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**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND
CIVIL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALI
AND CHAD**

by

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALI AND CHAD**

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This comparative case study examines two countries with similar security challenges but different conflict-solving responses. It then analyzes the effects of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and the political instrumentalization of disorder on the governments' divergent responses to conflict. By comparing two Sub-Saharan African countries in the Sahel, Mali and Chad, this thesis concentrates on two countries that have been similarly affected by security challenges in terms of transnational extremism but have experienced different outcomes from their conflict-solving efforts. As a result, the analysis shows that different types of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder affect a country's conflict-solving response. In the case of Mali, the country's government seems to allow disorder and conflict to persist in order to have continued access to resource revenues that guarantee state survival and prop up weak patron-client networks. The Chadian government, by contrast, seems to be interested in a balanced approach to conflict management that allows the government to maintain access to oil revenues, further strengthen its regional position, and suppress its domestic opponents without criticism from the international community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ANS	Agence Nationale de Sécurité (National Security Agency)
AQIM	Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
BVG	Bureau du Vérificateur General (Office of the Auditor General)
COML	Mali Country Office African Development Bank
DCSD	Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de defense (Directorate of Security and Defense Cooperation)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Training Mission Mali
FAMA	Malian Armed Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IC	International Community
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISWA	Islamic State in West Africa
MCC	Millennium Challenge Cooperation
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPS	Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (Patriotic Salvation Movement)
MUJAO	Movement for oneness and Jihad in the Sahel
ODA	Official Development Assistance
RPM	Rally for Mali
SSA	Security Sector Assistance
UFR	Union of Forces Resistance

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

On October 04, 2017, four American special forces soldiers died in an attack in North Niger. Following the attack, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)—a splinter group of extremists loyal to the Islamic State, located in the border region between Mali and Niger—claimed to be responsible. The coordinated attack showed how extremist groups have shifted their behavior and tactics since the French intervention began in 2013. In particular, after losing ground in Mali, extremist groups have used the opportunity to cross borders to regroup and plan further operations.¹ On November 25, 2019, 13 French soldiers died in a helicopter accident while conducting counterterrorist operations in Mali. The deaths were the single-biggest loss for France since the barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983. These soldiers had been part of the French counterterrorism operation Barkhane, which in total has around 4,500 soldiers in the Sahel zone. This operation started in 2014 with an uncertain outcome, as the French General Lecointre acknowledged, “We’re getting results but we have to be patient and persevering,”² Nevertheless, in the Sahel, conflict spillovers, like the spillover that occurred around the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998, continue to threaten the region.³

These United States (U.S.) and French losses are just a few examples of the deadly fight against insurgents in West Africa. African counterparts are even more dramatically impacted by this continuous, devastating struggle for security in the region. Beside many factors like poverty, climate change, resource scarcity, and a high rate of youth

¹ Baba Ahmed and Krista Larson, “Jihadist Ambush on U.S. Forces Shows New Danger in Sahel Region,” SFGate, accessed October 19, 2017, <https://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Jihadist-ambush-on-US-forces-shows-new-danger-in-12291482.php>.

² Sophie Louet and Diallo Tiemoko, “As France Mourns 13 Soldiers, Top General Says Full Victory in Africa Impossible,” Reuters World News, accessed November 27, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-mali/as-france-mourns-13-soldiers-top-general-says-full-victory-in-africa-impossible-idUSKBN1Y11X4>.

³ Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 108–11, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.106>.

unemployment, civil conflicts are mainly responsible for insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴

At least since the refugee crisis of 2015 in Europe, it has been clear that regional insecurity, even in areas far from the European Union, can directly affect daily life on the European continent. The crisis also demonstrated how vulnerable Europe has been in regard to security-related threats on its periphery. Therefore, successful and effective international engagements in Africa are necessary. This makes the international community's understanding of the African environment so important; and successful international engagement significantly depends on the African counterparts as well. Yet different actors perceive their roles differently, and the behavior of various African governments vis-à-vis external intervention varies widely.

The intent of this thesis is to look at how domestic politics influences African states' responses to conflicts. The thesis aims specifically at identifying domestic political behavior in regard to conflict-solving efforts, focusing on the following three domestic political strategies: neopatrimonialism, extraversion, and political instrumentalization of disorder. The goal is, on one side, to clarify and emphasize the affected government's responsibility in regard to its conflict-solving efforts and, on the other side, to give the international community a point of reference on how to further engage with its African counterparts.

