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AND
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SCHOOL OF LOGISTICS

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SUBJECT: Logistical Problems Peculiar to the Philippine
Army in Defense of the Philippines.

1. PROBLEM- To analyze the logistical problems which
confront the new National Defense Organization
of the Philippine Republic in its plan for the
military defense of the Philippine Islands.
2. DISCUSSION-
 - a. The Philippine defense plan embodied in the Phil-
ippine National Defense Act of 1935 and in subse-
quent orders issued by the Department of National
Defense provided for a regular force, a reserve
force, and a national police force. (Annex I)
 - b. Historical examples, indicate that the logistical
support system was deficient from a military
and economic point of view and that the Phil-
ippines was utterly unprepared for the last war.
(Annex 2)
 - c. The present economic and industrial capacity of
the Philippines is insufficient to support both
the civilian population and its armed forces.
(Annex 3)
 - d. Sympathetic areas adjacent to the Philippines May
to some extent, cover up the economic deficien-
es, but this would, during hostilities, be ex-
tremely difficult to obtain due to the great re-
quirements for transportation facilities.
 - e. Under the military assistance agreement between the
government of the USA and the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, the U.S. will fur-

nish equipment and supplies, arms, ammunition, certain aircraft and naval vessels and instruction and training by the Army and Navy of the U.S.A. (Annex 4)


- f. A military reserve, of such amounts as may be subsequently agreed upon, will be procured by the Philippine Government from the U.S.A. It can be seen that most, if not all, of our armed forces equipment and supplies are and will be U.S. made, thus may be classified as strategic defense material. Severance, or even any curtailment, of this source or stock-piling of U.S. equipment and supply present at the outbreak of a future war would have definite and critical implications on the logistical support of the Philippine armed forces in its execution of Military defense measures.

3. ACTION RECOMMENDED-

- a. That the government plan and push through an intensive food production drive that should take in its stride even the remotest corners of the country to remedy the present inadequacy of food supply.
- b. That the government formulate long-range plans for the stability of the financial, economic and industrial structure of the nation.
- c. That an organization be formed for integrating the supply and procurement needs of both the armed forces and the civilian economy during peace and in the event of an emergency.
- d. That an army-navy-air organization be established which can best remedy the handicaps which geogra-

phy imposes on the islands.

- e. That an organization be developed to plan with industry in peacetime the nation's wartime needs.



Jose Fernandez, Jr.
Capt., Phil. Army.

ANNEX 1.

The program for carrying out the national defense policy is embodied in the National Defense Act No. I of 1935. The defense program as conceived by President Quezon was to have been carried out for a period of ten years from 1936. It can be seen that this program never reached fruition, however, it will be worth while to analyse the defense principles, the extent to which the program was carried out, and the logistical implications of the defense program. These items must be examined as they have a definite bearing on the present National Defense Organization of the Philippine Republic. The Philippine National Defense Act has not been amended, so that application of these principles as explained by President Quezon still holds true to a great extent.

In his first message to the new National Assembly President Quezon explained the principles upon which his defense plan is based. The first of these principles is that every citizen is obligated to the Nation's defense, and that all individual and national resources may be used by the State in the interest of self-preservation. This principle ^{has} knows no limitation of time or condition and is applied by the National Defense Act in its provision for peace time training, and war time governmental control over all of the human and material resources of the nation.

The second basic principle of the Quezon plan is that the national defense system must provide actual security. "Security" is a relative term. Mr. Quezon expressed as follows his conception of the minimum degree of security which was required by the Philippines and furnished by the defense plan:

"... Our program of national defense must serve notice upon the world that the citizens of these Islands are not to be subjugated; that conquest of this nation cannot be accomplished short of its utter destruction, and that, ~~that~~ destruction would involve such staggering cost to an aggressor, both in blood and gold, that even the boldest and the strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such an undertaking."

Third principle declared by President Quezon to be applied in the National Defense Act is that of current and future economy. This principle precludes "for the present at least" the development of a battle fleet and, in the opinion of the President, emphasizes the "Passively defensive character" of the Philippines' military program.

The fourth principle is the necessity for a gradual rather than the sudden growth of the required defense establishment. "Nevertheless," declared President Quezon, "it is imperative that our plans reach fruition by the time the beneficent protection of ^{the} United States shall have been finally withdrawn. We have ten years, and only ten, in which to initiate and complete the development of our defensive structure, the creation of which, because of the conditions of our past existence must now begin at the very foundations. Not a moment is to be lost. Starting immediately, we must build economically and gradually, but steadily and surely, so as to attain within the time permitted us the highest possible efficiency at the lowest possible cost."

Finally, President Quezon emphasized the need for skilfully moulding the Commonwealth's security arrangements to fit the particular needs of the Philippines.

In outline, the National Defense Act, as originally enacted and applied, provided for an army of two elements: A regular force of approximately 10,000 men, including the Philippine Constabulary, with a Strength of about 7,000; and a reserve that would be augmented each year by approximately 40,000 men who had received five and a half months of intensive training. At the end of 1937 two semi-annual classes of trainees, numbering 36,601, selected by lot from a register of all men twenty-one years of age, had been trained and transferred to the reserve. During 1938, 33,247 additional reserves were trained.

In January, 1940, Field Marshal MacArthur stated in a press interview that 30,000 recruits would have been ^{trained} each year; that by 1946 the "citizen army" would have included some thirty ~~my~~ divisions of approximately 300,000 men, and that in the ensuing twenty years it would reach the intended maximum of ninety divisions of almost one million men. The five and a half months' period of instruction was admittedly short. To make it more effective, it was preceded by elementary military training as a by-product of public school education, beginning in the fourth grade, and by Sunday and Holiday instruction to young men not attending school. Reservists who have completed their original tour of instruction were kept in training by annual "refresher" courses, given mainly on week ends.

The army organization included the staff and live units that were regarded in 1935 as essential to a military establishment having the strictly defensive function of the Philippine Army. The creation of a competent officer corps, one of the most difficult problems faced in

building an army from scratch, was provided for the development of the former Philippine Constabulary Academy into a national military academy, which was turning out about one hundred officers annually, the establishment of reserve officers training ~~XXXXX~~ corps in colleges and universities, and advanced courses for selected trainees conducted by the army itself. So far as the regular army was concerned, a nucleus of officers was furnished by the officer corps of the Constabulary and the Filipino officers of the Philippine Scouts.

