

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION
TO MOLDOVA'S EFFECTIVENESS IN RESOLVING
THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

CONSTANTIN CISLEANU, MAJ, NATIONAL ARMY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Bachelor, Military Institute, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, 2008

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2020

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2020		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From-To) AUG 2019 – JUN 2020	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Mission to Moldova's Effectiveness in Resolving the Transnistrian Conflict				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Constantin Cisleanu, Major, MD Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Transnistrian conflict broke out in 1992 between the Transnistria region and the central government in Chisinau. A ceasefire was agreed to in July 1992 and the parties committed themselves to negotiate a settlement to the conflict facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE Mission to Moldova's top priority is to facilitate through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistria conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova. This study aims to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation. Whether or not OSCE can effectively resolve the Transnistria conflict depends on numerous factors analyzed in the research; the most important of them is its' unique end state of the mission to all the actors involved in the conflict. This study makes recommendations on how the OSCE Mission to Moldova might improve.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Moldova, Transnistria, Mandate, Conflict, Effectiveness					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	144	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Constantin Cisleanu

Thesis Title: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to
Moldova's Effectiveness in Resolving the Transnistrian Conflict

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Gregory J. Cook, M.A.

_____, Member
Mark T. Gerges, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Daniel C. Honken, M.S.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2020 by:

_____, Acting Director, Office of Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA'S EFFECTIVENESS IN RESOLVING THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT, by Major Constantin Cisleanu, 144 pages.

The Republic of Moldova is facing more than a quarter of a century with an unresolved conflict that casts doubt on the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country. The conflict broke out in 1992 between Transnistria and the central government in Chisinau. A ceasefire was agreed to in July 1992 and the parties committed themselves to negotiate a settlement to the conflict facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is the world's largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization. The OSCE Mission to Moldova's top priority is to facilitate through peaceful negotiations, a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistria conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova.

The paper first describes the operational environment in the Republic of Moldova using a PMESII/ASCOPE and RAFT framework to identify the actors, tensions, and relationships. Then, the paper examines the end state for the mission from different perspectives, using official documents, protocols, and political vision sources of all the actors involved in the researches area. Finally, the work develops an operational approach using overall Operational Design Methodology.

This study aims to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation. Whether or not OSCE can effectively resolve the Transnistria conflict depends on numerous factors analyzed in the research; the most important of them is its' unique end state of the mission to all the actors involved in the conflict. This study makes recommendations on how the OSCE Mission to Moldova might improve.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all those who allowed me to study at the Command and General Staff College and to those who provided support throughout my course of study. I would like to thank all those who willingly accepted to support me in conducting the research and accomplishing the Master of Military Arts and Sciences program. I appreciate the effort and patience of my MMAS committee chair, Mr. Gregory Cook, who constantly provided professional guidance, ideas, expert insight, and a lot of proofreading. I also want to express thanks to the committee members, Dr. Mark T. Gerges and Mr. Daniel C. Honken, for their professional assistance and excellent feedback.

Finally, I would like to thank my lovely wife Silvia and our beautiful children Bianca and Hector, who have supported me throughout this period with their perseverance and love. I want to dedicate this thesis to them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
TABLES	xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Overview	1
Research Questions.....	6
Primary Research Question.....	6
Secondary Research Questions	6
Assumptions.....	7
Definitions of Key Terms	9
Limitations	10
Scope and Delimitations	11
Significance of the Study	11
Summary	12
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	13
Introduction.....	13
Key Documents Review	14
Articles and Publications	44
Summary and Conclusions	49
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	50
Introduction.....	50
Data Collection	52
Data Analysis and Synthesis.....	55
Data Trustworthiness	60
Summary and Conclusion	60

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS.....	61
Introduction.....	61
Understanding the Operational Environment	62
Dynamics of the OSCE Mission to Moldova	63
Crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE	69
Republic of Moldova Overview.....	69
The Political Variable	69
The Military Variable	70
The Economic Variable	71
The Social Variable	72
The Information Variable	73
The Infrastructure Variable.....	75
Transnistrian Region Overview	78
The Political Variable	78
The Military Variable	79
The Economic Variable	80
The Social Variable	82
The Information Variable	83
The Infrastructure Variable.....	85
PMESII/ACSOPE Analysis.....	88
System Perspective RAFT	89
Understanding the Operational Environment Conclusion	93
Visualizing the Mission Desired End State	94
OSCE Desired End State	94
Moldova Desired End State	96
Transnistria Desired End State.....	99
Russians Desired End State	101
Defining the Problem.....	106
Summary and Conclusions	112
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	113
Introduction.....	113
Interpretation of findings described in Chapter 4	114
Recommendations.....	119
Recommendations for Further Study	122
Summary and conclusions	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

ACRONYMS

AA/DCFTA	Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
ABCNY	Association of the Bar of the City of New York
ACC	Audiovisual Coordinating Council
AO	Area of Operation
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
CFE	The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CiO	Chairperson-in-Office
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoG	Center of Gravity
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (until 31 December 1994)
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic instruments of National Power
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
OGRF	Operational Group of Russian Forces
GUAM	Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine
JCC	Joint Control Commission
LOE	Line of Effort
MoD	Ministry of Defense

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (since 1 January 1995)
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure
PMR	Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (in Russian <i>Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika</i>)
RAFT	Actors, Relationship, Functions, Tensions
RCP	Remove, Provide, and Change
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WG	Working Groups

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. OSCE Mission to Moldova Chain of Command	19
Figure 2. Chronology of Official Documents of the Transnistrian Conflict	43
Figure 3. Inductive Approach to Research	52
Figure 4. Data Collection Epistemology	54
Figure 5. Research Design	59
Figure 6. Map of the Republic of Moldova with the Security Zone	63
Figure 7. Dynamics of the Integration Path Targeted in the Fundamental Documents of the Transnistrian Conflict	65
Figure 8. Operational Environment Representation Using System Perspective RAFT Method	91
Figure 9. Defining the Problem	110
Figure 10. Operational Approach First Model	120
Figure 11. Operational Approach Second Model	121

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Moldova Trade Partners (2017).....	72
Table 2. PMESII/ASCOPE Republic of Moldova AO	77
Table 3. PMESII/ASCOPE Transnistria AO	87
Table 4. PMESII/ASCOPE Analysis	88
Table 5. OSCE Mission to Moldova Desired End State	95
Table 6. Moldova Desired End State	99
Table 7. Transnistria Desired End State	101
Table 8. Russians Desired End State	105

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institutions and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones. The hesitation of the latter arises in part from the fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, and in part from the general skepticism of mankind which does not really believe in innovation until experience proves its value. So it happens whenever his enemies have occasion to attack the innovator they do so with the passion of partisans while the others defend him sluggishly so that the innovator and his party are alike vulnerable.

—Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Problem Overview

The Republic of Moldova is facing more than a quarter of a century with an unresolved conflict that casts doubt on the independence and territorial integrity of the country. It all started at the end of 1989 when the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapsing. The policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* (economic restructuring and openness) used by Mikhail Gorbachev allow political pluralism at the regional level, develop national movements that became the leading political force in every republic from USSR. Besides, that creates conditions in which national feelings could be openly expressed and in which the Soviet republics could consider reforms.¹ These movements exhibited increasingly nationalist sentiments in Moldova and expressed intent to leave the USSR in favor of uniting with Romania. Following that, laws were enacted for changing the official language, returning to the Latin Romanian alphabet, traditional tricolor,

¹ New World Encyclopedia, “Moldova,” accessed December 20, 2019, <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/moldova>.

national anthem the same as Romanian, partial opening of the border between Romania and Moldova, and the name of the country was changed to the Republic of Moldova. That amount of change encountered growing opposition from among the primarily Russian-speaking ethnic minorities living in the republic, especially in the Transnistria region, which believed that a union between Moldova and Romania was inevitable. As a result, the Transnistria region proclaimed itself as an independent country known as PMR (Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublica), even though Gorbachev did not approve of that. The Moldovan Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence on August 27, 1991, including the Transnistria region on its eastern boundaries. The Transnistria region started a separatist movement and had its first clashes with local police forces in November 1991, when the first victims of the conflict were recorded. The war started on the same day that Moldova was admitted as a member of the United Nations, March 02, 1992. Actions commenced through simultaneous attacks on different police stations in the region to disconnect command and control from the government. In reaction, Moldavian President Mircea Snegur authorized military intervention against separatist forces. Even though the conflict was not long and lasted about five months, with hundreds of casualties on both sides, the outcome showed that the Republic of Moldova needed a small, mobile and sufficiently strong army that could defend the sovereignty of the state, repel foreign aggression, and defend the interests of the Republic of Moldova in the region. At the time, the Russian 14th Guard Army within Moldova numbered about 14,000 professional soldiers, plus Transnistria had 9,000 militiamen trained and armed by officers of the 14th Army. Half of the Russian troops fought side by side with the

separatist troops, handing over their weapons and opening ammunition depots.² A ceasefire agreement was signed on July 21, 1992.³ This official document, whose general framework was established by the Russian side, was signed by the presidents of Russia Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan Mircea Snegur. The agreement provided peacekeeping forces charged with ensuring observance of the ceasefire and security arrangements, composed of five Russian battalions, three Moldovan battalions, and two PMR battalions under the orders of a joint military command structure, the Joint Control Commission (JCC). After signing the agreement, de facto, 12 percent of the territory of the Republic of Moldova remained under the control of the authorities from Tiraspol. In 2002, during a press conference held in Chisinau, former President of the State Duma of Russia, Ghennadi Seleznirov, acknowledged that “Russia had to trigger the war in Transnistria to stop the union of Moldova with Romania.”⁴

After the agreed ceasefire, the parties in the conflict committed themselves to negotiate a settlement to the conflict facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organization. The top priority of the OSCE Mission to Moldova is to

² Human Rights Watch, “Russia,” accessed January 17, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/russia/#P131_22060.

³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/24369*, “Note Verbale dated 31 July 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Moldova to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations, August 6, 1992, accessed September 16, 2019, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MD%20RU_920000_AgreementPrinciplesPeacefulSettlementDniestrConflict.pdf.

⁴ Vitalie Călugăreanu, “18 ani de la încetarea focului la Nistru,” *Deutsche Welle*, last modified July 21, 2010, accessed December 20, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/ro/18-ani-de-la-%C3%AEncetarea-focului-la-nistru/a-5822372-0>.

facilitate through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistria conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova.⁵ Starting from 1993, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has been actively engaging both sides in dialogue and negotiation. The framework for dialogue is more of a political approach in convincing the sides for a definitive settlement of the conflict. The mission end state is reintegration and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova. This end state is endorsed by all 57 OSCE participating states, including the Republic of Moldova, through annual Ministerial Council Statements.⁶

The Transnistria conflict has been frozen since the ceasefire agreement was signed between the Republic of Moldova and Russia. The ceasefire agreement urged the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces and the establishment of a security zone between all parties to the conflict. Also, the JCC has under its authority military contingents from the parties to the conflict and military observers for the implementation of the Agreement.⁷ In other words, the ceasefire was agreed to without a political settlement followed to address the conflict or time limit to complete; a frozen conflict resulted. Over the years, Moldova has been trying to negotiate without success the withdrawal of Russian military and ammunition depot from Transnistria. Starting on December 10, 2004, the principles of cooperation were established between the OSCE

⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “OSCE Mission to Moldova,” accessed September 16, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ UNSC, S/24369*.

Mission in Moldova and the Joint Control Commission in the security zone. The principles regulate the cooperation between the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the JCC into creating a political framework for dialogue and negotiation and assist the sides for a political solution.⁸ The OSCE plays a mediator role alongside Russia and Ukraine, with the US and EU as observers (referred to as the 5+2 format). Besides, OSCE contributes essentially to the organization of the negotiation process, drafting documents concerning the military, political issues and informs the international community regarding the developments in the conflict settlement process. The OSCE assists with the democratization of Moldova's civil society and the development of civil society in the Transnistria region.⁹ Even though the OSCE Mission to Moldova brings good results in the dialog and social issues between sides, the end state of the mission is far from being achieved. This calls into question the effectiveness of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and its ability to resolve the Transnistrian conflict.

The reintegration of Moldovan territory is a national interest and Moldova will use the platforms of relevant international bodies, specifically OSCE, to request external support for conflict resolution. The Moldovan National Defense Strategy (NDS) article 32 stipulates the strengthening and intensifying cooperation in the areas of security and common defense policy with international entities such as the EU, UN, and OSCE. Additionally, one of the NDS specific objectives is the continuation of the peacekeeping

⁸ Government of Republic of Moldova, "Fundamental Documents of the JCC," accessed September 16, 2019, <https://gov.md/en/content/fundamental-documents-jcc>.

⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, "OSCE Mission to Moldova," accessed September 16, 2019, <https://www.mfa.gov.md/en/content/place-republic-moldova-osce-framework>.

missions in the Security Zone, until the current format of the mixed peacekeeping forces will change.¹⁰ The actual OSCE Mission to Moldova is very effective in dialogues with political representatives on both sides concerning social matters. On the other hand, the areas of negotiation regarding Russian troops stationed in the region, Russian ammunition depots, Transnistrian army status, economic unity, informational infrastructure, and other strategic fields of interest are not debated.

This study aims to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation. This paper will analyze numerous factors that determine whether the OSCE can effectively resolve the Transnistria conflict, especially the desired end state of the various actors involved.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

What is preventing OSCE from resolving the Transnistria conflict?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the current Operational Environment?

2. What are the actors desired End States?

a) What is the Moldavian desired End State?

¹⁰ Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, “Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Hotarirea Nr.134 din 19.07.2018 pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale de apărare și a Planului de acțiuni privind implementarea Strategiei naționale de apărare pentru anii 2018–2022,” *Monitorul Oficial* Nr.285-294 (August 3, 2018): art Nr:441, accessed September 16, 2019, <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=376667>.

- b) What is the Transnistrian desired End State?
- c) What is the Russian desired End State?
- d) What is the OSCE desired End State?

Assumptions

The following assumptions are relevant and appear to be valid:

1. The OSCE currently does not possess a real mechanism and influential power to achieve the OSCE Mission to Moldova end-state.

It is an assumption supported by numerous sources, as well as by the current OSCE Mission media critics in the Republic of Moldova.¹¹ These critics indicate the OSCE feasibility based on OSCE long-term peace processes, conflict management unsuccess in legal institutional frameworks, the impact of geopolitical factors on conflicts that hinder the dynamics of peace processes. Moreover, the weak influential power to the separatist region of Transnistria that has its armed forces and to Russian forces that are stationed in Transnistria, contrary to the Russian Federation commitments, made at the 1999 OSCE summit at Istanbul, to withdraw those forces.¹² It appears that Russia has the interest to keep and fund those forces in Moldova. This assumption is further analyzed through follow on research.

¹¹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Good Read. OSCE Mediation and Conflict Management,” accessed October 20, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/magazine/358196>.

¹² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Istanbul Summit 1999*, January 2000, para. 19, accessed October 28, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true>.

2. Russian economic and geopolitical interests in Moldova will tend to federalize the state or to keep Transnistria in its current status.

This assumption is easy to deduce from the foreign policy that Russia employ to retain influence in its near abroad. Since the 1990s, Russia has aided the proliferation of frozen conflicts in many countries in its historical sphere of influence. The recent political developments increase the likelihood that Russia will soon push to implement the next stage in the frozen conflict cycle: resolution through federalization¹³

3. Neither OSCE, Europe, or the US will significantly impede Russian DIME influence over the Republic of Moldova.

This assumption is hard to confirm but easy to deduce from the West's reactions to Russia's operations in Georgia 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Moreover, the process of discussing between Russia and the international community seems to be superficial in terms of Russian commitments to withdraw their forces at the 1999 OSCE summit at Istanbul, to respect Moldovan neutrality and territorial integrity and most importantly their direct support of Transnistria. Russia has generally used the Transnistria role and its status not only to seek or facilitate a political settlement but also to maximize its influence throughout Moldova and to include and retain Moldova within its sphere of influence.¹⁴

¹³ Diana Dascalu, "Frozen Conflicts and Federalization: Russian Policy in Transnistria and Donbas," *JIA SIPA*, last modified May 22, 2019, accessed October 20, 2019, <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/frozen-conflicts-and-federalization-russian-policy-transnistria-and-donbass>.

¹⁴ Atlantic Council, "More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy toward Moldova," August 27, 2018, accessed October 29, 2019,

Definitions of Key Terms

Frozen Conflict: “The term “frozen conflict” indicates a condition in which active fighting has ended or subsided but there is no peace agreement beyond a tenuous cease-fire.”¹⁵ In other words, a situation in which active armed conflict has been ended, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants.

Feasibility: “Operational plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.”¹⁶

Neutrality: “defined as the legal status arising from the abstention of a state from all participation in a war between other states, the maintenance of an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents, and the recognition by the belligerents of this abstention and impartiality.”¹⁷

Sides: In particular, in this paper and many reference documents, the term sides is used, which refers to both Moldova and Transnistria concerning the negotiation process.

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/more-than-a-frozen-conflict-russian-foreign-policy-toward-moldova/>.

¹⁵ Freedom House, “Modern Authoritarianism: Frozen Conflicts,” last modified May 24, 2017, accessed October 30, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-frozen-conflicts>.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 16, 2017), GL-9.

¹⁷ United Nations (UN), “International Day of Neutrality, 12 December,” accessed November 23, 2019, <https://www.un.org/en/events/neutralityday/>.

Transnistria: De jure is officially named autonomous region – “*Unitățile administrativ-teritoriale din stînga Nistrului*” – under the composition of the Republic of Moldova, at the east of the Dniester River.¹⁸ De facto, Transnistria proclaims itself a separate state, officially named “*Republica Moldovenească Nistreană* (RMN)”, which controls that part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, located to the east of the Dniester river. Transnistria is referred differently in various literature; contemporary literature uses Transdnestira, Pridnestrovie, and Pridnestrovskoe Moldavskaya Respublika (PMR). This paper uses Transnistria, which is used in the political system of the Republic of Moldova.

Limitations

It is essential to admit that this analysis presents some limitations. The selected case study is an ongoing mission. For this reason, it is difficult to anticipate the results of the OSCE mission or make predictions. This study focuses on the current operational environment in Moldova and the effectiveness of the OSCE mission in relation to all the actors involved. It explains what the desired end state is for the mission from perspectives, using official documents, protocols, and political vision sources of all the actors involved in the researches area. The study does not use any restricted (classified) information that is prohibited for disclosure to the public. This study aims to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation.

¹⁸ Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, “Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Legea Nr.173.

Scope and Delimitations

This study aims to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation. This study makes recommendations on how the OSCE Mission to Moldova might improve by developing an operational approach to the mission. The paper does not provide any solution to the problem, nor does it outline specifically what OSCE has to address or how to engage the issue. Such proposals and solutions are subject to further research and require detailed expertise in specific areas. It is important to mention that this paper covers details and evidence on the OSCE Mission to Moldova activity only and the boundary of the study is from August 27, 1991, until March 2020.

Significance of the Study

The OSCE plays a significant role in regional security. By providing relevant information on the mission's effectiveness and analyzing the main document and agreements contributes to a better understanding of the mission and visualize the conflict negotiation process complexity and ambiguity. The result of this study is an operational approach product that is closely related to the field of military art and science. This study interprets an application of the operational design methodology for identifying the real problem and feasibility of OSCE in achieving mission end state. By knowing what is preventing OSCE from resolving the Transnistrian conflict the reader will better understand and conceptualize the security environment of frozen conflict and aspects of the negotiation process.

Summary

This thesis will attempt to reveal the feasibility of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in facilitating through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistria conflict. The aim is to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of the state and to understand the complexity of the situation. To answer that, it is important to understand the operational environment in the Republic of Moldova to identify the actors, tensions, functions, and relationship (RAFT) and how the OSCE Mission was reflected in the official documents, signed by the parties from the beginning of the mandate, that will be presented in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A people who does not know their history is like a child who does not know their parents.

—Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria romanilor*, vol. 1

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the analysis of the related OSCE's mission to Moldova key documents and the academic literature that describe the effectiveness of the mission or feasibility to achieve the end state. The key references are based on official documents, political visions, and public opinion. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the operational environment in the Republic of Moldova. The second point is to detect the actors that have a direct influence in OSCE Mission to Moldova and their relationship towards the mission end state. The third is to explore the most relevant literature and documents that will help me identify what could impede the OSCE Mission to Moldova in fulfillment of its mandate.