Specifically, I investigate these strategies as they pertain to Mali and Chad—two countries where transnational insurgent groups have been active for most of the last decade. Despite many similarities, Mali and Chad have responded to regional and domestic conflicts differently. Whereas Chad has more aggressively sought to work with international partners and has responded effectively to conflict, Mali's response has been more muted.

⁴ Wim Naudé, "Conflict, Disasters and No Jobs: Reasons for International Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa" (working paper, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research, 2008), 1, <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45125/1/589772236.pdf>.

The analysis shows that different types of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder affect a country's conflict-solving response. In the case of Mali, the country's government seems to allow disorder and conflict to persist in order to continue to have access to aid revenues guaranteeing state survival. By contrast, the Chadian government embraces conflict management, but only to an extent that strengthens its regional position and permits repression of its opponents. Despite the general assumption that governments of conflict-ridden countries strive for development, peace, and prosperity, both the Malian and the Chadian governments have to some extent chosen a path of sustaining conflict instead of totally resolving it.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Certain domestic political strategies are especially crucial to analyze the variation in state response to conflict. In this context, scholars have identified a number of different factors as influential in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This section first introduces and defines state response to conflict as a dependent variable. It then discusses three key elements of domestic politics in Africa: neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder. These concepts serve as independent variables to analyze conflict responses of Mali and Chad.

1. Variation in State Response to Conflict

In general, political leaders of conflict-affected countries should be interested in solving civil conflicts as peace and security seem to be useful prerequisites for prosperity and development. States seeking to end or manage conflict engage in a number of activities. These activities, according to Patrick M. Regan, include both short-term and long-term measures.⁵ Short-term response strategies like "temporary respites from the fighting, implementing mechanisms for controlling the magnitude of the violence, ceasefires, agreements to disarm, the distribution of resources, and possibly even power sharing arrangements" are important and might lead to "cessation of hostilities," but only long-

⁵ Patrick M. Regan, "The Short-term Effects of Military Interventions in Civil Conflict," accessed August 30, 2020, <http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~pregan/documents/short-termeffects.pdf>.

term strategies addressing “social and cultural factors” might lead to “an underlying change in the relationship between the conflict parties.”⁶

In contrast to this rather promising and ideal theory of conflict management, some governments of conflict-affected countries choose a different and more confrontational approach by directly fighting their insurgencies. In a worst case scenario, this more confrontational approach can also lead to targeting of the “distrusted civilian populations associated with the armed resistance.”⁷ This approach follows more a coercive and repressive logic by “punishing civilians for real or suspected collaboration, which is designed to weaken and impose costs on the armed opposition and its supporters.”⁸ Thus, coercive or repressive measures used to solve internal conflicts can be identified as a more aggressive response. A less aggressive and more cooperative response might contain the accommodation of “grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements.”⁹ As a result, state responses can be characterized as strong or weak. Strong responses to conflict contain aggressive or cooperative measures to manage the conflict. On the other side, government actions designed to allow disorder to persist can be seen as weak response.

2. Political Survival in African States

Leaders in African states are known to use a variety of political tactics to maintain their power. These tactics may, at various times, support or undermine conflict management interests. I focus on three political strategies commonly employed by African leaders: neopatrimonialism, extraversion, and political instrumentalization of disorder. This section reviews literature on these tactics.

⁶ Regan, 2.

⁷ Scott Strauss, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 115.

⁸ Strauss, 115.

⁹ Cullen S. Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310361838>.

a. Neopatrimonialism

Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle characterize “hybrid political systems” as neopatrimonial, “in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.”¹⁰ Neopatrimonialism is often used to describe certain types and features of political systems mainly recognized nowadays in developing countries in Africa and across the world. The combination of strong executive, clientelistic linkages between politicians and citizens, and the use of state resources to guarantee political survival of the favored elite are features of a neopatrimonial system.¹¹ Patrick Chabal argues that neopatrimonialism is a prominent type of society throughout the global south, in which corruption and clientelism are closely linked and important.¹² Bratton and van de Walle identify neopatrimonialism as “the core feature of politics in Africa.”¹³ These characteristics are not only limited to authoritarian regimes; they also exist in highly competitive democracies, where neopatrimonial characteristics can be directly embedded in law and order.¹⁴

In a patrimonial system, informal practices seem more important than official rule, with a clear focus on the role of patronage and clientelism in order to legitimate the political system itself. This system leads almost inevitably to negative political and economic developments, which are linked to each other. As a neopatrimonial regime can be characterized by the constant struggle to sustain its power, it is important to understand the link between neopatrimonial features and their political and economic impact on the governments’ behavior regarding any conflict resolution effort. Especially, perceived threats towards power sustainment might shape a country’s behavior.