As an adjunct to the Philippine Army, the defense plan called for an "Off-Shore Patrol," of small, fast motor torpedo boats. "A relatively small fleet of such vessels," General MacArthur has declared, "manned by crews thoroughly familiar with every foot of the coastline and surrounding waters, and carrying, in the torpedo, a definite threat against large ships, will have distinct effect in compelling any hostile force to approach cautiously and by small detachments. These "Q" boats were to have been built for the Commonwealth in England. The press reported that the Government had planned to have a fleet of thirty such craft by 1946 and that the first two were received. Further procurement from Great Britain having become impossible, preparations were made for the construction of the hulls of these craft in the Philippines, the engines, other machinery, and fittings to be imported.

Operating in conjunction with the "Off-Shore Patrol" was the Army Air Corps, whose chief function would have been of coast defense. "In the fighting element of the Air

Corps," General MacArthur reported to President Quezon, "fast bombers with a reasonable radius of action will be the principal item of equipment. Other tactical types will be limited to the numbers needed for tactical support of the bombers maintained, while training planes

will be obtained in the amounts necessary... Under the plan every centavo that could have been spared from other equally essential purposes would have eventually been invested in the development and maintenance of a bombing fleet of reasonable size so as to assure the ability of marine and air units, working in complete cooperation, to "deny the use of territorial waters to hostile surface craft." By May of 1941 from forty to sixty planes had been acquired by the Philippine Army, most of them training ships. The original defense plan called for one hundred trained military aviators by 1946.

The training of reserves under the defense plan was begun in January, 1937, and, with adjustments indicated by experience, had proceeded according to schedule. In this major task, indeed in virtually all of the complicated procedures of creating an army, the United States military mission and the Philippine military and civil authorities had earned the praise of the ~~Phil~~ Filipino people and of disinterested observers. In January, 1941, there were 466 officers and 3,666 enlisted men in the army and 132,000 men organized into "approximately" thirteen divisions in the reserve. When the Philippine Army was organized in January, 1936, the Philippine Constabulary was consolidated with it and a national state police was formed to take over the police duties of the Constabulary. This arrangement having proved unsatisfactory, the state police were abolished in May, 1938, and the Constabulary division of the army was detached and reorganized as a national police force under its old name, the Philippine Constabulary. At the end of 1938 its authorized strength was 350 officers and 4,500 men, and on February 1, 1939, it was returned to the control of the Department of the Interior.

The military organization of the Philippines, as considered necessary for the needs of the national defense and as already referred to previously, was organized into the Philippine Army, now the Philippine Ground Force, the Philippine Army Air Force, now the Philippine Air Force, the Off-Shore Patrol now the Philippine Naval Patrol and the Philippine Constabulary, now the Military Police Command. The responsibilities assigned to the Philippine Army during the Commonwealth regime and those assigned now are of the same nature except that the Philippine Naval Patrol, if war comes, will become an auxiliary of the U.S. Navy. In peacetime, the PNP will help the Republic to protect its fishing industry, prevent illegal immigration, tend lighthouses and revenue cutters, handle sea rescues, and transport equipment for various government agencies. By now the PNP would have 45 more ships added to its present fleet of 39. It will be interesting to note that the ships mentioned above are of the minesweeper type purchased from the U.S. Surplus Commission.

It can be seen from the mission given the Philippine Naval Patrol and the type and number of ships it possesses, that it would not be employed, as the Off-Shore Patrol was conceived to be employed, to deny to hostile surface craft the use of the territorial waters of the Philippines. Bearing this in mind, the Philippine Air Force can be taken more seriously than the Philippine Naval Patrol. Would it, however be superior to the air force which a hostile nation could bring against it from nearly captured air bases, from aircraft carriers, and elsewhere taking into consideration the aircrafts the U.S. Air Force have in the Philippines? Could it afford, let us say, Manila reasonable security against hostile bombers while the U.S. Air Force is defending outlying islands and their fortified cities from naval bombard-

ment or combined air and naval attacks? Does it seem probable that operating in conjunction with the Philippine based U.S. air force the Philippine proposed air force, which will be limited in planes, material, experienced personnel, and aircraft supplies, including gasoline, etc., could seriously defend the whole national territory against hostile assaults from the sea and air and protect it from military invasion? Obviously, it does not.

An expeditionary force protected by longrange naval guns and on overwhelming air superiority might land tanks and supplies and establish a base on any of the major islands from which by air-tanks blitzkrieg tactics overrun the rest of the island. It is readily evident that the Philippines to resist such an attack must have a relatively large amount of mechanical equipment and supplies.

ANNEX 2

The organization of the logistical support system under the Philippine defense set-up was established and undertaken by the U.S. Army and the Philippine Army. Under this ~~xxx~~ system depots were established at strategic points in Luzon and Corrigidor with large stocks of supplies as war reserves and under the Philippine mobilization ~~xxxxxx~~ plan, each military district had mobilization warehouses or centers stocked with all classes of supplies except Class I to initially equip the reservists of the district with the bare essentials for warfare. The maintenance of the armed forces in the districts were to have been undertaken by depots located in the districts.

How effective this set-up would have been is not known because the war caught the Philippines at a period when the system was just being started. However an analysis of the system ~~xxx~~ as applied at the outset of the war at Manila and certain other localities and during the campaign at Bataan will give an idea of the system's effectiveness and deficiencies.

The moment ~~xxxx~~ hostilities in the Philippines began the tremendous job of obtaining and transporting to the troops all available classes of supplies was placed under the responsibility of the Philippine and Bataan QM depots. In this endeavor local resources were exploited to the maximum. Particular emphasis was placed upon obtaining Class I supplies, as higher echelons of command realized from the outset that food would quickly become the most critical item.

Another job given to the QM Depots, which was at Manila then, was to augment these stocks, as well as those of all other classes of supply with locally obtained items.

With this in mind rice was obtained in large quantities despite the difficulties with laborers and with

broken down, dilapidated civilian trucks.

I do not know the exact amount of supplies obtained, sorted, and transported by the QMC from the time the war began until Manila was declared an open city, but have reason to believe that the following amounts of Class I supplies were delivered to the following advance depots in Luzon: to Tarlac (North Central), 17 train-loads; to Los Baños (South Central), 11 train-loads; to Gaugau (Central), 7 train-loads. These supplies consisted principally of American-type food-stuffs.

Large reserves of palay (unhusked rice) were located at Cabanatuan, a Government rice central. I do not know how effectively distribution of this rice was made, but have reason to believe that the bulk of it was abandoned and was taken by the local population and by the enemy.

Late on the night of December 24, 1941, the QM Depot moved to the Bataan Peninsula. By this time the enemy had complete control of the air over Luzon and was rapidly advancing with his ground forces to converge upon Manila.

