master's research study, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, May 2019), 8.

<sup>33</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 8.

study did indicate that while nonviolent campaigns with anti-regime goals or other non-territorial related goals were significantly more effective than violent campaigns, nonviolent campaigns with territorial goals of anti-occupation or self-determination had a much smaller success margin.<sup>34</sup> Other research has explored this disparity in results for territorial campaigns, specifically exploring anti-occupation campaigns, and confirmed Chenoweth and Stephan's findings that both nonviolent and violent resistance has potential for success.<sup>35</sup>

Like Chenoweth and Stephan, scholars of nonviolent resistance specify the variable of resistance movement goals as part of the scope of their research.<sup>36</sup> Examining how other scholars have defined this variable, the author of this study has determined that cases of civil opposition against state actors are broken into two categories: domestic grievance-generating state actors such as a domestic authoritarian regime, and foreign grievance-generating state actors, such as a foreign military occupation or foreign political influence. For the purpose of this research, this categorization will be referred to as 'internal grievance' and 'external grievance'.

---

<sup>34</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 7-9.

<sup>35</sup> Chinsky, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Anti-Occupation Civil Resistance Campaigns", 30.

<sup>36</sup> Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful*; Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*; Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*; Roberts and Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*; Bartkowski, *Recovering Nonviolent History*.

## Theory

### Nonviolent Resistance Theory

Modern nonviolent political action traces its origin to Mahatma Gandhi in the early twentieth century. “Gandhi’s approach to politics entailed three essential elements: personal nonviolence as a way of life, constructive work to create the new society, and nonviolent resistance to direct and structural violence. All of these are firmly grounded in a concern with human needs and the realizations that the satisfaction of needs is central to conflict resolution.”<sup>37</sup> He believed that individual freedom was a necessity in society, and that it could be achieved through nonviolent means. As advocated by Gandhi, nonviolence was both an effective and ethical method of political action.<sup>38</sup> Emphasis was on the role of the individual, and on ethically uniting individuals on all sides of a conflict. Gandhi believes that the resister did not need to coerce or expel the oppressor. Rather, Gandhi’s concept of nonviolence emphasized converting the oppressor’s point of view to achieve unity.<sup>39</sup> Gandhi’s concept of unity through ethical nonviolence was influenced by his religious beliefs and was criticized as passive and ineffective. Gandhi himself “distinguished between those committed to nonviolence as a creed and those who used it as a policy.”<sup>40</sup> But it would be over half a century before an alternative approach was suggested.

---

<sup>37</sup> Robert J. Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 101-102.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 99.

In 1973 Gene Sharp proposed a theory of power in which regime power is dependent on the cooperation of local institutions and people.<sup>41</sup> He suggests political power is derived from six sources; authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions.<sup>42</sup> Arguably the factor ‘authority’ is most notable because it must be voluntarily accepted by the people.<sup>43</sup> If the population does not accept the authority of its government, and chooses to withdraw its obedience and cooperation from the regime, this can create a crisis for regime leadership by threatening regime survival.<sup>44</sup> As such, Sharp argued that nonviolent political action could be a pragmatic, effective tool for an oppressed population to employ as it seeks concessions from the governing body.<sup>45</sup> He describes 198 methods of nonviolent political action, each a tactical action that could be employed as part of a nonviolent resistance campaign. Though Sharp addressed the critics of Gandhi’s approach, his theory also drew criticisms. Notable among them were that he does not specify the source of obedience and cooperation, does not address alternative institutions necessary for effective resistance, and his theory was based on the assumption that governments depend on the obedience and cooperation of their populations.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 8.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>46</sup> Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, 44-46.

In 2004 Robert Helvey proposed that Sharp's six sources of political power "find expression in organizations and institutions, called 'pillars of support'."<sup>47</sup> These pillars include social, political, economic, and cultural institutions. For example, law enforcement, the military, civil servants, media, business, youth, workers, religious organizations, NGOs, and others.<sup>48</sup> Collectively, these pillars of support provide the foundation upon which a regime exerts power over its population. Within Helvey's model, regime reliance on the cooperation of the population can be recognized in the amount of popular support for regime pillars of support. Government power being reliant on the obedience of the people can be seen through whether the population utilizes regime institutions or establishes alternative pillars of support to meet their needs. In the latter, the government no longer has authority over the population, which lends legitimacy to the opposition and can contribute to increased international support to the opposition.<sup>49</sup> Another contribution from Helvey is emphasis on the importance of strategic planning and analysis, detailed in his proposed theory of 'strategic nonviolent struggle'.<sup>50</sup> This theory draws inspiration from the military model of achieving victory "by destroying the opponent's capacity and/or willingness to continue the fight. In this

---

<sup>47</sup> Robert Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals* (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 4.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 9-18.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., x.

regard, nonviolent strategy is no different from armed conflict, except that very different weapons systems are employed”.<sup>51</sup>

In 2011, Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that nonviolent resistance campaigns can separate the pillars of support from an oppressive regime.<sup>52</sup> They argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns succeed because there are less “physical, moral, and information barriers to participation”<sup>53</sup> than in violent resistance, and this increased popular participation enables campaign success in five ways:

First, mass, diverse participation tends to result in higher levels of civic disruption through mass noncooperation, which causes erstwhile regime supporters... to shift loyalties to the resistance. Second, regime repression against large, nonviolent campaigns is more likely to backfire against the perpetrator... often [resulting] in even greater mobilization, shifts in loyalty among erstwhile regime elites, and sanctions against the offending regime. Third... large-scale civilian participation [is more likely to] win meaningful support for their cause in the international community and to cause their opponent regimes to lose support... Fourth, large nonviolent campaigns tend to be better at evading and remaining resilient in the face of regime repression. Fifth, large nonviolent campaigns tend to be more adept at developing tactical innovations... allowing them to maneuver and adapt to conditions more easily than small campaigns.<sup>54</sup>

As was noted in chapter one, Chenoweth and Stephan’s research was the first comprehensive comparison of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, and it found that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance.

This section has summarized the main contributions to modern nonviolent resistance theory. Gandhi proposed nonviolent political action to unite the oppressor and

---

<sup>51</sup> Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, xi.

<sup>52</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 221.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 220.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 220-221.

the oppressed out of moral necessity. Sharp proposed that regime authority is reliant on the support of the population, and that nonviolent political action is a pragmatic approach to remove the regime's source of power. Helvey identified regime power as deriving from institutional pillars of support and proposed strategic planning in nonviolent campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan provide the statistical support for the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, and propose that mass, popular participation in nonviolent political action will separate an oppressive regime from its pillars of support.

### Theory of Special Operations

At the time of this writing, there is no widely accepted theory of special operations. There is ongoing debate whether a special operations-specific theory is necessary, whether it should be a single general umbrella theory or multiple mission-specific theories, and whether it should be about special operations as an activity or about the people and units that make up Special Operations Forces (SOF). Answers to these questions are outside the scope of this research; however, literature that addresses these questions provide theoretical insights for this research study.

The scholarly field of special operations was relatively unexplored until 1993 when Admiral (Ret.) William H. McRaven wrote a thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School titled "The Theory of Special Operations". Subsequently published as *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice*, McRaven argues that a theory of special operations is important to aid understanding of how and why a small

force can be successful against a larger or well-defended opponent.<sup>55</sup> He proposes a theory of special operations based on mitigating Clausewitz's 'friction' of war through synchronized balance of six principles of special operations; simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. Employing these principles enables special operations units to achieve relative superiority, mitigate the opponent's advantages, and exploit the initiative for mission success. McRaven's theory derived from a case study of eight special operations to destroy, eliminate, or rescue a specific target of political or military importance. Though his scope was tailored towards what today's military doctrine would consider to be surgical strike capabilities, McRaven's theory of special operations laid the initial groundwork for exploring a vital strategic tool of national security.

Six years into the Global War on Terror, Robert Spulak Jr. recognized that the delineation between SOF and conventional forces capabilities and operations was no longer clear. In *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF*, Spulak argues that SOF are distinct from conventional forces because of SOF attributes which enable special operations to overcome the Clausewitzian friction which limits conventional forces operations. He acknowledges that SOF originated to fill a capability gap in war, but that their value also extends to operations other than war where conventional forces cannot be employed. In this manner, SOF employed to achieve

---

<sup>55</sup> William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1995), 1.

national security objectives prior to conflict initiating may thereby preventing war altogether.<sup>56</sup>

In 2011 Joint Special Operations University identified a knowledge gap in strategic thought on special operations, and it hosted a workshop to “examine the role of military Special Operations (SOF-Power) in national security and the relevance and feasibility of a theory of Special Operations to inform and guide the development and use of Special Operations and SOF.”<sup>57</sup> Workshop participants concluded that SOF will continue to support conventional operations, but will also be utilized within the gaps that exist between the methods of national power employment. Further, the power represented by SOF is distinct within the military construct and must be understood uniquely like the military services or the other instruments of national power.

The workshop also concluded that SOF can be employed as a multi- and cross-domain force for achieving or supporting military and political outcomes. In addition to the traditional operating environments encompassed by the five recognized domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber), participants also proposed three conceptual, nontraditional environments in which SOF also operate: the complex operating environment (marked by instability and ambiguity); the high-risk, highly-sensitive environment (usually in denied areas where exposure is politically damaging); and the irregular warfare environment

---

<sup>56</sup> Robert Spulak, Jr., *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF* (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 2007), 22.

<sup>57</sup> Joseph Celeski, “A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art” (Report of Proceedings from SOF-Power Workshop, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill AFB, FL, 22-23 August 2011), 1.

(characterized by intra-state and sub-state acts of political violence).<sup>58</sup> The outcome of this workshop was a series of recommendations for future scholarly exploration to develop a unified theory of special operations.

Harry Yarger participated in the JSOU workshop, and subsequently wrote *21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations*. He explored existing literature to identify what is unique about U.S. SOF and special operations, and proposes 26 premises, 14 principles, and six definitions that, taken together, all encapsulate the foundational framework for future development of a unified American special operations theory. Yarger admits that there is nothing ‘new’ about these premises and principles (his work consolidates the main ideas from other authors). However, one could argue that this study’s lasting contribution is the recognition that while special operations are not unique to the U.S. military, there is a specific American military special operations theory: “While it may share some attributes with others, it is a part of the American strategic culture and therefore distinctly shaped by American perspectives of the military and the uses of power. These distinctions are important.”<sup>59</sup>

While previous scholarship has explored special operations theory primarily from the U.S. perspective, Dennis Gyllensporre addresses it from a modern, small state perspective in “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory”. He argues that existing special operations theory is not applicable to the SOF of

---

<sup>58</sup> Celeski, “A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art,” 15-16.

<sup>59</sup> Harry R. Yarger, *21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2013), 12.

small states in modern conflict, primarily because the leading special operations theorists all use a U.S. perspective. Gyllensporre uses the example of Russian hybrid warfare executed in Ukraine as an example of how small states need a special operations theory that focuses on their national defense against larger states with greater capacity. He proposes that small state SOF can be employed to bolster national and local institutional capacity to “identify, detect, and neutralize subversive and covert actions”<sup>60</sup> of aggressor states. If that fails, he proposes employment of SOF against aggressor key targets to rapidly escalate the situation and require the aggressor state to openly conduct hostilities. Once that public threshold of violence has been breached, the defending small state then seeks to employ a strategy that prevents losing a protracted campaign. Gyllensporre’s proposed small state theory of special operations is wholly about responding to threats from a stronger adversary, a very different theoretical perspective than his American predecessors.

In *A Unified Theory of Special Operations*, Richard Rubright proposes, “special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific effect.”<sup>61</sup> He argues that this theory is applicable to all special operations throughout time, and that it provides an overarching framework which includes topics such as special warfare, surgical strike, special operations power, the human domain, and whole-of-government strategies. The

---

<sup>60</sup> Dennis Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory,” in *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*, eds. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 33.

<sup>61</sup> Richard W. Rubright, *A Unified Theory for Special Operations* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017), 7.

foundational idea behind Rubright's theory is that special operations, the special operations community, and SOFs are not synonymous, and therefore a theory of special operations cannot be specific to military SOF.

In contradiction to Rubright, Tom Searle outlines a theory of military-specific special operations in *Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations*. He describes the theory through a visualization of all DOD activities and operations across the conflict continuum, and using all possible DOD capabilities, graphically depicted as a circle. Within that circle is a box that depicts the types of conventional operations DOD hopes to be highly proficient at, and against which DOD allocates the majority of its resources. This box of conventional operations does not encompass the entirety of the DOD circle. All the operations and activities "outside-the-box" yet still inside the circle are what Searle defines as special operations. He recognizes that the conventional operations box might grow and shrink based on the operational environment, and that it is a false dichotomy to suggest only conventional force conduct conventional operations and only SOF conduct special operations. Thus Searle's "outside-the-box" theory of special operations is not tied to specific missions or tasks (like McRaven), nor tied to forces, units, and nations (like Spulak and Yarger), nor is it too broad to be of utility to military special operations (like Rubright).<sup>62</sup> Searle also introduces the concept that special operations activities such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), UW, and CA are

---

<sup>62</sup> Tom Searle, *Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017).

“tightly integrated with other U.S. government agencies and with the activities of friendly foreigner governments and organizations.”<sup>63</sup>

In “Civil Context for SOF Theory”, Kurt Müller notes that previous attempts at defining a special operations theory have been limited in scope to subsets of Clausewitzian theory and focus on armed conflict. He argues that special operations encompass activities throughout the conflict continuum, and that theory must account for this variance. He builds on Searle’s discussion of the relationship between special operations and interagency activities by suggesting that “[t]he consistent emphasis on the small footprint of special operations offers advantages across the spectrum that facilitate interagency integration to achieve a national objective.”<sup>64</sup> Further, the interrelationship between elements of national power necessitates interagency analysis, planning, execution, and assessment united and focused on national policy goals rather than separated by agency-specific areas of focus. Müller highlights that civilian agencies do not have the manpower to meet global requirements, however, that capacity gap can be mitigated by providing civilian agency support to special operations. Further, he references Will Irwin’s work (discussed later in this chapter) and suggests there is a role for actors other than diplomats in “non-violent civil resistance to achieve policy goals at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, but above steady-state diplomatic engagement.”<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Searle, *Outside the Box*, 25.

<sup>64</sup> Kurt E. Müller, “Civil Context for SOF Theory,” in *Special Operations Theory*, eds. Peter McCabe and Paul Lieber (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017), 91.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

This section has summarized the main contributions towards a future theory of special operations. McRaven argued that smaller forces can overcome larger forces by mitigating Clausewitzian friction to achieve relative superiority. Spulak highlights the attributes of SOF which enable them to achieve relative superiority, and the contributions of SOF in operations other than war. JSOU concluded that SOF can support conventional operations and operate cross-domain as well as within the gaps between the elements of national power. Yarger proposed that U.S. culture and society result in a unique, American perspective on special operations. Gyllensporre proposed a small state special operations theory for defending against modern threats. Rubright argues that special operations are not unique to the military and delineates the terms special operations and SOF. Searle suggests that special operations are all DOD activities not designated as priorities for resourcing, or conducting, conventional operations; and introduces the linkage between special operations and interagency activities. Müller identifies the linkage between the elements of national power, and the unique military capacity for special operations to operate as an interagency partner.

### External Support

#### Scholarship Perspectives on External Support

Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman argue that people power movements and nonviolent conflicts succeed because they “exploits two fundamental realities: that authoritarian regimes depend on wide-scale obedience among the populations they oppress in order to maintain their control, and that not everyone in such regimes is

equally loyal”<sup>66</sup>. They summarize how nonviolent civil resistance works; that popular opposition uses nonviolent political action to withdraw popular obedience from the regime, disrupting the regime’s system, enabling defection of regime resources, and resulting in Sharp’s nonviolent coercion mechanism of change. They also support Thomas Schelling’s position that both the opposition and the regime have potential to win based on the back and forth interaction of each side’s tactical actions. Ackerman and Merriman propose that resister skills and strategic choices are more influential in determining the outcome than the environmental or structural conditions, and present three attributes of successful nonviolent resistance along with three trends that emerge from those attributes. Taken together, this six-point ‘checklist’ provides a simple framework for increasing probability of nonviolent civil resistance success and can serve as a reference guide for external supporters.

Maria Stephan’s “Checklist for External Assistance to Nonviolent Movements” describes underlying principles of external support, including consideration of the local context and needs of resisters, local consent, honest assessment of risks and rewards, and alignment of core values between the supporter and supported.<sup>67</sup> She provides an example framework for external actors to conceptualize how to support nonviolent resistance movements by populating Ackerman and Merriman’s ‘checklist’ with a series

---

<sup>66</sup> Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman, “The Checklist for Ending Tyranny,” in *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* ed. Maria Stephan (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015), 64.

<sup>67</sup> Maria Stephan, “Checklist for External Support to Nonviolent Movements” in *Is Authoritarianism Staging A Comeback?* ed. Maria Stephan (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015).

of example tools, or actions to take, that external supporters can use. Stephan also emphasizes the importance of enduring external support for political and economic development and institution building to assist the movement as it transitions from being regime opposition to regime partners.

In “Trends in Civil resistance an Authoritarian Response”, Erica Chenoweth proposes that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, authoritarian regimes have begun to employ new methods of countering nonviolent civil opposition movements. She summarizes 11 common methods, including some which appear specifically designed to overcome the strategic process nonviolent civil resistance. By understanding this ‘authoritarian playbook’, Chenoweth argues that external actors will be better equipped to understand how and when to effectively support resistance movements.

Maciej Bartkowski and Julia Taleb address the issue of external support to the ongoing Syrian resistance movement in “Myopia of the Syrian Struggle and Key Lessons”. Civil resistance to the Assad regime started nonviolent in 2011 and was showing tangible signs of effectiveness, but it was unequipped with the tools to integrate the large number of Syrian security forces defectors into the movement while still maintaining nonviolent discipline. It was not until the Syrian resistance movement turned violent that external actors began to provide robust support directly to the resistance. Bartkowski and Taleb highlight that “the international community lacks instruments to protect and assist nonviolent uprisings when it lasts. There is an urgent need to reinvent

the role of the international community in helping nonviolent movements.”<sup>68</sup> They argue that political and economic sanctions, the go-to option for intervention by external states and international organizations, are not enough. Instead, they propose a number of externally supported activities that could benefit nonviolent resistance movements; for example, train-the-trainer programs, planning protracted nonviolent struggles, distribution of educational materials, establishing alternative media outlets and messaging, and management and productive integration of security forces defectors.

Larry Diamond discusses international support to states transitioning towards democracy in “From People Power to Democracy Building”. He highlights three ways that external support can help close the power and resources gap between authoritarian regimes and opposition movements through activities to transfer and promote resources and skills. His ideas build on Ackerman and Merriam’s argument that the skills of the resistance are what will influence the campaign outcome. Diamond’s first form of external support is enabling access to the equipment and information civil resistance movements need to build and sustain their campaign. Second is training in what Diamond refers to as ‘liberation technology’; making effective use of the Internet and social media to build opposition infrastructure and mobilize popular support, while also using these digital platforms to protect the resistance movement from the regime. Third is using

---

<sup>68</sup> Maciej Bartkowski and Julia Taleb, “Myopia of the Syrian Struggle and Key Lessons,” in *Is Authoritarianism Staging A Comeback* ed. Maria Stephan (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015), 142.

diplomatic tools and privileges to leverage support or protection for the resistance.<sup>69</sup>

Diamond argues that external state support is most valuable when provided long-term, starting pre-conflict, and continuing through the periods of resistance and transition.

In *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan suggest that:

[N]onviolent campaigns do not necessarily benefit from material aid from outside states, though relatively small sums of money for items including cell phones, computers, radios, fax machines, T-shirts, office space, and other items that nonviolent activists use for recruitment purposes can go a long way. Nonviolent campaigns can, furthermore, benefit from sanctions, diplomatic support, and allies in international civil society, who can strengthen and diversify the [resistance movement] membership base.<sup>70</sup>

They propose some specific form of valuable external support such as enabling alternative media and technology and providing educational materials on successful nonviolent civil resistance. Chenoweth and Stephan emphasize that regardless of the form external support takes, it is most effective when support is coordinated with the activities of the resistance movement; it is not a replacement for popular participation.<sup>71</sup>

Innovation in external support is the theme of “Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset”. In it, Maria Stephan, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala argue that external actors “need to better understand the sources of social change, the actors that drive them,

---

<sup>69</sup> Larry Diamond, “From People Power to Democracy Building,” in *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* ed. Maria Stephan (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015).

