

RESISTANCE-RELATED MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS IMPLEMENTATION
IN LATVIA ARMED FORCES SOLDIERS TRAINING

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

RESISTANCE-RELATED MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS IMPLEMENTATION IN LATVIA ARMED FORCES SOLDIERS TRAINING, by Gaidis Landratovs, 167 pages.

The Republic of Latvia's 13 January 2020 National Security Law obligates the National Armed Forces to lead the whole-of-society resistance movement in crisis and wartime. Latvian Training and Doctrine Command's schools did not train the resistance movement-related mission essential tasks until the 2019.

The purpose of the MMAS thesis is to find the individual and collective resistance movement related mission-essential tasks for implementation into the TRADOC education programs. The paper determines the suggested proportion of the effort NAF TRADOC schools should devote to resistance-related tasks during training.

Qualitative research includes a study of the Latvian national resistance movement against Nazi and Soviet occupation, the USSR's and the Russian Federation's counterinsurgency doctrines studies, and US Army Unconventional Warfare Training Circulars, Resistance Operating Concept, and other document studies to develop MMAS thesis.

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ACRONYMS

CPT	Captain
FSB	Federal Security Service [Russian: Федеральная Служба Безопасности]
KGB	Committee for State Security
LCC	Latvian Central Council
LNPA	Latvia National Partisan Association
LNPO	Latvia National Partisan Organization
LSSR	Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic
LV	Republic of Latvia
MoD	Ministry of Defense
NAF	National Armed Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NKGB	The People's Commissariat for State Security (Russian: Народный Комиссариат Государственной Безопасности)
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Russian: Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел)
NSL	National Security Law
NSS	National Security Strategy
RAND	Research and Development Corporation
ROC	Resistance Operating Concept
RU	Russian Federation
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

US	United States of America
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation (RU) has pursued a negative and aggressive foreign policy towards the Republic of Latvia (LV) since the latter's independence was re-established on 21 August 1991. Daily, Latvia fights Russia's strategic information operations and propaganda activities intended to undermine trust in the government and increase social tensions. Because of Russia's expansive foreign policy during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the Crimea annexation in 2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Latvia's Ministry of Defense (MoD) has sought methods to deter and counter Russia's hybrid warfare and conventional superiority. Therefore, the Saeima (Parliament) made amendments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and other regulations.

The Republic of Latvia's Parliament approved the whole-of-society approach to national defense and resilience in the National Security Strategy on 26 September 2019. The whole-of-society approach to national defense, or comprehensive state defense system, is responsible for shaping all citizens' attitudes towards the state and its security. The holistic approach to national defense and resilience lies in seven pillars: military capabilities, public-private sector cooperation, education of society, civil defense, strategic communications, economic resilience, and psychological resilience.¹

¹ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Strategy* (Latvijas Vēstnesis, 27 September 2019), 2.

Reaction to evolving threats caused amendments to the NSS, and other legislative regulations created a shift to the comprehensive defense system. Latvia's MoD assessed that threats today possess a much broader spectrum of capabilities than just military. Therefore, society must be involved in the comprehensive effort to counter these hybrid threats.²

In addition to the NSS, the amendments also supplemented the Republic of Latvia's National Security Law (NSL). The changes in NSL resulted from Latvian Army lessons identified from the Soviet occupation in June 1940, when the authoritarian President Kārlis Ulmanis forbade the Army to resist the invaders, and from the Ukrainian Army's experience in 2014, when its forces did not receive timely and precise orders to resist the occupants in the Crimea. The first of several NSL amendments stipulates that unit commanders have the responsibility to independently attack positively-identified enemies according to the State Defense Plan, even when higher-echelon orders are delayed or not received. The second amendment stipulates that armed resistance during a war, military invasion, or occupation may not be prohibited.³

Additionally, amendments to the NSL empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF) to conduct military and civil defense measures in cooperation with central and local government agencies, legal entities, and individual persons. These measures include armed resistance, civil disobedience, and non-cooperation with the aggressor's

² Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Strategy*, 2.

³ Ibid., 25.

government institutions. Furthermore, the NSL obligates all citizens to defend the state's democratic system and its independence under the leadership of the NAF.⁴

The Latvian government assessed that to counter Russia's military superiority, the MoD should develop a variety of tools; therefore, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) states:

The NAF should develop conventional and asymmetrical military capabilities to counteract adversaries. Developed capabilities should neutralize the adversary's asymmetric warfare, special and airborne operations. Within the framework of this task, the NAF should effectively block the enemy's military initiative and action, demoralize and inflict maximum damage on its combat capabilities.⁵

The Latvia Ministry of Defense developed two military strategies to counter potential aggression: conventional defense and a resistance movement. Short-term tasks for implementation between 2019 and 2021 outline a resistance strategy and the development of resistance doctrine in the MoD report to Cabinet of Ministers "On Implementation of Comprehensive National Defense System in Latvia."⁶

While the Latvian Special Operations Unit is familiar with unconventional warfare and conducts specific training, NAF Land Forces and National Guard units are not trained in resistance movement-related, mission-essential tasks, except for small unit

⁴ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Law* (Latvijas Vēstnesis 14 December 2000), 23-25, accessed 24 January 2020, <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/14011-nacionalas-drosibas-likums>.

⁵ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Defense Strategy* (Latvijas Vēstnesis, 16 June 2016), 84, accessed 22 February 2020. <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/282964-parvalsts-aizsardzibas-koncepcijas-apstiprinasanu>.

⁶ Latvia Ministry of Defense, *Par visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanu Latvijā* [Implementation of a Comprehensive National Defense System in Latvia], Draft Legislation, 1 August 2019, 3, accessed 24 January 2020, <http://tap.mk.gov.lv/mk/tap/?pid=40462120>.

tactics. The problem is that Latvian soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers have insufficient training levels to lead comprehensive resistance efforts. This thesis focuses on implementation of resistance movement-related training in Latvian NAF Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training to mitigate knowledge gaps in the soldiers' education. Its research purpose is to determine the resistance movement-related individual tasks and collective mission essential tasks for inclusion in the soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs. Additional goals are to research how to implement the resistance movement-related tasks in training programs, and how to balance it with conventional training to prevent potential defeat of the resistance movement in case of occupation.

Research Question

What resistance movement-related individual and collective mission essential tasks must complement the Latvian NAF soldier, NCO, and officer-level training?

Secondary Questions

How can Latvian Armed Forces implement resistance movement-related mission essential tasks into the TRADOC training programs?

What is the optimum balance of resistance movement-related training and conventional defense training?

Assumptions

Research assumes that the Russian Federation will continue to have overwhelming conventional and asymmetric superiority in the Baltic Sea region and will persuade aggressive and expansive foreign policy. As the means of its foreign policy,

Russia will plan to employ hybrid warfare, which can include non-violent subversion, covert violent actions, and conventional warfare supported by subversion, against Latvia.

The Republic of Latvia, in the long term, will use a whole-of-society approach for its national defense and resilience. The two main military state-defense strategies will be conventional defense and resistance movement. The NAF will be responsible for all society's education for the resistance movement. In the near term, Latvia will continue to develop professional Land Forces and all-volunteer National Guard units. Latvia's MoD will not re-establish conscript military service until at least 2024.

Definitions

The thesis uses several key terms. The primary terms used are unconventional warfare, resilience, resistance, resistance movement, guerrilla force, guerrilla, underground, and auxiliary.

Unconventional Warfare (UW): consists of operations and activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.⁷

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), GL-12, accessed 22 January 2020, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf?ver=2018-03-15-111255-653.

Resilience: the will of the people to maintain what they have, the will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and recover from the effects of those pressures or influences. Resilience is the fundamental foundation of resistance.⁸

Resistance: a nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.⁹

Resistance Movement: an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally-established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.¹⁰

Guerrilla Force a group of irregulars, predominantly indigenous personnel, organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.¹¹

Guerrilla: an irregular, predominantly indigenous member of a guerrilla force organized similarly to military concepts and structure in order to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. Although a guerrilla

⁸ Swedish Defence University, *Resistance Operating Concept* (Stockholm, Sweden: Arkitektkopia, 2019), 21, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392106/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

⁹ Ibid., 21.

¹⁰ JCS, JP 3-05, GL-10.

¹¹ Ibid., GL-7.

and guerrilla forces can exist independently of an insurgency, guerrillas normally operate in the covert and overt resistance operations of an insurgency.¹²

Underground: a cellular covert element within unconventional warfare that is compartmentalized and conducts covert or clandestine activities in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the guerrilla force.¹³

Auxiliary: for the purpose of unconventional warfare, the support element of the irregular organization whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular movement.¹⁴

Limitations

This thesis is an unclassified document, written using open-source information available on internet databases, the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), and other resources generally available to the public. Only unclassified materials and references are quoted in the thesis, directly and indirectly.

¹² Sensitive Activities Division G3X, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide V1.0* (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 5 April 2016), 37.

¹³ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 26 August 2019), GL-7, accessed 24 January 2020.
[https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18909_ADP%203-05%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB\(2\).pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18909_ADP%203-05%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB(2).pdf).

¹⁴ Ibid., GL-2.

Case-studies analyzed in the thesis research and presentation are from secondary sources. The case-studies did not include research in the countries involved in the study due to the lack of time and funding dedicated to research.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of the research is limited to the individual tasks and collective mission essential tasks for inclusion in the soldier, NCO, and officers-level military training to effectively lead the whole-of-society resistance movement in aggressor-occupied territories. Although Latvia has a whole-of-society approach to state defense, research focus will be limited only to the necessary NAF military personnel training in leading central- and local- government agency, international and non-governmental organization, private-sector, and population efforts to resist invaders.

Historical case-studies on the Latvia resistance movement and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) counterinsurgency tactics are limited to the period from 1940 to 1956. The Russian Federation's anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency tactics case-studies in Chechnya and Eastern Ukraine are limited to the period from 1994 to 2019. The focus of the thesis is to identify the training objectives for inclusion into Latvian soldiers' training through comparative analysis of Latvia's historical and current operational environment, and through analysis of US Army unconventional warfare doctrine.

Significance of the Study

The topic is significant to the military profession, security professionals, and scholars because the inclusion of timely and qualitative resistance-related education in

training programs for military personnel will prepare them to lead an effective whole-of-society resistance movement in aggressor-occupied territories during wartime or crisis. Well-prepared and optimally-combined conventional and unconventional defense measures can make enemy invasion costly and either deter it or make it pay a high price for conquered territory. Lessons learned from violent and non-violent resistance in the three Baltic States, the Caucasus, and Ukraine provide opportunities for integration into Latvian soldiers' education via the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) training domain, which will improve their professional training level and set preconditions for a successful state defense.

The research topic will attempt to fill gaps in the scholarly literature by showing possible ways to bridge the gap from the current state, when National Security Law obligates the NAF to lead the resistance movement, to the state when military personnel are prepared to lead the entire society's resistance effort.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Critical for the development of a resistance movement and unconventional warfare-training is an understanding of the existing state's security strategy, friendly and opposing forces doctrines, and other literature, which reveal theoretical knowledge and historical case studies. Existing literature on resistance movements and unconventional-warfare training is extensive, and the material explicitly dedicated to resistance movements and unconventional warfare is significant. The research purpose is to determine the resistance movement-related individual and collective mission essential tasks for inclusion in the Latvian soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs. This literature review focuses on the available literature in the five subjects of: the Republic of Latvia's security and defense strategies, US Army unconventional-warfare doctrine and the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), the Russian Federation's counterinsurgency and hybrid-warfare doctrines, the general literature on the subject of unconventional warfare, and resources specific to the case studies researched.

The Republic of Latvia's Security and Defense Strategies

The Republic of Latvia's three primary legislated security and defense regulations are the National Security Strategy, the National Security Law, and the National Defense Strategy. The 26 September 2019 Latvian National Security Strategy is the main legislative document that states the strategic principles and priorities for threat-prevention and determining the development of the new policy-planning documents and security

action plans. The NSS states, “the precondition for the existence of Latvia as the State is a responsible attitude of all inhabitants of Latvia towards the State and its security.”¹⁵

Latvian national security and defense is based on a whole-of-society approach: state institutions and all society’s readiness to overcome threats, resist external influences, and the ability to withstand and independently recover from challenges and crises.¹⁶ The current NSS reinforces the country’s shift back to the comprehensive defense strategy of 2015, after the abandonment of total defense strategy in 2004 in favor of exclusively following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) collective defense strategy.

The current 2019 NSS recognizes that military means and capabilities are not sufficient to counter aggressive hybrid threats. To defeat them successfully, Latvia must use a comprehensive approach, which is based on government and legal institutions, private companies, and individuals’ trusts and partnerships. A country’s whole-of-society approach to national defense and resilience lies in the seven pillars: military capabilities, public-private sector cooperation, education of society, civil defense, strategic communications, economic resilience, and psychological resilience. To improve national deterrence capabilities and resilience during at war or crisis, the central government has assigned tasks and roles for each government agency, non-governmental organization, private company, and Latvian citizen.¹⁷

¹⁵ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Strategy*, 2.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 4.

The Latvian 2001 National Security Law determined the national security system and its tasks; the competence of the system's subjects, principles; and procedures for coordination, provision, and control of their activities. The NSL defined the MoD's responsibility to develop and implement national defense policy as well as to provide military education and national defense personnel management. Additionally, it empowers the NAF to conduct military and civil-defense measures in cooperation with central and local government agencies, legal entities, and individual persons, including armed resistance, civil disobedience, and non-cooperation with an aggressor's government institutions.

To empower the leaders and shorten response time, the NSL had three significant amendments since 30 October 2018. The first stated that unit commanders have the responsibility to independently attack positively-identified enemy according to the State Defense Plan, even if orders from higher echelon were delayed or not received. Second, armed resistance during a war, military invasion, or occupation may not be prohibited. Finally, the NSL obligates all citizens to defend the state's democratic system and its independence under the leadership of the NAF.¹⁸

Latvia's 2016 National Defense Strategy is a threat-analysis-based policy planning document. The NDS defines strategic objectives of the the national military defense, along with its fundamental principles, priorities, and measures in peace, crisis, and war. The NDS obligates the NAF to develop traditional and irregular warfare capabilities to defeat enemy forces. Unconventional warfare capability is essential to

¹⁸ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Strategy*, 25.

defeating an enemy's asymmetric methods while war is undeclared and to enable the resistance movement if the government has lost control over territory occupied by invaders'.¹⁹ The primary means by which the NAF plan to disrupt and defeat opponents are NAF units and volunteers from Latvian society.²⁰ While the relatively small Land Forces Mechanized Infantry Brigade is entirely professional, the National Guard's four brigades and cadet force ensure the potential for extensive voluntary involvement from society in the national defense effort. The NDS recognizes that NAF-led, timely, and high-quality education and training are the keys for the Latvia people's civic consciousness being strengthened, along with, direct, voluntary, and broad involvement in national defense. To enable society-wide participation in national defense and resistance movement, first, TRADOC must educate and train all level of military personnel to conduct violent and non-violent unconventional warfare methods, in addition to conventional and small-unit tactics.

In conclusion, all three primary frameworks of security and defense strategies state that the "Latvian people's unity and will to resist is the historically-formed Latvian national identity and expression of civic consciousness, which forms the strong and unique basis for state defense against aggressors."²¹ The thorough training of military personnel and civilian population during peacetime reinforces the basis of state defense

¹⁹ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Defense Strategy*, 84.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 35-43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

and creates preconditions for successful resistance against the aggressor during crisis and war.

US Irregular Warfare Doctrine and Resistance Operating Concept

The most recent US Armed Forces doctrine publications and the Swedish Defence University and SOCEUR-published Resistance Operating Concept were used in the research to develop theoretical knowledge on the matters of unconventional warfare and resistance movement training. The US Army's irregular warfare doctrine is described in several manuals listed in Table 1.

Table 1. US Army Irregular Warfare Doctrine Publications

Publications
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, <i>Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States</i> , dated 2 May 2007, last updated 20 March 2009
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, <i>Special Operations</i> , dated 16 July 2014
Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, <i>Army Special Operations</i> , dated 31 July 2019
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05, <i>Special Operations</i> , dated 29 January 2018
Army Field Manual 3-05, <i>Army Special Operations</i> , dated 9 January 2014
Army Field Manual 3-18, <i>Special Forces Operations</i> , dated 28 May 2014
Army Techniques Publication 3-18.1, <i>Special Forces Unconventional Warfare</i> , dated 21 March 2019

Source: Compiled by author.

Northern and Eastern European countries, along with SOCEUR, jointly developed the Resistance Operating Concept to enable deterrence of and resistance to the Russian Federation's aggression in Eastern Europe.

Joint Publication (JP) 1 defines irregular warfare (IW) as:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation's established government. The strategic point of IW is to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population.²²

Further, JP 1 specifies that less powerful adversaries can be state or non-state actors. To erode the superior opponent's power, influence, and will, and to increase friendly influence, the weaker actor uses indirect and asymmetric approaches and all elements of national power. As defined by IW, irregular forces include partisan and resistance forces.²³ In summary, waging IW requires a different mindset and capabilities; therefore, to lead a broad society-wide resistance movement, NAF soldiers must be appropriately trained. Future resistance movement leaders must influence the physical, social, informational, and social aspects of the operational environment to guide the Latvian population's behavior to achieve the nation's long-term ends.

The 2014 version of JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, defines unconventional warfare (UW) as, "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area."²⁴ Furthermore, the publication describes potential UW preconditions, objectives, planning approaches,

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), pt. 4. c, I-6

²³ Ibid., pt. 4. c, I-6.

²⁴ JCS, JP 3-05, GL-12.

involved force structure, tasks and synchronization, resource requirements, and potential risks. Drawing from this, the NSL obligates the Armed Forces to develop a resistance movement to influence, coerce, disrupt, or foster a change in occupying power's governing authority.²⁵ Similar to JP 3-05, Latvia NSL requires a whole-of-government planners' approach to UW to mitigate potential strategic risk and, diplomatic, political sensitivity.²⁶

The 2019 revised version of ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations*, and ADRP 3-05, *Special Operations*, published in 2018, describes the difference between insurgency and resistance movements and defines three elements of a resistance movement as being composed of underground, auxiliary and guerrilla forces. Additionally, the publications specify how the US conducts UW in two ways. The first way is as a supporting line of operation to a larger military campaign or operation. The second way is as the main strategic effort to preempt or respond to aggression.²⁷ Similarly, the Latvian NSL defines three ways to conduct UW. The first is the deterrence of potential aggressors, the second is a supporting effort for a conventional forces defense campaign, and the third is the whole-of-society resistance movement to an occupation power.²⁸

Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations*, published in 2014, defines the two types and seven phases of the US Army unconventional warfare. The two types of

²⁵ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Law*, 23.

²⁶ JCS, JP 3-05, II-9.

²⁷ HQDA, ADP 3-05, 2-43–2-48, 2-10, 2-11.

²⁸ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Security Law*, 23.

US unconventional warfare are with or without anticipation of large-scale US military involvement. The goal of large-scale involvement is to facilitate the introduction of conventional forces or to divert enemy resources away from specific points of the operational area. The limited-involvement UW goal is to pressure an adversary when operations are politically sensitive.²⁹ The seven phases of UW are preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, employment, and transition.

Knowledge of the US's UW doctrine and intentions can enable future Latvian resistance members to develop an appropriate strategy, which was not case in the past. Many Latvian resistance movement members made incorrect assumptions after World War II. In the expectation of an attack on the Soviet Union by western states, they took a waiting position and lost the initiative.

Additionally, Latvian resistance members need to understand that promptly developed and trained resistance will shorten the preparation phase and transition to active actions in case of war. This can be developed promptly by consulting a variety of other texts.

For example, the 2014 version of FM 3-18, *Special Forces Operations*, describes planning considerations for UW. The manual specifies the importance of intelligence,

²⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 9 January 2014), 2-1.

movement and maneuver, fires, military information support, protection, operations security, sustainment, and legal considerations for planning factors.³⁰

Another document, the 2019 version of ATP 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, is the most detailed doctrinal foundation for UW execution at the tactical level. It conceptually characterizes UW and support to resistance movements within the US's national policy context. The publication describes in detail why and how populations resist, the essential elements of resistance theory, and the overall concept of and five types of support to resistance. Additionally, for the first time, ATP 3-18.1 highlights the resistance's public component emergence in Army doctrine.³¹ The publication significantly contributed to this thesis's research with a detailed theoretical description of UW core activities and practical information on resistance movement-enabling activities.³²

Similarly, Training Circular (TC) 18-01.1, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha Level*, is the training guide that outlines twenty-four basic tasks for UW that all US Army participants must learn to enable a resistance. In addition, it describes the tasks of higher

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-18, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2014), 6-2.

³¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 21 March 2019), pt. 2-40, 2-10.

³² *Ibid.*, xvi.

headquarters, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners in UW.³³ TC 18-01.2, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Bravo Level*, and TC 18-01.3, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Charlie Level*, describe the basic, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partner tasks in UW for Special Forces company—and battalion-level headquarters, respectively. The three aforementioned training circulars provide initial comprehension of the potential tasks the Latvian NAF TRADOC must include in the soldiers’ training to prepare society for the resistance movement and to enable cooperation with the national chain of command and potential international partners.

Finally, the Swedish Defence University’s Resistance Operating Concept, published in 2019, is several nations’ joint effort that addresses states’ resistance and resilience. The ROC heavily relies on US UW doctrines definitions, but it more thoroughly researches resistance principles, requirements, and potential challenges that may inform doctrine, plans, capabilities, and force development. The ROC encourages governments to prepare the pre-crisis resiliency through Total Defense, a “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach. These complementary approaches must also include interoperability among own forces and allies’ and partners’ forces.³⁴ The Resistance Operating Concept provides theoretical knowledge and several case-studies,

³³ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Training Circular (TC) 3-18.1, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha Level* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 27 October 2016), xii.

³⁴ Swedish Defence University, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 17.

identification of training modules the other nations used for development of resistance movements.

Russian Federation Counterinsurgency and Hybrid Warfare Doctrines

This thesis uses three primary sources to research Russian Federation counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrines' origins, elements, and methods, along with its persistent and newly developed elements and forms. The three primary sources for the doctrines' studies are Alexander's Statiev's book, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, the United States Army Special Operations Command's publication, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014*, and Jānis Bērziņš's publication *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*.

Alexander Statiev's book, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*, published in 2010, describes communist counterinsurgency origins and doctrine. The book outlines the primary means to enforce doctrine, like agrarian reforms, deportations, amnesties, informant networks, covert operations, and local militias. It contributes analysis of Latvia's rural population eve on the Soviet Invasion.³⁵

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014*, published in 2015, analyses the Russian Federation's "Gerasimov's doctrine," the

³⁵ Alexander Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8-9.

evolution of its warfare, and its practical application from 1991 to the seizure of Crimea.³⁶ It contributes the possibility of comparing Soviet and Russian UW tactics with those that Russian Army employed in the Crimea.

Jānis Bērziņš's April 2014 publication, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, describes the Russian perspective on its Eastern borderlands and new generation warfare in Ukraine, identifies hybrid warfare's new military methods, and considers implications for Latvian defense policy.³⁷

General/Other Literature

Tālav Jundzis et. al., *Nepārtrauktības Doktrīna Latvijas vēstures kontekstā* [Continuity Doctrine in the context of Latvia History] is the volume that has twelve co-authors, including historians and lawyers. This collection of monographs describes the principles of state continuity and state succession in international law, and the importance of the state of the continuity principle in the Republic of Latvia's independence restoration in 1991.³⁸ The book helped to identify the need to include the state continuity

³⁶ US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014* (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 17-19.

³⁷ Jānis Bērziņš, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, Policy Paper No. 2 (Rīga: National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014), 4.