This chapter is divided into two main subchapters. The first subchapter reviews official documents and mandates of the OSCE Mission to Moldova such as the Agreement of the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova, 1992; Mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova; The Moscow Memorandum; Principles of cooperation between the OSCE Mission in Moldova and the Joint Control Commission in the Security Zone, December 10, 2004, and the Status of the Joint Control Commission; Istanbul Summit 1999; The law nr.173 from July 22, 2005, regarding the basic provisions of the legal status for the

localities on the left bank of the Dniester (Transnistria). The second subchapter reviews the articles, publications, and other authors' works concerning this topic.

Key Documents Review

To better understand the Operational Environment, the main actors, and the tensions within them, it is essential first to identify and analyze the fundamental documents of the Transnistrian conflict. One of the most important documents that were the basis of the ceasefire between Moldova and the Transnistrian separatist forces is the *Agreement of the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova*¹⁹, signed on July 21, 1992, between Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. The agreement provided for an immediate total ceasefire and the creation of a demilitarized security zone between the parties, 10 km left and right of the Dniester river, including also the city of Tighina/Bendery. The city of Bendery, following the agreement, is declared a zone of heightened security and the headquarters of the Joint Control Committee (JCC). Other stipulations in the agreement are: the establishment of a joint press center; economic reconstruction and free flow of international aid and most important in article 4 states that units of 14th Army of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation shall remain stationed in Transnistria and observe strict neutrality.²⁰ Later in a press release, the presidents of Moldova and Russia announced a set of principles for a peaceful solution of the conflict, including mutual respect for the sovereignty and

¹⁹ UNSC, S/24369*.

²⁰ Ibid.

territorial integrity of Moldova, the need for a special status of the left-bank Dniester region, and the right of the population of the left bank to decide on its future if Moldova was to reunite with Romania.²¹ A week after the signing of the agreement, on July 29, 1992, a provisional regulation was established concerning the basic principles of creation and activity of the military observer groups and of the military contingents, designed to end the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.²² This document states the condition of peace settlement (observers, military contingents), the consistency of the JCC (representatives of the MoD of the signatories of the Agreement and the military leadership of the Transnistrian region), the tasks to perform by military contingents and military observers, the authority of JCC to perform the peace settlement, the right to act in case of violation of the condition also the right to check the citizens and relation with the law enforcement agencies.

To implement the cease-fire, a tripartite Joint Control Commission was established in Tighina/Bendery, consisting of Moldovan, Russian, and PMR delegations assisted by a group of 30 military observers, 10 from each of the parties. In the case of violations of the cease-fire agreement, the JCC was authorized to take urgent and appropriate measures to restore the peace and re-establish law and order, and also to prevent the occurrence of similar violations in the future. The July 21 Agreement also provided for trilateral peacekeeping forces, consisting of 5 Russian, 3 Moldovan, and 2 Transnistrian battalions. These forces operate under the Trilateral Joint Military Command, which in turn is subordinated to the JCC. The peacekeeping troops began deployment on July 29, 1992.²³

²¹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Transnistrian Conflict: Origins and Main Issues,” June 10, 1994, accessed November 8, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42308?download=true>.

²² Government of Republic of Moldova, “Fundamental Documents of the JCC.”

²³ OSCE, “Transnistrian Conflict.”

In summary, the *Agreement of the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova* put an end to the active war but created fertile soil for the conflict to freeze. This Agreement was more of a capitulation document in front of the Russian Federation because it was created and signed in Moscow with or containing Russian terms and conditions. Moldova not only lost control over Bendery from the agreement but also resulted in the deployment of more Russian troops to Transnistria as peacekeepers and indirectly gave time to Transnistria to reorganize and create a de facto state. For Moldova, this was a total defeat because they no longer fought against separatism but the 14th Army of the Russian Federation. By the time the OSCE Mission to Moldova was approved, in February 1993, the JCC had already cooled the war and had already installed a peacekeeping system that would stall the solution until today.

The next relevant document is the *OSCE Mission to Moldova Mandate*²⁴ approved on February 4, 1993, and later ratified with the terms of reference and budget for the Mission by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Vienna Group on March 11, 1993. This document is the basis on which the OSCE Mission to Moldova is currently active and was initially approved for six months with its subsequent extension if no compromise was reached. The mandate objective is to facilitate the achievement of a political settlement, based on CSCE principles and commitments, of the conflict in the

²⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3, *CSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova*, February 4, 1993, accessed September 26, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/41137?download=true>.

Left-Bank Dniester areas of the Republic of Moldova in all its aspects.²⁵ The Mandate established a set of conditions required to achieve mission end state as follows:

1. The comprehensive political framework for dialogue and negotiations and assist the parties to the conflict in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement of the conflict, consolidating the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.
2. Gather and provide information on the situation, including the military situation, in the region, investigate specific incidents, and assess their political implications.
3. Encourage the participating states concerned in pursuing negotiations on an agreement on the status and the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops.
4. Provide advice and expertise in the field of human and minority rights, democratic transformation, repatriation of refugees, definition of the special status of the Trans-Dniester region.
5. Initiate a visible CSCE presence in the region and establish contacts with all parties to the conflict, local authorities, and local populations.²⁶

These conditions were pursued until 1999, after the Istanbul Summit on December 9, 1999, when the scope of the mandate was expanded by Permanent Council Decision No. 329²⁷ to include:

1. Ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments.

²⁵ OSCE, CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 4.

2. Coordinating technical and financial assistance to facilitate such withdrawal and destruction.²⁸

The mandate also states the mission offices in Tiraspol with headquarters established in Chisinau, the co-operation and co-ordination of the mission with other international organizations, the size, and composition of the mission, the chain of command and conditions of service. Regarding co-operation and co-ordination, the Head of Mission will establish appropriate contacts with representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations with an active interest in contributing to the resolution of the conflict.²⁹ Additionally, the Mission will co-operate and liaise with representatives of the existing JCC, but this failed at the beginning of the mandate until 2004 when was established the Principles of cooperation between the OSCE Mission in Moldova and the Joint Control Commission in the Security Zone; that will be addressed later in this chapter. The size and composition of the mission initially were composed of eight international staff members. Subsequent decisions of the Permanent Council brought the authorized strength of the Mission to currently 52 posts, of which 13 are internationally and 39 are locally recruited.³⁰ The chain of command represented in figure 1 shows the relationships within the mission and working groups.

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, “OSCE Mission to Moldova,” accessed November 27, 2019, <https://www.mfa.gov.md/en/content/osce-mission-moldova>.

²⁹ OSCE, CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3.

³⁰ The Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, SEC.GAL/116/19/Rev. 1, *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, June 20, 2019, 23, accessed September 26, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/74783?download=true>.




Figure 1. OSCE Mission to Moldova Chain of Command

Source: Compiled by the author based on Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “OSCE Annual Reports,” accessed December 29, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/annual-reports>.

The Head of the Mission will report to the Chairman-in-Office regularly, as a rule, every two weeks. The reports will then immediately be distributed to all participating states through the Secretariat. The CSO Vienna Group will provide overall guidance to the Mission considering the reports from the Head of Mission.³¹ Working groups (WG) created in Chisinau and Tiraspol, are intended to implement joint projects, with the help

³¹ OSCE, CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3.

of international partners, in the social-economic, humanitarian and security fields, to contribute effectively in supporting the population and at the same time, create conditions for the negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict.³² The members of the working groups are experts in their areas of expertise and officials from both sides as chief negotiators, named by the government of Moldova for the Moldavian side and by the authority of Transnistria to meet and debate different issues and solutions. The Head of Mission, as the OSCE mediator, uses shuttle diplomacy to mediate between Chisinau and Tiraspol: s/he facilitates negotiations between the two chief negotiators and in the thematic Working Groups.³³ The Mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova empowers the mission to activate using only diplomacy and informational power. On the other hand, the JCC can use the full DIME spectrum to control the conflict.

The first report of special importance in the negotiation process published by the OSCE on November 13, 1993, is *Report No. 13*.³⁴ The report represents the first proposal on a special status for Transnistria that was considered a basis for the negotiating process. The Mission proposes the setting up of a Special Region of Transnistria with its regional executive, elective assembly, and court but under one Constitution with the need for one single economic, social, and legal space. Furthermore, the Mission proposes to

³² Government of the Republic of Moldova, “List of WG Coordinators from Chisinau,” accessed November 30, 2019, <https://gov.md/en/content/list-wg-coordinators-chisinau>.

³³ OSCE, “OSCE Mission to Moldova.”

³⁴ CSCE Mission to Moldova, “Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, November 13, 1993, accessed December 2, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42307?download=true>.

distinguish between three categories of jurisdiction: exclusive central jurisdiction, exclusive regional jurisdiction, and mixed jurisdiction.³⁵ Exclusive central jurisdictions should include citizenship, state emblems and anthems, foreign relations, one defense system, security service, and monetary policy under central control. Exclusive regional jurisdictions should include self-organization within the agreed regional framework (administrative structures, regional organs, regional basic law, regional budget), regional emblems (to be used side by side with state ones), education, cultural life.³⁶ Finally, the mixed jurisdiction is a combination of the first two that the authorities from Transnistria and Moldova never agreed on. The OSCE Mission finds out that finding a special status to Transnistria will not solve all the problems. Later on, in June 1994 the OSCE published a report describing the *Origins and Main Issues of the Transnistrian conflict*.³⁷ According to the published report, the main four problems that are crucial to a political settlement is the language issue, the question of unification with Romania, the 14th Russian Army and the discussion on a special status for Transnistria.³⁸ These main problems persist even today and the OSCE has not yet found a mechanism to solve them all without involving the international community.

The next relevant document that will be reviewed is the *Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria*

³⁵ CSCE Mission to Moldova, "Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova."

³⁶ Ibid., 1.

³⁷ OSCE, "Transdnistrian Conflict."

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

signed in Moscow on May 8, 1997, also called the *Moscow Memorandum*.³⁹ This is the first document where the OSCE is stipulated with Russia and Ukraine as mediators in the process of normalizing the Transnistrian conflict. In compliance with the memorandum, Moldova and Transnistria reaffirm their commitment not to use force in their relations and any problems with the sides must be negotiated and consulted with the assistance and mediation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine as guarantor states. Besides, Transnistria has the right to unilaterally establish and maintain international contacts in the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres.⁴⁰ In other words, if a region is empowered to conduct its economic system with its currency, its education system, and its own culture with its flag and national anthem, that is de facto the creation of a divided nation. In that case, the unification or special status for Transnistria becomes an issue far to be achieved by OSCE. In less than a year, on March 20, 1998, proceeding from the provisions set down in the Moscow Memorandum, the Moldova and Transnistria leaders in statements of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, they met in Odessa to sign the *Agreement on Confidence Measures and Development of Contacts between Republic of Moldova and Transnistria*, also called the *Odessa Agreement 1998*.⁴¹

³⁹ The Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, The Moscow Memorandum, “Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria,” May 8, 1997, accessed December 2, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42309?download=true>.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁴¹ The Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, Odessa Agreement, “Agreement on Confidence Measures and Development of Contacts between Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 20, 1998, accessed December 5, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42310?download=true>.

According to the agreement, the sides should reduce the numerical composition of peacekeeping forces in the security zone to approximately 500 military men from each side. Additionally, the JCC should submit an analysis of the fulfillment of the Agreement on Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict of July 21, 1992, and from that perspective, to proceed to withdraw from Transnistria of excess Russian military equipment and to support the proposal of dispatching Ukrainian peace-keepers into the security zone.⁴² This agreement was signed in the presence of the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and somehow gave to OSCE more advantage to achieve its end state with Russian troops out of Transnistria, but that did not happen. A year later, on July 16, 1999, in the same composition, the leaders in the negotiation process met in Kyiv at a Meeting on Issues of Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, also called the *Kyiv Statement 1999*.⁴³ In a joint statement, the parties have agreed to construct their relations on the following principles: common borders and common economic, legal, defense, and social domains.⁴⁴ After this joint Statement, the OSCE Mission to Moldova achieved the necessary principles and goals to continue the negotiation process, but only one thing remains to be resolved: the Russian troops on Moldavian soil, that was debated late that year in Istanbul.

⁴² The Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, Odessa Agreement.

⁴³ The Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, “Joint Statement of the Meeting on Issues of Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, July 16, 1999, accessed December 8, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42311?download=true>.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 3.

The next relevant document, and one of the most successful and first fundamental documents as an organization, was the *Istanbul Document 1999*. The Istanbul Summit was the 6th OSCE summit, held in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 1999 resulting in the adoption of the Istanbul Summit Declaration and the signing of the *Charter for European Security*. In Istanbul Document 1999, OSCE-participating states declared their firm commitment to a free, democratic, and more integrated OSCE area where participating states are at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity, and security.⁴⁵ The most important declaration in this document regarding Moldova is the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova in three years, as stated, “We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, within their respective abilities, by the agreed deadline.”⁴⁶ Istanbul Document 1999 was used as a lever and the OSCE began to actively coordinate and even assist with the evacuation of Russian munitions. This was the road to success. If it was possible to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Moldova with the destruction or evacuation of ammunition, then the conflict resolution would have to be reduced to another dimension. It is important to mention that these activities took place under a radical political change in Russia and Moldova. On the Russian side, the Istanbul Document was signed under the Boris Yeltsin administration but shortly after a month, Yeltsin resigned with the

⁴⁵ OSCE, *Istanbul Summit 1999*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

appointment of interim Vladimir Putin. Putin's vision and dedication to the Istanbul document were different, undermining Russia's interests in Eastern Europe. However, Russia withdrew some of its weapons and equipment from the Transnistrian territory with financial aid and OSCE assistance despite Transnistria causing obstacles and difficulties. In December 2002, at the OSCE Conference in Porto, OSCE expressed its concerns and regrets to Russia and Transnistria that no progress had been made.⁴⁷ Under *Porto's ministerial declaration*, the Russians stated their commitment to withdraw and destroy all equipment and ammunition stationed in Transnistria by the end of 2003. It is obvious that the Putin administration did not assume this commitment and they asked for the extension of the term until determining what the future of Transnistria will be. Choosing 2003 for the deadline for the OSCE Mission to Moldova was controversial. First, Moldova and local Transnistrian authorities agreed to establish a Joint Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution for a reunited country; the OSCE Mission opened a new office in Bendery to provide the venue and support for this effort. Negotiating initiatives during the fall brought Chisinau and Tiraspol to the verge of a settlement, but a final accord eluded the parties.⁴⁸ This initiative of establishing the Joint Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution came from Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. He planned to reunify Moldova on a federal model that was broadly welcomed

⁴⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), MC.DOC/1/02, *Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 6 and 7 December 2002*, December 6-7, 2002, 24, accessed December 1, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/mc/40521?download=true>.

⁴⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *OSCE Annual Report 2003*, October 1, 2004, 72, accessed December 22, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/13580>.

and supported by OSCE. In a press release, the deputy official spokesman of Russia's ministry of foreign affairs Boris Malakhov states that Russia welcomes the Moldovan initiatives which could facilitate intensive and productive advancement towards a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistrian problem.⁴⁹ The initiative was doubtful, but it came after a visit by the President of the Republic of Moldova Vladimir Voronin to Moscow in February 2003. It was later revealed that Russia, without informing the international community, was setting out the principles of a memorandum to resolve the Transnistrian conflict known as the *Kozak Memorandum*. In a letter from the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, addressed to the President of the Republic of Moldova, Voronin, calling for the conclusion of a bilateral Moldovan-Russian agreement on the "military guarantees" of the Transnistrian settlement dated May 5, 2003, states that one of the key factors, namely the military guarantee to be provided by the Russian contingent as requested by the Transnistrian leader.⁵⁰ In other words, the leader of Transnistria accepts the "Kozak plan" provided Russia implements a contingent of military troops on the territory of Moldova for 30 years. If this was accepted then the role

⁴⁹ Boris Malakhov, "Statement," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, last modified February 14, 2003, accessed December 22, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/maps/md/-/asset_publisher/dfOotO3QvCij/content/id/532134?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_dfOotO3QvCij&_101_INSTANCE_dfOotO3QvCij_languageId=en_GB.

⁵⁰ Mihai Gribincea and Anatol Țăranu, *Conflictul Transnistrean. Culegere de documente și materiale (1989 – 2012)*, 4 vols (Chisinau: Lexon-Prim), 73, accessed October 30, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/11284043/Anatol_%C8%9A%C4%83ranu_Mihai_Gribincea._CONFLICTUL_TRANSNISTREAN._Culegere_de_documente_%C5%9Fi_materiale_1989_2012._Volumul_III_2003_2006_.Chi%C8%99in%C4%83u_Lexon-Prim_2014_636_p.

of the Moldovan authorities was to justify at the OSCE annual summit in Maastricht why Russia did not withdraw troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova. This could be a total victory for Russia and Transnistria. Total confusion was caused by the launch, in mid-November, of the so-called “*Kozak Memorandum*” of federalization of the Republic of Moldova. The authors of the memorandum, which is, in fact, Dmitry Kozak, one of Putin’s trusted advisers, claim that the proposed federalist formula provides the necessary framework for resolving the Transnistrian conflict.⁵¹ Initially, Moldova and Transnistria agreed to sign the text of the Memorandum based on which a new Constitution of the Republic of Moldova would be elaborated. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin himself said that honoring Russia’s international obligations regarding the withdrawal of Russian weapons and troops from Transnistria will be possible after the parties have accepted and implemented the provisions of the Memorandum.⁵² Subsequently, after the publication of the memorandum on November 17, 2003, a series of demonstrations took place from the opposition but also the diplomatic corps of the country. The official signing of the document was due to take place on November 25, 2003, during a visit to Chisinau by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The visit was canceled at the last moment at the initiative of President Voronin after supporters of opposition parties went out in protest against the Memorandum, and

⁵¹ Igor Boțan, “Anul Politic 2003,” Association for Participatory Democracy, last modified December 14, 2003, accessed December 22, 2019, <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312171/>.

⁵² Democracy Moldova, “Memorandumul Privind Principiile de Constituire a Statului Unificat,” last modified November 2003, accessed December 23, 2019, <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/20031125/>.

some western leaders warned Voronin about the bad consequences of signing the document for Moldova. Following the rejection by Chisinau of the Kozak memorandum, the Moldovan-Russian relations entered the phase of a long-lasting deterioration. The process of negotiations on the settlement of the conflict was frozen. Thus, the Moldovan authorities found themselves in one of the most difficult crises. They upset the Kremlin administration with their indecisive behavior, they warned the OSCE member countries by participating in secret actions on the “back of Europe,” they gave grist to the Transnistrian propaganda mill that speculates the lack of credibility of Chisinau and they found themselves with waves of protests from the united opposition, which until now could not find an opportunity for common actions.⁵³ The president of Moldova was forced to give up his intention, announcing that he postponed the signing of the Memorandum until the OSCE ministerial in Maastricht. Such behavior harms the Republic of Moldova both in relations with the West and in relations with Russia, which has come to prominence in Maastricht. Within the country, this behavior generated opposition protests and radicalized the position of Transnistrian leaders. 2003 for the OSCE ended with a *ministerial conference in Maastricht*.⁵⁴ In the declaration, most ministers recalled that some of the commitments made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit in Georgia and Moldova had not yet been fulfilled. Their fulfillment, without further delay,

⁵³ Igor Boțan, “Efectele ‘Planului Kozak’,” Association for Participatory Democracy, last modified November, accessed December 23, 2019, <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312031>.

⁵⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), MC.DOC/1/03, *Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council 1 and 2 December 2003*, December 2, 2003, accessed December 8, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/mc/40533?download=true>.

would, in their view, create the conditions for State Parties to move forward on ratification of the *Adapted CFE Treaty*.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the Russian Federation states that linking the so-called Istanbul commitments with the ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has nothing to do with the interests of settling the problems existing in Moldova and they reject any attempts to regard such implementation as a prerequisite for the commencement of the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.⁵⁶ The problem of Russian troops on the territory of Moldova, in the Russian vision, is a problem that concerns only Moldovan-Russian diplomacy. As stated by the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who accused the European institutions of “interference in the internal affairs of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).”⁵⁷ After the ministerial conference in Maastricht, the Istanbul Summit lost its credibility and commitment to the Russian Federation. These commitments were not respected by the Russian Federation after 2003 for several reasons. The main cause is Russia’s new geopolitical return policy in international relations promoted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. For more than a decade, Moscow has refused to discuss with Chisinau the subject of his army in the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Under these conditions, Moldova should constantly maintain the subject of the illegal presence of Russian troops in the territory of the Republic of Moldova within the various

⁵⁵ OSCE, MC.DOC/1/03, 98.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 108.

