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THESIS

**WHY DO DIFFERENT TYPES OF AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES PROVIDE DIFFERENT LEVELS
OF PUBLIC GOODS?**

by

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September 2020

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PROVIDE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PUBLIC GOODS?**

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ABSTRACT

Why do different types of authoritarian regimes provide different levels of public goods? This thesis compares Chad's personalist political regime to Gabon's single-party regime in terms of their provision of different levels of public goods. The research suggests that a regime's type, its survival strategies, and its vulnerability impact public goods distribution. More specifically, personalist regimes, like those in Chad since independence, that rely principally on coercive survival strategies are less likely to prioritize public goods distribution. By contrast, party regimes can use a wider array of survival strategies, including public goods provision, to remain in power. In both countries, greater oil revenue contributes to greater investments in public goods. The thesis informs theories of authoritarian regime behavior and political stability by examining the relationship between authoritarian regime type and public goods distribution in oil-producing states.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DGSSIE	General Directorate of State Security
EA	Electoral Authoritarianism
FROLINAT	National Liberation Front of Chad
GDP	gross domestic product
GNI	gross national income
GWF	Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz
HDI	Human Development Index
MPS	Patriotic Salvation Movement
PDG	Gabonese Democratic Party
PPT	Chadian Progressive Party
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNIR	National Union for Independence and Revolution

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

There exists very wide variation in the extent to which authoritarian governments provide public goods and services, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to their populations. Authoritarian governments are among both the best and worst in terms of public goods provision. Even among oil-producing authoritarian states in Africa, such as Gabon and Chad, there is wide variation in public goods provision. One potential reason for this variation is that there are many different types of authoritarian regime and power structure. This thesis addresses the question of whether and why different types of authoritarian regime provide different levels of public goods to their populations. It pays particular attention to this question in the context of oil-producing African states, specifically Chad and Gabon.

This thesis argues that Chad and Gabon provide different levels of public goods because their regimes face different types of threats and, as a result, have different survival strategies and different time horizons. The personalist regimes in Chad provide low levels of public goods because, in the face of irregular and violent threats of extra-constitutional removal, the regimes have operated with short time horizons and have relied primarily on coercion to survive. The Gabonese single-party regime on the other hand, has primarily faced threats of removal through regular elections, and has adopted public goods provision as one of their five survival strategies. Thus, one of the main findings of the thesis is that time horizons are less important than the types of threats that leaders face: institutionalized electoral threats lead to more public goods provision and non-institutionalized threats of overthrow lead to fewer public goods. Additionally, in both states, oil revenue provides the regimes with resources to both enable survival tactics like patronage and fund public goods. Thus, when countries produce oil for longer, they are more likely to have higher levels of public goods irrespective of their regime type.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

According to Freedom House, 61% of the world's population lives in countries that are not completely free meaning that, even as democracy movements grow across the world, a majority of the world's population, lives under some form of authoritarian regime.¹ African states are disproportionately authoritarian, score low on human development measures, and have the fastest growing populations on earth. In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, only 12% of the population lives under regimes that are classified as "free."² Whether this large and growing segment of the population is likely to receive basic goods and services such as healthcare, education, water and critical infrastructure has implications for domestic and international security, economic growth and political stability.

A study of authoritarian regimes and human development will help us better understand states and how international donors and development practitioners can possibly improve the lives of citizens. This work will examine in detail elements that improve human development, such as what political mechanisms seek to improve primary education or infrastructure development. If the international donor community better understands what political incentives improve the lives of its citizens, then they can more efficiently utilize their provided funds.

The thesis also has implications for institutional reform programs. Institutional reforms often fail when applying international best practices, such as the "Washington Consensus," because they do not take political context into account. This study better assists in understanding the political incentives that drive authoritarian leaders to deliver or not deliver public goods to their populations. If we can understand how and why states provide different levels of public goods, then we may be able to devise foreign assistance and governance programs to more effectively improve the lives of people on the fastest growing continent on Earth.

¹ "Freedom in the World 2018," Freedom House, accessed November 29th, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>.

² "Sub-Saharan Africa," Freedom House, November 29th, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa>.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction to Debate

To begin looking at which types of authoritarian regimes provide better public goods for its citizens, one has to first understand the different types of regimes and public goods. The literature on authoritarian regimes focuses primarily on how they differ from democracies, rather than on their varying capacity to enhance human development. Most of the literature on authoritarian regimes studies the differing nature of their political networks and what methods they use to remain in power after the third wave of democratization. Another smaller school of literature looks at economic and human development inside authoritarian regimes when compared both to democracies and to each other. All tend to use a wide examination lens that does not allow for an in-depth analysis within the institutions themselves that could provide insight into authoritarian regimes and their effect on public goods.

2. Authoritarian Regime Types

There is a growing literature recognizing the many different types of authoritarian regimes and how they differ. One of the most cited works in this area is by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (GWF), who wrote *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*; a comprehensive guide to authoritarian regimes.³ They identify four different types of dictatorships: monarchies, military dictatorships, civilian personalist rule, and single-party states.⁴ Authoritarian regimes typically emerge in a few ways: rigging an election, gradual removal of rights from a democracy, or violent take over. In turn, authoritarian regimes end either by a coup, uprising, rebellion, civil war, or foreign takeover, if the system for choosing leaders changes, or if the incumbent or allies lose an election to a different party.⁵ GWF's research opened a discussion into authoritarian

³ Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 5.

⁴ I do not focus on monarchies in this literature review because there are very few monarchies in the world, and only one (Eswatini) in sub-Saharan Africa.

⁵ Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 12.

regimes differences, but it does not look at the effects of that variation when it comes to public goods distribution or development.

a. *Military Dictatorship*

Military dictatorships are typically short-lived regimes led by a faction of military officers who, when faced with antigovernment opposition, typically turn over power to a competitive government. The literature on military dictatorship is based around Geddes' work (1999). She states that military dictatorships begin when a faction of military officers decide who will rule over a state and influence policy decisions.⁶ Since the same mechanism that allowed a faction to take over remains a threat of division over policy decisions in the face of hazardous situations, officers often choose to return to their former post in the military. Jay Ulfelder (2005) remarks that military officers value the survival of the military as an institution above all else, which is sharply different from all other authoritarian regimes.⁷ Since they have an easy route out of government, they typically can retain former (more preferred) careers and statuses, and allow military regimes to end with negotiations for a new transitional civilian government.⁸ They are rarely removed from power with force.⁹ Often mistaken with personalist regimes, not all regimes led by an individual in military uniform are military dictatorships; if the regime revolves around one individual who is above the law and the consent of the other officers, it becomes a personalist regime.¹⁰

b. *Civilian Personalist*

In a civilian personalist regime, power revolves around the office of one individual, whose removal often leads to violence for control. Such regimes are very resistant to

⁶ Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA; 1999, 7.

⁷ Jay Ulfelder, "Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes" *International Political Science Review* 26, no. 3 (July 2005): 318.

⁸ Geddes, 18.

⁹ Geddes, 21.

¹⁰ Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, "Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46, no. 4 (December 2011): 402.

internal splits due to their centralized network until the leader dies; they then subsequently collapse due to violent upheaval over the struggle among rival leaders for power.¹¹ Geddes specifically describes a personalist regime as one where an individual triumphs during a struggle for power, and draws support from the organization of origin; while this may initially be effective, it often limits their supporters' influence on policy and personnel decisions.¹² Due to the cost of losing power for a personalist leader, which is often death or exile, they will typically only transition out of power through force, and will commonly renege on any agreements.¹³ Personalism is uniquely more repressive than other authoritarian regimes. That is due to their weakness to gain broad regime support among the population, since they often lack a strong party or an ideological base. Any alternative control system within or outside of the personalist regime becomes a threat to it that will likely be met with repression. Additionally, personalist dictators often retain personal control over the security services, and the security services therefore become linked to regime survival, which lowers their barrier to use violence to protect the regime.¹⁴ Often, the leader forms a political party to handle the administration of the government, but the party itself does not have independent decision making abilities.¹⁵ Personalist regimes can transform into single-party states only if they relinquish influence to their supporting bodies.

c. Single Party

Single-party regimes are to some extent similar to democracies in their structure of power sharing and opposition inclusion. Geddes describes single-party regimes as one party dominating access to political office and policy while at the same time, other parties may exist and compete in elections.¹⁶ Single-party regimes are the most resilient of all

¹¹ Geddes, 8.

¹² Geddes, 9.

¹³ Geddes, 23.

¹⁴ Erica Frantz et al., "Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships," *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 374.

¹⁵ Geddes, 7.

¹⁶ Geddes, 7.

types, and are seldom defeated internally, instead they are usually bested by outside forces.¹⁷ She argues that the strategy of the ruling coalition is to coopt potential opposition, through tactics such as including the opposition in the legislature and often promoting opposition demands.¹⁸ Charron and Lapuente add that single-party regimes are more receptive to citizens demands because they have a built in system to channel citizen's voices via the party.¹⁹ Gandhi and Przeworski remark that single-party regimes have to create their own mobilization support network, which ties the party to more of the population and ultimately helps to build the party's strength.²⁰ Single-party regimes can feasibly transition into multi-party competitive democracies through a contested election in which an opposition party wins and changes power.

3. Democracy vs. Authoritarianism in the Provision of Public Goods

A debate exists over the ability of authoritarian regimes to provide public goods. To a large extent, this debate has compared authoritarian regimes to democracies; specifically examining whether democracies have a clear advantage at public goods distribution. The democratic advantage in public goods distribution is thought to primarily rest on electoral contestation; in other words, citizens ostensibly demand, through elections, more public goods from the government. Open authoritarian regimes that feature elections are more common than closed autocracies, which do not hold elections, yet there is little discussion in the debate over the differences among the regimes that hold elections, and their public goods advantages or disadvantages. Although they are not subject to traditional democratic forms of accountability, authoritarian leaders often form some kind of contract with their citizens that involves public goods provision. In some cases, electoral contests – even if not completely competitive, free or fair -- are a factor that could impact public goods distribution in authoritarian regimes. Lastly, one strand of this literature

¹⁷ Geddes, 8.

¹⁸ Geddes, 26.

¹⁹ Charron and Lapeunte, 399.

²⁰ Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships." *Economics & Politics* 18, no. 1 (March 2006): 15. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x>.

examines the relationship between authoritarian regime types and their quality of government, responsiveness to citizen demands, and corruption.

The literature comparing democracy and autocracy begins with the consensus view that democracies are inherently superior at public goods provision. Robert Deacon (2009), Martin McGuire and Mancur Olson (1996), argue this position in their research. Deacon argues a similar position to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) about the importance of the size of the winning coalition. Many democracies have larger winning coalitions than other forms of government, thus, their audience for public goods will also be greater. This is in contrast to most autocracies, many of which have smaller, elite-dominated coalitions.²¹

There is also literature supporting the opposite claim; namely, that democracy is not distinctively superior at delivering public goods. Michael Ross (2006) and Rory Truex (2017) argue that the previous studies of democracy, authoritarian regimes and public goods provision are not as clear cut as is often accepted. Truex compares democracies and authoritarian states using Polity and GWF regimes with 14 public goods dependent variables. He finds that the democratic advantage over authoritarian regimes is minimal: life expectancy and infant mortality are nearly the same, and when considering student-teacher ratios, autocracies perform better.²² Ross makes a similar argument; noting the equivalent infant mortality rates between regime types, but also highlighting how authoritarian regimes are possibly better suited to providing goods to all social classes rather than focusing primarily on the middle class. He finds that democracies spend more money than authoritarian states, but due to having larger winning coalitions, they seek to please the median voter (often a middle-income voter), ultimately leaving out public goods preference for the poor.²³

²¹ Robert Deacon, "Public Good Provision Under Dictatorship and Democracy," *Public Choice* 139, no. 1 (April 2009): 260; Martin C. McGuire, and Mancur Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 72–96; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press; 2003).

²² Rory Truex, "The Myth of the Democratic Advantage." *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)* 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 275.

²³ Michael Ross, "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 860.

A third perspective emphasizes that authoritarian regimes may provide many or few public goods. They provide goods to stay in power, to gain support ahead of elections or to garner a larger winning coalition. This raises the question of which types of authoritarian regimes provide more public goods and why.

4. Why Authoritarian Regimes Provide Public Goods

Authoritarian regimes are often viewed as providing public goods as a bargain between the elites and the common people. Raj Desai, Anders Olofsgard, and Tarik Yousef (2008) introduced the concept of an authoritarian bargain, which is an implicit arrangement between elites and citizens, similar to a social contract in that citizens relinquish political influence in exchange for public spending.²⁴ Authoritarian states have often used public welfare spending instead of repression in order to maintain power.