³⁸ Ineta Ziemeļe, "Valsts turpināšanās starptautisko tiesību teorijā un praksē" ["Continuation of the state in the theory and practice of international law"], in *Nepārtrauktības Doktrīna Latvijas vēstures kontekstā* [Continuity Doctrine in the Context of Latvia History] (Rīga: Latvian Academy of Sciences Baltic Strategic Studies Center, 2017), 25-29, https://tnagramatas.tna.lv/uploads/example/Nepartraukti_bas%20doktrina_LZA_Saturs.pdf.

and succession principles in the soldiers' training programs. Additionally, the book describes the Latvian population's violent and non-violent resistance to occupying powers in the period from 1940 until 1991, including its strengths and weaknesses. The analysis of the Latvian resistance movement development and performance identifies the learning objectives to include in resistance members' training programs.

The Latvian Commission of Historians' *National Resistance to Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe After World War II* describes Soviet agents' combat operations tactics, techniques and procedures against national partisans; the role of agents/combatants in the annihilation of the National Partisan Union of Latvia; and anti-Soviet resistance's national and international connections between 1944 and 1953.³⁹ Additionally, the publication describes the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR)'s Secret-Service operations against the national partisans of Latvia in 1953.

The Latvian Commission of Historians' *Occupied Latvia 1940–1990 Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia 2005* provides data on the Latvian Central Council (LCC) activists and supporters, along with structural analysis, and the development and employment of the LSSR Committee for State Security (KGB)'s Destruction Battalions. This includes case-study that describes the Bauska district

³⁹ Latvia Commission of Historians, *Nacionālā pretošanās komunistiskajiem režīmiem Austrumeiropā pēc Otrā pasaules kara* [*National Resistance to Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe After World War II*], Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia, vol. 17 (Rīga, Latvia: Institute of Latvian History, 2006), 103, 115.

national resistance movement struggle with the Soviet occupation authorities in the period from 1944 until the mid-1950s.⁴⁰

Ritvars Janson's article, "LSSR security institutions as the backbone of the occupation regime backbone," describes in detail the LSSR security institutions and evolution from 1943 to 1956. This includes studies of the tactics employed to destroy the national partisans. It concludes with analyzing the role it played in the resistance movement's neutralization process.⁴¹

Alexander Kokurin and N. Vladimircev's publication, *НКВД-МВД СССР в борьбе с бандитизмом и вооруженным националистическим подпольем на Западной Украине, в Западной Белоруссии и Прибалтике (1939-1956) Сборник документов* [The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight Against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents] appeared in 2008. It contains examples of declassified reports and orders illuminating the USSR security service's fight against the Latvian national partisans, outlaws, and criminals. It also reveals NKVD methods and

⁴⁰ Latvian Commission of Historians, *Occupied Latvia 1940-1990 Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia 2005*, Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia, vol. 19 (Rīga, Latvia: Institute of Latvian History, 2007), 103, 115.

⁴¹ Ritvars Jansons, "Latvijas PSR drošības iestādes – okupācijas režīma mugurkauls" ['LSSR Security Institutions - the Backbone of the Occupation Regime'], *VDK Post Scriptum*, no. 15 (2015): 32-36.
<http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/files/vdk%20post%20scriptum%202015.pdf>.

principles in the fight against anti-Soviet elements in the Western borderlands between 1939 and 1953.⁴²

The Research and Development Corporation (RAND) publication *Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance* assesses the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare threats to its peripheral countries and potential use of UW options for deterring Russian aggression. The research report suggests how the Baltic region's conventional defense measures can be reinforced with modest added expenditures for the development of resistance movements.⁴³

Summary

The Republic of Latvia's three primary legislative security and defense regulations clearly define the role of NAF personnel in the whole-of-society state defense conventional and unconventional effort. An analysis of the latest amendments of security regulations indicates a gap in the current LV NAF soldiers' training. Current TRADOC education programs do not prepare soldiers, NCOs, and officers to lead a whole-of-society resistance movement. The LV NAF can overcome the gap in the TRADOC

⁴² Alexander I. Kokurin and N. I. Vladimirtsev, *НКВД-МВД СССР в борьбе с бандитизмом и вооруженным националистическим подпольем на Западной Украине, в Западной Белоруссии и Прибалтике (1939-1956) Сборник документов* [*The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight Against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*], (Moscow: Joint Editorial Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 2008), 8, accessed 23 March 2020. https://www.docme.ru/doc/638132/nkvd-mvd-sssr-v-bor._be-s-banditizm-i-vooruzhennym.

⁴³ Stephen J. Flanagan, Jan Osburg, Anika Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, and Andrew Radin, *Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 1.

education programs by studying the previous Latvian national resistance movements' experience, the allies and partners unconventional warfare doctrine, the potential enemy, Russian counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine, and by analyzing the general literature and other sources about unconventional warfare. The analysis above and studies cited enable the identification of objectives for potential resistance-related training for future inclusion in LV military personnel training.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis's research purpose is to determine resistance movement-related individual tasks and collective mission-essential tasks for inclusion in soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs.

It will focus on two case-studies, the US Army UW training circulars, and Resistance Operating Concept analysis to answer the research question and draw conclusions. The first case-study is the analysis of Latvia's resistance movement to occupation between 1940 and 1953. The second case-study is an analysis of USSR counterinsurgency operations and the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare. The focus on US Army UW training circular and Resistance Operating Concept analysis is designed to identify the basic collective and individual tasks that are relevant to Latvian NAF soldiers' training.

The first case-study on Latvia's resistance to occupation in the period from 1940 to 1953 starts with historical background and demographics. It continues with an assessment of the resistance movement's development and performance. Finally, it concludes with the resistance movement and an evaluation of its results against the twelve principles of joint operations. The LV resistance and the evaluation of its results via the twelve principles of joint operations, allowing for the identification of the resistance's strengths and weaknesses. Lessons identified and lessons learned from this analysis, contribute respectively to research and potential learning objectives.

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations with Incorporating Change 1*, published in 2018, defines the twelve principles of joint operations, which are the first case-study evaluation

criterion. These provide a foundation for integrating Latvian legislation with UW doctrine when elaborated individually:

Objective: the purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.⁴⁴ The NDS defines the Republic of Latvia's objective: “

The purpose of the national defense system is to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the state. Independence and sovereignty of the state are possible with the involvement of the whole society, government capacity, and military power. National defense is the responsibility of the whole society, state institutions, and the national defense system.⁴⁵

Offensive: the purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly-defined objective. Offensive operations are how a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.⁴⁶ These criteria are essential to determining which offensive actions, violent or non-violent, placed the occupying power in the position of disadvantage and led to the restoration of the Republic of Latvia's independence.

Mass: the purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. To achieve mass, appropriate joint-force capabilities are integrated and synchronized, where they will have

⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, amended through 22 October 2018), pt. 2.a, A-1.

⁴⁵ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Defense Strategy*, 16.

⁴⁶ JCS, JP 3-0, pt. 2.b, A-1.

a decisive effect in a short period of time.⁴⁷ This criterion is important to assessing the resistance leaders' ability to concentrate effects for restoration of Latvia's independence.

Maneuver: the purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain a positional advantage, usually to deliver—or threaten the delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.⁴⁸ The assessment of the maneuver principle is essential to determining the resistance actions' effectiveness to create the effects on enemy forces.

Economy of Force: the purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on the main effort.⁴⁹ Economy of force assessment allows for weighing alternatives for force employment on other decisive points or in other events.

Unity of Command: the purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in the pursuit of a common purpose.⁵⁰ The unity of command assessment is vital to determining how an action did or did not contribute to the achievement of the national objective: freedom.

⁴⁷ JCS, JP 3-0, pt. 2.c, A-2.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pt. 2.d, A-2.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pt. 2.e, A-2.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pt. 2.f, A-2.

Security: the purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantages. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces, the population, or other critical priorities.⁵¹ Security is the main precondition of protecting all elements of the resistance movement and of waging successful UW. The failure of resistance members' conspiracies, and other security flaws identified in case-studies, provide examples of the importance of security.

Surprise and Simplicity: the purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended.⁵²

The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.⁵³

Restraint: the purpose of the restraint is to prevent the unnecessary use of force. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, the judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and national objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of

⁵¹JCS, JP 3-0, pt. 2.g, A-3.

⁵² Ibid., pt. 2.h, A-3.

⁵³ Ibid., pt. 2.i, A-3.

the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.⁵⁴

Perseverance: the purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to achieve national objectives. Perseverance involves preparation for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of national objectives. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.⁵⁵

Legitimacy: the purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences. These audiences will include Latvian national leadership and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations in the OA, along with nations and organizations around the world.⁵⁶

The thesis's second case-study is on the USSR's counterinsurgency operations and the Russian Federation's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare. The case-study starts with an analysis of the USSR's counterinsurgency doctrine's origins, evolution, and means of implementation via main instruments of national power. The study continues with analysis of Russian Federation's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare in the period

⁵⁴ JCS, JP 3-0, pt. 2.j, A-3.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pt. 2.k, A-4.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pt. 2.l, A-4.

1991 to 2019. The case-study aims to identify the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare and counterinsurgency operations as persistent and newly-developed policies, tools, and methods. Identifying enemy warfare elements that threaten resistance movement defines the UW training curriculum. The following criteria will be used for evaluating Russian unconventional warfare. A persistent element is an element applied at the three and more Russian operations. A newly-developed element is one employed in only one operation.

The focus of both the US Army UW training circular and SOCEUR Resistance Operating Concept is to identify the basic tasks which are relevant to Latvian NAF soldiers' training. Thus, research concentrates on TC 18-01.1, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha Level*, TC 18-01.2, *UW Mission Planning Guide for the SF Operational Detachment–Bravo Level*, TC 18-01.3, *UW Mission Planning Guide for the SF Operational Detachment–Charlie Level*.

Three evaluation criteria apply to determine the US UW's basic tasks' relevance for Latvian soldiers' training. First, the goal is to train all military personnel (soldiers, NCOs, officers) as the train the trainers on the basic UW tasks in TRADOC standard military educational programs. Second, every officer and NCO must be ready to train and lead civilian resistance members in war or against an asymmetric threat in peacetime. Third, the UW training program's intensity and complexity are proportional to military personnel's three training levels and responsibilities: soldiers, NCOs, and officers. Officers and NCOs train more intensively and comprehensively to lead the nation's resistance effort, while soldiers prepare to execute the basic tasks.

To conclude, the two case-studies and the US UW training circulars and ROC research determine the training objectives and tasks to include in Latvian military personnel's education programs. Analysis of Latvian armed resistance in the period 1940 to 1953 provides lessons identified and lessons learned from the thirteen-year struggle against occupying powers. The USSR's counterinsurgency doctrine, RU's counterinsurgency, and hybrid warfare analysis determine the resistance movement members' tactics and countermeasures training. The US's comprehensive UW training circulars and ROC provide a thorough, standardized approach to UW training, from which relevant basic tasks could be drawn to benefit Latvian soldier's training.

Additionally, these approaches will provide the answers to the two secondary research questions: how to implement the resistance movement-related mission-essential tasks in the training programs? What is the optimum balance of resistance movement-related training and conventional defense training?

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Analysis in this chapter is based on the two case-studies and the US Army UW training circulars and Resistance Operating Concept to answer the research question. The purpose of the analysis is to determine the resistance movement-related individual tasks and collective mission essential tasks for inclusion in the Latvian NAF soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs. The analysis starts with research on the Latvian resistance movement in the period from 1940 to 1953. This case-study establishes the historical background of events that are similar to the Russian Federation's current hybrid warfare in its western borderlands. Sequentially, analysis of the USSR's counterinsurgency, Russia's counterinsurgency, and hybrid warfare doctrines determines the measures the Latvian resistance members should counter or overcome. Finally, analysis of the US UW training circular and ROC determines the potential tasks which are applicable to the Latvian whole-of-society UW context, and what is the optimal time that Latvian TRADOC education programs must devote to UW training.

The first case-study on Latvian national resistance to occupying powers in the period 1940 to 1953 begins with historical background and demographics. It continues with an assessment of the resistance movement's development and performance during the time. Finally, it concludes with evaluation of the resistance movement's results via the twelve principles of joint operations.

Latvia's Historical Background and Population

The five ancient Baltic tribes, Livonians, Curonians, Semigallians, Selonians, and Latgalians, initially settled in and inhabited the area that is now Latvia (see figure 1). Initially, the Baltic tribes came under the lordship of the Vikings in the ninth century. The German Knights of the Sword and Knights of the Teutonic Order sequentially Christianized the Baltic tribes and established lasting dominance over Latvia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. German lordship continued in period until 1561, and during that time, the German landowning class ruled over the Latvian peasantry. Then, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden partitioned Latvia and ruled it until the early eighteenth century.⁵⁷

Russia progressively annexed the whole of Latvian territory in the eighteenth century. During the Great Northern War, Russia took Rīga from Swedes in 1710 and Vidzeme in 1721. The Russians annexed Latgale in the first partition of Poland in 1772 and Courland at the third partition of Poland in 1795. Therefore, by the end of the eighteenth-century, all of modern Latvia was subject to Russia. Despite the change of power, the German landowners managed to retain their influence in Latvia until the beginning of the twentieth century..⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the United States of America, “History of Latvia: A brief synopsis,” accessed 26 March 2020, <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/usa/culture/history-of-latvia-a-brief-synopsis>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.



Figure 1. Baltic Tribes, about 1200 AD

Source: Virtual Livonia, "The Livonians and other Tribes of Ancient Latvia, 10th-12th Centuries," 2017, accessed 5 May 2020, <http://virtuallivonia.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/figure-3.jpeg>.

Latvian nationalism developed at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. The idea of an independent Latvian state for the first time evolved during the Russian Revolution of 1905. This revolution occurred as a reaction against the German landlords' and Russian imperial institutions' economic and political pressure on Latvian social and national groups. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the end of World War I, Latvia declared its independence on 18 November 1918. The

Republic of Latvia Army fought the Liberation War against Soviet Russia and German and Russian monarchists from 1 December 1918 until 31 January 1920. Soviet Russia and Germany recognized the new nation and the territory of its state in 1920 (see figure 2).⁵⁹



Figure 2. The Republic of Latvia Territory in the Period 1920-1940

Source: Valters Nollendorfs and Oberländer Erwin, *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940-1991: Selected Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia*, vol. 14, Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia (Rīga: Institute of the History of Latvia Publishers, 2007), accessed 26 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1619_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_14_sejums.pdf.

⁵⁹ Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the United States of America, “History of Latvia: A brief synopsis.”

The first liberal elections to the Constitutional Assembly of Latvia took place on 17 and 18 April 1920. The Republic of Latvia became a member of the League of Nations in 1921. The new state achieved economic success, especially in agriculture, between the two World Wars. These occurred as a result of the land reforms and property rights reforms carried out by the state. Democratic coalitions governed the state until 15 May 1934, when Kārlis Ulmanis established autocratic rule through the coup and became the president.⁶⁰

The secret protocol of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 determined the fate of Latvia when World War II started in September 1939. Latvia signed a dictated treaty of mutual assistance in October 1939 by which the USSR obtained military, naval, and air bases in Latvian territory. The Soviet Union issued an ultimatum that demanded to replace the government and admit an unlimited number of Soviet troops on 16 June 1940. The next day, the Red Army occupied all of Latvia's territory. The Soviet-enacted government started its duties on 20 June 1940, and their puppet parliament voted for the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR on 21 July. The USSR accepted Latvia's incorporation on 5 August 1940. Mass arrests and red terror, especially against the intelligentsia, marked the first year of the Soviet rule.⁶¹ On 14 June 1941 the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [Russian: Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел, NKVD] and The People's Commissariat for State Security [Russian:

⁶⁰ Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the United States of America, "History of Latvia: A brief synopsis."

⁶¹ Ibid.

Народный Комиссариат Государственной Безопасности, NKGB] arrested and sent 5,921 people to military prisoners' camps, 583 people to gulags, and 10,396 people to Siberia.⁶²

The next change came when Germany occupied all Latvian territory from 10 July 1941 until the summer of 1944. Thus, Latvia became a part of Germany's province Ostland [Reichskommissariat Ostland). The German Army managed to retain the Courland bridgehead until the end of World War II on 9 May 1945. Similar to other Nazi-occupied territories the German authorities in Latvia attempted to exterminate the Jewish and Romani population. Einsatzgruppe A and Latvian collaborators massacred the majority of the Jewish and Romani minorities at the Rumbula forest. Approximately 1,500 members of the Viktors Arājs Commando and other Latvian members of the SD killed 26,000 Jews.⁶³

The Soviet Union re-occupied the Latgale, Vidzeme and Zemgale regions of Latvia in 1944 and Courland after the end of WWII in May 1945. Approximately 100,000 Latvians fled to Germany and Sweden before the arrival of the Soviet forces. These refugees scattered throughout the world in the period 1946-1959.

⁶² Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States*, 20.

⁶³ Aivars Stranga, *Holokausti Latvijā: 1941–1945* [*The Holocaust in Latvia: 1941-1945*], Chancellery of the Presidency of Latvia, 2004, 214, accessed 23 February 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/>kcfinder/files/item_1619_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_14_sejums.pdf.

The Soviet Union ruthlessly transformed Latvia into a typical Soviet republic during the period from 1944 to 1953, then more moderately during the following years until 1991. The transformational reforms, arrests, terror, and deportations caused the Latvian national partisans' armed resistance from 1944 until 1953. Part of the Soviet post-war reforms were the large-scale labor immigration from Russia and republics of the USSR (see table 2). After WWII, the proportion of Latvians in the population dropped from seventy-seven to sixty-two percent.⁶⁴

Table 2. Latvia's Population by Nationality at the Beginning of the Year				
Nationality	1935		2018	
	Quantity	Percentage, percent	Quantity	Percentage %
Latvians	1,467,035	77.0	1,202,781	62.2
Russians	168,266	8.8	487,250	25.2
Belarusians	26,803	1.4	62,713	3.2
Ukrainians	1,744	0.1	43,128	2.2
Poles	48,637	2.6	39,687	2.1
Lithuanians	22,843	1.2	22,831	1.2
Jews	93,370	4.9	4,721	0.2
Romanies	3,839	0.2	5,082	0.3
Germans	62,116	3.3	2,554	0.1
Estonians	6,928	0.4	1,676	0.1
Other	4,255	0.2	61,956	3.2
Total	1,905,836	100.0	1,934,379	100.0

Source: Created by author.

⁶⁴ The Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, "National composition of Latvian population," Central Statistical Bureau, accessed 26 March 2020, https://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/data/Skoleniem/iedzivotaju_etniskais_sastavs.pdf.

A national renaissance developed in the late 1980s within the Soviet campaigns for glasnost [гласность “openness”] and perestroika [перестройка “restructuring”]. The Latvian Popular Front established the opposition to the ruling Communist Party on 9 October 1988. It won the elections of 1990, and the Latvian SSR parliament passed a declaration of the renewal of the state’s independence on 4 May 1990. The Latvia parliament declared the restoration of full independence on 22 August 1991 after the failed coup in Moscow.⁶⁵ Latvia became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 29 March 2004 and a member of the European Union on 1 May 2004.

According to data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, more than 370,000 Latvians lived, studied, and worked in different countries around the world in 2019 (see table 3). Approximately 220,000 of them left Latvia during the last fifteen years for economic reasons. The assessed expatriates’ economic contribution back to Latvia economy is \$583 billion annually.⁶⁶

Table 3. The Number of Latvians Abroad			
Country	Quantity	Country	Quantity
United Kingdom	100,000	Norway	10,000
United States of America	85,000	Sweden	6,000
Ireland	25,000	Denmark	5,000
Australia	20,500	Netherlands	4,200

⁶⁵ Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the United States of America, “History of Latvia: A brief synopsis.”

⁶⁶ Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the Russian Federation, “Information for compatriots abroad,” accessed 26 March 2020, <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/moscow/tautiesiem/informacija-tautiesiem-arzemes>.

Germany	20,000	Lithuania	3,500
Canada	20,000	Estonia	1,600

Source: Created by author.

Latvian Resistance Movement in the Period 1940-1953

The USSR occupied the Republic of Latvia on 17 June 1940 after its authoritarian president Kārlis Ulmanis agreed to the USSR's ultimatum and forbade the Armed Forces to resist the invaders. Latvia's Army complied with the president's orders and did not resist the invaders. The occupying power reorganized the Latvian Army into the XXIV Territorial Corps of the Red Army and abolished the Latvian Ministry of War on 27 September 1940. It also arrested 4,665 soldiers in 1940 and 1941. They were either executed or sent to forced-labor camps.⁶⁷ In addition to military personnel, the NKVD also arrested 7,292 people for anti-Soviet activities in the period from 17 June 1940 to July 1941.⁶⁸ The occupants executed 1,005 of them, but approximately 3,400 died of excessive labor and starvation in the gulags. In the culmination of the Soviet repressions

⁶⁷ Daina Bleiere, Ilgvars Butulis, Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga, Antonijs Zunda, and Jānis Zvaigzn, *Litene - Latvijas armijas Katiņa [Litene - Katyn of the Latvian Army]*, accessed 12 March 2020, <https://www.sargs.lv/lv/vesturiski-jutigie-jautajumi/2011-05-30/litene-latvijas-armijas-katina>.

⁶⁸ Rudīte Vīksne and Kārlis Kangeris, *No NKVD līdz KGB: politiskās prāvas Latvijā 1940-1986: noziegumos pret padomju valsti apsūdzēto Latvijas iedzīvotāju rādītājs [From NKVD to KGB: Political Litigation in Latvia 1940-1986. The list of the Latvian population accused of crimes against the Soviet state]* (Rīga: Latvian History Institute Publishing House, 1999), 971.

on 14 June 1940, the NKVD deported 15,424 persons to Siberia, drawn mainly from the Latvia intelligentsia.⁶⁹

Thus, the USSR neutralized potential resistance leadership, and the Latvian resistance movement evolved from scratch. The Latvian resistance movement against the occupying powers had three distinct periods. First, the Latvian national resistance formed against the USSR's occupation from 17 June 1940 until 5 July 1941. During the second period the national resistance movement opposed the German occupation from 9 July 1941 until 8 May 1945. Finally during the third period, from July 1944 until 1957, the Latvian national resistance movement fought against the USSR's re-occupation.

The Resistance Against the Soviet Occupation, 1940-1941

The first period of resistance against the USSR took place from 17 June 1940 until 7 July 1941. The nation overcame the initial shock of occupation and sense of doom that it brought. Several resistance organizations started to form, but they lacked united command and control. The resistance members lacked experience in conspiracy. Initially, they were frivolous and did not count on ruthless repressions, even in the case of insignificant actions conducted against the Soviet regime. The underground groups like the New Latvians, Latvian National Legion, Fatherland Guards, Association of Young Officers, and others formed and issued illegal calls for resistance, sabotaging the orders

⁶⁹ Zigmārs Turčinskis, "Bruņotā pretošanās padomju un nacistiskajai okupācijai (1940–1957)" ["Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)"], in *Nepārtrauktības Doktrīna Latvijas vēstures kontekstā [The Doctrine of Continuity in the Context of Latvian History]*, 105-123 (Rīga: Latvian Academy of Sciences Baltic Strategic Studies Center, 2017), 107, https://tnagramatas.tna.lv/uploads/example/Nepartrauktibas%20doktrina_LZA_Saturs.pdf.

of the Soviet occupying power. In addition, the active school youth involvement characterizes this period.⁷⁰ Resistance members also established the Battle Organization for the Liberation of Latvia (BOLL) at the end of 1940 to launch violent resistance, but the effort was unsuccessful. The NKVD arrested the BOLL members before they were able to launch armed actions. It executed seven members, and imprisoned two others. Due to the Soviet Security Service's ruthless and successful actions, almost all resistance groups were eliminated at the beginning of the spring 1941.