⁵⁷ Boțan, “Efectele ‘Planului Kozak’.”

international interstate platforms, keeping this issue permanently on the agenda of the international community.⁵⁸

The next relevant document is the *Principles of cooperation between the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Joint Control Commission in the Security Zone, December 10, 2004*.⁵⁹ Political settlement negotiations were blocked at the beginning of 2004 after the Maastricht ministerial conference. During the first half of 2004, the OSCE Mission to Moldova worked to re-energize the political settlement negotiation process between the Moldovan Government and the Transnistrian authorities. The second half of the year was dominated by efforts to contain the crisis in relations between the two sides, precipitated by the July closure of Moldovan Latin script schools operating in Transnistria.⁶⁰ At the end of the year, the OSCE signed the principles of cooperation with the JCC. This document provides the cooperation and liaison of the OSCE mission with the already existing multilateral mechanisms established for the settlement of the conflict; namely JCC. The OSCE mission and the JCC ensure the contribution of the activities of each for the fulfillment of the mission objectives including information exchange, counseling, and assistance. Moreover, the OSCE mission assists JCC in establishing contacts with international and national organizations of third countries to address issues arising during a peacekeeping operation and in cases involving the interests of citizens living in the

⁵⁸ Ion Tăbârță, “Policy Brief,” Institutul pentru Dezvoltare și Inițiative Sociale (IDIS) Viitorul, June 2018, 27.

⁵⁹ Government of Republic of Moldova, “Fundamental Documents of the JCC.”

⁶⁰ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *OSCE Annual Report 2004*, May 6, 2004, 74, accessed December 23, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/14430>.

Security Zone.⁶¹ Instead of this, the members of the OSCE Mission are free to move in the Security Zone, and by prior notice, to the JCC they can participate with representatives to the meetings of the JCC. In other words, the OSCE mission recognizes the JCC as a full-fledged entity that has physical, legal, and executive control in the security area and ensures the establishment of contacts with international and national organizations; the OSCE ensures international legitimacy to the JCC activity.

The next relevant text to review is the *law nr.173 from 22 July 2005 regarding the basic provisions of the legal status for the localities on the left bank of the Dniester (Transnistria)*.⁶² It is very important to mention the international context of the adoption by Moldova of the law on July 22, 2005. First, NATO and the European Union expanded in 2004 to the east of the European continent, approaching the borders of Moldova. On April 22, 2005, at the GUAM summit held in Chisinau, the pro-western president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, launched seven principles under the slogan, “Towards regulation through democratization.”⁶³ In essence, the Ukrainian plan focused on three processes that were to take place on the left bank of the Dniester: democratization, demilitarization, and de-criminalization of the region. As a solution to boost the negotiation process, Ukraine proposed a more active involvement of the EU and the US

⁶¹ Government of Republic of Moldova, “Fundamental Documents of the JCC,” 4.

⁶² Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, “Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Legea Nr.173.”

⁶³ Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), “The Chisinau Declaration of the GUAM Heads of States ‘In the Name of Democracy, Stability, and Development’,” April 22, 2005, accessed December 26, 2019, <https://guam-organization.org/en/the-chisinau-declaration-of-the-guam-heads-of-states-in-the-name-of-democracy-stability-and-development/>.

in the process of regulating the Transnistrian approval. Nonetheless, this was another attempt to legalize the Transnistrian region in the international sphere. Because the initiative involved the modification of the peacekeeping operation in an international mechanism of military and civil observers under the aegis of the OSCE, one of the principles proposed was the organization of free and fair elections in the Supreme Soviet of Tiraspol, as a representative body of the region, as soon as possible, “under the legal conditions provided by the statute of Transnistria,” ensuring the monitoring of these elections by the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, Russia, and the United States, together with Ukraine.⁶⁴ From these proposals, one thing is clear: elections with international observers cannot be organized in Transnistria, as this would mean legitimizing the secessionist regime. Later, in more detail, a new round of consultations between the parties to the conflict and the mediators of the settlement process of the Transnistrian issue took place on May 16-17, 2005, in Vinnytsia. The stakes in this plan were motivated by the fact that Ukraine has real levers to influence the situation in the region through customs policies and the possibility to carry out control on the border segment with Transnistria. Under these circumstances, Russia’s role has radically changed. From a promoter of active positions, Russia became a defender of its interests and interests in the separatist region.⁶⁵ However, the plan did not refer to the status of the Transnistrian region in the composition of the Moldovan unitary state, not to the

⁶⁴ Igor Boțan, *Transnistrian Settlement: A European Solution*, Policy Paper, Association for Participatory Democracy, 2009, 34, accessed December 26, 2019, <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/publications/reglementarea-transnistreana/>.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 37.

inefficiency and necessity of changing the Penta-lateral format of negotiations, not even with the withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunition from the region, not even the need to operate some Moldovan-Ukrainian customs posts on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The reaction of the Moldovan legislature regarding the “Yushchenko Plan” came immediately on June 10, 2005, when the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted a decision on the initiative of Ukraine on the issue of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the measures for the democratization and demilitarization of the Transnistrian area.⁶⁶ Thus, the adopted documents did not merely reflect the position of the legislature towards the “Yushchenko plan,” but proposed a series of measures to supplement and improve it, such as, for example, the appeal to the Ukrainian authorities to secure the Transnistrian segment to the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, the appeal to the Russian Federation of the withdrawal and liquidation of the Russian military arsenal, as well as the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova. On July 22, 2005, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted, at second reading, Law number 173 on the basic provisions of the special legal status of the Transnistrian region.⁶⁷ According to the law adopted and currently, in force, a Transnistrian region is a territorial-administrative unit within the

⁶⁶ Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, “Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Hotărîrea Nr.117 din 10.06.2005 cu privire la inițiativa Ucrainei în problema reglementării conflictului transnistrean și la măsurile pentru democratizarea și demilitarizarea zonei transnistrene,” *Monitorul Oficial* Nr. 83-85 (June 17, 2005): art Nr: 385, accessed October 28, 2019, <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=307472>.

⁶⁷ Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, “Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Legea Nr.173.

composition of the Republic of Moldova, exercising its powers under its constitutional provisions. Only the localities that will accept this by referendum will be included in the Transnistrian autonomy. The Transnistrian autonomy is to be represented by a local parliament, which will be called the Supreme Council. The first elections in this body will be organized by the OSCE but will take place only after the evacuation of Russian troops, after demilitarization and democratization of the region.⁶⁸ The law was not accepted by Ukraine and Russia, leaving it to be understood that the law was adopted unilaterally by the Moldovan Parliament, without consulting the Transnistrian party and exceeding the analogous provisions of the Ukrainian Plan. Later, the Moscow Foreign Ministry released a press release rejecting the draft law being developed in Moldova without consulting the Transnistrian party. Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov also declared that, by adopting the law on July 22, 2005, Moldova irrevocably “buried” the Ukrainian plan.⁶⁹ From the Moldovan perspective, the adoption of the law granting the special status of Transnistria and the material and social guarantees following the reintegration were considered necessary steps towards democratizing the region and preparing for transparent and legal elections within the new republic. Nonetheless, there was only one thing left to do, namely the withdrawal of the Russian army from Transnistria, which was a taboo topic for Russia at any meeting of the negotiating format.

Later in the consultations between the representatives of the conflicting parties and the mediators from the OSCE, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, held on

⁶⁸ Boțan, *Transnistrian Settlement*, 44.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 45.

September 27-28, 2005, in Odessa, known as *Odessa Protocol*⁷⁰, the European Union, and the US were invited to participate in the negotiation process as observers. The observer status of the EU and the US was established based on an OSCE protocol on observers' rights and obligations in the negotiation process. According to the OSCE, observers have the right to attend official meetings, have the right to speak during them, and can intervene with questions. However, observers cannot sign the documents adopted in the negotiation process and do not participate in decision making. Thus, the new format of the negotiations was an asymmetric one, being called "5 + 2."⁷¹ Starting from September 2005, the negotiation process was in this format and there seemed to be a balance of interests on the negotiating table, but this one was going to take a completely different direction in the years to come. In 2006, the first round of negotiations in the "5 + 2" format took place on February 27, with a total failure by which Transnistria assumes the right to control the agricultural lands and the free movement of citizens and goods in the security area. The Moldovan delegation abandoned the negotiations and urged the participants in the negotiations to focus on solving this problem. On March 1, 2006, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuriy Yekhanurov, signed *the Ordinance №112-p*, which stipulated that only Transnistrian goods perfected at Moldovan customs should be

⁷⁰ The Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, CIO/GAL/145-0-2, "On the meeting of mediators from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the OSCE with the representatives of the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, September 28, 2005, accessed December 27, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/cio/16558?download=true>.

⁷¹ Boțan, *Transnistrian Settlement*, 48.

admitted across the Ukrainian border.⁷² On March 4, 2006, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing concern about the “unexpected” imposition of measures to “tighten” the transit regime of Transnistrian goods across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. “Under the pretext of restoring border order, Ukraine and Moldova are exerting economic pressure on Transnistria to force it to give in to issues related to the Transnistrian settlement.”⁷³ Transnistrian authorities described the Moldovan-Ukrainian measures as an “economic blockade” and accused Ukraine of taking part in the Republic of Moldova in the conflict. Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov even threatened that Transnistria would withdraw from the process of settling the conflict in response to the introduction of these measures. In response, the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria convened the “Sixth Congress of Deputies of all levels” in connection with the “crisis” created after the initiation of the “economic blockade” of Transnistria by Ukraine and Moldova. The Congress adopted a resolution, which proposed the organization of a referendum on relations with the Republic of Moldova. Of course, these actions of Transnistria were executed without the agreement or supervision of Moldova or the OSCE, and they will not be recognized either by the authorities in Chisinau or by the international community. As a result, Transnistria, supported by Russia, started preparations for organizing, on September 17, 2006, a referendum in which the population was going to choose between the possibility of unification with Moldova and independence, which implies the subsequent accession to the Russian Federation. In this situation, it is important to note

⁷² Boțan, *Transnistrian Settlement*, 61.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 62.

that Transnistria and Moldova, separately, appealed to the international research centers, asking for assistance in arguing Transnistria's right to independence from Moldova.

Thus, on July 19, 2006, a conference was held in Chisinau, during which the study was launched, *Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova*, conducted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY).⁷⁴ The conclusions of the study were as follows:

1. Transnistria is not entitled to external self-determination. Separation without the agreement of the constitutional power of the Republic of Moldova is not allowed under international law;

2. The Transnistrian regime exists de facto, assuming certain rights and obligations. The management by this regime of state property in Transnistria, following the same rules of international law, will be examined as an action of the occupation regime, which can use the properties only for the benefit of the population, without having them or without them estrange. In other words, the privatization under the auspices of the Transnistrian authorities is illicit, and the international companies participating in the privatization in Transnistria will have to be ready to challenge their rights;

3. Russia, as the third party involved in the conflict, has exceeded its duties as mediator and guarantor, granting openly to the separatist regime on the territory of the Republic of Moldova military, economic and diplomatic support.⁷⁵

Of course, the conclusions of the report were not to the liking of the Transnistrian leaders and they carried out as announced on September 17, 2006, the *Referendum on*

Transnistria's relations with the Republic of Moldova and Russia. According to data

published by the central electoral body of the region, about 310,000 voters participated,

⁷⁴ Christopher Borgen, "Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York," (SSRN Scholarly Paper, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, July 25, 2006), accessed November 28, 2019, <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=920151>.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 96.

i.e. 78.6 percent of the Transnistrian electorate. Of these, 97.2 percent voted for “Transnistria’s independence and its free accession to the Russian Federation”, and 94.9 percent voted against “renouncing PMR sovereignty and its accession to the Republic of Moldova.”⁷⁶ The election was monitored by about 130 international observers from CIS, Central, and Western Europe, including a group of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. The US, EU, OSCE, Ukraine, and other states and international organizations have declared that they do not recognize the referendum and its results. The Russian Federation did not recognize the referendum. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the poll “took place following all procedures, democratically and openly” and called on the parties to return to the negotiating table based on previously signed agreements.⁷⁷ The crisis again froze the negotiation process and the rest of the meetings focused on finding ways to restart the formal settlement negotiations, which failed to resume until 2012. According to the OSCE’s annual report from 2006 to 2012, the OSCE mission has made considerable efforts focused on building confidence between the sides.⁷⁸

The following sets of documents and protocols that the OSCE Mission to Moldova have signed and completed have a different approach to solving the deadlock. In February 2012, after a pause for almost six years, the negotiations in the “5 + 2” format resumed. Chisinau, to boost the relationship with Tiraspol, proposed the policy of

⁷⁶ Boțan, *Transnistrian Settlement*, 68.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ OSCE, “OSCE Annual Reports.”

“small steps,” which meant solving the local problems existing between the two banks of the Dniester without reaching the global problems of the conflict - the state of the Transnistrian region and the presence of the Russian army on the left bank of the Dniester.⁷⁹ This success is likely due to a change in the leadership of Tiraspol since the end of 2011 following the presidential election of Transnistria with Yevgeny Shevchuk’s win. The “small steps” policy aimed to create a climate of trust between the sides by jointly solving social-economic problems. Based on this approach of Chisinau, the key aspects of the Transnistrian problem would be gradually resolved. At the meetings in the format “5 + 2” from April 17-18 and July 13, 2012, in Vienna, were adopted the “*Principles and Procedures for the Conduct of Negotiations*” and a comprehensive agenda for the negotiating process to implement the policy proposed by Chisinau.⁸⁰ Three thematic baskets were created which were to be discussed in the negotiation process in the “5 + 2” format: socio-economic issues, general legal and humanitarian issues and human rights, and a comprehensive settlement, including institutional, political and security issues. Chisinau understands that once the problems in the first basket are solved, they will gradually move on to solving the issues in the other two baskets. Tiraspol’s position is that the Transnistrian region was constituted as a state-political entity, and only social-economic and humanitarian problems will be solved. The purpose of Tiraspol is to obtain internationally recognized legal-state elements, which would strengthen the

⁷⁹ Tăbârță, “Policy Brief,” 20.

⁸⁰ Government of Republic of Moldova, “Signed documents, by year,” sec. 2012, accessed December 29, 2019, <https://gov.md/en/content/signed-documents-year#2013>.

so-called Transnistrian state.⁸¹ Since the establishment of these thematic baskets in 2012-2013, there has been progressing in the socio-economic sphere. Several protocols are signed between the parties with the establishment of several facilities such as re-opening of rail freight traffic through Transnistria and disposal of radioactive waste.⁸² A new document that restored the negotiation climate in the “5 + 2” format is signed in Vienna on February 27, 2014, regarding the freedom of movement for permanent residence of Transnistria.⁸³ The signing of this protocol allows the free movement of citizens over the bridge from Gura Bicului, removing the barriers from the crossing points and allowing the agricultural works of the citizens of both banks in the security area. In the following years, a high-level of engagement between Moldova and Transnistria was also observed. The most significant achievement that gave another connotation to the dynamics of the “5 + 2” negotiation process was with the signing of the *Berlin Protocol* on June 3, 2016.⁸⁴ In this protocol, the sides agreed to achieve the specific agreements on the issue of apostille of diplomas issued in Transnistria; on the issue of the use of vehicles with number plates issued in Transnistria in the international road traffic; on the issue of telecommunications and connection; on the issue of ecology; on the issue of criminal cases and the issue of

⁸¹ Tăbârță, “Policy Brief,” 21.

⁸² Government of Republic of Moldova, “Signed documents, by year,” 2013.

⁸³ Ibid., 2014.

⁸⁴ The Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, “Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdnistrian Settlement,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, June 2-3, 2016, accessed December 29, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/244656>.

guarantees of implementation of agreements concluded within the negotiation process. Four of these problems were partially solved in the first year since the signing of the Berlin protocol and in the following year some issues were added for discussion; the Latin-script schools, the Dubasari farmland, freedom of movement for people, goods and services, and the Gura Bicului-Bychok bridge. This set of issues has been called a “*package of eight*” which emphasizes their importance in the Protocol signed in Vienna on November 28, 2017.⁸⁵ In the *Vienna Protocol*, the sides acknowledge the progress achieved and commit to drawing on the positive achievements and further work on settling the issues in the socio-economic and humanitarian spheres for the benefit of people. The next meeting of the “Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transnistrian Settlement” took place in Rome on May 29-30, 2018 where the sides signed the *Rome Protocol 2018*.⁸⁶ Under this protocol, the sides welcome the progress achieved in the “package of eight” but still regret the failure to comply with points 5 and 6 of the *Berlin Protocol* (namely the issue of criminal cases and the issue of guarantees). In 2019, there were no significant improvements again close to the OSCE Mission to Moldova’s end state. After a new round of international negotiations in the “5 + 2” format to resolve the Transnistrian

⁸⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdnistrian Settlement,” November 28, 2017, accessed December 30, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/359196>.

⁸⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdnistrian Settlement,” May 30, 2018, accessed December 30, 2019, <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885>.

conflict that took place in Bratislava, Slovakia, on December 6, 2019, the parties did not reach a compromise and no protocol was signed. The balance was presented by the head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch, who stated that more time is needed to finalize the negotiation round protocol.⁸⁷ According to the statements the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Alexandru Flenchea, Chisinau insisted on four priorities: freedom of movement in the security area, respect for human rights, ensuring the activity of schools teaching Latin script in the separatist region, as well as unifying fiscal and customs standards. Moldova is likely to insist on the negotiation of all topics, including the one related to the special status for the Transnistrian region and, on the other hand, Transnistria does not generally want to discuss the status issue. After 27 years of OSCE mission activity in Moldova, the dynamics of the regulatory processes have varied across the operational spectrum. The course of the mission, according to the documents signed by the actors directly involved in solving the conflict, is one of interest and not one of mutual agreement. The chronology of official documents that describes the course of the OSCE Mission to Moldova is represented in Figure 2.

⁸⁷ Alla Ceapai, “The ‘5 + 2’ negotiations in Bratislava - more questions than answers,” *Radio Europa Liberă*, last modified October 10, 2019, accessed December 30, 2019, <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/negocierile-5-2-de-la-bratislava---mai-multe-intrebări-decât-răspunsuri/30209628.html>.




Figure 2. Chronology of Official Documents of the Transnistrian Conflict

Source: Created by the author.

Articles and Publications

This subchapter studies the activity of the OSCE Mission to Moldova through the eyes of international authors and publications. It shows the diversity of opinions relevant to this topic.

The book *Transnistria 1989-1992: Cronica unui razboi “nedeclarat,”* by Ion Costas is a historical description of the events of 1989-1992 with regards to the Transnistria War.⁸⁸ The author dedicates this book to researching the events regarding the establishment of the independence of the Republic of Moldova and the ensuing war for the integrity of the state with the creation of the force structures in the country. General Ion Costas was at that time the first minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The book illustrates for the first time many pages little known in history and publishes documents from the former minister’s archive. The reader can find out from the first source in this book how the self-proclaimed Transnistrian republic was created in Moscow, how the Ministry of Internal Affairs planned and organized the secret arrest operation of the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, and under what conditions the separatist number one was released, to whom this was agreed and who was to win. The author managed to gather documentary testimonies about how Russia armed Transnistria with the forces of the 14th Army, how the events of the war developed, and also the “verbal portraits” of the politicians and state people of that period. The author offers a good perspective on the general context of the 1992 war and shows his disappointment with the inability of the political powers of the country but also of the

⁸⁸ Ion Costas, *Transnistria 1989-1992: Cronica unui razboi “nedeclarat”* (Bucuresti: Editura RAO, 2012).

OSCE to resolve the conflict. He emphasizes that on both banks of the Dniester there has grown a new generation that has a vague picture of what happened. The Moldovan population has ceased to believe in the prospect of reintegrating the country, and that of Transnistria has become accustomed to considering the Moldovan authorities as enemies. Regarding OSCE Mission, in each new stage of the negotiations on the Transnistrian problem, the Republic of Moldova has noticed an increasing demand from Transnistria. Transnistria no longer discusses cultural-national autonomy (as in 1989), about autonomy or federation (1993), about a common state (1997), but about full independence.⁸⁹ The book explains in essence that the deadlock in the negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria consists of the format imposed by Russia, a very interested mediator, and the illegal presence of the Russian army on the territory of the country.