Movement of all sorts on the highways and railroads was then difficult and hazardous. However, due to the brilliant leadership of General MacArthur, General Wainwright, and General Jones, evacuation of the American-Filipino forces into Bataan was satisfactorily accomplished. But this sudden change in the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ tactical situation created an insurmountable problem of supply: the large stocks of foods still in Manila and those previously sent to Los Baños and Tarlac, and the millions of pounds of palay at Cabanatuan, were perforce abandoned by the Army and lost, leaving the beleaguered Bataan force to fall back upon the meager supplies at Gaugau, those hastily shipped by water and highway from Manila, when MacArthur suddenly decided to shift his supply base to

Bataan in the latter part of December, supplies which had been brought in by various units in their own vehicles, and the very limited local resources of Bataan.

Immediately upon arrival at Bataan, on Christmas ~~Day~~ Day, 1949, the QMCP was set up at Km Post 163.3, near the barrio of Limay. Dumps and distribution points for Quartermaster supplies were immediately established to service the various fighting and ~~xx~~ service units.

~~Rather~~ Rather chaotic conditions existed at first on Bataan, as the units from all over Luzon came streaming in and established their positions and headquarters. However, due to the skillful management, hard work, and common sense of the top-ranking QM officers, commanded by Brig. Gen. C. C. Drake, supply was maintained, and few people went hungry or unclothed, despite the difficult situation.

After the first large-scale Japanese assault was thrown back at Abucay, it became apparent that our position would be relatively static until relief arrived, and that we would be in for a long siege.

By the first part of January it was possible to inventory the supplies on hand and determine the requirements of the using units. To our dismay it was found that, with the American Army, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Army, and Filipino civilians, we had to feed and clothe over 100,000 people. The answer was obvious--drastically reduce the food ration. This was a very serious step, but it was the only thing which could be done under existing circumstances if we were to maintain ourselves for a period long enough for help to arrive. Accordingly, on January 6, 1942, the ration was reduced to one-half of a ration per man per day; even then, many basic ingredients of this reduced ration were not ~~was~~ to be had.

The fighting at the front soon became stalemated, so that for many weeks the primary concern of many of our troops was not enemy bombs nor bullets but food. As food supplies got shorter, the men became hungrier and weaker, and a great deal of pilfering of supplies occurred. Due to this situation, and the need for very strict control of all issue of food, a considerable amount, including most of the type C ration, was shipped to Corregidor, where it was believed that it could be stored more safely, and from ~~xxx~~ which point could be distributed more fairly.

Early in January a large main QM dump was established near Little Baguio, at Km Post 169 on the ~~Mariveles~~ Road. From this dump supplies were moved daily to the various ration distributing points, and from these there ~~was~~ was daily automatic supply to consuming units. As the campaign wore on into February and March, fewer and fewer supplies were kept on Bataan. As a matter of fact, it was a policy to keep only a two-day supply of Class I supplies on hand at the main dump. This supply was replenished nightly with a one-day issue brought by barge from Corregidor. It is to the great credit of the Water Transport Service of the QMC that every delivery from Corregidor was safely made, even though the enemy had complete control of the air and operated light naval craft in Manila Bay.

One of the first acts of the QMC on Bataan was to establish a bakery. By the early part of January, under the able management of Major Harry H. Hull, QMC, this bakery was operating, and so long as the flour supply lasted, turned out sufficient breads of good quality, to supply all the troops. The flour supply, however failed

to last as long as the siege, and during the last few weeks of the campaign the bakery was forced to close down.

With so many Filipinos to feed, rice, of course, was a very critical item. Soon after January of 1942 our rice stocks reached a critical point, and it looked for a time as though we would be forced to surrender simply because we did not have enough rice. At one time-about the first of February-the rice issue got as low as two ounces per man per day. This is a very, very small ration and is not sufficient to maintain life, let along maintain a fighting man in top condition. However, just at the point where things looked the darkest, some inter-island boats from Cebu managed to break the Japanese blockade and reach Corregidor. These boats carried considerable stocks of rice, and enabled us to increase the ration, but only for a short while.

Every effort was made to exploit local resources to the maximum. Bataan is a very poor province and consists mostly of mountains and forests. However there is a small segment of the peninsula, near Manila Bay, on which rice is grown. At the time the war began, the rice in this area had been cut and piled in stacks, but had not been threshed. The QMC made every attempt to thresh this rice in the fields. This operation was very difficult, as much of the area was under enemy artillery fire, and all of it was subject to repeated Japanese bombings and strafing attacks. For this reason, Filipino civilians were loath to work in the fields, and only by the greatest persuasion could they be induced to harvest their rice. However, over 10,000 cavanese of palay was gathered in. Had the Filipinos not been so frightened, or had we had even as much as a single American-type threshing

machine, at least ten times this amount of palay could have been recovered. However, imagine yourself working with a group of twenty-five or thirty people out in the open fields where the nearest tree is a mile or so away; where there is no adequate cover close at hand; where enemy planes drowse lazily overhead at altitudes ranging from 50 to 25,00 feet, with out opposition of any sort; where these planes frequently bomb or strafe your group-then perhaps you can understand why the Filipino, and Americans too, were frightened, and why the operation was difficult. Great credit is due those few loyal and brave native souls who willingly risked their lives to garner in these few thousand bushels of palay.

At Orion and Balanga were rice mills. As the front contracted and these towns became a part of "No Man's Land," the mills were dismantled by the Corps of Engineers and taken to an area near the main QM ration dump, where they were reassembled. The palay taken from the fields was then brought to these mills for final milling and polishing.

This rice-gathering operation (perhaps in modern military jargon it ~~ex~~ would be known as "Operation Rice") was the responsibility of the Purchasing and Contracting Section of the QM Depot. This was perhaps a unique employment of P&C personnel. To them it meant that, rather than stay with the rear echelons, they went forward with trucks and men, and by display of leadership and initiative induced others, mostly Filipino farmers and refugees, to perform highly dangerous work. Illustrative of this experience was the fact that, while ~~ex~~ engaged in this operation, the car used by the head of the group was hit three times by bomb fragments, had four trucks demo-

lished, and lost seven men. From this the reader can get an idea that in at least one campaign P&C was not a rocking-chair rear-area job.

About the last of January it became necessary for our forces to withdraw from the flat lands of Bataan and set up new defensive positions. This put an immediate end to most of the rice-gathering operation and cut us off from the many thousands of bushels of rice still standing in stacks in "No Man's Land," around Orion and Balanga.