The situation changed in the summer of 1941. The deportations of 15,424 Latvian citizens on 14 June 1941 triggered the new wave of the national partisan unit establishment. The start of the USSR-Germany war on 22 June 1941 ignited widespread Latvian nationalist uprising. The partisan units attacked the withdrawing Red Army units. These battles resulted in approximately 800 killed and 1,500 captured Red Army soldiers. Before the German Army arrived, Latvian national partisan units assumed authority in the five districts of the capital of Rīga, nineteen towns, and numerous counties.

The Latvian national partisans met advancing German troops as partners in the fight against the Soviet occupation, but Latvian hopes for independence or self-governance were soon dashed. The German occupying power issued an order on 8 July 1941 to disband partisan units and give up weapons and banned the wearing of the Latvian Army uniform. The German military and civilian administration enforced strict

⁷⁰ Uldis Neiburgs, "Latvija Otrajā pasaules karā" ["Latvia in World War II"], Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, accessed 12 March 2020, <http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/lv/latvijas-okupacijas-vesture/1-padomju-okupacija/latvija-otraja-pasaules-kara>.

control and was not interested in restoring Latvian self-governance in the conquered territory.

The Resistance Against Nazi Germany's Occupation, 1941-1945

The second period is the resistance against the Nazi occupation from 8 July 1941 until 9 May 1945. Initially, Latvia's inhabitants perceived the German Army's attack and success as the liberation from Bolsheviks and red terror. This changed when Latvians realized that German intent was not to restore the Republic of Latvia independence, but rather to annex it to Greater Germany. The German occupying power soon proceeded with the efforts to annihilate the Jewish population, and general compulsory-labor service and labor recruitment for employment in Germany soon followed. The Nazi administration then started the Latvian population's forced mobilization into the German Army. This turned into total mobilization in the spring of 1944. The Nazi occupying actions mentioned above shaped the mindset of the Latvian population and provided the conditions for the development of resistance.

The resistance to the Nazi regime in Latvia started to form up in the autumn of 1941. It was not united; it had several directions and different goals. While the Latvian national resistance movement's purpose was to restore the state's sovereignty, the Soviet-backed communist resistance movements within Latvia aimed to re-install the Soviet regime, and the Polish resistance movement fought for Poland's restoration.⁷¹

⁷¹ Antonijs Zunda, "Pretestība nacistu okupācijai" ["Resistance to the Nazi occupation"], *Latvia Journal*, 18 August 2004, accessed 12 March 2020, <https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/92468>.

The Latvian national resistance movement's activities began in 1941-1942. The resistance involved intelligence representatives, former prime ministers, ministers, officers, students, academics, clergy, youth, rural people, and others. The resistance had internal and external lines of effort. The internal lines of effort defended the nation's interests by spreading messages to the society. It agitated for national survival and regaining of control over the homeland. Messaging opposed Latvian involvement in pro-German Police Service Battalions and the National Labor Service [*Reichsarbeitsdienst*] and protested against mobilization in the Latvian Legion.⁷²

The Latvian Central Council (LCC) contributed to external lines of effort. Latvia's four largest political parties' members, along with Professor Konstantīns Čakste, established the LCC on 13 August 1943. It had the seven commissions: foreign affairs, military, information, legal, economic, fundraising and communications.⁷³ The LCC was the only national resistance movement organization that collected intelligence on the situation and public sentiment in Nazi-occupied Latvia. The LCC delivered intelligence to western allied institutions through Latvian diplomats in Stockholm, London, and

⁷² Uldis Neiburgs, "Trešais ceļš. Pretošanās kustība Latvijā Otrā pasaules kara laikā" ["The third way: Resistance movement in Latvia during World War II"], Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, accessed 12 March 2020, <http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/lv/latvijas-okupācijas-vesture/nacistiska-okupācija/tresais-celspretosanas-kustiba-latvija-otra-pasaules-kara-laika>.

⁷³ Zigmārs Turčinskis, "Čekas aģentu kaujinieku loma Latvijas Nacionālo partizānu apvienības sagrāvē (1944–1953)" ["The Role of Agents-combatants in the Annihilation of the National Partisan Union of Latvia (1944–1953)"], 109, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2006, accessed 2 April 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1640_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_17_sejums.pdf.

Washington. Additionally, the LCC contributed to the resistance by organizing refugee boat traffic to Sweden, and by cooperation with Estonian and Lithuanian resistance movements.⁷⁴

The LCC's 17 March 1944 political declaration was of vital significance for the nation and its resistance movement. The memorandum stated:

The USSR's occupation of the Republic of Latvia was a severe violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The occupation violates the Latvian-USSR Treaty and several international treaties, and the Covenant of the League of Nations . . . With that said, following international law, the Republic of Latvia legally continues to exist. The German occupying power's current position that Latvia was a part of the USSR is illegal, along with the illegal Latvia population forced mobilization into the German Army. On behalf of the Latvian nation, we, the undersigned, declare our nation's united will:

The Republic of Latvia's actual sovereignty must be restored immediately. Latvia's government must be formed from all Latvian nations following the 1922 Constitution in force and on a coalition basis.⁷⁵

In total, one hundred eighty-eight people signed the LCC Memorandum. The signatories and national representatives were ministers, parliament members, scientists, writers, clergy from all denominations, and well-known individuals in Latvian society. The LCC published the Memorandum in the only issue of its illegal newspaper *the New Latvia* on 10 March 1944. This one-off resistance measure, printed in one-thousand copies, significantly reinforced the impact of national resistance until 1991. The resistance's members hand-copied and spread by word of mouth the Memorandum's state-continuity doctrine.

⁷⁴ Neiburgs, "The third way: Resistance movement in Latvia during World War II."

⁷⁵ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 110.

While this strengthened the resistance, other measures saw it weaken and transform. The German occupying power arrested LCC Chairman Konstantīns Čakste and other leading members on 29 April 1944 and sent them to the Stutthof concentration camp. This disrupted the LCC's continued resistance efforts until the end of 1945, when the Soviet security services eliminated the organization.

Battles and clashes took place between German forces and small Latvian units until the German capitulation in May 1945. These units were composed of a variety of Latvian citizens and former military. Almost every time Germans defeated one of them, ruthless revenge actions followed against nearby Latvian settlements and civilians.⁷⁶

For example, the LCC Military Commission members General (GEN) Jānis Kurelis and Captain Kristaps Upelnieks established the armed resistance unit in 1944. The unit consisted of four- to six-hundred fighters, and it was positioned in the Vidzeme region of Skrīveri county. General Kurelis formed the unit with German administration permission and under their direct supervision. The Germans planned the unit for subversion against the Red Army land lines of communication. However, several LCC radiomen were in the Kurelis unit, and they maintained communications with the Swedish and British intelligence services.

The Kurelis unit ignored the German Army order to stay behind the Red Army frontline and arbitrarily moved to Courland in western Latvia. The two-hundred and seventy-man group relocated to the Talsi region's Puze County. The unit broke formal

⁷⁶ Turčinskis, "Armed Resistance to Soviet and Nazi Occupation (1940-1957)," 111.

communications with German headquarters during the relocation and grew up to a strength of 3,000 men. The unit's numbers increased in large part because deserters from the Latvian Legion voluntarily joined.⁷⁷ Captain Upelnieks actively led the unit in the Courland. He maintained communications with the LCC's Ventspils group, developing plans to seize the Ventspils port and proclaim restoration of Latvia's independence. However, the desire to gain independence did not come true. German Army Group Courland switched focus to rear-area security once the situation in the Eastern Front stabilized, denying the opportunity.

Numerous national partisan units operated independently from the German and Soviet forces in the Courland bridgehead aside from the Kurelis's unit. Their core consisted of the Latvian soldiers who deserted from the German Army. The largest was Lieutenant Edvīns Zelmenis's hundred- and eighty-one-man unit operating in the Engure Forest. The Zelmenis unit was organized into three platoons and employed small-unit tactics. German forces encircled the Zelmenis unit on 27 October 1944 and either destroyed or dispersed its formations over the next three days. Zelmenis and his wife committed suicide to avoid falling into captivity.

The Kurelis unit met its end shortly after Zelmenis's when Army Group Courland launched actions against it in November 1944. The Germans encircled and arrested the unit headquarters and the majority of the unit's fighters. The German Court of War sentenced to death and executed eight staff officers on 20 November 1944. The Nazis

⁷⁷ Daina Bleiere, Ilgvars Butulis, Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga, and Antonijs Zunda, *Latvija Otrajā pasaules karā (1939-1945)* [*Latvia in the Second World War (1939-1945)*] (Rīga: Jumava, 2007), 322.

sent Kurelis and other arrested unit members to the Stutthof concentration camp. However, Lieutenant Roberts Rubenis lead battalion, located in Ugāle County's forests, refused to surrender. Rubenis's battalion consisted of approximately four-hundred and fifty Latvian deserters with combat experience. The unit engaged in battle with Germans and fought until 9 December 1944. Rubenis and his successor, Lieutenant Aleksandrs Druviņš, fell during the battles, but the survivors broke out of the encirclement and dispersed. The German forces followed with a penalty action in Zlēku County executing around one-hundred and sixty civilians and burning their homes.⁷⁸

The LCC did not succeed in reaching the established political objective; however, it reminded the Latvian population and international community that the idea of the independent Latvia was alive even in the circumstances of the occupation, and that, legally, the Republic of Latvia and its constitution existed. The LCC's most practical contribution was the 2,541 refugees transferred to Sweden over the Baltic Sea via fishing boats from autumn 1944 until May 1945. The refugees were mainly Latvian intelligence whose location on Soviet-occupied territory meant imprisonment in gulags or the death penalty.

Ultimately, the Latvian national resistance's deficiency was its lack of financial and political support. The Allied powers financially and politically supported the resistance movement in Western European countries. However, the same was not true of Eastern Europe, and thus, the Latvians did not have any external support.

⁷⁸ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 111.

The Resistance Against the USSR Re-Occupation, 1944-1953

The Soviet occupying regime in Latvia after World War II carried out mass terror, which culminated on 25 March 1949 with the deportation of more than 42,000 people to settlements in remote Siberian regions for life. The resistance against repressions and mass terror was a reciprocal societal reaction. The Latvian population of WWII survivors experienced the horrors of the war and terror, gained combat experience on its battlefields, had no illusions about the Soviet regime, and were ready to launch armed resistance. Latvian national partisans' armed resistance became the most widespread kind of demonstration of disobedience. In addition, the hope that the English and Americans might liberate the Baltic countries by military or political means inspired resistance members. While WWII in Europe finished on 8 May 1945, the bloody battles, murders of civilians, arrests, deportations in Latvia continued until 1953. The last resistance fighters gave up in 1957.⁷⁹

The armed resistance against the second USSR occupation had three distinct periods. During the first period from 1944 until the end of WWII on 8 May 1945, the resistance was most active in the Eastern part of Latvian territory. The second period, from May 1945, until March 1949, the time of mass deportations, was the time of the most active and widespread partisan actions. During the third period, from 1950 until 1957, the national partisan resistance gradually diminished until it ended.

The German secret services established the foundation for the anti-Soviet armed resistance in Latvia. The German Reich Security Main Office

⁷⁹ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 112.

[Reichssicherheitshauptamt] established an exclusively-Latvian military unit in late summer 1944. The aim was to create a Latvian underground and partisan organization in case of a Soviet reoccupation of Latvia. The project's name was "Wildkatze/Mežakaķis" (Wildcat). The Wildcat was the only case of an exclusively Latvian formation initiated by German intelligence service. It was the pilot project of German guerilla warfare. The Wildcat project initially became part of the Schutzstaffel Jagdverband Ost, but later became SS Jagdeinsatz Baltikum⁴ or SS Jagdeinsatz Ostland.⁸⁰ As the part of the Wildcat project, the German intelligence service in Latvia established seven reconnaissance and sabotage schools.⁸¹

Rīga Sicherheitsdienst (SD – Security Service) Latvian commander Boriss Jankavs started work on the Wildcat project in June 1944. Before this, the SD trained him at the German reconnaissance and sabotage school in Holland.⁸² He founded a "Center of Latvian National Partisans" (CLNP) in Kuldīga. The center was subordinated to the local branch of the Operation Zeppelin under the command of SS Sturmbannführer Otto Kraus. The Wildcat German supervisor was SS Sturmbannführer Dr. Manfred Pechau. The CLNP developed plans for the partisan organization named Latvijas Nacionālo Partizānu Organizācija (Latvia National Partisan Organization, LNPO). The first partisan groups

⁸⁰ Björn M. Felder, "SS Jagdverband Ost (1944–1945): A Case-study," Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2003, accessed 12 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1616_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_11_sejums.pdf, 221.

⁸¹ Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*, 247.

⁸² Ibid., 380.

parachuted behind the Red Army lines in the Vidzeme region in August and September 1944. Prior to that, the CNLP prepared the depots of weapons, ammunition and equipment in the operations areas and recruited personnel. Wildcat organizers involved Latvian personnel from various sources. The first manpower source was Latvians collaborating with German secret services; the second was local policemen, *Aizsargi* [Defenders] militia members, and parish elders; and the third was Latvian SS Legion soldiers. Captured deserters were especially “motivated” to join the unit to escape the death penalty.⁸³

The CNLP followed the German withdrawal from Rīga in October 1944, relocated to Courland, and continued its efforts. It established networks as the basis of future partisan organization. The CNLP followed its previous strategy. To establish networks, it used its personal and official connections to military and civil institutions and organizations. In addition, to the local policemen, *Aizsargi* militiamen, and parish elders, the networks in Courland also included Latvian Youth Organization [*Latvijas Jaunatnes organizācija*] members, and Latvian SS Legion staff and frontline officers. The Nazi-backed Latvian National Committee member Colonel Roberts Osis planned to use Project Wildcat Latvian troops as its armed forces in the beginning of May 1945.⁸⁴

The SS Jagdverband Ost joined SS and the Wehrmacht in the anti-partisan warfare in the Courland bridgehead during the autumn of 1944. For this purpose, Boriss Jankavs established at least twelve Jagdkommandos - closed units with about fifty

⁸³ Felder, “SS Jagdverband Ost (1944–1945): A Case-study,” 222.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 223.

soldiers per unit - and numerous “local groups.” While Jagdkommandos were active fighting units, the local groups performed police duties, controlled rural areas, and collected information for the Jagdverband staff. Both Jagdkommandos and local groups fought against Soviet partisans and Latvian national partisans, in addition to preparing for post-war Soviet re-occupation.

The Jagdverband and pro-Nazi Captain Jankavs looked at General Kurelis’s Latvian national partisan unit as part of the anti-Soviet partisan warfare effort, but these plans were stopped by the highest SS commander in Ostland Friedrich Jeckeln. The Jankavs troops participated in the destruction of the Kurelis unit. Friedrich Jeckeln assigned Jankavs as negotiator with Kurelis’s staff in November 1944.⁸⁵ The German army’s special reconnaissance unit Frontaufklärungstrupp 212 equipped and trained Kurelis’ army as well as the SS Jagdverband. While General Kurelis’s national partisan unit broke contact with German supervisors in August 1944, it stayed in contact with Jankavs’s SS Jagdverband Ost. Jeckeln used this to his advantage once Kurelis refused to comply with Nazi orders. Jankavs’s SS Jagdverband Ost troops facilitated the Kurelis’ unit’s liquidation, including, eight staff officers’ execution and five-hundred forty-five soldiers’ imprisonment in the Stutthof concentration camp. The Jagdverband also discovered Kurelis’ contacts to the west in Liepāja. Later, the Jagdverband succeeded the Kurelis army in Courland and established connections with the Latvian Central Council.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Felder, “SS Jagdverband Ost (1944–1945): A Case-study,” 223.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

The LSSR Minister of the Interior [Russian: Министерство Внутренних Дел, MVD] Major General A. Eglītis, in his 22 March 1947 report on the results of the fight against national partisans in period 1944 to 1947, stated that the headquarters of SS Jagdverband Ostland formed several sabotage groups, with a total manpower of one-hundred twenty people. On the day of the German surrender, Jankavs's saboteur groups went inland to communicate with the nationalist underground and organize armed gangs. Approximately seventy members of headquarters and staff platoon hid in safehouses and took refuge in the Renda Forest in Courland. As a result of successful MVD troops activities B. Jankav's headquarters broke up, and its participants dispersed into various gangs.⁸⁷

Upon analysis, the Wildcat project personnel composition in Latvia was very heterogeneous and contradictory. The Jagdverband Ost involved approximately 2,500 to 3,000 Latvians. These can be sorted several groups. The first group contains the great number of long-serving SD members like Boriss Jankavs and Rūdolfis Turks. Both participated in the Holocaust in Latvia, and anti-partisan war and massacres in Nazi-occupied Latvia, Russia, and Belorussia. The second group is former Latvian police and Aizsargi militia members, the SS Latvian Legion soldiers, and other non-military institutions representatives. The third group consists of the former members of the Lettische Kartei or Sondergruppe R (Latvian Card Index), the office of approximately

⁸⁷ Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*, 380.

sixty cadres and several hundred informers that collected the incriminating information on the SD's enemies.

Former members of the Latvian extreme right-wing organization Pērkonkrusts (Thundercross) were released after one-year-long imprisonments in the spring of 1944 with the intention of working for the Wildcat project. They worked for Jankavs, both voluntary and by force. The Latvian Card Index's personnel, like Teodors Jansons, Oskars Mitrevics, or Freds Launags, had academic educations and were Pērkonkrusts members or sympathizers for many years. They took part in the Latvian underground during the first Soviet occupation in 1940 and also during the German occupation. The Latvian Card Index acted as the think tank inside the Jagdverband. It used old connections of the resistance and developed guerilla infrastructure. Despite their position, its members were in opposition to the SD-staff and followed their own nationalistic aims.⁸⁸

The Wildcat project's influence on the post-war Latvian national partisan network cannot be assessed unequivocally. Soviet security forces captured or disconnected most of the Jagdverband Jagdkommandos and local groups soon after Latvia's re-occupation. Some units, like the Bonzaks and Feldbergs teams, joined the national partisans after the German Army's capitulation. Jankavs fought as a partisan until his capture in January 1947. Also, the former members of the Latvian Card Index actively involved themselves in anti-Soviet partisan warfare after WWII. Certainly, the percentage of former Jagdverband members within the partisans was very low. But in fact, at least in the

⁸⁸ Felder, "SS Jagdverband Ost (1944–1945): A Case study," 224.

Courland, the Wildcat project created a guerilla infrastructure which absorbed willing legionaries and other volunteers for partisan actions. Until 1947, the majority of Courland partisan units were closely connected to the Jagdverband's successor, the Latvia National Partisan Organization (LNPO). The LNPO also established contacts to other parts of Latvia. Former Wildcat agents' like the Rusovs brothers in Zemgale and Pēteris Supe in Latgale successfully established their own national partisan groups.

In summary, the Jagdverband Ost Project Wildcat was the facilitating, but not the main contributing factor to the anti-Soviet partisan warfare in post-WWII Latvia.⁸⁹ Björn M. Felder states that Project Wildcat was not only the Latvian collaboration with the Nazi regime, but also some part of the population's political articulation. For example, the Latvian Card Index members prepared anti-Soviet resistance with the main objective of an independent and western-type Latvian state in mind.⁹⁰

For example, the Center of Latvian National Partisans parachuted Pēteris Supe in to lead subversion group "Lapland" in the Northern part of Latgale on 1 October 1944 (see figure 3). Once the group lost communications with the German chain of command, it started to develop into a national partisan movement.⁹¹ Wildcat Project agent P. Supe

⁸⁹ Felder, "SS Jagdverband Ost (1944–1945): A Case study," 225.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Jānis Vasiļevskis, "Latvijas Nacionālo Partizānu Apvienības darbība" ["Latvia National Partisan Alliance Operations"] Latvian Association of Politically Repressed Persons, 2007, accessed 20 March 2020, <http://lpra.vip.lv/vasilevskis.htm>; Uldis Neiburgs, "Mums bija jāmirst, lai dzīvotu simti. Stompaku kaujai – 70" ["We had to die so the hundreds could live. Stompaku Battle's 70th Anniversary"], *Latvia Newspaper*, 14 March 2015, accessed 20 March 2020, <https://www.la.lv/mums-bija-jamirst-lai-dzivotu-simtistompaku-kaujai-70>.

was the former head of the Abrene parish agronomic office. Through connections to the Latvian University of Agriculture, he received the LCC's only published newspaper, with its political memorandum and call to unite under the national flag and to establish and develop the nation's military power. Supe's unit initiated the establishment of the first Latvia national partisan organization – the Latvia National Partisan Alliance (LNPA) - on 10 December 1944.




Figure 3. National Partisan Areas of Operations, 1 August 1944-8 May 1945

Source: Pascal Orcier, *Latvian National Partisan Armed Resistance 1944-1956*, Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, Atlas of the History Latvia in Europe, accessed 26 March 2020, <http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/lv/skolam/macibu-materiali/latvijas-okupācijas-muzeja-vestures-atlants-latvija-eiropa-20/#lg=1&slide=39>.

Supe followed the LCC's 10 March 1944 political memorandum and established the statutes of the LNPA, which stated:

1. LNPA (Alliance) is the Latvian people's national military political organization, which unites active freedom fighters and works secretly against the power occupying Latvia . . .

3. The Alliance finds its rights expressed within the framework of the United Nations and in the Republic of Latvia's Constitution; therefore, it is a legal organization of the Latvian state and can express the free will of a certain part of the Latvian people.

4. The Alliance's ultimate goal is to fight militarily and politically along with the vast majority of the Latvian people for the restoration of the independent democratic Republic of Latvia.⁹²

The LNPA was active only in the forests of Viļaka (Stampaku), Liepna, Tilža and Grīva in the winter of 1944-45, but during the summer of 1945, it rapidly expanded its activities. By late 1945, the LNPA covered most of the territories of Alūksne, Valka, Cēsis and Madona Counties. Simultaneously, the Alliance established the contacts with the Homeland Guard (guerrilla) Alliance [Tēvijas Sargu (partizānu) Apvienība, TS(p)A] operating in South Latgale and Selonija.⁹³

Initially, LNPA members worked in partisan units of unlimited size, but they later started to group units according to the territorial principle. The partisan sections from the parishes merged into partisan regions that complied with administrative-territorial divisions – like counties. Each partisan unit operated in a strictly-defined area of responsibility. While LNPA involved seven national partisan groups with one-hundred twenty-three members at the time of its establishment in December 1944, it grew up to

⁹² Neiburgs, "We had to die so the hundreds could live. Stompaku Battle's 70th Anniversary."

⁹³ Vasiļevskis, "Latvia National Partisan Alliance Operations."

three partisan regions and seven separate sections by May 1945. The LNPA united approximately 1,000 national partisans in the autumn of 1945.⁹⁴

At the beginning, the LNPA based its actions on the elected leaderships' verbal orders, but it later proceeded with written documents. The Alliance wrote first instructions in April 1945 and drafted statutes in May 1945. The LNPA Congress of Delegates amended the statutes twice on 15 May 1946 and 1947. Despite the superiority of Soviet occupational forces and Latvian security authorities, the LNPA continued operations until 1953.