<sup>70</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 223.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 225.

and whether and how external actors can help”.<sup>72</sup> This implies the importance of understanding the operational environment through an in-depth intelligence assessment. They suggest that the greatest challenge for external supporters is helping civil movements manage the risks involved in opposing the existing regime’s power, and highlight that external actors are well suited to support movement capacity building for strategic, nonviolent political action.<sup>73</sup> There are several external support tools available, including funding opposition movements, but Stephan, Lakhani, and Naviwala are clear that foreign funding is not the best method of providing support: “Money matters but is not the most important ingredient for social change efforts. Activism is critical.”<sup>74</sup> This supports Chenoweth and Stephan’s argument that there are other methods of support that are more valuable than financial and material aid. Additionally, Stephan, Lakhani, and Naviwala note that external actors working on-the-ground must have in-depth knowledge of the conflict environment, have capacity to build local support networks, and have freedom of movement in conflict zones.<sup>75</sup> A final contribution from the authors is that external support cannot be constrained by an arbitrary time-frame; rather, it must be prolonged and have surge capacity as needed.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> Maria Stephan, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala, “Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset,” (Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, February 2015), 14.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

*A Diplomats Handbook for Democracy Development Support* by Jeremy Kinsman and Kurt Bassuener comprehensively captures the contributions of diplomats in supporting democratic development around the world. They propose that lasting democratic development is achieved through nonviolent mechanisms and summarize the role of diplomats from states and international organizations in supporting those efforts through 11 case studies. They also address Mark Beissinger's one-size-fits-all concern (which is addressed later in this chapter) by recognizing "[t]here is no single model or template for democratic development. Each trajectory is different, depending on traditions and states of readiness."<sup>77</sup>

#### DOD Perspective on External Support

One of the leading advocates for the role of DOD in supporting democratic transitions and nonviolent resistance movements is Admiral Dennis Blair (Ret.), former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command and Director of National Intelligence. In "Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions", Blair argues that the relationship between an authoritarian regime and its armed forces is fragile, and the armed forces do not always protect the regime when it is challenged. He suggests a number of reasons why armed forces will support the regime against popular opposition: the regime maintains public order, security, and economic prosperity; opposition is violent and perceived to be supported by external states; ethnic allegiances; and military leadership's belief that an authoritarian regime is in the country's best interests until the

---

<sup>77</sup> Jeremy Kinsman and Kurt Bassuener, *A Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy Development Support*, 3rd ed. (Ontario, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013), 15.

country has created the institutional capacity to support a democratic system. On the other hand, Blair suggests that the military might support popular opposition against the regime when it seems to be the logical decision based on the domestic and global environment; when the regime has become corrupt and unpopular; or when individual military leaders recognize what is right for their country as part of their military service. Blair notes, “Although they can take pride in defeating armed and violent revolutionaries who kill their soldiers and kill and maim innocent citizens, it is a rare military officer who wants to go down in his country’s history as the man who gave the order to fire on citizens who were protesting peacefully.”<sup>78</sup>

Blair suggests that military leaders decide whether to support the regime or the opposition based on internal and outside influences. Internal influences encompass the interaction amongst and between groups, such as political parties, the military, the police, business leaders, and popular organizations. This interaction looks like the interaction of Helvey’s pillars of support. Outside influences over the course of a military career provide exposure to democratic systems, role of their militaries, and the relationship between the military and the people. It is these outside influences where external actors can support civil resistance movements and/or democratic ideology in general because militaries around the world are constantly in contact with each other in training and education, operations, exercises, conferences, and military engagements. Blair highlights that each of these outside influences is an opportunity for external actors to shape the

---

<sup>78</sup> Dennis Blair, “Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions,” in *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* ed. Maria Stephan (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015), 154.

perception of an authoritarian regime's military leaders to recognize the value of democratic governments and ideologies. Recognizing that the U.S. DOD has the largest military engagement program in the world, Blair argues "[w]hile there are many short-term imperatives and benefits from military engagement with other countries around the world, there is no more important long-term objective than helping them make a successful transition to democracy."<sup>79</sup>

Blair's two-volume *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions* is about the military's role in supporting and spreading democracy, and how democratic governments can overcome the unsynchronized, often limited, and reactive policies for supporting democratic development. Blair is clear that his proposal is:

not about supporting armed freedom fighters against dictatorships nor about invading authoritarian countries to establish democracy by force of arms... rather to persuade the armed forces of authoritarian governments that they should not oppose, and should even favor, peaceful transitions to democratic governments... because it is best for their countries and in the self-interest of the armed forces in which they serve.<sup>80</sup>

In addition to providing a variety of tools to enable external support, Blair preemptively addresses criticism of his approach through case studies of countries in which democratic countries have limited military engagement with the armed forces of the authoritarian regimes. Perhaps Blair's most valuable contribution in this book are his three policy proposals for increasing the effectiveness of external support towards democratic development:

---

<sup>79</sup> Blair, "Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions," 158.

<sup>80</sup> Blair, *Military Engagement*, 2-3.

[1] In the democratic countries, establish support for democratic development as a primary mission for military relations with autocratic and transitional countries. [2] Within the armed forces of democratic countries, develop detailed intelligence understandings of democratic development within both transitional and autocratic countries. [3] Establish international mechanisms within organizations such as NATO or the OSCE for the armed forces of democratic countries to coordinate activities that can support democratic change through military relations..<sup>81</sup>

Lionel Beehner, Steve Ferenzi and John Chambers explore the role of the U.S. military in supporting nonviolent civil opposition movements in “Achieving Victory Beyond Violent Warfare”. They acknowledge existing research about the efficacy of nonviolent resistance methods and suggest that within the modern international security environment there is increasing instances and opportunities for nonmilitary means of shaping conflict outcomes. Beehner, Ferenzi, and Chambers argue that “operationalizing a nonviolent action campaign is strikingly similar to executing UW operations... [in which an external actor] enables a resistance group through provision of supplies, advice and, in certain circumstances, capabilities such as direct combat support.”<sup>82</sup> On that basis, the authors propose three scenarios under which the U.S. military might provide external support to a nonviolent opposition movement; when violent military solutions are inappropriate or ineffective, when the resistance is recognized as legitimate, or when there is disunity amongst the regime’s military.

In “Nonviolent Resistance and Expanding the UW Toolkit”, Robert McBride and Thomas Doherty argue that ARSOF can support strategic nonviolent resistance movements as part of a USG strategy in great power competition. The authors define

---

<sup>81</sup> Blair, *Military Engagement*, 60.

<sup>82</sup> Lionel Beehner, Steve Ferenzi, and John Chambers, “Achieving Victory Beyond Violent Warfare,” *ARMY Magazine* (September 2018): 10-11.

strategic nonviolence and explore two examples of external support to civil opposition movements, the Polish Solidarity movement and the Serbian Otpor movement. They then highlight opportunities in Army Special Operations doctrine for supporting strategic nonviolent resistance; for example, CA human network analysis to identify opportunities for the movement to engage in nonviolent political action, and PSYOP framing methods for supporting strategic messaging, and providing equipment resourcing and technical assistance. McBride and Doherty conclude by suggesting that ARSOF support to nonviolent resistance movements can provides another option for policymakers.<sup>83</sup>

Adding to the doctrinal discussion, Jeffrey Uherka discusses how ARSOF can employ doctrinal ‘countergovernance’ to attack, and provide options to replace, adversary regimes while filling the power vacuum that results from its degradation in “UW Countergovernance: Political Warfare in Great Power Competition”. He discusses the evolution of doctrinal countergovernance, which includes ‘negative governance’ to degrade a regime’s governance capacity, and ‘competing governance’ which establishes an alternative form of governance on behalf of the population. Uherka details successful countergovernance in action through a case study of Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon to showcase how third-party state actors can weaponize political and economic

---

<sup>83</sup> Robert McBride and Thomas Dougherty, “Nonviolent Resistance and Expanding the Unconventional Warfare Toolkit,” in *SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition*, ed. Spencer B. Meredith (Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 2017).

power through support to popular movements, and concludes that U.S. ARSOF has the institutional capacity for employing countergovernance as well.<sup>84</sup>

In perhaps the first comprehensive analysis of USG STR activities, Will Irwin conducted a comparative case study of 47 cases of U.S. external support to violent and nonviolent resistance movements in *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness*. This research explores why U.S. STR has been executed in the past, and under what combination of variables (political environment, type of operation, and primary objective) they were most or least successful. Irwin's two most significant findings are, first, that STR has been least effective at overthrowing regimes and most effective for coercion, and second, that USG support to nonviolent resistance movements appears to be more likely to succeed than support to violent resistance.<sup>85</sup> Regarding the latter, he caveats that there have only been two known, overt, unclassified examples of USG support to nonviolent resistance (Solidarity and Otpor), therefore while the implication is interesting, it is not statistically conclusive. In considering SOF's role in STR, Irwin concludes that SOF must maintain its traditional role of UW but must also explore how the practice of contemporary resistance is changing and where SOF must adjust its capabilities and approach.

In a subsequent work, *How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters To SOF)*, Irwin provides an overview of major topics in the scholarly discipline of nonviolent civil

---

<sup>84</sup> Jeffrey Uherka, "UW Countergovernance: Political Warfare in Great Power Competition," in *SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition*, ed. Spencer B. Meredith (Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 2017).

<sup>85</sup> Irwin, *Support to Resistance*.

resistance; how and why civil resistance movements typically initiate, the variety of resistance tactics available to them, how regimes prevent or suppress them, and the role of external support. He relates these topics to current U.S. national security threats and opportunities, and discusses why SOF must understand, identify, and if called upon, support civil resistance. Irwin proposes that SOF is likely to be the USG force of choice for interacting with civil resistance movements due to its capacity rooted in employing indigenous popular masses, and acknowledges that “[t]he potential use of SOF in this role will be far from routine”.<sup>86</sup> He recognizes the gaps in current SOF doctrine and capabilities for interacting with nonviolent resistance movements, and argues that SOF has a role in a U.S. whole-of-government strategy that must start with improving SOF readiness to operate in and around civil resistance environments.

#### Arguments Against External Support

In 2006 Mark Beissinger conducted case studies of the ‘color revolutions’ in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan to determine if external support for democracy-promoting revolutions is advantageous or counter-productive for long-term democratic prospects. He found that, at the time of his argument, external support does not promote democratic stability post-conflict. His primary contention with advocates of external support is that it usually is provided in a one-size-fits-all package with no consideration for environmental conditions or cultural differences between regions or conflicts. Beissinger argues that the United States had entered the ‘democratic revolution business’ during the post-Cold War era leading up to the color revolutions, and if the U.S.

---

<sup>86</sup> Irwin, *How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters To SOF)*, 72.

continues to provide support to civil resistance, it risks corrupting the goals, meaning, and potential for success of civil opposition movements.<sup>87</sup> The first argument is countered by Kinsman and Bassuener who, as discussed earlier in this chapter, advocate that there is no single approach to external support. The second argument is countered by many of the external support advocates previously addressed in this chapter who highlight the importance of aligning external support goals and methods with the popular base of the resistance movement.

Jaime Jackson explores the relationship between external state support and civil resistance campaign outcomes in “The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Civil Conflict Outcomes.” In a statistical analysis of nonviolent campaigns, Jackson finds that external state support is detrimental to campaign success.<sup>88</sup> He admits that these results are based off a small-n sample due to limited availability of historic cases that meet these criteria, and therefore the results of this study are not conclusive. That said, there are three findings worth highlighting. First, states choosing to provide external support to nonviolent campaigns did so based on national interests other than interstate competition. Considering the trends in the current geo-political environment as great power interstate competition is on the rise, perhaps states’ decision-making criteria for providing external support will change as well. Second, security forces defections

---

<sup>87</sup> Mark R. Beissinger, “Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?” *Dissent* (Winter 2006): 23-24.

<sup>88</sup> Jaime Jackson, “The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Civil Conflict Outcomes,” (Research prepared for the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference 2015, 04 April 2015), accessed 19 February 2020, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a441/15e279248af6ff1c19ff586b1ce096417523.pdf>.

played an important role in determining the outcome. Third, nonviolent resistance was less likely to succeed when their regime was receiving external state support. This links to Chenoweth's discussion about the 'authoritarian playbook', and to Chenoweth and Stephan's finding that external support to the resistance must include a component that curtails external support to the regime

Stephen Zunes and Saad Eddin Ibrahim propose that external support from state sponsors can be detrimental to civil resistance campaigns in "External Actors and Nonviolent Struggles in the Middle East". They argue that a long history of colonization and occupation in the Middle East by Western states has created a societal culture of mistrust in foreign states. This mistrust has been furthered by a precedence of Western support for autocracies who supported Western economic and strategic interests, rather than the publicly advertised Western values of support for democracy development. As such, external support may be unwelcome if the opposition movement believes the support is not in its best interests or if there is risk the regime can usurp it into a propaganda campaign of foreign intervention. Despite these concerns, Zunes and Ibrahim recognize that there may be ways for states to provide support to opposition movements; such as, support for free independent media, information access, facilitating meetings, supporting free elections, and supporting training for political parties and civil organizations. Additionally, like Jackson, Chenoweth, and Stephan, they recognize that external support can manifest indirectly by withholding previously provided support to the regime and pressuring the regime and its allies.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> Stephen Zunes and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "External Actors and Nonviolent Struggles in the Middle East," in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization*,

## Summary

This chapter explored the existing scholarly literature related to ARSOF's role in supporting nonviolent civil resistance movements. The three sections of the chapter explored the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, theoretical perspectives on nonviolent resistance and special operations, and state-sponsored external support to nonviolent resistance movements.

Several common and/or important themes related to state-sponsored external support for nonviolent resistance campaigns have been exposed in this literature review. Two overarching themes are: first, external support must be aligned with, and cannot replace, local popular support and goals. Second, the importance of supporting development of nonviolent resistance skills and tools. Beneath those umbrella concepts, highlights include strengthening civil society to enable democratic development and/or transition; enabling and capacity building for strategic planning, messaging, and alternative institutions such as media; train-the-trainer programs; and engaging with security forces and managing defections. Specific to ARSOF, there are existing doctrinal capabilities with potential to contribute which are already rooted in enabling local popular action; further, the theoretical approach to planning and executing a nonviolent resistance campaign is similar to the ARSOF doctrinal approach to UW.

There has been limited scholarly exploration of the potential role of ARSOF in supporting nonviolent resistance movements. McBride and Doherty provide two examples of ARSOF doctrinal capabilities that can support nonviolent resistance

---

*and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria Stephan *Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

movements, but they fail to comprehensively link those capabilities to the cases of nonviolent resistance which they summarize in their argument. Their work provides an introductory primer into a potential ARSOF role, but does not provide breadth, depth, or a specific scope. Uherka links doctrinal ARSOF countergovernance to a case study of how Iran conducted it in support of Hezbollah. However, like McBride and Doherty, his contribution focuses on an extremely narrow piece of ARSOF doctrinal capability. The gap in existing literature is that there is no existing scholarship which addresses the full range of ARSOF doctrinal capabilities and links them to historical precedent. In the absence of historical precedence for ARSOF support to nonviolent resistance, existing literature has not yet linked ARSOF doctrinal capabilities to external support theoretical approaches. This gap in existing scholarship is the focus of this research study. Now that the topic for this research has been identified, the following chapter will discuss the research design.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

This study will utilize the qualitative methodology of case study analysis, and the research design follows the framework highlighted in ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology Visual Model’ (see figure 3). The research design begins in chapter one with the problem statement, which identifies that DOD is constrained in the options it can provide policy makers for effective STR in the current and future operational environment. The problem statement acknowledges ARSOF as the proponent for DOD STR activities, which leads to the primary research question: What can ARSOF contribute to a U.S. whole-of-government strategy to support nonviolent resistance movements? Armed with the problem statement and research question, the research continues into chapter two with a review of the relevant scholarship which identifies the gap in literature that informs the research question. Answering the research question and resolving the problem statement requires a new approach to STR which combines the traditional ARSOF UW perspective of support to violent resistance with the scholarly perspective of nonviolent resistance. These perspectives emerge and are framed in chapter two through a discussion of nonviolent resistance theory and special operations theory. The literature review identified the Serbian Otpor movement as an example of nonviolent resistance against an internal grievance-generating actor, and highlights that there may be a potential role for ARSOF in supporting nonviolent resistance movements. With this knowledge, chapter four will conduct a case study analysis of Otpor through a perspective of special operations theory to identify what role external support played in the past. Chapter four will then explore ARSOF doctrine through a perspective of

nonviolent resistance theory to identify what potential role external support might play in the future. A crosswalk analysis of the data will identify if the historical precedence of Otpor aligns with current ARSOF capabilities, and the resulting findings will provide the basis for policy, practice, and scholarship implications in chapter five.




Figure 3. Qualitative Case Study Methodology Visual Model

Source: Created by author.

As was identified in the literature review, there is no accepted single theory of special operations. However, there are valuable concepts and themes discussed throughout the literature. For the purposes of this study, the foundational concepts of special operations theory are:

1. Achieve relative superiority to mitigate the opponent's advantages.

2. SOF have unique attributes which enables them to overcome Clausewitzian friction.
3. Special operations are conducted in both peacetime and war to influence activities in, through, and from chaotic and politically sensitive environments where other instruments of national power cannot operate effectively.
4. Special operations are embraced as a capability outside the current and accepted norm, applicable to whole-of-government strategies under all environmental conditions.
5. SOF are uniquely trained to conduct and facilitate interagency operations and synchronization to maximize the interrelationship between the elements of national power.

These theoretical foundations will be applied to the case study of Otpor. Data for this case is drawn from primary and secondary sources, including firsthand accounts from resistance practitioners and supporters of the Otpor movement. The data for this case will be organized into three sections. First, a summary of the case will provide the necessary background information for frame of reference. Second, specific examples of external support activities and their effects will provide the data for crosswalk analysis. Third, specific policy considerations that influenced the provision of external support will validate if this case is suitable for this research design.

ARSOF capabilities will be explored through the foundational concepts of nonviolent resistance theory explored in chapter two:

1. Governments rely on the obedience and cooperation of their people, and withdrawal of obedience and cooperation can threaten regime survival.

2. Nonviolent resistance methods are a pragmatic, effective tool.
3. Governments exert power over the people through pillars of support, and disruption of pillars of support can weaken a regime's power over the people.
4. Strategic planning, preparation, and execution enable a resistance movement to link tactical nonviolent actions for strategic effects.
5. Nonviolent resistance relies on the widespread mobilization of the local population

These theoretical foundations will be applied to ARSOF doctrine. Data is drawn from primary sources in U.S. Army doctrine and DOD Joint doctrine. Army doctrine is examined because it is the service-specific doctrine which provides the authoritative guide to ARSOF for understanding, planning, and executing Army operations and activities. Joint doctrine is examined because SOF is employed as a joint capability, and joint doctrine provides the common framework for understanding, planning, and executing joint operations and activities. The data for this case will be organized into three sections. First, a summary of ARSOF fundamentals, activities, and considerations will provide the necessary background information for frame of reference. Second, specific examples of doctrinal capabilities to provide external support will provide the data for crosswalk analysis and assess the suitability of ARSOF as a contributor to whole-of-government STR strategies. Third, specific policy considerations that influence the manning, training, equipping, and employment of ARSOF will assess the feasibility of ARSOF contributing to whole-of-government STR strategies.

The analysis and findings of the crosswalk analysis in chapter four will result in insights to be articulated and explored in chapter five. These insights will provide a basis

for assessing whether ARSOF support to nonviolent resistance movements is viable policy option. Informed by these lessons, chapter five will provide implications to guide U.S. policy makers and ARSOF as they continue to examine options for supporting nonviolent resistance movements in the current and future operational environment. As has been noted throughout previous chapters, this research is a starting point. Chapter five will also include recommendations for future research to further advance the breadth, depth, and scope of scholarship related to ARSOF and support to nonviolent resistance.