¹⁰ Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62.

¹¹ Rachel Sigman and Staffan I. Lindberg, “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa’s Political Regimes” (working paper, The Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2017), 1, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/59409>.

¹² Christopher Chabal, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 49–50.

¹³ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 62.

¹⁴ Sigman and Lindberg, “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy,” 1.

Tim Kelsall argues that, viewed from a broad perspective, neopatrimonial structures can be good for development under certain conditions.¹⁵ Nevertheless, Kelsall also highlights that side effects of the determined power concentration can be “extra constitutional challenges to power, and consequently the prevalence of plots, coups, purges, insurrections, ethnic strife, and civil wars.”¹⁶ In addition, neopatrimonial characteristics like the “blurring of public and private roles”¹⁷ lead inescapably to corruption, which also impacts the availability of resources for public goods. Overall, these characteristics create an investor-hostile environment.¹⁸ On the other side, corruption not only negatively affects economic aspects, but also prevents institutional development and that in turn hampers political efforts to solve conflicts. In supporting these arguments, Bratton and van de Walle emphasize that factors like the constant redistribution of state resources leads inevitably to “fiscal crisis and diminished prospects for sustained economic growth.”¹⁹ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson relatedly highlight the negative influence of extractive economic institutions, which are designed to “extract incomes and wealth from on subset of society to benefit a different subset.”²⁰ The basis of extractive institutions is “an elite who design economic institutions in order to enrich themselves and perpetuate their power at the expense of the vast majority in society.”²¹

Additionally, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue that in a neopatrimonial system, leaders primarily have political obligation to their “clients, their communities, their

¹⁵ Tim Kelsall, *Business, Politics and the State in Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies on Growth and Transformation* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2013), 12.

¹⁶ Kelsall, 12.

¹⁷ Kelsall, 13.

¹⁸ Kelsall, 13.

¹⁹ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 67.

²⁰ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 76.

²¹ Acemoglu and Robinson, 399.

regions, or even to their religion.”²² Keeping such a clientelistic system alive demands resources, which of course depend on how extensive the patron-client network is. The legitimacy of the African ruling elite relies on its ability to constantly “nourish the clientele on which their power rests.”²³ Therefore, it is almost inevitable that politicians “exploit governmental resources for patrimonial purposes” instead of acting as servants of the state.²⁴ As a result, extractive economic and political institutions produce a “strong feedback loop,” in which extractive political institutions allow the ruling political elite to choose and introduce economic institutions “with few constraints and opposing forces.”²⁵ They also enable the ruling elite to design “future political institutions and their evolution,” which leads to further enrichment of the same elite.²⁶ As a result, members of the strong ruling elite use their client system as well as the modern state system and its institutions to constantly sustain their power. Thus, a government’s dependency on such relations eventually leads to ultimate protection of these networks, which then also shapes the governments’ behavior in regard to conflict-solving efforts if the system is threatened.

In contrast to this rather gloomy view of neopatrimonialism, Daniel C. Bach identifies and distinguishes between different types of neopatrimonialism. Although Bach acknowledges the existence of a “predatory and integral” type of neopatrimonialism and the negative effects associated with it, he introduces a second type, called regulated neopatrimonialism.²⁷ Beside the predatory form, in which state institutions are extremely weak, regulated neopatrimonialism can be “associated with the introduction of a policy of

²² Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 15.

²³ Chabal and Daloz, 15.

²⁴ Chabal and Daloz, 15.

²⁵ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*, 81.

²⁶ Acemoglu and Robinson, 81.