The peak of partisan warfare in the Latgale region was the Battle of Stompaki on 2 March 1945. The LNPA had established one of the largest Baltic partisan camps in the Stompaku swamp in the winter of 1944-45. "The Island Base" could accommodate up to four-hundred fighters. The base facilities included twenty-four bunkers for personnel, stables for thirty horses, a food depot, a hospital bunker, a partisan court, and a church. Supe's leading three-hundred national partisans engaged in battle with the 483 NKVD troops for twenty-four hours, before breaking the encirclement. Small groups dispersed to previously-developed hideout bunkers throughout the region. The Stompaku battle resulted in at least thirty-two Soviet and twenty-eight Latvian dead.⁹⁵

Despite the shift to the small-unit tactics after the Stompaku battle, the LNPA continued significant resistance actions against the Soviet regime. It actively disrupted

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Neiburgs, "We had to die so the hundreds could live. Stompaku Battle's 70th Anniversary."

Soviet mass arrests in February 1945. In addition, the alliance conducted attacks to release detainees, patrol areas to intercept Soviet troops, and spread messages about communist-planned repressions and deportations to involved families.⁹⁶

In one example, the LNPA protested against the mass arrests of inhabitants in Vidzeme and Latgale by sending a letter to the LSSR Commissioner for People's Affairs, Augusts Eglītis shortly before the Republic of Latvia's Independence Proclamation Day on 18 November 1945. In response to this protest, the LSSR security services introduced a state of emergency in Latvia for three days before and three days after November 18. The LNPA, in turn, inflicted serious damage on the communications network in the western part of Latvia during this period, with the largest damage in Valka and Cēsis Counties.⁹⁷

In the summers, the LNPA conducted seven to fifteen-day long partisan training courses. In the summer of 1946, it taught conventional Latvia Army doctrine that was not appropriate for the guerilla warfare. By the following summer, it had rewritten its doctrine to reflect its own experiences, which proved both appropriate and useful.

To further its aims, the LNPA boycotted the LSSR Supreme Soviet elections on 10 February 1946. The Alliance carried out an extensive agitation campaign, spreading approximately 1,000 copies of various anti-Soviet documents, blew up several bridges and roads, disrupted telephone communications, and interrupted the telegraph network in its area of operations. NLPA partisans also attacked the eleven election stations in

⁹⁶ Vasiļevskis, "Latvia National Partisan Alliance Operations."

⁹⁷ Vasiļevskis, "Latvia National Partisan Alliance Operations."

Alūksne and Viļaka Counties.⁹⁸ At the same time, the LNPA sent memorandum to the LSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's Chairman Augusts Kirhenstein and to the Council of Ministers' Chairman Vilis Lācis, in August 1946 and April 1947. On behalf of the Latvian nation, the LNPA requested the Soviet regime end deportations, terror and other violence against the Latvian population.⁹⁹

In comparison to Latvia's Eastern regions, the situation in the center of the country was relatively calm. Partisan groups in Vidzeme started to form in May 1945, when the snow melted and when the warmer weather gave greater opportunity for outlaws to meet each other. They merged into a number of partisan groups, perhaps as many as twenty. They disarmed, beat, and in several cases physically neutralized the most active pro-Soviet collaborators.¹⁰⁰

The armed resistance in the western part of Latvia, in the Courland bridgehead, started after the German Army capitulation on 8 May 1945. Approximately two thousand officers and soldiers of the SS Latvian 19th Waffen Grenadier Division disobeyed the orders and continued the fight against communism as national partisans. Intense fights started in the days after the capitulation when Red Army units systematically cleared the forests and conducted searches in houses. The Soviet soldiers' graves in the northern part of Courland, where there were no WWII battles, proves the efficacy of the resistance.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)."

Sixty graves in the Talsi Brothers' Cemetery are marked with dates from 10 May 1945 until the 1951.¹⁰¹ However, the partisans were ultimately defeated by Soviet forces.

After the Courland Bridgehead clearing operation, the Soviet regime tried to suppress the armed resistance in the eastern part of Latvia, in Latgale. Four Red Army divisions and three NKVD battalions took part in wood-clearing operation "Vostok" from 31 May 1945 until 9 August 1945. The operation resulted in twenty-one killed and seven wounded partisans, along with 3,471 captured.¹⁰²

The Red Army and NKVD wood-clearing operations did not stop the armed resistance (see figure 2). The national partisans' attacks focused on two main aims. The first aim was to neutralize the parish and village Executive Committees. Their personnel were not harmed if it did not resist. The second aim was to destroy the Soviet functionaries like NKVD personnel, organizers of the Communist Party, the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol), and Chairmen of Executive Committees. To this end, national partisans completely paralyzed or disrupted Soviet public administration in several counties. The partisans killed thirty-two and wounded ten Ilūkste County functionaries within ten-day period in July 1945. The Latvian Communist Party functionary in the subsequent trial stated that the Party Committee could not put its head out the window. A similar situation occurred in Abrene County, where thirty percent of parishes' Executive Committees were destroyed, but thirty percent did not even start their work. Heinrihs Vestmanis led fifty partisans to seize the well-defended

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 115.

¹⁰² Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 115.

Tilža Parish Center in Abrene County on the night of 4-5 July 1945. The attack resulted in eleven detainees released from NKVD prison and the burning of the Executive Committee building, along with five others. In total, during their operations, national partisans seized at least forty-one parish centers and the small town of Gostiņi.¹⁰³

The partisans established organizations of different sizes. The North Courland Partisan Organization formed on 9 September 1945 and operated in the Dundaga and Ventspils Forests (see table 2). The Latvia National Partisan Organization operated in vicinity of Kuldīga and Talsi from 1945 until 1947. The Fatherland Hawks Union (Tēvijas Vanagi) operated in vicinity of Liepāja in 1947. Latvian Self-Defense Organization members fought in Vidzeme in vicinity of Ērgļi from 1944 until 1945. Latvian Fatherland Guards (partisan) Union (LFG(p)U) (Latvijas Tēvzemes sargu (partizānu) apvienība (LTS(p)A)) resisted in the southern part of Latgale and partially in Vidzeme during 1945 and 1946. The LFG(p)U organized forces according to the former Latvian Army structure in partisan platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments. The afore mentioned LNPA operated in Latgale and Vidzeme's northern regions, along with central Latvia, and was the longest-lived organization, existing from 10 December 1944 until 15 January 1953. The North Latgale Independence Unit (Ziemeļlatgales Neatkarības vienība (ZLNV)) fought in Rēzekne and Viļaka counties in time 1947-1951. On average, partisan organizations lasted one or two years.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 116.




Figure 4. National Partisan Areas of Operations,
9 May 1945-31 December 1949

Source: Pascal Orcier, *Latvian National Partisan Armed Resistance 1944-1956*, Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, Atlas of the History Latvia in Europe, accessed 26 March 2020, <http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/lv/skolam/macibu-materiali/latvijas-okupācijas-muzeja-vestures-atlants-latvija-eiropa-20/#lg=1&slide=40>.

All national partisan organizations declared their efforts' aims in their establishment documents and statutes. Their end was the restoration of the Republic of Latvia sovereignty. The LNPA statutes' first point stated: "We are fighting for the Republic of Latvia's sovereignty (independence) restoration on the basis of legal force retained by the Latvian Constitutional Assembly's democratic laws and the United Nations Declaration, according to which the Latvian people must be the owners of their

land and decision-makers of its fate.”¹⁰⁵ Additionally, an LNPA declaration stated: “We want to stay in the European cultural circle, and therefore our orientation is Anglo-American.”¹⁰⁶

Similarly, LFG(p)U declared in statutes that, in accordance with the whole Latvian nation, it would endeavor to use all forces and means for the rapid restoration of the national sovereign and democratic Latvian state. This effort was based on the Republic of Latvia’s declaration of fact on 18 November 1918, which was recognized by most countries and nations, and on the guarantee of the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰⁷

All partisan organizations tried to publish newspapers and different messages. Initially, they typed the newspapers with typewriters and then multiplied them with copy paper. In total, partisans during their resistance period published fourteen various newspapers of approximately ten to one-hundred copies each. The last newspaper, *Dzimtene* (Fatherland) was published in 1950 and was handwritten, because the technical means were unavailable. These continuous information operations prove that the national partisan resistance’s aim was to remind the Latvia nation about the state’s independence, and to encourage citizens to fight for it.¹⁰⁸

Two opposite processes took place in Latvia in the autumn of 1945. The first was the unification of the resistance groups and an increasing number of partisan attacks. The

¹⁰⁵ Turčinskis, “Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957),” 116.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

second was the process of legalization of resistance movements and their members. The work required to amnesty resistance members and the Soviet regime's inability to control occupied territory triggered a unique event in Baltic partisan warfare. LNPA headquarters Chief of Communications section Antons Circāns and the Chief of the Valka County NKVD section Lieutenant-Colonel Korneyev signed the ten-day long armistice. The Armistice applied to all Valka County territory and was in force from 29 September 1945 until 9 October.¹⁰⁹ This was the only one case in Latvia's post-WWII partisan warfare in which the Soviet regime and Latvia national partisan leaders agreed on official cease-fire in open negotiations, and where it applied to whole county.

The LSSR's security services tried to restrict the national resistance movement. The People's Commissar for the Interior of the LSSR, Eglītis, published the call for legalization by addressing wavering partisans in newspaper *Cīņa* (The Struggle) on 12 September 1945. The call promised not to crack down on legalized people with repressions, if they surrendered, stopped resistance, and turned in their weapons. The offer came out in a time when it was clear that new war will not start soon, and the partisans needed to start preparations for winter survival. Overall, 1,268 partisans and outlaws responded and legalized in 1945. The LSSR security services published calls for legalization periodically. All county newspapers on 16 August 1946 published the

¹⁰⁹ Reinis Ratnieks, "Nacionālo partizānu grupu veidošanās un darbība Ziemeļrietumvidzemē 1944. gada rudenī – 1945. Gadā" ["Formation and Activities of Groups of National Partisans in Northwestern Vidzeme from the Autumn of 1944 to the End of 1945"], *Lativa News*, 2018, 68, accessed 12 March 2020, https://www.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/apgads/PDF/Vesture/2018_5/05_Ratnieks.pdf.

reminder that the 12 September 1945 Legalization Rules remained in effect. 2,567 people legalized in 1946. Calls for legalization would continue, with the last coming on 11 January 1956.¹¹⁰ These helped to sap the resistance of much of its strength during the struggle.

In addition to amnesty programs, the Soviet security services developed new tactics to improve their results in the fight against the partisans. New approaches foresaw Latvian territory split into the three operational sectors – Courland, Vidzeme, and Latgale. This concentrated and unified NKVD and NKGB forces. The joint NKVD and NKGB headquarters more successfully used agents to collect intelligence and information and conduct more effective attacks on partisan units. Each operational sector headquarters received two NKVD regiments as attachments. Due to these improvements, NKVD and NKGB joint forces started to seize the initiative and neutralize partisan units. Additionally, partisans became less mobile during the preparation and winter survival period. As the result, the fierce battles erupted. The NKVD troops partially or completely destroyed many partisan units residing in permanent camps or in underground shelters. One of the largest national partisan organizations, LFG(p)U, was destroyed during the winter of 1945-46. Despite this, some resistance groups were relatively successful. Twenty-five partisans engaged approximately three-hundred NKVD troops in battle in Kabile Parish in Kuldīga County on 1 January 1946. The battle lasted until the nightfall and resulted in the three partisans and approximately fifty NKVD soldiers killed.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Turčinskis, “Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957),” 117.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 118.

The spring of 1946 was a short period of hope for resistance members. The Latvian national partisans misinterpreted the Winston Churchill's 5 March 1946 speech in Fulton, Michigan. His words "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an 'iron curtain' has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe," was perceived by resistance members as a sign of a new war's beginning and of Latvia liberation.¹¹² However, this was not to be, and partisan warfare started to decline in 1946. The partisan units' size in the forests decreased to less than ten men; gradually units lost connections and switched to hiding and survival tactics. Only the LNPA continued to operate as partisan organization. Its main contribution was information operations through the newspapers *Land of Mara* and *Partisan of Latgale*.¹¹³

In the spite of the increasingly-effective NVKD territory control and setbacks, two partisan organizations developed in 1947. The partisan unit Tēvijas Sargi (Fatherland Hawks) fought in Courland in vicinity of Liepāja, and Augusts Kudrenīckis and Antons Gabrāns established North Latgale Independence Unit (NLIU) with a wide underground network. The NLIU had approximately fifteen regular fighters and eighty reservists. The

¹¹² Ritvars Jansons, "Čekistu militārās operācijas pret Latvijas nacionālajiem partizāniem (1944–1956)" ["Combat Operations of the Soviet Security Agents (Chekists) against National Partisans (1944–1956)"], Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2006, 108, accessed 12 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1619_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_14_sejums.pdf.

¹¹³ Ojārs Stefāns, Gunars Bluzma, Janis Vilums, Zigmars Turcinskis, Inese Dreimane, Raitis Abelnieks, and Ritvars Jansons, *The Unknown War: The Latvian National Partisans' Fight Against the Soviet Occupiers 1944 – 1956*, ed. Aleksandrs Kirssteins, trans. Peter Kalnins (Riga: Biedrība Domas spēks [The Power of Thought Society], 2019), 352.

NLIU also controlled twenty-seven armed members of the underground youth organization Latgales Vanagi (Latgale Hawks) in Rēzekne County Nautrēni High School. The youth organization's main effort was to spread leaflets with pro-partisan information.¹¹⁴

Despite the successful NKVD and NKGB joint operations between 1946 and 1949, the number of Latvian national partisans did not decrease. Reason for this include the Soviet regime's repressions, efforts to force the partisans to legalize, and forced collectivization. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) held known partisans' family members in prisons until the partisans "voluntarily" surrendered. Mass arrests and terror forced whole families to seek escape in the forests. As the result, the battles from this pointed forward resulted in more and more fatalities among women and children. For example, the Upīšu family sought escape in Viļaka County in the spring of 1946. NKVD troops had killed the entire family, father, mother and seven children, by 1952. Similarly, the Sprukuļu family escaped with its six children into the Viļaka County forests; all died during its encirclement in 1950.¹¹⁵

Soviet occupational power did not succeed in fully neutralizing violent and non-violent resistance in Latvia between 1944 and 1949. Therefore, to eliminate partisan support, the USSR's Council of Ministers approved Operation "Прибой" (Coastal Surf) on 29 January 1949. On the night of 24-25 March 1949, the NKVD simultaneously deported 94,779 people from the all three Baltic states. The communist regime from

¹¹⁴ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 119.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Latvia sent 42,149 people to Siberia, nearly seventy-three percent of whom were women and children. The deportations set the preconditions for more rapid rural collectivization, decreased the nationalist resistance support base, and forced the people escaping exile to join the partisans.

The LSSR's Ministry of State Security made very thorough preparations for operation Coastal Surf and exploited the initiative seized by the deportations. 24th Regiment, 5th Division, USSR Ministry of State Security Interior Troops arrested the majority of the amnestied partisan group commanders and members at the beginning of March 1949. Cheka, contrary to the promises made legalized partisans, tried and deported them. The 24th Regiment also intensified operations against partisan groups in the period prior to deportations. Soviet forces succeeded in destroying sixteen and detaining twenty-one partisans.¹¹⁶ They continued to exploit their initiative by conducting anti-partisan operations until the spring of 1950. Most of these casualties were women and children. Interior troops destroyed the ten-partisans strong Eiklons group in Sinole parish, Alūksne County on 2 August 1949. Among the ten killed were five women and two children.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Ritvars Jansons, Kārlis Kangeris, Kristīne Jarinovska, Arunas Bubnys, Meelis Maripuu, Boriss Sokolovs, Eva Eglāja-Kristsone, Jānis Lazdiņš, Ineta Lipša, Mārtiņš Kaprāns, and Solveiga Krūmiņa-Koņkova, *VDK Zinātniskās Izpētes Komisijas Raksti 2. sējums LPSR drošības iestāžu darbība (1944-1956)* [*KGB Scientific Research Commission Articles, vol. 2, Activities of the LSSR Security Services (1944-1956)*], (University of Latvia, 2016), 204, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/lu_portal/projekti/vdkkomisija/VDKkomisija_ra_ksti_2sejums_LPSR-drosibas-iestazu-darbiba-1944-1956_2016-05-06maijs_12-00.pdf.

¹¹⁷ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 120.

Pro-active resistance groups launched retaliation attacks on the most diligent Soviet supporters of deportations. Simultaneously, resistance groups planned attacks on the Soviet security representatives. For example, Mārtiņš Poklevinskis's group killed Jēkabpils County MGB [Ministry of State Security (Russian: Министерство Государственной Безопасности)] leadership - four officers and the Chief of the MGB Jēkabpils County section Major Sokolov - in an ambush.¹¹⁸

However, some effective operations by national partisan groups did not succeed in destabilizing and overthrowing the Soviet regime due to the force ratio. 24th Regiment assessed that, in its area of operation during the 1949 deportations, there were approximately thirty national partisan groups totaling two-hundred and nineteen men, along fifteen individual partisans. The regiment had 33,413 soldiers, along with Ministry of Interior and Ministry of State Security employees.¹¹⁹ Facing the numerically superior enemy, the national partisans gave up and gradually wound their operations down between 1950-1953 (see figure 3).

¹¹⁸ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 120.

¹¹⁹ Jansons, et al., *KGB Scientific Research Commission Articles*, vol. 2, *Activities of the LSSR Security Services (1944-1956)*, 203-204.




Figure 5. National Partisan Areas of Operations,
1 January 1950-21 December 1956

Source: Pascal Orcier, *Latvian National Partisan Armed Resistance 1944-1956*, Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, Atlas of the History Latvia in Europe, accessed 26 March 2020, <http://okupacijasmuzejs.lv/lv/skolam/macibu-materiali/latvijas-okupācijas-muzeja-vestures-atlants-latvija-eiropa-20/#lg=1&slide=41>.

The partisan groups' struggles with Soviet forces became desperately intense in the following years after the 1949 deportations. For example, in early 1952 five-hundred and fifty soldiers from 24th Regiment encircled thirteen members of the combined Grāvers and Indāns groups. The resulting battle lasted five hours and produced twelve dead partisans, one captured woman, and seven killed and seven wounded MGB soldiers. Often partisans committed the collective suicides to escape captivity. The remaining six

members of the Grāvers-Indāns group, including two women, committed suicide in Rauna Parish, Cēsis County, on 16 April 1952.¹²⁰

The last, bloodiest resistance battles occurred in 1953, when one-hundred partisans lost their lives. MGB continued with smaller-scale anti-partisan operations in the following years. The security services destroyed twelve, captured eighty-one and legalized over four-hundred partisans in the period between 1 April 1954 and 30 October 1956. These five-hundred thirty-three people rarely formed groups, preferring instead to remain solo outlaws or meet in groups of two to four.¹²¹

The Baltic Military District Military Tribunal preserved the motivation of the last resistance fighters in its criminal case materials. Security forces detained partisan Kārlis Zariņš in vicinity of Vecpiebalga in the Vidzeme region on 16 June 1953. His trial took place in Rīga from 10 to 13 February 1954. Twenty-six witnesses, four of them previously captured partisans, participated in the process. When the judge read the wording of the indictment, which included the formulation “for homeland betrayal,” Zariņš interrupted him and stated:

I am not a traitor to my homeland; my homeland is Latvia, but yours is Russia . . . I regret now that I shot so few Bolsheviks . . . I considered and believed that it was my duty to fight against Soviet rule. That was the only way I could be free . . . Because I have not been able to fight for the freedom of my homeland, my place is in the grave. You communists, I fought against you and so now I am

¹²⁰ Turčinskis, “Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957),” 120.

¹²¹ Ibid., 121.

ready to put my head down . . . I do not want to talk to you anymore. Judge me as you please.¹²²

The last partisan warfare event in Latvia occurred in Viļāni District on 13 February 1957. There, the Mičuļi family, three males and two females, emerged from the forest, where they had hidden since 1945. Prior to their legalization, they handed over two machine guns, three assault rifles, two rifles, four hand grenades and set of rounds to the security services.¹²³

In total, at least 12,237 Latvian national partisans violently resisted the Soviet regime for some part of twelve years. In accordance with the LSSR security services' reports during this time, 2,407 partisans fell in battle or committed suicide, 5,489 were captured, and 4,341 legalized. Cheka tried and deported majority of the legalized partisans to Siberia in March 1949. The Latvian national partisans did not receive any kind of support from abroad. Their armed resistance relied on weapons and ammunition collected on WWII battlefields, as well as on their stubborn effort to regain freedom and their reluctance to capitulate to the Soviet occupiers.¹²⁴

The Latvian Central Council Activists and Supporters' Structural Analysis

The Democratic Republic of Latvia's four largest political parties - the Social Democrats, the Farmers' Union, the Democratic Center, the Latgale Christian Farmers

¹²² Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 121.

¹²³ Ibid., 122.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 123.

and Catholic Representatives - founded the Latvian Central Council on 13 August 1943. The LCC became the center of the national resistance movement's responsibilities and made the effort to coordinate the fight against the Nazi and Soviet occupation powers to restore the state's independence. The LCC did not reach its objective because the Nazis initially disrupted the Council's work with arrests in 1944 and because Soviet security services almost completely destroyed the organization at the end of 1945.

After WWII, LCC activists opposed the Soviet regime with non-violent resistance. They choose their tactics to wait for the H-hour, when, in their view, Latvia could regain its independence with the help of Western countries. Although members of the LCC fought against Nazi Germany during WWII, the Soviet authorities did not consider this as an attenuating circumstance. The LSSR security services continued to capture some of the dismantled Council's members until 1953, took them under control, and used them in a game against Western intelligence services.¹²⁵

Due to the specific circumstances of the underground's, there is little documentary material on LCC actions in Latvian archives. The more extensive information about LCC activists and supporters' researchers obtained from the archives of the LSSR's former State Security Committee, which is the part of the Latvia State Archive since 1996. This information reveals much about the efficacy of the resistance.

¹²⁵ Dzintars Ērglis, "Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvistu un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze" ["Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis]," vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

Dzintars Ērglis's research indicates that Soviet security forces arrested at least one-hundred forty-eight LCC members and their supporters in Latvia after WWII. The total number of LCC personnel is not definitive and is certainly higher. Finding and collecting information about LCC activists and supporters is difficult due several reasons. First, usually the security services accused detained LCC persons not only of conspiring against the Soviet regime, but also of many other "crimes." Second, several people managed to conceal their affiliation with the national resistance movement during the investigation. Third, structural analysis covers only data on arrested LCC members and their supporters who did not leave Latvia. The data on the majority of LCC members and supporters, who escaped to the West (Sweden, West Germany, etc.) is not available. Fourth, the LSSR security services did not arrest numerous LCC members and supporters, including Valija Siliņa (1922-1957), Vidvuds Šveics (1919-1963), Jānis Vesmanis (1923-19??), Andrejs Spāde (1910-1986), Hermanis Zeltiņš (1906-2001), Vilis Skārds (1894-1980), and Rasma Temmere (1920-).¹²⁶

Analysis of LCC members and their supporters' criminal cases reveals data on each defendant's gender, ethnicity, age, education, occupation, marital status, place of residence, and time of arrest. The criminal cases also reveal which judicial authorities tried the detainees, what penalties they imposed, and when and where trials happened. Only some criminal cases reveal the details of the convicted person's fate.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Ērglis, "Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis," 323.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 324.

The majority of arrested LCC members and supporters were men, but the proportion of women was not insignificant (see table 4). These women were predominantly loyal and energetic supporters of the persecuted LCC activists.

Table 4. Gender Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Followers		
Gender	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Males	116	78
Females	32	22
Total	148	100

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvisti un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 325, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

The LCC was predominantly Latvian by ethnic composition, but its supporters included some members of other ethnicities (see table 5). Of the one-hundred forty-eight arrested, only three were non-Latvians. Two LCC supporters represented traditional Latvian ethnic minorities: a Jew and a Pole. Finally, detained Lithuanian citizen Prons Brijunas maintained contacts between the LCC and the Lithuanian national resistance movement. The NKVD arrested him in Latvia in 1946.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 325.

