

MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO MEET THE MULTIDOMAIN CHALLENGES OF
MALI NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY SINCE THE 2012 SECURITY CRISIS

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General Studies

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ISSA TANGARA, MAJOR, MALIAN AIR FORCE
Bachelor's Degree, Faculty of Sciences and Technology, Bamako, Mali, 2006

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Name of Candidate: Major Issa Tangara

Thesis Title: Military Capabilities to Meet the Multidomain Challenges of Mali National Sovereignty since the 2012 Security Crisis

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
O. Shawn Cupp, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, EdD

_____, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Rebecca A. Milkowski-Gerdelman, MBA

Accepted this 12th day of June 2020 by:

_____, Acting Director, Office of Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO MEET THE MULTIDOMAIN CHALLENGES OF MALI NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY SINCE THE 2012 SECURITY CRISIS by Major Issa Tangara, 79 pages.

Mali was one of the greatest empires in West Africa during the first twelve centuries and, in 1960, it gained its independence from France. Since then, security of the Republic has suffered from numerous crises such as repetitive rebellion and coups d'états. Consequences from the 2010 turmoil in Libya has had a tremendous impact on not only Mali's security, but other Saharan states. Since its 2012 security crisis, the Republic has faced one of the darkest moments in its history. Sixty percent of the northern part of the country was occupied by Tuareg insurgents and other terrorist groups. Overall the March 2012 coup in the south created chaos. The author analyses Malian security challenges using the instruments of national power. The objective of this research was to examine Malian military response to these different crises, determine adequate military capabilities in the short-, mid-, and long-term, and made recommendations to achieve long-term peace. Analysis determined the acquisition of new, high-tech mobility and communications equipment, combined with the development of well-trained professional soldiers will fill the Malian short- and mid-term security requirements. Long-term peace and reconciliation may be achieved through the sincere application of the conditions contained in the Algiers agreement.

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Brief Introduction of Mali

Mali is one of the biggest landlocked countries located in West Africa. Mali covers a total area of 1,240,192 square kilometers (478,841 square miles) and has 7,908 kilometers (4,914 miles) long boundary (World 2019). Mali shares this long border with seven countries: Algeria and Mauritania in the North, Niger and Burkina Faso in the East, Ivory Coast in the South, and Guinea Conakry and Senegal in the West. The population of Mali in 2019 was 20,043,857, and the main ethnic groups are the Mande, including the Bambara, Malinke, and Sarakole, accounting for 50 percent of the total population. Other groups include the Peul (or Fulani), accounting for 17 percent; the Voltaic, making up 12

percent; the Songhai, constituting 6 percent; the Tuareg and Moors, 10 percent; and other groups, 5 percent (Nations Encyclopedia 2020).

The Sahara Desert covers most of the northern part of the country, and this is where the nomadic Tuaregs live, mostly in the Kidal region. The rest of the population is scattered throughout the South. Mali is divided into eight regions: Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, plus Bamako the capital district.

Mali took his independence from France in 1960. Despite facing many threats to its security, such as *coup d'état*, insurgencies, and democratic protests, the Republic of Mali had been considered as a model of democracy in West Africa since 1992. Alex Thurston and Freedom C. Onuoha claimed that “before 2012, many observers considered Mali and its President Amadou Toumani Touré a success story for the ‘third wave’ of democracy’ (Onuoha and Thurston 2013).” However, the sovereignty of Mali was never been questioned until the 2012 security crisis.

Since the 2012 security crisis, Mali has faced one of the darkest moments in its history. It is important to highlight in detail the origin of this recurrent crisis. According to Diakite, “Since its independence, Mali has dealt with cyclic Tuareg and Moor rebellions (Diakite 2019).” Located mostly in Kidal, the eighth administration region, the Tuareg ethnic group represents less than 10 percent of the Malian population (Nations Encyclopedia 2020). In general, the Tuareg ethnic group is composed of two tribes: the minority, Ifogas, and the majority, Imgad. This minority Ifogas tribe tried to dominate the majority Imgad tribe in the Kidal region. In addition, from the Tuareg perspective, the central government does not care enough about developing their region in terms of infrastructure, education, and health care to name a few. As a result, some Tuareg leaders

(Ifogas) organized a rebellion movement, “*Mouvement de Liberation de l’Azawad*” (MNLA) [The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]. The MNLA did not have a robust military branch to face the regular Malian Army; this equation changed with the consequences of the Libya security crisis in 2011, specifically the social unrest leading up to the removal of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Many researchers argued that the consequences of this Libya security crisis were just one of the causes that aggravated the situation in the Northern part of Mali. A good example is in the article “Brothers Came Back with Weapons: The Effects of Arms Proliferation from Libya,” Nicholas Marsh mentioned that, according to a Malian Tuareg spokesman, who summed up one of the origins of the 2012 rebellion, “The Libyan crisis shook up the order of things. . . . Many of our brothers have come back with weapons (Marsh 2017).” The MNLA took advantage of the Libya crisis to join other African Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) to create an Islamic state of Azawad.

The battle of Aguelhoc on January 18, 2012, was one of the deadliest battles during this conflict. For the first time, the regular Army was surprised by the overwhelming power of the enemy. Regular soldiers in Aguelhoc fought until they ran out of ammunition. They surrendered, but unfortunately, the Ancardine group led by Iyad Agaly killed them all. When other members of the army discovered the atrocity of that battle, it severely impacted the morale of the entire army. In three months, the MNLA military branch, in collaboration with their terrorist allies, defeated Malian Armed Forces (MAF) and occupied eleven garrisons one by one (Diakite 2019). The rest of the regular

Army retreated desperately to Mopti (the fifth region in the center of Mali) and abandoned the civil population to the mercy of those extremist groups. Ultimately, the MNLA and its allies occupied two-thirds of the country.

These insurgents immediately applied Islamic Sharia law in their areas of influence, such as cutting off the hand or arm of those ere accused of stealing, beating a woman for not covering her head, and many other barbarisms. The MNLA and allies made a mistake by deciding to conquer the rest of the country to the south, starting with the battle of Konna. This decisive battle was a turning point (red line) in the crisis because Konna is near Mopti, and the Mopti international airport is critical to the Government. From the Government perspective, it was inadmissible for the terrorist group to take over Konna; otherwise that would have opened a path for the terrorists to reach the capital city Bamako with almost no resistance. The battle of Konna was one of the bloodiest battles since the beginning of the 2012 crisis. In short, this battle represents the equivalent of the Texas Battle of the Alamo.

In the south, the situation was critical, and people struggled to understand this complicated situation. Many questions were raised without appropriate answers, such as why did the soldiers in Aguelhoc not get the necessary logistic support? ‘Why could the Air force not support the soldiers in Aguelhoc? What precisely was the real intention of the MNLA and its hidden partner in the South? Why had the government not prioritized the modernization of the Army since the first rebellion in 1963? And many other sensitive questions.

Soldiers led by Captain Amadou Aya Sanogo decided to take matters into their own hands by removing democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Toure from

power. This unexpected coup created severe chaos in the South. The country now faced an unprecedented political crisis, in addition to its security challenge. According to Mali's Constitution, Article 36 states if the President cannot fulfill his duty, the President of the National Assembly will become the temporary President of the Republic (Anna 2020). Also, that he should organize the next presidential election within forty-one days after the official declaration of the vacancy of the presidency.

During this transition period, the temporary President Dioncouda Traore officially requested French military intervention to save the catastrophic situation in Mali from catastrophe. France initiated Operation Serval to stop the progress of terrorist groups moving toward the South. According to an anonymous Malian proverb, "If you ask people to come and help you kill the lion that is attacking you [your enemy], you better catch the lion's head first instead of its tail." In other words, When the first French troops arrived at Mopti, supported by U.S. logistical support, some courageous Malian warriors were fighting those terrorist groups at the front lines located at Konna.

Not having Mopti international airport under its control would have made the French operation more challenging because they would have had to use Bamako International airport instead to launch Operation Serval, which would have required tremendous American logistical support. The Malian soldiers used the slogan, "*la Patrie ou la mort* [the nation or death]," to galvanize themselves. That is why the Malian warriors fought this battle furiously. During Operation Serval, French and Malian soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate village after village, region by region. However, the French did not allow Malian soldiers to accompany them to liberate the last region of Kidal, which was a haven for those terrorist groups during the crisis. The

particularity of the Kidal region is discussed in chapter 2. In 2013, the MNLA decided to break their alliance with those terrorist groups to negotiate a peace treaty in Algeria with the newly elected government.

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ACRONYMS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
ASCOPE	Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
CAS	Close Air Support
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUTM	European Union Training Mission in Mali
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSM	Global System for Mobile
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
LOPM	Military Orientation and Programming Act
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAF	Malian Armed Forces

MIDFIELD	Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, and Development
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
PEMESII	Political, Military, Economy, Social, Information, and Infrastructure
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SINGARS	Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOL	United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION



Figure 1. Mali in Africa

Source: Maps of World, “Mali,” 2019, accessed October 31, 2019, <https://www.mapsofworld.com/answers/geography/what-are-the-key-facts-of-mali/attachment/map-of-mali>.