²⁷ Daniel C. Bach, “Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism: Comparative Trajectories and Readings,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 49, no. 3 (2011): 277–80, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2011.582731>.

ethnoregional balance.”²⁸ In that case, resources are distributed in a more formal inclusive way, highlighting cooptation and redistribution rather than coercion. This approach promotes a “culture of mutual accommodation,” in which increased state capacity is used to penetrate society and to guarantee compliance.²⁹ Overall, regulated neopatrimonialism still has the tendency to undercut the sense of good governance, but conveys an own understanding of “moral economy” with the ability to spur economic and state capacity processes.³⁰

David Booth and Diana Cammack also distinguish another type of neopatrimonialism, called developmental neopatrimonialism. Supporting Kelsall’s points, the authors argue that there is certainly widespread evidence of neopatrimonialism with all its associated effects on the African continent. Nevertheless, it is not the same everywhere. Therefore, a specific division is necessary to identify beneficial aspects of these types. Developmental neopatrimonial regimes consist of a system of centralized governmental management, which focuses on long-term views. In such cases, political strategies are not designed only to satisfy clientele demands immediately; instead, they use economic rents with a long-term perspective.³¹ Under such regimes, the focus is to improve the national economic situation by using rents productively instead of taking “the largest slices from it in the short term.”³² In order to realize such an understanding, policies and their implementation have to be aligned to the overall national long-term vision as well. Yet, this change usually does not happen accidentally or without pressure. Normally, the motivation for such a behavior is based on motivation created by “some existential shock

²⁸ Bach, 278.

²⁹ Bach, 278.

³⁰ Bach, 278.

³¹ David Booth and Diana Cammack, *Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems* (New York: Zed Books, 2013), 70.

³² Booth and Cammack, 70.

or threat.”³³ Therefore, neopatrimonialism does not have to be anti-developmental per se; a detailed inquiry is necessary to define harmful elements.

Also contrary to the mainly negative wisdom, Rachel Sigman and Staffan Lindberg offer an empirical assessment of neopatrimonialism in Africa. The authors argue that there is no clear evidence indicating such approaches necessarily prohibit the “advancement or survival of democracy.”³⁴ Additionally, they claim there is no significant difference between neopatrimonial regimes in developing countries in Africa and in the rest of the world, and the authors agree with Batton and van de Walle that the dimensions of neopatrimonialism differ from case to case. Therefore, it is important to disaggregate the individual elements of neopatrimonialism in order to understand the interactive effects of the different features.³⁵

Even if the acknowledgment of the influence of neopatrimonialism on government behavior differs, it is important not to discard it. The concept captures deeply rooted and influential aspects of governance recognized in many African countries.³⁶ Regarding the explained types and effects, neopatrimonialism seems to be an influential factor that can be supportive or detrimental. Naazneen H. Barma argues that political action taken by governments to solve conflicts “echoes the basic [neopatrimonial] political order and struggles of the past.”³⁷ Thus, different types of neopatrimonialism also influence a country’s government response to conflict.

b. Extraversion Strategies

Extraversion strategies utilize externally-focused resource procurement for political survival. Government leaders’ use their relationships with external actors to

³³ Booth and Cammack, 71.

³⁴ Sigman and Lindberg, “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy,” Abstract.

³⁵ Sigman and Lindberg, 21.

³⁶ Kelsall, *Business, Politics and the State in Africa*, 15.

³⁷ Naazneen H. Barma, *The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conflict States*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 52.

appropriate resources or authority in order to guarantee and enlarge their own power. Thus, the external resources could be access to aid and assistance, access to strategic support, or access to revenue from exports. Jean-Francois Bayart argues that in light of the history of African countries, most governments used extraversion strategies in the past. Therefore, extraversion is not a new phenomenon that exist as different types. Some of these types appeared already through the different historical phases of the African continent like slavery, colonialism, Christian conversion, decolonization, and the Cold War.³⁸ Although Bayart identifies African states' dependent relationships with foreign actors as a key element of extraversion, he highlights the importance of the ruling African elite being involved in the different operations. In this context, Bayart highlights their active role in the process of gaining and using resources from the international world. The different activities conducted by the ruling African elites over time underline "how much Africans have participated in the processes which have led to the insertion of their societies as a dependent partner in the world economy."³⁹ Somehow, strategies of extraversion can also be seen as means of Africa's integration into "the main currents of world history through the medium of dependence."⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Bayart claims that structural adjustment programs designed to facilitate higher levels of democracy are currently used by African elites to advance their own interests; for example, elites or their clients benefit from the privatization of public enterprises.⁴¹

Denis M. Tull focuses on how consistently the international community implements different measures.⁴² Beside the often too ambiguous objective of external donors to engineer political change in weak states, most African governments are

³⁸ Jean-Francois Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs* 99, no. 39 (2000): 251, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/723809>.