Table 5. Ethnic Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Followers		
Ethnicity	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Latvian	145	98
Jewish	1	~0.7
Polish	1	~0.7
Lithuanian	1	~0.7

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvistu un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 325, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

Age analysis of the convicted LCC activists and supporters reveals dominance by young adults, as is the case with many other illegal organizations (see table 6). The majority of detainees were twenty to thirty years old, born in the first twenty years of the twentieth-century. Most of the detainees, thirteen (nine percent), were born in 1913. The oldest detainee was Kārlis Gulbis, born in 1875; at the moment of capture in 1952, he was seventy-seven years old. He died in prison before his trial on 3 July 1952. The youngest captive was Valda Zande, born in 1930 and arrested in October 1947..¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 325.

Table 6. Age Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Supporters		
Age Group, Years	Number of Detainees	Percentage
17–21	6	4
22–40	93	63
41–60	36	24
61–77	13	9

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvisti un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 325, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

The majority of arrested LCC members (one-hundred nineteen or eighty percent) had secondary and higher education (see table 7). Many detainees had secondary special education, but the LSSR security services did not report this separately. In general, LCC members had a high level of education, as eighty percent had secondary or higher education.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 326.

Table 7. Education Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Supporters		
Education Level	Number of Detainees	Percentage, %
Elementary	29	20
Secondary or incomplete secondary	67	45
Higher or incomplete higher	52	35

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvisti un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 325, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

Analysis of detained LCC members occupation (see table 8) was complicated by diverse place of employment and the specific of Soviet regime categorization. The Soviet cadre’s questionnaires advantaged social background; therefore, people in relatively high positions indicated that they belonged to the working classes. Thus, the category of “workers” also includes white-collared workers, and many who were in high positions in various institutions and companies. Some examples of occupation are the librarian of the Radio Technical Factory Technical Library, the brigadier of furnace bricklaying of the Rīga Fire Brigade, the head of the photo lab of the Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House, an engineer of the Rīga City Technical Accounting Bureau, a professor of the LSSR Academy of Art, a forester of the Vecsalaca Forestry, a fisherman of the Skulte fishery, a teacher at the Rīga Secondary School No.29, a nurse of the Rīga 1st City Hospital, and a housewife.¹³¹

¹³¹ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 326.

Table 8. Occupation Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Supporters		
Occupation	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Workers	62	42
Peasants	4	3
Sailors and fishermen	11	7
Medical staff	6	4
Lawyers	2	1
Intelligence representatives	14	10
Housewives	6	4
Students and scholars	7	5
Unemployed and retired	11	7
Outlaws	23	16
Gulag camp prisoners	2	1

Source: Created by author.

This analysis of the Soviets' arrested LCC members and supporters' social composition also shows that they were mostly non-political residents of Latvia who did not hold any high political office during the independent Republic of Latvia.¹³²

The proportion of married and unmarried people in the organization was almost equal (see table 9). During the time period, the marriage rates in Latvian society were higher than LCC members', but many LCC members had just reached the age of marriage. Judging by the majority of detainees who were married, family life was not an obstacle to participation in the resistance movement for its married members.

¹³² Ērglis, "Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis," 334.

Table 9. Marital-Status Analysis of Arrested LCC Activists and Supporters		
Marital-Status	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Married	75	51
Unmarried	61	41
Divorced	6	4
Widows	6	4

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvistu un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 327, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

Analysis of arrested LCC members’ place of residence generally reveals that the majority of them lived in urban areas (see table 10). Outlaws’ place of residence is virtually impossible to determine, because they frequently changed it from the countryside to cities and back. For example, Eduards Andersons (1919-1947?), after his arrival from Sweden in October 1945, initially hid in Ventspils County, then in Ventspils and Rīga, and finally again in Ventspils County.¹³³

¹³³ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 327.

Table 10. Arrested LCC Activists' and Supporters' Place of Residence Analysis		
Place of Residence	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Urban areas	98	66
Rural areas	25	17
Gulag camps	2	1
Outlaws	23	16

Source: Created by author.

This place-of-residence regional analysis reveals that the majority of LCC members lived in Rīga and its vicinity, and the Courland region (see table 11). Both areas were the centers of LCC activities during the Nazi and Soviet occupations. Many arrested persons lived in Courland's coastal parishes, and the LCC ran refugee boat actions at the end of WWII. Latgale was the only region where the LSSR security services did not arrest LCC members.

Table 11. Arrested LCC Members' Place of Residence Regional Analysis		
Region	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Rīga and Rīga seashore, Jūrmala	70	47
Courland	64	43
Vidzeme	8	6
Zemgale	3	2
Lithuania	1	1
Gulag camps	2	1

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvisti un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 329, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

The LSSR's security services arrested LCC members in the period 1944 to 1953 (see table 12). The first person captured by the NKVD was Kārlis Krievs in Vyborg transfer camp on 15 December 1944. He voluntarily wanted return to Latvia from Sweden. The last arrested person was LCC supporter Jānis Lotiņš in Rīga on 19 March 1953. The most extensive arrests took place after Nazi Germany's capitulation in 1945. The NKVD and NKGB arrested most of LCC members in the period from 1945 to 1948.¹³⁴

Table 12. LCC Activists' and Supporters' Arrest Time Analysis		
Arrest Time	Number of Detainees	Percentage
1944	1	1
1945	50	34
1946	25	17
1947	35	24
1948	11	7
1949	5	3
1950	6	4
1951	12	8
1952	2	1
1953	2	1

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, "Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvistu un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze" ["Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis"], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 331, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

¹³⁴ Ērglis, "Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis," 331.

Sentence analysis reveals that the highest sentence was imposed on four (three percent) of the one-hundred thirty-six convicts (see table 13). The death penalty was upheld and executed for three of them. The investigators dropped twelve detainees' criminal cases in the course of the investigation. Kārlis Gulbis died in prison before trial, but eleven others security services released for various reasons. Some may have been recruited by Cheka and the KGB as Soviet agents. In general, the sentences were very severe. Almost one-third of the defendants received twenty-five years imprisonment.¹³⁵

Table 13. Analysis of the LCC Activists' and Supporters' Sentences		
Sentence	Number of Detainees	Percentage
Death penalty	4	3
25 years	43	31
20 years	6	4
15 years	5	4
10 years	58	43
8 years	7	5
7 years	4	3
6 years	1	1
5 years	5	4
5 years conditional sentence	2	1
Justified	1	1

Source: Dzintars Ērglis, “Padomju režīma arestētie Latvijas Centrālās padomes aktīvisti un atbalstītāji (1944–1953): struktūranalīze” [“Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis”], vol. 19, Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 333, accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1642_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_19_sejums.pdf.

¹³⁵ Ērglis, “Activists and supporters of the Latvian Central Council arrested by the Soviet regime (1944–1953): structural analysis,” 333.

In summary, analysis of Soviet security services arrests of LCC members reveals that the majority, or one-hundred forty-five (ninety-eight percent) out of one-hundred forty-eight LCC's members were ethnic Latvians. Two others belonged to two of Latvia's traditional ethnic minorities. Along with this Jewish and Polish detainee, one Lithuanian was detained. The one-hundred sixteen (seventy-eight percent) males predominated in the organization, but the thirty-two females made twenty-two percent of the organization. The majority - ninety-three members (sixty-three percent) of the resistance organization was between ages of twenty-two to forty, but thirty-six (twenty-four percent) belonged to the second-largest age segment, between forty-one and sixty years old.

Most LCC members were well-educated, with eighty percent having secondary or higher education. The data reveals that sixty-seven members (forty-five percent) had secondary education and fifty-two members (thirty-five percent) had higher education. From a social perspective, the largest part of the LCC's arrested members belonged to the middle class. The sixty-two workers, four peasants, eleven sailors and fishermen made up fifty-two percent of the resistance organization. One-fifth of the detainees were intellectual representatives. From family status perspective the LCC had almost equal proportion of married and unmarried members.

Obviously, the majority of the arrested persons were from LCC's centers of operations Rīga (forty-seven percent) and Northern Courland (forty-three percent). Seventy -one percent of arrests occurred between 1945 and 1947. The courts and military tribunals sentenced four convicts to death, but one-third got twenty-five years imprisonment.

These numbers reveal a broad spectrum of involvement in the LCC, at least among those detained and studied. They came from variety of social and economic backgrounds, of the trades and social classes expected around urban centers like Rīga. They also dispel the myth that the LCC was an organization of the former political elite.

Latvian National Resistance Movement Performance Assessment

Objective

The LCC's 17 March 1944 political memorandum established the Latvian national resistance movement's objective—restore the Republic of Latvia's actual sovereignty and form a government from the Latvian nation, in accordance with the 1922 Constitution and on a coalition basis.

This thesis considers the “objective” principle of joint operations as the most important lesson learned from this case-study, because it reflected the nation's will and was continuously pursued until state independence restoration in 1991. Despite the fact, that the LCC published this objective only once and in only 1,000 copies, it became widely known. The nation communicated the statement further in handwriting and verbally. For example, LNPA commander Pēteris Supe got the Memorandum through his connections in the Latvia University of Agriculture and used it as the basis for his effort to resist the Soviet regime in Eastern Latvia. Similarly, SS Jagdverband Ost project Wildcat agent Supe had no direct connections with national underground in Rīga but fought for the same goals.¹³⁶ The LCC's call to restore the Republic of Latvia's

¹³⁶ Turčinskis, “Armed Resistance to Soviet and Nazi Occupation (1940-1957),” 112.

sovereignty and explanation of state continuity doctrine spread through word of the mouth until collapse of the USSR. Finally, the Latvian nation reached the objective and restored the states independence on 22 August 1991 by non-violent means.

This leads to the conclusion that three learning objectives should supplement the Latvian soldiers' unconventional warfare training programs. The first training objective is the same as Republic of Latvia's in the NDS's defined end-state:

The purpose of the national defense system is to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the state. Independence and sovereignty of the state is possible with the involvement of the whole society, government capacity, and military power. National defense is the responsibility of the whole society, state institutions, and the national defense system.¹³⁷

The second training objective is the need to study the State Continuity and Succession Doctrine in order to teach the soldiers that the occupied state retains its legal status in international law. Finally, the third training objective is to use a case-study similar to the above, detailing how the LCC's defined objective of democratic and independent Latvia, along with professor Konstantīns Čakste's explanation of the State Continuity Doctrine contributed to the actual Republic of Latvia's sovereignty restoration from 1944 to 1991.

Unity of Command

The Latvian national resistance did not have a single commander with authority to direct all forces in pursuit of sovereignty restoration. Instead, Latvia's authoritarian president Kārlis Ulmanis assumed absolute power in Latvia by a law of 23 April 1940. On 15 May, he became the supreme commander of the entire country, with authority to

¹³⁷ Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, *National Defense Strategy*, 4.

manage all the nation's human and material resources. As a result, only President Ulmanis had authority to decide on the nation's fate. On 16 June 1940, Ulmanis forbade the Latvia Armed Forces from resisting Soviet occupation. He retained Presidential authority until 21 July 1941, collaborating with the Soviets and signing the laws that disbanded national political, military, economic and information institutions.¹³⁸ Finally, the NKVD either dismissed, arrested, executed, or deported key persons loyal to the Republic of Latvia. Thus, the resistance organizations that emerged operated without unity of command, forming either separately or across the different time periods.

The four largest political parties and University of Latvia law professor Konstatīns Čakste established the Latvian Central Council, which operated from 13 August 1943 until the Gestapo arrests on 29 April 1944.¹³⁹ The LCC did not ensure unity of command, as it had seven committees: foreign affairs, military, information, legal, economic, fundraising and communications. For example, the Military Committee started to form armed groups only in the summer of 1944, after key leadership had already been arrested. The LCC's Chairman of the Military Committee, General Kurelis, started to form this armed unit on Nazi Germany administration's orders. Nazi Germany troops, on the orders of the highest SS commander in Ostland, Friedrich Jeckeln, then disbanded

¹³⁸ President of the Republic of Latvia, "Kārlis Ulmanis Ministru presidents kā valsts prezidenta amata izpildītājs 1936-1940" ["Kārlis Ulmanis Prime Minister as Acting President of the Republic 1936-1940"], Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2019, accessed 30 March 2020, <https://www.president.lv/lv/valsts-prezidents/bijusie-valsts-prezidenti/karlis-ulmanis>.

¹³⁹ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 110.

and destroyed parts of Kurelis units in November and December 1944 due to the unit's plan to seize Ventspils.¹⁴⁰ The disrupted LCC then continued some resistance efforts until its destruction by the NKVD and NKGB in 1945.

Following this, SS Jagdverband Ost Wildcat Project agents Pēteris Supe and CPT Boriss Jankavs established two national partisan organizations which operated in two separate regions with a very loose connection and coordination. The agronomist Supe established the LNPA on 10 December 1944 and operated in conjunction with the Homeland Guard (guerrilla) Alliance in Eastern and Central Latvia. The Soviet security forces destroyed the LNPA and HG(g)A leadership severely disrupting the organizations' operations, in 1945 and 1946. Former Wildcat Project Chief of Staff Captain Jankavs established the LNPO in July 1945, which operated in Courland until 1947. In summary, national partisan resistance organizations had no unity of command or unity of effort. After the removal of key leaders by MVD forces between 1945 and 1947, national partisans were forced to resist only through several disconnected networks.

An opportunity for unity of command did not exist in the diplomatic realm. The Republic of Latvia's Cabinet of Ministers granted extraordinary powers to Latvian Ambassador in London Mr. Kārlis Zariņš to represent Latvia's interests abroad on 17 May 1940. After Latvia's occupation on 17 June 1940, Zariņš represented Latvia's interests abroad until his death on 29 April 1963. Ambassador Zariņš had the power to issue binding orders to all Latvian missions, to deal with all state funds, to dismiss envoys, to cancel and transfer the staff of all other missions, and to liquidate missions

¹⁴⁰ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 111.

except the US Embassy. Latvian ambassador to the US Alfrēds Bīlmans was a substitute for Zariņš. Despite the extraordinary authority, however, Ambassador Zariņš could not coordinate or direct the national armed resistance effort in Latvia. He contributed only to Latvian diplomatic and consular meetings in 1946, 1947, and 1953. During the meetings the ambassadors crafted strategy, including how to ensure the de jure preservation of Latvia's independence.¹⁴¹

Therefore, this thesis considers the “unity of command” principle of joint operations as a lesson identified. Latvian national resistance members established the LCC on 13 August 1943 as a unified command structure, but they failed to ensure the organizations survivability and long-term viability. In addition, the partisan units failed to unite in one armed resistance organization under a single commander during their most active operations from 1945 to 1947.

This contributes to the proposed training objectives for Latvian NAF soldiers' education programs, as stated. The first training objective is the knowledge of National Security Law and its determination of national security system principles, procedures and tasks, and the competence of the persons or institutions responsible for state sovereignty restoration in case of war or crisis. The second training objective is the development of the resistance networks in Latvia and abroad and their activation in case of war or crisis. The third training objective is the knowledge of the basic principles of conspiracy for the resistance network, including the aforementioned principles of joint operations.

¹⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “Kārlis Zariņš” [“Karlis Zarins”], accessed 29 March 2020, <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/ministrija/arlietu-dienestavesture/latvijas-republikas-arlietu-ministri-un-latvijas-diplomatiska-dienesta-vaditajikops-1918-gada/karlis-zarins-dv>.

Legitimacy and Restraint

To establish their legitimacy, the largest national resistance organizations like the LCC, LNPA, HG(p)A, and LNPO had statutes, which were based on the Republic of Latvia Constitution, the framework of the United Nations, and state continuity doctrine. Excepting the LNPO, all the largest organizations made decisions in councils and documented the decisions and orders. Latvian SS Legion soldiers made up the majority of the LNPO; they made decisions collectively, but did not write orders. The smaller partisan units and outlaws hiding from Soviet security services had no statutes and did not document their actions. They often focused their effort more on survival than on active measures against the Soviet authorities, which robbed them of national-level legitimacy in most cases.

Latvian national partisan organizations tried to engage Soviet institutions not only with combat actions, but also through the protest memorandums. For example, on the behalf of the Latvian population, LNPA protested against the mass arrests and sent a memorandum protest to the LSSR's Commissioner for People's Affairs Eglītis in autumn of 1945.¹⁴² This helped to retain their legitimacy, especially in public opinion.

The "legitimacy" principle of joint operations is part lesson identified and part lesson learned. While the national partisans succeeded in identifying the legal basis for operations and establish statutes, they failed to attack only military targets and minimize collateral damage. As statistics illuminate, the percentage of civilian casualties from national partisan operations was high (see table 14).

¹⁴² Vasiļevskis, "Latvia National Partisan Alliance Operations."

Table 14. Latvian National Partisan Inflicted Death, 1945-1946				
Position	1945		1946	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Police	43	5.6	21	5.1
NKVD and Red Army soldiers	114	14.8	51	12.5
Militia	200	25.9	92	22.5
Soviet activists	152	19.7	67	16.4
Civilians	262	34.0	177	43.4
Total	771	100.0	408	100.0

Source: Alexander Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.

A civilian casualty rate of over thirty percent means that legitimacy was at least partially less identified. Partisan actions were not always legitimate and restricted. The partisans often ruthlessly killed not only the traitors, but also their family members. However, innocent civilians also suffered from Soviet actions. Therefore, three training objectives should complement Latvian NAF soldiers' UW training. First, the Latvian NAF's military personnel should study the legal basis for Latvian NAF UW and whole-of-society resistance effort. Second, soldiers at all level must study the Law of Armed Conflicts and the Geneva Conventions from unconventional warfare perspective. Third, constant and continuous effort should be made to reinforce rules of engagement during the Latvian soldiers training.

The Latvian national resistance members failed to prevent the use of the unnecessary force. As class enemies of the Soviet society, the partisans were outcasts and doomed to death. Most of them lost innocent relatives and acquaintances during the first Soviet occupation period. Therefore, during attacks on the public administration institutions, partisans often did not restrict the use of force. As a result, casualties

included Soviet officials' and activists' family members, including many women and children. The Soviet regime immediately exploited the fact of the innocent civilian casualties in propaganda, thus portraying resistance movement members as terrorists and bandits.

The restraint principle of joint operations within Latvia national resistance movement effort is thus a lesson identified. Potential resistance members must understand that, to reach national objectives, they must apply appropriate use of force during operations without damaging the legitimacy of the organization. To prevent the unnecessary use of force, the legal basis for Latvian NAF UW and whole-of-society resistance effort, the Law of Armed Conflicts, the Geneva Conventions, and the rules of engagement, must complement the LV military personnel training. This will achieve both restraint and legitimacy

Offensive

Latvian national resistance organizations did not succeed in organizing their effort according to the offensive principle of joint operations. The USSR and Nazi Germany seized, retained, and exploited the initiative strategically due to their numerical and technological superiority. Latvian armed resistance units occasionally seized the tactical initiative, but they did not succeed in exploiting it.

The LCC focused more on anti-German propaganda and intelligence collection and its delivery to Western Allies. The LNPA and HG(p)A partially seized the initiative from the Soviet public administration in the Eastern Latvia in 1945 but did not to retain it in the struggle with the Interior forces or Red Army troops. The Communist Party of Latvia Inspector J. Dimans reported from Abrene County on 5 June 1945 that:

The scope of armed resistance disturbs the representatives of the Soviet government. The bandits destroyed 24 out of 57 village councils (several of them remain blocked and communication with them lost). The bandits destroyed and burned down the Bērzpils and Tilžas Parish centers. Additionally, throughout the county, bandits exterminate local activists. 11 activists were killed on the night of June 2-3. Bandits commit murders in more impudent forms every day. They control all the main roads leading the county, and bandit document checks on the roads is a common occurrence.¹⁴³

The LNPO in Courland also seized the tactical initiative in positions of advantage over the local Soviet institutions for a short time period. This was a result the Soviet strategic wood-clearing initiative. However, this dispersed and shrunk national partisan units.¹⁴⁴ After this setback and large national partisan unit defeat, groups choose a more cautious approach. National partisans also misinterpreted Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton on 5 March 1946, as mentioned. They choose a strategy of waiting for the Western nations' new war with the USSR and gave the initiative up to the NKVD and NKGB troops.¹⁴⁵

The joint principle of "offensive" is a lesson identified, because the national resistance organizations and members did not seize, retain, and exploit the initiative at any level for a prolonged period. Occasional seizures of tactical initiative did not lead to the Soviet regime's attrition and overthrow. This produces three training objectives for inclusion into soldiers UW training. The first training objective is understanding of UW

¹⁴³ Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight Against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*, 152.

¹⁴⁴ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 115.

¹⁴⁵ Jansons, "Combat Operations of the Soviet Security Agents (Chekists) against National Partisans (1944-1956)," 108.

fundamentals and process: to build understanding, knowledge, and skills in choosing appropriate strategy, operations, and tactics to place the enemy in the position of disadvantage; in short, to seize initiative. The second training objective is to learn to develop these UW strategies, operations, and tactics for UW in conditions when the country is isolated from outside help. The third training objective is to study resistance operating concepts developed by NATO and regional countries, as they will be likely to play a role in any future Latvian UW. These measures will help to cultivate awareness of the importance of the offensive and initiative.

Maneuver

Analysis of Latvian national partisan operations reveals that their units successfully employed the small-unit tactics, including moving and maneuvering on foot within parish and county boundaries. The majority of the partisan units moved via horses and bicycles. The most advanced units used trucks and motorcycles for movement and maneuver. In contrast, the NKVD and NKGB's regular troops had trucks and jeeps that were organic to their units. As the result, national partisans were able to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and outmaneuvered it while the security troops executed a pre-planned maneuver, advanced to assault, or created blocking positions in the area of operations. However, once the Soviet security troops began to launch well-prepared stealthy surprise attacks, the partisans failed to outmaneuver their opponents, suffering heavy casualties or being destroyed.

The "maneuver" principle of joint operations is a partial lesson identified and a partial lesson learned. The lesson learned is to use small units to move, outmaneuver, and fight the enemy. Latvian soldiers should develop and maintain this skill. The lessons

identified portion is more significant. To seize, retain, and exploit the tactical and strategic initiative in the current environment, resistance forces must mass, move, and maneuver in all of the state's territory, and abroad. Thus, the training objectives to include into the training programs are movement, maneuver, infiltration and exfiltration methods and techniques, link-up procedures, communications, and procurement of the means of movement and maneuver.

Mass

Latvian national resistance organizations failed to concentrate the effects of their combat power against the occupying powers in the assessed period in order to produce the decisive effect: to restore the Republic of Latvia's sovereignty. Reasons for this include insufficient military and enabling capabilities and a concentration of effects that was only loosely coordinated and unsynchronized across separate regions. The national resistance movement had a network of support, but lacked the military capability to overthrow or coerce the totalitarian Soviet regime. While initially significant, partisan military force gradually diminished due to the successful operations of Soviet security forces operations and their numerical and technological superiority. Resistance also failed to recruit and train new members, adopting the strategy instead of inflicting decisive effects on the occupiers' institutions.

The results of national partisans' operations indicate that the units could concentrate direct fires and some information operations effects on the Soviet administration institutions and security forces, including key leaders and units, at the parish and county level. An example illustrates the difficulties of such operations: despite a successful ambush in 1946, resistance members failed in their attempt to destroy the

LSSR's Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vilis Lācis (Bear), due to the lack of continuous surveillance. The partisans killed the crew of the car that their intelligence indicated contained the Chairman, but Lācis was actually in another vehicle of the convoy.¹⁴⁶ Thus the partisans both missed their target and revealed themselves to be only partially competent.