A potential weakness in this research design is that it compares current military capabilities to a historic example in which there were none. However, this weakness is mitigated by focusing comparison on the activities and effects between the cases, rather than the organizations conducting those activities and enabling those effects. Further, utilizing both nonviolent resistance theory and special operations theory juxtaposed over their antithesis data of ARSOF traditionally violent STR and Otpor nonviolent resistance provides breadth to this study. With only two case studies, this study lacks enough depth to provide statistically significant findings. However, this is done intentionally because this study uses a novel research design exploring a relatively novel concept; it intends to provide a comprehensive starting point for future in-depth studies. The scope of this research design, explored in chapters one and two, aligns with the conditional environment in which Otpor operated. That is, a political opposition movement seeking to address an internal grievance with the recognized, domestic government. This scope translates to ARSOF doctrine through STR and UW, within which are activities to support a resistance movement against its government.

There was no human-subject research involved in the conduct of this research study, and there was no requirement for review by Institutional Review Board or the Human Protections Administrator.

## CHAPTER 4

### DATA AND ANALYSIS

Thus far this study has laid the foundations for understanding the scope of the thesis, why it is important, existing literature on the relevant subjects, and presented the intended research design which will answer the research question. This chapter will now present the data for analysis. The data is divided into four sections. First is an overview of modern Yugoslav history, Milosevic's reign, and emergence of resistance to Milosevic in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia. Second is a description of the Otpor civil resistance movement in Serbia. Third is the external support provided to resistance efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia. The final section describes ARSOF doctrinal capabilities. Collectively, this data provides a comprehensive picture of the environment and conditions throughout Milosevic's rule in the 1990s and efforts to resist his Greater Serbia policies. The data section is followed by the crosswalk analysis of the data, starting at the macro level of all resistance efforts across Greater Serbia, and then narrowing specifically to the Otpor civil resistance movement.

#### Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Slobodan Milosevic

Within the discipline of nonviolent resistance there is a scholarly debate over the relative importance of environmental conditions and skills of the resistance in determining the outcome of nonviolent resistance campaigns.<sup>90</sup> Without taking a side in

---

<sup>90</sup> Peter Ackerman, "Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?" (Presentation, Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 15-18 March 2007), accessed 19 February 2020, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/skills.pdf>.

that debate, this section will present both the conditions and skills related to Serbian nonviolent resistance movement Otpor in its campaign to remove Slobodan Milosevic from the presidency of Yugoslavia. This section will begin with background information on the political, social, and economic situation in Yugoslavia under which Slobodan Milosevic rose to power, and popular attempts to resist his policies prior to the emergence of Otpor. This will be followed by an overview of the Otpor movement, its goals, and activities throughout its resistance campaign. The final portion of this section will be a discussion of the external support received by Otpor. Collectively, this section will provide a summary of the major events which influenced the emergence of Otpor and their activities, which ultimately resulted in the abdication of Milosevic on 06 October 2000.

### Background Information

During World War II, the Yugoslav guerrilla group Partisans received support from the British Special Operations Executive and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Under the communist leadership of Josip Broz Tito, the Partisans' goal was the expulsion of German and Italian occupying forces, and establishment of a Marxist-Leninist government. In late 1944, the Soviet Red Army arrived in Yugoslavia and aided Tito in the liberation of Belgrade, its capital city.<sup>91</sup>

Emerging from World War II, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established as a federation which included the six equal republics of Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Within Serbia,

---

<sup>91</sup> Irwin, *Support to Resistance*, 36-39.

the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomy in deference to the interests of their ethnic populations. Yugoslavia was formed as a federal state with centralized politics and economics controlled by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In the following decades, constitutional reforms would alter the structure of the Yugoslav political system, shifting power from the federal government to the republics and their municipalities. The Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, which included the president, republic and provincial representatives, and administrative representatives, fulfilled the functions of the executive functions of government, and in 1974, Tito was vested for life as the Yugoslav president. However, his death in 1980 led to a period of instability as the presidency was rotated amongst the representatives of the republics.<sup>92</sup>

The economy of Yugoslavia focused on industrialization following World War II, and in the following decades, Yugoslavia had developed a system of workers' self-management, through which work organizations were governed by workers' councils with elected boards to run their specific work enterprise. This system enabled economic growth through the 1950s and 1960s, but economic development slowed and by the 1980s Yugoslavia suffered from widespread inflation, unemployment, and low productivity. Previously, these issues had been resolved through foreign borrowing, but in 1983 the International Monetary Fund refused to provide further support until Yugoslavia restructured its economic system. During the period following Tito's death when there was political disunity between the republics over who and how the federal

---

<sup>92</sup> John R. Lampe and John B. Allcock, "Yugoslavia: Former Federated Nation [1929-2003]," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003>.

government should run, there was also disunity between the republics over how to implement economic reforms throughout the federation.<sup>93</sup>

In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, followed the next year by Macedonia and Bosnia. In 1992, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro formed a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in which the federal president was elected by a legislative assembly. Some social and economic matters would be run at the republic levels, which each had their own government and constitution, but defense, security, foreign policy, money and market systems, civil rights, and communications would be run by the federal government. This system of governance would remain in place through the end of the twentieth century.<sup>94</sup>

#### Milosevic's Rise to Power

Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power began in 1984 when he became leader of the Belgrade communist party. He established a new political style in Serbia that appealed to the people's nationalist ideology, advocating for an ethnic 'Greater Serbia' across the Yugoslav republics; his popularity resulted in his election in 1986 as head of the Serbian communist Party, the League of Communists of Serbia. Milosevic used his influence as leader of Serbia's political party to influence the Yugoslav government to remove the autonomy of the Serbian provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo, and during a period when the federal government was trying to establish economic reform, he presented himself as a

---

<sup>93</sup> Lampe and Allcock, "Yugoslavia."

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

defender of the socialist state and of Serbian nationality.<sup>95</sup> In 1987, the Serbian president sent Milosevic to Kosovo to calm the ethnic unrest rising between the ethnic Serbians and ethnic Albanians in the province, whose historical importance to the Serbian people was added to by its valuable natural resources. Rather than reducing the ethnic tensions, Milosevic encouraged the Serbian Kosovars to rise up and fight for land that he argued was rightfully theirs.<sup>96</sup> This message tied into a broader understanding of the disparity felt by ethnic Serbians throughout Yugoslavia, and Milosevic encouraged a Serbian ethnic revolution to restore Serbia's position of strength in the federation.<sup>97</sup> Using his party and political influence, Milosevic installed his supporters as leaders in the Vojvodina and Kosovo political parties and continued to spread his influence throughout Serbia, resulting in 1989 with the Serbian assembly removing the president of Serbia and installing Milosevic in his stead.<sup>98</sup>

As president of Serbia, Milosevic aimed to consolidate Serbian power by utilizing the Serbian diaspora throughout Yugoslavia to strengthen the federation and counter the weakening union of republics. Resistance to Serbian communist policies throughout the

---

<sup>95</sup> John B. Allcock, "Slobodan Milosevic: President of Yugoslavia," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Slobodan-Milosevic>.

<sup>96</sup> Jerrold M. Post, *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 181.

<sup>97</sup> Vjeran Pavlakovic, "Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After," in *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramat and Vjeran Pavlakovic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 13.

<sup>98</sup> Allcock, "Slobodan Milosevic."

federation led to the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the federal party, into separate parties for each republic. With communist political power weakened, noncommunist parties won elections in Croatia and Slovenia. Milosevic rebranded the League of Communists of Serbia as the new Socialist Party of Serbia, and at the end of 1990 he was again chosen to lead this new socialist party. When the other republics began to secede from Yugoslavia, Milosevic supported ethnic Serbian oppositionist in each of the republics to maintain a united federation and support his ideas of Greater Serbia. Violence would start with civil war in Slovenia, shortly followed by Croatia. Conflict would be the worst in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where for three years Milosevic-supported Bosnian Serbs waged civil war in opposition of to the republic's move towards independence. In 1995 in a move that highlighted the anti-Serb sentiment throughout Yugoslavia, Croatia forcibly removed the Serbian population from its historic communities in Croatia. Not only was Serbia losing social and political support, but its economy continued to suffer. Combined with the effects of the failing economic systems of the 1980s, the United Nations and the United States had instituted arms embargos and economic constraints in 1991 which were escalated into trade sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1992, and the cumulative result was a suffering Serbian economy. Facing failing systems and losing support, Milosevic signed a peace accord in 1995 on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs to end the fighting in Bosnia, and in exchange the UN sanctions were lifted.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Allcock, "Slobodan Milosevic."

## Popular Resistance Emerges

Popular resistance to Milosevic began in Belgrade in March 1991 when tens of thousands of Serbians joined a protest organized by the Serbian Movement for Renewal, the main Serbian political party in opposition to Milosevic's socialist party. The Serbian Movement for Renewal was protesting the state-run television which they claimed had given favorable coverage to Milosevic and his party.<sup>100</sup> Over the course of four days of protests, violence by activists was met by police and army repression. The final day of protest was nonviolent, and was represented by almost 100,000 people in Belgrade, after which Milosevic agreed to concessions that included firing staff at the state-run television and creating new laws to regulate state media.<sup>101</sup> At the end of the protests, political opposition leader Vuk Draskovic gave a speech to the crowd in which he not only highlighted the illegitimacy of Milosevic and his socialist party, but also highlighted that violence must not be the solution: "Serbia will never be the same after March 9... Never again must a Serb raise his hand on another Serb in violence."<sup>102</sup>

In 1992, students from Belgrade University initiated anti-Milosevic protests after new legislation was passed which decreased the autonomy of universities in Serbia. Students saw this legislation as further representation of the illegitimate socialist

---

<sup>100</sup> Stephen Engelberg, "Police Storm Protest in Belgrade; 2 Dead," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1991, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/10/world/police-storm-protest-in-belgrade-2-dead.html>.

<sup>101</sup> Blaine Harden, "Yugoslav regime Bows to Protesters," *The Washington Post*, 13 March 1991, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/03/13/yugoslav-regime-bows-to-protesters/fdd1ab04-2342-4502-b97a-e12a056bf894/>.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

government of Milosevic, and they demanded the disbanding of the Serbian National Assembly and the government of the Republic of Serbia, and the resignation of Milosevic. Students viewed all three parties responsible for Serbia's desperate social, political, and economic conditions, and they established their civil resistance based on nonviolent principals and deliberately separated their efforts from that of existing political opposition groups..<sup>103</sup> However, student activism was relatively short-lived and concluded at the end of the end of the school year.

Four years later, popular resistance to Milosevic would appear again. In the Serbian municipal elections of November 1996, a coalition of five opposition parties called Zajedno ('Together') won elections in 40 cities across Serbia, including Belgrade. But the results of the elections were not recognized by the local election committees, which Milosevic had instilled with his supporters. Zajedno and its supporters flooded the streets of Belgrade in protest to demand the electoral committees recognize the true election results..<sup>104</sup> In keeping with Draskovic's message of nonviolence five years prior, opposition leaders emphasized their support for peaceful protests as the mechanism for

---

<sup>103</sup> Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Quest of 'Another Serbia'," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 11, no 1 & 2 (1993): 128, accessed 14 April 2020, [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-z6rBu-joAhUJOq0KHa7ECggQFjABegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fscholarworks.iu.edu%2Fjournals%2Findex.php%2Faeer%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F596%2F698%2F&usg=AOvVaw2z\\_jKweHLSB1xZ-AePIfma](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-z6rBu-joAhUJOq0KHa7ECggQFjABegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fscholarworks.iu.edu%2Fjournals%2Findex.php%2Faeer%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F596%2F698%2F&usg=AOvVaw2z_jKweHLSB1xZ-AePIfma).

<sup>104</sup> Joshua Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," in *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*, ed. Gene Sharp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11.

change.<sup>105</sup> Included in the mass of protesters were university students such as Srdja Popovic, who would later be one of the founders of Otpor.<sup>106</sup> In addition to supporting Zajedno's demand's for recognition of election results, students revitalized their earlier grievance against the regime of restricting university autonomy. Milosevic responded to the combined protests by shutting down independent media to reduce the challenges to his regime's legitimacy. Protests continued into early 1997 until the regime announced that it would recognize the election results, and Zajedno elected officials assumed their duties in municipalities across Serbia. This ended the Zajedno protests, however, student grievances had not yet been addressed. Students continued to protest for an additional 51 days until 'illegitimate' senior university officials conceded and resigned.<sup>107</sup> The 1996-1997 protests highlighted that nonviolent civil resistance in Serbia could work, yet it also exposed the divide within civil society between existing political opposition groups and others in civil society who's objectives spread beyond political power and influence to broader concerns of regime illegitimacy and need for societal change. These ideological differences would set the stage for the coming emergence of Otpor.

---

<sup>105</sup> John Pomfret, "Belgrade Paralyzed by Massive Protest," *The Washington Post*, 26 November 1996, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/11/26/belgrade-paralyzed-by-massive-protest/b94efe36-2902-46ae-9228-12ee7a9e21a8/>.

<sup>106</sup> CNN, "Students protest on streets of Belgrade," 29 November 1996, accessed 14 April 2020, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9611/29/yugo.students/index.html>.

<sup>107</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 11-12.

### Milosevic Consolidates 'Legitimate' Federal Power

In 1997, Milosevic's second term as Serbian president concluded, and he was constitutionally barred from serving a third term. Drawing on his extensive influence and network of supporters across Yugoslavia, Milosevic was elected by the national assembly as president of Yugoslavia. This new position provided Milosevic access to a federal platform from which to spread and increase his repressive policies, censorship, and ethnic disparity across Yugoslavia using the full resources of the federal government. Against this backdrop of extended influence, Milosevic continued his rhetoric of Serbian destiny in Kosovo, and throughout 1997, Serbian Kosovars challenged the political reign of the Albanian Kosovar Democratic League of Kosovo, which had been the leading political party in Kosovo since 1989.<sup>108</sup> Civil unrest in Kosovo escalated into 1998 with violent encounters increasing between ethnic Serbian police and militias supported by Milosevic and the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army which had been building its strength, size, and fighting capability since 1993. In April 1998, Milosevic 'legitimized' his ethnic suppression in Kosovo through a vote to keep foreign intervention out of the Kosovo conflict, which was publicized as a Yugoslav internal security conflict.<sup>109</sup> This discussion of the Kosovo conflict will continue later in this section because while it did not end in

---

<sup>108</sup> Frances Trix, "Kosovar Albanians Between a Rock and a Hard Place," in *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After*, eds. Sabrina P. Ramat and Vjerran Pavlakovic (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2005), 315-316.

<sup>109</sup> John K. Cox, *The History of Serbia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 167.

Milosevic's removal from power, the events and outcome of the conflict would influence the population's perception of Milosevic and strengthen his base of popular support.

### Summary

Thus far this section has discussed the political, social, and economic events which shaped Yugoslavia following World War II. It emphasized the instability which emerged in the 1980s and remained prevalent throughout the 1990s. Also highlighted was Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power within the Republic of Serbia and his consolidation of power throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s; all against the backdrop of continued political, social, and economic depravity within the population. These grievances were acted upon numerous times by the Serbian people in attempts to gain concessions from Milosevic's regime. While popular victories were achieved in 1991 and again in 1997, their results were short-term and had limited impact on the environment in which the Serbian population had to live. To create long-term change in Serbian society that would endure into the twenty first century, a new approach to popular resistance was needed. What follows is the story of the Otpor resistance movement, which mobilized the Serbian population and political opposition to unite in strategic nonviolent resistance.

### Civil Resistance and Otpor

#### Origins and Early Resistance

At the end of 1997, veterans of the student protests recognized that their efforts earlier that year had not produced lasting results. Instead, Milosevic had consolidated power and influence, and was increasing his repressive policies and rhetoric. A number

of these student veterans came together and began to analyze their earlier resistance efforts. Over a series of meetings and discussions, they identified shortcomings in their earlier attempts, and a year later these gaps would become their strategic focus.<sup>110</sup>

On 10 October 1998, these students formed the resistance movement Otpor, meaning “Resistance” in Serbian,<sup>111</sup> and they had three major demands: free and fair elections, free universities, and free press.<sup>112</sup> They recognized that elections were the best mechanism for transfer of power while reducing the risk of violence, and that election fraud and meddling would prevent that outcome. Regarding the media, the 1998 Law of Public Information had given the regime greater control over the press, and specifically targeted anti-Milosevic media outlets. Their last demand was in line with their enduring student grievance throughout the 1990s. Further, Milosevic had instituted the 1998 Law on Universities to remove universities’ autonomy and require state appointed university leadership.<sup>113</sup> As the movement progressed, members began to recognize that a piecemeal approach through policy reform would not work; they needed a single primary objective. Thus, Otpor shifted its focus from policy change to removing Milosevic from office.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Olena Nikolayenko, “Origins of the movement’s strategy: The case of the Serbian youth movement Otpor,” *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 2 (March 2013), 149-150.

<sup>111</sup> Paulson, “Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000,” 12.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.; Nikolayenko, “Origins of the movement’s strategy,” 145.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 145-146.

<sup>114</sup> Lester R. Kurtz, “Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000),” (Summary Report, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington, DC,

Despite the country's lineage of resistance back to Tito's guerrilla fighters in WWII, Otpor recognized that methods of violent resistance would simply play to Milosevic's strengths.<sup>115</sup> As Srdja Popovic described it, "we have a long history of guerrilla movements winning the power in this country. [But] when I say guerrilla I don't think about violence."<sup>116</sup> Otpor's organizers made a deliberate choice to maintain nonviolence throughout its campaign because it would reduce the risk of violent repression, appeal to a larger portion of the population that had already suffered through a decade of violence, and it would enhance Otpor's legitimacy in the international community.

Two months after officially organizing, Otpor conducted its first large-scale tactical action; a nonviolent march from Belgrade to Novi Sad with the goal of raising movement awareness in the Serbian province Vojvodina. Activism continued with a variety of nonviolent tactics such as printing and distributing leaflets, additional marches, sit-ins, graffiti, street theater, and others which targeted the legitimacy of Milosevic's authority and sought to shift pillars of support away from the regime. As would be

---

February 2010), 2, accessed 25 March 2019, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/otpor-struggle-democracy-serbia-1998-2000/>; Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 12.

<sup>115</sup> Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 November 2000, accessed 25 February 2020, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001126mag-serbia.html>.

<sup>116</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*, produced and directed by Steve York, a production of York Zimmerman Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington, D.C. 2002, documentary film, 55:42, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/bringing-dictator-english/>.

expected, this increase in resistance activity resulted in regime repression and arrests of Otpor activists.<sup>117</sup>

### The Kosovo Conflict

At the same time as Otpor was beginning to organize and conduct initial small-scale civil resistance, Milosevic's ethnic war in Kosovo escalated. After a series of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacks against police stations in Kosovo, the United States special envoy for Kosovo announced that the KLA was "without any questions, a terrorist group."<sup>118</sup> While this was not an official position of the USG, one might speculate that it provided Milosevic the perceived legitimacy to escalate his violent repression in Kosovo. In March of 1998, Serbian police killed a suspected leader of the KLA, his entire family, and his neighbors; in total 83 deaths that included woman and children.<sup>119</sup> This unnecessary action increased support for the KLA's violent opposition, and two months later Milosevic began a military offensive in western Kosovo. After a series of diplomatic attempts by the United States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe failed to stem the ethnic violence and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovar civilians, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization initiated an aerial bombing campaign that would last from March through June of 1999. NATO's

---

<sup>117</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 13-14.

<sup>118</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, "The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties? From 'Terrorists' to 'Partners'," (Report by the Republican Policy Committee, 31 March 1999), accessed 16 April 2020, <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/fr033199.htm>.

<sup>119</sup> Trix, "Kosovar Albanians Between A Rock and a Hard Place," 332.

objective was degradation of Yugoslav military capabilities to stop the ethnic cleansing.<sup>120</sup> NATO strikes destroyed civil infrastructure across Yugoslavia as part of its military campaign, and while Milosevic capitulated in the end, damage from the campaign devastated the Serbian economy and quality of life. This aggravated Serbian popular grievances against NATO and united domestic support for the Milosevic regime.<sup>121</sup>

### Operational Approach

Recognizing growing popular support for Milosevic, Otpor organizers reduced their resistance signature during the NATO intervention. But when the conflict ended in June 1999 with the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo, “Otpor reappeared, deploying a series of irreverent stunts that capitalized on public dissatisfaction and mocked Milosevic’s pretensions of being a conquering hero despite having suffered an obvious defeat.”<sup>122</sup> The movement’s focus on humorous pranks had a two-fold purpose. First, it reduced the risk of excessive repression by implying that it was harmless, and second, it intended to have a cumulative effect against regime legitimacy. According to Popovic, the humorous approach to resistance was all part of Otpor’s plan: “Everything we did must have a dosage of humor, because I am joking, you are becoming angry. You are always showing one face, and I am always showing a positive

---

<sup>120</sup> Irwin, *Support to Resistance*, 156.