³⁹ Bayart, 220.

⁴⁰ Bayart, 241.

⁴¹ Bayart, 243.

⁴² Denis M. Tull, "Weak States and Successful Elites: Extraversion Strategies in Africa," (working paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2011), 5, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP09_tll_ks.pdf.

constantly threatened by domestic political conflicts and violent opponents. Many Western actors are not aware of the different interests resulting from that constant fight for survival, which explains the divergent perspectives and perceptions held by Western actors and the African elites.⁴³ The constant concern of African political elites with survival leads to different domestic strategies to achieve that specific objective. In this context, Tull asks the question about “how African actors shape their foreign relations and how they deal with external actors, particularly when considering their structural dependency” in relation to Western countries.⁴⁴ He argues that African leaders, to a certain extent, think dependency is “politically desirable or at least useful.”⁴⁵

With this approach, African elites try to compensate for domestic weaknesses like the “lack of authority, legitimacy or resources.”⁴⁶ This concept of extraversion focuses on generating external resources from international partners, including development assistance, loans, investment, diplomatic support, and security-related cooperation. Overall, through this strategy African elites focus not only of securing or maintaining access to external resources, but also try to capitalize on foreign dependency. Additionally, Tull argues that the aid-based extraversion strategies of some of African elites prevents them from developing alternative types of resource mobilization, like levying taxes. This, in turn, helps African rulers to keep political costs low: by limiting the extent to which they raise taxes, they also limit societal demands for accountability to their benefit. International dependency, in line with a foreseen extraversion strategy, tries to keep the state out of the principal idea of state building—the ability to extract resources. Therefore, “the weakness of state institutions is perpetuated in the interest of the elites, who have little need for legitimacy,” because they are able to sustain their financial resources through international instead of domestic sources.⁴⁷

⁴³ Tull, 5.

⁴⁴ Tull, 8.

⁴⁵ Tull, 8.

⁴⁶ Tull, 8.

⁴⁷ Tull, 8.

In this context, Tull highlights the potential downsides of Western commitments in Africa in relation to the perceived pressure to address problems like democratization, state collapse, or terrorism. On the African partner side, this problem can create political opportunities and it can give an advantageous position toward the Western community.⁴⁸ Therefore, Tull criticizes the international community for not enforcing sufficient consequences, arguing that “governments of fragile states will not implement reforms when they know that they continue to expect assistance.”⁴⁹ In this way, international donors effectively reward poor governance by guaranteeing unconditional support.⁵⁰

In addition to Tull’s argument, Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert focus their inquiry on the variety of external relations used by African countries for domestic political and material benefits. Some countries seem to have “more diversified extraversion portfolio – than others.”⁵¹ Peiffer and Englebert argue that the “greater a portfolio’s dependence on foreign donors, or the less control a regime has over the options in its portfolio, the more vulnerable it might be to donor demands for democratization.”⁵² Thus, the two authors claim to see a direct relationship between the likelihood of liberalization and the vulnerability of a country’s extraversion portfolio.⁵³ The use of extraversion strategies by African countries is widespread and varied, however, which makes some systems more vulnerable than others. That is why “observable variations in the specific elements of their foreign relations that regimes instrumentalize” can be identified as part of their overall strategy of extraversion.⁵⁴ After all, each country has its own unique

⁴⁸ Tull, 9.

⁴⁹ Tull, 26.

⁵⁰ Tull, 26.

⁵¹ Pierre Englebert and Caryn Peiffer, “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and Political Liberalization in Africa,” *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 356, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads029>.

⁵² Englebert and Peiffer, 356.

⁵³ Englebert and Peiffer, 357.