History of Mali




Figure 2. Mali Empire and Djenne

Source: Smithsonian Institute, “Mali Empire and Djenne figures,” 2019, accessed February 24, 2020, <https://africa.si.edu/exhibits/resources/mali/index.htm>.

Mali was one of the greatest empires in West Africa. Sundiata Keïta was a great warrior and founded his empire in 1235. After winning many battles, he extended his territory from present-day Senegal to Niger. At the peak of its glory, the Malian Empire covered current Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Burkina-Faso, Mauritania, and Niger (Diakite, 2019). Mansa Aboucar II Keïta became the new emperor after Sundiata Keïta died; he was passionate about adventure. According to Abdoulaye Seine, the historian Ivan Van Sertima mentioned in his book, *They Came Before Columbus*, that Mansa Abubakar

traveled across the Atlantic Ocean and discovered America in 1311, 180 years before Christopher Columbus (Seine 2012). The Prince Kankou Moussa became one of his successors, well known throughout the world for being one of the richest men in the world. Celebrity Networth estimated Mansa Moussa's fortune at up to \$400 billion, four times more than Bill Gate. He liked to travel and made a pilgrimage to Mecca (Saudi Arabia). He brought with him one hundred camels, each loaded with three hundred pounds and five hundred servants, each one carrying four pounds of gold. He was very generous and distributed gold to people anywhere his caravan made a stop from Timbuktu passing through Egypt until reaching Mecca. By the middle of the fourteenth-century, the Empire of Mali reached its decline to the benefit of the Songhai Empire.

Once a political prisoner by the Malian Empire, Sunni Ali the Great established the Songhai Empire in 1464. After escaping, Sunni Ali conquered the city of Gao and made it the capital of the Songhai Empire. He extended his territory to the strategic trading cities of Timbuktu and Djenne (Ducksters 2020). In 1493, Askia Muhammad, a fervent Muslim, became the new emperor, extending his territory throughout the Sahara Desert, and made Islam the dominant religion in the Empire, ruling by sharia law. Under his leadership, the Songhai Empire reached its apogee, but internal discord and civil war weakened the Songhai Empire. As a result, the Moroccan Saadi Dynasty took over the Songhai Empire after the Battle of Tondibi in March 1591.

In 1712, the Bambara Kingdom of Segou was one of the most influential kingdoms in the region. Ultimately, Hadj Umar Tall, in collaboration with his mujahedeen, defeated and conquered the Bambara Kingdom of Segou in 1861. El Hadj Tall established the Toucouleur Empire in 1864 and declared Islam as the main religion.

He ruled his empire until a French missionary conquered the region in 1890. The French named the region the “French Sudan” in 1905. In 1959, French Sudan became the Sudanese Republic and formed the Federation of Mali with Senegal. The federation of Mali took its independence from France in March 1960. Six months later, Senegal withdrew from the Federation of Mali. Finally, on September 22, 1960, the Sudanese Republic became the independent Republic of Mali with Modibo Keita as its first President.

Research Question

In this study, the primary research question was what military capabilities are required to meet the multi-domain challenges that face Mali’s national sovereignty?

This question was answered through three secondary questions:

1. Which multi-domain challenges can be addressed using the military instrument of national power?
2. How can the government develop MAF capacities and capabilities to meet these challenges?
3. What happens if these challenges are not met within the next ten years?

Assumptions

To continue with this qualitative research, it is necessary to make some assumptions. This topic did not address the following topics; however, these assumptions will impact the research’s result.

1. The Malian Military will be trained and equipped to accomplish its mission.

2. The G5 Sahel will receive more financial support from the U.S. and partners and become more operational in the Sahel.
3. The French will be more proactive and reinforce security and stability in the Sahel region through Operation Barkhan.
4. The Government and the Tuareg movement might find difficulties in fully applying the Treaty of Alger, which may result in the requirement for another diplomatic effort.
5. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) will remain in Mali for at least ten more years.

Scope

Due to the porous border and the complex geopolitics and geostrategic of the Sahel region, neighboring countries, such as Niger and Burkina Faso, are facing the same crisis. The different government responsibility, as well as the Sahel region military capabilities, might be considered; however, this research focused on Malian military response to the multi-challenge. The author conducted qualitative research through diverse literature on the topic, the whole completed by his personal experience from the theater during the 2012 security crisis.

This research did not address the influence of politics in the military. The Liberian and Indonesia case study covered the period from 2010 to the present.

Definition of Terms

AQIM: Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization operating in North Africa's Sahara and Sahel (Masters 2013).

Military Capability: Military capability is defined by the Australian Defense Force as "the ability to achieve the desired effect in a specific operating environment." It is defined by three interdependent factors: combat readiness, sustainable capability, and force structure (Definitions 2020). In another world, the capacity of the military to accomplish its mission in time and space using the available means or build it in terms of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) (AcqNotes 2018).

Multi-Domain Challenge: many problems in many areas such as politics, security, development, education, socio-economic, culture, to name a few.

Sovereignty: "Sovereignty is the quality of having independent authority over a geographic area, such as a territory." In other words, "government free from external control (Definitions 2020)."

Serval: "A long-limbed, nocturnal African cat, *Felis serval*, about the size of a bobcat, having a tawny coat spotted with black: now rare in many former habitats (Dictionary.com s.v. "Serval," accessed February 24, 2020, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/serval?s=t>)."

MUJAO: Movement for Unicity of Jihad in West Africa is a splinter group of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which formally announced its

existence following its abduction of three humanitarian workers from a Saharan refugee camp in Tindouf on October 23, 2011 (TRAC 2011).

Azawad: The name “Azawad” or “Azawagh,” designated traditionally the basin of an ancient tributary of the Niger River, a region now spanning Algeria, Mali, and Niger in the central Sahara. In the early 1990s, several politico-military groups mainly made up of Tuaregs and Arabs began to use the name “Azawad” to designate those territories of northern Mali and Niger which they sought to declare independence from those two postcolonial states, which they blamed for having abandoned Tuareg and Arab populations to their fate (Nationalia 2017).

Kidal: The eighth administrative region in Mali; it is located 1,500 kilometers northeast from the capital city, Bamako (Chrisafis 2013).

Timbuctou: The sixth administrative region in Mali. “Timbuktu was an important trade center of the Mali Empire which flourished between the thirteenth- and fifteenth-centuries CE (Cartwright 2019).”

Gao: The seventh administrative region in Mali. The Capital of the Songhai Empire in 1464 (Ducksters 2020).

Ifogas: Tuareg clan traditionally considered noble (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018).

Imghad: Tuareg clan traditionally considered tributaries to the nobility (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018).

Barkhan: Takes its name from the French term for a crescent-shaped dune. Its objective is to deny the extremists a fixed base. Most of all, it makes it much more difficult for them to recruit, train, and launch attacks on both the Sahel nations and Europe (Knott 2018).

Gendarmerie: A member of a body of soldiers, especially in France, serving as an armed police force for the maintenance of public order. It is the equivalent of the U.S. Military Police (MP) (Merriam-Webster s.v. “gendarmerie,” accessed February 24, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gendarmerie>).

ECOWAS: “The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organization of fifteen West African countries established on May 28, 1975. Its main goal is the promotion of economic integration among its members. Indeed, ECOWAS is one of the five regional pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC). ECOWAS has three official languages: English, French, and Portuguese (International Democracy Watch 2020).

LOPM: “*Loi d’Orientation et de Programmation Militaire (LOPM)*” [Military Orientation and Programming Act]. According to the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “This text provides for a 1,200 billion FCFA investment for the army for the period 2015-2019 (International Security Sector Advisory Team 2019).”

GDP: Gross Domestic Product is the broadest quantitative measure of a nation’s total economic activity. More specifically, GDP represents the monetary value of all goods and services produced within a nation’s geographic borders over a specified period (Merriam-Webster s.v. “GDP,” accessed January 11, 2020. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/GDP>).

Alger: The capital of Algeria.

Significance of the Study

First, this topic is significant to the military profession, security professionals, and other scholars because it is related to the homeland security domain. The homeland

security domain is one of the hot topics and challenges that many countries face in the world. Many works of literature had been written about security challenges in the Sahel in general. Second, this study focused on Malian's security crisis using a military analytical framework such as operational variables or instruments of national power. The primary purpose of this research is to analyze the Malian military response to the different past crises and determine what adequate military capabilities, both the short- and long-term, are needed to face these challenges and produce possible solutions. Third, the output of this study could advance scholarship in the field of military arts and sciences. This thesis may help the future student who is interested in the security challenges in the Sahel region to use as a resource and further develop it. The result of this study could improve, not only Malian military practice and effectiveness, but also other African Forces' capabilities.