<sup>121</sup> Cox, *The History of Serbia*, 168.

<sup>122</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler, *This Is An Uprising* (New York: Nation Books, 2016), 67.

face with another message to divide your audience, and that's how we collected the third-party, because that is what's important, the publicity, the people on the ground.”<sup>123</sup>

What set Otpor apart from previous resistance efforts was its strategic approach. The movement developed a strategy built on five lines of effort, and then conducted daily tactical action to make progress along each of these efforts.

1. Use elections for mass mobilization of the population.
2. Focus efforts on the removal of Milosevic from office.
3. Build a broad popular support.
4. Create a culture of resistance.
5. Unify opposition political parties and develop influential alliances.<sup>124</sup>

Activists worked towards two decisive points as part of their campaign. The first was to target the regime's pillars of support in Belgrade. Special emphasis was put into effecting security forces defections. The second was to expand and unite opposition outside of Belgrade, in smaller municipalities and rural areas where Milosevic had limited influence, into a nation-wide effort of overwhelming numbers.<sup>125</sup> This was critical to achieving the majority of votes that would be necessary to win federal elections.

The movement's widespread use of advertising, such as graffiti, stickers, T-shirts, pamphlets, and others, was the hallmark of a deliberate marketing campaign that aimed to

---

<sup>123</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*.

<sup>124</sup> Nikolayenko, “Origins of the movement's strategy,” 149.

<sup>125</sup> Kurtz, “Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000),” 4.

create a culture of resistance in Serbian society. According to Ivan Marovic of Otpor's press department, the goal was to promote a new lifestyle so that people would live resistance, rather than simply support it.<sup>126</sup> This marketing campaign was aided by alliances with media outlets and independent journalists. The aim was to get Otpor front-page coverage every day to spread and maintain public awareness of the movement.

The organizational structure developed by Otpor enabled proactive tactical action and removed the hierarchical constraints of an official leadership structure. Over 130 autonomous cells were established across Serbia, with synchronization and support emanating from a main office in Belgrade. As one of member from the main office described it, "We didn't have a system of hierarchy in Otpor. We told Otpor activists that in each city they had their own Milosevic, head of the Socialist Part or the mayor, or somebody else. That person should be a target too. But each cell had a total autonomy... In other organizations, everything needs to be controlled. In Otpor, it didn't happen that way. We in Belgrade didn't try to control activities in other cities."<sup>127</sup> Instead, the main office in Belgrade served as a support hub for the movement. It was organized into six functional teams to maximize country-wide support while reducing risk from regime repression, all while encouraging tactical innovation in its autonomous members and cells. The action cell coordinated country-wide logistical support and rapid reaction to arrests. Human resources covered recruitment and training. Marketing encouraged a culture of resistance. Networking built internal and external relationships. The press cell

---

<sup>126</sup> Nikolayenko, "Origins of the movement's strategy," 147.

<sup>127</sup> Nikolayenko, "Origins of the movement's strategy," 152.

was responsible for public relations. In keeping with Otpor's grassroots student origins, a university cell was the primary pathway to students at universities across Serbia.<sup>128</sup>

As part of its strategic plan for ousting Milosevic, Otpor organizers chose to remain politically nonpartisan because they thought it would limit their ability to attract nationwide support. Otpor did not care who would replace Milosevic, and instead focused on uniting the opposition movements; "We knew that defeating Milosevic and securing free and fair elections was something we could all agree on... [s]o we agreed to put our differences aside until Milosevic was gone."<sup>129</sup>

### Unifying the Opposition

In the summer and fall of 1999 Otpor activists staged a series of protest events, progressively gaining wider participation and support. On 13 January 2000, Otpor hosted a rock concert for the public in celebration of the Orthodox New Year, using the event to launch a new resistance slogan "This is THE year".<sup>130</sup> The next month the Socialist Party of Serbia held a congress to re-elect Milosevic leader of the political party. In line with its humorous approach to resistance, Otpor held a satirical parody with its own 'First Otpor Congress'. Although the inspiration for this meeting was to mock the regime, it served an important purpose. Representatives from political opposition parties, NGOs, independent

---

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>129</sup> Engler and Engler, *This Is An Uprising*, 70.

<sup>130</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*; Duda Nenad Petrovic, "Chronology of Events – A Brief History of Otpor" (Summary report, Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, Belgrade, Serbia), accessed 16 April 2020, <https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Chronology-OTPOR.pdf>.

media, and local Otpor branches from across the country all attended, and this was a critical first step towards unifying the opposition.<sup>131</sup>

Growing popular support for the student movement meant the opposition political parties could not afford to maintain their distance, yet Otpor continued to remain nonpartisan. Under these circumstances, numerous opposition parties began to loosely unite in a political coalition called the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Otpor continued to maintain widespread popular support and offered to back any electoral candidate that would have unified DOS support. The movement offered a ‘carrot’ of votes from hundreds of thousands of Otpor members. However, Otpor also threatened to use its ‘stick’ and exert its influence against any opposition leader who betrayed the unity of the coalition.<sup>132</sup>

In May 2000, the regime declared Otpor a terrorist organization: “Anyone who tries to present Otpor as a student organization, and a political party is mistaken. Otpor is a neo-fascist organization, in the tradition of the Red Brigades, and this state will use the same means used by other states, when presented with terrorism of such proportions.”<sup>133</sup> Over the following months, Milosevic increased repressive measures against the opposition including wide-spread arrests, raiding the Otpor Belgrade headquarters, confiscating communications equipment, and shutting down independent media stations. Otpor had predicted the regime might employ such measures and had been proactively

---

<sup>131</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*; Petrovic, “Chronology of Events – A Brief History of Otpor.”

<sup>132</sup> Engler and Engler, *This Is An Uprising*, 77.

<sup>133</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*.

planning and preparing mitigation measures to counter, and use to its advantage, each episode of repression. But despite these preparations, there was still real risk to Otpor's unofficial leaders who acknowledged that they were almost forced into hiding underground..<sup>134</sup>

### Milosevic's Final Ploy

By mid-summer, Milosevic recognized that his consolidation on power was waning. Not only was he losing popular support, but he was also about to start his final year in office as president. Under the Yugoslav constitution, the president was restricted to a single four-year term, and was elected by members of the federal parliament. The federal parliament was elected by members of the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro. Milosevic had previously secured his presidency through the votes of his socialist supporters in all three parliaments, but by 2000 the government of Montenegro was beginning to break-away from Milosevic. On 6 July 2000, the Yugoslav Parliament passed a constitutional change that would give Milosevic an opportunity to retain his 'legitimate' power. Under the change, the president may serve two four-year terms, and elections would be by popular vote instead of parliamentary vote. The expectation was that Milosevic would win by popular election because, according to polls, he was still a more popular candidate than any of the opposition leaders..<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 18.

<sup>135</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Change in Yugoslav Constitution Allows Milosevic to Seek Another Term as President," *The New York Times*, 7 July 2000, accessed 16 April 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/07/world/change-yugoslav-constitution-allows-milosevic-seek-another-term-president.html>.

Armed with the legislative support of the new constitution, on 27 July 2000 Milosevic called for presidential elections to be held on 24 September 2000. His plan was to take advantage of the divided opposition and secure the popular vote 10 months prior to the end of his term of office, rather than risk Otpor's growing popularity and its progressive efforts to unite the opposition. An Otpor supporter within the regime had alerted the movement two weeks earlier that Milosevic would call for early elections, so when the announcement was made, Otpor was already prepared with an anti-Milosevic marketing campaign.<sup>136</sup> But what was still needed was an opposition candidate to support.

Just weeks before the election, DOS finally announced its unified support for Vojislav Kostunica as the opposition candidate. Kostunica was recognized as a nationalist, which would be critical to gaining the ethnic minority vote. He was also known for his anti-American rhetoric, which would help undermine any attempts by Milosevic to brand him a traitor. DOS, Otpor, NGOs, and others all campaigned simultaneously, but dispersed, on behalf of Kostunica. This ensured that Milosevic could not shut down the opposition effort. In preparation for election day, the Serbian Center for Free Elections and Democracy organized training for poll observers to be able to identify and prevent voting fraud. Otpor even looked beyond election day and began preparing resistance action for when the regime would inevitably refuse to accept the popular vote.<sup>137</sup>

---

<sup>136</sup> Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?"

<sup>137</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*.

## The Power of Mass Mobilization

On September 24, a record number of the Yugoslav population cast their vote for the election, a testament to Otpor's widespread campaign to build mass popular support. Early counts, supervised by the trained poll observers, indicated that Kostunica had achieved the majority of votes needed for victory. But Milosevic refused to acknowledge the results, and two days later the Federal Election Commission claimed that while Kostunica had more votes than Milosevic, he did not have the required number for a victory, and a runoff election would need to be held on October 8 to determine the election outcome. The opposition knew that this was a fraudulent regime attempt to undermine the legitimate electoral process. Kostunica announced that "the victory is obvious, and we will defend it by all nonviolent means."<sup>138</sup> The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church encouraged "everyone, including the army and the police, to defend the interests of the people and the state rather than [Milosevic]."<sup>139</sup> But for Otpor, this was exactly the regime reaction they had expected and been preparing for. Popovic told Otpor activists: "Now you will face the greatest task of your lives. You must lead the protests. You are trained to do this. You have networks at the universities. This protest is yours! It is now up to you."<sup>140</sup>

The next day two hundred thousand protesters gathered in Belgrade to support Kostunica, and tens of thousands more held similar protests across the country. To

---

<sup>138</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 21.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> *Bringing Down a Dictator*.

protect the people, Kostunica solicited compliance from Milosevic's key pillar of support, the security forces: "Our message to the army and the police is that we are one. The army and the police are part of the people; they exist to protect the people, not one man and his family."<sup>141</sup> Protests, strikes, and civil disobedience erupted across the country. Of significance was the participation of workers and unions that controlled Serbian industry, who had not participated in the earlier opposition efforts of 1996-1997.

### Pillars of Support Fall

On October 5, a large-scale coordinated rally was planned in Belgrade for opposition from across the country to come together in front of the federal parliament building. Towns across Yugoslavia emptied as their populations make massive convoys into Belgrade. Activists had planned to encounter regime blockades on the routes into the city and used bulldozers to break through and continue their marches. Opposition leaders had pre-coordinated with security forces in Belgrade to plead for them to ignore Milosevic's orders to use violence against their own people. By afternoon, protestors had taken over the parliament building and state-run television station. The central police station surrendered to the growing crowd. Army forces remained in their barracks. Independent radio and television stations were re-occupied and began broadcasting in support of the opposition. The two pillars of support which Milosevic relied on most heavily were no longer under his control.

The next day, the Russian foreign minister met with Milosevic and Kostunica, and encouraged Milosevic to step down. Shortly after, the Constitutional Court recognized

---

<sup>141</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 22.

Kostunica as the legitimate winner of the election. Separated from his sources of power, and without any means to continue battling the legitimate results of the election, Slobodan Milosevic resigned from the presidency of Yugoslavia on 6 October 2000. The following day Kostunica was sworn in as president, and two months later, DOS won the majority of seats in the federal parliament.

### Conclusion

Otpor's goal of removing Milosevic from power had been achieved using a campaign of nonviolent civil resistance, but their work was not yet complete. Their long-term goals remained policy changes that would enable Serbia to rebuild and grow. In the eyes of Otpor leaders, there remained the risk that the newly elected DOS officials might fall back onto the old political trends of consolidating personal power. Otpor assumed a new identity as a political watchdog, but as Serbian quality of life improved and Otpor continued to remain politically unaligned, the movement's membership, influence, and necessity progressively decreased until it officially ended in 2004.

### External Support

#### Introduction

The previous two sections have presented Slobodan Milosevic's reign in Serbia and Yugoslavia as a period of civil depravity, ethnic despair, and popular division. As leader of the Serbian Communist Party, and subsequently renamed Socialist Party of Serbia, Milosevic gained influence and power through an agenda of Serbian ethnic nationalism and unity across the federation. As president of Serbia, he supported ethnic-Serbian civil wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina while consolidating his

domestic power through authoritarian policies and repression against his own Serbian population. Finally, as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Milosevic continued to implement authoritarian policies against the will of a growing popular opposition, while escalating ethnic violence and repression in Kosovo.

Throughout this period, external actors have played a variety of roles in attempts to counter Milosevic's influence, activities, and aspirations. This section will explore the role of external actors (i.e. states, NGOs, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and individuals) in resistance against the Milosevic regime and its proxies. Three areas of external action will be studied: the conflict in Bosnia from 1992-1995, the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, and the ongoing domestic popular resistance in Serbia from 1991-2000. This study is focused on USG policy and ARSOF options, therefore this section is primarily concerned with external actors related to that scope.

### Bosnia

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was arguably the first major geopolitical event in Europe after the end of the Cold War. In 1993, USG experts on Serbia from CIA, Department of State, DOD, and the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that 'Greater Serbia' would likely be disruptive to Europe; consolidating power in Belgrade, use force beyond its borders, and engage in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.<sup>142</sup> Prior to 1995, intervention in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina was

---

<sup>142</sup> U.S. Director of Intelligence, Office of European Analysis, "Greater Serbia A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s" (Intelligence Memorandum, 27 January 1993), Clinton Digital Library, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12301>.

led by a coalition of European nations with the United States taking a limited role. During that period there was ongoing debate within the USG over whether to violate the UN arms embargo and covertly provide the Bosnian Muslims with the equipment they might need to defend against Serb attacks.<sup>143</sup> Yet while it appears the official USG decision was no, there are still rumors that the CIA funded, supplied, and trained Bosnian forces.<sup>144</sup> But in the summer of 1995, the USG recognized the need to increase its involvement in resolving the conflict. As Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the United Nations, described it: “Although we may have been correct to limit our role in the past – on the grounds that the former Yugoslavia was primarily a European responsibility – the circumstances and our interests have now changed. Our interest in resolving this conflict has broadened.”<sup>145</sup> Albright was concerned that United States leadership and influence was being challenged in the UN. Combined with other factors, such as the recent ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica and the perception by the Clinton administration that a new strategy was needed, the United States assumed a leading role in resolving the

---

<sup>143</sup> John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 607-610.

<sup>144</sup> Athan Theoharis, Richard Immerman, Loch Johnson, Kathryn Olmsted, and John Prados, eds., *The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 65.

<sup>145</sup> Madeleine Albright, “Memorandum for the National Security Advisor,” (Memorandum to Anthony Lake, 03 August 1995), National Security Council, European Affairs, and Alexander Vershbow, “Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2],” Clinton Digital Library, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/72147>.

Bosnian conflict in summer of 1995.<sup>146</sup> After a limited NATO bombing campaign, negotiations to end economic sanctions, and concessions between the governments of Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Serbia, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed at the end of 1995, bringing an end to the ethnic violence. Slobodan Milosevic signed the peace agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, yet he had his own priorities in the peace process; lifting the sanctions which had devastated the Serbian economy for the previous three years. The UN arms embargo was lifted, but the USG ‘outer wall’ of sanctions (which restricted Yugoslav access to international financial institutions and full participation in international organizations) remained in place, “tied to cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal and progress toward a broader regional settlement, including restoration of autonomy to Kosovo.”<sup>147</sup> One could argue that Milosevic’s seat at the table added legitimacy to his regime as he was now a regional power broker alongside major powers such as the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany. As part of the peace agreement, the United States committed 20,000 ground troops to the post-conflict NATO Implementation Force, including use of SOFs in the key role of liaison between NATO and non-NATO nation.<sup>148</sup> The United States would continue to have varying

---

<sup>146</sup> Ivo H. Daadler, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 01 December 1998), accessed 17 April 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/>.

<sup>147</sup> National Security Council, “Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,” (Summary report, Washington, DC, May 19, 1995), Clinton Digital Library, accessed 17 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12464>.

<sup>148</sup> William J. Perry, “Briefing on NATO Implementation Force,” (Presentation, Department of Defense), Office of Communications and Don Baer, “Bosnia 2,” Clinton

numbers of troops in Bosnia until the European Union assumed responsibility for the Bosnia mission in 2004.<sup>149</sup> The USG intelligence community also expanded its support in Bosnia post-conflict. An interagency National Military Intelligence Support Team supported ongoing intelligence requirements in Bosnia with representatives from CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service, National Security Agency, and others.<sup>150</sup>

### Kosovo

Milosevic's vision of Greater Serbia in Kosovo was discussed earlier in this chapter, starting in the 1980s and culminating in 1999 with his campaign of ethnic cleaning. As the republics of Yugoslavia were pursuing independence during Milosevic's first term as Serbian president, ethnic oppression was also occurring in Kosovo: "1.7 million Albanian Kosovars were denied education, health care, and access to jobs... [In response,] they boycotted Serbian elections, refused to pay taxes to the Serbs, and set up an underground "parallel" government of their own, in hopes of gaining international support."<sup>151</sup> However, international support was busy with the violent civil war in Bosnia. Further, Kosovo was legally a province of Serbia, and the international

---

Digital Library, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/34706>.

<sup>149</sup> R. Cody Phillips, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995-2004," Center for Military History, United States Army, accessed 17 April 2020, [https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-97-1/cmhPub\\_70-97-1.pdf](https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-97-1/cmhPub_70-97-1.pdf).

<sup>150</sup> Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, 616.

<sup>151</sup> Cox, *The History of Serbia*, 164-165.

community was trying to leverage Milosevic to end the active civil war in the Bosnian regions of Greater Serbia. There was no mention of Kosovo in the Dayton Accords agreement. However, the USG outer wall of sanctions remained in place and diplomatic negotiations towards a settlement over Kosovo's political status continued between Milosevic regime and USG. In 1996 a wave of ethnic violence began in Kosovo, and it would continue to escalate for the next three years. In 1997, Kosovar Albanians were receiving money, weapons, and foreign fighter support from other Muslim nation, but there was a clear lack of direct support from the west, which may have emboldened Milosevic to expand violent repression in Kosovo in early 1998.<sup>152</sup> That summer, the USG developed a carrot and stick negotiation offer for Milosevic. The incentive for compliance was lifting of sanctions, but the coercion for compliance was threat of additional sanctions and other punitive measures.<sup>153</sup> USG also determined it "will not accept violent pursuit of independence" from the KLA, and instead would welcome KLA participation in finding a political solution.<sup>154</sup> This non-acceptance of violence is interesting given speculation that the CIA was funding, training, and supplying the

---

<sup>152</sup> Cox, *The History of Serbia*, 167.

<sup>153</sup> National Security Council, Declassified Documents concerning National Security Council, "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia" (Summary report, June 19, 1998), Clinton Digital Library, accessed 19 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

<sup>154</sup> National Security Council, Declassified Documents concerning National Security Council, "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia" (Summary report, June 22, 1998), Clinton Digital Library, accessed 19 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.

KLA.<sup>155</sup> However, three months later, President Clinton's Foreign Policy Team determined that the Kosovo conflict was unlikely to be resolved solely through diplomatic and humanitarian appeals; they proposed, and President Clinton agreed, that the threat of NATO military action was needed.<sup>156</sup> The threat worked temporarily. In October, Milosevic agreed to pull back his troops. But in January, Serbian violent repression in Racak reignited the tensions between the USG and Serbia.<sup>157</sup> Diplomatic attempts at a peace agreement failed as it required Serbia to accede political control of Kosovo; a concession Milosevic refused to make. In mid-March, Milosevic began an offensive in Kosovo to expel ethnic Albanians from the province, and four days later NATO began its bombing campaign against Serbian forces.<sup>158</sup> As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, NATO targets expanded beyond Serbian military forces in Kosovo to military and civil infrastructure targets across Serbia. In conjunction with leading the NATO bombing campaign, the United States also organized an information operation called 'Ring Around Serbia' (RAS). RAS was a series of radio transmitters established in countries surrounding Serbia to "[provide] Serbs, particularly those living in the Belgrade Area, with easier access to an important alternative source of news and information."<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>155</sup> Theoharis et al., *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 65.

<sup>156</sup> Samuel Berger, "Kosovo: Preparing for an Ultimatum," (Memorandum for the President, 24 September 1998), Declassified Documents concerning Kosovo, Clinton Digital Library, accessed 19 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16195>.

<sup>157</sup> Cox, *The History of Serbia*, 168.

<sup>158</sup> Trix, "Kosovar Albanians Between A Rock and A Hard Place," 334.