⁵⁴ Englebert and Peiffer, 361.

extraversion portfolio with specific linkages to the international world in order to gain from abroad the resources needed for domestic domination.⁵⁵

Extraversion portfolios do not have to remain static and are subject to change. Specifically, as it becomes a significant patron, China's influence on the African continent rises, and the discovery of natural resources like oil can similarly change the type of extraversion strategy. Following the argument of Tull, it is evident that inconsistent policies from the donor side provide African countries "blanket budget support in exchange for broad policy commitments," which will consequently weaken the effective leverage of the donors.⁵⁶ Even though the "extraversion literature" distinguishes numerous different types of strategies and recognizes the vulnerability of the system in regard to the shape of the portfolio, the use of insecurity as an extraversion strategy seems to be underestimated. Extraversion strategies could undermine the overall conflict-solving effort of affected African countries. Conflict can serve as an additional source of revenue that helps politicians maintain power, often through neopatrimonial structures. Overall, because extraversion strategies shape countries' relationships with foreign countries, those strategies may influence how countries respond to conflicts of concern to the international community.

c. Political Instrumentalization of Disorder

In their book *Africa Works*, Chabal and Daloz develop a paradigm called the political instrumentalization of disorder. This paradigm refers to the process by which political elites in Africa seek "to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos."⁵⁷ In this context, disorder is a type of resource, which minimizes the incentives for institutional order. This, in turn, influences the shape of neopatrimonial systems, which presupposes resources. This circumstance leads to an

⁵⁵ Englebert and Peiffer, 361.

⁵⁶ Englebert and Peiffer, 377.

⁵⁷ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, xviii.

inevitable “tendency to link politics to realms of increased disorder, be it war or crime.”⁵⁸ Therefore, it is not uncommon that Western development approaches are opposed to political instrumentalization of disorder. On the contrary, rulers embedded in such a system tend to reduce bureaucratic capacity if that helps them to keep their power at the center of a patronage system.⁵⁹

In addition to the explanation of Chabal and Daloz, Englebert and Tull emphasize that the use of continuous disorder in combination with a tuned extraversion strategy of insecurity leads to access to additional resources and beneficial external interventions.⁶⁰ This argument is supported by the different perspectives described by Matt Andrews: countries try to convince outsiders that they would adopt “impressive-looking reforms,” which they later will not be able to implement.⁶¹ Such behavior combined with the manipulation by the ruling elite of their institutions’ “weakness and political disorder extends to violent conflict, state failure, and state reconstruction,” which means that African elites may engage in at best empty pledges to improve their capacity to reduce disorder.⁶² In addition to the more externally orientated direction, William Reno argues that disorder also functions as political instrument in order to promote “disorganization and competition among potential opponents, leaving them to appeal to the personal favor of rulers to help them against rivals.”⁶³

Regarding the explained effects, instrumentalization of disorder understood as cultivating insecurity for internal and external value also seems contradictory to the overall conflict-solving effort of affected African countries. Instead, disorder may legitimize

⁵⁸ Chabal and Daloz, 162.

⁵⁹ William Reno, “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa,” in *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*, ed. D. E. Davis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 327.

⁶⁰ Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” 118.

⁶¹ Matt Andrews, *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33.

⁶² Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” 119.

⁶³ Reno, “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa,” 329.

suppression of opponents, and thus, helps ruling regimes to strengthen their power. In addition, non-excessive disorder might also spur regional and international support and, thus, generate additional revenues for governments of the affected countries. Therefore, how disorder is used by governments of conflict-ridden countries also influences their conflict-solving behavior. As a result, such governments might allow civil conflict to continue or even actively prolong it.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This section develops a set of hypotheses about how domestic political factors or strategies affect state responses to conflict. Specifically, I focus on the roles of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, as well as political instrumentalization of disorder in shaping state response to conflict. The primary hypothesis is that, contrary to the ideal notion that governments strive for long-term development and peace, conflict-ridden countries' governments may use large international engagements not to end conflict and rebuild the country but rather to maintain or strengthen their own power. From the perspective of incumbent political leaders, an end to civil conflict may necessarily lead to a potential reduction in resources from international partners that regimes rely on to secure their political survival. These resources come in a number of forms: financial support, regime security, legitimacy, and state security. As a result, conflict-ridden countries' governments may be less interested in solving civil conflicts; in fact, they may even be interested in actively prolonging a conflict. Within this context, neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder can be understood as influential domestic factors or strategies of political survival that shape the responses by the governments of conflict-ridden countries. These domestic strategies are linked to each other but can also occur separately. In light of different domestic factors, the following related hypotheses emerge.