The collection in 4 volumes *CONFLICTUL TRANSNISTREAN. Culegere de documente și materiale (1989 – 2012)*⁹⁰ of the historians, Anatol Țăranu, Ph.D., and Mihai Gribincea, Ph.D., constitutes the first attempt to analyze the evolution of the Transnistrian conflict from its beginnings to the present. The work of the authors consists of over 1000 documents and materials in each volume that shows this conflict like many others appeared in the process of dismantling the USSR, which continues to be a major source of danger and regional instability. All the documents of the collection are presented in chronological order and divided into four volumes: Volume I - 1989-1993; Volume II - 1994-2002; Volume III - 2003-2006 and Volume IV - 2007-2012. The

⁸⁹ Costas, *Transnistria 1989-1992*, 530.

⁹⁰ Gribincea and Țăranu, *Conflictul Transnistrean. Culegere de documente și materiale (1989 – 2012)*.

documents are presented in one of the three languages - Romanian, English and Russian, as a rule, in the original language. All the documents and materials included in this collection elucidate the fact that, like other conflicts in the former Soviet space, the Transnistrian conflict was one inspired by Russia. Some documents highlight the role of the US in the regulatory process, as well as the fact that the US diplomacy in Moldova in these years assumed the second position in the negotiation process where Russia plays the leading role.⁹¹ The authors argue that at present the Transnistrian conflict is seen by Moscow as the main lever capable of hindering the pro-European path and the modernization process of the country. The extent to which Russia will succeed in achieving its goal depends not only on the efforts and determination of the Moldovan Government to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and to integrate into the European Community but also on the support received from the international community, in the first place EU and US.

The book *Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lesson from the Moldova – Transnistria conflict*, by William H. Hill, provides a good explanation and analysis of the interaction between Russia and West during the negotiation over the Kozak Memorandum.⁹² The author of the book is a former retired Foreign Service Officer who served two terms as head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from June 1999-November 2001 and January 2003-July 2006. During both his tenures, especially after the Istanbul

⁹¹ Gribincea and Țăranu, *Conflictul Transnistrean. Culegere de documente și materiale (1989 – 2012)*, vol. 4, 5.

⁹² William H. Hill, *Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lesson from the Moldova – Transnistria Conflict* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

Summit commitment from 1999, Hill was a key player on the ground directly involved with negotiation for a political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict and facilitator of the withdrawal of Russian forces, arms, and ammunition from Moldova. The book considers the Transnistria conflict in a broader Euro- Atlantic context, but focuses in particular on the year 2003, when President Voronin's constitutional initiative and Dmitri Kozak's Memorandum brought the conflict the closest to settlement it has ever been. The author final lesson for the mediators and the OSCE is that irrespective of any reasons that support resolution of the conflict, one needs to remain mindful of the factors driving the parties apart, whether internal demographic, social, economic, and cultural factors, or the rivalries of interested external powers. In his opinion, if the participating states neglect the latter, their efforts to overcome the former will continue to be in vain.⁹³

In a study developed within the IPP (Institute of Public Policies) project, "Conflict management" entitled *IMPLICAREA OSCE ÎN SOLUȚIONAREA CONFLICTULUI TRANSNISTRIAN* (OSCE involvement in the solution of the Transnistrian conflict), Marcel Garaz explains the relationship of the peacekeeping operation, that contravenes the norms of international law, and the participation in the conflict settlement process.⁹⁴ The author argues that by signing the Ceasefire Agreement of 1992 Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, as in the case of the common

⁹³ William H. Hill, "The OSCE and the Moldova-Transdnistria Conflict: Lessons in Mediation and Conflict Management," *Security and Human Rights* 24, no. 3-4 (April 30, 2014): 297.

⁹⁴ Marcel Garaz, "Implicarea OSCE in Soluționarea Conflictului Transnistrian" (Institutul de Politici Publice, Chisinau 2001), accessed November 28, 2019, <http://ipp.md/old/download.php?file=cHVibGljL2JpYmxpb3RlY2EvMTUvcv8vSW1wbGljYXJlX1JvbS5wZGY%3D&id=191>.

state notion, introduced a novelty in the history of international law - peacekeeping forces composed of the belligerent parties. The study discusses a possible trap in which Moldova could fall and, which Russia is well-versed. The study discusses placing the peacekeeping operation under the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, therefore, Russia itself, but the CIS was not granted the right to structure enabled with the solution of the regional security problems. At present, in Europe, only the OSCE has this mandate and, therefore, it is the only regional organization entitled to intervene and participate in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In conclusion, the author stipulates that the peacekeeping operation in Moldova is illegitimate because it was not placed, according to the provisions of international law, under the mandate of an organization's global or regional security. The current peacekeeping operation has a negative influence on the internal situation in the republic, as it does not support the efforts of a sustainable political settlement of the dispute but on the contrary cement the position of the Russian Federation (and the puppet regime) in preserving the country's division and strengthening the position of the separatist regime. The author of the study proposes that the 1992 ceasefire agreement be terminated based on Article 8 thereof and initiate actions to involve the international community in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and to place the peacekeeping operation under the mandate of an international organization capable of solving security problems (UN, OSCE).⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Garaz, "Implicarea OSCE in Soluționarea Conflictului Transnistrian," 29.

Summary and Conclusions

To summarize, this chapter explains how the mission evolved chronologically reflected in OSCE core documents. Essentially, the related key documents and academic literature reviewed in the chapter describe the OSCE Mission to Moldova in the negotiation process and its effectiveness in reaching the end state. With only a brief look, it is easy to see that Russia is the leader in the negotiation process and the OSCE has a secondary role. Any major change in geopolitics has to be accepted by Russia in the first place because it is the power that can radically change the negotiation process in Moldova. The OSCE's global trend is towards long-term regional stability, resolving crises, aiding, and support to ensure that the parties to the conflict reach consensus. The same trend is observed in the official documents of the OSCE Mission in Moldova. But also, it is noted the OSCE's inability to compel Russia and other members of the organization to establish a single dispute settlement vector or establish a viable settlement mechanism accepted by all.

Numerous sources provide insight on OSCE Mission to Moldova activity reports and documents. However, there are not many resources that explain the OSCE effectiveness, methodology, and strategies to achieve their end state. Nor are there many sources describing clearly the OSCE Mission to Moldova capabilities and progress over the years in terms of efficiency or failure. This gather of literature contributes to a better understanding of the mission and visualizes the conflict negotiation process complexity and ambiguity. Therefore, this paper explains the methodology and tools this author uses to answer the research question in Chapter 3 in order to visualize a different perspective of the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The research conducted for this paper attempts to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of Moldova with Transnistria and to understand the complexity of the situation, given the past and current situation in the Missions operational environment. This chapter describes the steps of the research, how the data is collected and analyzed, and how they lead to a logical conclusion.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part contains the literature collection description. It describes the type of data, criteria of selection, and the instrument used to collect the data. The second part contains data analysis and synthesis. This part describes how the data is organized and managed, what analytical tools are used to come to the findings in Chapter 4, and how the research design supports answering the research question. Finally, the third part addresses the data trustworthiness and explained how the credibility of the research is verified.

This is a qualitative research paper. Qualitative research refers to non-numeric data and information such as interview transcripts, notes, video, and audio recordings, images, and text documents to identify the necessary information.⁹⁶ The rationale for qualitative methodologies is that they apply to problems or questions that are highly

⁹⁶ John Dudovskiy, “Qualitative Data Analysis,” Research-Methodology, accessed January 24, 2020, <https://research-methodology.net/research-methods/data-analysis/qualitative-data-analysis/>.

unstructured, and need descriptive or interpretive results to understand the problem better, suggest approaches for resolution, or develop approaches to future research.⁹⁷ The main qualitative method used in this work is the content analysis which is used to analyze documented information in the form of official documents, protocols, and political visions sources of all the actors involved in the researches area. The analysis focuses on the meaning and understanding of the problem and uses the inductive methodology to find answers to the research questions. In an inductive approach to research begins by collecting data that is relevant to the topic of interest. Then, after a substantial amount of data has been collected, the researcher looks for patterns in the data, working to develop a theory that could explain those patterns. Thus, when researchers take an inductive approach, they start with a set of observations, and then they move from those particular experiences to a more general set of propositions about those experiences. In other words, they move from data to theory, or from the specific to the general.⁹⁸ Figure 3 outlines the steps involved in an inductive approach to research.

⁹⁷ Thomas E. Ward, Ph.D., “Qualitative Methodologies,” (Research Guide, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 25, 2018), 10.

⁹⁸ Saylor Academy, “Inductive or Deductive? Two Different Approaches,” accessed January 25, 2020, https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_principles-of-sociological-inquiry-qualitative-and-quantitative-methods/s05-03-inductive-or-deductive-two-dif.html.




Figure 3. Inductive Approach to Research

Source: Saylor Academy, “Inductive or Deductive? Two Different Approaches,” accessed January 25, 2020, https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_principles-of-sociological-inquiry-qualitative-and-quantitative-methods/s05-03-inductive-or-deductive-two-dif.html.

Data Collection

Considering that the OSCE mission began its mandate in 1993 and is an ongoing mission, the collection of relevant materials is included in this period. This study used two main methods for collecting information about the OSCE Mission to Moldova: observation and document analysis. The *Observation* method is collecting information by “seeing” and “listening,” and the *Document analysis* by use of the content and other techniques to analyze and summarize electronic or printed material and existing information.⁹⁹ In this paper, most data collection methods are seen through the initiator’s perspective. In this approach, data is collected to provide information that has been identified as important by the researcher.¹⁰⁰ The research samples are mainly official

⁹⁹ Ellen Taylor-Powell and Sara Steele, G-36584, Program Development and Evaluation, *Collecting Evaluation Data: An Overview of Sources and Methods* (University of Wisconsin-Extension, Madison, WI, June 1996), 4, accessed January 25, 2020, https://web-okcd01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?C=XEWuHTMUBApE4FvwKF7y1XMvKOrF-EKGA9h7WhBlNHBgbSZpvwzYCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fwww.racialequitytools.org%2fresourcefiles%2fG3658_4.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

documents, protocols, and political vision sources that were selected under the criteria of importance in the OSCE Mission to Moldova accomplishment.

The strategy for analyzing the observation method is a structured one and mainly chronology where it describes what was observed in documents chronologically over time, and represents the dynamics of the mission. The strategy for the content analysis method is Archival research. *Archival research* is research involving primary sources held in archives, a Special Collections library as OSCE secretariat, or another repository. Archival sources can be manuscripts, documents, records (including electronic records), objects, sound, and audiovisual materials, or other materials.¹⁰¹ The methodological framework of the paper has an Interpretivism philosophy. Interpretivism involves researchers interpreting elements of the study. This philosophy emphasizes qualitative analysis over quantitative analysis where studies usually focus on meaning and may employ multiple methods to reflect different aspects of the issue.¹⁰² The epistemology of data collection in this paper is represented in Figure 4.

¹⁰¹ Jill Anderson, “GSU Library Research Guides: Archival Research: Why Archival Research,” accessed January 26, 2020, [//research.library.gsu.edu/c.php?g=115813&p=751002](https://research.library.gsu.edu/c.php?g=115813&p=751002).

¹⁰² John Dudovskiy, “Interpretivism (Interpretivist) Research Philosophy,” Research-Methodology, accessed January 26, 2020, <https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/interpretivism/>.




Figure 4. Data Collection Epistemology

Source: Created by the author.

The main weaknesses of the interpretivism method are related to the subjective nature of this approach and great room for bias on behalf of the researcher. Primary data generated in interpretive studies cannot be generalized since data is heavily impacted by personal viewpoints and values. On the contrary, the strengths of interpretivism are on its qualitative research areas such as cross-cultural differences in organizations, issues of ethics, leadership that can be studied at a great level of depth. Primary data generated via Interpretivism studies might be associated with a high level of validity because data in such studies tend to be trustworthy and honest.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Dudovskiy, "Interpretivism (Interpretivist) Research Philosophy."

Data Analysis and Synthesis

In this paper, the data are organized and managed chronologically from the beginning of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The work for answering the primary question uses the Operational Design as analytical Methodology. Operational design is a methodology that helps commanders and staffs reduce the uncertainty of a complex environment, understand the nature of the problem, and then construct an operational approach to achieve the desired end state.¹⁰⁴ At the base of the operational design methodology there are four questions:

1. What is going on in the environment?
2. What do we want the environment to look like?
3. What (the problem(s)) is preventing movement from the current state to the desired end state?
4. How do we get from the current state to our desired state?¹⁰⁵

This methodology essentially explains that if you know what is happening in an operational environment, and just as you know how you would like that environment to look or be changed, you could interpret what prevents us from making that change, in other words, the problem. Once the problem is identified, as well as the tensions, difficulties, and competition of the actors of interest in the operational environment, the methodology can approach the fourth question with an operational approach that

¹⁰⁴ Dale C. Eikmeier, “From Operational Art to Operational Plans” (Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS), 21.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

describes the steps and actions to address the problem to make the change in the desired end state. In the same vein, this paper is organized.

The secondary research question one is what is the current operational environment of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. To describe the operational environment the paper uses several tools such as Pattern observation, crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure/Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events), and RAFT system perspective. The Pattern observation is a procedure for observing and analyzing the course of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, targeted in the official OSCE documents to view the mission dynamics. This observational tool will visualize the mission successes and failures over the years. The crosswalk of the operational variables (PMESII) with civil consideration (ASCOPE) is a tool to assist commanders in understanding the social, political, and cultural variables within the AO and their effects on the mission. Besides, the use of ASCOPE characteristics helps to analyze civil considerations that are essential in supporting the development of effective plans for operations.¹⁰⁶ This analysis tool shows what favors and impede the OSCE Mission to Moldova and how compatible is the operational environment to make the transition from the current state to the desired end state. Finally, to define the operational environment the work uses the RAFT method. The acronym RAFT stands for *Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions*, and represents a way to view and study an environment.

¹⁰⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2019), 4-22.

An environment is comprised of various systems called *actors*. The systems may also contain sub-actors occasionally referred to as nodes. Each system or *actor/sub-actor* normally have *relationships* to other systems or actors. These relationships are the links between systems' *sub-actors/nodes*. Every relationship has a *function* or purpose which should be identified. *Tensions* are characterizations of the relationships.

A systems perspective of the operational environment attempts to provide an understanding of interrelated systems. Understanding these systems (*Actors*), their interaction (*Relationships and Functions*) with each other (*Actors*), and how system relationships will change (*Tensions*) over time will increase knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components (RAFT). This knowledge helps commanders and planners identify leverage points where actions can move the environment closer to the desired end state¹⁰⁷

According to the same algorithm of Operational design methodology, the secondary research question number two is what is the desired End State? To answer this question, the paper subdivided the question into four tertiary questions. Each tertiary question explains what is the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from the perspective of the OSCE, Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia. The paper examines the end state for the mission from different perspectives, using official documents, protocols, and political vision sources of all the actors involved in the researches area. Finally, after the end state of the actors is defined, the work confirms or denies the unique end state of the mission to all the actors involved in the conflict and how the operational environment should look like.

The third question in the operational design methodology is the primary question in this paper, namely what is preventing OSCE from resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Once the current end state and the desired end state is known, the work identifies the underlying cause and not just the symptoms of the problem. This step asks, what is the

¹⁰⁷ Eikmeier, "From Operational Art to Operational Plans," 17.

difference between the current state and the desired end state and what in the environment is preventing us from reaching the end state. Failing to identify the right problem can result in an operational approach that only treats the symptoms not the problem.¹⁰⁸

The operational design methodology is the basis of the research design that supports answering the research questions. The last question of the operational design methodology is represented as an operational approach that recommends how the OSCE Mission to Moldova might improve. These recommendations on improving the OSCE Mission to Moldova will be set out in Chapter 5. The research design in this paper is easily transferable in other situations or other audiences where the operational environment is uncertain and complex, which helps the researcher to understand the problem first than to construct an Operational approach to achieve the desired end state. The research design for this work is represented in Figure 5.

¹⁰⁸ Eikmeier, “From Operational Art to Operational Plans,” 26.




Figure 5. Research Design

Source: Created by the author.

Data Trustworthiness

Taking into consideration that this work is a qualitative study, the data trustworthiness is all about establishing that all findings are credible and dependable. The Credibility of the findings in this qualitative research is insured by the primary source from the archives of the OSCE. All the documents of the OSCE Mission to Moldova that the paper relies on are signed by all Actors involved in the negotiation process. The study does not use classified information that is prohibited for public disclosure. All sources in the free press are the most current ones and directly concern the study or the question.

Summary and Conclusion

To sum up, Chapter 3 shows general information about the research methods used to answer the primary, secondary and tertiary questions of the paper. The work uses qualitative research techniques to obtain its final objectives. This chapter describes the algorithm of the research, how the data is collected and analyzed, and how they lead to a logical conclusion. The main method used in the research is Operational Design as analytical Methodology. Moreover, to the qualitative method, the primary source is used to support certain arguments and to add credibility to the research. The current methodology best supports data analysis to answer the primary question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Our life is the result of the choices we make. Blaming those around us, the environment, the other external factors, means giving these things the power to control us.

—Stephen R. Covey, *Time Management or How We Set Our Priorities*

Introduction

The purpose of the research is to analyze what is keeping the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of Moldova with Transnistria and to understand the complexity of the situation, given the past and current situation in the Mission operational environment. This chapter is compartmentalized into three main subchapters.

The first subchapter is the analysis focused on understanding the Operational Environment. The paper uses several tools such as Pattern observation, a crosswalk of PMESII/ASCOPE, and a RAFT system perspective that help to determine the reality of the OSCE Mission to Moldova on the ground.

The second subchapter is the analysis focused on visualizing the desired end states of the various actors. The paper examines the end state for the Mission from different perspectives, using official documents, protocols, and political vision sources of all the actors involved in the negotiation. The analysis of the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from the perspective of the OSCE, Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia. This analysis will describe how each actor would like the environment to look like or how to be changed.

The third subchapter is the analysis focused on defining the problem of the mission and what in the environment is preventing us from reaching the desired end state.

Overall, Chapter 4 addresses every subject of the argument through the steps of Operational Design methodology. The chapter answers all the secondary and tertiary research questions, which enables answering the primary research question.

Understanding the Operational Environment

The framework for understanding the operational environment used in this work is Observation, PMESII/ ASCOPE, and RAFT tool that facilitates the analysis necessary to answer a secondary question of the thesis. The fact is that the area of operation of OSCE Mission to Moldova is the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova with its internationally recognized borders as represented in Figure 6. The Moldovan authorities and the Transnistrian region are the main actors in the negotiation process throughout the entire area of operation. To understand the mission successes and failures over the years, this paper uses an observation tool to identify the mission dynamics. To highlight the differences and characteristics of each actor in the area, the work conducts a crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE analysis for each one. In the end, the paper compares the PMESII analysis in both regions and applies the system perspective RAFT tool to understand the relations and tensions of other actors in AO.



Figure 6. Map of the Republic of Moldova with the Security Zone

Source: Natalya Belitser, “Transnistrian Conflict: State of Affairs and Prospects of Settlement,” *Black Sea News*, last modified January 27, 2013, accessed January 8, 2020, <https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/55025>.

Dynamics of the OSCE Mission to Moldova

In order to represent the reintegration process facilitated by the OSCE, the work is based on the official documents signed by the parties involved in the negotiation represented in Figure 2 of Chapter 2. Based on the fact that the OSCE mission in the report published on June 10, 1994, entitled “*The Transnistrian Conflict in Moldova: Origins and Main Issues*,” three basic problems are identified as follows:

1. Illegal presence of Russian troops in Transnistria.
2. Granting special status to Transnistria.

3. Socio-economic problems related to language, symbols, administration, and market.¹⁰⁹

The paper discusses these three basic problems with which the OSCE Mission to Moldova has wrestled over the years. These topics were more or less discussed in the basic documents regarding the OSCE Mission to Moldova, where the dynamics of the mission are derived. In other words, how close it was to reintegration. These dynamics of the integration path targeted in the fundamental documents of the OSCE Mission to Moldova are represented in Figure 7 of this paper. As shown in Figure 7, the reintegration of the country could be achieved if those two axes intersect. The principle of tracing the axis of the diagram is approached according to the criterion of discussion of each sphere of the problem in the documents cited with the signature by all the parties involved in the negotiation process by agreeing in a unique resolution. In other words, document resolving the conflict and reconciling the two parties would only be possible if both sides could agree in all three problem areas. Keys turning points in the dynamic of the negotiation process or the critical event are annotated with stars. The first critical event and the one that came closest to bringing about integration was the signing of the Istanbul Document 1999. The Istanbul Document 1999 was the only document during the OSCE Mission to Moldova that has touched the issue of the Russian troops' in Moldova. According to the document, Russia pledged to withdraw Russian troops from Moldovan territory within two years. The Kremlin administration led by the

¹⁰⁹ OSCE, "Transdnistrian Conflict."