<sup>159</sup> Madeleine Albright, "Ring Around Serbia: Demarching Romania to Obtain New Frequency for FM Broadcast From Resita," (Secretary of State Cable, 01 October

The operation began broadcasting on 07 April 1999, and included programming from BBC, Radio France International, Deutsche-Welle, Radio Free Europe, and others.<sup>160</sup> On 09 June 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia signed a Military Technical Agreement with NATO that ended the bombing campaign in exchange for complete withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav federal forces from Kosovo.<sup>161</sup> The following day, the UN Mission in Kosovo was established, and security in Kosovo became the job of the NATO Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR). Throughout this conflict, the USG interagency manned National Intelligence Support Teams for Kosovo, like it had previously in Bosnia.<sup>162</sup> As part of its commitment to NATO and peace in Kosovo, the United States contributed approximately 7,000 troops to KFOR.<sup>163</sup> Over twenty years later, United States troops continue to serve in Kosovo. KFOR's size has decreased over the past two decades, yet its mission is still not complete as an enduring political solution for Kosovo has yet to be found.

---

1999), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia, Clinton Digital Library, accessed 17 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/100549>.

<sup>160</sup> Jamie Metzl, "RE: 2 items," (email to Steven J. Napalm, 21 April 1999), National Security Council, "Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia."; Richard D. Kauzlarich, "TFSRO2: Radio Feral Up, Radio Fern to Follow," (AMEMBASSY Sarajevo Cable, 08 April 1999), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>161</sup> Trix, "Kosovar Albanians Between A Rock and A Hard Place," 335.

<sup>162</sup> Prados, *Safe For Democracy*, 616.

<sup>163</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn, "Larger Kosovo Force Takes to Field," *American Forces Press Service*, 25 June 1999, accessed 19 April 2020, <https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42742>.

## Serbia

The focus of this study is support to nonviolent resistance movements. This chapter has shown how the origins, actions, goals, and popular support for resistance are not necessarily restricted to the domestic environment. For example, domestic Serbian popular resistance to Milosevic was related to both his domestic and foreign policies and the effects of those policies on the domestic population. Nor is it restricted to an established period of organizational existence. Otpor established itself as a new organization in October 1998, but its founders and supporters were linked to a history of domestic resistance movements linking back to 1991. Prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, there was little support for popular resistance to Milosevic beyond diplomatic efforts and sanctions. External support in the years leading up to the Dayton Accords were focused on humanitarian relief and ending violence in Bosnia. One could argue that this is a form of support to Serbian popular resistance because it intended to counter further expansion of Greater Serbia. However, the U.S. objective was focused on influencing events in Bosnia, not Serbia. Further, the U.S. made concessions to Milosevic to get him to join the peace process. While these events decreased Milosevic's influence in Bosnia, they further consolidated his domestic power. If this had been a deliberate campaign supporting a USG policy for systematically eroding Milosevic's power until he could be deposed, then one could make the argument that it was support to popular resistance. But this was not the case. In the years between Bosnia and Kosovo, the USG continued to use diplomatic tools and sanctions in attempts to influence Milosevic to adopt policy reforms. However, USG efforts were primarily aimed at humanitarian relief, not at supporting the Serbian popular opposition. Even the intervention in Kosovo was a

humanitarian mission, aimed at ending ethnic violence and repression by removing Milosevic's forces from the province. There was a USG objective of increasing the autonomy and self-determination of Kosovo. However, USG was not actively supporting popular opposition in Serbia. Nor does it seem that USG even recognized the potential opportunity prior to Otpor successes in mobilizing mass popular support after Kosovo.

Throughout the decade-long period of popular resistance in Serbia, the USG supported democracy development in Serbia, but it was not directly supporting opposition efforts. This may have been because there was no clearly identifiable replacement for Milosevic, either as an individual leader, or for the Socialist Party of Serbia, as the reigning political party.<sup>164</sup> But the ongoing diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions undertaken by the USG, European Union, NATO, and the UN throughout the breakup of Yugoslavia and the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo could arguably be said to have had tangential effects of supporting domestic popular resistance; despite the indications presented throughout this chapter that those efforts may have actually been counter-productive to popular opposition goals. The public emergence of Otpor in October 1998 as a planned, organized resistance movement that displayed credible potential (especially after the Kosovo conflict) may have been what was needed to incentivize external actors to focus efforts on supporting domestic efforts in Serbia.

By April 2000, the USG recognized that Serbian opposition efforts were responsible for putting the most pressure on Milosevic, and that elections were the best

---

<sup>164</sup> U.S. Director of Intelligence, Office of European Analysis, "Greater Serbia A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s," 7.

way to remove him from office.<sup>165</sup> The next month, then Secretary of State Albright was highlighting Otpor's successes to foreign leaders and suggested that Milosevic might shortly fall from power.<sup>166</sup>

### Information

After the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, RAS continued broadcasting content into Serbia. By October 2000, when Milosevic stepped down, RAS had expanded from its original site in Bosnia to include sites in Croatia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Romania, and possibly others. Similarly, its broadcast programming had expanded from being a source of alternative media in Serbia to also be a platform for countering Serbian propaganda. When Milosevic began to crack down on domestic independent media in spring of 2000, USG began to explore mechanisms for enabling indigenous Serbian media to continue broadcasting their content from sites beyond Milosevic's reach.<sup>167</sup> This program, nicknamed 'Pebbles', was operational by June 2000 and enabled indigenous Serbian media to broadcast direct to Belgrade from sites in Bosnia.<sup>168</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> Alexander Vershbow, "Balkans: S/SA Dobbins, Permreps March 30 Discuss Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia," (USMISSION USNATO Cable, 06 April 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>166</sup> Secretary of State, "Secretary's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Petre Roman," (Secretary of State Cable, 31 May 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>167</sup> Madeleine Albright, "Broadcasting Into Serbia," (Secretary of State Cable, 18 May 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>168</sup> Department of State, "Supporting Broadcasting Into Serbia," (Secretary of State Cable, 07 June 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

Numerous USG agencies were involved with RAS and Pebbles, including Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, National Intelligence Council, National Security Council, and others.<sup>169</sup> Intergovernmental organizations included the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN, the European Commission. Individual nations included the governments of nations hosting transmission locations.<sup>170</sup> Another USG effort was development of synchronized messaging such as the “Target the Truth” campaign; creating a campaign brand using the image of a target, and stamping it on all paper and electronic messaging products (e.g. leaflets) to use visual messages to support radio messages.<sup>171</sup>

### Democracy Development

In Spring of 2000, the Serbian Democratic Forum, a Croatian NGO focused on refugee returns, worked with U.S. AID to open offices throughout Serbia. In addition to repatriating Croatian Serbs who were forcibly removed from their homes earlier in the 1990s, these efforts had the potential added benefit of supporting the political platform of

---

<sup>169</sup> William Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68,” (Washington, DC, 30 April 1999), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning PDD-68, International Public Policy, Clinton Digital Library, accessed 20 April 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/49440>.

<sup>170</sup> Madeleine Albright, “The Secretary’s Meeting With International Community Officials in Bosnia,” (Secretary of State Cable, 17 March 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>171</sup> Jamie Metzl, “IPI Update,” (Email to Steven J. Napalm, 23 April 1999), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

the Serbian opposition. Another Croatian NGO, Glas 99, conducted voter mobilization workshops with Otpor.<sup>172</sup>

Funding from USG and other private funders totaled approximately \$40 million in the year leading Milosevic's ousting; for the Serbian economy in which it had more purchasing power, that was a per capita equivalent to over \$1 billion in the United States.<sup>173</sup> As described by former Ambassador James Dobbins, who had been the Acting Assistance Secretary of State for European Affairs starting in May 2000; "We brought one of Otpor's young leaders to Washington, arranged meetings throughout the administration, and sent him back with enough funding to train and deploy 30,000 election monitors."<sup>174</sup>

The Serbian organization Center for Free Elections and Democracy advocated the importance of elections and was one such group that trained election monitors. Another NGO, G17Plus, brought together opposition economists, social scientists and intellectuals to mobilize popular support for social and economic reform, advised the opposition, and facilitated civil improvement projects with foreign support in opposition led

---

<sup>172</sup> AMEMBASSY Zagreb, "Croatian Support for Serbian Democratization," (AMEMBASSY Zagreb Cable, 06 April 2000), National Security Council, Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia.

<sup>173</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia," *Policy Brief* 1, no 5 (May 2001): 5, accessed 01 April 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/PolBrief5.pdf>.

<sup>174</sup> James F. Dobbins, *Foreign Service: Five Decades on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 211, quoted in Irwin, *Support to Resistance*, 177-178.

municipalities to highlight the value of democratic institutions and governance..<sup>175</sup> The National Democratic Institute, which had been sponsoring democracy development activity in Yugoslavia for years, focused on enabling opposition access to media and building the political parties within the opposition..<sup>176</sup>

Along with Otpor and other NGOs, these organizations played a key role in mobilizing the population, gathering information about popular opinion and preferences, planning for and developing alternative institutions (rather than simply elect an opposition leader to preside over the existing faulty institutions), and uniting the opposition parties..<sup>177</sup>

### Building Civil Resistance

The Center for Civic Initiatives, a Serbian organization, translated, published, and distributed thousands of copies of Gene Sharp's *From Dictatorship to Democracy* to Otpor as well as the largest opposition political party at the time (Democratic Party)..<sup>178</sup>

In Spring 2000, the International Republican Institute sponsored a training workshop for Otpor. Movement members participated in the training, which was hosted in Budapest. There they met Robert Helvey, a retired United States Army Colonel who was a pupil and then colleague of Gene Sharp. The training curriculum Helvey delivered

---

<sup>175</sup> Florian Bieber, "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 85, accessed 14 April 2020, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020198>.

<sup>176</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 15.

<sup>177</sup> Bieber, "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society," 85.

<sup>178</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 15.

focused on “theory of power, its sources, how those sources of power are expressed in organizations and institutions [known as pillars of support], how to analyze them to identify strengths and weaknesses, then how to think strategically to neutralize or destroy them.”<sup>179</sup> The framework he shared with Otpor was that resistance needs to be organized towards accomplishing its objective by deliberately planning and executing a strategic plan, a lesson he learned from a career in the military. Beyond the lessons in planning action against the regime, Helvey also shared methods for Otpor to prepare activists and future recruits for regime repression and overcoming their fear of reprisal.<sup>180</sup> It is important to recognize that Otpor already had strong domestic support prior to meeting Helvey. Their challenge was that despite growing membership, Otpor leaders could not see how to mobilize that capacity into action with effects that would facilitate Milosevic’s removal from office.<sup>181</sup> In military terms, Otpor’s challenge was translating tactical action into accomplishing strategic objectives. What they needed was the tools to develop a strategic plan and an associated operational approach. In Helvey’s opinion, strategy in nonviolent action was just as important as strategy in military action.<sup>182</sup>

---

<sup>179</sup> Paulson, “Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000,” 15.

<sup>180</sup> John Bacher, “Robert Helvey’s Expert Political Defiance,” *Peace Magazine* (April-June 2003), accessed 18 February 2020, <http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p10.htm>.

<sup>181</sup> Tina Rosenberg, “Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students Who Overthrew Milosevic,” *Foreign Policy*, 16 February 2011, accessed 25 February 2020, <https://www.umass.edu/preferen/You%20Must%20Read%20This/Facebook%20Liberation%20Tactics.pdf>.

<sup>182</sup> Ifeanyi Ogwuru, “The Effect of Nonviolent Movement on Democracy and Peace in Serbia,” accessed 25 February 2020, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rt=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjtoavAofvoAhUBnawKHbWuAT0QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academi>

[Nonviolent civil resistance is] a form of warfare, and you [got to] think of it in terms of war. And if you decide to accept nonviolent struggle, then the same principles of war, we mentioned objective, you mentioned mass, you know, to be able to get your forces together at the decisive point. And the initiative, you know, [you are] never going to win by being on the defensive. [You have] got to take the offense, whether it's in a military struggle or in an unarmed struggle. So, the overlap of the principles of war are the same.<sup>183</sup>

After this 'train-the-trainer' experience, these Otpor members returned to Serbia and began implementing their newly learned techniques into recruiting, mitigating regime repression, and outreach to security forces to encourage defections.<sup>184</sup> Otpor wrote a civil resistance training manual for its members incorporating lessons from Helvey and Sharp; this manual would become a tool for Otpor to spread its resistance lifestyle across the country. As described by Popovic, "[through] two years of our nonviolent struggle, Otpor's human resources team developed six different training programs based on the technique of nonviolent struggle. More than four hundred activists of Otpor were trained in nonviolent methods, through Otpor's 'user manual' for working with activists."<sup>185</sup> These hundreds would go on to train thousands across 42 cities nationwide.<sup>186</sup>

---

a.edu%2F35881014%2FThe\_effect\_of\_Nonviolent\_Movement\_on\_Democracy\_and\_Pea  
ce\_in\_Serbia&usg=AOvVaw2y1zrrCQnX467xDMlIXYia.

<sup>183</sup> *Bringing Down A Dictator*.

<sup>184</sup> Bacher, "Robert Helvey's Expert Political Defiance."

<sup>185</sup> Srdja Popovic, email comments to Rosalyn Abraham in the office of Peter Ackerman, cited in Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000, 16.

<sup>186</sup> Paulson, "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000," 16.

## ARSOF Capabilities and Activities

### Introduction

This section intends to provide an overview of special operations and ARSOF capabilities and activities that are relevant to this study. It will not address the full range of special operations activities, as that is outside the scope of this study. Some activities will be briefly mentioned for the purpose of amplifying the analysis and recommendations in Chapter 5.

### Special Operations and Irregular Warfare

Special operations are operations that require unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.<sup>187</sup> They provide policy makers with scalable options that can be synchronized with interagency efforts to accomplish USG objectives, and normally require knowledge and culture of the operational area. These options may generate lower risk of escalation than other policy options, and foreign partners may be more willing to work with SOF because of their small size in politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments. Special operations

---

<sup>187</sup> Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 July 2014), GL-11.

are often a protracted series of activities which, when synchronized with Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and CAO, can create exponential effects..<sup>188</sup>

SOF are specially trained in a variety of fields through both civilian education professional military education, often includes foreign language and regional culture training, and in partnership with interagency and multinational partners. In both training and operations, SOF often work with other USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and the forces of other nations, developing partnerships and networks across the world. Some SOF capabilities include working with foreign military and civilian authorities and populations, working in politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas, assessing local situations, and developing options for addressing USG national concerns..<sup>189</sup> Often SOF support interagency requirements by conducting engagement activities to keep the environment below the threshold of armed conflict, develop and build host nation capabilities, and enhance situational awareness to anticipate, forewarn, prevent, or forestall crises..<sup>190</sup>

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s), and SOF conduct a variety of activities that support irregular warfare while considering the cognitive, informational, physical, cultural, and social aspects of the environment to influence popular behavior..<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>188</sup> Joint Staff, JP 3-05, I-2.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., I-5 – I-6.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., I-8.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., II-1.

SOF conduct numerous activities under the umbrella of irregular warfare, and as seen below, those activities depend on the nature of the environment (see figure 4). UW, or UW, is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forces in a denied area.<sup>192</sup> FID, is United States activities that support a host nation's internal defense and development strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.<sup>193</sup> Counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), and stability operations are outside the scope of this study.




Figure 4. Relationship between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare

Source: Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 July 2014), II-2, titled in source “Special Forces and Unconventional Warfare.”.

<sup>192</sup> Joint Staff, JP 3-05, GL-2.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., II-10.

From this construct, both UW and FID are relevant to this study. UW relates to USG activities to support a resistance movement. After the resistance is successful, USG engagement can continue through FID to support the new or reformed regime to maintain domestic stability during and beyond the period of regime transition. As was mentioned earlier, MISO and CAO can amplify the effects of these irregular warfare activities. MISO are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's (i.e. USG) objectives.<sup>194</sup> CAO are actions planned, executed, and assessed by [CA forces] that enhance the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.<sup>195</sup> Two additional special operations activities relevant to this study, yet outside the irregular warfare construct, are security forces assistance (SFA) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). SFA is DOD activities that support the development of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.<sup>196</sup> Like FID, SFA is another engagement opportunity for USG during the post-transition period. FHA is the humanitarian activities that DOD conduct outside the United States to relieve or reduce human suffering,

---

<sup>194</sup> Joint Staff, JP 3-05, II-14.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., II-16.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., II-11.

disease, hunger, or privation.<sup>197</sup> These activities usually support other USG interagency efforts, intergovernmental organization efforts. Amongst other contributions to FHA, SOF can use their cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and ability to work with multiethnic indigenous peoples and relief organizations to support humanitarian efforts.

#### ARSOF and the “Resistance Profession”

In Joint doctrine, ARSOF are the active and reserve component forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.<sup>198</sup> However, this research is specifically focused on special operations as they related to resistance activities. The “Resistance Profession” is ARSOF either supporting or defeating resistance movements.<sup>199</sup> As can be seen below (see figure 5), these activities are conducted by CA, PSYOP, and SF personnel.<sup>200</sup> Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the term ARSOF will be an umbrella term referring to those individuals. Figure 5 also supplements the above discussion of irregular warfare. UW activities support a resistance movement against a hostile nation state; FID activities support friendly nation state activities to defeat a resistance movement.

---

<sup>197</sup> Joint Staff, JP 3-05, II-14.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., GL-6.

<sup>199</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, xv.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.




Figure 5. The ARSOF "Resistance Profession"

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Technical Publication 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), xv.

ARSOF are trained to evaluate all the variables within an environment and how they will impact any actor; this enables ARSOF to distinguish relevant information, efforts, and actors. This understanding is built by examining the relationships between people and places, with consideration for the sociocultural factors that make a specific population and/or region unique. With this knowledge, ARSOF plan operations and activities with and through USG and international governmental and nongovernmental partners and indigenous populations. ARSOF are particularly adept at designing, planning, and conducting diplomatically sensitive missions with far-reaching effects.

ARSOF has two core competencies which are the essential, enduring, overarching categories for the capabilities they provide as a policy option for the USG: special warfare and surgical strike. Special warfare is the execution of capabilities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. It includes the ARSOF capabilities related to the human aspect of operations, such as leveraging indigenous forces, providing situational awareness, understanding of relevant individuals and groups, developing and sustaining partnerships, and creating access. Surgical strike is the execution of capabilities in a precise manner that employ SOFs in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats. These can be conducted unilaterally or collaboratively to shape the environment or influence a target audience in support of larger strategic interests.<sup>201</sup> Both special warfare and surgical strike can be utilized to support resistance activities.

ARSOF units are regionally aligned to enable regional expertise developed over time, supporting time-sensitive requirements by being rapidly deployable to provide an on-the-ground assessments to advise policy makers. In addition to the planning processes and frameworks employed by the rest of DOD, ARSOF also apply planning

---

<sup>201</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019), 1-3.

considerations for working with or through foreign partners. They utilize a cognitive framework to identify the right person, at the right time, at the right place, with the right capabilities to support achieving USG objectives, and develop trusting relationships with a shared desire for the agreed-upon intended outcome. These partners are often resistance movements or other nonstate actors.

Each of the activities listed earlier that relate to irregular warfare are ARSOF core activities. Units are specifically organized, manned, trained, and equipped to conduct these activities using unique capabilities under conditions in which others are not able to operate.<sup>202</sup> USASOC is also the lead component for each of those activities, with the exception of FHA. As UW is the primary activity in supporting resistance, and MISO and CAO can amplify the effects of UW, the remainder of this section will explore these three ARSOF activities further.

### CAOs

CAOs are conducted by CA personnel and units; they are the primary ARSOF asset for engaging nonmilitary organizations, institutions, and populations. They establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military and/or civil authorities and the population to shape the environment and prevent future conflict. CAOs also provide the capacity to assist or perform the functions of local governance.<sup>203</sup> In support of UW, CAOs analyze the civil society strengths and vulnerabilities of both the resistance and the regime. Their operations simultaneously work to support increasing

---

<sup>202</sup> HQDA, ADP 3-05, 2-1.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

environmental stability and resistance legitimacy while also destabilizing and delegitimizing the regime at scalable levels to support resistance and USG objectives (see figure 6).




Figure 6. CAO support to UW

*Source:* Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2019), 4-14.