First, the degree and structure of neopatrimonialism in a country's political institutions and society influences the government's response to internal conflicts. Presidentialism and clientelism seem to be especially important neopatrimonial features in shaping a government's response direction. Presidentialism is important in shaping conflict

response because it enables a powerful president to concentrate and centralize power and monopolize control of state resources. This level of control lengthens political time horizons, which shapes their motivation to control conflict. Political leaders who are likely to be in office for a long time do not want to have a wide-spread and intensive conflict, which might endanger the ruling elite's power structures. If a leader expects to hold power for longer, he or she has an interest in not seeing the conflict spin out of control. In contrast, if a leader expects to stay in power a shorter time, either because electoral institutions are stronger or the leader does not have extensive executive control over the state and its resources, he or she may not have as much incentive to invest in containing or solving the conflict.

In addition, the structure of clientelism is important. If patron-client networks are widespread, especially in areas of conflict, political leaders may have better control of these parts of the country, and will be better able to project power. These networks and capabilities help to legitimate rulers as conflict solvers, increasing the chance of success in managing conflict. Thus, ruling elites are empowered to seek long-term solutions because they have the networks and legitimacy to implement these solutions. By contrast, where leaders do not possess stable patron-client networks in the area of conflict, they do not have the connections and power necessary to sustain long-term solutions.

Different types of extraversion strategies also influence a government's response to internal conflicts. The relationship between extraversion and conflict response depends on the types of benefits that countries obtain from foreign actors. If extraversion strategies are primarily concerned with raising revenue from natural resources, political leaders and ruling elites will have stronger incentives to address internal conflicts, at least partially. These elites have a secure source of internal revenue, but they depend to some extent on their foreign partners for technical support and buyers. Thus, if a conflict spins out of control, the elites may lose that crucial support and see the conflict expand in ways that threaten the resources themselves. On the other side, if an extraversion strategy is primarily concerned with accessing more and more aid, a country's government will have less interest and urgency in solving civil conflicts because an end to the conflicts would jeopardize the future partnerships that produce aid.

Additionally, extraversion strategies designed to gain external regime protection will lead to the regime's greater interest in solving internal conflicts. In this context, a government's long-term survival strategy is based on being a reliable regional partner, leading international actors to continue to provide protection to the regime.

Closely linked to both neopatrimonialism and extraversion strategies, political instrumentalization of disorder also impacts state response to conflict by using disorder as a supporting measure for state survival. Disorder can have positive and negative effects for ruling elites in conflict-ridden countries, and it definitely affects how these leaders behave in regard to their conflict-solving efforts. Disorder might be used to spur international engagement resulting in externally provided security assistance and training, and humanitarian and emergency assistance. In addition, disorder makes repression of political opponents more legitimate. Thus, instrumentalization of disorder supports the neopatrimonial system and serves as a source for possible extraversion strategies. Besides having a seemingly supporting effect, excessive instrumentalization of disorder also contains certain risks to governments and their ruling elites. Forced violence, human rights violations, and the targeting of possible political opponents could trigger unfavorable external actions and thus threaten current power structures. In this context, regional and international actors could see the necessity to intervene in affected countries by political means like sanctions or in a more violent way by invasion. Especially the inaction of governments of conflict-ridden countries to help or protect civilians as well as the persistent disorder and violence might trigger such a reaction, which would be counterproductive for the ruling elite's power structures. Thus, supporting a certain degree of disorder allows ruling elites to legitimately suppress opponents and to continue their protective extraversion strategy. By contrast, a country's government will allow disorder to persist, and even allow it to spread, to keep international support necessary for sustaining patron-client networks, if at the same time regime survival is not endangered by the conflict itself.

At the end, all these strategies shape a country's response to conflict and thus its relations with the international community. In order to not only manage a civil conflict, the international community needs to understand the whole conflict environment and especially the political survival dynamics that surround the regime in power. Only with an

overall understanding of the domestic politics will the international community be able to adjust its engagement in conflict-ridden countries as shown schematically in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Domestic Strategies or Factors Possibly Affecting Government's Behavior

D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In order to test the hypotheses and to understand possible variations of African countries' state responses to conflict, this thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Chad. Testing the hypotheses on the basis of these two cases allows a more general assessment.