Figure 7. Dynamics of the Integration Path Targeted in the Fundamental Documents of the Transnistrian Conflict

Source: Created by the author.

new president Vladimir Putin requested a one-year extension at the 2002 Porto OSCE conference. During this extension, Russia tried to implement the Kozak plan which proposed the federalization of the state with the granting of equal status and rights for Transnistria. After the Moldovan President refused to sign this plan, Russia stopped the withdrawal of troops and gradually degraded the OSCE Mission to Moldova. Russia accused the European Institution of interfering in the internal affairs of CSI and Russian troops on the territory of Moldova as a reason to not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. This issue, in their perspective, is a concern to Moldovan-Russian diplomacy only. The second critical event in the Integration Path is the introduction of the new negotiation format “5+2.” In the middle of 2005, the Moldovan Parliament adopted Law number 173 which gave Transnistria the status of a territorial-administrative region within Moldova. Their autonomy should be represented by a local Supreme Council and the first election should be held by OSCE but only after the evacuation of the Russian troops and ammunition from the region. This law was not accepted by the rest of the members in the negotiation process, stating that it was drafted without consulting the parties, although the Moldovan side states that it was a necessary step towards democratizing the region and preparing it for transparent elections within Moldova. Two months later, in Odessa, the parties in the negotiation process invited the EU and the US to participate in the negotiation process as observers, in the new negotiation format referred to as a “5+2.” This new format seemed to establish a balance of interests on the negotiation table, but in reality, it set the conditions for the negotiation process to worsen in the upcoming years. The third critical event in the Integration Path is the unrecognized Referendum held on 17 September 2006 in the Transnistrian region. The first meetings in the new “5 + 2” negotiation format

resulted in a total failure when Transnistria took control of some agricultural territories and restricted the free movement of goods in the security area by emplacing checkpoints. The situation worsened after Ukraine adopted an ordinance that stipulated that all export goods from Transnistria should be registered at Moldovan customs. Transnistrian authorities described these measures as an “economic blockade” and accused the Ukrainians of taking part in the conflict in favor of Moldova. In response to this blockade, the Transnistrian leader convoked a congress of deputies from all levels where they discussed organizing a referendum on the relationship with the Republic of Moldova. The referendum was supported by the Russian political body and was held on 17 September 2006. The population of Transnistria had to choose between the reunification with Moldova or to be independent and accession into the Russian Federation. The OSCE Mission to Moldova could not prevent this escalation, which worsened the situation, and made it almost impossible the mission to fulfill its mandate. To prevent this referendum, Moldova appealed to a legal society to study the right of Transnistria to independence from Moldova. This study was conducted by ABCNY entitled *Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova*. The study concluded that Transnistria does not have the right under international law to self-determination without the agreement of the constitutional power of Moldova and Russia has exceeded its duties as mediator and guarantor in the negotiation process granting DIME support to the separatist regime.¹¹⁰ The result of this study did not prevent the Transnistrian authorities from holding the referendum as planned. According to

¹¹⁰ Borgen, “Thawing a Frozen Conflict,” 96.

Transnistrian “authorities.” 97.2 percent voted for independence from Moldova, and with the free unification with the Russian Federation. The referendum was not recognized by any country, even by Russia, which again called the parties to the negotiating table but under another scope. For the Transnistrian authorities, this referendum led them to believe that they were independent and could join the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, for the OSCE Mission to Moldova, it created a six-year deadlock in the negotiation process. The fourth critical event in the Integration Path was the change of the leadership in Transnistria. After six years of effort in building confidence and security measures, the negotiation in the “5+2” format resumed. In February 2012, in one of the negotiation processes, Moldova proposed the policy of “small steps” that are meant to solve the local problems in the sphere of socio-economic issues and create a climate of trust. Since that time, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has managed to solve several social problems, such as freedom of movement in the security zone in 2014, as the “package of eight” in 2017 that solves several local social problems, but has not managed at all to bring about negotiations on the problems of the special status of Transnistria or the presence of the Russian army in Transnistria. The new leadership from Transnistria is opened to discuss the social problems that favor most of that region but in the posture of an independent state. The fifth critical event in the Integration Path diagram is the delimitation of this paper. The point represents the state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in a continuous struggle to bring all the actors together and touch only the discussion of the sphere of socio-economic issues, represents Transnistria which is considered independent and does not even question its status or component of Moldova and represents Russia which

maintains its troops in Transnistria without considering the OSCE Mission to Moldova as legally rightful to discuss such topic with.

Crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE

Republic of Moldova Overview

The Political Variable

Moldova's policy is conducted within a framework of a representative parliamentary democratic republic, in which the prime minister is the head of the government in a multi-party system. The 101-seat unicameral Parliament exercises legislative power, and its members are elected by popular vote on party lists every four years. The government exercises executive power with a Cabinet consisting of nine ministries appointed by the prime minister. The prime minister is nominated by the president and approved through a vote of confidence in Parliament. The judicial power is represented by the Supreme Court of Justice and Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is autonomous to the other branches of government; the Court interprets the Constitution and reviews the constitutionality of parliamentary laws and decisions, decrees of the president, and acts of the government. The most influential people in the state are the president and the prime minister. It is important to mention that the Metropolitan of Moldova has an indirect political influence. The next presidential elections will be in autumn 2020 and parliamentary in February 2023.¹¹¹ The working groups on the political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict are part of the Bureau of

¹¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova," accessed January 11, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html>.

Reintegration Policy, within the State Chancellery and are directly subordinated to the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the implementation of policies in the field of country reintegration.

The Military Variable

The forces of the national defense system of the Republic of Moldova are constituted on the principle of defensive sufficiency that ensures the neutrality and security of the borders. The National Army consists of the Land Forces Command, Air Forces Command, and the Carabinieri Troops (during wartime). Military service in Moldova is compulsory for males at age 18-27 with a one-year service obligation. Moldova intends to abolish military conscription by 2021. Military expenditures consist of 0.35 percent of GDP (2018)¹¹² The Republic of Moldova has a military budget of nearly 30 million dollars, with manpower of 5,100 active members and 60,000 reserve personnel.¹¹³ The armed organizations in the country are the army and the police which is directly subordinate to the president as supreme commander. The Minister of Defense is responsible for the entire activity of the ministry before the Government, and as a member of the Government - before the Parliament. The Chief of the General Staff is in command of the Moldovan National Army and is appointed by the President of Moldova

¹¹² CIA, “The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova.”

¹¹³ Radio Europa Liberă, “Armata R. Moldova la 28 de ani de la formare: cu un buget redus și dependentă de politic,” accessed January 11, 2020, <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/o-armată-subfinanțată-de-ziua-armatei-3-septembrie-2019/30144704.html>.

at the recommendation of the Minister of Defense.¹¹⁴ The National Army was created on September 3, 1991, and this date is celebrated as the Day of the Army. On March 2, 1992, is the beginning of the armed conflict on the Dniester and is considered the day of commemoration of the victims of the war in Transnistria.

The Economic Variable

Despite recent progress, Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. With a moderate climate and productive farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agriculture sector, featuring fruits, vegetables, wine, wheat, and tobacco. Moldova also depends on annual remittances of about \$1.2 billion - almost 15 percent of GDP - from the roughly one million Moldovans working in Europe, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere. With few natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Moldova's dependence on Russian energy is underscored by a more than \$6 billion debt to Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom, largely the result of unreimbursed natural gas consumption in the breakaway region of Transnistria. The government's stated goal of EU integration has resulted in some market-oriented progress. Moldova experienced better than expected economic growth in 2017, largely driven by increased consumption, increased revenue from agricultural exports, and improved tax collection. During fall 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU (AA/DCFTA), connecting Moldovan products to the world's largest market. The unemployment rate of

¹¹⁴ IBP Inc., *Moldova A "Spy" Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments* (Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2007).

the country is 4.1 percent (2017), with a significant number of labor force preferring to go abroad to work. The remittances as a percent of GDP in 2018 were 16.06 percent.¹¹⁵ The export and import partners are mainly Romania, Russia Ukraine, and Italy as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Moldova Trade Partners (2017)				
Moldova	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Export	Romania (24.6%)	Russia (13.7%)	Italy (9.1%)	Germany (6.2%)
Import	Romania (15.5%)	Ukraine (11.4%)	Russia (10.6%)	China (10.4%)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova,” accessed January 11, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html>.

Over the longer term, Moldova’s economy remains vulnerable to corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, energy import dependence, Russian political and economic pressure, heavy dependence on agricultural exports, and unresolved separatism in Moldova’s Transnistria region.¹¹⁶

The Social Variable

The Republic of Moldova has a population of approximately 3,437,720 (July 2018) with an urbanization index of 42.7 percent of the total population (2019). Pockets of agglomeration exist throughout the country, the largest being in the center of the

¹¹⁵ The Global Economy, “Moldova Remittances, Percent of GDP - Data, Chart,” accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Moldova/remittances_percent_GDP/.

¹¹⁶ CIA, “The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova.”

country around the capital of Chisinau (504,000 in 2019), followed by Tiraspol and Balti. The major ethnic groups in Moldova consist of Moldovan 75.1 percent, Romanian 7 percent, Ukrainian 6.6 percent, Gagauz 4.6 percent, Russian 4.1 percent, Bulgarian 1.9 percent. Linguistically, the population breaks down to Moldovan/Romanian 80.2 percent (official), Russian 9.7 percent, Gagauz 4.2 percent (a Turkic language), Ukrainian 3.9 percent, Bulgarian 1.5 percent. The main social structures in the country are the schools, kindergartens, churches, and hospitals that each locality has. The level of literacy is 99.4 percent of the total population.¹¹⁷ The main religion is Orthodox Christians, who make up 93.3 percent of Moldova's population that believes the church as the most trustful organization in-country. The main social problems facing the population are unemployment, corruption, poverty, and migration.¹¹⁸ August 27 is the national day of Moldova commemorating the adoption of the Declaration of Independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Information Variable

In Moldova, state-owned national radio-TV broadcaster and operates one TV and one radio station; a total of nearly 70 terrestrial TV channels and some 50 radio stations are in operation. Russian and Romanian channels also are available (2019). The mobile phone market has extended the reach of service outside the cities and across most of the country. Endeavors to join the EU have promoted regulatory issues to be in line with EU

¹¹⁷ CIA, "The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova."

¹¹⁸ Agora, "Study. Top 5 Major Problems Facing the Republic of Moldova," accessed January 11, 2020, <https://agora.md/stiri/18502/studiu--top-5-probleme-majore-cu-care-se-confrunta-republica-moldova>.

principles and standards, the market is competitive with 80 ISPs active, LTE services available, and mobile broadband growth. Competition among mobile telephone providers has spurred subscriptions with little interest in expanding fixed-line service. Mobile-cellular telephone density sits at 105 per 100 persons (2018). The internet user's percent of the population is 71 percent (July 2016 estimate).¹¹⁹ The main sources of information of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova are television and the Internet with almost 50 percent informed by TV and 34 percent through the Internet. The regulatory authority on public and private audiovisual media in Moldova is the Audiovisual Coordinating Council which supervises the enactment of the Broadcasting Code, and issues broadcasting licenses and retransmission authorizations. The composition of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council consists of nine members, appointed by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova for a term of 6 years.¹²⁰ The code of the audiovisual media services in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the media transparency, is analyzed and monitored by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.¹²¹ Annually, a media-forum is organizing by the Press Council of the Republic of Moldova. Following the discussions of the group and those of the thematic workshops, the approved resolution of the mass-media forum is transmitted to the national authorities,

¹¹⁹ CIA, "The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova."

¹²⁰ Audiovisual Coordinating Council, "The Activity of Audiovisual Coordinating Council," accessed January 11, 2020, <http://www.audiovizual.md/activitatea-ca>.

¹²¹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), "Legal Analysis on the Draft Code of Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova," 20 June 2018, accessed January 11, 2020, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/385206#_blank.

foreign representations and embassies, to the European and international organizations and experts that monitor the democratic development of the Republic of Moldova.¹²²

The Infrastructure Variable

The development of infrastructure in Moldova has progressed significantly in the telecommunications network. However, the country lacks the improvement of the infrastructure in the field of transport, freight, and energy. the road network in Moldova is a total of 9,352 km with paved 8,835 km (2012).¹²³ The main means of transportation in Moldova are railways 1,138 km (707 mi) and a highway system (12,730 km or 7,910 mi overall, including 10,937 km or 6,796 mi of paved surfaces). The only international air gateway to Moldova is Chisinau International Airport. The Giurgiulești port on the Danube is compatible with small sea vessels.¹²⁴ Moldova's electrical supply is a key factor in improving the deficits in infrastructure in Moldova. Generally, 61 percent of energy imports are gas and rely on Russia for much of this supply. The country doesn't have the money or resources to spend on improving its infrastructure. As of November 2017, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has agreed to work with authorities on creating sustainable practices in infrastructure development in Moldova. They plan to support the modernization of its roads and railways and encourage

¹²² Media Forum, "Forumul Mass-Media," November 4-5, 2019, accessed January 11, 2020, <https://mediaforum.md/event/2019>.

¹²³ CIA, "The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova."

¹²⁴ Giurgiulesti International Free Port, accessed February 15, 2020, <https://gifp.md/en/home/>.

transparency in the policy.¹²⁵ The population of the Republic of Moldova is largely builders who prefer to work abroad because of financing. The following priority projects in infrastructure are in the field of improving national and international roads. Another project that is expected to be completed in 2020 is the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline project, which will reduce the dependence on Russian gas.

¹²⁵ Borgen Project, “The Need for Investment in Infrastructure in Moldova,” last modified January 21, 2018, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://borgenproject.org/infrastructure-in-moldova/>.

Table 2. PMESII/ASCOPE Republic of Moldova AO						
	Areas	Structure	Capabilities	Organizations	People	Events
Political	Parliamentary democratic republic	The unicameral Parliament 101 seats The government 9 ministries Constitutional Court	Parliament legislative power Government and President executive power Constitution Court judicial power	National Bank	President prime minister Metropolitan	Next presidential elections 2020 parliamentary in February 2023
Military	Ensures the neutrality and security of the borders	Land Forces Command Air Forces Command Carabinieri Troops	5,100 active members 60,000 reserve personnel	Army Police	President Minister of defense Chief of the General Staff	3 SEP Army day 02 MAR Starting war on Transnistria
Economic	Farmland and agriculture	Market with Europe and Russia	Distribution of food and raw material through market	Tobacco industry Wine industry	The unemployment rate of 4.1% labor force prefers overseas work	One harvest per year The market usually in weekends
Social	Moldova 3,437,720 Chisinau 504,000	Schools kindergartens churches and hospitals	Literacy rate 99.4% High medical standards	Churches religion Orthodox Christians 93.3%	Moldovan 75.1%, Romanian 7%, Ukrainian 6.6%, Gagauz 4.6%, Russian 4.1%	August 27 is the national day
Information	TV and mobile service covers most of the country	TVs x 70 Radio x 50 Mobile cellular 105% Post-service Internet 71%	TV streaming Radio broadcast Internet	National TV National Radio Independent TV and radios ACC	50% informed by TV 33% informed through the internet	Election of 2020 Annually Mass-Media Forum
Infrastructure	Urban area 42.63% Rural 57.37% of population Electricity - 100%	Railways Airport Port Roads	Maintenance only	BERD	Builders Work overseas	Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline project 2020
			Favors OSCE Mission to Moldova			
			Does not favor OSCE Mission			
			Neutral for OSCE Mission			

Source: Created by the author

Transnistrian Region Overview

The Political Variable

Transnistria is de jure an autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova made up of administrative-territorial area on the Eastern (left) bank of the Dniester River. De facto, it is a self-proclaimed separatist state, calling itself the Dniester Republic of Moldova (RMN). Transnistria's "government" assumes the form of a presidential democracy. The president is directly elected for a maximum of two-consecutive five-year terms. The Supreme Council is a unicameral legislature. It has 43 members who are elected for five-year terms. Elections take place within a multi-party system.¹²⁶ The president and the government have the executive power both administrations have divided the ministries and the supreme council represents the legislative power. One of the most powerful and influential corporations in the region is Sheriff. The Sheriff has grown to subsume nearly all forms of profitable private business in this small unrecognized region and has even become significantly involved in Transnistrian politics and football. A study by investigative journalists from *RISE Moldova* calls Transnistria "Sheriff's Republic" shows that in 2015, every third ruble that entered the budget of the unrecognized Moldovan Republic was transferred by companies controlled by the Sheriff holding company.¹²⁷ The next presidential elections are expected in 2021. The OSCE

¹²⁶ Supreme Council Pridnestrovie, accessed January 12, 2020, <http://en.vspmr.org/>.

¹²⁷ Vladimir Thoric, "Republica Sheriff," *Rise Moldova*, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://www.rise.md/articol/republica-sheriff-3/>.

Mission to Moldova does not participate in the monitoring of elections in Transnistria or other political movements.

The Military Variable

Transnistria is a separatist region with a high militarization coefficient. It has border guards and customs inspectors, and law enforcement in addition to its conventional military. The Operational Group of Russian Forces, are stationed in Transnistria. The armed forces and the paramilitary of Transnistria are composed of around 4,500 troops plus an estimated 15,000 reservists who can be mobilized. The police consist of about 10,000 police and other law enforcement personnel in nine militia divisions, plus an elite Dniester battalion of some 500 troops. The state security has some 2,000 personnel and includes a special Delta battalion of approximately 150 troops, a Cossack reserve regiment of roughly 200, and approximately 800 border guards and customs inspectors. The Army is equipped with eighteen T-64 tanks, 69 armored personnel carriers, and a small air contingent consisting of eight helicopters and five airplanes that conduct regular training and exercises with Russian OGRF troops. Additionally, the People's Militia, a voluntary citizens home guard modeled after Swiss and Israeli reservist forces, is a regularly trained and well-armed force of 2,000, about 70 percent of whom have some combat experience.¹²⁸ The commander-in-chief of the army and the police is the president of Transnistria.

¹²⁸ Internet Archive, "Law Enforcement and Armed Forces of Pridnestrovians," last modified November 4, 2009, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20091104073203/http://pridnestrovie.net/armedforces.html>.

The Economic Variable

Transnistria has a market-based economy where the government encourages privatization and economic growth. Most of the companies in Transnistria are now privately owned. The economy is based on a mix of heavy industry (steel production), electricity production, and manufacturing (textile production), which together account for about 80 percent of the total industrial output. After signing the Moldovan association agreement with the EU (AA / DCFTA) in Transnistria the export increased significantly. It should be noted that Transnistria cannot export goods without registration in the Republic of Moldova. The two main destinations for Transnistrian products are Romania and Poland, where about 62 percent of all deliveries reach the EU market. The Transnistrian economy is trying to orient on several different vectors and is interested in trading with all potential partners, including with the countries of the European Union.¹²⁹ The support of the Russian Federation and “natural gas subsidies,” according to different figures, provide 75 to 80 percent of the revenues in Transnistrian’s budget, and the annual aggregate aid from Russia is estimated at one billion dollars, which almost doubles the GDP of the region (1.112 billion dollars in 2014). The Transnistrian region’s debt to Gazprom is 4.5-4.7 billion dollars. Against the background of the departure of Russian investors from the region, as well as the sequestration of the budgetary expenditures, carried out by the Russian Federation, granting financial aid in the size requested by

¹²⁹ TV 8 Moldova, “Cum economia Transnistriei este salvată de UE și Moldova,” accessed January 12, 2020, <http://tv8.md/2018/04/16/cum-economia-transnistriei-este-salvata-de-ue-si-moldova/>.

Tiraspol is unlikely.¹³⁰ Transnistria has its central bank, the Transnistrian Republican Bank, which issues its national currency, the Transnistrian ruble. It is convertible at a freely floating exchange rate but only in Transnistria. The Economic sector of Transnistria is based on four giant industrial plants: the leading steel industry Moldova Steel Works (part of the Russian Metalloinvest holding) in Rîbnița, the Tirotex, the largest company in the textile industry which claims to be the second-largest textile company in Europe; the Ribnita Cement Plant and the largest power company Moldavskaya GRES (Kuchurgan power plant) that is in the Dniester and owned by Inter RAO UES.¹³¹ Sheriff corporation plays a special role in the region's economy. It is the largest employer in Transnistria with the number of employees, 13,157 people registered in 2012, which made up 17 percent of all employees in Transnistria. The holding consists of more than ten firms and production plants representing various industries. The Sheriff is also the largest taxpayer of the region and holds first place in the total amount of tax payments to the regional budget. In 2012, the company transferred 58 million US dollars to the state budget as taxes, duties, and fees. That made up 14 percent of the annual turnover and 19 percent of all tax revenues of the state. In the context of the 50 largest taxpayers of the region, more than 52 percent of payments to the budget and extra-budgetary funds come from the Sheriff corporation, which made up 32 percent of the

¹³⁰ IDIS, *Economic Outlook*, IDIS Viitorul, December 2015, 21, accessed January 12, 2020, <http://viitorul.org/ro/content/economic-outlook-decembrie-2015>.