Through CAO, the resistance addresses popular grievances, gaining legitimacy and transitional governance. CAO is comprised of 11 functions; however, this study will only address those functions that relate to supporting a resistance movement. These are civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil information management, support to civil

administration, foreign humanitarian assistance, and civil-military engagement. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment to understand the impacts of the civil component on military operations, military operations on civil component, and development of assessments to enhance situational awareness and enable decision making.<sup>204</sup> In support of UW, civil reconnaissance provides actionable information and assessments to policy makers and supports resistance efforts to identify strengths and weaknesses in the environment which they may take advantage of or choose to disrupt to their advantage. Civil engagement is interaction between CA and nonmilitary personnel and organizations to build relationships, reduce causes of instability, gather and evaluate information, foster legitimacy, and promote cooperation.<sup>205</sup> In UW, civil engagement contributes to policy maker situational awareness and links the resistance with other enabling entities. Civil information management is the process of gathering, collating, processing, analyzing, and producing information products based on civil component data, and its dissemination.<sup>206</sup> In UW, this supports policy maker decision making and supports resistance efforts to understand the environment and make informed operational plans. Support to civil administration is CA assistance to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing

---

<sup>204</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2019), 2-3.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., Glossary-3.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., 1-4.

body of a foreign country, by assisting an established or interim government..<sup>207</sup> In UW, those same activities can be a tool for supporting alternative or opposition government bodies and/or civil structure and infrastructures. Foreign humanitarian assistance is activity conducted outside the United States to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation..<sup>208</sup> In UW, this activity can increase the legitimacy of the resistance by addressing popular grievances. Civil-military engagement is a special operations-specific CA program to establish, sustain, or enhance civil capabilities and capacities that mitigate or eliminate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations..<sup>209</sup> In UW, this supports resistance efforts to mitigate grievances in under-governed areas, building popular support and legitimacy. Additionally, civil-military engagement involves analysis of human networks, which can influence assessments of resistance capacity, potential for USG support, and advise USG policy making. In addition to CAO, ARSOF CA support civil-military operations (CMO). CMO are activities to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by enabling stability..<sup>210</sup> In UW, this can enhance the relations between the resistance and regime security forces to reduce repression and/or encourage defections.

---

<sup>207</sup> HQDA, FM 3-57, 1-5.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 2-24.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., Glossary-4.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

## MISOs

MISO is a special operations activity which can be employed as an independent operation or in support of other operations; USASOC is the lead SOF component for MISO skills and activities.<sup>211</sup> Like CAO, MISO facilitates understanding of resistance grievances and structure. When conducted during irregular warfare, MISO provides a critical function in shaping and influencing ideologies, perspectives, and decision making amongst individuals and groups in the target environment. In UW, employment of MISO can influence behavior of the regime and/or population to support accomplishment of resistance and USG objectives.

MISO is planned and executed by Army PSYOP forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct activities that “affect the behavior and decisions of select foreign individuals and groups in ways that support both DOD and interagency partner objectives.”<sup>212</sup> While the primary function of PSYOP forces is to influence, on occasion they may also be utilized to inform because PSYOP forces have organic capacity for delivering messages. The difference between the two functions is that influence function is used to shift target audience behavior while the inform function is used to deliver facts to the target audience.<sup>213</sup> PSYOP forces regularly support

---

<sup>211</sup> HQDA, ADP 3-05, 2-2.

<sup>212</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-53, *Psychological Operations Forces (Initial Draft)* (Washington, DC, January 2020), 2-1. Referenced and cited with approval from Chief, Psychological Operations Doctrine Division, Special Operations Center of Excellence.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-11.

interagency efforts overseas to influence and/or inform as part of diplomatic efforts.<sup>214</sup>

Influence and inform efforts may simultaneously complement or mutually reinforce each other, but neither requires the use of the other.

PSYOP forces can conduct three different missions to support UW: military influence and shaping operations, interagency-intergovernmental support (IIS), and DOD deception activities. In addition, the activities associate with Target Audience Analysis (described later in this section) assist with resistance network development and facilitates accomplishing mission objectives. Within the first mission, MISO is the title of the DOD-wide influence function, but Army PSYOP forces also plan and recommend other influence activities such as psychological actions (PSYACT). PSYACTs are planned lethal or nonlethal action executed to produce a specific psychological effect in a foreign individual, group, or population.<sup>215</sup> Achieving the desired psychological effect may require a series of PSYACTs and/or supporting influential messages, which may be delivered through MISO. Alternatively, MISO might be conducted as an independent influence activity. In the second mission of IIS, PSYOP forces support existing USG or international efforts to communicate messages and influence foreign decision making in support of USG objectives. The third mission of deception is a tool for influencing adversaries' decision making so that they do things detrimental to their causes and favorable to USG objectives. Each of these missions can be used to support resistance and USG objectives. The relationship between PSYOP forces functions and missions is

---

<sup>214</sup> HQDA, FM 3-53 (Initial draft), 2-1.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 1-13.

depicted in figure 7 below. Figure 7 also notes civil authority information support (CAIS) in the bottom left, which is a PSYOP mission during disaster relief conducted within the United States; and thought reform in the top right, which is not conducted by PSYOPs but by adversaries as another tool of psychological pressure. As psychological pressure increases between the regime and the population, it decreases popular trust and rapport with the regime.




Figure 7. Relationship between Informational and Influence Activities

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-53, *Psychological Operations Forces (Initial Draft)* (Washington, DC, January 2020), 2-2.

Influence activities are planned and conducted through a seven-phase process: planning, target audience analysis (TAA), series development, product development and

design, approval, production/distribution/dissemination, and evaluation.<sup>216</sup> In TAA, foreign groups and individuals are analyzed for their ability to be influenced, and TAA results inform strategies for changing target audience behavior. This is the most important step in the planning process and is an ongoing effort throughout planning and execution.<sup>217</sup> TAA also identifies the best mechanism for delivering the influence products, whether that be by radio, television, Internet, leaflets, loudspeaker, face-to-face, or others.<sup>218</sup> The final phase, evaluation, provides a deliberate process for assessing influence effectiveness in achieving the intended psychological objectives.

Influence activities serve a critical role in UW and should begin as early as possible to prepare the population for the emergence of the resistance movement and its activities. PSYOP forces will also transition to training and advising the resistance movement to be able to conduct its own influence activities. Both U.S.-only and partnered activities are conducted in support of synchronized resistance and USG objectives.

## UW

UW was earlier described as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency. A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying

---

<sup>216</sup> Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 07 January 2010, incorporating Change 1, 20 December 2011), V-1.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, V-3.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, V-5.

power and to disrupt civil order and stability.<sup>219</sup> An insurgency is the use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region, and can refer to both the activity and the group itself.<sup>220</sup> As the focus of this research is nonviolent resistance, this section will primarily use the term resistance movement when describing UW. However, it should be understood to be referring to both resistance movements and insurgencies as described above.

UW activities can be conducted to assess, prevent, stabilize, or resolve security conflicts in support of USG national security objectives. SF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct UW, including emphasis on regionally aligned language and cultural training. There are two types of UW, and while they have similar underlying principles, in execution they may be very different. First is UW as an operation in support of a larger military campaign. In this type of operation, UW shapes the operational environment to set conditions for a conventional military force to conduct large-scale combat operations. The second type is UW as the main military contribution to a larger USG interagency effort, often synchronized with the activities of other USG departments and agencies. Both options are scalable based on environment and requirements, but the second type typically enables a smaller-scale USG commitment of USG.<sup>221</sup>

---

<sup>219</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, Glossary-5.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., Glossary-3.

<sup>221</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05, 2-1.

## The Basic Resistance Model

UW doctrine describes a basic resistance model, informed by historical precedence and USG experience, which is used to provide education in basic resistance concepts and a foundational, unifying vocabulary. However, every example of resistance is unique, and it is critical to recognize that they do not require all the components of this basic model. By understanding basic resistance concepts, SF are prepared to train, advise, and assist resistance movements through the conduct of UW. There are four primary components to the doctrinal basic resistance model: the underground, guerrilla forces, auxiliary, and the public component. The underground is a cellular covert element within UW that is compartmentalized and conducts covert or clandestine activities in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the guerrilla force.<sup>222</sup> It operates clandestinely in areas inaccessible to other components, and conducts activities such as intelligence and counterintelligence, subversion, inform and influence, fabrication, sabotage, medical support, and others.<sup>223</sup> The guerrilla forces are the element of the resistance that serves as the violent combatants of the resistance. They may be organized as a guerrilla force: a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.<sup>224</sup> But they may also be organized as an armed force for violent functions beyond guerilla warfare such as sabotage, non-lethal violence, and others. It is important

---

<sup>222</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, Glossary-5.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 2-12.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., Glossary-3.

to note that not every resistance movement will include a guerrilla force or armed component, and for those that do, it may not look like the guerrilla force that one might typically associate with a violent resistance or insurgency. The auxiliary is the support element of the irregular organization whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular movement.<sup>225</sup> Auxiliary members provide part-time support to underground and guerrilla forces such as logistical procurement, labor, intelligence, security, recruitment, communications, product distribution, and others.<sup>226</sup> The public component is an overt political manifestation of a resistance.<sup>227</sup> Its primary role is to be the public face of the resistance to negotiate with the regime or occupying power in support of resistance objectives, but it also appeals for domestic and foreign support.<sup>228</sup>

As was noted earlier, each of the four components are part of a basic resistance model, but not every resistance movement will have all four, and some might have others. This research is not an in-depth analysis of resistance models and/or UW. Therefore, it will not describe all the supplemental components. However, one worth highlighting as it is pertinent to this research is the shadow government; governmental elements and activities performed by the irregular organization that will eventually take

---

<sup>225</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, Glossary-3.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., 2-21.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., Glossary-4.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 2-26.

the place of the existing government.<sup>229</sup> It is an alternative governmental function that provides “goods or services that parallel or supplant the functions and control of the [regime].”<sup>230</sup>

There are a variety of methods a resistance might use to support its functional activities. Similarly, there are a variety of tactical actions a resistance might employ ranging from violent paramilitary operations to nonviolent action inspired by Gene Sharp’s *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. The activities and actions of a basic model resistance or insurgency are depicted in figure 8 below.

---

<sup>229</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, Glossary-4.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., 2-36.




Figure 8. Activities and Actions of a Basic Resistance Model

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Technical Publication 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019). NOTE: titled in source “Special Operations Research Office resistance pyramid.

A couple clarifying points about the above graphic are needed. First, it implies a transition from clandestine to overt activities. Second, it implies that specific activities are conducted by specific components of the resistance. Third, it implies that each of these activities is conducted sequentially. These three points are highlighted to reinforce the previous discussion of the basic model of resistance as a baseline for common education and language. Much like the principle that every resistance organization is uniquely composed of varying, scalable components, so too are a variety of scalable activities and actions selected by individual resistance movements based on their environment, objectives, and strategy. Figure 8 is not a step-by-step guide. Rather it is another tool for facilitating education and common understanding.

### The UW Model

Military doctrine recognizes that UW is not solely a military activity, but rather employs capabilities from across the USG interagency. However, doctrine highlights five SF contributions to UW:<sup>231</sup>

1. Linking up with resistance elements in denied territory
2. Assessing resistance potential for external support
3. Training and advising the resistance
4. Synchronizing resistance and USG efforts
5. Facilitating peaceful transition post-conflict

---

<sup>231</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-18, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 3-4.

These SF contributions are conducted simultaneous as other interagency efforts in pursuit of USG objectives through a seven-phase UW model with the goal of “change in political control and/or perceived legitimacy of regimes.”<sup>232</sup> The seven phase of UW are preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition. These phases are not necessarily sequential, and often phases can be skipped due to environmental conditions and resistance status.

During preparation, the environment is assessed for factual conditions, UW plans are developed, and operations are conducted to shape the environment for future activities (for example preparation of the environment, MISO, and CAO). During initial contact, SF and interagency partners continue to assess the environment, assess the resistance for viability as a USG partner, and begins coordinating for follow-on USG support. During infiltration, SF infiltrate the operational area and link-up with the resistance to begin deliberate support activities. This phase continues the enduring on-the-ground assessment of conditions and resistance potential. During organization, SF advise the resistance on its organizational structure to develop the most appropriate resistance model based on the environment, and resistance and USG objectives. As was mentioned earlier, SF are trained and educated in a basic model of resistance from which they can advise resistance partners to pursue and/or adopt any number of variations from that basic model. During buildup, resistance membership is expanded as well as its organic capacity to conduct activities in pursuit of its objectives. For example, buildup might include acquisition of communications or messaging equipment, expanding the

---

<sup>232</sup> HQDA, FM 3-18, 3-5.

resistance cadre of trainers, and other capacity development. The buildup phase is also a period for employment of small-scale resistance tactical action to increase public awareness, recruitment, and effect the regime without triggering large-scale regime repression. During employment, the resistance has grown large and strong enough to escalate its tactical actions, planned and coordinated to achieve resistance and USG strategic objectives. The final phase of transition is when the resistance and USG partner with the new or reformed regime to pursue stability and institutional development. During transition, other USG departments and agencies will have an increased role in supporting stability and development projects. The transition phase is also the period when SF's mission may change from UW to FID as the military's contribution to stability and development efforts.

## STR

STR is a USG policy option to support foreign resistance actors that offers an alternative to a direct U.S. military intervention or formal political engagement in a conflict.<sup>233</sup> UW doctrine describes five primary types of STR, but highlights that the differences between them are more of a USG policy distinction which might influence the operational approach. The different types of STR are not significant for the purpose of this research. However, it is important to recognize that the tactical aspects of STR in planning and execution will remain very similar across the five STR types. Therefore, the doctrinal constructs of UW, CAO, and influence operations, and how they relate to supporting resistance movements, are relevant considerations when the USG is

---

<sup>233</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, Glossary-4.

considering STR as a policy option. In all forms of STR, including when UW or other military operations are directed and executed as described above, USG efforts are synchronized across various departments, agencies, and organizations to maximize effects through use of all the instruments of national power (see figure 9).




Figure 9. Collaborative planning across USG agencies

*Source:* United States Special Operations Command, *United States Government Support to Resistance Framework (Draft)*, version 0.33, in HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, 3-3.

Key efforts in in STR include enabling political activities, shaping the information environment, providing material and nonmaterial assistance, and conducting military and paramilitary operations.<sup>234</sup> UW, CAO, and influence operations can each contribute to those efforts, most effectively when conducted as a synchronized effort in combination

<sup>234</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-18.1, 3-4 – 3-6.

with other interagency efforts, and it is important to recognize ARSOF's inherent capacity to contribute to STR. Recognizing ARSOF capabilities opens the potential for alternative policy options and methods of execution which are at risk of being overlooked based on decision maker lack of education, or worst, being ignored based on potential misperceptions.

### Crosswalk Analysis of Case Study with ARSOF Doctrine

This section will analyze the data through the theoretical lenses of nonviolent resistance and special operations, as described in chapter three. The analysis starts with a summary of the chronological episodes of popular resistance to the Milosevic regime and/or his policies such as Greater Serbia, as well as types of external support (see table 1). Table 1 is broken in four variables. The first identifies episodes of popular resistance. The second identifies whether that episode of popular resistance was primarily violent or nonviolent. The third identifies specific external support provided directly to the resistance movement in that episode. Finally, the fourth identifies specific external support which was not directly to the resistance but may have indirectly supported resistance efforts. Not every example of resistance to Milosevic was discussed in chapter four. Those included are meant to highlight trends or examples of different forms of resistance and different forms of external support. Instances of covert or unconfirmed external support are included in the analysis to highlight the breadth of support options. Based on the research limitations and delimitations, readers may disagree with the analysis based on their own personal experiences or access to information that was unavailable for this research. The findings drawn from this analysis are from an

examination of a single case, unique in its breadth, depth, and scope. However, the lessons derived from this analysis may inform future policy, practice, and scholarship.

| Table 1. Episodes of Popular Resistance and External Support |                                   |                                                                                        |                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Example of Popular Resistance                                | Violent or Nonviolent             | Direct Support                                                                         | Indirect Support                                                                                           |
| 1991: Serbian Movement for Renewal protests                  | Started violent; ended nonviolent | No                                                                                     | No                                                                                                         |
| 1992: student protests                                       | Nonviolent                        | No                                                                                     | -UN sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                                                    |
| 1993-2000: Kosovo political opposition                       | Nonviolent                        | No                                                                                     | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                    |
| 1992-1994: Bosnian War                                       | Violent                           | - European Peacekeepers<br>-Diplomacy                                                  | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions                                                              |
| 1995: Bosnian War                                            | Violent                           | -Peacekeepers<br>-Diplomacy<br>-NATO campaign<br>-CIA paramilitary?<br>-Covert arming? | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions                                                              |
| 1996-2000: Post-Bosnian War                                  | Both                              | -NATO IFOR<br>-Diplomacy                                                               | -Diplomacy<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                                     |
| 1996-97: Zajedno and student protests                        | Nonviolent                        | No                                                                                     | -Diplomacy<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                                     |
| 1997: Students organizing pre-Otpor                          | Nonviolent                        | No                                                                                     | -Diplomacy<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                                     |
| 1997: KLA resistance                                         | Violent                           | -paramilitary, equipping, and funding from Muslim nations                              | -Diplomacy<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                                     |
| 1998: KLA resistance                                         | Violent                           | -Diplomacy<br>-NATO threat<br>-CIA paramilitary?                                       | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                    |
| 1998-99: Otpor (pre-NATO intervention in Kosovo)             | Nonviolent                        | No                                                                                     | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Democracy development                                    |
| 1999: KLA resistance                                         | Violent                           | -Diplomacy<br>-NATO campaign<br>-CIA paramilitary?                                     | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Ring Around Serbia<br>-Democracy development             |
| 1999-2000: Otpor (post-NATO intervention in Kosovo)          | Nonviolent                        | -Diplomacy<br>-Funding<br>-Training<br>-Education<br>-Democracy development            | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Ring Around Serbia<br>-Pebbles<br>-Democracy development |
| 2000: Democratic Opposition of Serbia                        | Nonviolent                        | -Diplomacy<br>-Funding<br>-Training<br>-Education<br>-Democracy development            | -Diplomacy<br>-UN sanctions<br>-USG sanctions<br>-Ring Around Serbia<br>-Pebbles<br>-Democracy development |

Source: Created by author.

Analysis of table 1 highlights four interesting trends. First is that throughout the decade of resistance to Milosevic, there was not a single instance of direct external support to nonviolent resistance during the first eight years of opposition. Second is that every episode of violent resistance was directly supported by military force or threat of force, and almost every violent episode had direct diplomatic support. Third is that indirect support relied on diplomacy, sanctions, and varying levels of democracy development programs for the first eight years of opposition. Lastly, once direct support to nonviolent resistance began in the ninth year of opposition, it included a broad range of types of support; further, indirect support types expanded as well.

Further consideration of these trends would indicate that foreign actors are hesitant to directly support nonviolent opposition efforts until they assess a high likelihood that nonviolent resistance may be successful. On the other hand, foreign actors appear to take every opportunity to directly support violent opposition with further violence and direct diplomatic outreach. There were several considerations during this period which may explain these trends. First, nonviolent resistance had previously occurred throughout history around the world but the potential effectiveness of nonviolent resistance as a tool for political change did not start to be widely recognized until the twenty first century; after nonviolent resistance methods were given credit for ousting Milosevic. Second, the humanitarian crises throughout the Balkans that resulted from Serbian violence forced the hands of foreign actors to intervene, and they did so with the only tools they knew how; when diplomacy failed they turned to sanctions and when those failed they turned to violence. The risk in this approach is that it creates a ‘carrot or stick’ mentality for resolving global crises. Alternate policy options are needed

along that spectrum between the far end of the carrot and the other far end of the stick; recognizing Otpor's potential opened the opportunity for an alternative policy approach through support to nonviolent resistance. A third consideration is that Otpor originated through domestic, popular initiative. It was not conceived of by foreign actors, and it did not rely on support from foreign actors to pursue its objectives. Therefore, foreign actors may not have even considered supporting nonviolent resistance efforts because there was limited understanding of what it was, how it worked, and if it had potential to succeed. Otpor proved that nonviolent resistance could work against a violently repressive regime.