Summary

Since independence in 1960, Mali has faced four rebellions. However, the 2012 insurrection created one of the worst instances of chaos in the country. This crisis created multiple challenges for the security of the Republic. In short, despite being one of the greatest empires in West Africa, the existence of Mali as a country has never been in more danger since the 2012 event. The French Operation Serval, supported by U.S. logistics, stopped the chaos, and helped the Malian Army conquer most the region except Kidal, which created controversy. This study analyzed the Malian security crisis in-depth and provided possible feasible, suitable, and acceptable solutions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The main purpose of this research is to analyze Malian military response to the different past crisis and determine what adequate military capabilities in the short, mid, and long term is needed to face these challenges and produce possible solutions. This chapter is organized around different points: understanding of the operational environment (OE), instruments of national power such as diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME), operational variables, which is consisted of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), nature of the insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategy.

Understanding the Operational Environment

According to U.S. doctrine, specifically Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, “The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017).” During the conflict in 2012, the Malian operational environment geographically covered half of the country. Starting from Segou in the South, through Mopti in the Southwest up to Timbuktu, Gao in the North, and Kidal in the Northeast. The area of operation covered the five regions. This vast OE is equivalent to four times the size of the state of Kansas. One of the best analytical frameworks to better understand this OE is PMESII. Another framework, which help commander to greater understand the OE in terms of civil of considerations is known as Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events (ASCOPE). In fact, Civil considerations are the influence

of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2012). ASCOPE is the acronym, which describes the six characteristics of civil considerations. In the paper, Emerging Crisis News Monitor: Mali PMESII, the authors, Angelia Sanders, and Maya Mosely, summarized the situation in Mali in a PMESII matrix within ASCOPE (Mosely and Maya 2012).

It is interesting to emphasize one specific area in the OE, which is Kidal. Understanding Kidal is crucial to this study because Kidal remains the only part of Mali that makes sovereignty uncertain. On the one hand, Patricio Asfura-Heim argued that “Fearing revenge attacks on the Tuareg population, the French did not permit the deployment of Malian Army units, most of which are of Bambara ethnicity, into the northern-most area (Asfura-Heim 2013).” On the other hand, according to the former French Ambassador Nicolas Normand, he argued that the MNLA proposed the French soldiers help them fight AQIM in the region. In return, the French guaranteed their autonomy and did not allow the National Army to enter Kidal (Serges 2019). In short, the operational environment is vast and complex. The status of Kidal, which remains in the status quo, is a prime example. The international community works hard with the central government to find the best way and time to solve the problem through the application of the peace agreement named the Alger Accord.

Instruments of National Power (DIME)

The U.S. Department of Defense defines instruments of national power as all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are

expressed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (Military Factory 2020). In other word, DIME represents different tools for the government to leverage and coordinate in time and space to achieve its strategic goals. Each instrument of national power is important to some degree; because it allows the nation to use ways and means available to achieve the end state by mitigating the risk. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, *Strategy*, highlights that “the DIME has been used for many years to describe the instruments of national power (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018a).” The document also points out the necessity for U.S. strategists and policymakers to consider the new acronym MIDFIELD (Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, and Development) (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018a). MIDFIELD is one of the most significant analytical frameworks to analyze the conflict. It is interesting to highlight some of the literature about Malian Instruments of National Power.

First, Malian diplomacy, supported by Algerian expertise, has played a huge role in handling different insurgencies since independence in 1960. The author Keïta in his paper, “conflict and conflict resolution In the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali,” emphasized on the choice of Algeria to supervise the negotiation process not only because of the geographic position but also Algeria had a great experience with dealing insurgency (Keita 1998).

Second, information is also an excellent instrument to impact on the evolution of the conflict. Sometimes, the opposing parties manipulate the information to influence public and international opinion during the conflict. Angelia Sanders and Maya Mosely reported that there are over three hundred radio stations operating and over forty privately-owned newspapers on the radio in Mali. Therefore, radio is the most common

form of media; approximately 61 percent of the population has access to cell phones; and only 2.9 percent of the population has access to the internet (Mosely and Maya 2012). Nowadays, the proliferation of social media needs to be considered. Usually, social media is one of the best tools for insurgent groups to make propaganda. Therefore, sharing information between the neighbor states in the Sahel region is capital to overcome the transnational threats. Captain Felix Asante argued that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are necessary for West Africa Air Force. He said, “these capabilities can be used for rapid collection, assessment and exploitation of intelligence information and sharing of such information at national and regional levels (Asante 2013).” Another author, Dao, said, “Private domestic media companies sharing information with media abroad would help the international community to take action sooner rather than later (Dao 2019).” The information has an impact on the outcome of any battle.

Third, military means are usually used as a last resort when diplomacy fails. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is a prime example. After Libya collapsed, Many Tuareg combatants joined Mali with their equipment. Former President Amadou Toumani Touré sent his emissary (diplomat) to negotiate with them; one group accepted. However, a second group refused and started hostilities. The president used military forces as a last resort to protect and defend the country. Unfortunately, the force ratio in terms of equipment and personnel was not in Mali’s favor. Diarra agreed that the MAF was ill-equipped to face the insurgent (Diarra 2012). He said, “Since 1992, with the establishment of a democratic civilian government, no major military equipment has been purchased. The lack of investment in the military reduced its capabilities and has

seriously affected the morale of the troop (Diarra 2012). Also, the lack of military capabilities is a massive gap in this literature review, which was analyzed in chapter 4.

Lastly, the economy was another significant leverage to consider. According to the World Bank, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was \$899.70 in 2018 (World Bank 2019). The GDP growth rate was 7.9 in the same year (United Nations 2019). The ISSAT reported that mineral wealth is gold (72 percent of exports), iron ore, bauxite, and manganese. Most Productive Sectors are agriculture and mining, which make up 80 percent of Malian revenue and exports (International Security Sector Advisory Team 2019). Economically, Mali has many potentialities; however, the repartition of those resources, especially in the northern region, is still perceived differently by both parties, the government and some Tuareg group who believe that the northern region should deserve more development. According to Diarra, the lack of development of the northern region in terms of infrastructure, health center, education, to name a few, were some of the contributory factors to the different insurgencies (Diarra 2012). Diakite had pointed out the failure of the successive government to tackle effectively and efficiently the different rebellions since 1963 (Diakite 2019).

Operational Variable (PMESII)

Operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) (Army 2011, 2). These operation variables are significant because they allow commanders to better comprehend, visualize, and describe the operational environment. Ultimately, PMESII is one of the best tools used by the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) analyst to analyze the operational environment in terms of: (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, III-39).

1. Political: Takes into consideration local and regional governments, political parties and interest groups, international relations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, III-39).
2. Military: Some of the considerations are the rule of engagement (ROE), military role in the development of national strategy, factors regarding the development and maintenance of a military, and characterization of military and civilian relationships (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, D-10).
3. Economic: Some considerations may include the type of economic model (capitalism, social, other), agriculture, and other factors regarding the informal economy such as terrorist financing, narcotics trade, trafficking in humans, unregulated labor, and smuggling (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, D12).
4. Social: Takes some considerations such as cultural differences among population, presence, and impact of separatist and terrorist groups, and cohesion of socio-religious groups (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, D13).
5. Information: Covert, essentially global information, national information, and defense information networks (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, D15).
6. Infrastructure: Includes utilities, transportation, industry, and public facilities.

Insurgency Formation

There are many definitions of insurgency in literature. An insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstration) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (O'Neill 2005, 15). According to Joint

Publication 1-02, “insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016).” Also, H. Thomas Hayden mentioned that “Insurgency is best defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflict.”

One of the most suitable definitions is found in the book named, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012*, published by the U.S. Government. According to this source, “Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and criminal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources (U.S. Government 2012).” Colonel Tejindar Singh Shergill reported Lawrence’s viewpoints on the insurgency, “In a few lines, Lawrence sketched a strategy of insurgency, where a small band of insurgents could exhaust the resources of their opponents while drawing strength from the terrain, the people (the Arab Nation) and psychological superiority (Shergill 1986, 12).”

Moreover, to better understand the nature of insurgency, O’Neill suggested nine types of insurgents, such as anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, apocalyptic-utopians, secessionist, reformists, preservationists, and commercialists (O’Neill 2005).

1. Anarchist: Anarchist groups believe that the political system ought to be destroyed but not replaced because all authority is unnecessary and illegitimate (O’Neill 2005, 20).

2. Egalitarian: These insurgents fight to enforce a new system based on the ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled system. The New People's Army in the Philippines and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are some prime examples (O'Neill 2005, 20).

3. Traditionalist: They request for primordial and sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion. They also seek to restore a political system of the states where they were located. A good example is Al Qaida and its affiliates who seek to establish a worldwide Islamic political system or caliphate (O'Neill 2005, 21).

4. Apocalyptic-Utopian: This group, motivated by some religious belief, envisages to establish a world order by committing some terrorist attack to precipitate the apocalypse. The Mahdaviyat "Last Imam" group in Iran is an example (O'Neill 2005, 23).