This logic is often applied to oil exporting authoritarian states. They can maintain regime durability by using oil revenue to invest in public goods for their population, without having to resort to violent repression. Ben Smith (2004), and GWF (2015), wrote about the durability of oil exporting authoritarian states, stating that they have a lower likelihood of civil war and antigovernment protests.²⁵ Smith argues that oil exporting states use their export profits to invest in public goods and institutions that can provide either non-repressive or repressive means to respond to organized opposition in times where oil prices fall.²⁶ Gonzalez (2018) adds that in particular that during oil booms rents are invested into public goods to cope with the increasingly competitive labor market between oil and the public sector.²⁷ In other words, repression is not the only tool for an oil

²⁴ Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef, “The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains.” *Economics & Politics* 21, no. 1 (March 2009): 93. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00337.x>.

²⁵ Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival” *British Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 2 (April 2015): 287–306; Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 238, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00067.x>.

²⁶ Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” 243.

²⁷ Lucas I. Gonzalez, “Oil Rents and Patronage: The Fiscal Effects of Oil Booms in the Argentine Provinces,” *Comparative Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 2018): 114.

exporting authoritarian regime's durability; rather, they exert their political control through a mixture of public investment and repression.

Scholars also debate whether elections in single-party states, regardless if they are free or fair, promote public goods provision. When looking at elections in authoritarian regimes, it is important to compare their impact on the gains in human development that come from elections in democracies. Nam Kyu Kim and Alex Kroeger, (2018) argue that the benefits of democracy on improving human development via electoral contestation are not replicated in autocratic states.²⁸ Instead, they argue that autocracies with weak capacities face political violence around elections and transitions, which then leads to lower human development like higher infant mortality rates.²⁹ Conversely, Miller (2015) argues that Electoral Authoritarianism (EA) improves human development in regimes. He adds that when single-party regime should regular elections, regardless if they are free or fair, they still improve public goods provision to aid their election chances.³⁰ During elections, political incumbents face real challenges, often more than originally expected. Electoral Authoritarianism provides pressure on the regime to the point where they can even lose office and face regime collapse if they do not provide sufficient goods and services to the population, such as the case with the PRI regime in Mexico. Regime collapse via elections frequently leads to democratization. To avoid losing elections, incumbents therefore must address public concerns—including the issues important to voters, such as, commonly, an access to social welfare.³¹ Electoral Authoritarianism simultaneously develop political institutions such as bureaucracies and parties to win elections as well as provide services that deliver on public goods to limit opposition support.³² Such authoritarian tend to be

²⁸ Nam Kyu Kim and Alex M Kroeger, "Do Multiparty Elections Improve Human Development in Autocracies?," *Democratization* 25, no. 2 (February 17, 2018): 253. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2017.1349108>.

²⁹ Kim and Kroeger, 256.

³⁰ Michael K. Miller, "Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development," *Comparative Political Studies* 48, no. 12 (October 1, 2015): 1535.

³¹ Miller, 1534.

³² Miller, 1537.

more liberal and offer at least some channels for popular pressure that leads to improved public goods distribution.³³

The more an autocratic state places emphasis on contested elections, the more accountable and responsive they tend to be to their citizens' demands, leading to greater public goods distribution. There are very few closed autocracies today such as Saudi Arabia, or the UAE who do not feature these elections that improve accountability. Unfortunately, the literature does not speak to differences between Electoral Authoritarianism states nor does it speak on the impact of the oil-exporting dimension.

Different types of authoritarian regimes may provide different levels of public goods because they vary in terms of their quality of government, such as the efficiency of the public bureaucracy and an impartial legal system. In the quality of government literature, there is an argument about the effectiveness of differing authoritarian regime types in providing public goods. Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente (2011), looks at authoritarian regimes in general to see which type produces the best quality of government. They define quality of government as the state's capacity to conduct administrative action efficiently without corruption.³⁴ They conclude that single-party states are the most effective at creating quality of government in high income countries where the citizens demand more accountability. They argue that single parties have higher quality of government because their formation does not often rely on previous institutions such as the military or courts. Instead, single parties cannot rely on the loyalty from the older organizations; they usually have to create their own popular support mobilization from the people, which in turn creates a more heterogeneous ruling coalition between trade unions and other organizations, and forms a pseudo social contract rather than the military dictatorship or a civilian dictator.³⁵ Charron and Lapuente also note that monarchies are

³³ Miller, 1533.

³⁴ Charron and Lapuente, 398.

³⁵ Charron and Lapuente, 405.

close to single-party states in providing quality of government, but only if the monarchy has a long time horizon.³⁶

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) add a new dimension to the conversation on regime types; expanding it to include a look at public goods versus private good provision across all types of states, not just in democracies versus autocracies or its subgroups. They argue that no two democracies or autocracies are the same, since each has their own nuances in political mechanisms. Each state has a body of individuals who participate in politics, the selectorate, and those who rule, and benefit from victory, the winning coalition.³⁷ The differences in the selectorates or winning coalitions varies across each state; it is not dependent simply on whether the state is a democracy or autocracy. They argue that the larger winning coalition a state has, the more likely it is to spend on public goods to benefit the entire population, instead of spending on private goods, for whom only the winning coalition benefits.³⁸ However, smaller winning coalitions with large selectorates breeds loyalty and long serving leaders, which has the unfortunate effect of lower economic growth and lower public goods provision.³⁹

The literature that surrounds authoritarian regimes speaks with impressive breadth across the world. However, the quantitative research focuses on trends and it lacks a discussion on mechanisms. Currently, the discussion on institutions in autocratic regimes tends to focus on factors that predict their survival or compares them to democracies. A focus into the institutions themselves within the regimes and what ultimately differentiates authoritarian regimes is an important addition to the literature. There needs to be an in-depth discussion on the differences between single-party states and personalist regimes, since those are more common, not only in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also across the world.⁴⁰ In particular, what political mechanisms that are unique to either single party or personalist

³⁶ Charron and Lapuente, 404.

³⁷ Bueno de Mesquita et al., 42.

³⁸ Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 386.

³⁹ Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 475.

⁴⁰ Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions" *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): forthcoming.

regimes in the world today are important to recognize and understand for public goods distribution?

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

A significant portion of authoritarian states are dependent on oil revenue, making it important to examine how resource dependence interacts with authoritarian politics in the provision of public goods. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 88% of the population live under authoritarian regimes, many of which rely on oil or mineral rents, that enable the government to survive.⁴¹ Nearly 29% of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa are oil exporters.⁴² If the authoritarian regime literature concludes that single-party states are more likely to provide public goods than personalist regimes, do natural resources—which allow the regimes insulation from the population—change that arithmetic? Would oil revenue in particular allow for personalist regimes to be more likely to provide public goods than single-party states?

I also focus in particular on authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa features dozens of authoritarian regimes that frequently suffer from the notorious resource curse. Sub-Saharan Africa also will also be home to nearly half of the world population within the century, so the nature of human development that occurs in Africa in the coming years will be very important for humanity at large. My study therefore focuses on two different types of authoritarian regimes in two oil-producing states in Africa—Chad and Gabon.

I develop three hypotheses to examine how different types of oil-producing authoritarian regimes deliver public goods. The hypotheses focus specifically on mechanisms related to the incentives of the ruling elite to deliver public goods to their populations.

⁴¹ “Sub-Saharan Africa,” Freedom House, accessed November 29th, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa>.

⁴² “Atlas of Economic Complexity” Growth Lab at Harvard University, accessed December 8th, 2019. <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/>

H1: *Single-party states should perform better at public goods distribution than personalist dictators.* Single-party states will provide more public goods because their survival strategy will likely incorporate public goods to maintain their diverse and inclusive winning coalitions. Personalist regimes will prioritize coercion as a survival strategy and spend less on public goods.

H2: *Leaders in single-party states have a longer time horizon than personalist dictators, which provides a higher level of public goods distribution.* The more durable the regime, the more the regime is likely to engage in the distribution of public goods. Longer time horizons lead to a lower reliance upon coercive goods and more spending on public goods. Personalist regimes are less likely to have a long time horizon compared to party regimes since the personalist regime collapses with the death or absence of the leader, and therefore personalist regimes will likely have shorter time horizons and prioritize on coercive goods over public goods.

H3: *Oil rents improve public goods distribution in single-party states, while in personalist regimes it has a negligible effect due to the primary focus of regime survival.* Single-party states use their oil profits to invest into public goods that ultimately improve human development. Personalist regimes will focus their oil profits on repressive public goods such as security and military assets to prevent another armed coup similar to the one which brought them into power.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

To investigate these hypotheses, I conduct a comparative case study with two similar cases that differ on the key independent variable of interest: authoritarian regime type. Chad and Gabon are both oil-rich African states with different types of authoritarian regimes. A significant difference that I use as my independent variable is their government structure. According to GWF's authoritarian regime index, Gabon is classified as a single-party state, led by the Gabonese Democratic Party, who have ruled since its independence from France. Chad is classified as a civilian personalist state, currently ruled by Idriss Déby, who took over in a coup against the former President Habré in 1990.

The overall expectation emerging from the hypotheses above is that the personalist regimes in Chad will focus primarily on coercion and less on development. Conversely, the Gabonese Democratic Party single-party state, which can maintain the regime through a systematic succession of executives through the party, will invest in the state and in public goods provision. The two countries' trajectories on the Human Development Index have diverged in recent decades. Gabon has a human development score of 0.702 at 110th place out of 189 countries, while Chad, at 186th place, has an HDI of 0.404.⁴³ Chad and Gabon also have widely different literacy rates with Chad's at 22% and Gabon's at 82.3%. Such differences in human development indicators provide an initial proxy to the concept of public goods provision, illustrating that Gabon does indeed appear to be delivering more public goods than Chad.

Typically, the more a state invests in public goods, the higher its human development indicators will be. Health and education outcomes are important components of overall measures of human development, like the United Nation's Human Development Index. When governments spend more on public goods like health services, education, and infrastructure, their outcomes in areas such as life expectancy, literacy rates, and GDP are likely to become higher. For example, Gabon spends more per capita on education than the Sub-Saharan African average, and as a result features a higher literacy rate. Yet Gabon's literacy rate, at 82% and spending on education per GDP at 2.7% is lower than the upper-middle income state average, states with Gabon's GDP per capita, who spend an average of 4.1% of GDP on education and feature a 99% literacy rate.⁴⁴

Both Gabon and Chad are ethnically diverse countries with no majority ethnic group. Both have had regional unstable neighbors. Chad faces regional instability through the Darfur crisis in South Sudan, as well as through transnational terror groups around Lake Chad. Gabon has, at times, also faced instability from neighboring conflicts in Congo and Cameroon. Both countries were colonized by the French.

⁴³ "Human Development Index and its Components" United Nations Human Development Reports, accessed September 5th, 2019. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.

⁴⁴ The World Bank, *Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP)*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=XT&view=chart>.

Both countries are oil producing states. Oil revenue has provided a majority of Gabon's GDP, exports, and government revenue since Gabon began exportation early into its post-independence history. Gabon's oil is extracted offshore, its reserves peaked in 1997, and it has been diminishing ever since, to an estimated exhaustion around 2030. Moreover, Chad has only recently begun exporting oil in 2003, but since then, oil has dominated its exports and government revenue. Chad's oil reserves are modest, located in the south of the country, and they will likely only last 25 more years.⁴⁵ Both states feature elements of the resource curse.⁴⁶

My method is to examine the hypothesized relationships between the political mechanics of Gabon and Chad and their public goods distribution patterns. I focus in particular on human development and infrastructure outcomes, for which I use the World Bank's World Development Indicators including life expectancy, primary school enrollment, literacy rate, electric power consumption, rail lines, and military expenditure (% of government expenditure).⁴⁷ For qualitative work, I look into published work by non-governmental organizations, think tanks, local news, and government documents. For each country, I analyze the regime history and politics and how they relate to the distributional trends in these areas.

The difficulty of data collection in authoritarian regimes is that they are not as open as democracies with sharing data on infrastructure and human development. Often, they will claim higher numbers to receive foreign aid and to boost legitimacy. Another difficulty is including the individuals who are far from the urban centers of public goods distribution and infrastructure. These subsistence agriculture villages are often not involved in the political process, and thus receive little goods. Since I am comparing two authoritarian

⁴⁵ The World Bank, *Republic of Chad Poverty Notes: Dynamics of Poverty and Inequality following the Rise of the Oil Sector*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.
<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/201821468015589462/pdf/809350ESW0P1270Gray0cover00PUBLICTD.pdf>

⁴⁶ Douglas A. Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural Resources*, (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 5.