The focus of this research is ARSOF external support to nonviolent resistance. Chapter four highlighted that ARSOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to support both violent and nonviolent resistance movements. When considering ARSOF capabilities for employment in STR, it appears that there was potential for ARSOF employment throughout the duration of opposition to Milosevic. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia would each have had a unique ARSOF operational approach to supporting resistance efforts. In Bosnia, there would have been a variety of ARSOF activities, including SFA, FID, and UW. Regardless of the activity name, potential existed for ARSOF to conduct CAO, MISO, PSYACTs, and UW operations throughout Bosnia. Given the wide-spread international support for foreign intervention, and the support of the internationally recognized host nation government, ARSOF support could have been overt, low-visibility, clandestine, or covert (if directed by the President). In Kosovo, ARSOF would have been conducting UW, as it would have been supporting resistance to the internationally recognized Serbian regime. Support to the KLA and violent resistance, or insurgency, would have followed the seven-phases of UW, with supporting CAO,

MISO, and PSYACTs as applicable to the operational approach. This support would not be overt; at a minimum it would be low visibility to reduce risk, and it potentially would be clandestine or covert. Supporting the nonviolent political opposition movement would have primarily been conducted through CAO and MISO, but in coordination with all other operations and activities being conducted simultaneously in opposition to Milosevic. The public signature of this support would likely be the same as the support to KLA for the same risk reduction reason.

Like the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo, ARSOF support to domestic Serbian nonviolent resistance would have included a variety CAO, MISO, PSYACT, UW, and other special operations; all synchronized with USG interagency and international efforts. Instead of proposing what ARSOF would have done, the following analysis will attempt to extrapolate any correlation between how Serbian resistance was conducted and supported in the past and compare that to ARSOF capabilities to inform how ARSOF could do it in the future. First is an analysis of the development and progression of Serbian resistance and how it compares to the seven phase UW model (see table 2). This analysis is chronological based on major resistance events.

| Table 2. Serbian Resistance and the UW Model                                |                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                      |                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Event                                                                       | Resistance Objective                                                                            | Significance                                                                                                                         | UW Phase        |
| 1991: Serbian Movement for Renewal protests                                 | -Decrease regime influence in media                                                             | -First mass protest<br>-Popular commitment to nonviolence<br>-Milosevic concedes                                                     | Preparation     |
| 1992: Student protests                                                      | -Disband national assembly<br>-Disband government of Serbian Republic<br>-Milosevic resignation | -First student led protest<br>-No regime concessions<br>-Resistance efforts dissolve                                                 |                 |
| 1996-1997: Zajedno protests                                                 | -Recognition of municipal election results                                                      | -Milosevic concedes<br>-Opposition leaders assume positions in municipalities                                                        |                 |
| 1996-1997: Student protests                                                 | -Decrease regime influence in universities                                                      | -Otpor founders participate<br>-Students joined with Zajedno<br>-Regime-supported university officials resign                        |                 |
| 1997: Student assessment                                                    | -Determine why previous efforts did not produce lasting effects                                 | -First instance of deliberate planning                                                                                               | Organization    |
| 1998: Otpor officially founded                                              | -Free and fair elections<br>-Autonomous universities<br>-Free press                             | -First instance of an organized resistance movement with a deliberate plan of action                                                 |                 |
| Otpor refines objective                                                     | -Remove Milosevic from office                                                                   | -Assessment and analysis reveal the root of the grievance and determine a strategic objective                                        |                 |
| First multi-city action                                                     | -Increase public awareness<br>-Recruitment<br>-Weaken regime authority                          | -Deliberate effort to increase popular support<br>-Initial 'confidence building' in nonviolent action                                | Buildup         |
| Various small actions: leaflets, marches, sit-ins, graffiti, street theater | -Increase public awareness<br>-Recruitment<br>-Weaken regime authority                          | -Expanding membership and tactical action<br>-Employment of various tactics for complementary effects                                |                 |
| Wide-spread arrests and repression                                          | -Organizational survival<br>-Weaken regime authority                                            | -Recognition of the opportunity to use repressive acts to Otpor's advantage                                                          |                 |
| 1999: Decrease activity                                                     | -Organizational survival<br>-Refine operational approach                                        | -Assessment and analysis reveal increase in popular support for regime<br>-Planning to re-engage the population                      |                 |
| Increase activity through humorous acts                                     | -Increase public awareness<br>-Recruitment<br>-Weaken regime authority                          | -Assessment and planning identified a specific operational approach (humor)                                                          |                 |
| 2000: Rock concert                                                          | -Mobilize the masses<br>-"this is THE year"                                                     | -Transition to large-scale mobilization and action                                                                                   |                 |
| First Otpor Congress                                                        | -Increase public awareness<br>-Recruitment<br>-Begin unifying the opposition                    | -Political opposition parties began to acknowledge Otpor's influence                                                                 |                 |
| Democratic Opposition of Serbia formed                                      | -Unite the political opposition parties                                                         | -Political opposition parties recognize they cannot defeat Milosevic is they are divided                                             |                 |
| Training with Helvey                                                        | -Increase effectiveness of resistance efforts                                                   | -Learn how to plan strategically, link tactical actions to strategic objectives, overcome fear and increase recruitment              |                 |
| Otpor internal training                                                     | -Increase effectiveness of resistance efforts                                                   | -Enhanced the effectiveness of resistance tactics<br>-Increased membership<br>-Synchronized resistance cells in a strategic campaign |                 |
| Regime repression: "Otpor is a terrorist organization"                      | -Organizational survival<br>-Maintain resistance momentum<br>-Weaken regime authority           | -Regime recognition that it is losing<br>-Pre-planning enabled Otpor to capitalize on repression, further weakening the regime       |                 |
| Otpor meets with USG representatives                                        | -Increase international credibility and legitimacy                                              | -USG provided direct funding and diplomatic support                                                                                  | Initial Contact |
| Serbian Democratic Forum repatriation efforts                               | -Increase legitimacy of opposition                                                              | -External actors were operating in Serbia to support resistance efforts                                                              | Infiltration    |

|                                                            |                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                |            |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Milosevic calls for early elections                        | -Mass mobilization<br>-Identify a DOS candidate                                                                                            | -Otpor was prepared<br>-DOS was not fully united<br>-No opposition candidate yet                                                                                                               | Employment |
| Kostunica announced as DOS candidate                       | -Mass mobilization<br>-Election campaigning<br>-Set conditions for recognition of legitimate election outcome                              | -Political opposition is united<br>-Opportunity to achieve resistance strategic objective<br>-Recognition that Milosevic will not accept legitimate election results → planning for next phase |            |
| Kostunica wins the vote; Regime calls for run-off election | -Pursue institutional mechanisms for recognition of election results<br>-Mass mobilization to coerce regime to recognize results           | -Opposition had anticipated regime reaction and implemented its plan<br>-Opposition must oust Milosevic prior to run-off election or risk losing it                                            |            |
| Opposition appeals to security forces                      | -Force security defections                                                                                                                 | -Weaken regime's tool of repression                                                                                                                                                            |            |
| Nation-wide mass civil disobedience and noncooperation     | -Force the regime to acknowledge legitimate election results                                                                               | -Worker unions join the opposition<br>-Regime institutions are disrupted                                                                                                                       |            |
| Mass mobilization in Belgrade                              | -Force regime to acknowledge legitimate election results                                                                                   | -Pre-planning facilitated security defections and reduced risk                                                                                                                                 |            |
| Milosevic resigns                                          | -Strategic objective achieved                                                                                                              | -Nonviolent resistance had removed a repressive, authoritarian leader                                                                                                                          |            |
| Kostunica sworn in as president                            | -Strategic objective achieved                                                                                                              | -Legal, institutional processes facilitated transition of governance                                                                                                                           | Transition |
| DOS wins majority in parliament                            | -Begin policy reform to improve quality for Serbian citizens<br>-Transition from resisting the regime to external observer/quality control | - Legal, institutional processes facilitated transition of governance                                                                                                                          |            |
| Otpor as a 'political watchdog'                            |                                                                                                                                            | -Otpor did not immediately collapse after achieving its strategic objective<br>-Otpor continued to serve a new function in support of the Serbian population                                   |            |

*Source:* Created by author.

Table 2 was created by considering the events involved in Serbian domestic resistance, through a theoretical perspective of special operations, and informed by ARSOF capabilities. It is meant to highlight the similarities between the Serbian case and the UW doctrinal model. In this regard, table 2 clearly highlights that Serbian resistance included each of the UW phases, despite not having direct USG support until 2000. This correlation between Serbian resistance and the phases of UW makes sense because UW doctrine was developed based on historical study of resistance best practices; and it describes a UW model that is meant to support a resistance movement from its origins through achievement of objectives and peaceful transition. Doctrinal UW also emphasizes that not every phase of the UW model will occur in every case of resistance,

and that the phases will not always be in a sequential order. In the Serbian case, the second UW phase of initial contact occurred out of sequence per the doctrinal model, but still makes sense within the doctrinal model because it was after USG policy makers had made the decision to pursue further assessment of, and support to, Otpor. From that point forward, USG support fit into opposition efforts as appropriate, and continued as the resistance moved from the buildup phase to the employment phase. Similarly, the third UW phase of infiltration is not an exact comparison either. In the Serbian case, infiltration refers to foreign actors such as NGOs entering Serbia to provide indirect support to the opposition. But as a point of comparison, this is still an important correlation because it indicates the potential for foreign actors (i.e. ARSOF) to infiltrate the operational environment to provide support.

The next section of analysis will compare the organization and functions of Serbian domestic resistance to the components and functions described in the ARSOF basic resistance model. Like the previous comparison to UW, this analysis will be through the theoretical perspective of special operations. For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to note that the intent is not to find exact comparisons in the level of public signature (i.e. overt, low-visibility, clandestine, or covert) because the basic resistance model acknowledges that every case of resistance is unique and adopts the basic model as needed. Rather the focus of the analysis is whether the functions described in the basic resistance model were conducted in the Serbian case (see table 3).

| Table 3. Resistance Functions    |                                          |                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Basic Resistance Model Component | Function                                 | Example from Serbian Case                                                                                                        |
| Underground                      | Intelligence                             | -Early warning that the regime would call for early elections                                                                    |
|                                  | Counterintelligence                      | -Developing/encouraging security forces defections                                                                               |
|                                  | Subversion                               | Every Otpor activity                                                                                                             |
|                                  | Inform                                   | -Leaflets, independent media, mass gatherings                                                                                    |
|                                  | Influence                                | -Leaflets, independent media, mass gatherings, graffiti, street theater, security forces defections, arrest rapid-reaction teams |
|                                  | Fabrication                              | -Publishing the resistance training manual                                                                                       |
|                                  | Sabotage                                 | -Planning to use bulldozers to break through barricades                                                                          |
|                                  | Other support                            | -Arrest rapid-reaction teams and legal council                                                                                   |
| Guerrilla Force                  | Paramilitary operations                  | N/A                                                                                                                              |
|                                  | Sabotage                                 | -Using bulldozers to break through barricades                                                                                    |
|                                  | Non-lethal violence (towards humans)     | N/A                                                                                                                              |
| Auxiliary                        | Logistical procurement                   | -Communications printing equipment                                                                                               |
|                                  | Labor                                    | -Printing and distribution                                                                                                       |
|                                  | Intelligence                             | -Notification of arrests and upcoming repression                                                                                 |
|                                  | Security                                 | -Notification of upcoming repression                                                                                             |
|                                  | Recruitment                              | -Ongoing throughout                                                                                                              |
|                                  | Communications                           | -Product distribution, tactical actions                                                                                          |
|                                  | Product distribution                     | -Distribution of training manuals, <i>Politics of Nonviolent Action</i> , leaflets                                               |
| Public Component                 | Public face of the resistance            | -First Otpor Congress<br>-DOS as opposition political party                                                                      |
|                                  | Negotiate with the regime                | -DOS through legal, institutional means                                                                                          |
|                                  | Appeal for support                       | -Otpor international outreach                                                                                                    |
| Shadow Government                | Parallel services outside regime control | -Alternative media<br>-Democracy development projects                                                                            |

*Source:* Created by author.

This analysis does not require a complete, exhaustive list of every single action or activity conducted by the Serbian resistance. Yet even with only a handful of examples, table 3 highlights that almost every function described in the ARSOF basic resistance

model was conducted by the Serbian resistance. The only exceptions were the use of violence or threat of violence towards humans through paramilitary or other non-lethal violence. Table 3 indicates that the functional requirements of nonviolent resistance movements fit the basic resistance model. Despite being a nonviolent movement, this case even included a form of the armed component, in that they employed the organized use of bulldozers to sabotage regime blockades. Further, remembering that the Serbian resistance made a deliberate choice to avoid violence towards humans, the functional examples in table 3 combined with the development and progression examples from table 2 both correspond to the activities and actions of a basic resistance model depicted in figure 8.

The final analysis for this study will focus on external support. Like previous analysis, this section will attempt to extrapolate if ARSOF can provide similar external support as was provided to the Serbian resistance. Analysis will compare the examples of external support provided to Serbian resistance with ARSOF capability to support resistance movements (see table 4). Regarding the ARSOF capabilities, this analysis is not restricted to ARSOF organic capabilities, but also includes consideration if ARSOF can enable or facilitate it through organic capabilities.

| Table 4. External Support and ARSOF                           |                              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| External Support to Serbian Resistance                        | Comparative ARSOF capability |
| Ring Around Serbia                                            | MISO                         |
| Pebbles                                                       | MISO                         |
| Target the Truth                                              | PSYACTs and MISO             |
| Repatriation                                                  | CAO, PSYACTs, and MISO       |
| Funding                                                       | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Equipping                                                     | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Municipal projects                                            | CAO and PSYACTs              |
| Translation, printing, and distributing educational materials | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Training in voter mobilization                                | CAO                          |
| Training in election monitoring                               | CAO                          |
| Training in resistance as a strategic activity                | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Training in resistance operational approach                   | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Training in resistance recruitment methods                    | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Training in how to conduct resistance training                | CAO, MISO, and UW            |
| Diplomacy                                                     | N/A                          |
| UN sanctions                                                  | N/A                          |
| USG sanctions                                                 | N/A                          |

*Source:* Created by author.

Table 4 includes indirect external support in the form of sanctions and diplomacy to highlight that external support is a multi-department, multi-agency, multinational effort. Some might argue that ARSOF play a role in facilitating diplomacy, but this analysis is considering diplomacy in the context of formal interaction with diplomatic officials. Table 4 indicates that all the direct external support provided to the Serbian resistance could be conducted or facilitated through ARSOF capabilities. This is significant because it indicates that the USG has a policy option for directly supporting nonviolent resistance movements through employment of ARSOF. Additionally, combining the results of table 4 with tables 1 and 2 indicates that ARSOF direct or indirect support to nonviolent resistance could occur at any point in the lifecycle of a resistance movement. This is important to recognize because it suggests that USG policy makers can employ ARSOF as part of an STR strategy to assess, organize, and train a

nonviolent resistance movement with the goal of increasing the probability of the resistance succeeding rather than waiting for the resistance to prove that it has high potential to succeed.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Findings

Summarized below are six findings that were produced by this research. This study recognizes that these findings are the result of a single case study. However, there is still value in describing these findings as they may provide insight or guidance to future USG policy makers, resistance practitioners, supporters of resistance, and scholars. Each will be explored for its significance, implications, and contribution towards answering the research questions originally posed in chapter one.

The first finding is that state actors are hesitant to directly support a nonviolent resistance movement until they assess a high likelihood that the resistance will succeed. One could argue that this is a logical decision-making process for a state policy maker. However, this research has shown that support to nonviolent resistance has potential to be a suitable, feasible, and acceptable strategy at any point of the resistance lifecycle. Making that decision requires accurate assessments of the operational environment and resistance potential with consideration that STR may alter that assessment. ARSOF is one possible tool for generating or contributing to that assessment.

The second finding is that state actors tend to support violent resistance movements with diplomacy, sanctions, and increased combat power. This is not surprising given the historical use of these three tools, either independently or in concert, to resolve conflicts. Additionally, the USG arguably has the most global influence and strongest military, therefore it makes sense to utilize these tools of intervention. However, the risk is that policy makers will continue to use these tools in the carrot or

stick method. As this case highlighted, the carrot and stick method does not always work, might unintentionally strengthen the position of the opponent, and risks escalating the conflict. This research has shown that an alternate approach through STR might mitigate those risks without necessitating compromise, concessions, or large-scale commitment of resources from the intervening state.

The third finding is that the Serbian nonviolent resistance organized and acted to provide the same functions as the ARSOF doctrinal basic resistance model. This indicates that ARSOF have the training and education to assess and understand nonviolent resistance movements. This capability can serve to better inform the intelligence community and policy makers about facts on-the-ground which inform USG policies. It also suggests that it would be valuable for ARSOF to study nonviolent resistance and ensure unit readiness to assess and/or support them to provide a viable policy option to USG decision makers.

The fourth finding is that the Serbian nonviolent resistance movement progressed through the same phases as the ARSOF doctrinal phases of UW. This suggests that ARSOF have the capability to conduct UW in support of a nonviolent movement. Therefore, like the recommendation above, it would be valuable for ARSOF to study nonviolent resistance movements and ensuring unit readiness to assess and/or support them.

The fifth finding is that external support to the Serbian nonviolent resistance movement was provided through multiple USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGO: this aligns with the ARSOF doctrinal model of STR as a synchronized effort through all the USG instruments of national power. As

such, it suggests that ARSOF is already organized, trained, and equipped to be integrated into an interagency STR strategy.

The sixth and final finding is that all external support provided directly to the Serbian nonviolent resistance movement could be conducted or facilitated through ARSOF organic capabilities. This is possibly the most significant finding because it indicates that ARSOF is already organized, trained, and equipped to conduct support to nonviolent resistance movements.

With these findings, this study will now attempt to answer the research questions posed in chapter one. The primary question is what can ARSOF contribute to a United States whole-of-government strategy to support nonviolent resistance movements? The answer is that ARSOF has organic capabilities to conduct CAO, MISO, PSYACTs, UW, and other special operations which can be synchronized with interagency efforts to assess and support nonviolent resistance movements. ARSOF support can be provided directly or indirectly and can be initiated at any point in the lifecycle of the nonviolent resistance movement; to include when grievances are first identified or emerging. The second research question is what has USG support to nonviolent resistance looked like in the past? Based on this case study, the answer is that the USG historically supports nonviolent resistance movements with diplomacy or sanctions against the grievance generating actor. The third research question is does ARSOF have the capability to provide support to nonviolent resistance movements? The answer is yes, as described in the answer to the primary research question. The final research question is should ARSOF conduct these activities? This study did not produce findings to answer this question, therefore, future research should explore it further. There are numerous factors

within that question that future research should explore? For example, what is the risk to the resistance movement if it becomes affiliated with the USG; what is the risk to a nonviolent movement if it becomes associated with support from a military source; and what is the international law and norms concerning external intervention in sovereign affairs and how does that inform USG policy making? Additional areas of future research should further explore the functions and composition of resistance movements with consideration to the variety of definitions for violence and nonviolence. Another valuable contribution would be analysis and comparison of other nonviolent resistance cases to ARSOF and/or USG STR capabilities, such as the Polish Solidarity movement, the color revolutions, and Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab spring. Insights from these studies would further inform ARSOF readiness and USG policy options. A final proposal for future research is the role of nonviolent tactical action as it relates to other ARSOF activities. For example, how does ARSOF train, advise, and assist an indigenous partner force through FID activities to increase the internal stability of that host nation when there is both violent and nonviolent tactical action occurring in the operational environment?

#### Evolution of the Research Methodology

The methodology for this study was to conduct a case study analysis of Otpor from 1998-2000 through a theoretical perspective of special operations and compare it to ARSOF capabilities through a theoretical perspective of nonviolent resistance to answer the primary research question. Upon deeper exploration of the case study, it became clear that Otpor was rooted in a societal precedence of nonviolent protest dating back to 1991 that was organized around political opposition parties and/or groups of students. This

precedence may be why Otpor chose to remain unaligned with any specific political party. Once the case study was expanded to include relevant data about the origins and development of Otpor grievances, objectives, and methods of resistance, it became clear that Serbian domestic resistance was linked to the ongoing effort by Milosevic to pursue Greater Serbia, maintain the national integrity of Yugoslavia, and consolidate individual power in pursuit of the first two. This realization led to expanding the case study from Serbian domestic resistance to include the Bosnian war and the Kosovo conflict as contributing factors to Serbian domestic grievances under the umbrella of Greater Serbia, as well as the examination of external support across Greater Serbia. After analyzing popular resistance to Milosevic as a singular phenomenon across Greater Serbia, the analysis returned to the primary focus of the methodology which was the analysis of Otpor. However, as described above, this analysis required examination of the entire period of Serbian domestic resistance from 1991-2000.