5. Pluralist: They aim to establish a system that emphasizes the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise, in which political structures are differentiated and autonomous (O'Neill 2005, 24).

6. Secessionist (or Separatist): Those groups of insurgents who renounce and seek to withdraw from the political community (state) of which they are formally a part. During the American Civil War (1861-1865), the formation of the Confederate States of America by the Southern States secessionist is an excellent example (O'Neill 2005, 24). Another illustration is the separatist Malian Tuareg of the MNLA in 2012, who seek independence or autonomy of the state of Azawad from Mali.

7. Reformist: Those groups target policies that determine the distribution of the economic, psychological, and political benefits that society must offer. The National

Liberation Army in Macedonia, who fight to maintain unity, and the multiethnic state of Macedonia, is a good illustration (O'Neill 2005, 26).

8. Preservationists: These groups like maintaining the status quo because of their relative political, economic, and social privileges they derive from. A good example is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the United States, who terrorized blacks to maintain white supremacy (O'Neill 2005, 27).

9. Commercial: This this type of insurgent objective is the acquisition of material resources through seizure and control of political power (O'Neill 2005, 28).

In addition, guerrilla warfare is another concept of insurgency to consider. De Leroy Thompson, reported that according to Mao, guerrilla warfare is divided into three phases:

1. Phase 1: guerillas would use hit-and-run tactics to capture weapons (Thompson 2002, 22).

2. Phase 2: Guerillas would attack police and military outposts to show the government's inability to function. They also recruit widely and train a conventional force for the next phase (Thompson 2002, 23).

3. Phase 3: Guerillas would use powerful conventional forces to defeat the enemy in the field (Thompson 2002, 23).

Eventually, each insurgency is different to some degree. Hannah Armstrong asserted that the nature of the Malian insurgency was an ethnic insurgency (Armstrong 2013). Some of the Tuareg in the North accused the central government of not doing enough in terms of development, infrastructure, healthcare, decentralization, to name a few. As a result, they formed the MNLA to defend themselves. Hannah reported one

MNLA member, Nina Wallet, said, “We can be economically independent without cutting the territory in two. We want autonomy, with our own government, our own ministers, our own budget (Armstrong 2013).” The MNLA allied with other terrorist groups to achieve their objective.

The author, Dona J. Stewart, stated, “Ansar Dine signed an agreement brokered by Algeria with the MNLA in late May 2012 to cooperate and work together to create an independent Islamic state on the territory they occupy, stating both sides had made concessions (Stewart 2013).” Other authors highlighted the consequence of the Libya crisis in 2011, which significantly impacted the situation in Mali. The author Nicholas Marsh, according to a Malian Tuareg spokesperson, summed up one of the origins of the 2012 rebellion, “The Libyan crisis shook up the order of things. . . . Many of our brothers have come back with weapons (Marsh 2017).” That said, the collaboration between insurgents and terrorists created a more complex, dangerous, and ambiguous security crisis in Mali.

This vast and complex environment is a “safe haven” for terrorist groups to conduct their business. The author Sidibé asserts that “The Sahel has become the sanctuary of choice for criminal networks and terrorist groups in search of bases from which they can secure financing and plan attacks (Sidibé 2012).” Sidibe’s assertion is further espoused by Gregory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, who explained that “Criminal groups and terrorist organizations thrived on illegal trades such as arms, drugs, cigarettes, illegal immigration flows, and many others counterfeit products (Chauzal and van Damme 2015).” A transnational network of drug trafficking is well established in the north of Mali, added Sumedh Rao (Rao 2013). Eventually, there are many causes of the

formation of Malian ethnic insurgency, including the lack of development in the north, the Libya revolution, and illegal trafficking to name a few. However, it is interesting to look at the literature about counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, also as known as COIN, is “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018b).” A strategy is the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war (Merriam-Webster, “Gendarmerie,” accessed February 24, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gendarmerie>). In other words, a strategy is an art of combining ways and means to reach the end state by mitigating the risk. One of the recognized leaders in counterinsurgency study, Galula highlighted four basic principles of counterinsurgent warfare in terms of laws (Galula 2006).

1. The first law: The objective is the population (Galula 2006).
2. The second law: The support from the population is not spontaneous, and in any case, must be organized. Having population support is crucial to the success of any COIN (Galula 2006).
3. The third law: This minority will emerge, and will be followed by the majority, only if the counterinsurgent is seen as the ultimate victor (Galula 2006).
4. The fourth law: is based on the destruction of the main guerrilla forces in order to control the population, and therefore to win its support (Galula 2006).

Galula claimed that those principles worked in the Algeria case and might be applied elsewhere (Galula 2006). Another famous leader in counterinsurgency study, Roger Trinquier, shares the same opinion with Gallula about the population support. Trinquier said, “We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population (Trinquier 1964, 8).”

To better understand the counterinsurgency in today’s geopolitics and geostrategic environment, David Kilcullen, one of the most persuasive experts in COIN, proposed two fundamentals. Understanding in-depth of the root cause of the conflict and the different actors is the first fundamental. The second is to act with respect for the local population by protecting, defending, and building trust with them, which is one of the keys to operational success (Kilcullen 2010).

Furthermore, to be successful in counterinsurgency, General David H. Petraeus, added fourteen more principles:

1. Do not try to do too much with your own hands (Petraeus 2006).
2. Act quickly because every army of liberation has a half-life (Petraeus 2006).
3. Money is ammunition (Petraeus 2006).
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success (Petraeus 2006).
5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation (Petraeus 2006).
6. Intelligence is the key to success (Petraeus 2006).
7. Everyone must do nation-building (Petraeus 2006).
8. Help build institutions, not just units (Petraeus 2006).
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier (Petraeus 2006).

10. Success in counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations (Petraeus 2006).

11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders (Petraeus 2006).

12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants (Petraeus 2006).

13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders (Petraeus 2006).

14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone (Petraeus 2006).

Mali should learn from other nations' COIN strategy experiences and adapt it to the Malian reality. Pere Vilanova and Paula de Castro argued that the response to the Sahel's problems requires a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach, encompassing diplomacy, security, and development (Vilanova and de Castro 2013). He emphasized the necessity of military cooperation between nations in terms of training, equipment, sharing intelligence. To reinforce this point of view, Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman added that despite the contribution of French operation Barkhan and UN mission MINUSMA, it is imperative to take advantage of the U.S. expertise and experience in COIN (Shurkin, Pezard and Zimmerman 2017).

The U.S. Army has spent the last eighteen years conducting COIN. Therefore, the U.S. contributions are more than welcome. Alexis Arieff mentioned in the CRS report that prior to 2012, Mali received substantial U.S. counterterrorism assistance under the State Department-led, multi-country Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Moreover, Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman suggested that the United States could improve Malian military counterinsurgency capabilities in many domains such as

communication, long-distance patrols, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) (Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman 2017).

Having local support such as Algerian expertise on COIN, ECOWAS, and African Union (AU) is the key to success in any COIN strategy in not only Mali, but also in the Sahel region. Wolfram Lacher highlighted that a new framework for regional cooperation is needed, and while this can only be established on the initiative of regional states themselves, external actors need to adapt their policies to help such a framework emerge (Lacher 2013). He also recommended including North African countries, especially Algeria, in the resolution of the Malian conflict. In support of that, Alexis Arieff claimed that Algeria played a crucial role in mediating past Malian peace accords with Tuareg groups, and in recent years has attempted to coordinate a regional response to AQIM (an Algerian-origin group) and other security threats (Arieff 2013).

Furthermore, some of the central resources for the terrorist group is based on illegal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and kidnapping for ransom. Ibrahima Dao suggested that creating a mechanism to target the insurgent funding system will reduce instability (Dao 2019). He added, “Military, political, and economic responses must be simultaneously implemented to deal with insurgency (Dao 2019).”

Summary

In short, many works of literature have been written about insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as the security challenge in the Sahel region in general and the Malian 2012 crisis specifically. Understanding the operational environment, especially the Kidal region, is significant to this study due to the special status of that region. The instrument of national power (DIME) and operational variables (PMESII) are some of the

best frameworks to describe and analyze the Malian case. Despite many definitions and types of insurgency, countering this phenomenon is not easy, especially in a complex and changing environment.

Many experts in counterinsurgency agreed that gaining population support is critical to the success of COIN, which requires coordination and synchronization of a great deal of effort from many actors (national and international). Ultimately, this topic contributed to in-depth understanding of the complicated situation in Mali to fill the gaps in Malian military capabilities for the benefit of not only Mali, but also the whole Sahara region in Africa. The new acronym, MIDFIELD (Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, and Development) was used as a framework to analyze the Malian security crisis (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018a). The following criteria, such as military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and development was elaborated in chapter 3 and used in chapter 4. Case study methodology was used in the following chapter to compare the Liberian Second Civil War (1999-2003) to the Malian 2012 crisis.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The aim of this study is to analyze Malian military response to the different past crisis and determine what adequate military capabilities in the short, mid, and long term is needed to face these challenges and produce possible solutions. This chapter is organized to answer the primary and secondary research questions, and develop criteria to determine feasibility, the suitability of the case study methodology.