⁴⁷ "Indicators" World Bank, accessed November 29th, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>.

regimes, the possibility for inaccurate data is present in both countries, minimizing the threat of biasing the study.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

My thesis addresses the question of whether and how different authoritarian regime types provide different levels of public goods, by looking at Chad and Gabon in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first chapter has introduced the research question, relevant literature, hypotheses, and research design. In the second chapter, I discuss Chad's history of personalist regimes, provide an overview of trends in public goods provision, and analyze each of the three hypotheses outlined above. The third chapter repeats this exercise for Gabon and the Gabonese Democratic Party. In the final chapter, I summarize and compare the findings from each country study and reflect on the implications of the findings.

II. CHAD AND PERSONALISM

A. INTRODUCTION

Chad, an oil-exporting African state, has been ruled by three personalist leaders since its independence from France in 1960. Chad has one of the lowest human development ratings in the world, ranking 187 out of 189 according to the United Nations Human Development Index. However, under its latest leader, Idriss Déby, Chad has seen consistent investment into health, education, and infrastructure.

I argue in this chapter that Chad has historically provided low levels of public goods because coercion has been the primary survival strategy under every Chadian personalist regime. In Chad, there is a linkage between the vulnerability of the personalist regime, its time horizons, and its prioritization of coercive versus public goods spending: the more vulnerable a regime is to violent threats, the more it prioritizes coercive goods, which crowds out public goods. Finally, growth of Chad's oil revenue is linked to increased public goods investment, because oil provides the funds for public goods and strengthens the regime so it can prioritize public goods over coercive goods.

I begin this chapter by describing continuity in Chad's personalist leaders since its Independence in 1960. I then describe the low levels of public goods in Chad to include health, education, and infrastructure, and their improvements under Idriss Déby since 2000. Lastly, I investigate the three hypotheses relating to regime type, time horizon, and oil revenue to help explain why the regime provides the level of public goods it does.

B. PERSONALIST REGIMES IN CHAD

Chad has been ruled by a series of personalist leaders since its independence from France in 1960. The cycle started with N'Garta Tombalbaye, who transformed Chad's largest political party at independence into his own personalist party. Subsequent leaders took over Chad through guerilla armies and would also maintain personalist regimes. All three regimes fit Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's definition of a personalist authoritarian

regime, where one person centers power and leadership decisions on themselves.⁴⁸ In this section, I briefly describe each personalistic regime.

1. Tombalbaye

Chad's independence leader and first president, N'Garta Tombalbaye, started a personalist cycle of rule when he transformed what had previously been an organized political party into his own personalist regime. Before Chad's independence in 1960, Tombalbaye started as a member of the strongest political party in Chad, the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT). Tombalbaye became a leader in the party, eventually rising to prime minister. Upon Chad's independence in 1960, Tombalbaye and the party adopted a constitution with a presidential system, with himself as president.⁴⁹ He consolidated personalistic control over the party by removing his rivals from the party and country.⁵⁰ He then outlawed all other political parties, solidifying his authoritarian rule.

Tombalbaye then tried to extend his power by violently suppressing and extracting taxes from the northern Muslim population, who were independent, even under French colonial rule. Tombalbaye's efforts were met in 1966 with a violent rebellion in the north and, later, with turmoil among his own supporters. The northern rebellion formed an umbrella organization, *Front national de liberation du Tchad* (FROLINAT), that united three separate armies, each backed by different client neighbor states: Sudan; Libya; and Nigeria.⁵¹ Tombalbaye meanwhile continued his efforts to centralize his power via purges of possible rivals within the party and the military.⁵² In 1975, in response to his purges his own tribe killed him in a coup that brought a military junta to power.⁵³ The junta would rule for a few years before losing to a FROLINAT army in a civil war. Thus, Chad's first

⁴⁸ Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 9.

⁴⁹ Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981), 23.

⁵⁰ Thompson and Adloff, 23.

⁵¹ Thompson and Adloff, 50.

⁵² Mario Joaquim Azevedo and U. Nnadozie Emmanuel, *Chad: A Nation in Search of Its Future*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 50.

⁵³ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 50.

independent ruler personalized the state by centralizing the government around himself, but in his efforts to remove all rivals, he failed and paid with his life.

2. Habré

Tombalbaye's death left a fractured Chad in a civil war, which was eventually won by guerilla army leader Hissène Habré. After Tombalbaye was removed by a military junta in 1975, the conflict between FROLINAT and the Chadian government grew into a larger civil war. Hissène Habré, one of the FROLINAT leaders, became prime minister of the junta government as a compromise with the junta to end the civil war in 1978.⁵⁴ Habré led his FROLINAT faction to seize control of the capital, N'Djamena, in 1979 in a surprise betrayal against the junta government.⁵⁵ This move plunged Chad into a new civil war between 1979 and 1982, which Habré subsequently won by conquering every major town, eventually establishing his own personalist regime.⁵⁶

Like Tombalbaye, Habré spent his reign, between 1982 and 1990, trying to consolidate power through a variety of political and coercive means. Leveraging a common tactic for personalist regimes, Habré formed his own political party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR).⁵⁷ Habré likewise created a constitution that gave his office, the presidency, the power to change the constitution at will, legally cementing his personalist rule.⁵⁸ When his political rivals undermined his rule, by supporting secession movements and fermenting rebellion, Habré responded with coercive means -- violence, torture, and killings -- to purge his government of other influences and further entrench his personalist rule.⁵⁹ Instead of co-opting his rivals with public services or patronage, Habré used his powerful security services to repress the population, leading to

⁵⁴ Azevedo and Emmanuel, *Chad*, 53.

⁵⁵ Azevedo and Emmanuel, *Chad*, 53.

⁵⁶ Azevedo and Emmanuel, *Chad*, 56.

⁵⁷ Azevedo and Emmanuel. *Chad*, 46.

⁵⁸ Azevedo and Emmanuel, *Chad*, 46.

⁵⁹ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 61.; Samuel Decalo, *Historical Dictionary of Chad*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 1997), 20.

an estimated 40,000 killed under his rule.⁶⁰ As with Tombalbaye, Habré's heavy-handedness alienated his supporters, with the result that Idriss Déby, his army chief of staff ousted Habré in a coup backed by Libya in 1990.

3. Déby

Idris Déby replaced Hissène Habré in 1990 as yet another personalist leader of Chad. The overthrow was facilitated by Déby's guerilla army and movement, the *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* (MPS), or the Patriotic Salvation Movement, which later became the leading political party in Chad.⁶¹ Déby, who was Habré's Army Chief of Staff, seized power from Habré, at an opportune moment with direct external support from Sudan and neutral support from France, which had earlier supported Habré but ultimately did not intervene to save him. Habré had lost support from internal factions and from France because of his violent repression towards political dissidents and rival ethnic factions. Déby initially led a failed coup in 1989 when Habré was vulnerable. Afterwards, Déby regrouped in the Darfur region of Sudan, and with support from Sudan's dictator, El-Bashir, he formed the MPS guerilla movement which took the capital of N'Djamena in 1990.⁶²

Déby, however, found himself in a vulnerable position; he was surrounded by the same threats Habré faced: externally supported armies and revolts from within. Nevertheless, Déby would go on to create the most stable personalist regime in Chad to date; he built coalitions with multiparty elections, deescalated rebel armies, and counterbalanced security services to avoid coups.⁶³

Today, Déby maintains an effective security apparatus that counterbalances itself, lowering the risk of coups by filling the leadership positions with his close family members. The Chadian Army, which often fights external foes in support of UN and French missions, is counterbalanced by both the Nomadic National Guard, a unit that operates in the

⁶⁰ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 64.

⁶¹ Jerome Tubiana and Marielle Debos, *Chad: Political Manipulation at Home, Military Intervention Abroad, Challenging Times Ahead* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017), 6.

⁶² Roy May and Simon Massey, "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Chad's Protracted 'Transition to Democracy,'" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 111.

⁶³ May and Massey, 112.

hinterlands, and the *Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité et des Institutions de l'Etat*, DGSSIE, a presidential guard. Déby's main ethnic group, the Bari in the Muslim north, initially supported his armed revolt and presidency. However, Déby has shifted control of the security services away from being ethnic-based towards personal familial ties, which has helped him stabilize the regime to avoid a coup and rebellion from his former ethnic supporters the Bari.⁶⁴ A typical personalist tactic is to use a small loyal support base to form your security services, and members of Déby's family lead the DGSSIE, the National Nomadic Guard, and the Military Intelligence units.⁶⁵ Both the Nomadic National Guard and *DGSSIE* are better funded and equipped than the Army, as Déby ensures that the best trained and equipped forces are under his familial leadership.⁶⁶

Thus, Déby counterbalances each of the armed forces, so that no group can overthrow him in a coup. As a result, Déby is not as vulnerable from internal threats as his predecessors. In addition, Déby's co-optation of rival elites and political tactics have kept state violence and repression at lower levels than under Habré's rule.⁶⁷ Déby both created a strong military to defeat rebellions and counterbalanced it so that he can survive coups; all these efforts strengthen the regime, which has, as of 2020, lasted 30 years.

C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN CHAD

Throughout its independent history, Chad's leaders have typically invested little into public goods provision. Following independence, Chad experienced very little infrastructure development. Chad had few roads and no railroads. Likewise, there were very few hospitals, and the few Chad had were run by the French well until the late 20th century.⁶⁸ Health and education also suffer from this lack of transport infrastructure and

⁶⁴ Tubiana and Debos, 12.

⁶⁵ Tubiana and Debos, 14.

⁶⁶ Tubiana and Debos, 13.

⁶⁷ Marielle Debos, "Living by the Gun in Chad: Armed Violence as a Practical Occupation." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 414.

⁶⁸ International Monetary Fund. *Chad: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2000-01*, (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000) <https://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/tcd/01/#II>.

facilities. Overall, Chad ranks at 187 out of 189 on the United Nations Human Development Index.⁶⁹ Nearly 96% of Chadians live in poverty, defined by The World Bank as living on less than \$5.50 a day at 2011 international prices.⁷⁰ The vast majority of those in poverty are the 87% of Chadians who live in rural areas compared to the 13% in cities; for example, only one in five in N’Djamena live in poverty.⁷¹

However, public investment has grown under the Déby regime. Before Déby, the overall Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was \$270, which had not changed much since independence.⁷² After Déby took over Chad in 1990 and consolidated power, his government set out poverty reduction strategies with multinational organizations to address some of these issues. There has been a corresponding trend of public goods investment in Chad following the year 2000. This section briefly describes these trends in the areas of infrastructure, health and education.

1. Infrastructure

One major barrier to public goods provision for Chad’s rural population is the lack of infrastructure; for decades, infrastructure was neglected, but since 2000, there has been greater investment in this area. In the year 2000, the road network in Chad only covered 40,000 kilometers (km), with only about 300 km paved. This inadequate road network hampers economic growth, especially for the rural population, who operate 80% of the economy, consisting of agriculture and livestock exports.⁷³ Farmers and merchants cannot freely transport their goods and they pay an increased cost to transport their goods to market, both within Chad and abroad.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ United Nations, *Human Development Index*, (New York: United Nations, 2020), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdro_statistical_data_table2.pdf.

⁷⁰ The World Bank (World Development Indicators: Chad; accessed May 14th, 2020). <https://databank.banque mondiale.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=TCD>.

⁷¹ International Monetary Fund.

⁷² Azevedo and Emmanuel, 74.

⁷³ International Monetary Fund.

⁷⁴ International Monetary Fund.

Since 2000, Déby has allocated most of Chad's public investments to infrastructure. Public investment in infrastructure and public works were 30% of state expenditures under the regime's poverty reduction strategies in the 2000s.⁷⁵ Between 2001 and 2009, Chad spent nearly 57% of its investment budget on physical infrastructure, compared to 11% on security services, demonstrating the priority the Déby regime places on infrastructure and the future compounding growth that infrastructure can bring.⁷⁶ During road development programs from 2002 to 2006, paved roads grew by 80%, from 560 km to 1000 km in 2006 and to 1602 km in 2011.⁷⁷ Due to the large rural population of Chad, infrastructure is the primary factor in delivering public goods to the population.