¹³¹ Kamil Catus, "An Aided Economy. The Characteristics of the Transnistrian Economic Model," OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, last modified May 16, 2013, accessed January 17, 2020, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-05-16/aided-economy-characteristics-transnistrian-economic-model>.

budget tax revenues.¹³² The population of the region usually buys the necessary staples from the local markets and the bazaars open on weekends.

The Social Variable

In general, the Transnistrian region is a multi-ethnic pro-Russian region, composed of inhabitants from 35 different nationalities. According to the 2004 Transnistrian population census, Moldovans make up 31.9 percent of the population of the region; 30.3 percent of the population are Russians, and 28.8 percent - Ukrainians. There are also Bulgarians (2.5 percent), Gagauzians (0.7 percent), Belarussians (0.7 percent), and others such as Germans, Jews, Tatars, Armenians, etc.¹³³ In total, the population of the Transnistrian region is about 505 000 people with a concentration of 70 percent living in urban areas and 30 percent in rural areas. The major social structure is all under the control of the Sheriff holding that owns a chain of petrol stations, a chain of supermarkets, a TV channel, a publishing house, a construction company, a Mercedes-Benz dealer, an advertising agency, a spirit factory, two bread factories, a mobile phone network, the football club FC Sheriff Tiraspol and its newly built Sheriff Stadium including a five-star hotel. The companies connected to the Sheriff holding company function as a state within another state, being active in all segments of the economy - from the trade-in food, automobiles, fuels, medicines, alcohol production and export to

¹³² Sheriff Ltd., “Economic Effectiveness,” accessed January 17, 2020, <http://sheriff.md/en/company/econom/>.

¹³³ Biroul Național de Statistică, “Recensământul populației și al locuințelor 2014,” accessed January 12, 2020, <https://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=479&#idc=205&>.

hotel services, fixed and mobile telephony, internet, banks and insurance, sports, and press.¹³⁴ The religious belief in Transnistria is the same as in Moldova of about 91 percent of Eastern Orthodox Christians. There are three official languages in Transnistria: Russian, Moldovan based on the Cyrillic alphabet, and Ukrainian. Public education in Transnistria is done using the Russian language and Soviet-originated Moldovan Cyrillic alphabet. Daily life, office work is performed in 99 percent of cases in the Russian language. The “5 + 2” negotiation process and all the documents signed in the negotiation are in the Russian language primarily as the negotiation language subsequently translated into English for evidence. The Transnistrian region celebrates its national day on September 2, which is the day of self-declaration independence.

The Information Variable

In the Transnistrian region, there are several television stations, newspapers, and radio stations. In general, the media in Transnistria is controlled by authorities in Tiraspol. In terms of private media, it is represented by the owners of the Sheriff holding, a conglomerate that controls most of the private business in Transnistria. The owners of the Sheriff, are also the founders of Tiraspol’s TSV television channel, registered in 2006 under the name “Editorial media, Television of Free Choice.” The channel’s headquarters is on Liebknecht street, Germany, at the same address as the Sheriff sports center and Mercedes car showroom, which are also controlled by Sheriff’s director.¹³⁵ In

¹³⁴ Thoric, “Republica Sheriff.”

¹³⁵ Vladimir Thoric and Natalia Silitcaia, “Media Sheriffs from Transnistria,” *Rise Moldova*, accessed January 14, 2020, <https://www.rise.md/english/underground-deals-media-sheriffs-from-transnistria/>.

Transnistria, the media sector is dominated by public media such as the State Tele-Radio company and State Media Service, which is subordinated to the government. Public media editorial policy is coordinated by Moscow, through the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, with which the Media Service signed a memorandum of cooperation in 2014.¹³⁶ In the region, the provision of internet and mobile services is provided by the company “Interdnestrcom”, which also belongs to the Sheriff holding company, and which operates on a CDMA format. The company “Interdnestrcom” is a Russian company registered in Ukraine, the same company that provides the Internet and mobile telephony in Crimea.¹³⁷ The Transnistria state media is filled, at least in editorial terms, by party media. Thus, the newspaper “Obnovlenie”, registered in 2007, is the mouthpiece of the party with the same name. After the elections of November 2015, the party won 23 of 43 seats in the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol and become the main political force in opposition to the current Tiraspol leader.¹³⁸ According to the survey and the annual report of the non-governmental organization Freedom House, there are zero free and independent media in Transnistria. The authorities closely monitor and control the public media, and Sheriff

¹³⁶ Thoric and Silitcaia, “Media Sheriffs from Transnistria.”

¹³⁷ Thoric, “Republica Sheriff.”

¹³⁸ Thoric and Silitcaia, “Media Sheriffs from Transnistria.”

dominates private broadcasting, leading to widespread self-censorship. That indicates a territory as opposed to an independent country.¹³⁹

The Infrastructure Variable

From Soviet times until today, the Transnistrian region has been an industrial area that contributed to Moldova's supply of electricity and other infrastructure materials. The region has an old Soviet railway infrastructure and a non-functioning airport that is privatized by Russian oligarchs. Transnistria cannot develop the infrastructure of the region independently, only limited maintenance. The latest investments in infrastructure were made from extra-budgetary funds that reduce the salaries and pensions paid in proportion of 70 percent to the whole region. The leader of the region, says that the Transnistrian Humanitarian Fund, whose sources are renovating and widening streets and rehabilitating buildings, is fed by businessmen from outside Transnistria and has no connection with the reductions to pensions and salaries.¹⁴⁰ The entire Transnistrian territory is supplied with electricity from the power plant from Kuchurgan and supplied with Russian gas that is not taxable.¹⁴¹ The Dniester River provides drinking water to both banks, and the irrigation systems are in good order. The railway in Transnistria is used only on the Tiraspol-Ukraine segment, Moldova is obliged to bypass the region at

¹³⁹ Freedom House, "Transnistria Not Free," last modified January 30, 2019, accessed January 14, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/transnistria>.

¹⁴⁰ Lina Grâu, "Transnistria: Investiții fără precedent în infrastructură, pe fundalul unei crize economice profunde," *Radio Europa Liberă*, accessed January 15, 2020, <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/27207022.html>.

¹⁴¹ Catus, "An Aided Economy."

Russian or Ukrainian routes due to lack of customs control as well as a consensus between the parties.¹⁴²

¹⁴² Corneliu Rusnac, “Trenurile Către Rusia Nu Vor Fi Redirecționate Prin Transnistria,” *BBC*, accessed January 15, 2020, http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2006/11/061102_trenuri_moldova.shtml.

Table 3. PMESII/ASCOPE Transnistria AO						
	Areas	Structure	Capabilities	Organizations	People	Events
Political	De jure – Autonomous region from Moldova. De facto -self-proclaimed separatist state	Presidential democracy Presidency (5 ministries and 3 councils) Government (6 ministries and state services) Supreme Council (43 members)	President and Government are the executive power. Supreme Council the legislative power.	Sheriff Transnistrian Republican Bank	Sheriff director President Chairman of Supreme Council Obnovlenie Party	The election in 2021. No OSCE involve in an election.
Military	High militarization region	Border Guards Police Army State Security	Police – 10000 Army –4500 15000 reserve SOF – 500 State security 2000 personnel	People's Militia Cossack reserve Regiment OGRF Forces	President is the commander in chief of the army and police. MoD, COS.	Annually Parade in Tiraspol on 02 September
Economic	Mixed economy	Market Rail Metallurgical industry Energetic industry Textile	Steel production 52% Electricity 17% Textile production 13% To GDP	Transnistrian Republic Bank Metalloinvest Inter RAO UES Tirotex Sheriff	Sheriff director Moldova Steelworks director Inter RAO director Black market	Weekend market
Social	Multi-ethnic pro-Russian region Approx. 505000 Capital Tiraspol	Sheriff Stadium Sheriff Supermarkets	Internet Food Markets Fuel, Medicine, alcohol production Sport	Eastern orthodox Christianity 91% Sheriff	31.9 % Moldovans 30.3% Russians 28.8 % Ukrainians 2.5% Bulgars Russian language in use	02 September National Day
Information	Full coverage of TV and Radio Newspapers	Party media Public media Privat media	Internet Cable TV -4, radio -11, newspaper -14 Mobile communication DCMA	Sheriff holding State Tele Radio State Media Service Interdnestrcom	Government decision on media Sheriff control	Fake news and Russian propaganda
Infrastructure	Urban – 69.9% Rural – 30.1% Industrial area	Rail Roads Airport (not functional) Irrigation Gas Electricity	Maintaining only the infrastructure Limited medical Supply with gas, electricity, water.	Construction company (Sheriff) Ribnita Cement plant Sheriff control 50% of the construction market	builders and workers in industries	none
			Favors OSCE Mission to Moldova			
			Does not favor OSCE Mission			
			Neutral for OSCE Mission			

Source: Created by the author.

PMESII/ASCOPE Analysis

Considering the final goal pursued by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and analyzing the operational variables PMESII in conjunction with civil consideration ASCOPE of both territories concluded in the identification of the fields that favor and prevent the achievement or fulfillment of the conditions for reaching the final desired end state. These fields in Tables 2 and 3 are represented in red those that do not favor the mission, with green those that favor and with yellow those that are neutral or have a minor influence on the mission. There are 36 fields total in a PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk. It follows that Moldova has eight fields that favor the OSCE Mission to Moldova, a field that is not in favor and 27 neutral. On the other hand, Transnistria holds one field in favor, 14 in detriment and 21 neutral. The result of the analysis is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. PMESII/ASCOPE Analysis			
OSCE Mission to Moldova	Favors OSCE Mission to Moldova (fields)	Does not favor OSCE Mission (fields)	Neutral for OSCE Mission (fields)
Moldova	8	1	27
Transnistria	1	14	21
Issues focus on Operational Variables		Political Military	

Source: Created by the author.

Most of the fields that obstruct the OSCE Mission to Moldova are in the Transnistrian region and focus more on the political and military variables. The political variable is at

the expense of the mission because the political power of the region wants to maintain the status quo which is in contravention of the ultimate goal pursued by the OSCE Mission to Moldova. Furthermore, the military variable is the guarantor of the security of the region, which together with the Russian armed forces in the region, exerts psychological pressure and deterrence for all those involved in the negotiation process. The OSCE Mission to Moldova since the Istanbul summit from 1999 has no longer discussed the resolution of these variables, which is also the main factor that prevents reaching the end state of the mission.

System Perspective RAFT

The leadership of the OSCE Mission to Moldova must have a system perspective to form a vision or in our case an operational approach. A system perspective is key to understanding the environment and all the interrelated systems within it. This paper uses the RAFT method to show the systems inside the operational environment, the Actors in each system with their components, and their interaction with each other. Understanding how system relationships will change (*tensions*) over time will increase knowledge of how activities within a system can affect other system components. This understanding will help the commander of the mission to identify the leverage points where the negotiation can focus to move the environment closer to the desired end state.¹⁴³ In this paper, the operational environment using the system perspective RAFT method is represented in Figure 8. Based on the PMESII/ASCOPE analysis, and the OSCE Mission to Moldova dynamics over the years, the paper describes the operational environment

¹⁴³ Eikmeier, “From Operational Art to Operational Plans,” 18.

divided into three interrelated systems. The first system is Moldova with all its constitutional components, divided into spheres of influence of political, military, economic, and social operational variables. The second system is the OSCE Mission to Moldova, which includes all the actors in the “5+2” negotiation format plus the passive actors that affect other actors or other components in the operational environment. The third system is Transnistria with all its components equally divided into spheres of influence of political, military, economic, and social operational variables. The relationships and tensions between the actors and their components are represented by lines color-coded according to the legend of Figure 8.




Figure 8. Operational Environment Representation Using System Perspective RAFT Method

Source: Created by the author.

The identification of the tensions between the actors and their components in the represented systems is from the perspective of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, namely how that relationship can help the mission or on the opposite, that the relationship between the actors is vulnerable concerning the mission may be an eventual leverage point. All actors and components in the operational environment that are represented in the red color are the most affected in the event of reaching the final state from which it turns out that they will oppose the highest resistance. The connections between the actors and the components that are vulnerable are represented in a double red line, this shows us that this connection is lacking in the legitimacy or is protected by the actor so that it is not discussed in the negotiation process and subsequently changed or eliminated from the operational environment. These vulnerabilities can be used as leverages in the negotiation process and the OSCE Mission to Moldova must have a plan on how these vulnerabilities or illegalities will support the change to integrate these two systems. According to Figure 8, Russia is the most influential actor with the most connections in the operational environment, which acts as a mediator in the negotiation process and guarantor of security in the area. It follows that the focus of the negotiations must be focused on Russia because it will have the most to change in terms of relationships and connections with the other actors and components. Now, the OSCE Mission to Moldova can create a vision on how to approach the current state to reach the final state proposed in the mandate, as well as details on how to influence its actors and components in the operational area with all its advantages and disadvantages to reach the compromise and accept the change.

Understanding the Operational Environment Conclusion

In this subchapter, the paper focused on understanding the Operational Environment and used analytical tools such as Pattern observation, crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE, and RAFT system perspective to comprehend the reality of the OSCE Mission to Moldova on the ground. The Pattern observation targeted in the based document resulted in the Dynamics of the OSCE Mission to Moldova where is shown that the most successful approach to accomplish the mandate is to use a political model similar to Istanbul Document, 1999, where the Mission was at its closest point to the reunification of the state. This diplomacy directly concerns Russia and the status and presence of its military forces illegally stationed on the territory of Moldova. This is probably a problem that the OSCE Mission to Moldova should not have gone further without resolving because sooner or later this issue must be resolved in order to solve the other issues. The PMESII/ASCOPE analysis resulted in that the fields of political and military variables obstructing the OSCE Mission to Moldova. That is because the political power of the region wants to maintain its status quo and the military variable is the guarantor and security of the region. Finally, the RAFT system perspective identifies the actors and their components that oppose the change desired by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and that those relationships between them have a strong interest in one of the main actors in the negotiation process that is Russia. To summarize, the OSCE Mission to Moldova operate in a complex operational environment, with a long back history full of accomplishments and failures, where it faces resistance from the political and military side of Transnistria that is strongly supported by the influential actors and components in the system that impedes the achieving of the mission desired end state.

Visualizing the Mission Desired End State

This subchapter analyzes some particular key documents that help the mission to focus on visualizing the mission desired end states of the various actors. The mission end state is a set of required conditions that define the achievement of the OSCE Mission to Moldova objectives. The paper examines the end state and the conditions required to the mission from different perspectives, using official documents, protocols, and political visions sources of all the actors involved in the negotiation. The analysis of the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from the perspective of the OSCE, Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia. This analysis will describe how each actor would like the environment to look like or how to conduct the change.

OSCE Desired End State

The desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and its condition required are described in the mission mandate. The end state of the mission is to “facilitate through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova.”¹⁴⁴ This specific end state is endorsed by all current 57 OSCE participating States, including the Republic of Moldova, through annual Ministerial Council Statements.¹⁴⁵ The mandate established a set of conditions required to achieve this end state. One of the conditions is to obtain a comprehensive political framework for dialogue and negotiation and assist the parties on a lasting

¹⁴⁴ OSCE, “OSCE Mission to Moldova.”

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

political settlement of the conflict.¹⁴⁶ This condition will consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova along with another condition to grant special status for the Trans-Dniester region. The next essential condition is an “orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops.”¹⁴⁷ This condition was emphasized at the Istanbul summit 1999 where the mandate, based on decision number 329, was after that only modified with one additional condition and “ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments.”¹⁴⁸ The conditions and the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova are described in Table 5.

Table 5. OSCE Mission to Moldova Desired End State		
OSCE Mission to Moldova	Set of conditions required	Desired end state
	• A lasting political settlement • Moldova’s independence and sovereignty consolidated • Complete withdrawal of foreign troops • Special Status for Transnistria clearly defined • Russian ammunition and armament removed from Transnistria.	<i>Facilitate through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria within Moldova</i>

Source: Created by the author.

¹⁴⁶ OSCE, CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3, 2.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

Since the beginning of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, no conditions stipulated in mandate have been met to reach the desired end states. Here is the essence of the problem about what prevents OSCE Mission to Moldova to achieve the desired end state.

Moldova Desired End State

The desired end state of the Moldovan government vis-à-vis the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Transnistrian region is depicted from the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, and the law number 173 from 22 July 2005 regarding the basic provisions of the legal status for the localities on the left bank of the Dniester. Before defining the desired end state of Moldova, it is necessary to identify some of the conditions towards the end state from these fundamental documents. Declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova in paragraph four underline the existence of Moldovans in Transnistria, a part of the historical and ethnic territory of Moldovans people.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, in paragraph 17, the first Parliament requests the USSR to terminate the illegal state of occupation and annexation and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its national territory.¹⁵⁰ It is noticeable that the Russian Federation did not accept these conditions even though independence was recognized by USSR back then. In the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Title 1, Article 11, it specifies that the Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality and does not admit the stationing of any foreign military troops on

¹⁴⁹ Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, *Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova*, August 27, 1991, para 4, accessed March 25, 2020, <http://www.presedinte.md/eng/declaration>.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

its territory.¹⁵¹ From here it is clear that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria is the main condition for the consolidation of Moldova's independence and sovereignty. This condition, as well as more detailed ones, are specified in the law nr. 173 from 22 July 2005 regarding the basic provisions of the legal status for the localities on the left bank of the Dniester. This national law grants Transnistria a special legal status as an autonomous territorial unit within Moldova under a fundamental law of Transnistria that does not contravene the Moldovan constitution and the possibility of forming a system of democratically elected power under the OSCE mandate. The courts, the prosecutor's offices, the Directorate of the Information and Security Service, and the Department of Internal Affairs of Transnistria are part of the single system of courts and the unique system of law organs of the Republic of Moldova that carries out the activity of law and state security under the legislation of the Republic of Moldova.¹⁵² The law assures Transnistria its symbols, which are applied with the symbols of the Republic of Moldova, and the official languages in the region are the Moldovan language, based on Latin spelling, Ukrainian and Russian. The establishment of these conditions under this law is after the complete, urgent, and transparent evacuation of Russian troops and armament from the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Moldova believes that the adoption of the law is granting the special status of Transnistria and the material and social guarantees following the reintegration were considered necessary steps towards

¹⁵¹ Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, *Constitution of the Republic of Moldova*, March 29, 2016, accessed March 25, 2020, <http://www.presedinte.md/eng/constitution>.

¹⁵² Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, "Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Legea Nr.173.

democratizing the region and preparing for transparent and legal elections within the new republic. The only thing left to do was the withdrawal of the Russian army from Transnistria. Even if none of these conditions were accepted by Transnistria and Russia along the negotiation process, it can be deduced from these fundamental documents, and especially Law number 173, that the desired end state of Moldova is strengthening the unity of the people, restoring the territorial integrity of the state, creating a unique space of legal, economic, defense, social, customs, and humanitarian, as well as ensuring civic peace, trust, mutual understanding and agreement in society, stability, security, and the democratic development of the state. The conditions and the desired end state of Moldova are described in Table 6.

Table 6. Moldova Desired End State		
Moldova	Set of conditions required	Desired end state
	• Demilitarization by complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Transnistria • The power system in Transnistria democratically elected under the OSCE umbrella • Granting Transnistria, special legal status as an autonomous territorial unit within Moldova. • The fundamental law of Transnistria does not contravene the Moldovan Constitution • A single system of courts and the unique system of law organs under the legislation of the Republic of Moldova • Transnistria has its symbols applied with the symbols of the Republic of Moldova • Official languages in the region are Moldovan, based on Latin spelling, Ukrainian and Russian.	<i>Strengthening the unity of the people by restoring the territorial integrity of the state in a unique space of legal, economic, defense, social, customs, and humanitarian, which ensures peace, trust, mutual understanding in society, stability, security, and democratic development of the state.</i>

Source: Created by the author.