“Mass” is also a partial lesson identified and a lesson learned. Resistance members succeeded in massing effects and disrupting the functioning of some Soviet local institutions in 1945, but the effort did not translate to higher levels of war, nor to the decisive effect of overthrowing the Soviet regime. The following years' small-scale attacks and acts of terror on the Soviet security service's representatives and activists also had only a local significance and did not result in decisive effects. The best-trained and most-motivated partisan troops attempted to kill high-ranking Soviet officials, but they only partially succeeded. In addition, the results of national partisan units' attacks on high-ranking officials still are classified and thus cannot be assessed. From the perspective of domains, the partisans partially succeeded in massing effects on land. The only successful effect on the maritime domain was the evacuation intellectual representatives via boats, which did require a massing of transport capabilities, if not effects. The occupying power constantly dominated in the information domain, but resistance organizations used minimal effort to produce pamphlets and other calls for

¹⁴⁶ Rīgas Laiks, “Lāča mednieks Saruna ar Tālrītu Krastiņu” [“Conversation with Tālrīts Krastiņš: Bear Hunter”], 2003, accessed 30 March 2020, <https://www.rigslaiks.lv/zurnals/laca-mednieks-14026>.

freedom, which sustained nation's will for an independent country throughout the occupation.

The identified training objectives for inclusions in Latvian NAF soldiers' education programs are the warfighting function integration and the effects synchronization.

Economy of Force

Latvian national partisan units operated in small ten to twenty-man groups most of the time. Only two NKVD reports include data on partisan units larger than 150 members. As the national resistance organizations stated in statutes their ultimate goal was to fight militarily and politically alongside the vast majority of the Latvian people for the restoration of the independent democratic Republic of Latvia.

Because of the small nature of partisan groups and dominance of Soviet security troops in the area, the resistance movement failed to allocate the maximum combat power for the primary effort, the fight for the Republic of Latvia's independence. Instead, isolated units were forced to be self-sufficient. Instead of having support from higher headquarters, they needed to obtain means of survival and operations; ensure security; screen, recruit, and train new members; and conduct reconnaissance and planning for operations themselves. Thus, without the larger networked organization with specialized cells, the partisans spent the most of their time on secondary efforts. Consequently, economy of force is assessed as a lesson identified. To mitigate a similar situation in the future, the Latvian NAF soldiers' training programs should include details of the organization and elements of a resistance movement, including the resistance movement's primary components, their duties, and their interrelations.

Security

The resistance movement's members lack of knowledge and experience in conspiracy, as well as their lack of skills in prolonged survival in the forests, was the primary reason that led to their destruction by NKVD units.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, many resistance members soon became self-confident and had reckless attitudes towards security measures.¹⁴⁸ As the partisan experience demonstrates, to protect forces from security troops' actions, influence or surprise, the best methods are to rely on self-resupply without asking for help from surrounding civilians, to blend into the environment, and to freely move between rural and urban areas. Additionally, during prolonged inactivity periods like winter survival, only the units that relocated beyond the NKVD's reach survived. Partisan groups also had to resist infiltration by Soviet agents. For example, the LNPA conducted operations until 1953 because it developed security measures to reduce the influence of KGB agents. The LNPA headquarters introduced new procedures which restricted uncoordinated personnel flow between units, which sharply curtailed the possibility of infiltration.

The "security" principle of joint operations is a lesson identified because Soviet and Nazi German security services penetrated and ultimately destroyed all Latvian national resistance organizations. They neutralized the leadership of the national resistance movement and some other groups relatively easily, thus disrupting the organizations' operations. To mitigate the failure in future Latvian NAF UW operations,

¹⁴⁷ Ratnieks, "Formation and Activities of Groups of National Partisans in Northwestern Vidzeme from the Autumn of 1944 to the End of 1945," 76.

¹⁴⁸ Rīga Laiks, "Conversation with Tālrīts Krastiņš: Bear Hunter."

soldiers must be trained on the basics of conspiracy, operational security, and in the Russian Federation hybrid warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, procedures, which will likely be used against them.

Surprise

The national resistance movement's members had excellent knowledge of the operational environment. The underground and auxiliary forces collected and passed intelligence information to the partisans. As a result, the units conducted surprise attacks on Soviet public administration institutions, activists and security forces in time and place where they were the most vulnerable. These attacks balanced on the edge of being terrorism, keeping the enemy off-balance and pushing the opponent to constantly contribute significant forces for area security. Additionally, the partisans operated in small, decentralized units and applied the mission command concept. Therefore, during the battles with security forces they were able to adapt to dynamic situations by finding enemy vulnerabilities. This gave the partisans a number of victories at the tactical level via surprise.

However, the fact that partisans successfully surprised Soviet troops and institutions at the tactical level, in parishes and even counties, did not translate to surprise at the operation, strategic, or state levels. Soviet leaders and security forces had already faced similar resistance movements during the Russian Civil War and agriculture collectivization program, so they had well-developed counterinsurgency strategies and tactics, which they immediately applied in Latvia.

The principle of surprise at the tactical level, is a lesson learned. The Latvian TRADOC should continue to train soldiers to deceive the enemy and impose maximum

damage with surprise attacks or defensive operational methods. At the operational and strategic levels, surprise is a lesson identified. This is to translate tactical surprise to higher levels, keeping them off-balance across domains. To reach the desired surprise effect, the soldiers should be trained in camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques at the tactical level and their leaders in similar methods at higher levels.

Simplicity

The national resistance organizations succeeded in their objective of representing the nation's will and employing mission command in their effort to reach it. As a result, the partisan unit commanders had certain areas of operations, which they commanded with concise orders. The Latvian NAF TRADOC should continue to train leaders to develop clear, uncomplicated plans and to prepare concise orders. The lesson identified is that resistance members should not become self-confident and reckless, but rather should remember the basics conspiracy and employ sound and simple security measures.

Perseverance

Above all, the Latvian national resistance movement demonstrated perseverance reaching the national objective. The resistance movement's persistence paid off in 1991 through non-violent resistance means. Despite this, the "perseverance" principle of joint operations for the resistance in period 1940-1953 is a lesson identified. The Republic of Latvia and the nation failed to prepare for the scenario in which an enemy occupies the country but the nation still continues to resist. The resistance during was mainly based on armed actions, because the occupiers destroyed or dissolved other elements of national power. To prepare the NAF's soldiers for UW against the numerically- and

technologically-superior Russian Federation forces, education programs must cover the principles of and means for violent and non-violent resistance, the preparation for UW and its conduct, sustainment of a national resistance movement, and the Latvian foreign community's involvement in the resistance effort.

Conclusion

The above case-study on Latvian national resistance between 1940 and 1953 explored the movement's historical background, demographics, establishment, development, performance, strengths, and weaknesses. Assessment of the national resistance movement's performance via the twelve principles of joint operations fulfilled the primary research question and illuminated both lessons learned and lessons identified (see table 15), which must complement the Latvian NAF's military personnel education programs.

The case-study also directly links to the following case-study on the USSR's counterinsurgency, and Russia's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrines. While the first case-study draws lessons identified that did not take place to allow for victory, the second case-study will research the potential opponents' doctrines origins, elements, tools, and methods, which determined their success in Eastern Europe and Chechnya after WWII to the present.

Table 15. Training Objectives Identified from Latvian Resistance, 1940-1953				
No.	Training Objective	Officers	NCOs	Soldiers
1.	State Continuity and Succession Doctrine	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.	Case-Study of LCC's 17 March 1943 definition of national resistance objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
3.	National security system's principles, procedures, tasks	Yes	Yes	Yes
4.	The legal basis for Latvian NAF UW and whole-of-society resistance effort	Yes	Yes	Yes
5.	Law of Armed Conflicts and the Geneva Conventions	Yes	Yes	Yes
6.	Rules of engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes
7.	UW fundamentals, phases, conduct, strategies, tactics	Yes	Yes	Yes
8.	NATO UW concept, Resistance Operating Concept	Yes	Yes	Yes
9.	Violent and non-violent resistance principles and means	Yes	Yes	No
10.	Resistance movement elements, network development	Yes	Yes	No
11.	Large resistance organization's basic principles of conspiracy	Yes	Yes	No
12.	Basics of operational security	Yes	Yes	Yes
13.	Movement, maneuver, infiltration and exfiltration methods and techniques	Yes	Yes	Yes
14.	Link-up procedures	Yes	Yes	Yes
15.	Communications	Yes	Yes	Yes
16.	Resistance movement sustainment	Yes	Yes	No
17.	Preparation for UW and its conduct	Yes	Yes	No
18.	Warfighting function integration	Yes	Yes	No
19.	Synchronization of effects	Yes	Yes	No
20.	Russian hybrid warfare and counterinsurgency doctrines, tactics, techniques, procedures	Yes	Yes	Yes
21.	Camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques	Yes	Yes	Yes
22.	The Latvian foreign community's involvement in the resistance	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Created by author.

Thus, the training objectives identified from the Latvian national resistance case-study in connection with the training objectives identified from USSR and Russian UW doctrines, and US Army UW training circulars, will contribute to one unified individual and collective mission-essential task list for inclusion in Latvian NAF military personnel's UW education programs.

USSR and Russian Doctrines: Origins and Components

Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Origins and Components

In order to better understand the counterinsurgency and UW doctrine of Russia, Latvia's potential future resistance opponent, it is necessary to first understand the Soviet Union's counterinsurgency doctrine, as the predecessor state to the current Russian Federation. Bolshevik counterinsurgency doctrine started as early as 1919. As soon as Soviet administrators began to confiscate grain for starving workers, they provoked approximately 100,000 peasants' in Tambov, in Eastern Ukraine and Siberia to rise up, along with millions more who supported them.¹⁴⁹ Facing the threat that in Vladimir Lenin's assessment was far more dangerous than remaining White movement the Bolsheviks began to develop doctrine to both explain resistance by "class allies" and find solution to it.¹⁵⁰

Initially, the Communist party adopted some policies from the Tsarist government like reliance on secret police and collective responsibility, including methods stemming from the collective responsibility principle like deportations and hostage-taking. To detect and differentiate friends from foes, the Bolsheviks based their assessment on the people's affiliation with a certain class: kulaks, bedniaks, and seredniaks. Ethnicity, citizenship, and religious affiliation played no role in Bolshevik security decision making.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 15.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 16.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

To fight the revolt, the Bolsheviks decided to destroy the kulaks, the wealthy, land-owning peasantry, and win the support of the bedniaks' and seredniaks' by dividing the kulaks' land between them. To set the example and stabilize the situation, Lenin gave orders to subordinates in Penza:

The revolt by the five kulak volosts (districts) must be suppressed with no mercy . . . We need to set an example.

You need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100 notorious kulaks, the rich and the bloodsuckers . . .

Execute the hostages . . . This needs to be accomplished in such a way that people for hundreds of miles around will see, tremble, know, and scream out: let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking kulaks.¹⁵²

Subordinates even went further. To suppress the Don Cossacks' rebellion, Leon Trotsky directed Soviet soldiers "to raze Cossack villages to the ground." General Mikhail Tukhachevsky even attempted to gas the peasants hiding in Tambov Province forests.¹⁵³

The standard Bolshevik practice was to apply the principle of collective responsibility and to take insurgents' or "class enemies'" families as hostages, to facilitate guerilla surrender and to prevent attacks on Soviet administrators. One of the Red Army's commander's orders prescribed:

Upon arrival, [a Red unit] surrounds the district and takes between 60 and 100 of the most prominent [peasants] as hostages . . . The residents have two hours to surrender any bandits, weapons and bandit families . . . If the residents do not surrender the bandits and weapons within two hours, . . . the hostages are publicly executed, after which new hostages are taken and the second request to surrender

¹⁵² Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 17.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

the bandits and weapons is made . . . In case of defiance, new executions are carried out, etc.”¹⁵⁴

Soviet leaders soon found that the public execution of the hostages had a horrifying effect on the population and forced the surrender of thousands of guerillas and outlaws. In addition, they added another form of hostage-taking: deportations. From the rebellious villages, the Bolsheviks incarcerated in concentration camps families whose members were absent. If the guerilla or “class enemy” did not surrender within two weeks, the Soviet government deported their relatives to the forced labor camps and, confiscated their property and divided it among loyalists. The Bolsheviks granted those who surrendered immunity from the death penalty and released their family members.¹⁵⁵ Tukhachevsky considered deportations to be one of leading strategies which lead to the defeat of guerillas in the Tambov region.

The next strategy to decrease insurgent forces was to combine amnesties with repressions. To deplete the “White” armies and insurgency, the Bolsheviks amnestied tens of thousands of “socially proximate” enemy fighters who were willing to switch sides, along with continuing repressions of those who continued to fight.¹⁵⁶ The Siberian Revolutionary Committee’s decree offered:

1. All insurgents, who have fought against the Soviet power and are hiding, armed or unarmed, must report to the regional military conscription offices and declare their desire to atone for their guilt by departing to the front.

¹⁵⁴ Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 19.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 20.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 24.

2. The regional military conscription offices must immediately enlist them in the Red Army, providing them and their families with all allowances and benefits to which Soviet soldiers are entitled . . .

5. Those who fail to report within a month of the date of this announcement will be regarded as enemies of the people; their property will be confiscated and they will suffer severe punishment according to the revolutionary law.”¹⁵⁷

This dual “amnesty-repression” policy depleted the insurgent forces. For example, the Siberian insurgent forces led by D. Donskoi in Irkutsk Province decreased from six-hundred to one-hundred twenty after the declaration of the amnesty in November 1920. Also, the involved commanders assessed that amnesties were important political measures that split the insurgent forces.¹⁵⁸

To fight the insurgency, the Bolsheviks also established the Special Task Force (части особого назначения) in 1919. It consisted of Cheka security troops as its core and a militia of workers, poor farmers, and demobilized Soviet soldiers. The Special Task Force included 39,673 security troops and 323,372 militiamen by December 1921.¹⁵⁹ Through the experience of plunder, the Bolsheviks learned that the militia could serve their goals if regular security forces and party agencies supervise it. While the militia served as the early-warning system and tied down insurgent main forces, agents of Cheka’s regular forces conducted several successful covert operations during the civil war. One method was to infiltrate a Soviet agent into the insurgent units and kill the leadership. The second method was to camouflage the Soviet units as insurgents and

¹⁵⁷ Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 24.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 25.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

assassinate the leadership during the meetings.¹⁶⁰ In addition, a vast and continuously increasing informer network collected information for the security forces' officers from every social group.

To turn the events into the desired direction, whether to ignite social struggle or calm the situation, the Bolsheviks used agrarian reform called the New Economic Policy (NEP) or collectivization reform. Initially, with the Decree of Land, the communists won popular support. They took away the wealthier peasantry's land and gave it to those who did not have any. However, once the Bolsheviks understood that were turning the peasantry against them and derailing all revolutionary effort through grain confiscation, they launched temporary a NEP. Finally, when they stabilized the overall revolutionary effort, the Bolsheviks nationalized all land and started collectivization. All afore mentioned populist reforms focused on taking property from the wealthier and dividing it among poorer persons. The characteristic features of this processes were to escalate tensions between social classes, to repress the wealthier persons, and to intimidate the rest into the neutrality.¹⁶¹ The Bolsheviks learned fast quickly that, in insurgency, political actions pay far more significant dividends than military ones.

Two additional factors to consider in Soviet counterinsurgency strategy were the ethnic/cultural and religious considerations. The distinction of Soviet counterinsurgency is that it did not consider the ethnic and cultural aspects of the insurgency. Instead, the Bolsheviks applied their universal counterinsurgency model everywhere, reflecting their

¹⁶⁰ Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 24.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 33.

adherence to their universalist Marxist ideology. In this same vein, religion played a role in Soviet counterinsurgency. In contrast Tsarist Russia, where the police expected clerics to denounce all forms of discontent and hostile intentions, the Bolsheviks perceived the clergy as the class enemy. They did not attempt to use the clergy for pacification during the early years of Soviet rule.¹⁶²

In the summary, the Soviet Union's counterinsurgency doctrine was based on class struggle. The communists used agrarian reform, the New Economic Policy, and collectivization reform to change structure of the society and to fight the insurgency. To reach their end, the Bolsheviks applied several methods, including the principle of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, preventive arrests, deportations, amnesties, covert operations, and overt operations. The means of enforcing these counterinsurgency policies were the Cheka regular troops, militiamen, and a vast network of the informers.

The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the LSSR, 1940-1953

The Soviet Union applied already-developed and -tested class-struggle and counterinsurgency doctrine in Latvia during the period of its resistance movement. Similar to the larger Soviet Union after the 1917 October Revolution, the communists in Latvia set up class struggle, ignited the resistance, and then defeated it in three phases. During the first phase the Soviets repressed class enemies, especially, the wealthier and most patriotic, and educated part of the population, and nationalized all private property. The People's Parliament declared the land as state property on 22 July 1940. Communists

¹⁶² Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 23.

determined the maximum size of a farm at thirty hectares, and the excess land they distributed to small farmers, landless peasants, or to the state property fund.¹⁶³ Soon followed the nationalization of all banks, credit institutions, companies, small businesses, hospitals, and pharmacies, leading to the spring of 1941.¹⁶⁴ After their re-occupation of Latvia in 1944, the Soviet regime applied a policy similar to the NEP until 1947. The peasants paid taxes which increased steeply every year in order to force them into the collective farms. Thus, Soviet policy pushed the farmers to leave their farms and move to the cities. Those who failed to relocate and donate their property forcibly joined the collective farms after the 1949 deportations.

The Soviet regime's means of enforcing counterinsurgency policies were the NKVD and NKGB regular troops, destruction battalions, an informers' network, and Red Army units, if needed. To fight hostile elements, the Soviet security forces split Latvia's territory into three areas of operations, assigned each a joint NKVD-NKGB headquarters, and attached two NKVD regiments to each headquarters. The joint NKVD and NKGB headquarters successfully directed and oversaw the intelligence-collection operations from agents and the informers' network, the NKVD regular regiments' and militia's

¹⁶³ Gatis Krūmiņš, "Pirmie soļi Latvijas lauksaimniecības kolektivizācijas virzienā 1940. Gadā" ["First steps towards collectivization of Latvian agriculture in 1940"], Latvia University, 16 September 2009, 86, accessed 1 April 2020, https://www.lvi.lu.lv/lv/LVIZ_2010_files/2numurs/G_Krumins_Pirmie_soli_LVIZ_2010_2.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Edīta Brikmane, "Latvijas okupācija nenotika vienā dienā. 1940. gada 17. jūniju pieminot" ["The occupation of Latvia did not happen in one day. Commemorating June 17, 1940"], LV Portal, 17 June 2017, accessed 1 April 2020, <https://lvportals.lv/norises/288072-latvijas-okupacija-nenotika-viena-diena-1940-gada-17-juniju-pieminot-2017>.

operations, and covert operations.¹⁶⁵ The Soviet security forces involved Red Army units in the counterinsurgency fight only in decisive moments. For example, they did so after the Courland reoccupation in May 1945 and intense partisan activities in Latgale in the summer of 1945. Then, taking into the consideration the large scale of possible adversaries and vast territories, the Soviet command involved four red Army divisions and three NKVD battalions in wood-clearing operations. The rest of the time security forces relied on their own specialized forces..¹⁶⁶

The LSSR NKVD, and from 1947, MGB, militia, or proxy-forces analogue, were so called Destruction Battalions [Latvian: Iznīcinātāju bataljoni, (DB)], which fought the anti-Soviet elements from July 1944 until the end of 1954. The NKVD established the first DB in Ludza County in 1944, and the rest of them followed in 1945, mainly in the county centers. The DB's were a gendarmerie, having a military structure, and performing policing functions..¹⁶⁷

The average size of the DB was eight-hundred fighters each. Battalions had six to eight companies with approximately of around one-hundred to one-hundred fifty men

¹⁶⁵ Turčinskis, “Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957),” 118.

¹⁶⁶ Jansons, “LSSR security institutions as the backbone of the occupation regime backbone,” 34.

¹⁶⁷ Ainārs Bambals, “Latvijas PSR VDM iznīcinātāju bataljonu komandējošais un algotais sastāvs” [“Commanders and Recruited Personnel of the Extermination Battalions of the Latvian SSR Ministry of State Security (1944–1954): Structural Analysis”], Chancellery of the President of Latvia, 2007, 374, accessed 2 April 2020, https://www.president.lv/storage/kcfinder/files/item_1676_Vesturnieku_komisijas_raksti_21_sejums.pdf.

each, platoons of twenty-five to fifty men operated in each parish. The battalions consisted of both full-time and volunteer personnel. Demobilized officers and NCOs formed their full-time core, but the rest of the contingent was drawn from the local Soviet activists and residents. The total number of the DBs personnel fluctuated on average from 14,500 to 15,000 annually. In total, 44,000 people served in DBs between 1944 and 1955, including 2,825 officers and NCOs.¹⁶⁸

The overwhelming majority, or almost ninety-eight percent, of the full-time personnel joined the DBs voluntarily. The Latvian Communist Party only sent just over one percent of full-time DB personnel involuntarily. The volunteers' motivation included guaranteed subsistence allowance, free food and clothing. DB members earned two-hundred rubles in salary per month, which was significant amount during the post-war years.¹⁶⁹ In terms of social origin, nearly seventy percent of DB membership was from the peasantry, with around twenty-eight percent from working classes, and other three percent from domestic labor backgrounds. More than a half, just over fifty percent of combatants were without party affiliation, and forty-eight percent were members or candidates of the Communist party or the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol).¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Bambals, "Commanders and Recruited Personnel of the Extermination Battalions of the Latvian SSR Ministry of State Security (1944–1954): Structural Analysis],” 375.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 391.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 390.

The majority, around fifty-three percent, of the DB's commanding and full-time personnel were between twenty and twenty-nine years of age, and nearly sixty percent of DB personnel were single. Only around four percent were female. 1,244 members of the 2,825 strong DB's core were from Latvia, but the largest part, or 1,581 people were immigrants from other parts of the USSR.¹⁷¹

In terms of ethnicity, the majority of the 2,825 full-time personnel were Russians, amounting 1,720. The eight-hundred four Latvians, one-hundred twenty-one Ukrainians, and ninety-five Belarussians made up other main ethnic segments. Ethnicities under one percent of total manpower include thirty Poles, ten Lithuanians, ten Tatars, nine Jews, four Chuvashs, and two Georgians.¹⁷²

Finally, DBs participated in the liquidation of 702 anti-Soviet groups between July 1944 and 1956. During these counterinsurgency operations DB's lost three-hundred eighty-six fighters.¹⁷³

The methods applied to fight the insurgency and to transform Latvia into a Soviet Socialist Republic were similar to those used in the USSR during the inter-war period. They included preventive arrests, the principle of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, amnesties, deportations, and overt and covert operations. However, these required some adjustments.

¹⁷¹ Bambals, "Commanders and Recruited Personnel of the Extermination Battalions of the Latvian SSR Ministry of State Security (1944–1954): Structural Analysis],” 395.

¹⁷² Ibid., 384.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 377.

To enforce Soviet policies, the communists' regime in Latvia applied massive preventive arrests, deportations and executions in 1941 and 1949. The USSR People's Commissar of State Security Vsevolod Merkulov prepared and sent an order "On Cleaning Measures From the anti-Soviet, Criminal, and Socially-Dangerous Elements in the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs" to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) on 16 May 1941. The CPSU and the USSR Council of People's Commissars' signed order stated:

Due to the significant number of the former counter-revolutionary nationalist parties' members, policemen, landowners, manufacturers, state apparatus key leaders, and other persons presence in the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSRs, their subversive anti-Soviet work, and assistance to foreign intelligence services:

1. Allow the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSRs to arrest, with confiscation of property, and send to camps for a period 5-8 years, and, after serving their sentences in the camps, exile them to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years, the following categories of persons:

- a) active members of the counter-revolutionary parties and anti-Soviet nationalist White Guard organizations;
- b) former security guards, gendarmes, former policemen and criminal leadership, as well as ordinary police officers and jailers, if there are incriminating materials on them;
- c) former large landowners, manufacturers and state apparatus key leaders;
- d) former officers of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and White armies on which there are incriminating materials;
- e) a criminal element that continues to engage in criminal activity.