2. Health

Healthcare in Chad is a serious problem: the primary obstacle is access to health for the largely rural population, and the secondary obstacle is the limited number of health professionals in the country. Health is an area of public services in which the government has not improved much, health professionals tend to focus on the Chadian cities, leaving the rural population with limited access. As a result, Chad has one of the highest maternal mortality rate among African countries, with 827 maternal mortalities per 100,000 live births in 1997, which increased to 860 per 100,000 live births in 2015.⁷⁸ Chad has only 1 doctor for every 27,680 people and 1 midwife for every 9,074 people, which fails to meet the WHO standards of: 1 doctor for every 10,000 people and 1 midwife for every 5,000 people. Additionally, 46% of doctors are in N'Djamena alone.⁷⁹ Consequently, the average

⁷⁵ Chad Ministry of the Economy, Planning, and International Cooperation, *National Development Plan 2013–2015*.

⁷⁶ The World Bank, *Republic of Chad Public Expenditure Review Update: Using Public Resources for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 16. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698551468236104584/Republic-of-Chad-public-expenditure-review-update-using-public-resources-for-economic-growth-and-poverty-reduction>.

⁷⁷ International Monetary Fund.

⁷⁸ Chad Ministry of the Economy; The World Bank. *Maternal mortality ratio (national estimate, per 100,000 live births)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PC.CD?locations=TD>.

⁷⁹ International Monetary Fund.

Chadian must travel 14 km to reach a health facility, and that distance increases for the rural population to 18 km in the north a 16 km in the south.⁸⁰

However, there has been some improvement in the provision of health services. For example, mortality of children under five in 2018 was Chad's lowest in documented history at 119 per 1,000, down from 194 per 1,000 in 1997.⁸¹ However, in relation to GDP, Chad spends around 1% on health, which is low compared to other developing states (around 2%).⁸² Until access to health for the rural population increases in the form of more health clinics, more doctors, and better transportation infrastructure, Chadians will continue to have limited access to health goods.

3. Education

Education is a sector in which Chad has spent considerable effort and seen growth, passing its own poverty reduction goals. Primary school enrollment rose from 20% in 1960 to 99% in 2009.⁸³ From 2001 to 2005, education rates were growing 6.3% a year, with gross primary enrollment rate increasing from 71% in 2000 to 84.4% in 2005, and with rates for girls specifically growing from 54.7% in 2000 to 67.9% in 2005.⁸⁴ These rates surpassed Chad's National Poverty Reduction Strategy 1 goals.⁸⁵ Likewise, literacy rates grew from 11% in 1993 to 34% in 2009.⁸⁶ Public spending on education grew from 10% in 2002 to 14% in 2005.⁸⁷ Yet, at 2.4%, of GDP like health, education receives a lower portion of public spending than defense or infrastructure, and also lower than the Sub-

⁸⁰ International Monetary Fund.

⁸¹ The World Bank.

⁸² The World Bank.

⁸³ Chad Ministry of the Economy.

⁸⁴ International Monetary Fund.

⁸⁵ International Monetary Fund.

⁸⁶ Chad Ministry of the Economy.

⁸⁷ International Monetary Fund.

Saharan African average of 3–4% of GDP.⁸⁸ Based on this data, primary education improvement practices in Chad are working.

As I will explain in the following section, Chad’s recent growth in public goods is the product of a change in personalist regime stability and survival tactics, longer time horizons of the regime, and the emergence of Chadian oil revenue in 2003.

D. HYPOTHESIS 1: PERSONALIST SURVIVAL TACTICS AND PUBLIC GOODS

The first hypothesis relates to which of two regimes types, single-party and personalist, is more likely to invest in and deliver public goods and services. Generally, speaking, the personalist leaders in Chad have not relied on public goods to stay in power, as coercion has been the primary survival strategy for all three leaders. France has subsidized coercion in Chad with direct military intervention. As a result, there has been, overall, little public goods investment by Chadian personalist regimes; however, as described above, public goods provision has changed to some extent under Idriss Déby.

1. Coercion as a Primary Survival Strategy

The primary survival strategy of Chad’s first President, N’Garta Tombalbaye was coercion, public goods were not a survival strategy. Tombalbaye spent significant capital and effort on subjugating the northern half of Chad, which had been autonomous under French colonial rule. His coercion efforts led to a violent uprising with the formation of rebel armies under FROLINAT.⁸⁹ His response was more coercion, with assistance from the French military, which would subsidize the coercive approaches of all of Chad’s personalist leaders.⁹⁰ When Tombalbaye received backlash from his own support group, the southern, Christian Sara population, he used coercion to jail and remove any voices of dissension within the military and his party, to include the army chief of staff.⁹¹

⁸⁸ The World Bank, 16.

⁸⁹ Thompson and Adloff, 50.

⁹⁰ Thompson and Adloff, 55.

⁹¹ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 50.

Tombalbaye's heavy-handedness alienated his own ethnic support base, which murdered him in a coup. Instead of building a coalition and providing goods to the populace, Tombalbaye chose to use coercion to repress the north, and against his own support group.

After the fall of Tombalbaye, Chad's second personalist leader Hissène Habré, a FROLINAT rebel army leader, used coercion to take power and to maintain his regime; public goods were not a factor for his regime's survival. Since he presided over Chad during conflict and civil war, Habré utilized coercion to repress guerilla movements and other rebel armies.⁹² He used violence and torture, and purged his government of any rivals or dissidents.⁹³ Like Tombalbaye, instead of building coalitions and distributing the few goods Chad had, Habré resorted to coercion to maintain his regime, with an estimated 40,000 killed during his rule.⁹⁴

Idris Déby, Chad's third personalist leader, took power after he ousted Hissène Habré with a rebel army. Déby, like his predecessors, has used coercion as his primary survival strategy. Like Habré, Déby has faced violent threats from guerrilla armies, and he has used coercion to defeat them, along with assistance from the French military.⁹⁵ Unlike Tombalbaye and Habré, Déby has been able to effectively deescalate rebel armies with patronage: he brings rivals into his administration as either ministers, Army officers, or special advisers with generous benefits.⁹⁶ Yet, even with a stronger patronage network, in 2008, he was almost ousted by a large rebel army that nearly took the capital, N'Djamena.⁹⁷ Therefore, despite the patronage network, Déby's primary survival strategy

⁹² Azevedo and Emmanuel, 61.

⁹³ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 61.

⁹⁴ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 64.

⁹⁵ May and Massey, 112.

⁹⁶ Ketil Fred Hansen, "A Democratic Dictator's Success: How Chad's President Déby Defeated the Military Opposition in Three Years (2008-2011)" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 592.

⁹⁷ Marielle Debos, "International Interventions and the Human Cost of a Militarized Political Marketplace in Chad." *Reinventing Peace* (blog), World Peace Foundation, July 2014, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventin_gpeace/2014/07/17/international-interventions-and-the-human-cost-of-a-militarized-political-marketplace-in-chad/.

is coercion; Déby also represses media outlets, political rivals, and critics of the regime.⁹⁸ Even though Déby uses coercion to a lesser extent than his predecessors which allows him to provide more public goods, coercion is still the bedrock of his regime survival, which prevents further public goods distribution.

2. Erratic Public Goods Investments in Chadian Personalist Regimes

Due to Chadian leaders use of coercion to maintain power, there have been limited cases where Chadian regimes have invested in public goods. Initially, Tombalbaye and the PPT instituted five-year development plans, originally in agriculture and livestock production, to improve exports and revenues, as well as road development.⁹⁹ But this public investment was limited by a lack of revenue and Tombalbaye's prioritization of coercion to centralize power.

Habré, on the other hand, invested all resources into coercion to survive. He even extracted resources out of the state-owned enterprises and looted national treasures to fight the civil wars.¹⁰⁰ There is no available data on public goods provision during Habré's regime, which is a sign that he did not prioritize public goods.

The Déby regime has more consistently invested in public goods, especially since the beginning of Chad's oil exportation in 2003. This public goods improvement came from a combination of oil funds and the Déby regime's status a more stable regime with a longer time horizon, explained in the following sections.

3. Hypothesis 1 Summary

All three of Chad's personalist leaders have primarily used coercion to become leaders and to stay in power. Personalism as a regime type lends itself heavily to coercion over public goods as a survival strategy. That is because the personalist leaders are more concerned than single-party regimes with being violently overthrown, since losing power usually means losing their lives, whereas single-party states are more likely to negotiate

⁹⁸ Tubiana and Debos, 9; May and Massey, 128.

⁹⁹ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 71.

¹⁰⁰ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 83.

and bargain a regime transition, instead of violent collapse.¹⁰¹ Moreover, personalist regimes seldom rely upon public goods, because to do so as a survival strategy would require them to coalition-build, and in doing so they weaken their centralization of power. Déby, on the other hand, still uses coercion as his primary survival strategy, yet finds a unique balance – rare in Chadian personalist regimes – between coercion and provision of public goods. As long as coercion is the bedrock of the Chadian personalist regimes, however, public goods provision will remain relatively low.

E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZONS AND PUBLIC GOODS

The second hypothesis predicts that leaders in personalist regimes distribute fewer public goods than single-party regimes because they have shorter time horizons, which leads to lower levels of investment in public goods. Personalist regimes suffer from shorter time horizons than single-party states because their regimes center on an individual, which makes a regime more brittle. Unlike single-party states, where a coalition of elites can maintain the regime after a leader's passing, if a leader of a personalistic regime dies or is absent, the regime may collapse. Chad's personalist leaders have accordingly had short time horizons, particularly as they have faced unpredictable threats of extraconstitutional removal. Their reliance upon coercion weakens political dialogue and coalition formation, instead creating a vulnerable regime that has traded long term stability for short term security, leading to a cycle of coercive survival strategies, instability, and low levels of investment into public goods. As I discuss in more detail below, the importance of time horizons in Chad flows from the unpredictable and often violent nature of political threats, which leads to greater investment in private coercive goods. These dynamics are evident from differences in public goods provision between the regimes of Habré and Déby, where Habré, in the face of intense threats to his political survival, had very short time horizons and provided few public goods. Déby, on the other hand, has minimized such threats, leading him to longer time horizons and more consistent public goods investment.

¹⁰¹ Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," 23.

1. Time Horizon, Regime Vulnerability, and Public Goods

All of Chad's leaders have ruled in a context of high regime vulnerability, leading to short time horizons. Hissène Habré had the shortest time horizon, from 1982–1990, as well as the most vulnerable regime, and therefore the lowest investment in public goods. Habré's regime was vulnerable to not only external armies supported by Sudan and Libya but also enemies from within. Internal threats were serious; his successor, Idriss Déby, was Habré's army chief of staff. Habré was vulnerable during the entirety of his rule.

As described in the previous section, Habré's response to this vulnerability was to invest in coercion to maintain control. Figure 1 denotes Chad's military expenditure as a proportion of GDP, which ranged from 4.7% to 5.25% during Habré's years, far higher than the 2.5% to 3.8% Sub-Saharan African average.¹⁰² Habré's military expenditure indicates that as a result of his vulnerability Habré prioritized coercive goods, and public goods investment suffered. There is minimal data of public goods during Habré's rule, but Chad's Gross National Income (GNI) per capita did not grow, instead it hovered around \$200, while the Sub-Saharan African GNI per capita grew during this same period averaging \$650.¹⁰³ Therefore, despite data deficiencies on actual public goods distribution, Habré's rule was almost certainly the period in Chad with the least investment into public goods.

¹⁰² The World Bank. *Military expenditure (% of GDP)—Sub-Saharan Africa, Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=ZG-TD>.

¹⁰³ Azevedo and Emmanuel, 74.



Figure 1. Military Expenditure (% of GDP) Chad and Sub-Saharan Africa 1964–2018.¹⁰⁴

By contrast, Idriss Déby’s rule is unique in Chad because even though he has faced similar threats as his predecessors, he has managed these threats with a more diverse set of tools, leading to less vulnerability and longer time horizons from extraconstitutional removal, and therefore higher investment into public goods. First, it is clear from Figure 1 that Déby, especially since 2005, has invested to a significant extent in the military. The increased military expenditures are due to not only regime insecurity, such as a new civil war that culminated in 2008, but also because Chad was engaged in more regional military adventures in Central African Republic and in Mali, and in countering Boko Haram and other Violent Extremist Organizations in the Lake Chad Basin. However, prior to 2005,

¹⁰⁴ The World Bank.

military spending in Chad as a portion of GDP shrank, from its peak of 2.3% in 1993 to a trough of 0.8% in 2005, even as oil profits began in 2003. Only after Déby's regime faced a short time horizon because of new rebel armies did he increase military spending to its peak in 2008.¹⁰⁵ Afterwards, once the threat was dealt with and his time horizon relatively secure, he lowered military spending again.