The QMCP was then moved to Little Baguio, as Limay had then come within enemy artillery range. From this ~~xxx~~ time on, QM activity was concerned almost entirely with distribution of supplies rather than with procurement, as there was little left to procure. The clothing-and-equipage dump was moved from Gabcaben and set up near the main ration dump, and issue was made from its meager stock~~x~~ to the most needy cases. A clothing-repair shop was established on the west side of Bataan, and civilian laborers were employed to mend and repair clothing. It seems almost comic now, but one of the biggest problems of this operation was securing needles for the machines. A supply of new needles was finally "procured" from a Chinaman found living in a cave in the side of Mt. Marivales. For this operation practically all the usable sewing-machines in Bataan were commandeered by the Army.

A salt-manufacturing plant (boiling sea-water in large iron cauldrons) was set up near the sea-shore. ~~2~~ By the end of the campaign enough salt was being produced to supply nearly all the salt requirements of the beleaguered forces. Only those who have ever eaten rice without salt can really appreciate the importance

of this condiment in our ration.

QM truck companies were kept busy throughout the campaign, transporting supplies and personnel and maintaining vehicles of all sorts. Under Colonel Michael Quinn, QMC, the Motor ~~Transport~~^t Transport Corps performed miracles of motor maintenance and operation on Bataan with makeshift materials, antiquated vehicles, and improvised shops.

Using the cars, trucks, and other motor vehicles which were on Bataan, the Motor Transport Corps set up various motor pools. The drivers and maintenance men for these vehicles were obtained from among the civilians in our midst. Great credit is due these drivers, as they showed no fear or hesitancy in driving their battered, beaten-up vehicles virtually into the face of the enemy on all types of missions. It should be mentioned that it was principally these vehicles which were used in the rice-gathering operation previously referred to, as they were considered more expendable than our few good American trucks.

From mid-February on, the situation on Bataan deteriorated rapidly, particularly because of lack of food and medical supplies. Besides the troops, there were tens~~e~~ of thousands of Filipino civilians who had to be cared for and provided with food, clothing, medical aid, and shelter by the Army. These people were a great but necessary burden to the armed forces. They were grouped ~~together~~ together in various civilian camps throughout the peninsula, and to each camp was assigned an American Officer-in-charge. This officer drew supplies from the QM on requisition, the same as all military units.

Two such camps were organized and run as labor work

camps by the QMC for a short period of time because laborers were needed to thresh palay, which had been transported in the sheath to the rear areas. Although this operation was highly inefficient, it did provide a few thousand bushels of rice which we would not otherwise have obtained. The straw from these threshing operations was ~~hired~~ baled by primitive hand methods, and the bales were turned over to the pack trains for feed. The laborers who threshed this palay were not only fed by the Army but were paid on-the-spot wages for their work. As soon as all the palay was threshed and the straw baled, the camps were turned over to GHQ and removed from QM control.

Another operation undertaken by the QMC, working in conjunction with the Veterinary Corps, was the procuring and slaughtering of the native carabao. Many hundreds of carabaos had been abandoned by their ~~own~~ owners in the face of the Japanese advance, and were running wild over all parts of Bataan. Accordingly a project was organized to obtain as many of these animals as possible for our use. A stock pen was set up to which were taken all carabaos obtained. Whenever a carabao was commandeered for the Army, every effort was made to ascertain the identity of the owner and reimburse him, either in cash or by voucher, for his animal. Many of the ~~owners~~ owners, of course, could not be identified, as they had abandoned their property. These carabaos were slaughtered at the stock pen, and their carcasses were shipped to Corregidor, where they were placed in the cold storage plant for freezing and storage. Nightly delivery of the frozen carcasses was made from Corregidor to Bataan. As this supply of meat, however, was entirely inadequate to supply the forces, great difficulty was experienced in

making fair and equitable distribution of such supply. As the food situation grew worse it became necessary to slaughter all the Army's horses and mules, except those of the pack-train. Every effort was likewise made to make fair distribution of this meat, but "leaks" along the line of supply from the QMDP to the using units were difficult problems.

We had very few cigarettes and cigars, and very little pipe tobacco with us on Bataan, and it was found, much to our dismay, that many men would go hungry to get a "Fag". The theoretical issue of tobacco throughout most of the campaign was one cigarette per man per day. With such meager issue it is not difficult to visualize the great leakage which existed along the lines of distribution. The problem of distributing cigarettes became so acute, even in the early stages of the campaign, that Colonel McConnell, Commanding Officer of the QM Depot, was forced to establish what he called a "special-issue counter," from which he personally issued all tobaccos. The number of items on this special-issued counter grew and grew as things became scarce, until Colonel McConnell was personally issuing at least two dozen items besides cigarettes.

As supplies became increasingly short, many complaints were made by receiving units. In order to protect himself the Quartermaster was forced to obtain receipts from every requisitioning unit as to the amount of each item actually received. Scarcely a day went by in the latter part of the campaign when one or more general officers failed to make personal inspections of QM activities. Thanks, however, to this system of receipts, and to a vigorous and honest QM administration, a

minimum of complaint was seriously leveled at the Quartermaster. The leakages in supply apparently occurred, in most instances, lower down in the line of distribution. It should be noted that the ration was determined by GHQ, and not by the operating QM. The QM function was merely to provide the ration to the requisitioning units in their pro-rata share.

As March drew to an end our situation on Bataan looked hopeless indeed. However, rumors were rife that help would soon arrive, and as a matter ^{of} fact, Seaman Cove, across the North Channel from Corregidor, actually had been put in readiness by the Engineers to receive supplies. The QM was organizing labor gangs to unload these supplies and disburse them to the various dumps. It was at this moment that the Japanese chose to launch their all-out attack on Bataan. Our men were weak from lack of food and sick from lack of quinine. The situation was simply untenable, and a few short days our lines gave way before the vicious Japanese Attacks and we were forced to capitulate to the enemy.

Heartbreaking it was indeed to learn, some years later, that those supplies which we were preparing to receive, and for which we had hoped and prayed so fervently, were actually aboard ship and at Cebu, waiting to come to Bataan under promised air and naval support, on the day of the surrender.

This, then, is a short story of the Quartermaster Depot activities in Manila and on Bataan. It is a story of an attempt to do something with nothing. It is ~~xxxx~~ primarily a story from which ~~x~~ surely we can all learn a lesson of preparedness. Had we been adequately supplied in the Philippines, had we even had our required war reserves safely stored away on Bataan, the story would likely have been very different.