The primary research question was what military capabilities are required to meet the multi-domain challenges that face Mali's national sovereignty? The three secondary questions were:

1. Which multi-domain challenges can be addressed using the military instrument of national power?
2. How to develop Malian armed forces' capacities and capabilities to meet these challenges?
3. What happens if these challenges are not met within the next ten years?

Considering the pertinence of those questions and the significance of this topic, a qualitative case study research methodology was used because of the integral strength of that method.

Qualitative Case Study Methodology

According to John W Creswell, case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of

information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes (Creswell 2007). Based on this definition, the author used to compare and contrast the Malian 2012 security crisis to the second Liberia crisis (1999-2003) to understand the Malian military capabilities required to face the multidomain challenge and make some suggestions.

There are several procedures to conduct a case study. This study focused on Stake's approach to conducting a case study. First, the author identified if the case study methodology is appropriate based on the thesis problem statement; then, the Malian case study was compared in contrast to Liberia. Both case studies provided different perspectives of the problem.

For data collection, Yin recommends six types, such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations, and physical artifacts (Yin 2014). Due to time constraints, the author focused on documents and archival records. The author collected data honestly and endeavored his own bias would not interfere with the choice of the data.

Then during the analyzing phase, Creswell advises within-case analysis be followed by cross-case analysis, as well as assertions or an interpretation of the meaning of the case (Creswell 2007). To understand the complexity of the cases, each case was described in detail, and then an impartial thematic analysis across the cases was provided. The lessons learned from both cases were reported as the final step in the interpretation of the findings.

MIDFIELD and DOTMLPF Frameworks

In this study, the U.S. doctrine will be used by the author as a general reference. According to Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, *Strategy*, U.S. strategists and policymakers have begun to use the new acronym MIDFIELD in lieu of DIME as a significant analytical framework to address armed conflict. On the one hand, the author will use the MIDFIELD framework to better describe both cases study in detail. On the other hand, the author will use one of the great frameworks for military capability building, known as DOTMLPF-P framework, in chapter 4, to analyze and address the Malian military capabilities gaps.

The following variables of Military, Diplomatic, and Financial, were especially considered during the analyzing phase. Mali and Liberia used these variables to address their respective insurgencies. The performance of each country using these variables were measured with a positive (+), and negative (—), valuation technique. In fact, a positive (+) represents a good use of the variable, while a negative signifies (—) a bad use of the variable.

Table 1. Variables and countries performance		
Countries Variables	Mali	Liberia
Military	Measure the strategy and efficacy of military operations to address insurgency.	
Diplomatic	Measure the diplomatic effort of each nation with other partners to avoid escalation of conflict and ultimately find common ground for peace.	
Financial	Measure the financial impact of the conflict on the national economy.	

Source: Created by author.

Summary

The author used the qualitative case study methodology to better understand the complexity of the thesis. Despite the time constraint, the use of secondary sources in terms of documents and archival records will be prioritized. To answer the primary and secondary research questions, the author used the MIDFIELD and DOTMLPF-P analytical framework. Finally, the author will provide a precise, honest, and impartial analysis in the following chapter based on the data collection and the defined variables.




Figure 3. Methodology

Source: Created by author.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The objective of this research was to analyze the Malian military response to the different past crisis and determine what adequate military capabilities in the short, mid, and long term are needed to face these challenges and produce possible solutions. The primary research question was, what military capabilities are required to meet the multi-domain challenges that face Mali's national sovereignty? The three secondary questions were:

1. Which multi-domain challenges can be addressed using the military instrument of national power?
2. How to develop Malian armed forces' capacities and capabilities to meet these challenges?
3. What happens if these challenges are not met within the next ten years?

This chapter is the author's attempt to objectively analyze the data found during research based on the criteria defined in the previous chapter. Before that, it was first important to understand the complexity of the Malian problem in comparison to the Liberian Second Civil War (1999-2003) using the PMESII framework.

Liberia Case Study

Background



Figure 4. Liberia in Africa

Source: Maps of World, “Liberia,” 2019, accessed March 26, 2020, <https://www.mapsofworld.com/answers/geography/what-are-the-key-facts-of-liberia>.

Liberia is located on the West Africa coast, and it shares its borders with Sierra Leon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and the Atlantic Ocean. Liberia has about 111,300 square kilometers (43,000 square miles) of land, with an estimated 2020 population of 5.06

million (World Population Review 2020). It is important to understand some of Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997) background. In fact, Liberia was founded by the African-Americans known as Americo-Liberians in the 1800s. The Americo-Liberians had ruled the country for 133 years (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011). Despite establishing stability and development, the Americo-Liberians segregated most indigenous Africans. Sarah Left claimed that the relatively small group of Americo-Liberians held power until 1980 when Samuel Doe assassinated the serving American-descended president (Left 2003). Doe had run the country with an authoritarian military regime. He created an ethnic division by favoring his own ethnic group Krahn as well as the Mandingo over the other ethnic groups such as Gio and Mano, which led to violent clashes between the military and ethnic groups (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011). Ultimately, in 1989, the brutal oppression of some of those ethnic groups by Doe's regime ignited the armed rebellion, which led to the first civil war.

In addition, it is interesting to highlight the role played by Charles Taylor during the first civil war. In fact, Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer argued that Charles Taylor, whose father was Americo-Liberian, came back to Liberia in 1980 after receiving education in the United States. He served as the head of procurement in Doe's government until he was charged with embezzlement. He fled to the U.S., where he was arrested and jailed pending extradition to Liberia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011). After escaping from prison and receiving guerrilla warfare training in Libya, Taylor returned to Liberia in 1989 to lead the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) insurgency against Dos' regime (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011) Taylor was working in collaboration with another warlord Prince Johnson. Together they attacked the government forces in the

capital Monrovia. The battle of Monrovia was one of the most violent battles of the war, which ended Doe's regime. Sarah Left mentioned that Prince Johnson, seized, tortured, and executed Doe in front of video cameras in September 1990 (Left 2003). Later, the rivalry between Taylor and Johnson aggravated the situation in Liberia. Fortunately, after intense diplomatic effort, the West African peacekeeping force, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), supported by the UN mission United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) stabilized the situation. Johnson accepted asylum in Nigeria, and Taylor ran for the presidential election in 1997 with his famous slogan "He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, but I will vote for him." (Left 2003). Ultimately, many Liberians hoped Taylor's strong hand would bring stability to the country, and Taylor became the twenty-second Liberian President in 1997 with a full 75 percent of the vote (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011).

Nevertheless, after his election, the violence continued in Liberia. Taylor established a cruel regime, marked by violations of human rights and persecution of political dissidents, which plunged Liberia into the second civil war in 1999 (Teran 2007). George Klay Kieh, Jr. argued that one of the main causes of the Liberian Second Civil War was the failure of the post-first civil war transitional processes such as disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration, security sector reform (Kieh 2009). He added that "the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched armed attacks initially against the northwestern regions of Liberia on April 21, 1999. As expected, the Taylor regime launched counter-attacks against the insurgents, thereby setting into motion the second Liberian civil war (Kieh 2009)." Unfortunately, over the last fourteen years of on-again, off-again fighting, around

200,000 Liberians have died. Another 1.5 million have been forced to flee their homes (Left 2003).

Liberia PMESII

Looking through the lens of PMESII, Liberia faced many challenges during the Second Civil War (1999-2003). First, The Liberia government system, which mirrors the U.S. Government model, has three branches the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Peter Dennis mentioned that in 1997, Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia, with nearly 75 percent of the vote (Dennis 2006).

Second, in 1999, the military situation in Liberia was complicated. Denis argued that, on the one hand, Charles Taylor supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone (Dennis 2006). On the other hand, the opposition group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) headed by Sekou Conneh began to engage in sporadic fighting with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) (Dennis 2006). After two years of intense fighting, the LURD controlled 80 percent of the territory, while Charles Taylor maintained his control on the capital Monrovia (Dennis 2006). Finally, Taylor accepted the peace agreement deal proposed by the ECOWAS, which offered him asylum in Nigeria (Dennis 2006).

Third, during the Liberian Second Civil war, the economic situation in Liberia was catastrophic. The annual GDP was \$440 million, with \$175 GDP per capita in 1999, which made Liberia one of the poorest countries in the world (190 out of 195 countries) (Countryeconomy.com 1999).

Fourth, the Liberian society is diverse. The population is classified into three major groups: the indigenous people, black immigrants from the United States (known

historically as Americo-Liberians), and other black immigrants from neighboring Western African states (Encyclopædia Britannica s.v. “Liberia: Ethnic groups and languages,” accessed March 13, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Liberia/People>). Some of the ethnic groups are the Kpelle (20.3 percent), Bassa (13.4 percent), Grebo (10 percent), Gio (8 percent), Mano (7.9 percent), Kru (6 percent), Loma (5.1 percent), Kissi (4.8 percent), and others (24.5 percent) (Encyclopædia Britannica s.v. “Liberia: Ethnic groups and languages,” accessed March 13, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Liberia/People>).