Second, Déby introduced multiparty elections, which have allowed former guerilla army leaders to form opposition parties. Thus, instead of only waging war against the regime, they can compete politically.¹⁰⁶ Elections, though they have not been very competitive, have therefore allowed Déby to become less vulnerable since he can co-opt his rivals instead of defeating them on the battlefield, which would prioritize coercive goods.¹⁰⁷

Third, Déby has been effective at negotiating with and disarming his rivals using patronage. Déby brings political rivals and rebel armies under his regime, offering them official positions in government as a minister, special advisor, or commissions within the Chadian Army. He even incorporates the soldiers of the rebel armies, giving them positions as enlisted soldiers within the Chadian Army.¹⁰⁸

Since both elections and patronage have helped the Déby regime to reduce its vulnerability, it has lengthened his time horizon, leading to greater prioritization of public goods investment. Under Déby, public investment has grown, and not only from oil exports. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, before the beginning of oil exports in 2003 in Chad, primary school enrollment consistently grew from 46% in 1995 to 72% in 2003.¹⁰⁹ This trend suggests that Déby's regime was less vulnerable and thus lowered its spending on coercive goods, allowing public goods to receive more consistent investment.

¹⁰⁵ The World Bank.

¹⁰⁶ Debos.

¹⁰⁷ Hansen.

¹⁰⁸ Hansen, 592.

¹⁰⁹ The World Bank. *School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=TD>.

2. Hypothesis 2 Summary

Every leader in Chad has been vulnerable to unpredictable extraconstitutional removal. This vulnerability has shortened the time horizons of the regimes and damaged the necessary stability for public goods distribution. The extent of their vulnerability has affected their ability to invest in public goods. The clearest contrast exists between Habré and Déby. Habré was the most vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal and so he prioritized coercive goods for most of his regime, leaving little resources for public goods. Déby became less vulnerable with his governance and allowed coercive goods to wane and public goods to grow, until a threat arose and he quickly increased spending on coercive goods to meet the threat. But after Déby beat back a rebel army in 2008, he shifted priorities again, back to public goods investment. The less vulnerable the regime is, the more it can spend less on coercive goods and allow public goods distribution.

F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS

The third hypothesis predicts that oil rents in personalist regimes have a negligible effect on public goods because the regime will focus primarily on survival, therefore they prioritize spending the revenue on coercive goods. Oil was discovered in Chad in 1950, but it was not extracted and sold until 2003.¹¹⁰ Oil in Chad is therefore a recent phenomenon, beginning thirteen years into Déby's regime. Oil has had two effects on Chad's political regime that have brought about greater investment in public goods. First, it directly funds public goods, and second, it strengthens the Déby regime, which allows the regime to lower their spending on coercive goods and further invest into public goods. By 2014, oil provided 30% of Chad's GDP and 70% of its government budget revenue.¹¹¹ Oil allows Déby to have a larger patronage network, which allows him to co-opt opponents, avoiding costly combat, and to build coalitions.

Oil funds public goods in Chad; it has generated most of government revenue since 2003 and has led to the spike in Chad's spending on health, education, and infrastructure.

¹¹⁰ The World Bank, *Republic of Chad Public Expenditure Review Update, 2*.

¹¹¹ African Development Bank, *Republic of Chad: Country Strategy Paper 2015–2020*.

With the budget growth from oil, Chad initially allocated 70% of public spending to poverty reduction from the oil accounts, but this was reduced to 65% in 2007, due to rebellion threats and the corresponding increase in security funding.¹¹² Chad’s recent oil revenue grew health spending from \$18 per person in 2003 to \$44 in 2014, a 2.5-fold improvement.¹¹³ Similarly, in education, gross primary school enrollment grew from 71% in 2003 to 100% in 2014.¹¹⁴ Figures 2, 3, and 4 depicts the strong relationship between oil-led GDP growth between 2003 and 2014 and a similar growth in Chad’s health expenditure per capita and primary school enrollment during those same years. After 2014, there is a similar drop in oil prices, Chad’s GDP, and public goods. Another indicator of the strong relationship between oil revenue and public goods is that when oil prices drop, so does public goods investment.




Figure 2. Chad’s GDP Per Capita (current US\$) 2000–2019.¹¹⁵

¹¹² International Monetary Fund, *Chad: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, 67.

¹¹³ The World Bank. *Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PC.CD?locations=TD>.

¹¹⁴ The World Bank. *School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)—Chad*.

¹¹⁵ The World Bank. *GDP Per Capita (current US\$)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2019&locations=TD&start=2000>.




Figure 3. Chad's Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$), 2000–2017.¹¹⁶




Figure 4. Chad's Primary School Enrollment, 1990–2015.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ The World Bank. *Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PC.CD?locations=TD>.

¹¹⁷ The World Bank. *School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)—Chad*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=TD>.

Oil also has a stabilizing effect on the regime. Oil allows Déby to fund an extensive patronage network that has helped to deescalate armed rivals from continuing aggression. With oil funding, Déby can not only pay off the leader of a rebel army with a lucrative government position but also pay off his soldiers.¹¹⁸ Déby's oil-funded patronage network allows him to coalition build, to deescalate violence and therefore entrench his regime. Oil revenue both provides funds for public goods and improves the stability of the regime, allowing it to use those funds to invest in public goods.

Oil exports provided the Déby regime resources to invest in public goods and provide regime stability, creating an environment for more public goods spending. It assists the Déby regime to deescalate violence, and directly funds public goods like health, education, and infrastructure. Even though public goods spending decreases with lower oil prices, the stability that the regime faces with oil, allows consistent public goods distribution.

G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Chad's personalist regimes that have ruled since 1960 have provided low levels of public goods due to the primacy of coercion as their survival strategy. Each personalist leader in Chad relied upon coercion to become the leader, and to survive in office. The more vulnerable the regime was to violent extraconstitutional removal, the shorter their time horizons, and the more they focused on investments in coercive goods. Public goods, which are costly, and do not remove rivals, were not a priority for Chad's more vulnerable leaders. The introduction of oil has strengthened the Déby regime by allowing him to fund a larger patronage network. Oil has also allowed the regime to consistently invest more into public goods. The stronger the Déby regime is, the more it will invest into public goods instead of coercive goods.

¹¹⁸ Tubiana and Debos, 7.

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III. GABON AND THE SINGLE-PARTY STATE

A. INTRODUCTION

Gabon, an oil-exporting African state, has maintained the same single-party regime since its independence from France in 1960. Thanks to its oil revenues, Gabon has one of the highest per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa, placing it as an upper-middle income country. Gabon provides more funding per capita for health and education, than the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average, and considerably more than Chad. Gabon also has a higher life expectancy, literacy rate, and access to electricity than the SSA average, though it does not effectively develop its roads or rails, where it has the same road density as Chad.

I argue in this chapter that Gabon's level of public goods provision, which I classify as moderate given its high GDP per capita, is a function of the fact that the Bongo family and the PDG rely only moderately on public goods to stay in power. Instead, the regime relies upon other survival strategies such as patronage, election rigging, coercion, and international support. These survival strategies have kept the regime safe from extraconstitutional removal, avoiding violence and turmoil. Since Gabon introduced multiparty elections in 1990, its time horizons have become synced with the election cycle. Unlike in Chad, however, these shortened time horizons have led to the party's greater reliance on public goods to survive, suggesting an important difference between institutionalized and non-institutionalized threats to power. Finally, there is a strong linkage between growth in Gabon's oil revenue and a growth in public goods. The inverse is also true: public goods suffer when oil revenues drop.

I begin this chapter by describing the authoritarian regime of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) and the Bongo dynasty, who have ruled as its Presidents. I then provide an overview of public goods in Gabon, to include health and education. Lastly, I investigate the three hypotheses: regime type, time horizon, and oil's impact on why the regime provides the level of public goods it does.

B. GABONESE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OVERVIEW

Gabon has been ruled by an authoritarian regime since its independence from France in 1960. The regime began when the first president, Leon Mba, used repression to push out other parties and opposition leaders.¹¹⁹ In 1968, his successor, Omar Bongo, outlawed all parties except his own *Parti Démocratique Gabonais* (PDG), which would become the state's single-party. The PDG has continued to rule even after 1990 when multiparty elections were instituted.¹²⁰ From 1990 onwards, Omar Bongo, and later, his son Ali Bongo, would lead the PDG to dominate elections and keep the regime in power using survival strategies such as coercion, vote-rigging, international support, patronage, and public goods.

The PDG fits most definitions of a single-party regime definition, such as those argued by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, Charron and Lapuente, as well as Gandhi and Przeworski and discussed in Chapter 1. Specifically, the party's use of repression, its elite unity, extensive patronage networks, and its integration with civil society are all consistent with the concept of a single party regime. The PDG is a broad, ethnically diverse, and geographically inclusive.¹²¹ Most civil society groups in Gabon are a part of the PDG; for example, all women's groups, youth groups, and trade unions are appendages of the party.¹²² Moreover, Gabon's elites have been to some extent united under the PDG as its clients, in a large patron-client network.

Gabon is not only ruled as a single-party state, it also embodies elements of personalism. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz label Gabon as a party-personalist regime.¹²³ For

¹¹⁹ Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions" *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2), 2014, <http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/wp-content/uploads/sites/12570/2016/05/GWF-Codebook.pdf>.

¹²⁰ "Omar Bongo: President of Gabon and Longest-Serving Head of State in Africa Whose Autocratic Style Defied Democracy," *The Times*, Jun 09, 2009. <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/320158532?accountid=12702>.

¹²¹ "Gabon: Bongo, Omar, and the One-Party State, 1967 to the Present." *Routledge*, 2004. http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/routafricanhistory/gabon_bongo_omar_and_the_one_party_state_1967_to_the_present/0.

¹²² Richard King, "An Institutional Analysis of the Resource Curse in Africa: Lessons for Ghana," November 30, 2008, 15.

¹²³ Geddes, Wright, and Frantz.

most of the regime's history, between 1968 and 2009, Gabon was ruled by Omar Bongo, and the party was united under his leadership. A significant amount of power was centralized under the office of the presidency.¹²⁴ Omar Bongo held personal control of the Defense Minister position, and control of the presidential guard. The intelligence services were controlled by his close family members, like his son Ali Bongo.¹²⁵ Omar Bongo was at the center of the party and its leadership decisions, and upon his death in 2009, without his unifying presence, the party split into factions. When the party picked Ali Bongo to become the party's nominee for president, a rival faction within the party, called the "barons," defected to join and lead opposition movements, indicating that Omar Bongo's personal power, not the party's, was a key unifying force for the elites.¹²⁶

C. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC GOODS IN GABON

Currently, Gabon provides goods at a moderate level, more than the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) average, yet lower than states with similar GDP per capita levels. Gabon featured a much higher GDP per capita of \$6,830 in 2018 compared to the SSA average of \$1,517.¹²⁷ Gabon's higher GDP per capita, largely a result of its oil wealth and small population, ranks the country as an upper middle-income state. Gabon's relatively high per capita GDP enables higher levels of spending on health and education than many of its SSA counterparts. However, Gabon has the resources for even more goods distribution, which is evident in their government spending as a proportion of GDP, which is lower than both the SSA average and the average for upper middle-income countries around the world. If Gabon invested in public goods at similar rates (as a proportion of GDP) as the SSA and upper middle-income countries, its population would enjoy considerably greater access to services like health and education.

¹²⁴ "Omar Bongo: President of Gabon and Longest-Serving Head of State in Africa Whose Autocratic Style Defied Democracy."

¹²⁵ Douglas Yates, *The Historical Dictionary of Gabon* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 140.

¹²⁶ Nadia Ahmadou, "Gabon: Continuity in Transition," *African Security Review*, 18:4 2009, 78.

¹²⁷ The World Bank, *Gabon Country Page*.

1. Health

Gabon provides more health goods than the SSA average but less than globally comparable upper-middle income states. Gabon's life expectancy is 63, more than the SSA average of 60 and under the upper middle-income states' average of 74.¹²⁸ In 2017, Gabon's health spending per capita was \$217, higher than the SSA average of \$83, but lower than the upper middle-income average of \$459.¹²⁹ Even though Gabon outspends the SSA average in dollars per capita, it spends far less as a percentage of its GDP; 2.7% in 2017 compared to the SSA average of 5.1%.¹³⁰ If Gabon invested in health at a similar rate (as a proportion of GDP) as SSA, then its population would receive similar access to health as other upper-middle income states do.¹³¹ Thus, based on their spending per GDP, Gabon provides only a moderate level of health goods with the resources it has at its disposal.