A point worth considering, which had not been mention here-to-for and which was a direct factor that contributed to the inadequacy of the supply situation, was that the scope of the former logistical planning was the idea that the Philippines would carry out the mission of defending the islands for six months, after which time help would arrive from the United States. Due to this concept more emphasis was placed on strategy and tactics rather than on logistical support.

ANNEX 3

1. General aspects. The Philippines lies a few hundred miles to the southeast of the great continent of Asia, north of the Dutch and British Island of Borneo, and south of the island of Formosa. It consists of 7,100 islands extending in the form of a huge triangle 1,152 miles from north to south and 688 statute miles from east to west. Only 2,773 of the islands have names. The northmost island known as Y'Ami Island, is 65 miles from Formosa; while the southernmost island, called Salwag, which is $4^{\circ} 46'$ north of the equator, is only 30 miles east of Borneo. The total land area of country is about 115,600 square miles. This is larger than the combined area of the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware. It is about two-thirds the size of Spain; around 7,000 square miles smaller than the British Isles; 5,000 square miles larger than Italy; and more than twice as large as either Java or Cuba. The island of Luzon alone is as large as Denmark, Belgium and Holland combined; and Mindanao is about the size of Portugal.

2. Climate and Population. Lying within the Tropics, the Philippines has a truly tropical climate--warm days and usually cool nights. The most delightful month are November, December, January, February, and March. The days are clear, sunny, and dry, with a mean average temperature of 78° F (25.5° C), and the minimum temperature early in the morning is 17° F (9.5° C) lower than the maximum in the afternoon.

The climate of the Philippines is among the best in the Tropics. Generally speaking, it is agreeably warm, with beautiful early mornings, pleasant late afternoons, and cool nights, although there are some places in the

country which cannot strictly be so described. December, January, February, and March are Months nearly so ideal. Even in the months of April and May, many parts of the country, especially Manila, enjoy a cool breeze during some hours of the day. The rest of the year is rainy.

During the hot season the months are dry and warm with a maximum day temperature of 91° - 92° F (33° - 34° C) and a minimum night temperature of 70° - 73° F (21° - 24° C). Sunstroke is unknown in the Philippines.

The total population of the Philippines was 7,635,426 according to the census of 1903 and 10,314,310 ~~xxxxxx~~ according to census of 1918. The population in 1935 has been estimated at 13,000,000. The present population has been estimated by the Census Commission to be about 18,000,000.

On the basis of the above figures, the average density per square mile was 67 in 1903, 90 in 1918, and 132 in 1935, the population however, is unevenly distributed throughout the provinces and ranges (1935) from a density of 628 per square mile in Cebu and 576 in Iloilo to 15 in the Province of Agusan, Mindanao, and 13.5 in the Province of Nueva ~~Vizcaya~~ Vizcaya, Luzon. The Provinces of Pampanga and Pangasinan in the central plain of Luzon have a population density of 361 compared with 34 for the entire island of Mindanao. The Filipinos as a people have settled chiefly in areas along the coast rather than in the fertile valleys in the interior.

5. Agriculture and Commerce.a. The Philippines is primarily an agricultural country. The country is favoured with soil and climatic conditions which are adapted to the growing of agricultural products. The principal crops are rice, abaca (Manila hemp), sugar cane, coconut, tobacco, corn, and maguey. About 80 per cent of the goods exported

from the Philippines were agricultural products, mainly ~~sugar~~ sugar, coconut products, abaca, and tobacco products.

b. Sugar. The Philippines was one of the major sugar-producing countries of the world prior to World War ~~III~~ II. This country followed India, Java, the Japanese, and the United States in the order of their importance. The production of centrifugal sugar by the sugar centrals during 1935-~~13~~ 1937 was estimated at 1,004,449 long tons. The quota of 973,000 short tons allowed by the Tydings-McDuffid Law represents roughly 65 per cent of the normal milling capacities of the centrals. Sugar was the leading export product of the Philippines, the value of sugar shipments represented 35 per cent of all Philippine exports. It has been estimated that 2,000,000 people were dependent upon the sugar industry, in which the capital invested was placed at around \$225,000,000 and contributed about 40 per cent of the total revenues of the Government.

c. Coconut. The Philippines was the second largest producer of coconut in the world, being excelled only by the Netherlands East Indies, and was the world's principal exporter of coconut products with about one-third of the world copra trade to its credit. The coconut palm is grown in every province, and for the year ending June 30, 1937, 635,940 hectares, or around 25 per cent of the ~~xx~~ cultivated area of the country, were devoted to this crop. In point of area under cultivation, the coconut industry ~~xxxxxxx~~ ranks second in importance, being surpassed only by rice. Philippine coconut products were exported to 24 countries. There were about 4,000,000 people dependent upon the ~~x~~ industry, in which more than \$150,000,000 was invested. Revenues derived from the industry, was estimated at \$3,500,000.

d. Abaca. The Philippines still enjoys a virtual

monopoly of abaca production in the world. The plant^t has been introduced into several ~~countries~~ countries that are tropical, but no fiber produced in any other country has yet equalled the best Philippine grade. The fiber production for the year 1937 amounted to 200,627 metric tons. Although about 15 per cent of the country's cultivated area was devoted to abaca, sugar, and coconut products. About 2,500,000 people are directly or indirectly dependent upon the industry, and the investment in the business totalled \$42,500,000. The industry gave the Philippine Government an average income of about \$1,000,000 annually.

e. Rice Rice constitutes the staple food of the Philippines. The area cultivated to rice, which amounted to approximately 2,000,000 hectares, represented 48 per cent of the area planted to leading crops,. Palay was grown in every province of the Philippines, but principally in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. But due to the insufficiency of local production, rice had to be imported from abroad.

f. Corn. Corn largely supplants rice in the diet of the people of Cebu, Bohol, Oriental Negros, Western Leyte and northern Mindanao. Over half a million hectares were annually cultivated for the production of corn.

g. Other Products. Other agricultural products grown in the Philippines are the following: bananas, sweet potatoes, mangoes, cassava, lanzones, cacao, pineapples, papayas, coffee, rubber, peanuts, kapok, lumang, pilinuts, mandarin, sugar, apples, oranges, pomelas, chicos, soursops, custard apples, cotton, castor beans, and Irish ~~pk~~ potatoes.

h. Foreign Commerce. The overseas trade of the Philippines had progressed rapidly during the four decades under the American administration. The peak was registered in 1929 when the total trade aggregated \$311,607,117 of

which \$164,446,843 represented the value of exports, the highest on record, and that of imports, \$147,160,275. Imports reached the highest mark in 1920 when they registered \$149,438,283.