Fifth, concerning information and infrastructure, Tony Reis mentioned that during the Liberian Second Civil war, some of the infrastructures, such as roadways, railways, airports, seaports, were inoperative. He also highlighted there are three privately owned television stations, one state-owned radio station, and about fifteen independent radio stations broadcasting in Monrovia with another twenty-five local stations operating in other areas and two international broadcasters (Reis 2015). Ultimately, the Second Civil war had a huge impact on many domains of PMESII in Liberia.

Liberia Military Variable

During Liberia Second Civil War (1999-2003), the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) under the leadership of Charles Taylor was defeated by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and later by the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) which split from the LURD and opened the second front from the Kiel reported that on April 21, 1999, the LURD initially conducted violent attacks against Liberia’s northwestern regions. The Taylor government conducted counter- against the rebels as planned (Kieh 2009). The Battle between LURD and government forces was

marked by intense fight and territories control back and forth between both belligerents. It is critical to highlight the use of child soldiers during the Second Civil War. De Tony Tate reported that according to Human Right Watch, “Despite the international law, which prohibits the use of children in armed conflict, both of the opposition groups, the LURD and the MODEL, as well as government forces which include militias and paramilitary groups widely used children when civil war resumed in 2000 (Tate 2004).” Ultimately, the LURD controlled 80 percent of the territory after two years of extremely heavy fighting, while Charles Taylor held power over the capital Monrovia (Dennis 2006). Taylor finally accepted ECOWAS’s proposed peace agreement, which offered him asylum in Nigeria (Dennis 2006).

Liberia Diplomacy Variable

Experience has shown that usually, the military conflict will terminate with negotiation around the table. Liberia’s Second Civil war will not be an exception. Since the first civil War (1989-1997) the ECOWAS supported by the UN mission United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) had employed a huge diplomatic effort to bring peace in Liberia by not only applying sanctions, but also successfully implementing programs such as Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR), and Security Sector Reform (SSR). In fact, Hany Besada reported that, according to the UNMIL report on December 7, 2003, the UNMIL troops disarmed 13,490 fighters and collected 8,679 weapons, 2,650 unexploded ordnance, 2,717,668 rounds of ammunition at Camp Scheffelin near Monrovia (Besada 2010). Thomas Jaye added that the DDRR program was completed on October 31, 2004, with 101,496 combatants and their “associates” disarmed and demobilized, which

included 22,370 women, and 10,972 children soldiers (Jaye 2009). During the rehabilitation and reintegration phase, Jaye asserted that approximately 90,000 ex-combatants also participated in the rehabilitation and reintegration phase, which offered training opportunities in formal education, vocational training, and apprenticeship (Jaye 2009). It is undeniable that the success of the DDRR program not only had contributed to reinforce the AFL capabilities in terms of personnel and training but to bring peace and stability in Liberia.

Moreover, the UN had imposed an extensive sanction against the Liberian government, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Those sanctions included an arms embargo, as well as the ban on some of the belligerents' sources of revenue, such as diamond and timber. Over time, those diplomatic efforts had paid. Nika Stražišar Teran mentioned that on August 18, 2003, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Accra between the Government and the rebel forces, LURD, and the MODEL (Teran 2007). According to this agreement, Charles Taylor resigned and was exiled to Nigeria while the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was established in October 2003 (Teran 2007). It is important to highlight the huge diplomatic role played by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in collaboration with the NTGL to organize a peaceful democratic election in Liberia. Ultimately, in January 2006, Ellen Johnson-Sirlea became the first democratically elected woman in Africa. Under her leadership, Liberia renews with peace until nowadays.

Liberia Financial Variable

It is essential to highlight that one of the primary strategic resources to finance the conflict in Liberia and Serra Leon was diamond trade. Warring factions, including Taylor's government, traded diamonds to fuel the conflict. Teran asserted that, according to the UN Panel of Experts, despite the UN economic sanction to ban diamonds, Liberian rough diamonds, which were smuggled out of the country using neighbor certification, continued to reach international markets (Teran 2007). In addition to diamonds, Timber was another significant source of revenue for Taylor's regime.

Unfortunately, the corruption around the timber industry had a negative impact on the economy. Teran claimed that "According to the Global Witness research, the timber industry in Liberia was worth at least U.S. \$187 million in revenues in 2000, but only an estimated U.S. \$6.7 million was deposited into the national budget (Teran 2007)."

Ultimately, the Security Council recognized the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds and timber, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms as a major source of fueling and exacerbating conflicts in West Africa, particularly in Liberia (United Nations 2003). As a result, the UN established an economic sanction such as the ban on the diamond, timber, and other resources trade against the Liberia armed groups, including Taylor's government, to bring peace in Liberia.

Table 2. Variables and Liberia Performance

Countries Variables	Liberia
Military	—
Diplomatic	+
Financial	—

Source: Created by author.

Table 2 explains that Liberia has positively used the diplomatic instrument, supported by the regional and international community effort, to bring peace, security, and stability in Liberia, as demonstrated by the successful DDRR program and the signature of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2003. However, Liberia failed to use both military and finance instruments to address the insurgency effectively and efficiently as confirmed by not only the illegal use of children soldiers but also corruption through the illegal use of natural resources funds such as diamond and timber in violation of the internal law and sanctions.

Mali PMESII

The 2012 crisis created multiple challenges in many domains, such as political, military, economy, social, information, and infrastructure (PEMESII).

First, politically, Mali is no longer a good example of democracy in West Africa since its 2012 military coup. The executive branch has always significantly influenced the legislative and the judiciary branch. This fact breaks down the principle of separation and balance of power. After a long negotiation with the mutineers, the international community helped Mali organize its Presidential election in 2013; Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta became the fifth President of the Republic of Mali.

Second, the lack of military training and equipment aggravates the situation in terms of readiness and responsiveness. During the dictatorial regime of former president General Moussa Traore in 1978, the Malian Army operated Russian equipment such as the T-34 tank and MiG 17, MiG 19, and MiG 21 fighter jets. Unfortunately, most of that old materiel can no longer face the challenges of the ever-changing geopolitics and geostrategic environment. Despite different rebellions in the north, follow-on presidents did not prioritize MAF modernization. Therefore, the lack of modern equipment has created a significant gap in their capacity.

Third, economically, poverty and corruption continue to negatively on society. Even though Mali has many natural resources, such as gold, most of the population still lives below the threshold of the poverty line. Additionally, corruption is one of the worst enemies of its economy. According to the Transparency International corruption perception index, Mali is 120th out of 180 countries on this scale. Corruption is like cancer, attacking from within the body, and each successive government has tried its best to fight corruption but without apparent success until now.

Socially, many ethnic groups live in Mali. Statistics, according to Nations Encyclopedia, show the diversity of Mali. The main ethnic groups of Mali are the Mande, including the Bambara, Malinke, and Sarakole, which account for 50 percent of the total population. Other groups include the Peul (or Fulani), accounting for 17 percent; the Voltaic, making up 12 percent; the Songhai, constituting 6 percent; the Tuareg and Moor 10 percent; and other groups, 5 percent (Nations Encyclopedia 2020). These ethnic groups have lived in peace since independence from France in 1960. However, many Tuaregs and Moors have recently claimed that France promised their independence from

the rest of Mali if the French were allowed access to natural resources, such as gold and uranium in the North.

In regard to information, some terrorist groups use the proliferation of media, such as newspapers, radios, and especially social networks, to spread their propaganda. This propaganda tends to demoralize troops deployed in operations.

The lack of infrastructure such as roads, steady supply of electricity, and clean water are evident in the North. In the Sahara Desert region, many development projects for the North did not produce the desired effect due to corruption.

Military Variables

The MAF's overall strategy to deal with the insurgents was basically a defensive strategy for many reasons. First, the lack of equipment and training across the MAF contributed to aggravate the situation. Diakite argued that Malian's successive governments failed to adopt a sustainable equipment and training program that prepares the Malian Armed Forces to effectively control and secure the lawless Malian Sahara to deter potential infiltration and settlement by armed groups (Diakite 2019). The second reason is the MAF's lack of knowledge of the Operational Environment. The Tuareg insurgents collaborated with some of the experienced Islamic combatants coming from Libya with sophisticated weapons, to defeat the MAF. It is undeniable that the Tuareg insurgents and allies know the terrain better than the MAF. The battle of Aguelhoc on January 24, 2012 is a prime example.