2. Education

As with healthcare, Gabon spends less on education than its GDP per capita would expect based on relevant comparison between the SSA average and global upper middle-income states. Gabon spends an average of \$442 per student, compared to \$693 in Botswana, an upper middle-income state, and more than Ghana, a lower middle-income state, at \$282 per student.¹³² Gabon's spending on education per GDP and government expenditure nearly match Chad's rates: 2.7% versus 2.9% per GDP, and 11.4% versus 12.5% of government expenditure.¹³³ Gabon's 2.7% per GDP falls short of the SSA average of 4.3% in 2014, and the upper middle income average of 4.1%.¹³⁴ Gabon spends

¹²⁸ Saleh, Couttolenc, Barroy, and Debra, *Health Financing in the Republic of Gabon*.

¹²⁹ The World Bank, *Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$)—Gabon*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=AO>.

¹³⁰ The World Bank.

¹³¹ The World Bank.

¹³² The World Bank, *Public Expenditure Review: Gabon*.

¹³³ The World Bank.

¹³⁴ The World Bank, *Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of GDP)*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=XT&view=chart>.

proportionally less on education, but because of its high per capita income from oil, it still spends more than most SSA states and provides a literacy rate of 89%, higher than the SSA average of 65%, but short of the 99% of the upper middle income average.¹³⁵ Similar to their health spending habits, Gabon has the resources to invest at a higher level in education.

3. Infrastructure

Gabon provides mixed levels of infrastructure as well. It provides much of its population with access to electricity, but roads and rail remain underdeveloped. In Gabon, 93% of the population had access to electricity in 2018, which nearly double the SSA average of 47% but just beneath the upper-middle income average of 99%.¹³⁶ Gabon can achieve a high access to electricity due to its oil production, large hydroelectric potential, and its unusually high urbanization rate of 85%.¹³⁷ In contrast, Gabon's road and rail network is less developed than its neighbors: The Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Central African Republic. Gabon's road density is similar to Chad.¹³⁸ Gabon's road network is comprised of nearly 9,170 kilometers, with less than 11% of these being paved with asphalt, and less than 20% of the unpaved roads being in proper working condition.¹³⁹

As I will explain in the following section, Gabon's moderate level of public goods provision is the product of the regime's five survival strategies, and the emergence of multiparty elections that produce short time horizons forcing the regime to provide more goods to gain a winning coalition.

¹³⁵ The World Bank, *Public Expenditure Review: Gabon*.

¹³⁶ The World Bank, *Access to Electricity (% of population)*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=XT&view=chart>.

¹³⁷ The World Bank, *Public Expenditure Review: Gabon*.

¹³⁸ The World Bank, *Country Partnership Strategy*.

¹³⁹ African Development Bank Group, *Republic of Gabon: Country Strategy Paper 2011-2015*.

D. HYPOTHESIS 1: SINGLE-PARTY STATE SURVIVAL TACTICS AND PUBLIC GOODS

The first hypothesis suggests that party regimes will distribute public goods at greater rates than personalist regimes because they are more inclusive, diverse, and responsive to their populace. The Bongo family and the PDG have relied to a moderate extent on public goods to stay in power in Gabon. This results in more public goods in Gabon than in Chad, where the regime relies even less on these goods to stay in power. However, as the previous section demonstrated, there are not as many public goods as there could be in Gabon given their level of economic wealth. This is because public goods are only one of five factors that the regime uses to stay in power. The PDG and the Bongo family have other survival strategies – namely, co-opting elites with a patronage jobs, election rigging, coercion, and international support. Historically, international support from the French has been one of the most important factors in maintaining the current regime in Gabon. Together, all of these survival strategies explain why Gabon does not provide public goods as much as they could.

1. The PDG’s Elite-Focused Survival Strategies

For most of Gabon’s history, the PDG has not relied upon the delivery of public goods to the population to stay in power; rather, they relied on private goods distributed to their elite patronage networks. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the party and Omar Bongo distributed private goods to elites within Gabon through lucrative positions within government and the party.¹⁴⁰ After the PDG introduced multiparty elections in 1990, Omar Bongo expanded the PDG’s patronage network to include opposition party leaders.¹⁴¹ He also provided positions in his cabinet to elites from each ethnic group.¹⁴² Gabon is an ethnically diverse country, and this strategy helped him to unite different groups and gain their approval. Thus, Omar Bongo’s survival strategy focused to a greater extent on the

¹⁴⁰ “Hear those drums” *Africa Confidential* December 20, 2002. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1111/Hear_those_drums_

¹⁴¹ “Obame: No, He Can’t,” *Africa Confidential*, February 18, 2011. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3854/Obame_no%2c_he_can%e2%80%99t.

¹⁴² “Hear those Drums,” *Africa Confidential* December 20, 2002. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1111/Hear_those_drums_

distribution of private benefits to elites rather than on building grassroots support among party members.

Bongo also rewarded loyalty from his supporters. Bongo and the party would direct government goods and services to their loyal supporters, as a form of clientelism.¹⁴³ An example of this behavior is the Trans-Gabon railway. It was originally designed to connect the port cities on the west coast to the iron deposits in the east, but Omar Bongo diverted the project towards his home region, so that he secure the loyalty from his Téké ethnic group.¹⁴⁴ This project took priority over all other public investment; it took 14 years and cost four times the original estimate.¹⁴⁵ Omar Bongo prioritized and rewarded his small ethnic group to form a strong, loyal support base whom he could trust with positions of power. A large majority of the military and its leadership have been and continue to be Téké men.¹⁴⁶ Since the Téké are dependent on the Bongo dynasty for private goods, they are committed enough to the regime's survival to staff and lead the security services.

The PDG under the leadership of Bongo's son, Ali Bongo, who gained power in 2009, has relied more on the distribution of public goods to survive than they did under his father, Omar, because Ali has not been able to rely on the previously strong patronage network that united the elites within the party. Before Ali Bongo took over as president, he was the head of the “renovators” faction within the party, a faction that was more technocratic and desired to divest from oil and invest in the people.¹⁴⁷ The opposing faction to the “renovators” in the party, the “barons,” did not unite behind Ali Bongo when he became President. Instead, many of the “barons” defected in order to join or start new

¹⁴³ “Digging Deeper Holes,” *Africa Confidential* November 5, 1999. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1314/Digging_deeper_holes.

¹⁴⁴ Douglas Yates, “Neo-“Petro-monialism” and the Rentier State in Gabon,” In *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Matthias Basedau, and Andreas Mehler, (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005), 184.

¹⁴⁵ William Tordoff and Ralph A. Young. “The Presidential Election in Gabon.” *Review of African Political Economy* 26, no. 80 (June 1, 1999): 269–77.

¹⁴⁶ Douglas Yates, 142.

¹⁴⁷ Tirthankar Chanda, “Gabon—Présidentielle gabonaise: 2 favoris, 4 dissidents et les autres.” *RFI (French)*. Lundi 22 Août 2016.

opposition parties.¹⁴⁸ These strong elites posed greater challenges to Ali Bongo than those his father faced.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, as I discuss at greater length below, by 2009, Gabon's oil revenues were shrinking, having hit their peak in 1997. Oil's diminishing returns gave Ali Bongo and the party fewer resources to fund the patronage network.¹⁵⁰

In response to the increased pressure of a shrunken patronage network and more challenges from Gabon's elites, Ali Bongo and the PDG publicly prioritized public goods to stay in power. They launched a new public investment plan, *Gabon Emergent*, soon after Ali became president. The plan's goals were to diversify Gabon's economy away from oil, expand access to healthcare, improve human capital, and increase infrastructure.¹⁵¹ From 2010 – 2014, Ali Bongo and the party used oil profits to fund the *Gabon Emergent* public goods projects, spending 11.4% of GDP on public investment in 2012 at the highest, compared to the average of 5% in 2015, after oil prices dropped.¹⁵² Ali Bongo used public goods projects within *Gabon Emergent* to gain support from opposition strongholds, promising them hydroelectric plants.¹⁵³ During Ali Bongo's time as president, public funding of health insurance for the poor also improved under a new program.¹⁵⁴ These actions to increase public goods by Ali and the party likely served to increase his broad appeal, and thus, his chances of remaining in power.

¹⁴⁸ Chanda.

¹⁴⁹ "Ali Bongo célèbre les 49 ans du Parti démocratique gabonais." Radio France Internationale. March 13, 2017. <https://advance-lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5N32-XF91-JBJ4-207W-00000-00&context=1516831>.

¹⁵⁰ "Obama: No, He Can't.

¹⁵¹ République Gabonaise, *Plan Strategique Gabon Emergent: Vision 2025 et orientations stratégiques 2011–2016*, Libreville, Gabon, 2012. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/cafi/docs/Gabon%20documents/French/Gabon_2015_SM%20A_PlanStrategieGabonEmergent.pdf

¹⁵² The World Bank, *Public Expenditure Review: Gabon*.

¹⁵³ "A Family Legacy" *Africa Confidential*, January 21, 2011. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3818/A_family_legacy.

¹⁵⁴ Saleh, Couttolenc, Barroy, and Debra.

2. Public Goods and Local Leader Support

The PDG's accountability to elites during Omar Bongo's leadership was typically in the form of patronage, and with the addition of multiparty elections in 1990, elites outside the party could form opposition movements for better bargaining position. After Ali Bongo took over in 2009, more party elites, especially from the "baron" faction, defected to form opposition movements and gain private goods. For these elites, elections were a competition of patronage, where jobs and resources were given out in exchange for political support, oil, timber, or manganese export control.¹⁵⁵ When former party elites defected and formed their own opposition parties, it was partially in an attempt to renegotiate for more patronage, after which they would either rejoin the party, or the coalition of parties.¹⁵⁶

The party also negotiates with local leaders and party members to garner their support ahead of elections. Before the legislative elections in 2011, the prime minister went on tour to local districts to gather support for the PDG. The negotiations centered on getting *Gabon Emergent* public goods projects funded, otherwise the local village leaders would throw their support behind opposition groups instead.¹⁵⁷

There are even instances of Omar Bongo promising to pay the poor's electricity bills to get their votes.¹⁵⁸ In another example, Omar Bongo sent in his 1998 campaign manager run to Libreville, the capital, in order to improve roads and infrastructure, a primary concern of the population. This was likely done to gain more votes and support,

¹⁵⁵ "Hear those Drums."

¹⁵⁶ "GABON: President Will Consolidate His Power." *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, January 23, 2018.

¹⁵⁷ Douglas Ntoutoume. "Le Parti démocratique gabonais descend sur le terrain du 5ème arrondissement." *Gabonews FR*. Février 2011. <https://advance-lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:526C-P3W1-F19D-C4W0-00000-00&context=1516831>.

¹⁵⁸ "Bongo-gate" *Africa Confidential* October 21st, 2005. <https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1629/Bongo-gate>

and since the effort was successful, Omar gained popularity in Libreville.¹⁵⁹ Ali Bongo and the PDG have continued this behavior; they directly hand out tools, food, and furniture to village leaders and party activists to obtain their support.¹⁶⁰

3. Other Survival Strategies: International Support, Coercion, and Vote Rigging

The Bongo dynasty and the party do not rely solely on public goods distribution to stay in power. They have also relied on French involvement, coercion, and vote rigging at various times since independence. These alternative survival mechanisms relieve pressure on the regime to distribute public goods.

Historically, the regime has relied to a large extent on the French government to maintain its power. France would support the regime through aid, grants, loan relief, certifying the legitimacy of Gabon's elections, and even coercion.¹⁶¹ France's role in keeping Omar Bongo in power became clear following the murder of an opposition member and subsequent mass uprisings in the 1990s. The French Army's rapid reaction battalion, stationed near Libreville, intervened to support the regime, they stopped the riots and restored order. Douglas Yates, scholar of Gabonese history, notes that Omar Bongo would have been overthrown if it were not for the direct French intervention in 1990.¹⁶² In the 1990s, with the introduction of multiparty elections, the French supplied election observers to provide their stamp of legitimacy to the international audience.¹⁶³ Since the

¹⁵⁹ Gomez Virginie, Ngoma Yves-Laurent, "Vie publique." *L'Express*, 12 décembre 2002, [https://advance-lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4B5Y-0MH0-TWK6-11YR-00000-00&context=1516831](https://advance.lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4B5Y-0MH0-TWK6-11YR-00000-00&context=1516831).