The greater portion of the trade was carried on with the United States. Ever since commercial relations between the United States and the Philippines began, the former had been an important outlet for Philippine exports. Free trade with the United States which was established in 1909 stimulated the export trade of the Philippines, so that the American market is today, as ever, the most important outlet of Philippine products. Being mainly an industrial manufacturing country, the United States is an excellent export field for raw materials and other tropical products of the Philippines. It is not surprising, therefore, that around 81 per cent of the Philippines annual export find their way to that vast and profitable ~~markety~~ market.

The value of Philippine imports from the United States totalled, in 1938, \$90,357,229, or the third highest in the history of Philippine-American trade relations. The United States in 1938 supplied 68 per cent of the total imports, the highest percentage on ~~xxxxxx~~ record.

Exports to the United States made up 77 per cent of the total export to all countries.

Thus the Philippines was not only a good source of raw materials for the United States but was also a valuable and growing market for American goods. The increasing ~~xx~~ sales of Philippine exports in the United States had made possible the remarkable increase in the importation of American products to the Philippines. It is evident, therefore, that the United States played a dominant role, not only in the export trade to the Philippines, but, also in the import trade.

The principal exports of the Philippines to the United States prior of the war were sugar, coconut oil, copra, ~~xxxx~~ embroideries, desiccated coconut, abaca, tobacco and tobacco products, canned pineapples, copra meal, lumber and timber, and cutch,.

The leading imports of the Philippine were as follows: iron and steel products, cotton goods, automobiles and trucks, including accessories and tires, mineral oils, tobacco products, paper and its manufactures, electrical machinery, apparatus, and its appliances, chemicals, drugs, dyes, and medicines, meat and dairy products, wheat flour, fruits and nuts, and fertilizers.

Japan was the second leading market as well as the second principal supplier of imported goods of the Philippine .

The leading exports of the Philippines to Japan, in the order of importance, were abaca, iron ore, lumber and timber, copper ore, manganese, ore, tobacco products, maguey, canton fiber, and ramie fiber.

In exchange for these products, the Philippines imported ~~from~~ ^{from} Japan cotton goods, silk and its manufactures, iron and steel manufactures, vegetables, fish and fish products, glass and glassware, coal and coke, cement, hats and caps, and India rubber and its manufactures.

Great Britain was the third leading buyer of the Philippines and the seventh among the important sellers to the Islands.

The Philippines exports ~~to~~ to Great Britain were abaca, lumber and ~~xxxx~~ timber, hats maguey, tobacco and its manufactures, ~~The~~ canton ~~xxxx~~ fibers, gums and x resins, and shells and its manufactures. The leading imports of the Philippines from that country were the following: cotton goods; iron and steel manufactures; spirits, wines and liquors; vegetable fibers and its manufactures; wool and

its manufactures; and silk goods and oils.

Netherlands was the fourth leading market of the Philippines and ranked sixth among the suppliers of Philippine imports.

Among the leading products exported to Netherlands may be mentioned copra, copra meal, abaca, coconut oil, tobacco and its manufactures, maguey, lumber and timber, and knotted hemp. The principal imports of the Philippines from Netherlands were dairy products, fertilizers, cotton goods, meat products, paper and its manufactures, electrical machinery, diamonds and other precious stones, iron and steel goods, flavoring extracts, and spirits, wines and liquors.

France ranked fifth among the leading markets of the Philippines although she occupied only the twelfth among the principal suppliers of the Philippines.

France imported from the Philippines abaca, copra, tobacco and its manufactures, maguey, copra meals, gums and resins, hats and canton ~~fiber~~ fiber. The Philippines in turn bought from France cotton goods, iron and steel manufactures, perfumery and other toilet preparations, diamonds and other precious stones, silk and its manufactures, spirits, wines and liquors, and ~~xxx~~ paper and its manufactures.

The other leading buyers of the Philippines were Germany, Spain, China, Hongkong, and Italy in the order of importance.

Germany ranked third among the leading exporters to the Philippines.

China ranked fourth among the principal suppliers of the Philippines.

Other principal sellers to the Philippine were the Dutch East Indies, British East Indies, Australia, and Belgium.

Sugar constituted the most important export of the Philippines, and made up 43 per cent of the value of all exports. Around 99.9 per cent of the total annual exports were shipped

to the United States.

The other nine leading exports of the Philippines were as follows: copra, coconut oil, abaca, embroideries, tobacco and its manufactures, desiccated coconut, lumber and timber, copra meal, and iron ore.

The other important exports of the Philippines ~~were~~ worth mentioning are copper ore, cordage, chrome ore, lard and butter substitutes, mangnaese ore, cutch, maguey, hats, gums and resins, buntal fiber, hides and skins, shells and its manufactured, knotted hemp, distilled spirits, fish and fish products, fruits and nuts, and molasses and ~~syr~~ syrup.

The Philippines is a great importer of manufactured products. The twelve major imports, were as follow: iron and steel and manufactures, cotton goods, mineral oils, automobiles and trucks including accessories and tires, tobacco products, paper and its manufactures, wheat flour, dairy products, chemicals, drugs, dyes, and medicines, electrical machinery, apparatus, and appliances, and silk and its manufactures.

It may be mentioned in passing that the Philippines was among the best markets for American products. This country was first in the consumption of United States cotton manufactures, dairy products, cigarettes, canned sardines, whear flour, toilet preparations, and automobile tires. The Philippines was also the fourth customer of the United States in total leather and manufactures, and in vegetables and preparations thereof, and third in rayon goods and its manufactures. It was also among the first ten buyers in other items, like meat products, natural silk and its manufactures, fruits and nuts, iron and steel manufactures, medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, and paints, pigments and varnishes.

Commercial Possibilities. The Philippines, because of its strategic position in the international commercial routes in the Far East, can serve as a convenient distributing point for the Asiatic trade especially of the United States. It lies in the very center of the Far East-the important countries from Australia in the south and almost a semicircle with Manila in the Middle.

Fishing is one of the most important industries in the Philippines, but the methods of fishing, preserving, and transporting the fish products are still crude. Along the coasts food fishes are found in abundance. Almost 2,000 kinds of fish most of which are edible, are found in Philippine waters. The fishing industry would be highly profitable if scientific deep sea fishing and modern methods of fish-canning and preservation be adopted.

The Philippine is rich in minerals. Among the more important minerals and mineral products which occur in greater or lesser quantities are the following: gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, manganese, chromium, coal, petroleum, asphalt, and related bitumens; asbestos, gypsum, mineral waters, guano and phosphate rock, salt sulphur, cement, clay products, lime, and building and ornamental stone. Gold was by far the most important of the minerals produced.