Transnistria Desired End State

The desired end state of Transnistria regarding the OSCE Mission to Moldova is ambiguous and difficult to determine because the sources of reference are unconstitutional and unrecognized by the international community. Nevertheless, the Transnistrian leader has an official website where is published the Constitution of Transnistria and even a Development Strategy of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic 2019–2026. These documents of the self-proclaimed republic are not recognized by the international community, but they can provide a good insight into the desired end state of

Transnistria. In the published constitution, the region claims its name as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic as a “sovereign, independent, democratic, legal state.”¹⁵³ Besides, to defend sovereignty and independence of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, the Armed Forces are established.¹⁵⁴ It follows that Transnistria does not even plan to negotiate in the direction of the reintegration of Moldova or the final settlement desired by it or by OSCE. A better perspective is shown in the development strategy published on the same site where describes the conditions necessary for achieving the strategic goals of Transnistria. Some of the main conditions are strengthening independence with a focus on gaining international recognition and implementation of the results of the 2006 referendum and building a society-oriented state with a market economy.¹⁵⁵ The strategy also emphasizes the importance of informing people in foreign countries on the inalienable right of the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic to independence and strengthening and expansion of political and diplomatic contacts with the Russian Federation. Concerning the Republic of Moldova, the key is to reach agreements on current economic, social, and humanitarian aspects and the construction of equal good neighborly interstate relations.¹⁵⁶ The objectives proposed

¹⁵³ President of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, *The PMR Constitution*, accessed March 26, 2020, <http://en.president.gospmr.org/pravovye-akty/konstitutsiya-pmr/>.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵⁵ President of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, “Development Strategy: Introduction,” accessed October 20, 2019, <http://en.president.gospmr.org/strategiya-razvitiya/>.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.2 c).

by Transnistria are opposite to those of Moldova. The conditions and the desired end state of Transnistria are summaries in Table 7.

Table 7. Transnistria Desired End State		
Transnistria	Set of conditions required	Desired end state
	• Gain international recognition • Build a society-oriented state with a market economy • Inform people in foreign countries on the inalienable right of the PMR to independence • Strengthening and expansion of political and diplomatic contacts with Russia • Reach an agreement on current economic, social and humanitarian aspect with the Republic of Moldova • Construction of equal good neighborly interstate relations with the Republic of Moldova	<i>PMR is a sovereign and independent state, internationally recognized, with political stability, economic, self-sufficiency, and social justice that ensures the growth of citizens' welfare and countering negative trends.</i>

Source: Created by the author.

This end state is interpreted based on the nomenclature of the strategy and objectives proposed by Transnistria until 2026. It should also be noted that in fact what Transnistria wants is to be recognized as an entity in the international space with subsequent recognition as an independent state.

Russians Desired End State

The desired end state of the Russian Federation government vis-à-vis the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Transnistrian region is equally ambiguous and difficult to identify but still, a very good perspective is described in the Russian initiative to resolve

the conflict through federalization called the *Kozak Memorandum*. This initiative was proposed at the end of 2003 by the most trusted adviser of Putin, Dmitry Kozak, and supposed to be implemented that year with Putin's participation in signing these commitments. The official signing was postponed at the initiative of the President of Moldova because this could have serious consequences and there was a wave of protests and dissatisfaction from the opposition as well as the international community. However, so far, it remains the only source to refer to how Russia would like to settle the Transnistrian conflict. The Kozak memorandum refers to a solution by creating an asymmetrical federation with Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia as state entities within the Federation. These three states form their state structures of the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, it has its constitution and legislation, state property, independent budget, and fiscal system, as well as its state symbols and other attributes of its state status.¹⁵⁷ The new federation would be called the Federal Republic of Moldova and it had to be a neutral and demilitarized state.¹⁵⁸ Transnistria and Gagauzia have the right to withdraw from the Federation in cases where it was decided to join Romania or about the total loss of the sovereignty of the Federation.¹⁵⁹

The federal legislative body of state power is the Federal Parliament, which consists of two chambers - the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate consists of 26 senators, elected for 5 years, of which 4 are elected by the People's Assembly of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, 9 by the Supreme Council of the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova, 13 by the House of

¹⁵⁷ ИА REGNUM, “Меморандум Козака’: Российский план объединения Молдовы и Приднестровья,” accessed October 30, 2019, <https://regnum.ru/news/458547.html>.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 2, 3.5.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.16.

Representatives of the Federal Parliament. The House of Representatives consists of 71 deputies, elected for 4 years according to the federal organic law based on the universal, direct, equal vote, by secret ballot in a single electoral district, following the proportional electoral system.¹⁶⁰

These as well as other conditions regarding the formation of the supreme court and the constitutional court, clear indications about what should be written in the new federal constitution, and the steps that Moldova must take to implement it. One of the steps was for the parties to appeal to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the European Union with a proposal to provide political and economic guarantees to ensure compliance with the conditions of association and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Moldova provided in the memorandum.¹⁶¹ The last and most important measure for Russia was for the parties to submit a proposal to the Russian Federation regarding the provision of security guarantees, the conditions of association, and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Moldova provided by this memorandum. To this end, after obtaining the consent of the Russian Federation before the referendum on the adoption of the Constitution of the Federation, the Republic of Moldova signs and ratifies the Agreement with the Russian Federation on the territory of the future Federation, for the transitional period, until the state will be completely demilitarized, but by 2020, peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation numbering no more than 2000 people, without heavy military equipment and weapons.¹⁶² This memorandum looks like more as an ultimatum or order that Russia indicates to them to accept the settlement of

¹⁶⁰ ИА REGNUM, “Меморандум Козака”, 9.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁶² Ibid., 18.

the Transnistrian conflict according to the wishes of more Russians or ethnic Russians. It is understood that Russia does not want the international community to be involved in the problems in the CIS area and they consider that Moldova is a law territory that belongs to Russia and that in the current situation will never allow the disadvantage of the Russian citizens or the geopolitical interest towards Europe. According to all the conditions imposed in the Kozak Memorandum, the Russian desired end state it is understood as the reunification of Moldova in an asymmetric federation that is neutral and demilitarized, with Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia as equal entities within the federation and whose security is guaranteed by the Russian troops during the period of transition and complete demilitarization. The conditions and the desired end state of Russia are summaries in Table 8.

Table 8. Russians Desired End State		
Russia	Set of conditions required	Desired end state
	• Federal Republic of Moldova • Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia as state entities within the Federation • Neutral and demilitarized state • Transnistria and Gagauzia have the right to withdraw from the Federation in cases where it was decided to reunite with Romania • Federal Parliament, which consists of two chambers - the Senate and the House of Representatives • The Senate consists of 26 senators, of which 4 are elected by Gagauzia, 9 by Transnistria, and 13 by the House of Representatives • The House of Representatives consists of 71 deputies, elected following the proportional electoral system • The superior court formed by the senate and the constitutional court from 11 judges, 6 elected by the House of Representatives, 1 from Gagauzia and 4 from Transnistria • State, municipal and private property rights are recognized throughout the federation • Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the EU offer political and economic guarantees • Russia offers security guarantees during the transition period with Russian troops	<i>The Federal Republic of Moldova is a neutral and demilitarized state, with Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia as equal entities within the federation and whose security is guaranteed by the Russian troops during the period of transition and complete demilitarization.</i>

Source: Created by the author.

Defining the Problem

A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In the context of operations, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels DIME actions to resolve it.¹⁶³ For this paper, defining the problem is answering the primary question of the research; and that is what is preventing OSCE Mission to Moldova to achieve the desired end state. The steps to identify the problem in this paper are applied by comparing the current operational environment with the desired end state to identify the main aspects of the problem or the “symptoms”, developing the problem statement, and finally defining the problem.

To identify the main aspects of the problem or the “symptoms” when we compare the current operational environment with the desired end state, it is necessary to apply some basic questions such as:

1. What needs to change?
2. What doesn’t need to change?
3. What is missing and needs to be provided?
4. What behaviors need to change?
5. What must be removed?
6. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the actors?
7. What are the opportunities and threats (tensions)?

¹⁶³ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2015), paras. 4–1.

8. What conditions need to exist for success?¹⁶⁴

This comparison and identification of the problem aspects are represented in Figure 9. The first thing that is obvious and needs change is the alignment of the objectives to all the actors in a single end state that gives the possibility of the mission to be achievable. The OSCE Mission to Moldova must consolidate all participants in the 5+2 negotiation format under a single objective, otherwise, the regulatory process will be counterproductive. The desired end state of the Republic of Moldova does not require change because it pursues the same objective. The OSCE Mission to Moldova is missing a clear vision of how to reach the end state and the guarantees of any form to the disadvantaged actors or systems components in the environment. Many components in the area of operation do not imagine what their state will be after the reunification of Moldova and how they will keep what they have at the moment, which is why they are set for resistance in negotiations. One of the mission's efforts must be directed towards changing the behavior and the population's desire to accept the reintegration path approved by the international community. Two things must be removed from the operational environment, first, is the Russian style peacekeeping operation that is illegally conducted from the international law point of view and second is the Russian troops (OGRF) with the armament and munitions depots from Transnistria. One of the basic principles of the United Nations Peacekeeping according to the UN charter is

¹⁶⁴ Eikmeier, "From Operational Art to Operational Plans," 26.

Impartiality.¹⁶⁵ The peacekeeping operation in Transnistria is illegitimate because it was not placed, under the provisions of international law, under the mandate of a global or regional security organization such as the UN / OSCE and contravenes the norms of international law and the provisions of international organizations through the impartiality of the peacekeeping forces and involvement in the operation of the belligerent parties. A frozen conflict is nothing more than a peacekeeping operation with the participation of belligerent forces. The second item to be removed is Russian troops (OGRF) with the armament and munitions depots from Transnistria because it violates the sovereignty and constitutional neutrality of Moldova. The strengths of Russia and Transnistria are that they have total control of the region and permanently have economic or social levers that influence Moldova. Their weaknesses are that they lack the legitimacy of the control they carry and maintain this frozen state until the right time. An opportunity would be to initiate actions to involve the international community in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and to place the peacekeeping operation under the mandate of an international organization capable of solving security problems (UN, OSCE). The threats with that can be that Russia can use its veto right in the UN to protect their interest or can use its military force to execute that mandate. The most important condition that must exist to succeed in this mission is the desire of the population on both banks of the Dniester to accept the reintegration of the country. The will and power are

¹⁶⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, “Principles of Peacekeeping,” United Nations, chap. 3, accessed March 31, 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

two factors that can produce change. All the actors involved in the negotiation process need to have the will and at least one to have the power to accomplish the reintegration.

The next step to identify the problem is developing the problem statement based on all the problems aspects resulted from asking the basic questions.




Figure 9. Defining the Problem

Source: Created by the author.

The problem statement is the description of the primary issue or issues that may impede OSCE from achieving their desired end states.¹⁶⁶ Resulting from problem aspects from above, the problem statement is developed as follows: How does the OSCE Mission to Moldova achieve the mandated end-state considering the diversity of the final objectives of the various actors, with an existing and illegal peacekeeping operation in place that is supported by Russian troops illegally stationed in Transnistria and Russian interest to maintain the status quo of property, economy, leverage, and influence. This problem statement should be the basis of each round of negotiation and most importantly the basis of the operational approach. The problem aspects are what is preventing the OSCE Mission to Moldova to achieve its desired end state. Each aspect of the problem can be lines of effort in an operational approach that leads to the end state.

In general, a broad problem for OSCE Mission to Moldova is the Russian interest in Transnistria and the inability of OSCE to influence Russia to compel its mandate. Another aspect of the broad problem is the ignorance and apathy of the rest of the world to Moldova's situation. No one has National interest at the state level in Moldova other than Russia. No one has the power to change the situation other than Russia. No one has the will to change the situation other than Russia. Therefore, the 25 plus years of frozen conflict with the very real possibility of 25 more, the OSCE is showing the impotence to resolve the conflict.

¹⁶⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 22, 2016), paras. 9–61.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 4 represents the meat and potatoes of the thesis. The focus of the chapter is to answer all the secondary and tertiary research questions. The analysis begins with understanding the Operational Environment where the OSCE Mission to Moldova activates, using tools such as Pattern observation, crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE, and RAFT system perspective to understand the reality on the ground. It continues with the examination of official documents, protocols, and political vision sources of all the actors involved in the negotiation to visualize the mission desired end states from different perspectives. Subsequently, the chapter analyzes and defines the problem of the mission and what in the environment is preventing it from reaching the desired end. Additionally, the chapter lists the aspects of the problem which are the obstacles that prevent the current environment to change in the desired environment. Moreover, the chapter develops the problem statement that serves the basis for further analysis as well as in developing the operational approach. In general, the chapter analyzes and accumulates the data needed to answer the primary question of the thesis as well as the data needed to draw conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and weak suffer what they must.

—Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 431 BC

Introduction

The purpose of the research is to analyze what is preventing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe from achieving the unification of Moldova with Transnistria and to understand the complexity of the situation, given the past and current situation in the Mission operational environment.

Chapter 5 is organized into four sub-chapters and it summarizes the findings of the research. The first subchapter interprets the findings described in Chapter 4 by explaining what those results mean, what the implications of these summaries are, and describing any unexpected findings. The second subchapter address the recommendations in the form of an operational approach to the necessary improvements of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The third subchapter mentions the recommendations for further study. In this subchapter, it is mentioned how can be further developed the other aspects of the problem or methodologies in the same line of ideas. The fourth subchapter is a summary and conclusions that summarize the research findings based on the researched questions from this thesis.

The work uses the Operational Art to address the activity of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and apply Operational Design as a tool to understand the past and current

environment, to visualize the desired end state of all the actors and to define the problem to understand what is preventing the OSCE from achieving their desired end state.

The analysis from Chapter 4 found that the OSCE Mission to Moldova operates in a complex operational environment, where is facing resistance from Transnistria and Russia that follow different end states what results in the inability of OSCE to influence Russia to compel its mandate.

Interpretation of findings described in Chapter 4

The findings described in Chapter 4 are oriented towards understanding the operational environment by using tools as Pattern observation, PMESII/ ASCOPE, and RAFT; and towards visualizing the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the other actors in the operational environment. From these findings, the work defines the problem which is the obstacle that prevents the OSCE Mission to Moldova to achieve the desired end state and complete the mandate.

The Pattern observation tool provides an understanding of the OSCE Mission to Moldova dynamics over the years. The paper identifies five critical events in the dynamics, as shown in Figure 7. The first critical event, and the one that comes closest to bringing about integration, was the signing of the Istanbul Document in 1999. The Istanbul Document 1999 was the only document throughout OSCE Mission to Moldova that touched upon the presence of Russian troops in Moldova. The implication is that the political model used in the Istanbul Summit, 1999, is the most successful approach to accomplish the mandate. That moment was to the closest to the reunification of the state since independence, but after the Putin administration came to power in Russia, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has experienced a constant decline in the negotiation process.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria represents the most basic condition for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova. From then on, the OSCE Mission to Moldova continued further the negotiation without having the chance or advantageous position to bring in negotiation the issue of Russian troops in Transnistria. The next critical events shown in the dynamics of the mission represent the state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in a continuous struggle to bring all the actors together and touch only the discussion of the sphere of socio-economic issues, represents Transnistria which is considered independent and does not even question its status or component of Moldova and represents Russia which maintains its troops in Transnistria without considering the OSCE Mission to Moldova as legally rightful to discuss such topic with.

The crosswalk PMESII/ASCOPE tool provides an understanding of the fields that favor the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the fields that prevent the achievement or fulfillment of the conditions for reaching the final desired end states. The analysis of the operational variables PMESII in conjunction with civil considerations ASCOPE was applied to both Moldova and Transnistria. The results of the analysis using this instrument reveal that the Political and Military variables from the Transnistrian overview are to prevent the OSCE Mission to Moldova from meeting its objectives. The implications are that the political power of the region wants to maintain the status quo which is in contravention of the ultimate goal pursued by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, and the military variable is the guarantor of the security of the region. Both of the variables are supported by the Russian army and their diplomacy, which together exerts psychological pressure and deterrence for all those involved in the negotiation process. It is, therefore, no wonder that since the Istanbul summit from 1999, Russia and OSCE

Mission to Moldova has no longer discussed the resolution of these variables, which is also the main factor that prevents reaching the end state of the mission.

The System Perspective RAFT tool provides an understanding of the environment and all the interrelated systems within it. The RAFT is key to understand the environment and all actors in each system with their components and their interaction with each other. A better understanding of how system relationships will change over time will increase ways of how activities or specific action within a system can affect or change other system components. In this work, the system perspective RAFT method is represented in Figure 8 where the operational environment is divided into three interrelated systems: Moldova, the “5+2” negotiation format, and Transnistria. The OSCE Mission to Moldova must implement these vulnerabilities and illegalities as milestones in the lines of effort and should use them as leverages in the negotiation process to support the change to integrate these two systems. The RAFT reveals that Russia is the most influential actor with the most connections in the operational environment, which acts as a mediator in the negotiation process and guarantor of security in the area. From here it turns out that the effort of the negotiations must be focused on Russia because they have most of the change to support in terms of relationships and connections with the other actors and components.

The understanding of the current Operational environment resulted from these three tools is that the OSCE Mission to Moldova operates in a complex environment, with a long back history full of accomplishments and failures, where it faces resistance from the political and military variable of Transnistria that is strongly supported by the

influential actors like Russia and other components in the system that impedes the achieving of the mission desired end state.

In order to visualize the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the other actors in the operational environment, the work describes and interprets some of the official documents that reveal the perspective or the true desired end state of the main actors from the negotiation process. The conditions required and the desired end state of the OSCE Mission to Moldova according to the mission mandate are described in Table 5. In terms of effectiveness, since the beginning of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, no conditions stipulated in mandate have been met or accomplished. From here the doubt that the OSCE Mission may not be capable or lacks the mechanism and power needed to resolve the conflict. The conditions required and the desired end state of Moldova are described in Table 6. It is noticed that the desired end state and the conditions, that are more detailed, followed by Moldova are aligned and follow the same purpose. The conditions required and the desired end state of Transnistria according to their Constitution and Development Strategy are summaries in Table 7. These two documents of the self-proclaimed republic are not recognized by the international community, but they can provide a good insight into the desired end state of Transnistria. It is noticed that the desired end state and the conditions which Transnistria establishes are radically opposed to those pursued by the OSCE and Moldova. Transnistria intends to be internationally recognized and tries to strengthen statehood through the OSCE and other institutions as an entity with full rights to self-determination. The conditions required, and the desired end state of Russia is extracted according to the Kozak Memorandum and summaries in Table 8. It is also worth noting that the desired end state and the conditions

are the opposite of those of OSCE and Moldova and that they come more in support of Transnistria. One thing is clear, Russia does not want to leave Transnistria and supports the regime in the region as its most reliable partner and any change will be only with the agreement of the Russians. Comparing the current operational environment with the desired end state of all the main actors, the work defines the problem which is the obstacle that prevents the OSCE Mission to Moldova to achieve the desired end state. This comparison and identification of the problem aspects are represented in Figure 9. The general problem that the work reveals is that the OSCE Mission to Moldova has neither a mechanism nor the power to influence Russia and Transnistria under international law to accept the proposed mandate. Nonetheless, the paper defines a problem statement that asks how does the OSCE Mission to Moldova should achieve the mandate end-state considering the diversity of the final objectives of the actors, with an existing and illegal peacekeeping operation in place that is supported by Russian troops illegally stationed in Transnistria and Russian interest to maintain the status quo of property, economy, leverage, and influence. The problem is divided into several aspects like radically opposed end state to the OSCE Mission to Moldova, JCC inefficiency and illegality, OGRF troops in Transnistria, private properties, and Russian interests in the region, and most importantly, the people's willingness to accept change. The OSCE Mission to Moldova must develop an Operational Approach that encompasses all these aspects so that it can remove the obstacle that prevents reaching the desired end state. Otherwise, the OSCE will continue for many years ahead of the same passive and inefficient approach to resolve the Transnistrian conflict that will not bring any results,

moreover, it will legitimize the region indirectly by talking about it as an entity with the right of self-determination.

Recommendations

The recommendation to the OSCE Mission to Moldova is that the mission needs a professional staff to plan and further implement a realistic plan that addresses the real problem, not just its symptoms. After understanding the environment and defining the problem the staff needs to develop an Operational Approach. Experienced staff can develop an operational approach that will increase the efficiency of the mission.