¹⁶⁰ "Rearranging the Cabinet" *Africa Confidential*, February 18th, 2011. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3855/Rearranging_the_cabinet; "A family legacy" *Africa Confidential*, January, 21st, 2011. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3818/A_family_legacy.

¹⁶¹ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil*, 29.

¹⁶² Douglas Yates, "Neo-"Petro-monialism" and the Rentier State in Gabon," In *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Matthias Basedau, and Andreas Mehler, (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005), 186.

¹⁶³ David E. Gardinier, "France and Gabon Since 1993: The Reshaping of a Neo-Colonial Relationship." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18 (2) 2000: 228.

French were the last safeguard to defend the regime in Gabon against overthrow, the regime did not have to rely upon public goods.

By the 2000s, France had divested from their control of Gabonese oil, which diminished their incentive to support the regime.¹⁶⁴ With less French investment, the 2009 and 2016 elections saw French criticism and a likely possibility that France would no longer directly intervene to save the regime in the future.¹⁶⁵ Since the French employed coercive force to save the regime and provided international legitimacy to fraudulent elections, Bongo and the PDG did not have to rely to a large extent on public goods to stay in power.

Coercion has always been a tool for the party and the Bongo dynasty. From the beginning of the regime to the most recent 2016 election, opponents of the Bongo dynasty have been harassed, arrested, and even found dead.¹⁶⁶ Ahead of every multiparty election, the regime has used coercion, primarily from the Presidential Guard, to attack members of the press, opposition groups that will not support the party, and popular mobilization in the streets.¹⁶⁷ Violence has been common during elections to suppress the opposition and garner a party victory. In the latest presidential election, where Ali Bongo nearly tied with Jean Ping, a former party elite, the Presidential Guard attacked the opposition headquarters, killing dozens.¹⁶⁸ As long as the party can rely upon violence to coerce the opposition, public goods will not be the primary factor for winning elections and staying in power.

The party and the Bongo dynasty have also used vote rigging to win elections, allowing them to avoid the pressure to provide more public goods. From Omar Bongo's first multiparty election in 1993 to Ali Bongo's latest 2016 presidential election, vote rigging has been apparent. When compared to the rest of the country, the home region of

¹⁶⁴ Yates, *The Scramble for African Oil*, 32.

¹⁶⁵ "New at the convivial party" *Africa Confidential* January, 21, 2005. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/1402/New_at_the_convivial_party

¹⁶⁶ Douglas Yates, *The Historical Dictionary of Gabon* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 19.

¹⁶⁷ Yates, 19.

¹⁶⁸ "Between 50 and 100 killed' in Gabon election violence, presidential challenger tells FRANCE 24," *France 24* June 9th, 2016, <https://www.france24.com/en/20160906-deaths-gabon-presidential-election-violence-ping-bongo>.

Omar Bongo always has a higher voter turnout, has less restrictions to vote early, and possibly allow voters to vote more often.¹⁶⁹ In Omar Bongo's first election, he even cancelled the second round of elections and declared himself victor before the results, since he feared he would lose. He then employed coercive security services to guarantee his victory.¹⁷⁰ Despite these instances of vote rigging, French support enabled Bongo to unfairly win the 1993 multiparty elections without much international scrutiny. This changed in 2009 and 2016, when the Presidential elections started to receive international complaints, and requests for recounts.¹⁷¹ Ali Bongo did not even win a majority in 2009, only a plurality.¹⁷² Despite the loss of French support, the regime will likely continue to prioritize vote rigging over public goods as a survival mechanism.

4. Hypothesis 1 Summary

Gabon only moderately relies upon public goods to stay in power, because the regime has other stronger means of survival. The party initially provided some goods as patronage to maintain a united elite network in the party. Once multiparty elections were introduced in 1990, Bongo and the party could not rely on the elite patronage network alone, and they formed a broader coalition in 2000 to successfully increase their electorate. This coalition was formed with public goods bargaining involving an array of local leaders. Before multiparty elections, the PDG was broad and inclusive, integrating with society, and united Gabon's elites under one political organization. After multiparty elections in 1990, the PDG became more responsive to its population, as it must compete in elections, and provide public goods. The PDG's actions support my claim that single-party regimes

¹⁶⁹ "Violence breaks out in Gabon after controversial presidential vote," *France 24*, August 31st, 2016, <https://www.france24.com/en/20160831-gabon-bongo-wins-presidential-election-commission-ping>.

¹⁷⁰ François Ngolet, "Ideological Manipulations and Political Longevity: The Power of Omar Bongo in Gabon since 1967," *African Studies Review* 43, no. 2 (2000): 67.

¹⁷¹ "Post-election crisis: EU adopts resolution against Gabon," *RFI* February, 2nd, 2017, <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20170202-crise-post-electorale-UE-adopte-resolution-contre-gabon>. ; "Gabon: ICC begins examination of documents provided by opponent Jean Ping," *RFI*, December, 17th, 2016. <http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20161217-gabon-cpi-presidentielle-jean-ping-ali-bongo-justice>.

¹⁷² Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber, and Klaas Van Walraven. *Africa Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2011*, (Boston: Leiden, 2012), 266.

will distribute public goods at greater rates than personalist regimes because they are more inclusive, diverse, and responsive to their populace.

As will be discussed at greater length in the next section, there also appears to be a connection between electoral threats to political survival and the distribution of public goods, and these more urgent political survival needs may be further magnified by the diminishing amount of oil revenue available to the PDG. Ali Bongo's *Gabon Emergent* plan, introduced in 2009, is evidence of the party adapting to these changes by raising the importance of public goods distribution. As Gabon loses its old survival tactics, primarily the French support, the party will likely continue to raise the importance of public goods to try to maintain their rule.

E. HYPOTHESIS 2: TIME HORIZON AND PUBLIC GOODS

The PDG regime in Gabon faces two different threats to survival, each with different impacts on time horizons and public goods. In earlier periods the regime was more vulnerable to threats of extraconstitutional removals like coups or popular overthrow. Since then, however, their time horizons have shifted to align with the electoral cycle; this has brought about more institutionalized political threats, namely in the form of elections. While the first is unpredictable, the second is not—and the latter forces the regime to behave with more accountability to the population.

1. Time Horizons and Extraconstitutional Removal

The regime has effectively leveraged its five survival strategies to lower its risk from the threat of extraconstitutional removal which, prior to the introduction of multiparty elections in 1990, brought about the stability necessary for consistent public goods provision. However, these tactics have also undermined democratic accountability, leading to an overall small positive effect on public goods. The longer time horizon during this time had also lowered spending on coercive goods, like security services or the military.

The Bongo family and the PDG had managed to minimize threats of extraconstitutional removal by employing the previously mentioned survival factors:

French involvement, coercion, vote rigging, patronage, and public goods. These strategies had enabled the Bongo family in particular to rule Gabon with minimal concern for instability, thereby lengthening their time horizons. This stability is evident, for example, in a recent 2019 coup attempt. While Ali Bongo was disabled and out of the country for months receiving medical treatment following a stroke, the coup attempt by five soldiers had no real chances of success.¹⁷³ Ali Bongo's direct control over the security services, and the party's patronage system meant that the coup plotters were a minority within the military, and would not garner elite support.

The regime's long-time horizon against extraconstitutional removal led to a slight net positive to public goods, since funding for coercion was a lower priority than it was in other states, like Chad. If a regime was concerned with physical safety above all, they would prioritize funding coercive goods, like security services instead of health and education. Since the Gabonese regime has had stability from the afore mentioned factors, they could spend less on coercive goods, and more on public goods. Gabon's military spending has ranged between one and two percent of GDP for most of the regime's history, lower than other oil-exporting SSA states like Chad, Equatorial Guinea, or Angola.¹⁷⁴ Gabon's stability against extraconstitutional removal and violence also limits interruptions of public goods distribution from instances like insurrection, political violence, and civil war. The regime's long-time horizon against violent removal has provided a slight positive effect on public goods. While it does not directly provide more goods, the lack of disruptions, and the lower priority of coercive goods means that there are more resources available to focus on distributing public goods.

¹⁷³ "Gabon coup attempt: Government says situation under control" *BBC*, January 7, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46779854>.

¹⁷⁴ The World Bank. *Military expenditure (% of GDP)*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=AO>.

2. Elections and Time Horizons

With the introduction of multiparty elections 1990, the political threats have become institutionalized via elections, leading the regime to behave in ways that are more conducive to public goods provision. Although elections have arguably shortened time horizons, the pressure of electoral contestation shapes the regime's behavior to provide public goods to compete to gain a broader winning coalition. After Omar Bongo nearly lost the first multiparty presidential elections, the party adapted; namely, by negotiating with smaller opposition parties to form a broad winning coalition. The survival tactics of coercion and vote rigging are still used in the multiparty elections, but the regime also expands their patronage network and uses public goods to increase the coalition size. The coalition building and bargaining for goods gave Omar Bongo and the PDG a sizeable coalition, of 29 out of a total 35 parties to win the 1998 and 2005 presidential elections with significantly larger majorities of 79% in 2005.¹⁷⁵

Ali Bongo's rule, starting in 2009, demonstrates the increasing link between the institutionalization of a shorter time horizon and more public goods. Ali Bongo could not rely on the same survival tactics of his father. He had less funds for the patronage network, faced former party elites as rivals, and did not have the support of France.¹⁷⁶ These factors contributed to Ali Bongo's shorter time horizon and he became more reliant upon public goods to win elections and stay in power. Soon after taking office in 2009, he announced a major public works project, the *Gabon Emergent*, to shape Gabon's economy into a diverse emerging economy, with higher human capital and more public infrastructure.¹⁷⁷ Under Ali Bongo, public investment has increased significantly, and it is likely due at least partially to his political vulnerability that forms a short time horizon.

¹⁷⁵ "GABON: President Will Consolidate His Power." *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, Jan 23, 2018.; Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 265.

¹⁷⁶ "Obama: No, He Can't."

¹⁷⁷ République Gabonaise. *Plan Stratégique Gabon Emergent: Vision 2025 et orientations stratégiques 2011-2016*. Libreville, Gabon, 2012.
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/cafi/docs/Gabon%20documents/French/Gabon_2015_SM%20A_PlanStrategieGabonEmergent.pdf

3. Hypothesis 2 Summary

Gabon has used their five survival strategies to minimize extraconstitutional threats of removal such that, up until 1990 when elections were introduced, they had long time horizons. The regime's long-time horizon allowed Gabon to avoid political violence, turmoil, and civil war, there were no disruptions to public goods distribution. The regime also did not have to prioritize funding the coercive goods, since France was their backstop against removal. Once multiparty elections were introduced, the regime became vulnerable to institutionalized competition. With this new short time horizon, the more vulnerable the regime became to electoral competition, the more likely they were to prioritize public goods spending. If Bongo and the PDG's other survival strategies lose effectiveness, and electoral contestation's pressure increase in the future, Gabon may continue to behave in ways that are beneficial for public goods distribution.

F. HYPOTHESIS 3: OIL REVENUE AND PUBLIC GOODS

Like Chad, oil revenue is a significant contributor to public goods provision in Gabon. The oil sector in Gabon dominates the economy by providing most of its GDP, its exports, and its government revenue; this ratio has been maintained since the 1970s, when oil exports began.¹⁷⁸ Their large reservoir of oil revenue leads to the availability of more funds for the government that can be used for public investment. Since oil production began in 1931 in Gabon, it has always been part of the governing calculus, leading to longer time horizons and revenues being channeled toward investment instead of repression. Despite the regime's moderate priority for public goods, oil revenue allows Gabon to provide higher per capita spending on public goods than other SSA states.

In terms of education, Gabon's oil wealth allows it to spend 1.5 times more on education per student than other SSA states.¹⁷⁹ Gabon also provides more education funding despite a lower spending rate per GDP than in SSA due to its oil wealth. The strong

¹⁷⁸ International Monetary Fund, *Gabon: Background Paper*, (Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 1995), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF002/02692-9781451813845/02692-9781451813845/Other_formats/Source_PDF/02692-9781463906795.pdf?redirect=true.

¹⁷⁹ The World Bank, *Public Expenditure Review: Gabon*.

link between oil-led growth and public goods is evident, particularly between the years of 2000 and 2008, where GDP, which is strongly linked to oil revenue, grew nearly 3 times. During this time education spending per capita increased 2.5 times.