Fish, vegetable, and fruit canning were developed to a certain extent, though the excessive production of fish, vegetables, and fruits a certain seasons, not to speak of the greater production that could doubtless result through the development of the canning industry, would have been sufficient to maintain several large canneries.

Marine products such as pearls, coral shells, sponges, trepangs, and many others, all of which are found in abundance in the Philippine waters, were little developed.

Soil and climatic conditions make the Philippines an ideal place for the cultivation of rubber. It is believed that the extensive areas suitable for growing rubber in Mindanao and in the island of Basilan can supply the entire world demand for rubber. At present the rubber is barely developed. More capital is needed to develop the extensive potential rubber plantations of the Philippines.

Lumber, rattan, gums, resins, and other minor forest products offer great opportunities to investors.

As a conclusion to the above discussion, I would like to say that if the production levels, which were attendant at the outbreak of the war, could be attained as rapidly as possible and further developed to make the major islands in the self-sufficient in its basic food requirements and still have a considerable emergency reserve, the Philippines in my opinion would be able to support a modern army and its civilian population in a protracted war regardless of the handicaps which geography imposes on the islands.

The geographical, economic, commercial, and industrial aspects of the Philippines predicate that all major islands be economically self-sufficient from a logistical point of view.

We will now examine the economic and industrial capacity of the Philippine Islands. In as much as the economic standing of a country is dependent to a large degree on its export and how it balances with its imports, I will give you a comparison of the import-export picture in 1941 and in 1945. This comparison is shown below:

<u>IMPORTS</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>% Decrease</u>
Textiles	₱ 60,612, 038	₱ 2,752,887	95%
Metals	51, 587,058	3,307,855	94%
Tobacco	16,627,966	2,309,828	89%
Grains	16,010,420	12,058,873	25%
Meat and Dairy products	13,683,282	7,448,075	45%
Automobiles, tires	13,038,970	2,726,465	79%
Paper and Manufactures	13,000,712	2,174,424	83%
Non-metallic minerals	10,912,272		100%
Chemicals, drugs, dyes	10,205,974	2,978,503	70%
Vegetables and Preparations	4,203,122	2,606,147	38%
Beverages, Wines, liquors		5,694,782	
Other	61,340,966	13,710,355	77%
<u>EXPORTS</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>% Decrease</u>
Minerals and metals	₱ 110,703,037	₱ 50,000	99%
Coconuts and products	66,603,065	1,000,000	98%
Sugar and products	54,742,904		100%
Fibers and Manufactures	90,668,325	795,233	97.5%
Cotton:	9,415,555	47,520	99%
Embroideries			
Timber, lumber and logs	8,874,925	4,452	99%
Tobacco	7,208,387	3,550	99%
Manufactures			
Fruits	7,208,387	37,000	100%
Animal product, inedible	912,609	37,000	95%
Rubber	841,368	137,899	85%
Manufactures	4,567,428		
Other	4,567,428		100%

At the end of 1947 the Philippine exports had generally increased thirty-five percent and the imports forty-two percent. It can be seen that it will take several years before a stable economic balance between imports and exports can be reached.

The Philippines, as a whole, before the war was not completely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, particularly cereal and cereal products. Since a high proportion of the Filipino diet is commonly made up of cereals, substantial quantities of the basic foodstuffs, which were taken care of from the local production of rice, corn, sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, peanuts and minor root crops, were augmented by the supply of imported cereal and cereal products. There supplemental quantities were rice, wheat flour, corn grain and starch, mongo beans, Irish potatoes, macaroni, and vermicelli.

Appendix I to Annex shows the basic supply available from local production compared with requirements based on the average consumption of these commodities for the Philippines by regions in 1941. The calculations showed out of the total of 1,826,000 metric tons of the basic foodstuff consumed, 1,665,000 metric tons were locally produced and 161,000 metric tons were imported. The calculations were based on the population of the Philippines in 1941 by regions, the average of the estimates of the productions made for three years ending June 1941, and the average quantity of foodstuffs consumed in each region as per its population for a period of three years. Quite clearly this figures would not show what and how much of each item actually was consumed in a given region before the war, because each region had incoming and outgoing food materials. What they were intended to show was the approximate extent to which each region would have been self-sufficient, in these basic items of food, if it had had available only what was produced locally.

The surpluses or deficits as found in these calculations are themselves not statements of these requirements. The requirement ~~requirement~~ of any region~~st~~ will depend upon the standards

of consumption that are adopted, upon increases or decreases in the production of these crops since 1939, or possibly upon the changes in population which may have occurred.

According to these calculations Central Luzon and the Cagayan Valley regions were strongly surplus while most, of the other larger islands south of Luzon were deficient.

Again it can be shown that most of the islands, with the probable exception of Luzon and Mindanao, would have to depend more or less to those islands that have surpluses of supplies.

Sympathetic areas adjacent to the Philippines may, to some extent, cover up the economic deficiencies, but this would during hostilities, be extremely difficult to depend upon due to the great requirements for transportation facilities. It will suffice to say that not all of the major islands have ports that are capable of handling the great amounts of tonnages of supplies necessary for sustenance.

AGGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES

Considering the desire of the government of the Republic of the Philippines to obtain assistance in the training and development of its armed forces and the procurement of equipment and supplies therefor during the period immediately following the independence of the Philippines, considering the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, signed March 14, 1947, and in view of mutual interest of the two Governments in matters of common defense, the President of the United States of America has authorized the rendering of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines towards establishing and maintaining national security and towards forming a basis for participation by that Government in such defensive military operations as the future may require, and to attain these ends the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America have agreed as follows:

Title I

PURPOSE AND DURATION

Article I.- Subject to mutual agreements, the Government of the United States of America will furnish military assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces and in the performance of other services essential to the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon the Republic of the Philippines under its international agreements including commitments assumed under the United Nations and to the maintenance of the peace and security of the Philippines, as provided in Title II, Article 6, hereof.

Article 2.- This agreement shall continue for a period of five years from July 4, 1946, unless previously terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.

Article 3.- If the Government of the Republic of the Philippines should desire that this Agreement be extended beyond the stipulated period, it shall make a written proposal to that effect at least one year before the expiration of this Agreement.

Article 4.- This Agreement may be terminated before the expiration of the period of five years prescribed in Article 2, or before the expiration of an extension authorized in Article 3, by either Government, subject to three months' written notice to the other Government.