2. Allow the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSRs to arrest and send the following categories of persons for the term of 20 years, with the confiscation of property to exile in the remote areas of the Soviet Union:

- a) family members or dependents of the persons listed in paragraph 1 ("a," "b," "c," "d") with whom they lived at the time of arrest;

- b) family members of the counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations' participants who have moved to an illegal position and are hiding from government institutions;
- c) family members of the counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations' participants whose heads are sentenced to capital punishment;
- d) persons repatriated from Germany, as well as Germans who signed up for repatriation to Germany and refused to leave and for whom there are materials about their anti-Soviet activities and suspicious ties with foreign intelligence ¹⁷⁴

The actual arrests and deportations happened on 14 June 1941. According to People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov's 17 June 1941 report, the security forces in Latvia arrested 5,625 people and sent 9,546 into exile, totaling 15,171 people.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, the NKVD executed 1,005 people in Latvia and gulags between 17 June 1940 and July 1941.¹⁷⁶

Hostage-taking and the principle of collective responsibility were common practice for Soviet counterinsurgency in Latvia during the period. The NKVD detained and kept imprisoned the relatives of national partisans or outlaws until they "voluntarily" surrendered. In some cases, relatives sat in the prisons for a year and half without formal arrest orders. Similarly, to previous communist practices, executed partisans' bodies were used by the Latvian NKVD for public intimidation in the populated areas.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight Against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*, 37-38.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 43.

¹⁷⁶ Turčinskis, "Armed resistance to Soviet and Nazi occupation (1940-1957)," 107.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 119.

To divide and deplete the national partisan organizations, and to intimidate or convert less-motivated people, the LSSR NKVD published calls for amnesty in national and local newspapers. As mentioned, the People's Commissar for the Interior of the LSSR Augusts Eglītis published the call for legalization in the newspaper *Cīņa* (The Struggle) on 12 September 1945. The call promised not to crack down on legalized persons, if they surrendered, stopped resistance, and turned in their weapons. The local newspapers published the last call on 11 January 1956. As a result, the LSSR NKVD amnestied 3,835 people in 1945 and 1946 alone. However, despite the promises made most, of the amnestied people and their relatives were deported to Siberia by security forces on 25 March 1949.

As mentioned, the Soviet security forces adjusted their approach to clergy for their counterinsurgency operations in Latvia. They took tight-control of all religious institutions across denominations from the beginning of the occupation. The USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Leonid Beria reported "On Measures Taken to Clear the Latvian SSR from the "Enemy Elements,"" on 26 January 1945:

Comrade Merkulov took the following steps in Rīga to purge the LSSR of enemy elements: . . .

Developed and implemented agent-operational action plan for the Lutheran, Catholic and Orthodox clergy in Latvia.

Prepared the head of the Lutheran Church, Irbe's, arrest, due to evidence of his connection with German intelligence and hostility towards the Soviet government. Our agent, an authority respected among parishioners and clergy, will be promoted to the post of Lutheran Church head after his [Irbe's] arrest.

Arrested Roman Catholic priest Kazlas and the actual head of the church in Latvia prelate A.I. Pastors. Kazlas is testifying about anti-Soviet activities of a number of other priests.

Arrested seven people from the Orthodox Church.¹⁷⁸

In contrast to previous practices, Soviet security forces actively used the clergy's authority and religious information domain to shape and direct the minds and behavior of the Latvian population. For example, on 20 March 1945, Catholic Archbishop of Rīga Antonijs Springovičs called for deserters to legalize and confirmed that the Soviet authorities would not punish those who volunteered. The Lutheran congregation prayed for the Soviet administration and called on all believers to help the Soviet government by all means on 9 May 1946. Additionally, Archbishop Springovičs called for Latvians to participate in the 1946 elections to the Supreme Soviet.¹⁷⁹ The Soviet security services used the church to help legitimize the Soviet rule, encourage enlistment into the Red Army, inform the police about subversion, and facilitate the surrender of anti-Soviet elements. The clergy's calls for legalization, enlistment into the Red Army and resource donation to help the Soviet government effectively decreased the national insurgency and outlaws' human and material resource pool.¹⁸⁰

Soviet security forces also used overt and covert operations to fight the Latvian national partisans and outlaws. Unlike the Latvian resistance, the official response often made good use of the principles of joint operations, especially unity of effort and mass. The fight against the national resistance movement was one of the functions of the LSSR

¹⁷⁸ Kokurin and Vladimirtsev, *The NKVD-MVD of the USSR in the Fight Against Banditry and the Armed Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States (1939-1956) Collection of Documents*, 248.

¹⁷⁹ Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency*, 262.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 259.

NKGB, but it was also assisted by the LSSR NKVD' activities in 1944 and 1945. The NVKD's Interior troops and the Destruction battalions fought against national partisans in Latvia from July 1944. The NKVD OBB (отдел борьбы с бандитизмом) directed and coordinated the actions of both committees. To improve and deconflict actions, the reorganized LSSR Ministry of State Security established the Section 2N to fight the armed resistance in March 1947. Section 2N took over the Ministry of Interior OBB functions.¹⁸¹

However, the government forces did not always perform well. Initially, to fight the armed resistance in its early years, the LSSR's security services launched large wood-clearing, search and attack, and cordon and search operations, but they gave a negligible result. The LSSR Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs Alberts Sieks, Deputy People's Commissar for National Security Jānis Vēvers and Commander of the Internal Troops 5th Division Petr Leontiev in a joint report on 20 April 1945 concluded:

Military combat operations in the fight against partisans are ineffective, and several are even without results. The troops currently are concentrated in large garrisons but are able to control only a small area. Troops are positioned too far from scene; in response to guerrilla attacks, they arrive too late. Operational staff do not work enough with the agents and informers, and for the military assigns too-vague tasks.¹⁸²

The Interior troops and Destruction Battalions, as regular military units, were unable to locate partisan groups, gain access to individual partisans, and kill or arrest partisans without intelligence. The Latvian NKVD took a note of its mistakes, and at the

¹⁸¹ Jansons, et al., *KGB Scientific Research Commission Articles*, vol. 2, *Activities of the LSSR Security Services (1944-1956)*, 174.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 175.

end of 1945, concluded that, to be successful, it needed to combine informers' networks, agents' work, and combat operations. The People's Commissar for National Security Noviks and People's Commissar for the Interior Eglitis on 1 November 1945 issued order No. 00113/0016 "On Measures to Intensify the Fight Against the anti-Soviet Nationalist Underground and Its Armed Gangs," in which they ordered:

1. Immediately set up an agency that could gain access to members of the large guerrilla formations and infiltrate the anti-Soviet underground, use them to destroy anti-Soviet organizations and expose guerrilla groups to the NKVD/NKGB task forces' attacks.
2. strengthen operational work by filtering agents into the intelligence and clerical environment (due to the Catholic clergy participation in Latgale national partisan organizations).
3. recruit women as agents, given that national partisans and the anti-Soviet underground often use women as runners/liaisons [and] meeting place providers in apartments and other places, etc.
4. prepare route guides/agents for infiltration into the partisan groups; in each case carefully develop appropriate legends to prevent failure, etc.¹⁸³

In the period from 1944 to 1946, the security forces realized that national partisan groups could best be eliminated through covert operational methods and that successful combat actions were not possible without the use of the agents recruited by the security services. Therefore, from March 1947, the LSSR's MoSS took over the main role in combating armed resistance.

From 1945 to 1953, the most effective means of destroying the Latvian national partisans were special agents who served as combatants and special agents united in special groups. These special agents infiltrated into the national resistance movement and

¹⁸³ Jansons, et al., *KGB Scientific Research Commission Articles*, vol. 2, *Activities of the LSSR Security Services (1944-1956)*, 177.

used combat equipment to kill its' members. According to the documents and the national partisans' recollections, "combat equipment" means weapons and drugs. The Soviet security services physically destroyed the largest national resistance movement's organizations and key leadership only after special agents' or special groups attacks.¹⁸⁴ The special agents killed at least one-hundred sixty-seven and captured fifty-eight national partisans during the resistance. The most effective special agent, Arvīds Gailītis, nickname "Grosbergs," killed eighteen and captured twelve partisans by himself. Methods included physical assassinations and poisoning, including with sleeping pills.¹⁸⁵

The Latvian SSR Ministry of Interior (MoI)'s 30 September 1946 Directive "On the Special Agents and Special Agents Groups Established from Former Bandits and Outlaws Use in the Fight Against Banditry" ordered:

Use the special groups throughout Latvia to:

1. destroy partisan command and control centers by physically destroying or detaining their commanders;
2. destroy fragmented small partisan groups and their commanders;
3. expose partisan groups to security services officers' and troops' attacks;
4. collect intelligence information on the partisans' disposition, armaments, and runners/liaisons;
5. find weapons caches and the means of communication.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Jansons, et al., *KGB Scientific Research Commission Articles*, vol. 2, *Activities of the LSSR Security Services (1944-1956)*, 179.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 188.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 181.

The Soviet security services used the special agent groups for both official and criminal activities. When the NKVD failed to destroy the national partisan movement in Abrene County' Šķilbēnu Parish in the beginning of 1945, it launched covert operations to defame the partisans and separate them from local population. The ability of Šķilbēni Parish Catholic priest Ludvigs Štagars, national partisan resistance member and authority in area, to shape the population's attitude made this task even more complicated. As a result, Šķilbēni Parish experienced two "accidents," on 29 May and 15 June 1945, that never found explanation in NKVD documents. Two large families were massacred. Altogether twelve people perished, including seven children. The NKVD blamed the national partisans, but never tried to investigate the murders and find the perpetrators, because not a single criminal case against the captured partisans refers to these crimes. Despite that, the Soviet propaganda did everything to maintain the accusations of partisans.¹⁸⁷

In summary, the USSR's and LSSR's public administration institutions' and security forces' counterinsurgency effort in Latvia was based on the doctrine developed during the Russian Civil War and the inter-war period. Initially, the Communists used nationalization reform to ignite class struggle in 1940 and 1941. Then, they used the analogue of the New Economic Policy from 1944 to 1947 to transform Latvia into a Soviet Socialist Republic. Finally, the Soviets applied the Collectivization reform to destroy the support basis of the national resistance movement. The Soviet regime's means of enforcing counterinsurgency policies were the NKVD's (from 1947, MoI) and

¹⁸⁷ Turčinskis, "The Role of Agents-combatants in the Annihilation of the National Partisan Union of Latvia (1944–1953)," 115.

NKGB's (from 1947, MoSS) regular troops, Destruction Battalions, the informers' network, and if needed Red Army units. To defeat the Latvian national resistance movement, the Soviet security forces applied several methods, including the principle of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, preventive arrests, deportations, amnesties, and covert and overt operations. Unlike during the inter-war period in the USSR, in Latvia, the communists extensively used the clergy to shape and direct the population's attitude and behavior. The most effective tool in the Soviet fight against the anti-Soviet elements in Latvia were the special agents, who killed or captured the resistance's leadership and later destroyed or exposed to security troops' attacks the remnants of the partisan units.

The Russian Federation's Counterinsurgency and Hybrid Warfare Doctrine, 1991-2019

The Russian Federation, as the USSR's successor state, continues to apply the Soviet Union's counterinsurgency policies, tools, and methods, which it had adjusted to fight the opponents in Chechnya and the Crimea. Analysis of Russian hybrid warfare and counterinsurgency policies identifies the Russian way of war as based on both traditional and persistent military methods and new military methods. Thus, analysis will identify methods that the Latvian military needs to prepare to counter.

Reforms and simultaneous application of all elements of national power continue to characterize the Russia counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare. These were seen after military forces finished the isolation of territory and gained control over it in Chechnya between 1999 and 2009, and again in the Crimea from 2014 to 2019. Case-studies from these two conflicts illustrate details of Russia's current doctrine.

The Russian Federation successfully combined lethal and non-lethal capabilities during the Second Chechen War. Strategically, it based the campaign on the military, information, political, and economic instruments. Moscow used separatist attacks in neighboring Dagestan as its pretext for military response and the defeat of Islamic rebel forces in Chechnya. At the operational level, initially, Russia's overmatching military capabilities defeated the separatists at key locations and forced them to withdraw to remote locations. As a follow-on the Ministry of Interior employed its regular troops and proxy forces to separate the rebels from the population and resources and to deny them initiative.

Russia also dominated the information environment. It supported the military campaign by condemning extremist attacks on civilian population. It also exploited the Chechen administration of Aslan Maskhadov's inability to provide effective governance over the warlords after the First Chechen War. The warlords both employed kidnapping as a policy and took hostages. The mass media locally and internationally illuminated the Mashadov's government's inability to control the increasing influence of these criminal gangs, along with prevalence of Sharia law. The neighboring post-Soviet states, along with international society, began to shift their opinions as a result, moving away from supporting rebels in Chechnya and towards supporting more traditional Russian jurisprudence in the region.

The Russian government reinforced its initial military success and gained popular support and legitimacy by providing effective political and economic administration in Chechnya. Moscow complemented improved economy governance with significant

investments to boost economic development.¹⁸⁸ While it is impossible to untangle whether or not investment actually helped the Chechen economy, Russia did invest more than six billion dollars in reconstructing the infrastructure and economy between 2001 and 2014.

Similarly, the Russian Federation's actions in the Crimea from 2014 to 2019 are a good example how the application of the Gerasimov's doctrine wins small-scale conflict and defeats potential insurgency. The doctrine foresees the use of nonmilitary to military measures at a ratio four to one. In the opinion of Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, political, economic, cultural, and other nonmilitary factors play decisive roles in today's warfare. He also emphasizes that decisive application of technologies that escalate from non-lethal to lethal, the erosion of enemy society's will, and annihilation of enemy military capabilities ensures success in contemporary operating environment.¹⁸⁹

Gerasimov emphasizes the difference between traditional and new methods in military conflicts (see table 16). The current Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the human mind. As a result, information and psychological warfare dominates new-generation wars in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy's military personnel and civil population.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men*, 13.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁹⁰ Bērziņš, *Russia's New Generation Warfare*, 4.

Table 16. Changes in Russian Military Methods	
1. Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War). 2. Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units. 3. Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control. 4. Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation. 5. Combat operations on land, air and sea. 6. Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance.	1. Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all). 2. Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups. 3. Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure. 4. Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons—lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.). 5. Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military). 6. Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory. 7. Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space. 8. Use of asymmetric and indirect methods. 9. Management of troops in a unified informational sphere.

Source: Jānis Bērziņš, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, Policy Paper No. 2 (Rīga: National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014), 5.

In Crimea, cultural, economic, and political factors played a key role in setting the conditions for the success of military operations. Russia set up, and later exploited, legal and cultural factors on 24 August 1991. Initially, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement to split Soviet military bases on the peninsula. Later followed the idea that Ukrainians and Russians are peaceful brother nations and will always live in peace in harmony. Russia began stationing military personnel to live among the Ukrainian

population and engage in cross-nation marriages. These actions were purposeful. Russian presidential adviser Sergey Karaganov's 1992 thesis included in the foreign-policy concept "Strategy for Russia" that states that ethnic Russians left in the former Soviet Republics must serve as long-term influence levers.¹⁹¹ In 2014, Moscow exploited both the seventy percent of the Crimean population that was ethnically Russian and remaining Ukrainian population's ambivalence to seize the peninsula.

Political and economic influence levers shaped the environment for success long before the military operation. Initially, the pro-Russia Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich consolidated and promoted the Ukrainian Russian parties in the government.¹⁹² Then he neutralized the opposition party leader Yulia Tymoshenko via criminal charges for abuse of power and embezzlement. Russia exploited Ukraine's desire to keep government expenditures low and to sustain the loans from the International Monetary Fund. On 21 April 2010 Yanukovich signed the Ukrainian–Russian Naval Base for Natural Gas treaty. As he articulated later, the cheap gas deliveries allowed the government to cut expenditures to meet European Union standards. The treaty put the country firmly on Russia's economic hook via cheap gas and guaranteed the Black Sea fleet's, legal presence until 2042.

¹⁹¹ Tālav Jundzis, "Nepārtrauktības doktrīna sarunās par Krievijas karaspēka izvešanu no Latvijas (1992–1994)" ["The Doctrine of Continuity in Negotiations on the Withdrawal of Russian Troops from Latvia (1992–1994)"], in *Nepārtrauktības Doktrīna Latvijas vēstures kontekstā* [*The Doctrine of Continuity in the Context of Latvian History*], 410–432 (Rīga: Latvian Academy of Sciences Baltic Strategic Studies Center, 2017), 421, https://tnagramatas.tna.lv/uploads/example/Nepartrauktibas%20doktrina_LZA_Saturs.pdf.

¹⁹² US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men*, 24.

Similarly, to previous campaigns, economic measures continued to reinforce the military's success after the Crimea peninsula's annexation. The most significant measures were the nationalization of vital businesses and the effort to link the peninsula's economy with Russia mainland, for example, by the Kerch Strait Bridge. Russia nationalized, without any compensation, all energy-producing, transportation, banking and food production businesses, along with universities, in Crimea. 6,000 railway workers, potential source of unrest, were moved from Crimea to the Russian mainland.¹⁹³ Once the Russian Federation's government stabilized the situation in June 2016, it reversed the process and ordered local government officials to denationalize the less-essential businesses and properties or compensate their former owners, if they still resided in the Crimea. As a result, former business owners who departed for mainland Ukraine remain ineligible for compensation.¹⁹⁴

The Russian Federation's means for hybrid warfare in the Crimea and the counterinsurgency in Chechnya were numerous. They included both special operations and regular units, interior forces, proxies or local militias, and informers' network. These all united to achieve the ends Russia desired in both areas of operation.

¹⁹³ Andrey Sambros, "Изображая Чавеса: чем закончился год национализаций в Крыму" ["Portraying Chavez: what ended the year of nationalization in Crimea"], Carnegie Moscow Center, 27 February 2015, accessed 17 February 2020, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/59199>.

¹⁹⁴ Olga Nadytko, Anna Mogilevskaya, Svetlana Bocharova, and Yana Milyukovo, "Правительство поручило создать механизм пересмотра национализации в Крыму" ["Government instructed to create a mechanism for revising nationalization in Crimea"], *RBC*, 6 June 2016, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/06/2016/575572bd9a7947325b5b71e2>.

Similar to Latvia in 1940, the legitimate presence of Russian Armed Forces units played a crucial role in the occupation of the Crimea and seized the initiative from Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia signed the agreement allowing Russia to keep the Black Sea Fleet units in the Sevastopol port and Crimean Peninsula in 1992. In 2010, pro-Russian President Yushchenko extended the lease agreement for twenty-five years. The Russian military presence in the Crimea facilitated the success of military occupation in several ways. First, Russia exploited basing and transit agreements. Without raising an alarm, it legally moved Special Operations Forces (SOF) into the peninsula to build its combat power. Military transit agreements allowed the movement of the significant number of regular troops and material into Ukraine as well. Subsequent SOF and naval infantry raids on key infrastructure points, border crossing sites, and military bases surprised the Ukrainian political and military leadership and seized the initiative.¹⁹⁵

Second, the Russian Black Sea Fleet's location in the peninsula enabled rapid blockading of Ukrainian vessels in the ports.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the existing bases in the Crimea provided the foothold and facilitated the initial logistic arrangements.

Third, permission for Russian military personnel to live and move freely among the Crimea population enabled intelligence-gathering and build-up of the local militia forces. The pro-Russia militia facilitated the success of Russian SOF and naval infantry units in the early stages of occupation. The militia took over vital infrastructure sites that

¹⁹⁵ Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, *Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), accessed 4 April 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.htm, 9.

¹⁹⁶ US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men*, 51.

the Russian military had seized and facilitated their transfer to their next objectives. Such symbiosis was crucial in promoted success while Russia continued to build combat power on the peninsula.

Furthermore, the employment of unmarked military personnel and equipment, official denial of the Russian involvement, and large-scale military snap-exercises along Ukraine's borders that threatened conventional gave Ukrainian leaders the wrong impression about Russian intentions and thus seized the initiative for Moscow.

In addition to the above, the Russian military presence in the Crimea facilitated the seizure of political power. Russian intelligence service agents identified the pro-Russia Crimean parliament members and political parties. At the operational level, Russia seized political power replacing Sevastopol's mayor with Russian citizen Alexei Chaliy on 10 March 2014. The new mayor encouraged the population to disobey Kyiv's illegal orders.¹⁹⁷ Russia backed Crimean parliament member Vladimir Klychnikov who publicly called for constitutional amendments and a plebiscite on the status of Crimea.¹⁹⁸ The plebiscite formalized the Crimea's annexation at the strategic level on 18 March 2014. Crimea's inclusion in the Russian Federation illustrated achievement of strategic objectives via acquisition of Soviet land, and is a successful example of the current Russian way of war.

A similar example occurred as the Chechen Republic's security forces applied the principle of collective responsibility in combination with deportations in December 2014.

¹⁹⁷ US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men*, 56.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

As the response to Chechen insurgents' attack in Grozny on 4 December 2014, the Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov warned the population:

If a fighter in Chechnya kills a police officer or other person, the fighter's family will immediately be expelled from Chechnya without the right to return, and the house will be demolished along with the foundation. Everyone should know this before pointing a weapon at a police officer or other person. I will not let anyone shed blood here.¹⁹⁹

To enforce this policy, between 6 and 19 December 2014, people in masks demolished with bulldozers the houses of six people related to perpetrators of criminal acts.²⁰⁰

According to the Human Rights Center "Memorial" reports, hostage-takings and preventive arrests are still Russian methods of repressing opposition. The report states:

Any person, regardless of gender, age, state of health, or position in society is at risk of unlawful prosecution in Chechnya. However, there are groups for which this risk is increased . . . The latter include people, at least once caught by law enforcement on suspicion of having links with the armed opposition. Moreover, this risk applies to people who fought on the opposition side (including the first war), and those who voluntarily or by coercion, knowingly or without suspecting it, at least once rendered to militants a small service (brought up, bought food, allowed to sleep overnight), as well as relatives and friends of militants or those whom someone slandered under torture . . . The persecution of such people usually develops as follows:

1. abduction, detention in an unknown place without registration of detention, torture in order to obtain a confession of real or imaginary involvement in the armed underground (torture is often accompanied by extortion, and

¹⁹⁹ Elena Milashina, "Суд счел законным отказ СКР открыть дело после заявлений Кадырова" ["The court deemed legal the refusal of the TFR to open a case after Kadyrov's statements"], *RBC*, 13 April 2015, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/552bea339a794785a626cd01>.