Similar increases during this time are evident in the health sector. As Figures 5 and 6 shows, the connection between oil led GDP growth between 2000 and 2008, and similar growth in Gabon's health expenditure per capita between 2000 and 2008.




Figure 5. Gabon's GDP (current US\$) 2000–2008.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ The World Bank. *GDP (current US\$) - Gabon*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2008&locations=GA&start=1999&view=chart>.




Figure 6. Gabon's Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$) 2000–2009.¹⁸¹

There also exists evidence that when Gabon faces lower oil prices, public goods decrease, further demonstrating the linkage between oil and public goods. Public spending on goods fluctuates with the global price of oil. Figures 7 and 8 demonstrates the volatility of Gabon's GDP, and the corresponding spending on health after 2009. This instability is evident in the 1990s, when Gabon added copays and user fees for healthcare, making it less accessible to the poor. This action coincided with significantly lower oil revenues in the country in the late 1980s.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ The World Bank. *Current health expenditure per capita (current US\$) - Gabon*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PC.CD?end=2009&locations=GA&start=2000>.

¹⁸² Saleh, Couttolenc, Barroy, and Debra, *Health Financing in the Republic of Gabon*.




Figure 7. Gabon's GDP (current US\$) 1960–2019.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ The World Bank. *GDP (current US\$) - Gabon*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2008&locations=GA&start=1999&view=chart>.




Figure 8. Gabon's Health Expenditure Per Capita (current US\$) 2000–2017.¹⁸⁴

In Gabon, there is strong evidence that public good spending increases with oil revenue. The same linkage also demonstrates that when oil revenue is lower than anticipated, public goods decrease. For Gabon, public goods are dependent on oil revenue, and because of oil, Gabon can spend more per capita on some public goods than other SSA states.

G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Gabon's authoritarian regime has been in power for 60 years and has provided a moderate level of public goods due to the primacy of other survival strategies. For most of Gabon's history, the regime relied on French interference, coercion, patronage, and vote-rigging to stay in power. These survival strategies meant that the regime enjoyed stability and long-time horizons, therefore decreasing their incentives to invest more heavily in public goods. When the regime faced increasingly short, but institutionalized, political time

¹⁸⁴ The World Bank. *Current health expenditure per capita (current US\$) - Gabon*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020.

horizons after the introduction of multiparty elections, they increased the priority of public goods as a survival strategy. Additionally, oil in Gabon allows the regime to have higher per capita spending on public goods than the SSA average. As the cost of the regime's other survival strategies increases, and the pressure of institutionalized short political time horizons continues, one can assess that the regime will rely more on public goods to stay in power.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis has sought to understand whether and why different kinds of authoritarian regimes provide different levels of public goods. It has examined this question with case studies of two longstanding authoritarian regimes in Africa: Chad and Gabon. Chad and Gabon are similar in many ways, they are both authoritarian oil-exporting sub-Saharan African states with a French colonial background, but they have had very different levels of investment in public goods. As this research has revealed, this difference in public goods provision is driven by the different types of threats that the two regimes face. These threat differences lead to divergence in: 1) survival strategies associated with each type of regime; and 2) leaders' time horizons. In both countries, oil revenues allow leaders to increase their investments in public goods, but they do not explain differences across the two regime types.

For the first hypothesis, there is clear evidence that Chad and Gabon utilize different survival strategies based on of their regime types and the types of threats faced by each regime. Personalist regimes are vulnerable to collapse from non-institutionalized coercive threats since the regime ends with the leader. Thus, personalist dictators are more interested in employing coercion as a survival tactic in response to these threats. In contrast, party regimes are less vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal.

These different levels of vulnerability lead to different survival strategies which, in turn, impact the degree to which they prioritize public goods funding. Chad's personalist regime does not prioritize public goods for its survival because its personalist leaders have primarily used coercion to face down the violent threats to their survival. This is due to the nature of personalist regimes, which tend to enjoy less popular and elite support and which tend to be less stable.¹⁸⁵ As a result, the Chadian personalist regimes prioritize investments in security services that can offer regime protection, rather than public goods that benefit the population.

¹⁸⁵ Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," 8.

Unlike the personalist regime in Chad, the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) uses public goods as one of five survival strategies. The Gabonese single-party regime relies upon an inclusive and broad support base, such that it requires coalitions and unified elite support to survive. As such, the PDG cannot rely solely on coercion to survive, and therefore must employ a variety of survival strategies, one of which is public goods distribution. This results in the Gabonese single-party regime providing a moderate level of public goods.

For the second hypothesis, the regimes in Chad and Gabon have featured different time horizons, in terms of both length and type, which affect the degree to which they prioritize funding either public goods or coercive goods. In Chad, leaders have had shorter time horizons because of threats of extraconstitutional removal from office, especially popular rebellions among some segments of the population. These threats lead to low spending on public goods since the regime's focus is primarily on coercive protection to survive. Since the mid-1990s Déby has managed to reduce the vulnerability of his regime, leading to lower coercion spending and distribution of more public goods.

Until 1990, Gabon faced few threats to their survival, leading to longer time horizons and little need to invest in public goods. Once multiparty elections were introduced, however, Gabon leaders' time horizons became shaped primarily by elections. This shortening of time horizons, however, did not lead to a decrease in public goods. Instead, the more predictable threats of removal (elections) provides the regime with enough stability to reduce coercive goods spending and increase public goods investment. Even if elections in Gabon at times produce shortened time horizons, the regime provides public goods to grow its winning coalition to survive.

For the third hypothesis, oil in both states contributes to funding public goods and stabilizes the regime, lowering the regime's reliance on coercive goods, exerting a positive effect on public goods investment. There is clear evidence that oil largely provides the funding for both Chad's and Gabon's public goods: in addition, oil revenue supports the regimes' other survival tactics, by providing tools to deescalate violence and fund a large patronage network of elites. However, Chad and Gabon have had different relationships with oil due to the amount of time the regimes have had to factor oil revenue into their

survival strategies. Because Gabon has had oil since its founding, the regime developed to utilize the oil resources for its survival. Whereas, in Chad, under the current personalist leader Déby, his regime’s survival tactics adapted with the influx of oil 13 years into his rule. In short, the oil revenue enables the regimes in both Chad and Gabon to prioritize coercive goods less and public goods more. These findings are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Findings between Chad and Gabon

State and Regime Type	H1: Personalist vs. Single-Party Survival Strategies	H2: Long vs Short Time Horizons	H3: Oil and Public Goods
Chad (Personalist)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No reliance upon public goods for survival • Primary survival strategy is coercion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personalist regimes vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal, which leads to shorter time horizons • Regimes with shorter time horizons (extraconstitutional) prioritizes coercive goods over public goods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil exports started in 2003 • Oil directly funds public goods • Oil funds patronage network that entrenches the regime so that it can spend less on coercive goods
Gabon (Single-Party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate reliance upon public goods for survival • Public goods are only one of five survival strategies • As other survival strategies become more expensive, public goods will likely increase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long time horizon against extraconstitutional removal has allowed Gabon to spend less on coercive goods • France heavily subsidized coercive goods for regime stability • Multiparty elections introduced short political time horizons • Short time horizon regime vulnerability raises public goods spending 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil exports since 1960s • Oil directly funds public goods • Public goods dependent on global oil prices, price shocks interrupt public goods

B. IMPLICATIONS

1. Academic

This thesis adds to the literature on authoritarian regimes, in particular their relationship with public goods. The literature has largely focused on the difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes with respect to public goods. This thesis adds insight into the differences among different types of authoritarian regimes, the differences in time horizons, and the impacts of oil revenue. This work not only highlights variation within regime types but also adds to the study of African cases of authoritarian regimes, under which much of the African population live. It also adds the importance of focusing on differences in political survival strategies and time horizons between different types of regimes. Additionally, oil revenue is likely to increase public goods spending regardless of the other political dynamics. This work can lay a foundation for further investigations into the nuanced relationship between authoritarian regimes and public goods. The more we examine the reasons why regimes spend on public goods or coercive goods, the better we can understand the lives of the people under them.

The study also contributes new knowledge about the political and institutional foundations of development. This thesis can add to literature on development and poverty reduction strategies. The findings demonstrate that for poverty reduction, party regimes and elections in particular are good for health, education, and infrastructure. In addition, oil was found to have benefited poverty reduction and development regardless of regime type.

2. Policy

The findings of my thesis could be applied by international governmental Organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their programs in authoritarian countries. States, IGOs, and NGOs can look at the regime type, party or personalist, and see which survival strategies the regime relies on, to better understand where their aid dollars may end up, either going to coercive goods, patronage, or actually supporting public goods. Additionally, they can examine the primary threats a regime, and specifically whether or not the regime faces intrastate violence that would shorten its time

horizon. In those cases, aid dollars may support coercive goods to prop up the regime instead of going to the people in the form of public goods.

Lastly, the impact of oil on public goods is important for donors to understand since the government's interest in public goods provision is very dependent on global oil prices. When global oil prices fall, aid groups can help sustain public goods provision, but once oil prices rise again, they could allow the regime, which has the resources, to fill the gap with new oil rents. These findings will assist these NGO / IGO's research when they look at their public return on investment in terms of their aid donations toward public goods.

C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The thesis also points to several areas for future research on the relationship between authoritarian regimes, oil production, and public goods provision. An area for further investigation is the variation in length of time a country has produced oil and its volume of oil production and how these variables impact its investment into public goods. In the cases of Gabon and Chad, Gabon has had oil production for almost as long as the regime has existed, 60 years, and so has exported much more oil, while Chad has only exported oil since 2003. As this thesis has found, oil revenue provides both the funds for public goods and assists regime stability. Gabon has benefited from its older oil industry, in providing the stability for less coercive goods, and the funds to provide more public goods, that Chad did not have until recently. Since, in both countries, oil has been the primary source of funds for public goods, oil may be a larger factor than regime survival strategies in the specific public goods investment strategies in Chad and Gabon. Further research would need to look at the possible relationship between patterns of public goods spending and profit from oil exports, for which data were not readily available for this research, to determine if Chad and Gabon are spending comparable percentage of oil revenue on public goods, or if there is an inherent difference based off of their survival strategies and priorities. Such a study would have to take into account that the World Bank stipulated when it invested into Chad's oil pipeline that it had to spend 70% of its oil revenue on public goods. This information would provide insight into policies that encourage oil-exporting countries to increase levels of public goods spending.

The research also found significant evidence of foreign interference in both Chad and Gabon, and further research should be undertaken to look at how the effects of external actors change the regime's prioritization of public goods distribution. French support, in particular, has played a potentially important role in shaping leaders' threats and time horizons in both countries. The personalist regimes in Chad have all been somewhat supported by the French, especially in terms of military protection. In addition, the Chadian regimes were more vulnerable to extraconstitutional removal from militias with external support. For example, the FRONILAT armies supported by Sudan, and Libya. It is clear from these examples that external support shapes both threats and time horizons of authoritarian leaders. If the Chadian regimes did not face externally supported armies, or if the French military had consistently supported the regimes and subsidized the cost of coercion, then the personalist regimes could have faced a longer time horizon and might have spent less on coercive goods and more on public goods. By contrast, the PDG and the Bongo family in the 20th century have largely avoided challenges from any externally supported groups and have benefited from consistent French support. Foreign interference from France has subsidized both authoritarian regimes at different levels and changed their calculus for survival strategy and their time horizons. Future research should examine the extent of the impact of foreign actors on authoritarian regimes and their public goods distribution. Theoretically, if foreign interference is a stronger factor on public goods provision than previously thought, it could alter the role of the international community in terms of peacekeeping or direct support to the regimes so that they can decrease their reliance upon coercive goods, and possibly provide more public goods.

D. FUTURE FOR CHAD AND GABON

Both Chad and Gabon are spending more on public goods now than previously in their histories. Over time in Gabon, the cost of using strategies of survival that are not based on public goods distribution has increased: the regime lost its French support in the 2000s, oil prices and revenue have decreased since 1997, and increasing pressure from international observers has dampened their ability to rig elections. Coercion will continue to be a survival strategy, but without French support it will be more costly. As the other survival strategies increase in cost, public goods will likely grow. In addition, as multiparty

elections in Gabon become more and more competitive, the regime will likely continue to use public goods to form large enough coalitions to win at the polls.

Chad, on the other hand, will likely see consistent investment into public goods unless new threats to the Déby regime appear. The regime, however, remains highly personalist, implying that his death or absence will almost certainly rupture this public investment and possibly send Chad into another cycle of short time horizons and a cessation of public goods investment.

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