Article 5.- It is agreed on the part of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines that title to all arms, vessels, aircraft, equipment and supplies, expendable items excepted, that are furnished under this Agreement on a non-reimbursable basis shall remain in the United States of America.

Title II

GENERAL

Article 6.- For the purposes of this Agreement the military assistance authorized in Article I, hereof is defined as the furnishing of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies; certain aircraft and naval vessels, and instruction and training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States and shall include the following:

(a) Establishing in the Philippines of a United States Military Advisory Group composed of a Army group, a Navy group and an Air group to assist and advise the Republic of the Philippines on military and naval matters;

(b) Furnishing from United States sources equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of Philippine armed forces of such strength and Composition as mutually agreed upon:

(c) Facilitating the procurement by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines of a military reserve of United States equipment and supplies, in such amounts as may be subsequently agreed upon;

(d) Making available selected facilities of United States Army and Navy training establishments to provide training for key personnel of the Philippine armed forces, under the conditions hereinafter described.

Title III

MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

Article 7.- The Military Advisory Group shall consist of such number of United States Military personnel as may be agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Article 8.- The functions of the Military Advisory Group shall be to provide such advice and assistance to the Republic of the Philippines as has been authorized by the Congress of the United States of America and as is necessary to accomplish the Purposes set forth in Article I of this Agreement.

Article 9.- Each member of the Military Advisory Group shall continue as a member of the branch of the armed forces of the United States to which he belongs and serve with that group in the rank, grade or rating he holds in the armed forces of the United States and shall wear the uniform thereof, as provided in current regulations. Officers and enlisted men so detailed are authorized to accept from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines offices and such pay and emoluments thereunto appertaining as may be offered by that Government and approved by the appropriate authorities of the United States Government for remittance to the individual if in the opinion of the appropriate authorities of the United States such course appears desirable.

Article 10. Members of the Military Advisory Group shall serve under the direction of the authorities of the United States of America.

Article III All members of the Group shall be on active duty and shall be paid regularly authorized pay and allowances by the Government of the United States of America, plus a special allowance

to compensate for increased costs of living. This special allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America and shall be revised periodically. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall reimburse the Government of the United States of America for the special allowances provided for in this Article. The special allowance shall be applicable for the entire period each member of the group resides in the Philippines on duty with the Group, except as specified elsewhere in the Agreement.

Article 12,- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees to extend to the Military Advisory Group the same exemptions and privileges granted by Articles V, XII, and XVIII of the Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases, signed March 14, 1947.

Article 13.- Except as may be otherwise subsequently agreed by the two Governments, the expense of the cost of transportation of each member of the Military Advisory Group, his dependents, household effects, and belongings to and from the Philippines shall be borne by the Government of the United States of America to the extent authorized by law. Members of the Group shall be entitled to compensation for expenses incurred in travel in the Republic of the Philippines on official business of the Group and such expenses shall be reimbursed to the Government of the United States of America by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines except for expenses of travel by the transportation facilities of the Group.

Article (14).- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall provide, and defray the cost of, suitable living quarters for personnel of the Military Advisory Group and their families and suitable buildings and office space for use in the conduct of the official business of the Military Advisory Group. All living and office quarters shall conform to the standards prescribed by the United States military services for similar quarters. Official

supplies and equipment of American manufacture ~~required~~ by the Group shall be furnished by the Government of the United States of America which shall be reimbursed for the cost thereof by the Government of the United States ^{and} of the Republic of the Philippines. Official supplies and equipment of other than American manufacture shall be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Official supplies and equipment of other than American manufacture shall be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The cost of all services required by the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Article 15.- All communications between the Military Advisory Group and the Republic of the Philippines involving matters of policy shall be through the Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines.

Article 16.- (a). The provisions of Articles XIII and XXI of the Agreement of March 14, 1947 between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases are applicable to the Military Advisory Group, it being agreed that the Headquarters of the Military Advisory Group will be considered a temporary installation under the provisions of Article XXI of the group to be designated by him, will be accorded diplomatic immunity.

(b) The chief of the Military Advisory Group, and not to ~~exceed~~ ^{exceed} six (6) other senior members of the group to be designated by him * will be accorded diplomatic immunity.

Title IV

LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

Article 17.- The decision as to what supplies, services, facilities, equipment and naval vessels are necessary for military

assistance shall be the Philippines and the United States.

Article 18.- Certain initial equipment, supplies and maintenance items shall be furnished gratuitously by the United States in accordance with detailed arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. Additional equipment and supplies other than those surplus to the needs of the United States required in the furtherance of military assistance shall be furnished by the United States subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines on terms to be mutually agreed upon. All items of arms, munitions, equipment and supplies originating from sources other than those surplus to the needs of the United States shall be furnished only when the requisite funds have been specifically appropriated by the congress of the United States.

Article 19.- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees that it will not relinquish physical possession or pass the title to any and all arms, munitions, equipment, supplies, naval vessels and aircraft furnished under this Agreement without the specific consent of the Government of the United States.

Article 20.- Military equipment, supplies and naval vessels necessary in connection with the carrying out of the full program of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines shall be provided from Philippines and United States sources in so far as practicable and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure arms, ammunition, military equipment and naval vessels from governments or agencies other than the United States of America. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure United States military equipment, supplies and naval vessels only as mutually agreed upon.

Title V

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

Article 21.- As part of the program of military assistance the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be permitted to send selected students to designated technical and service

schools of the ground, naval and air services of the United States. Such students shall be subject to the same regulation as are United States students and may be returned to the Philippines, without substitutions, for violation of such regulations. Numbers of students and detailed arrangements shall be mutually agreed upon and shall be kept at a minimum for essential requirements. All Philippine requests for military training of Filipino personnel shall be made to the Government of the United States through the Military Advisory Group.

Title VI

SECURITY

Article 22.- Disclosures and exchanges of classified military equipment and information of any security classification to or between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America will be with the mutual understanding that the equipment and information will be safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the information with military security classification established thereon by the originating Government and that no ~~redisclosure~~ ^{redisclosure} by the recipient Government of such equipment and information to third governments or unauthorized personnel will be made without specific approval of the originating Government.

Article 23.- So long as this Agreement, or any extension thereof, is in effect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall not engage or accept the services of any personnel of any Government other than the United States of America for duties of any nature connected with the Philippines armed forces, except by mutual agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.

Title VII

In witness whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement in duplicate, in the City of Manila, this twenty-first day of March, 1947.

For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:

MANUEL ROXAS

President of the Philippines

For the Government of the United States of America:

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to the
Republic of the Philippines.