²⁰⁰ Maxim Solopov, "В Чечне продолжили разрушать дома родственников боевиков" ["Militant Relatives houses continue to be demolished in Chechnya"], *RBC*, 21 December 2014, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/12/2014/5496bea19a7947e80204b517>.

sometimes relatives manage to free the kidnapped with money, which, however, does not protect him from repeated abductions);

2. if the kidnapped agrees to give the required testimony, he is legalized: they issue a detention (at a later date), are charged under Article 208 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “organization of or participation in an illegal armed formation” (less commonly, article 209 “banditry” or article 210 “organization of a criminal community or participation in it”), are placed in a pre-trial detention center, [and] with the help of a lawyer, are persuaded to agree to a special procedure for the trial and sentenced to 1-2 years in prison;

3. if the kidnapped withstands torture and does not give the necessary evidence, they continue to torment him and, in the end, kill him. If he was in an illegal prison for a long time, and his beard had grown, he was dressed in camouflage, equipped with weapons, and given out as a militant killed in battle. In the event that this is not possible, the corpse is secretly buried or destroyed. If circumstances do not allow to kill the kidnapped, he, mutilated by torture, is taken out and thrown away in a deserted place.²⁰¹

Additionally, Russia continued to employ amnesties as a method in the fight against the insurgency and terrorism in the North Caucasus region in the period between 1994 and 2007. The government declared at least five amnesties within the period. More than 3,500 fighters applied for amnesties, and 1,521 were fully amnestied.^{202, 203}

Covert operations continue to be Russian security forces’ method of destroying the insurgency’s leadership in Chechnya and abroad. Special operations force or special agents kill or poison opponents. For example, the Russia Armed Forces General Staff

²⁰¹ Svetlana Gannushkina, “Чеченцы в России” [“Chechens in Russia”], Human Rights Center, Moscow, 2014, 5, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.refworld.org.ru/pdfid/579a1a414.pdf>.

²⁰² “Все чеченские амнистии” [“All Chechen Amnesties”], *Коммерсантъ*, no. 130 (19 July 2006): 3, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/691173>.

²⁰³ Yuri Filippov, “Последняя амнистия в Чечне подводит черту под войной” [“The last amnesty in Chechnya draws a line under the war”], *RIA Novosti*, 7 June 2008, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://ria.ru/20060922/54176299>.

Main Intelligence Directorate's (GRU) officers liquidated main military and ideological leader of the Chechens' underground Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Doha on 13 February 2004 via landmine explosion under his car. A Russian agent poisoned Saudi Arabian Samer Saleh Al-Suwale, known as Khattab, in Chechnya in March 2001.²⁰⁴ Similarly to how Soviet security forces killed Ukrainian insurgency leaders prior and after WWII, Russian operatives continue to destroy elements that they see as a threat to the state's security. One of the most recent examples is the assassination of the former Chechen field commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin on 24 August 2019. According to a joint study by the Russian web publication Insider, the international investigative journalism project Bellingcat and the German journal Der Spiegel the suspect in the killing, Russian citizen Vadim Krasikov, often visited the training bases of the Russian Federal Security Service's Task Force.²⁰⁵

The Russian Federation exploited religious and cultural aspects in its unconventional-warfare efforts since the counterinsurgency in Latvia after WWII. Russian security forces, in contrast to their Soviet predecessors, very actively use religious organizations for their goals. After the Second Chechnya War, the

²⁰⁴ Andrey Kots, "Найти и уничтожить: как спецслужбы России ликвидировали главарей боевиков" ["Find and destroy: How Russian special services eliminated militant leaders"], *RIA Novosti*, 16 June 2017, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://ria.ru/20170616/1496686613.html>.

²⁰⁵ Bellingcat Investigation Team, "'V' for 'Vympel': FSB's Secretive Department 'V' behind Assassination of Georgian Asylum Seeker in Germany," *Bellingcat*, 17 February 2020, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/02/17/v-like-vympel-fsbs-secretive-department-v-behind-assassination-of-zelimkhan-khangoshvili/>.

administration and security forces paid more attention to the “human terrain.” The Russian authorities focused on “culture-centric warfare,” and looked at a branch of Islam, Kunta Haji’s, teachings to nullify the anti-Russian forces in the region. Kunta Haji, the founder of Zikrism propagated “non-resistance to evil” in the mid-nineteenth century. Russia leveraged this to convert an exhausted Chechen population near the end of war. Kunta Haji advocated for non-violent resistance to the Russian “infidels;” thus Chechens, instead of violent actions, continued to resist “in thought.”²⁰⁶

The Russian Federation increased exploitation of clerical and social pressures to bolster the state’s interests in Crimea and Ukraine. The facts demonstrate that there are the FSB influence agents among the clergy. The FSB spread the agents through the clergy to achieve this. One example is Yevgeniy Petrin, the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate employee of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR). He worked undercover in the DECR and gathered information for the FSB.²⁰⁷

The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church sat up a staff in the Synod Department of External Church Affairs for hybrid operations against Ukraine. According to the Kyiv journalist Lana Samohvalova’s statement, actually, this FSB operation existed to create disagreement between the Orthodox churches in Ukraine and

²⁰⁶ Krystel von Kumberg, “Russian Counterinsurgency Doctrine During the Second Chechen War 1999-2009,” *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, 6 March 2020, accessed 4 April 2020, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/03/06/russian-counterinsurgency-doctrine-during-the-second-chechen-war-1999-2009/>.

²⁰⁷ Kseniya Kirillova, “The Kremlin turns priests into obedient ‘comrades’,” *Euromaidan Press*, 15 March 2016, accessed 5 April 2020, <http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/03/15/90510/>.

to complain to international institutions that Ukraine is religiously intolerant.²⁰⁸ The FSB operation also intended to provoke conflicts between the Moscow Patriarchate and the parishes of the Kyiv Patriarchate through the pursuit of five goals.

The first goal was to discredit all by Moscow churches in Ukraine. The second sought religious problems in Ukraine to the attention of the Universal Patriarchate to block its recognition of Kyiv as a canonical patriarchate. The third goal worked for the deformation of the Ukraine's information space. The fourth was to create conditions within the faithful for civic strife, and the fifth was to intimidate pro-Kyiv churchmen of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine by threatening them in various ways.²⁰⁹

Russia also works in positivist ways to leverage religious and cultural institutions/ For example, it has sought to portray the Crimea as being more religiously free under its rule than prior Ukrainian control. A report on the webpage Украина.py states:

The rights and freedoms of the Crimean Tatars expanded significantly three years after the accession to Russia. In April 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the rehabilitation of all Crimean people affected by the repressions, in particular the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, and Germans. The Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar languages received equal official status in Crimea, which was not [so] under the Ukrainian government. The inhabitants of the peninsula have the opportunity to read the press, listen to radio programs, and watch television programs in all three languages. In addition, the number of mosques increased from three-hundred thirty to four-hundred eighty.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Paul A. Goble, "Moscow Patriarchate beefs up its staff for hybrid operations against Ukraine," *Euromaidan Press*, 18 January 2016, accessed 5 April 2020, <http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/01/18/moscow-patriarchate-sets-up-new-staff-to-destabilize-inter-church-relations-in-ukraine/>.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ukarine, "После присоединения к России из Крыма на Украину переехал 1% населения полуострова" ["After joining Russia, 1% of the population of the

In essence, the Russian Federation's security services developed Soviet counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrine after 1991. Russian security forces ruthlessly and continuously follow and destroy opponents as in the same way their Soviet colleagues. Their reforms, like nationalization and denationalization in Crimea and economic subsidies to the Chechen republic, mark the modernization efforts of the Kremlin to adapt those theories to modern conflict spaces. The Kremlin continues to maintain and develop its tools for unconventional warfare, including armed forces special operations and regular units, interior forces, proxies or local militia, and an informers' network. Russia continues to apply Soviet combat-tested counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare methods, but effectively and creatively adjusting them to the operational environment. Their means continue to include the principle of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, preventive arrests, deportations, amnesties, and covert and overt operations. Current FSB operatives in comparison with Soviet KGB predecessors, are more intensively and effectively using the cultural aspects of human terrain and religious organizations to reach the states objectives. Certainly, the Russian Federation's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine stems from its Soviet predecessors, but is more effective, flexible, and adaptive. Therefore, Latvian training objectives related to Soviet and Russian counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrines, tools, and methods should complement the Latvian soldiers' unconventional warfare training in order to effectively lead a whole-of-society resistance movement.

peninsula moved from Crimea to Ukraine”], *Ukraina*, 19 April 2017, accessed 5 April 2020, <https://ukraina.ru/news/20170419/1018561234.html>.

Conclusion

The analysis of the USSR's counterinsurgency and Russian's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrines' origins, elements, tools, and methods illuminates potential enemy's patterns, development, strengths, and weaknesses. The elements of enemy warfare identified, along with tools and methods provide training objectives that will complement Latvian NAF soldiers', NCOs' and officers' resistance-related education programs in order to prepare them to lead a whole-of-society resistance effort during peace time, crisis, and war-time.

The case-study on Soviet and Russian counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine reveals their common origin, persistent elements, and methods that ensured the success against opponents. The key historical Soviet enablers of success were the ability to seize the strategic initiative, erode opponents' political will, annihilate national military power, and the ruthlessly impose Soviet regimes.

The former Soviet Union's method for policy implementation were the principles of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, preventive arrests, deportations, amnesties, and covert and overt operations. In the course of time the Soviet security forces demonstrated an ability to adjust the use of the clergy to shape and direct the populations' attitude and behavior in the favor of the regime. Special agents proved themselves to be most effective tool in the fight against the anti-Soviet elements in Latvia.

Research also reveals that the USSR successor demonstrates highly successful counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare from 1999 to 2019. The preconditions for Russian success lie in its more sophisticated hybrid warfare doctrine and more flexible use of tools and methods. The main implications for the Republic of Latvia's defense policy lie

with Russia's shift to asymmetric and indirect methods. To neutralize the Russian hybrid warfare, the Latvian TRADOC's education programs must prepare the military personnel to lead a whole-of-society resistance effort and counteract enemy activities during the peace, crisis, and war time.

Finally, the case-study on Russian doctrine reveals that Latvian NAF must prepare to resist in conditions when the war will not be declared and the opponent will extensively use armed civilians and proxy forces to shape the battlefield. Moreover, Latvian military personnel must not only identify and counter Russian shaping efforts and information and psychological warfare, but they also must master avoiding simultaneous high-precision first strike capabilities in all domains.

US Army UW Training Circular and ROC Analysis

US Army UW training circular and Resistance Operating Concept analysis focuses on identifying the basic collective and individual tasks which are relevant to Latvian NAF soldiers' training. While US Army UW training circulars provide comprehensive reference material on the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of UW, the Resistance Operating Concept contributes in-depth analysis on how to develop national resistance capabilities and how Latvia can prepare to defend itself against a loss of national sovereignty.

As noted, this thesis uses TC 18-01.1, Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha Level, TC 18-01.2, UW Mission Planning Guide for the SF Operational Detachment–Bravo Level, TC 18-01.3, UW Mission Planning Guide for the SF Operational Detachment–Charlie Level, and the Swedish Defense University and SOCEUR developed Resistance Operating Concept.

Three evaluation criteria apply to determine the relevance of US UW basic tasks for Latvian soldiers' training. First, the goal is to train all military personnel (soldiers, NCOs, officers) as the train the trainers on the basic UW tasks in TRADOC's standard military educational programs. Second, every officer and NCO must be ready to train and lead civilian resistance members in war or against an asymmetric threat in peacetime. Third, the UW training program's intensity and complexity are proportional to the military personnel's three training levels and responsibilities: soldiers, NCOs, officers. Officers and NCOs train more intensive and comprehensive to lead the nation's resistance effort while soldiers prepare to execute the basic tasks.

After analysis of US Army UW training circular and ROC analysis, twenty-four unconventional warfare tasks should complement Latvian NAF soldier's training (see table 17).

Table 17. Latvian Soldiers' Unconventional Warfare Tasks				
Number	Name	Officers	NCOs	Soldiers
Task 1	Conduct Steady State Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 2	Conduct Operations Security	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 3	Synchronize Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 4	Conduct Pre-mission Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 5	Transition from a Steady State to Unconventional Warfare	Yes	Yes	No
Task 6	Conduct Mission Planning	Yes	Yes	No
Task 7	Integrate Military Information Support Operations	Yes	Yes	No
Task 8	Integrate Civil Affairs Operations	Yes	Yes	No
Task 9	Infiltrate into the Area of Operations	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 10	Move in a Denied Area	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 11	Conduct Evasion	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 12	Conduct Area Assessment	Yes	Yes	No
Task 13	Develop an Area Command Group and Staff	Yes	Yes	No
Task 14	Organize Forces	Yes	Yes	No
Task 15	Develop the Area Complex	Yes	Yes	No
Task 16	Establish Administrative Procedures (Unconventional Warfare)	Yes	Yes	No
Task 17	Conduct Area Command	Yes	Yes	No
Task 18	Establish Training Programs and Areas	Yes	Yes	No
Task 19	Support and Coordinate Shadow Government Functions	Yes	No	No
Task 20	Conduct Unconventional Warfare Core Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 21	Conduct Mutually Supporting Resistance and Conventional Forces Operations without Linkup	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 22	Conduct Resistance Linkup with Conventional or Multinational Forces	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 23	Conduct Resistance Operations in Conjunction with Conventional Forces or Multinational Forces Subsequent to Linkup	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task 24	Conduct Execution of Transition Plans	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Created by author.

The current Latvian NAF TRADOC schools' education programs consist of three main training blocks: defensive, offensive and stability operations. The time and effort spent for each block is approximately equal. After the inclusion of unconventional warfare in the training programs, it will become the fourth main training block. In order

to balance the added training programs, the schools must either lengthen the course of study by twenty-five percent or reduce the time dedicated to the three existing areas of study in the same proportion.

Finally, to implement the resistance movement-related mission essential tasks in training programs, the TRADOC schools should retain their approach to training. For example, similarly to defense, offense, or stability training blocks during the junior NCO and platoon commanders' courses, schools with the allocated time and resources should provide theoretical classes, followed by drills and practical exercises. For the Junior Staff Officers Course, theoretical lessons with small practical exercises, one map exercise with full Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and produced orders testing exercise in tactics simulator should complement the curriculum.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the resistance movement-related individual tasks and collective mission-essential tasks for inclusion in the soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs in Latvia. It also examined how to implement the resistance movement-related tasks in training programs and how to balance them with conventional training to prevent the resistance movement's defeat in case of the occupation.

Its primary question is what resistance movement-related individual and collective mission-essential tasks must complement the Latvian NAF soldier, NCO, and officer-level training? Additionally, it asks two secondary questions. The first of them seeks to determine how to implement the resistance movement-related mission-essential tasks in training programs? The second's purpose is to determine what is the optimum balance of resistance movement-related training and conventional defense training?

The Republic of Latvia faces the Russian Federation's strategic information operations and propaganda activities, aimed at undermining trust in government and increasing social tensions on a daily basis, and has since 21 August 1991. Latvia's three primary legislative security and defense regulations are the National Security Strategy, National Security Law, and the National Defense strategy; they aim to counter Russia's hybrid warfare efforts. On 26 September 2019, Latvia adopted whole-of-society approach to state defense. Part of the National Security Law empowers the NAF, in cooperation with central and local government agencies, legal entities, and individual persons, to

conduct military and civil defense measures, including armed resistance, civil disobedience, and non-cooperation with an aggressor's government institutions. The Latvian Ministry of Defense identifies NAF military personnel's capability of leading the whole-of-society resistance effort as a gap, because Land Forces and National Guard personnel are not trained to lead a comprehensive society resistance effort.

This thesis's findings identify the individual and collective mission-essential tasks that should complement the Latvian TRADOC's education programs to prepare personnel lead a whole-of-society resistance movement. Its historical background and population description indicate, that since Latvia inclusion into the Russian Empire in 1795, Russia sees Latvia as within its sphere of influence, and even its territory. This tendency remains the same today, and there are no indications it will change any time soon. Russian proxies, German landlords, and ethnic Russians, historically facilitated Latvian oppression under Russian rule. The Russian minority increased from nine percent to twenty-five percent between 1935 and 2018, thus increasing the number of potential pro-Russian agents.

Following the short independence period from 1918 until 1940, the USSR occupied the Republic of Latvia. The Latvian national resistance movement successively resisted the Soviet, Nazi German, and once again the Soviet occupying regimes between 1940 and 1953. The case-study of the Latvian national resistance movement during this period identified twenty-two training objectives for Latvian NAF soldiers' training in TRADOC schools (see table 14). Thus, it answered the primary research question and compiled a Latvian NAF soldiers' resistance-related task list (see table 18). The identified training objectives, if included in TRADOC education programs, will provide

knowledge of why and how the Latvian national resistance movement failed, and what should be done differently to overcome Russian hybrid warfare.

The second case-study on Soviet counterinsurgency doctrine and Russian Federation counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine identifies their origins, elements, and development during the last century and into the current. It identifies similarities in their policies, tools, and methods, and also finds that implementation becomes more sophisticated and flexible as time progresses. Russia's basic counterinsurgency policies are economic and politic reforms to strengthen and maintain the regime in occupied territory. The main means used to reach established objectives are the armed forces' special operations and regular units, interior forces, proxies or local militia, and an informers' network. The Russians reached their objectives via the principle of collective responsibility, hostage-taking, preventive arrests, deportations, amnesties, and covert and overt operations. Soviet and Russian security services showed the capability to adapt and exploit the cultural aspects of human terrain and religious organizations to reach the states objectives as time progressed.

Certainly, the Russian Federation's counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrine is effective, flexible, adaptive, and, most of the time, outmaneuvers the resistance, especially when it is violent. Moreover, Russia's current hybrid warfare doctrine foresees the erosion of the opponents' political will, and the degradation and eventual destruction of military capabilities, as demonstrated in case-studies in the Baltics in the 1940s and Crimea in the 1990s and beyond.

Therefore, training objectives centered on understanding Soviet and Russian counterinsurgency and hybrid warfare doctrines, tools, and methods are essential and

should complement the Latvian soldiers' UW training in order to effectively lead a whole-of-society resistance movement. The conclusions of the second case-study complement the answer to the primary research question and contribute to the compiled Latvian NAF soldiers' resistance-related task list (see table 18).

The third research effort, involving US Army UW training circular and the Resistance Operating Concept, identified twenty-four unconventional warfare tasks that should complement Latvian NAF soldiers' training (see table 17). It also complemented the answer to the primary research question and contributed to the compiled Latvian NAF soldiers' resistance-related task list (see table 18).

The analysis of the Resistance Operating Concept and the knowledge of the Latvian TRADOC education programs determined the answer to the secondary research questions. The answer to the question seeking the optimum balance of resistance movement-related training and conventional defense training is that the current Latvian NAF TRADOC schools' education programs consist of three main training blocks: defensive, offensive and stability operations, but this needs to be adjusted. The time and effort spent for each block is approximately equal. After the inclusion of unconventional warfare in the training programs, it will become the fourth main training block. In order to balance the added training programs, the schools must either lengthen the course of study by twenty-five percent or reduce the time dedicated to the three existing areas of study in the same proportion.

The answer to the secondary research question how to implement the resistance movement-related mission essential tasks in the training programs, is that the TRADOC schools should retain their approach to training. For example, similarly to defense,

offense, or stability training blocks during the junior NCO and platoon commanders' courses, schools with the allocated time and resources should provide theoretical classes, followed by drills and practical exercises. For the Junior Staff Officers Course, theoretical lessons with small practical exercises, one map exercise with full Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and produced orders testing exercise in tactics simulator should complement the curriculum.

Therefore, compiling all conclusion and recommendations produces a list of forty-three individual and collective training tasks that should complement the Latvian NAF soldiers' education programs (see table 18).

Table 18. Compiled LV NAF Soldiers' Resistance-Related Task List				
No.	Task	Officers	NCOs	Soldiers
1.	Know and apply State Continuity and Succession Doctrine	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.	Case-study LCCs on 17 March 1943 defined national resistance objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
3.	Know and apply national security system's principles, procedures, tasks	Yes	Yes	Yes
4.	Know the legal basis for Latvia NAF UW and whole of society resistance effort	Yes	Yes	Yes
5.	Know and apply Law on Armed Conflicts and the Geneva Conventions	Yes	Yes	Yes
6.	Know and apply Rules of engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes
7.	Know and apply The UW fundamentals, phases, conduct, strategies, tactics	Yes	Yes	Yes
8.	Know and apply NATO UW concept, Resistance Operating Concept	Yes	Yes	Yes
9.	Know and apply the violent and non-violent resistance principles and means	Yes	Yes	No
10.	Know the resistance movement elements, develop network	Yes	Yes	No
11.	Know and apply the large resistance organization's basic principles of conspiracy	Yes	Yes	No
12.	Conduct link up procedures with resistance cells	Yes	Yes	Yes
13.	Communications	Yes	Yes	Yes
14.	Conduct resistance movement sustainment	Yes	Yes	No
15.	Prepare for the UW and its conduct	Yes	Yes	No
16.	Integrate Warfighting functions	Yes	Yes	No
17.	Know the RUS Hybrid warfare and counterinsurgency doctrines, counter its tactics, techniques, procedures	Yes	Yes	Yes
18.	Know and apply camouflage, concealment and deception techniques	Yes	Yes	Yes
19.	Involve the Latvian foreign communities in the resistance	Yes	Yes	No
20.	Conduct Steady State Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
21.	Conduct Operations Security	Yes	Yes	Yes
22.	Synchronize Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
23.	Conduct Pre-mission Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
24.	Transition from a Steady State to Unconventional Warfare	Yes	Yes	No
25.	Conduct Mission Planning	Yes	Yes	No
26.	Integrate Military Information Support Operations	Yes	Yes	No
27.	Integrate Civil Affairs Operations	Yes	Yes	No
28.	Infiltrate into, exfiltrate from the Area of Operations	Yes	Yes	Yes
29.	Move and maneuver in a Denied Area	Yes	Yes	Yes
30.	Conduct Evasion	Yes	Yes	Yes
31.	Conduct Area Assessment	Yes	Yes	No
32.	Develop an Area Command Group and Staff	Yes	Yes	No
33.	Organize Forces	Yes	Yes	No
34.	Develop the Area Complex	Yes	Yes	No
35.	Establish Administrative Procedures (Unconventional Warfare)	Yes	Yes	No
36.	Conduct the Area Command	Yes	Yes	No
37.	Establish Training Programs and Areas	Yes	Yes	No
38.	Support and Coordinate the Shadow Government Functions	Yes	No	No
39.	Conduct Unconventional Warfare Core Activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
40.	Conduct Mutually Supporting Resistance and Conventional Forces Operations Without Linkup	Yes	Yes	Yes
41.	Conduct Resistance Linkup with Conventional or Multinational Forces	Yes	Yes	Yes
42.	Conduct Resistance Operations in Conjunction with Conventional Forces or Multinational Forces Subsequent to Linkup	Yes	Yes	Yes
43.	Conduct Execution of Transition Plans	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Created by author.

Recommendations

The first recommendation is to use the identified resistance movement-related individual tasks and mission-essential tasks for Latvian soldier, NCO, and officer-level education programs' according the National Security Law requirements. Additionally, the literature and other sources used in this thesis can also serve as the initial reference material for concept developers of Latvian soldiers' UW training.

Recommendations for further study are to establish a joint Latvian NAF resistance movement development working group with several tasks. The first task is to finalize the Latvian NAF Resistance Operating Concept and synchronize it with NATO and EUCOM Resistance Operating Concepts. The second task is to commission in-depth analysis by subject matter experts and confirm, supplement, or shorten the identified individual and collective unconventional warfare-related task list. The third task is to develop each confirmed resistance-related mission essential collective or individual task with sub-steps and evaluation criteria.

The limitations of time and subject-matter expertise leave unanswered the question of more-detailed individual and collective tasks for NCOs and officers. The NCO's tasks should be divided among section, platoon, company, and senior NCO levels. The officers' tasks should be divided in two levels for the Basic Commanding Officers Course and the Junior Staff Officers Course. Subsequent researchers may also investigate which elements require trainees to have theoretical knowledge of, and which require practical skills.

Finally, the 370,000 Latvians studying, working, and living abroad in 2019 represent almost twenty percent of the nation, including economic contributions back to

Latvia of approximately five-hundred eighty-three billion dollars annually. This is a significant human and financial resource whose motivations and potential support of any resistance movement are worth studying.

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