During this battle, the MAF elements had defended their position in the garrison of Aguelhoc for one week without resupply. Unfortunately, the lack of sustainment obliged them to surrender because the insurgents and allies, who know better the

environment, cut their line of supply. Authors Michael Shurkin, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, and Stephanie Pezard mentioned that during the battle of Aguelhoc, ninety-seven Malian soldiers were executed by their captors (Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman 2017). This battle was one of the turning points in the Malian Crisis because the rebels sent some propaganda images of Malian executed soldiers, which created a psychosis among the rest of the Malian Troup. The rest of the demoralized MAF successively retrograded to the south up to Konna (Mopti region) and abandoned their arms and ammunition to the mercy of the insurgents and allies. Therefore, within three months, the insurgents and terrorist allies occupied sixty percent of the country. In short, due to the reasons addressed above, the MAF failed to address effectively and efficiently the 2012 insurgency.

Diplomacy Variables

Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations (Merriam-Webster s.v. “Diplomacy,” accessed March 17, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomacy>). Since its independence in 1960, Mali has experienced four insurgencies (1963 to 1964, 1990 to 1996, 2006 to 2009, and 2012 to 2013) (Pezard 2015). However, the Malian diplomacy, in collaboration with partners such as Algeria, and France, to name a few, had always played a huge role in finding solutions to these recurrent rebellions. In Malian culture in general, the dialogue is considered as a virtue. No matter the problem opposing different ethnic groups, the dialogue will prevail at the end to find a solution. The authors Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin mentioned the Malian diplomatic effort concerning finding peace. They argued that the negotiation in Algeria between the Malian official and Tuareg rebellion

group ended up with the signature of separate peace agreements such as the National Pact of 1992, the Algiers Accord of 2006 and 2015 (Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman 2017).

Some of the objectives of the last agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process are:

1. To create a new base to rebuild unity in the country, while respecting its territorial integrity, taking into account its ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as its specific geographical and socio-economic characteristics (Republic of Mali 2015).

2. To restore security immediately, promote durable peace and stability in our country, and to make real the rules of good governance, transparent management, respect for human rights, justice, and the fight against impunity (Republic of Mali 2015).

3. To fight against terrorism and international organized crime (Republic of Mali 2015).

The implementation of the last Alger accord, which was signed on May 15, 2015 in Bamako, is still in process at the time of this thesis in March 2020.

Financial Variables

Despite the multidomain crisis since 2012, the current government under the leadership of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, initiated in 2015 the new Military modernization program named *Loi d'Orientation et de Programmation Militaire* (LOPM) [Military Orientation and Programming Act]. According to the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “This text provides for a 1,200 billion FCFA investment for the army for the period 2015-2019 (International Security Sector Advisory Team 2019).” According to the President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, in his address to Nation discourse on January 1, 2020, he emphasized that Mali has maintained an average of 5

percent GDP Grow rate since 2013, with an equivalent of 37 percent GDP in debt, Comparing to 70 percent average in other countries in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) environment. This performance made Mali one of the lowest country debt in West Africa (Fama 2019). Marcus Tullius Cicero said, “Endless money forms the sinews of war (Cicero 2020).” Therefore, to support the war effort in Mali, the supreme chief of the army highlighted that Mali spends 24 percent of its GDP, which is colossally comparing to other priority spending sectors (Fama 2019). It is undeniable that in the long-term, maintaining 24 percent of the GDP to support the military operation will be challenging for the Malian Government.

Table 3. Variables and Countries Performance

Countries Variables	Mali
Military	—
Diplomatic	+
Financial	+

Source: Created by author.

Table 3 shows that Mali used successfully diplomatic and financial instrument to avoid escalation of the conflict as demonstrated by the signature of the Alger peace accord as well as the colossal financial effort deployed by the government not only to support the war effort but also to modernize the MAF capabilities through the LOPM. Unfortunately, militarily, Mali failed to use adequate military tools to address the rebellion, as demonstrated by the lack of adequate equipment and training across the

MAF, which led to the occupation of sixty percent of the country by the Tuareg insurgents and their terrorist allies.

Ultimately, it is fascinating to compare in the following table, the Malian crisis to the Liberian one after looking through the MIDFIELD perspective.

Table 4 compares both countries' performance in terms of Military, Diplomatic, and Financial response to the conflict. First, table 4 shows that both countries failed to address effectively and efficiently the insurgency using military instrument of national power. Mali lost 60 percent of the territory due to lack of military equipment and training, while the Liberia government lost eighty percent of its territory despite the strategy of using children soldiers in violation of the international law. Second, both countries, in collaboration with other partners, demonstrated their diplomatic capacity to avoid escalation of the conflict through a huge and positive diplomatic effort. The Signature of different peace agreements such as the Alger accord of 2015, as well as the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2003, are some prime examples. Another illustration is the successful implementation of the Liberian DDRR program. Third, on the one hand, illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds and timber, in addition to corruption, had a negative impact on the Liberian economy during the conflict. On the other hand, despite other spending priorities such as healthcare, education, infrastructure, to name a few, the Malian government sometimes supported by some partners such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, UN, EU, and others partners employed a colossal financial effort through the LOPM to support the war effort, which has a positive impact on the economy.

Table 4. Variables and Countries Performance

Countries Variables	Mali	Liberia
Military	—	—
Diplomatic	+	+
Financial	+	—

Source: Created by author.

Furthermore, it is thrilling to analyze and address the Malian military capabilities gaps using one of the greatest frameworks for military capability building, known as DOTMLPF-P.

Mali Security Challenge

Since 2012, Mali has faced one of the darkest moments of its history. The Tuareg insurgency, supported by terrorist groups, occupy half the country. The military coup in the south created more chaos in the country. Also, the lack of military training and equipment aggravates the situation in terms of readiness and responsiveness. During the dictatorial regime of former President General Moussa Traore in 1978, the Malian Army possessed much Russian equipment such as the T-34 Tank and MiG 17, MiG 19, and MiG 21 fighter jets. Unfortunately, many of that old materiel can no longer face the multi-challenge of the ever-changing geopolitics and geostrategic environment. Despite different rebellions in the north, the subsequent president did not prioritize the MAF modernization. Therefore, the lack of modern equipment has created a significant gap in the capacity of the MAF.

Geographically, Mali is twice the size of the state of Texas, with only twenty million people. The Sahara Desert covers half of the country, and Mali is a landlocked country, surrounded by seven countries. The border is very porous and difficult to control with an insignificant armed force due to the complex environment and the obsolete equipment. Looking at the Malian 2012 crisis through the lens of DOTMLPF-P perspective, the Malian high authority (the Nation) decided to place emphasis on specific domains in the military, such as training and new high-tech materiel to address these issues. It is vital to develop MAF capabilities by acquiring new high-tech equipment and developing well trained professional soldiers, who will be able to utilize the modernized equipment effectively and efficiently in their future missions.

MAF New Material Capability

First, it is undeniable that the MAF needs new high-tech equipment in terms of mobility and communication. Extending operational reach with new transport capabilities such as the C-130J model is very important. The Malian Air Force has only a couple of small transport aircraft such as CASA C-295W, Y-12, and the Basler BT-67. It is almost impossible to cover this vast country with only those assets. Therefore, the C-130J will be one of the best material solutions to reinforce Air mobility capability. According to www.military.com, the C-130J Hercules will be able to carry 44,000 pounds (20,000 kilograms) Of cargo, fly two thousand miles (3,200 kilometers) at the speed of four hundred miles per hour (Military.com 2020). These characteristics allow the C-130J to reach any part of the country from the Capital city of Bamako, without refueling. This capability is extraordinary in terms of operational reach and the risks taken during refueling in the North. Also, the lack of runways throughout the country would no longer

be an issue as the C-130J can land and take off from any unprepared terrain. The C-130J can also accomplish many other missions such as aeromedical evacuation, airborne, and cargo transport.

In terms of the operational concept, the C-130J model will create a significant advantage on the battlefield. It will give commanders the operational flexibility, adaptability, and global reach within time and space to achieve strategic goals on the battlefield. The commander can use the C-130J to transport troops and supply rapidly anywhere in the theater. Another example of how the C-130J will enhance operations is the ability to train paratroops in tactical jumping (high and low altitude airdrops). The C-130J will also be able to perform humanitarian relief missions by bringing humanitarian aid to victims of natural disasters, famines, and refugees. The C-130J will be a great tool to improve Malian Air Force capabilities for the benefit of the country. In brief, there is no doubt that the C-130J will enhance Malian Airlift capabilities, which play a colossal role in the success of the operation in the North. The lack of adequate communication tools is also another factor to take into consideration.

Besides, communication is essential for superior coordination during any operation. Experience shows that, in the past, the Malian Army and Air Force had difficulty communicating over the radio due to non-compatible radio systems. A good example is the Battle of Konna (fought in 2012 in Mopti, in the center of Mali). During this battle, Tetras light aircraft responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance, could not give the positions of the terrorist groups to the combat units instantaneously because they could not talk by radio to the pilot. To mitigate this, pilots used their Global System for Mobile (GSM) cell phones to call back to the operation center to rely on their

observations. By the time the combat units received this information, the enemy had already moved.