### Research Implications

This adjusted research design produced significant findings, answered the primary research question, and validated the thesis of this study. At this point in the study, it is prudent to readdress two topics discussed in chapter one to determine possible implications based on this research.

The first topic relates to USG policy and strategy. The current National Security Strategy reflects the policy of the United States to provide support and assistance to societies suffering oppression or denial of basic human rights, both out of moral necessity as well as to curb the challenge to U.S. national security. That single sentence could be used to summarize the role the USG played in supporting the oppressed societies of

Greater Serbia in the 1990s. The current National Defense Strategy emphasizes the need for innovation and increased effectiveness in support of national security objectives. This is significant because this study has found that there are alternative policy options for supporting oppressed societies beyond the traditional carrot and stick methods of diplomacy, sanctions, and overwhelming combat power. The current administration, its advisors, and senior leaders across the various USG departments and agencies must be educated in the potential for STR as an alternative policy option. This research study is just one step, and it complements the recently updated and published *Resistance Operating Concept* which proposes a model of resilience and resistance against foreign occupation by supporting and developing violent and nonviolent methods of resistance pre-conflict. However, both these studies were developed through the military instrument of national power: this thesis by an Army officer at the Army Command and General Staff College, and the *Resistance Operating Concept* by United States Special Operations Command Europe with its partners and allies.

This research has shown that STR is a synchronized, interagency strategy. Further, the National Security Strategy discusses how the USG will employ all its instruments of national power to achieve USG objectives. The entire interagency needs to be working together to explore STR options to reduce the risk of overlooking a suitable, feasible, and acceptable USG strategy. A previous attempt to develop an interagency STR framework was halted in 2017.<sup>235</sup> Now that new concepts and scholarship about STR are

---

<sup>235</sup> Email correspondence between the author and one of the primary contributors to the STR framework effort.

being produced, it is time for interagency leaders to readdress the subject in the best interests of the USG.

The second topic relates to the force management domains of DOTMLPF-P. In Chapter one it was claimed that there is no DOTMLPF-P requirement for ARSOF to be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct support to nonviolent resistance movements. At the conclusion of this study, it appears that claim may have been inaccurate. Informed by this research, this section will address each of the DOTMLPF-P domains. This section uses the term insurgency when referring to violent resistance.

Doctrine: Joint doctrine includes the military activity of support to insurgency, executed through UW. However, by definition, an insurgency includes the organized use of violence. There is no military activity to specifically support a nonviolent resistance movement. As this research has shown, ARSOF doctrine includes a basic model of resistance and a seven stage UW model which can be applied to both insurgencies and nonviolent resistance movements.

Organization: This research has shown that ARSOF are organized to support both insurgencies and nonviolent resistance movements.

Training: This research has identified that SF is specially trained for UW because it provides SF with the skills needed to conduct other military activities. SF initial training during the SF Qualification Course (SFQC) focuses on guerrilla warfare, which makes sense because those skills are translatable beyond UW to other military activities which require organizing and training indigenous military or paramilitary forces. There are some advanced courses that individuals may attend on a selective basis, and a select number of units may conduct collective UW training at a CTC, but it is the author's

opinion that the majority of SF soldiers never expand their UW skills beyond the scope of guerrilla warfare. For those that do, there are limited opportunities to maintain that skill set through sustainment training.

**Materiel:** This research has shown that ARSOF are equipped to support both insurgencies and nonviolent resistance movements.

**Leadership:** Leaders have a significant role in shaping their organizations, making decisions about organizational goals and strategies for achieving those goals.

Requirements for unit readiness are informed by policy, precedence, and expected employment, and ARSOF leaders use these insights to set priorities within their organization to maintain and enhance unit readiness. However, those insights can only be informed through exposure to, and evaluation of, information and ideas. ARSOF leaders who have never been exposed to the potential effectiveness of nonviolent tactical action or the idea of supporting a nonviolent resistance movement are unable to consider including those concepts into their unit readiness requirements or recommending it as a course of action to support USG policy.

**Personnel:** This research has shown that ARSOF have the personnel to support both insurgencies and nonviolent resistance movements.

**Facilities:** This research has shown that AROF already have the capabilities to support both insurgencies and nonviolent resistance movements. Therefore, the current facilities support the current capabilities.

**Policy:** UW is designated as a USSOCOM special operations activity in Title 10 of United States Code, and USASOC is designated the lead USSOCOM component in all matters pertaining to UW, CAO, and PSYOP. ARSOF conduct of support to nonviolent

resistance movements as a USG policy option has already been described in depth throughout this study.

### Recommendations

The DOTMLPF-P summary above suggests that there may be some areas for improvement in the domains of joint doctrine, training, and leadership to maximize ARSOF's readiness to conduct the full range of UW activities and supporting operations. This research did not fully examine joint doctrine in-depth, therefore it would be premature to recommend changing the joint activity of support to insurgency. However, this research did expose a discrepancy between the joint doctrinal activity, which is focused on supporting violent action, and the ARSOF doctrine, which recognizes the role of both violence and nonviolent action. Therefore, further research must examine all DOD doctrinal activities, the components assigned to execute them, and the supporting doctrine to clarify this discrepancy and ensure that doctrine is serving its intended role as a common framework and language.

The gaps in the training and leadership domains can both be addressed through education. USASOC is the lead USSOCOM component in all matters pertaining to UW. It is not enough to provide entry-level training in guerrilla warfare and hope that ARSOF units across the force will be prepared to conduct UW to the level of expertise expected by policy makers and deserved by resistance movements. It is true that individuals and units increase proficiency and readiness to support an insurgency through training, deployments, and other engagements. However, this research has shown that the strategic and operational approach to supporting an insurgency is entirely different to supporting a nonviolent resistance movement. Therefore, this study recommends ARSOF institute an

educational mechanism across the force to better inform, educate, and prepare ARSOF to support all methods of resistance.

The first step in this process is educating ARSOF, DOD, and interagency leaders on the potential effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, and to recognize that it is occurring throughout the international security environment. At the leadership level, this education might start with nonviolent resistance seminars in which experts from the discipline of nonviolent resistance can provide a theoretical, conceptual, and historical overview. This process has already begun on a small-scale at the Army War College. This can be coupled with a panel of experienced civil resistance practitioners to highlight the relevance to real-world events and lessons learned. Leaders will then be equipped to evaluate ARSOF training through their broadened perspective on methods of resistance and determine how best to train the force to meet the needs of the operational environment. Adapting existing ARSOF training for UW to incorporate a nonviolent resistance plan of instruction should be relatively simple because the institutional requirements for training UW already exist. The greatest gap that must be addressed before instituting a nonviolent resistance plan of instruction is the lack of institutional knowledge within ARSOF. This gap can be addressed by sending a cadre of trainers from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) to one of the existing nonviolent resistance training seminars hosted by several NGOs worldwide. These cadre will return to SWCS to serve as subject matter experts and create a plan of instruction for conducting train-the-trainer courses for ARSOF. There are two options for implementing this train-the-trainer program. The first is for SWCS to integrate nonviolent resistance training into the existing plans of instruction for all relevant training courses and events.

The second is for those cadre to be picked from across the ARSOF units so that they can return to their units and incorporate their expertise into the training courses and mechanisms within each unit.

These proposals are low cost and can be executed within the existing institutional capabilities of DOD and ARSOF. They are not an attempt to develop a new capability, but rather intend to complement the existing knowledge, capacity, and capabilities that already exist to ensure ARSOF are best prepared to meet the challenges and operational requirements of the twenty first century. Expanding ARSOF institutional capacity to support nonviolent resistance movements will enhance ARSOF strategic value to the USG in line with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and USASOC Strategy of “expanding options to wield influence and manage escalation in the competition space.”<sup>236</sup>

---

<sup>236</sup> USASOC, *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy*, 6.

## GLOSSARY

**Auxiliary.** For the purpose of unconventional warfare, the support element of the irregular organization whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular movement.

**Civil Affairs Operations.** Actions planned, executed, and assessed by [Civil Affairs forces] that enhance the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

**Foreign Internal Defense.** United States activities that support a host nation's internal defense and development strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.

**Guerrilla Force.** A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.

**Insurgency.** The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.

**Military Information Support Operations.** operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.

**Psychological Action.** Planned lethal or nonlethal action executed to produce a specific psychological effect in a foreign individual, group, or population.

**Public Component.** An overt political manifestation of a resistance.

**Resistance Movement.** An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.

**Shadow Government.** Governmental elements and activities performed by the irregular organization that will eventually take the place of the existing government.

**Subversion.** Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.

Support to Resistance. A United States Government policy option to support foreign resistance actors that offers an alternative to a direct U.S. military intervention or formal political engagement in a conflict.

Unconventional Warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forces in a denied area.

Underground. A cellular covert element within unconventional warfare that is compartmentalized and conducts covert or clandestine activities in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the guerrilla force.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994.
- Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-violent Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
- Bartkowski, Maciej J., ed. *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.
- Blair, Dennis. *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions*, Vol. 1, *Overview and Action Plan*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.
- Burrowes, Robert J. *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
- Cox, John K. *The History of Serbia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.
- Engler, Mark, and Paul Engler. *This Is An Uprising*. New York: Nation Books, 2016.
- Eriksson, Gunilla, and Ulrica Pettersson, eds. *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Fiala, Otto C. *Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2020.
- Helvey, Robert. *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*. Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2004.
- Irwin, Will. *How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters to SOF)*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2019.
- . *Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2019.
- Jones, Seth G. *A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018.

- Kinsman, Jeremy, and Kurt Bassuener. *A Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy Development Support*. 3rd ed. Ontario, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013.
- McCabe, Peter, and Paul Lieber, eds. *Special Operations Theory*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017.
- McRaven, William H. *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice*. New York: Presidio Press, 1995.
- Paulson, Joshua. "Case Study – Serbia, 1996-2000." In *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*, ed. Gene Sharp, 10-33. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Post, Jerrold M. *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Prados, John. *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
- Ramat, Sabrina P., and Vjeran Pavlakovic, eds. *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.
- Roberts, Adam, and Timothy Garton Ash, eds. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Rubright, Richard W. *A Unified Theory for Special Operations*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017.
- Schock, Kurt. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
- Searle, Tom. *Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2017.
- Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973.
- Sharp, Gene, with assistance of Bruce Jenkins. *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Spulak Jr., Robert. *A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF*. Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 2007.
- Stephan, Maria, ed. *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.

———. *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015.

Theoharis, Athan, Richard Immerman, Loch Johnson, Kathryn Olmsted, and John Prados, eds. *The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006.

Yarger, Harry R. *21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations*. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 2013.

#### Government Documents

Berger, Samuel. Declassified Documents concerning Kosovo. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed 19 April 2020. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16195>.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, *Army Special Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019.

———. Army Technical Publication 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019.

———. Field Manual 3-05, *Army Special Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2014.

———. Field Manual 3-18, *Special Forces Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014.

———. Field Manual 3-53, *Psychological Operations Forces (Initial Draft)*. Washington, DC, January 2020. Referenced and cited with approval from Chief, Psychological Operations Doctrine Division, Special Operations Center of Excellence.

———. Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2019.

Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, incorporating Change 1, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 22 October 2018.

———. Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 July 2014.

———. Joint Publication 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 September 2015.

———. Joint Publication 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 07 January 2010. Incorporating Change 1, 20 December 2011.

- National Security Council. Declassified Documents concerning National Security Council. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed 19 April 2020.  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197>.
- . Declassified Documents Concerning PDD-68, International Public Policy. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed 20 April 2020.  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/49440>
- . Declassified Documents Concerning Ring Around Serbia. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed 17 April 2020.  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/100549>.
- . “Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia.” Washington, DC, May 19, 1995. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed 17 April 2020.  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12464>.
- National Security Council, European Affairs, and Alexander Vershbow. “Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2].” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed April 17, 2020,  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/72147>.
- Office of Communications and Don Baer. “Bosnia 2.” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed April 17, 2020, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/34706>.
- United States Army Special Operations Command. *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy*. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, October 2019.
- . *U.S. Government Support to Resistance Framework (Draft)*. Version 0.33. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 11 January 2017.
- United States Department of State. “Dayton History Project: Interview with Madeleine Albright, 28 October 1996.” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed April 17, 2020.  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12627>.
- United States Director of Intelligence, Office of European Analysis. “Greater Serbia A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s.” Intelligence Memorandum, 27 January 1993. Clinton Digital Library. Accessed April 17, 2020,  
<https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12301>.
- United States President. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017.
- United States Secretary of Defense. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018.

### Periodicals

- Bacher, John. "Robert Helvey's Expert Political Defiance." *Peace Magazine* (April-June 2003). Accessed 18 February 2020. <http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p10.htm>
- Beehner, Lionel, Steve Ferenzi, and John Chambers. "Achieving Victory Beyond Violent Warfare." *ARMY Magazine* (September 2018): 10-12.
- Beissinger, Mark R. "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?" *Dissent* (Winter 2006): 18-24.
- Bieber, Florian. "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 73-90. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020198>.
- Brands, Hal. "Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict." *Survival* 60, no. 5 (October-November 2018): 61-114.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria Stephan. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 7-44.
- CNN. "Students protest on streets of Belgrade." 29 November 1996. Accessed 14 April 2020. <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9611/29/yugo.students/index.html>.
- Cohen, Roger. "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" *The New York Times Magazine* (26 November 2000). Accessed 25 February 2020. <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001126mag-serbia.html>.
- Cunningham, Kathleen G. "Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 291-304.
- Engelberg, Stephen. "Police Storm Protest in Belgrade; 2 Dead." *The New York Times*, 10 March 1991. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/10/world/police-storm-protest-in-belgrade-2-dead.html>.
- Erlanger, Steven. "Change in Yugoslav Constitution Allows Milosevic to Seek Another Term as President." *The New York Times*, 7 July 2000. Accessed 16 April 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/07/world/change-yugoslav-constitution-allows-milosevic-seek-another-term-president.html>.

Harden, Blaine. "Yugoslav regime Bows to Protesters." *The Washington Post*, 13 March 1991. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/03/13/yugoslav-regime-bows-to-protesters/fdd1ab04-2342-4502-b97a-e12a056bf894/>.

Kozaryn, Linda D. "Larger Kosovo Force Takes to Field." *American Forces Press Service*, 25 June 1999. Accessed 19 April 2020. <https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42742>.

Nikolayenko, Olena. "Origins of the movement's strategy: The case of the Serbian youth movement Otpor." *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 2 (March 2013): 140-158.

Pomfret, John. "Belgrade Paralyzed by Massive Protest." *The Washington Post*, 26 November 1996. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/11/26/belgrade-paralyzed-by-massive-protest/b94efe36-2902-46ae-9228-12ee7a9e21a8/>.

Prosic-Dvornic, Mirjana. "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Quest of 'Another Serbia'." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 11, no. 1 & 2 (1993): 127-137. Accessed 14 April 2020. [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-z6rBu-joAhUJOq0KHa7ECggQFjABegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fscholarworks.iu.edu%2Fjournals%2Findex.php%2Faer%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F596%2F698%2F&usg=AOvVaw2z\\_jKweHLSB1xZ-AePIfma](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-z6rBu-joAhUJOq0KHa7ECggQFjABegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fscholarworks.iu.edu%2Fjournals%2Findex.php%2Faer%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F596%2F698%2F&usg=AOvVaw2z_jKweHLSB1xZ-AePIfma).

Rosenberg, Tina. "Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students Who Overthrew Milosevic." *Foreign Policy*, 16 February 2011. Accessed 25 February. <https://www.umass.edu/preferen/You%20Must%20Read%20This/Facebook%20Liberation%20Tactics.pdf>.

### Papers and Reports

Carothers, Thomas. "Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia." *Policy Brief* 1, no. 5 (May 2001). Accessed 01 April 2020. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/PolBrief5.pdf>.

Celeski, Joseph. "A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art." Report of Proceedings from SOF-Power Workshop, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill AFB, FL, 22-23 August 2011.

Chinsky, Benjamin. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Anti-Occupation Civil Resistance Campaigns." Master's research study, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, May 2019.

- Congressional Research Service (CRS). *Federal Workforce Statistics Sources: OPM and OMB*. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 24 October 2019. Accessed 13 May 2020. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf>.
- Daadler, Ivo H. "Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended." The Brookings Institution, 01 December 1998. Accessed 17 April 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/>.
- Garfield, Richard. *Economic Sanctions, Health, and Welfare in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1990-2000*. Report prepared for the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, Belgrade, Serbia, 2001. Accessed 06 May 2020. [https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/FRY\\_01-013.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/FRY_01-013.pdf).
- Jackson, Jaime. "The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Civil Conflict Outcomes." Research prepared for the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference 2015, 04 April 2015. Accessed 19 February 2020. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a441/15e279248af6ff1c19ff586b1ce096417523.pdf>.
- Kacsur Jr., Charles J. "Economic Sanctions Targeting Yugoslavia – An Effective National Security Strategy Component." Research project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 2003. Accessed 06 May 2020. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420059.pdf>.
- Kurtz, Lester R. "Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000)." Summary report, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington, DC, February 2010. Accessed 25 March 2019. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/otpor-struggle-democracy-serbia-1998-2000/>.
- Meredith, Spencer B., ed. *SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 2017.
- Ogwuru, Ifeanyi. "The Effect of Nonviolent Movement on Democracy and Peace in Serbia." Research paper. Accessed 25 February 2020. [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjtoavAofvoAhUBnawKHbWuAT0QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F35881014%2FThe\\_effect\\_of\\_Nonviolent\\_Movement\\_on\\_Democracy\\_and\\_Peace\\_in\\_Serbia&usg=AOvVaw2y1zrrCQnX467xDMIIXYia](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjtoavAofvoAhUBnawKHbWuAT0QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F35881014%2FThe_effect_of_Nonviolent_Movement_on_Democracy_and_Peace_in_Serbia&usg=AOvVaw2y1zrrCQnX467xDMIIXYia).
- Petrovic, Duda Nenad. "Chronology of Events – A Brief History of Otpor." Summary report, Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, Belgrade, Serbia. Accessed 16 April 2020. <https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Chronology-OTPOR.pdf>.

- Phillips, R. Cody. "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995-2004." Center for Military History, United States Army. Accessed 17 April 2020. [https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-97-1/cmhPub\\_70-97-1.pdf](https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-97-1/cmhPub_70-97-1.pdf).
- Pinckney, Jonathan. "Making or Breaking Nonviolent Discipline in Civil Resistance Movements." Monograph, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington, DC, 2016. Accessed 13 February 2019. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICNC-Monograph-Making-or-Breaking-Nonviolent-Discipline.pdf>.
- Rennack, Dianne and (name redacted). *Economic Sanctions and the Former Yugoslavia: Current Status and Policy Considerations Through 1996*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 16 December 1996. Accessed 06 May 2020. [https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19961216\\_97-20\\_92de1e618a5d683521ce8f1eb5d8f7cbf212d9c8.pdf](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19961216_97-20_92de1e618a5d683521ce8f1eb5d8f7cbf212d9c8.pdf).
- Stephan, Maria, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala. "Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset." Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, February 2015.
- United States Army Special Operations Command. *ARSOF Fact Book 2018*. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2018. Accessed 13 May 2020. <https://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html>.
- United States Congress. Senate. "The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties? From 'Terrorists' to 'Partners'." Report by Republican Policy Committee, Washington, DC, 31 March 1999. Accessed 16 April 2020. <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/fr033199.htm>
- United States Department of State. "GTM Fact Sheet: Facts about Our Most Valuable Asset – Our People." Factsheet, Department of State Human Resources, 31 March 2020. Accessed 13 May 2020. [http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/0320\\_state\\_dept\\_hr\\_factsheet.pdf](http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/0320_state_dept_hr_factsheet.pdf).

#### Other Sources

- Ackerman, Peter. "Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?" Presentation, Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 15-18 March 2007. Accessed 19 February 2020. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/skills.pdf>.
- Allcock, John B. "Slobodan Milosevic: President of Yugoslavia." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Slobodan-Milosevic>.

*Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced and directed by Steve York. A production of York Zimmerman Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington, DC 2002. Documentary film, 55:42. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/bringing-dictator-english/>.

Lampe, John R., and John B. Allcock. "Yugoslavia: Former Federated Nation [1929-2003]." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed 14 April 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003>.