The Operational Approach describes what must be done, rather how to do it, it is a conceptualization of the broad general action. It starts by asking how will the problem be solved or managed. Generally speaking, operational approaches fall into one of three categories; remove, provide, and change (RPC). If the transition from the current to the desired state is blocked by something that is not needed in the desired state then removal is an approach. If the transition is prevented by the absence of a requirement, then an approach is to provide. If the problem is a behavior or a condition of a requirement, or something that cannot be removed then change is an approach.¹⁶⁷

For this particular problem described in the paper, the operational approach should include all three combinations of the RPC type actions. One way to develop an operational approach is to consider the aspects of the problem represented in Figure 9 as lines of effort. “Lines of effort link tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus toward establishing end state conditions.”¹⁶⁸ Each line of effort has its defeat mechanism or

¹⁶⁷ Eikmeier, ““From Operational Art to Operational Plans,” 27.

¹⁶⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 31, 2019), paras. 2–68.

broad RPC action that applied to supported objectives can create the condition to achieve the desired end state as represented in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Operational Approach First Model

Source: Created by the author.

Another operational approach model can be developed based on the problems set out in the OSCE mission report published on June 10, 1994, entitled “The Transnistrian Conflict in Moldova: Origins and Main Issues.” The basic problems from the report can

be considered as lines of effort and the objectives along that line can create the condition to achieve the end state, as represented in Figure 11.




Figure 11. Operational Approach Second Model

Source: Created by the author.

Both operational approaches shape the mission in a broad concept of the operation, important is to have a mechanism of executing the supported objectives from it.

In the environment everything is dynamic, there are actors with actions, reactions, and counter-actions, the environment is subject to change agents that behave in predictable and unpredictable ways, therefore, chief of the mission and his staffs continually assess and reassess throughout planning and execution in order to understand the changing environment, possibly changing problems and the need for changing solutions. Reassessing is restarting the operational design process and can stem from significant changes to understanding, the conditions of the environment, or the end state.¹⁶⁹

For this reason, it is so important for the OSCE Mission to Moldova to have a professional staff to help the chief of the mission reassessing the operational design and adjust or develop strategies throughout the operations process.

Recommendations for Further Study

While this study answered all of the research questions, it was not all-encompassing and three potential areas for further research about the OSCE Mission to Moldova are identified.

The first recommendation and one thing throughout the paper that requires further study is the application of the operational design as a tool to determine the system's objective, critical capabilities, and center of gravity (CoG) of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. Furthermore, the identification of CoG's critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities will help to create the lines of effort that will be more accurate. Continuing to identify and develop all the elements of operational design for the OSCE Mission to Moldova will help formulate conceptual plans and then bridge to detailed planning.

The second recommendation for further research can be directed towards the UN and how their peacekeeping mechanism can reinforce OSCE or find a realistic solution

¹⁶⁹ Eikmeier, ““From Operational Art to Operational Plans,” 29.

for the Transnistrian conflict. The research can focus on the UN and OSCE conflict resolution mechanisms, to identify the advantages and disadvantages, the possibility of systems-connection and mutual support to increase decision-making power and influence.

The third recommendation for further research is to conduct case studies on OSCE's previous missions in countries like Ukraine, North Macedonia, Serbia, Georgia, and Montenegro, in order to identify lessons learned and other successes and failures that could be implemented or avoided in the Republic of Moldova's situation.

Summary and conclusions

This paper analyzed what is preventing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to achieve the unification of Moldova with Transnistria and provided an understanding of the situation, given the past and current situation in the Mission operational environment. The paper analyzed the activity of the OSCE Mission to Moldova only, highlighting the successes and failures it has had over the years of activity based on the official documents in force.

To answer the primary question, the paper developed two secondary questions, namely what is the current state in the operational environment and what is the desired end state in the operational environment. The second secondary question is divided into four tertiary questions that explain the final status desired by all the main actors in the area of operation. In general, the methodology applied in this paper is Operational Design which is based on understanding the current operational environment with the complications and current relationships of the actors, understanding and visualizing the end state desired by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and other actors with influence in the area of operation, defining the problem or the obstacle that prevents achieving the desired

end state and the visualization of an operational approach with the creation of a vision. The current operational environment in which the OSCE Mission to Moldova activates is described as a complex one with a long back history full of accomplishments and failures, where it faces resistance from the political and military variable of Transnistria that is strongly supported by the influential actors like Russia and other components in the system that impedes the achieving of the mission desired end state.

To understand and describe the desired end state, the paper analyzes and interprets the basic documents of the actors that describe the final objectives pursued regarding the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The analysis shows the diversity of the final objectives of the actors, describes the existing peacekeeping operation that is in Transnistria, which is, in fact, illegal, confirms the support to the regime of Russian troops illegally stationed in Transnistria and conclude with the Russian interest to maintain the status quo of property, economy, leverage, and influence in Transnistria.

The general problem that the work reveals is that the OSCE Mission to Moldova has neither a mechanism nor the power to influence Russia and Transnistria under international law to accept the proposed mandate. The OSCE Mission to Moldova diplomacy is a passive one concerning Russian diplomacy. In negotiation, everyone tends to come out as the winners or be in the advantage, in this case, the OSCE seems to be bothered by the fact that it is not efficient but does not appear to recognize this. There is nothing wrong with the realization that something is wrong, it is important to be aware of where the deadlock is and only then can action be taken to overcome the obstacles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agora. "Study. Top 5 Major Problems Facing the Republic of Moldova." Accessed January 11, 2020. <https://agora.md/stiri/18502/studiu--top-5-probleme-majore-cu-care-se-confrunta-republica-moldova>.
- Anderson, Jill. "GSU Library Research Guides: Archival Research: Why Archival Research." Accessed January 26, 2020. <https://research.library.gsu.edu/c.php?g=115813&p=751002>.
- Atlantic Council. "More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy toward Moldova." August 27, 2018. Accessed October 29, 2019. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/more-than-a-frozen-conflict-russian-foreign-policy-toward-moldova/>.
- Audiovisual Coordinating Council. "The Activity of Audiovisual Coordinating Council." Accessed January 11, 2020. <http://www.audiovizual.md/activitatea-ca>.
- Belitser, Natalya. "Transnistrian Conflict: State of Affairs and Prospects of Settlement." *Black Sea News*. Last modified January 27, 2013. Accessed January 8, 2020. <https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/55025>.
- Biroul Național de Statistică. "Recensământul populației și al locuințelor 2014." Accessed January 12, 2020. <https://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=479&#idc=205&>.
- Borgen Project. "The Need for Investment in Infrastructure in Moldova." Last modified January 21, 2018. Accessed January 12, 2020. <https://borgenproject.org/infrastructure-in-moldova/>.
- Borgen, Christopher. "Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York." SSRN Scholarly Paper, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, July 25, 2006. Accessed November 28, 2019. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=920151>.
- Boțan, Igor. "Anul Politic 2003." Association for Participatory Democracy. Last modified December 14, 2003. Accessed December 22, 2019. <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312171/>.
- . "Efectele 'Planului Kozak'." Association for Participatory Democracy. Last modified November 2003. Accessed December 23, 2019. <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312031>.
- . *Transnistrian Settlement: A European Solution*. Policy Paper. Association for Participatory Democracy. 2009. Accessed December 26, 2019. <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/publications/reglementarea-transnistreana/>.

- Călugăreanu, Vitalie. "18 ani de la încetarea focului la Nistru." *Deutsche Welle*. Last modified July 21, 2010. Accessed December 20, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/ro/18-ani-de-la-%C3%AEncetarea-focului-la-nistru/a-5822372-0>.
- Catus, Kamil. "An Aided Economy. The Characteristics of the Transnistrian Economic Model." OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. Last modified May 16, 2013. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-05-16/aided-economy-characteristics-transnistrian-economic-model>.
- Ceapai, Alla. "The '5 + 2' negotiations in Bratislava - more questions than answers." *Radio Europa Liberă*. Last modified October 10, 2019. Accessed December 30, 2019. <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/negocierile-5-2-de-la-bratislava---mai-multe-intrebări-decât-răspunsuri/30209628.html>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook: Europe: Moldova." Accessed January 11, 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html>.
- CGSC Learning Resource Center. Combined Arms Research Library. E-mail submission. May 12, 2020. Reviewed for grammar, punctuation, and clarity of expression.
- Costas, Ion. *Transnistria 1989-1992: Cronica unui razboi "nedeclarat."* Bucuresti: Editura RAO, 2012.
- CSCE Mission to Moldova. "Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. November 13, 1993. Accessed December 2, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42307?download=true>.
- Dascalu, Diana. "Frozen Conflicts and Federalization: Russian Policy in Transnistria and Donbas." *JIA SIPA*. Last modified May 22, 2019. Accessed October 20, 2019. <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/frozen-conflicts-and-federalization-russian-policy-transnistria-and-donbass>.
- Democracy Moldova. "Efectele 'Planului Kozak'." Last modified November 2003. Accessed December 23, 2019. <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/200312031/>.
- . "Memorandumul Privind Principiile de Constituire a Statului Unificat." Last modified November 2003. Accessed December 23, 2019. <http://www.e-democracy.md/monitoring/politics/comments/20031125/>.
- Dudovskiy, John. "Interpretivism (Interpretivist) Research Philosophy." Research-Methodology. Accessed January 26, 2020. <https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/interpretivism/>.

- . “Qualitative Data Analysis.” Research-Methodology. Accessed January 24, 2020. <https://research-methodology.net/research-methods/data-analysis/qualitative-data-analysis/>.
- Eikmeier, Dale C. “From Operational Art to Operational Plans.” Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, n.d.
- Freedom House. “Modern Authoritarianism: Frozen Conflicts.” Last modified May 24, 2017. Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-frozen-conflicts>.
- . “Transnistria Not Free.” Last modified January 30, 2019. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/transnistria>.
- Garaz, Marcel. “Implicarea OSCE in Soluționarea Conflictului Transnistrian.” Institutul de Politici Publice, Chisinau 2001. Accessed November 28, 2019. <http://ipp.md/old/download.php?file=cHVibGljL2JpYmxpb3RlY2EvMTUvcv8vSW1wbGljYXJlX1JvbS5wZGY%3D&id=191>.
- Giurgiulesti International Free Port. Accessed February 15, 2020. <https://gifp.md/en/home/>.
- The Global Economy. “Moldova Remittances, Percent of GDP - Data, Chart.” Accessed May 1, 2020. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Moldova/remittances_percent_GDP/.
- Government of the Republic of Moldova. “Fundamental Documents of the JCC.” Accessed September 16, 2019. <https://gov.md/en/content/fundamental-documents-jcc>.
- . “List of WG Coordinators from Chisinau.” Accessed November 30, 2019. <https://gov.md/en/content/list-wg-coordinators-chisinau>.
- . “OSCE - The Place of the Republic of Moldova in the OSCE Framework.” Accessed September 16, 2019. <https://www.mfa.gov.md/en/content/place-republic-moldova-osce-framework>.
- . “Signed documents, by year.” Accessed December 29, 2019. <https://gov.md/en/content/signed-documents-year#2013>.
- Grâu, Lina. “Transnistria: Investiții fără precedent în infrastructură, pe fundalul unei crize economice profunde.” *Radio Europa Liberă*. Accessed January 15, 2020. <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/27207022.html>.

- Gribincea, Mihai, and Anatol Țăranu. *Conflictul Transnistrean. Culegere de documente și materiale (1989 – 2012)*. 4 vols. Chisinau: Lexon-Prim, n.d. Accessed October 30, 2019. https://www.academia.edu/11284043/Anatol_%C8%9A%C4%83ranu_Mihai_Gribincea._CONFLICTUL_TRANSNISTREAN._Culegere_de_documente_%C5%9Fi_materiale_1989_2012._Volumul_III_2003_2006._Chi%C8%99in%C4%83u_Lexon-Prim_2014_636_p.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, July 2019.
- . Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2019.
- . Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2015.
- . Field Manual, 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2016.
- Hill, William H. “The OSCE and the Moldova-Transdnistria Conflict: Lessons in Mediation and Conflict Management.” *Security and Human Rights* 24, no. 3–4 (April 30, 2014): 287–297.
- . *Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lesson from the Moldova – Transnistria Conflict*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.
- Human Rights Watch. “Russia.” Accessed January 17, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/russia/#P131_22060.
- IBP Inc. *Moldova A “Spy” Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments*. Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2007.
- IDIS. *Economic Outlook*. IDIS Viitorul. December 2015. Accessed January 12, 2020. <http://viitorul.org/ro/content/economic-outlook-decembrie-2015>.
- Internet Archive. “Law Enforcement and Armed Forces of Pridnestrovians.” Last modified November 4, 2009. Accessed January 12, 2020. <https://web.archive.org/web/20091104073203/http://pridnestrovie.net/armedforces.html>.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2017.

- Malakhov, Boris. "Statement." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Last modified February 14, 2003. Accessed December 22, 2019. https://www.mid.ru/maps/md/-/asset_publisher/dfOotO3QvCij/content/id/532134?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_dfOotO3QvCij&_101_INSTANCE_dfOotO3QvCij_languageId=en_GB.
- Media Forum. "Forumul Mass-Media." November 4-5, 2019. Accessed January 11, 2020. <https://mediaforum.md/event/2019>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. "OSCE Mission to Moldova." Accessed November 27, 2019. <https://www.mfa.gov.md/en/content/osce-mission-moldova>.
- Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova. "Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Hotarirea Nr.117 din 10.06.2005 cu privire la inițiativa Ucrainei în problema reglementării conflictului transnistrean și la măsurile pentru democratizarea și demilitarizarea zonei transnistrene." *Monitorul Oficial* Nr. 83-85 (June 17, 2005): art Nr: 385. Accessed October 28, 2019. <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=307472>.
- . "Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Hotarirea Nr.134 din 19.07.2018 pentru aprobarea Strategiei naționale de apărare și a Planului de acțiuni privind implementarea Strategiei naționale de apărare pentru anii 2018–2022." *Monitorul Oficial* Nr.285-294 (August 3, 2018): art Nr:441. Accessed September 16, 2019. <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=376667>.
- . "Parlamentul Republicii Moldova Legea Nr.173 din 22.07.2005 cu privire la prevederile de bază ale statutului juridic special al localităților din stînga Nistrului (Transnistria)." *Monitorul Oficial* Nr. 101-103 (July 29, 2005): art Nr: 478, July 29, 2005. Accessed October 28, 2019. <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=313004>.
- New World Encyclopedia. "Moldova." Accessed December 20, 2019. <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/moldova>.
- Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM). "The Chisinau Declaration of the GUAM Heads of States 'In the Name of Democracy, Stability, and Development'." April 22, 2005. Accessed December 26, 2019. <https://guam-organization.org/en/the-chisinau-declaration-of-the-guam-heads-of-states-in-the-name-of-democracy-stability-and-development/>.
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3, *CSCE Mission to the Republic of Moldova*. February 4, 1993. Accessed September 26, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/41137?download=true>.
- . "Good Read. OSCE Mediation and Conflict Management." Accessed October 20, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/magazine/358196>.

- . *Istanbul Summit 1999*. January 2000. Accessed October 28, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true>.
- . “Legal Analysis on the Draft Code of Audiovisual Media Services of the Republic of Moldova.” 20 June 2018. Accessed January 11, 2020. https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/385206#_blank.
- . MC.DOC/1/02, *Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 6 and 7 December 2002*. December 6-7, 2002. Accessed December 1, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/mc/40521?download=true>.
- . MC.DOC/1/03, *Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council 1 and 2 December 2003*. December 2, 2003. Accessed December 8, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/mc/40533?download=true>.
- . “OSCE Annual Reports.” Accessed December 29, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/annual-reports>.
- . *OSCE Annual Report 2003*. October 1, 2004. Accessed December 22, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/13580>.
- . *OSCE Annual Report 2004*. May 6, 2004. Accessed December 23, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/14430>.
- . “OSCE Mission to Moldova.” Accessed September 16, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova>.
- . “Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement.” November 28, 2017. Accessed December 30, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/359196>.
- . “Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement.” May 30, 2018. Accessed December 30, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885>.
- . “Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Main Issues.” June 10, 1994. Accessed November 8, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42308?download=true>.
- Presidency of the Republic of Moldova. *Constitution of the Republic of Moldova*. March 29, 2016. Accessed March 25, 2020. <http://www.presedinte.md/eng/constitution>.
- . *Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova*. August 27, 1991. Accessed March 25, 2020. <http://www.presedinte.md/eng/declaration>.

President of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. "Development Strategy." Accessed October 20, 2019. <http://en.president.gospmr.org/strategiya-razvitiya/>.

———. *The PMR Constitution*. Accessed March 26, 2020. <http://en.president.gospmr.org/pravovye-akty/konstitutsiya-pmr/>.

Radio Europa Liberă. "Armata R. Moldova la 28 de ani de la formare: cu un buget redus și dependentă de politic." 2019. Accessed January 11, 2020. <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/o-armată-subfinanțată-de-ziua-armatei-3-septembrie-2019/30144704.html>.

The Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria. CIO/GAL/145-0-2, "On the meeting of mediators from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the OSCE with the representatives of the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. September 28, 2005. Accessed December 27, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/cio/16558?download=true>.

———. "Joint Statement of the Meeting on Issues of Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. July 16, 1999. Accessed December 8, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42311?download=true>.

———. The Moscow Memorandum, "Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria." May 8, 1997. Accessed December 2, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42309?download=true>.

———. Odessa Agreement, "Agreement on Confidence Measures and Development of Contacts between Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. March 20, 1998. Accessed December 5, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42310?download=true>.

———. "Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdnistrian Settlement." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. June 2-3, 2016. Accessed December 29, 2019. <https://www.osce.org/moldova/244656>.

Rusnac, Corneliu. "Trenurile Către Rusia Nu Vor Fi Redirecționate Prin Transnistria." *BBC*. Accessed January 15, 2020. http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2006/11/061102_trenuri_moldova.shtml.

Saylor Academy. "Inductive or Deductive? Two Different Approaches." Accessed January 25, 2020. https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_principles-of-sociological-inquiry-qualitative-and-quantitative-methods/s05-03-inductive-or-deductive-two-dif.html.

The Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre. SEC.GAL/116/19/Rev. 1, *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. June 20, 2019. Accessed September 26, 2019.
<https://www.osce.org/secretariat/74783?download=true>.

Sheriff Ltd. “Economic Effectiveness.” Accessed January 17, 2020.
<http://sheriff.md/en/company/econom/>.

Supreme Council Pridnestrovie. Accessed January 12, 2020. <http://en.vspmr.org/>.

Tăbârță, Ion. “Policy Brief.” Institutul pentru Dezvoltare și Inițiative Sociale (IDIS) Viitorul, June 2018.

Taylor-Powell, Ellen, and Sara Steele. G-36584, Program Development and Evaluation, *Collecting Evaluation Data: An Overview of Sources and Methods*. University of Wisconsin-Extension, Madison, WI, June 1996. Accessed January 25, 2020.
https://web-okcd01.mail.mil/owa/redir.aspx?C=XEWuHTMUBApE4FvwKF7y1XMvKOrF-EKGA9h7WhBINHBgbSZpvwzYCA..&URL=https%3a%2f%2fwww.racialequitytools.org%2fresourcefiles%2fG3658_4.pdf.

Thoric, Vladimir. “Republica Sheriff.” *Rise Moldova*. Accessed January 12, 2020.
<https://www.rise.md/articol/republica-sheriff-3/>.

Thoric, Vladimir, and Natalia Silitcaia. “Media Sheriffs from Transnistria.” *Rise Moldova*, Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://www.rise.md/english/underground-deals-media-sheriffs-from-transnistria/>.

TV 8 Moldova. “Cum economia Transnistriei este salvată de UE și Moldova,” n.d. Accessed January 12, 2020. <http://tv8.md/2018/04/16/cum-economia-transnistriei-este-salvata-de-ue-si-moldova/>.

United Nations. “International Day of Neutrality, 12 December.” Accessed November 23, 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/events/neutralityday/>.

United Nations Peacekeeping. “Principles of Peacekeeping.” United Nations. Accessed March 31, 2020. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

United Nations Security Council. S/24369*, “Note Verbale dated 31 July 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Moldova to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General.” United Nations. August 6, 1992. Accessed September 16, 2019.
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MD%20RU_920000_AgreementPrinciplesPeacefulSettlementDniestrConflict.pdf.

Ward, Thomas E., Ph.D. “Qualitative Methodologies.” Research Guide, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 25, 2018.

ИА REGNUM. “Меморандум Козака’: Российский план объединения Молдовы и Приднестровья.” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Accessed October 30, 2019. <https://regnum.ru/news/458547.html>.