Another factor to consider during this Battle was the ability of the enemy to listen to Malian's Radio communication because Malian Armed Forces cannot encrypt and secure their radio communications. Therefore, the lack of compatible radio and non-secured radio communications system was one of the causes of the failure of this battle. The Malian military must have radios which can provide encrypted communications between ground to the ground units as well as Air to ground units. One of the solutions is the L3 SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) Harris RT-1523. This radio has many capabilities to enhance Malian's Military operations.

According to Daniel Kearns, a former paratrooper with the 82nd ABN, 2-325th AIR, "They are exceptionally difficult to locate, jam, or intercept because of their frequency hopping (changing frequencies 111 times per second) (Quora 2013)." In other words, the L3 SINCGARS will create multiple dilemmas for the enemy, trying to decrypt the communications. The light infantry and Special Forces can use this radio as well as Operation centers (C2) to coordinate operations between the Air and Ground component. This radio would have changed the course of the Battle of Konna. Adding this radio to the Malian's military capabilities will foster better communication and coordination.

Furthermore, the Malian Armed Forces will implement the L3 SINCGARS in many ways. First, the Malian's Inter-Armed Tactical Battalion will use it as a primary source of communication to communicate safely not only between units but also with the Center of Operation. This excellent radio will create multiple dilemmas to the enemy, who will try to intercept the communication. Second, the L3 SINCDARS will be handy

during CAS and Airstrike operation with the Super Tucano. The TACP will be able to correctly guide the fighter aircraft toward the target and minimize the collateral damage. Also, the light aircraft Tetras will be able to guide through this radio the ground combat unit in the hostile environment to avoid ambush, improvised explosive device (IED) on the road, to name a few. Considering the importance of Command and Control (C2) on the battlefield, the L3 SINCGARS will be an indispensable tool for coordinating, synchronizing, the operation in the theater. Having these innovative devices will fill the gap and enhance the military capabilities to face the multi-challenges. There is no doubt that this new approach of reinforcing MAF material capability will also require a new reorganization of the MAF's structure to meet these multidomain challenges.

MAF Organizational and Training Capability

The operating environment is constantly changing. Malian Armed Force needs to adjust its structure base on the usage and repartition of new high-tech acquisition materiel. The Light Infantry and Special Forces units must have a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) unit integrated into their organization. This TACP unit can precisely guide aircraft in Close Air Support (CAS) or Airstrike missions. Considering the importance of TACP units, the Malian authority, in collaboration with the European Union Training in Mali (EUTM), is working hard to make this organizational change a reality.

Moreover, Mali is a member of the G5 Sahel organization, which is composed of Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Tchad. The G5's primary mission is to joint their ability to fight terrorist groups such as (AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun, and Boko Haram). Each country must standardize his Armed Force's organization in terms of Standard Operation

Procedure (SOP) and materiel acquisition. The acquisition of the Super Tucano aircraft in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania Air Forces is a good example.

Furthermore, the EUTM is training and organizing the Malian Inter-Armed Tactical Battalion. Each Battalion is composed of three infantry companies, one armor platoon, one artillery component, one engineer platoon, one logistic platoon, and one TACP platoon (Forces Operations Blog 2014). This new organization combines soldiers from different services using common materiel. This configuration is more efficient and effective against terrorist groups. In total, more than 11,500 soldiers have been trained by EUTM Mali, which represents approximately one-third of the Malian Army (Swedish Armed Forces 2020).

Lastly, after analyzing the security challenges of the MAF, there is a strong need to equip and train these Forces. By having and correctly implementing the proposed solution with the blessing of allies and partners, we can affirm beyond any doubt that the Malian Armed Forces will be able to have the necessary capabilities to meet the multi-domain challenge for not only the benefit of Mali but also to contribute to the global peace in the world.

Summary

The aim of this study is to analyze MAF current capabilities and determine what adequate military capabilities in the short, mid, and long term is needed to face the multidomain challenges. This chapter examined Malian's multi-domain challenges through PMESII. It is arguable that to address the Malian security challenge, one of the best tools is using the military instrument of national power. However, it is crucial to develop the MAF capabilities to fill the gaps. On the one hand, after looking the MAF

situation through DOTMLPF, it is undeniable that by acquiring new high-tech equipment in terms of mobility (C-130 J) and communication (L3 SINCGARS) and by developing well trained professional soldiers, the MAF will Malian Armed Forces should be able to face the multi-domain challenges, not just for the benefit of Mali, but also for the Sahara region. On the other hand, using the MIDFIELD framework to compare both case studies, Mali should follow Liberian's successful example in terms of DDRR and SSR processes to reinforce the MAF capabilities across the country. Finally, failure to build the MAF capabilities to meet the multidomain challenges within the next ten years would most likely have a catastrophic consequence on not only the sovereignty of Mali, but also the stability of the Sahara region in Africa.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main reason for this study was to analyze Malian military response to the different past crises and determine what adequate military capabilities in the short, mid, and long term are needed to face these challenges and produce possible solutions. The primary research question was what military capabilities are required to meet the multi-domain challenges that face Mali's national sovereignty? The three secondary questions were:

1. Which multi-domain challenges can be addressed using the military instrument of national power?
2. How to develop Malian armed forces' capacities and capabilities to meet these challenges?
3. What happens if these challenges are not met within the next ten years?

This last chapter recaps the findings during the research, draws a conclusion, and provide some recommendations for further study.

Findings

During this study, the author determined the following:

1. Despite different rebellions in the north, follow-on presidents did not prioritize MAF modernization except the current government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who has initiated the LOPM strategy to reinforce the MAF capabilities since 2015.
2. MAF needs newer high tech equipment and training to face their future mission.

3. The ambiguity role played by France about not letting the MAF to enter the Kidal Region.

4. The Malian Government's financial (24 percent of GDP) supports the effort of the war.

5. The use of children soldiers during Liberia's Second Civil War in violation of international law.

6. The success of the UN DDDR and SSR program to reinforce AFL capabilities in Liberia.

Conclusion

Despite being one of the greatest and wealthiest empires in West Africa under the leadership of Kankan Moussa, Mali has faced one of the darkest moments of its history since 2012. The consequence of the Libya crisis in 2011 is one of the most contributors' factors that aggravated the situation. While in the North, the MNLA, in collaboration with some terrorist groups, defeated the MAF and occupied 60 percent of the country while the military coup in the capital created chaos in the country. The international community led by France through Operation Serval stopped the insurgent's progression to the south. As a result, Mali regained the integrity of its territory despite the special status of the region of Kidal, which still today remains under the influence of former Tuareg insurgents. It is irrefutable that using the military instrument of national power as a solution to address the Malian security challenge demonstrated its limitation.

Meanwhile, the Malian diplomatic effort supported by its partners finally paid off with the signature of the Alger Accord, signed in Bamako in 2015 between the Malian government and the insurgents. The implementation of this peace agreement to bring

peace and stability in Mali is still in progress under the supervision of partners such as MINUSMA, Algeria, France, and others.

In addition, it is unquestionable that the acquisition of new, high-tech equipment in terms of mobility, communication, and the development of well-trained professional soldiers will fill the MAF capabilities gaps in the short and midterm. The continuity in the LOPM program for the next ten years will not only allow the reinforcement of the MAF and its ability to face future challenges, but also to reach a long-term goal of capability building.

Recommendations

The following suggestions are strongly recommended, but not limited to some of possible solutions to Malian multi-domain challenges:

1. The sincere application of the last agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers despite obstacles and imperfections.
2. The Malian central government should emphasize regular recruitment in the military by taking into account the ethnic diversity and recruit volunteers based on merit.
3. The MAF should set up doctrine based on the U.S. doctrine, but adapted to the Malian reality.
4. The Malian government should inspire from the Liberian example in the DDRR and SSR process to reinforce the MAF capabilities.
5. Mutualize the local, regional, and international effort (unity of action) under a unique command and control to achieve a strategic goal of fight the phenomenon of terrorism, not only out of the Sahel region through Africa but also out of the world.

6. The G5 Sahel should be placed under chapter 7 of the UN.
7. Establish an impartial justice for everyone with No impunity for justice.
8. Finally, the Malian government should coordinate with the U.S. Embassy through the Security Cooperation Program of Foreign Military Sale (FMS), the acquisition of some new high-tech equipment.

Areas for Further Study

Due to the time constraint imposed by the length of Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC), the following recommendations may be interesting for further research.

1. The standardization and synchronization of G5 Sahel capacities to stabilize the Sahel Region.
2. How to finance the G5 Sahel to face the multidomain challenge in the Sahel region?
3. How to build impartial justice capabilities to face the future challenges?

APPENDIX A



Figure 5. C-130 J Hercules

Source: “C-130 J Hercules,” accessed September 23, 2019, <https://www.military.com/equipment/c-130-hercules>.



Figure 6. L3 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCARS) Harris RT-1523

Source: L3 Harris, “SINCARS Harris RT-1523 VHF Radio,” 2019, accessed September 23, 2019, <https://www.harris.com/solution/harris-sincgars-rt-1523-vhf-radio>.

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