Mali and Chad face a similar threat in terms of transnational terrorism in the Sahel Zone, and both countries are similarly poor. In addition, Chad and Mali both have highly fractionalized societies with many different ethnic groups and a similar history. While Chad has faced a civil war and internal disputes over the last decades, primarily with the Muslim population in the north, Mali has recently experienced and still struggles with its internal conflict, mainly concentrated in central and northern Mali. Mali's internal conflict is characterized primarily by intercommunal disputes and transnational terrorism. In both cases, a French-led intervention guaranteed the survival of both countries. In the current

fight against terrorism, both countries are close allies to the French effort in the Sahel.⁶⁴ The research design for this thesis thus treats these two countries as “most similar systems.”

The analysis centers on the two countries’ different abilities and capabilities in responding to internal threats and conflicts. Chad is actively supporting international efforts, like the French-led operation Barkhane, by dispatching over 2,000 troops not only in Chad but also in neighboring countries.⁶⁵ By contrast Mali seems to take a different path: despite enabling efforts by international organizations like the European Union (EU) since 2015, Mali’s armed forces are still only conditionally ready for counterterrorism operations. In fact, Mali’s armed forces have been accused of violating Human Rights.⁶⁶ Both countries face similar threats through internal conflicts, which allows for a comparison and an analysis of the reasons for different outcomes.

The dependent variable of this thesis is government response to conflict—understood as actions carried out by governments to manage internal conflicts. Potential actions include conducting police and military counter operations as well as the projection of state power in affected regions. If the country’s existing capabilities are limited, all measures that increase the needed capabilities to counter the civil conflict would also constitute an active conflict response. In order to measure the dependent variable, the following are analyzed: government structures, their actions regarding the internal conflict, and changes in relative power of the government and the insurgency. If a stronger state response—by repression or by accommodating grievances through peaceful means—is detectable, then successful conflict-solving efforts are more likely. By contrast, a weak response is observed when leaders do not directly counter the conflict with military means,

⁶⁴ John A. Gould and Matthew S. Winters, “Petroleum Blues: The Political Economy of Resources and Conflict in Chad,” in *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad (London, UK: Earthscan, 2012), 318–19.

⁶⁵ “Chad: Economic Woes Threaten Counterterrorism Role,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, accessed July 15, 2020, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1940275972/fulltext/DE8E8334AD6B4B7FPQ/1?accountid=12702>.

⁶⁶ Denis M. Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army: The Dissonant Relationship Between Mali and Its International Partners,” *International Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2019): 406, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz003>.

but also by the misuse of conflict-solving resources given by the international community, or by the government actively supporting the conflict or its belligerents.

The three political strategies identified previously serve as the core independent variables expected to affect the governments' responses to conflict. How neopatrimonialism affects a country's political behavior can be measured in terms of the level of corruption, the distribution of power in the government, the type and efficiency of "formal institutions such as the security forces, the role of the president, the distribution of state resources, and the embeddedness of clientelism. How a country uses extraversion strategies, especially in the case of security, can be measured through international engagement, physically or economically, like United Nations (UN) Peace Keeping Operations and Security Sector Assistance (SSA), or simply through aid. In addition to the first two independent variables, the instrumentalization of disorder is observed through the exploitation of violence by different ethnic groups. In addition, disorder is observed if the government uses these groups to destabilize the security within the country.

To conduct the inquiry, I consulted necessary sources and data sets. In regard to the specific-country comparison, the intent is to construct the research, on one side, from official documents provided by Mali and Chad and, on the other side, from data collected from international institutions like the UN, the EU, and the European Council of Foreign Relations publications, and publications from the U.S. Congressional Research Service or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Additionally, information from organizations like Transparency International, Human Rights Watch, Millennium Challenge Cooperation, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank, Uppsala Conflict Database, and SIPRI help to show the relevant influence of the described domestic strategies.

The thesis is structured as follows. After the introduction chapter, the second chapter focuses on the security challenges of Mali and Chad and their state response. It shows that both countries seem to be similar in terms of the threats they face, but each of them has chosen a different conflict-solving approach. Mali's government seems incapable or unwilling to resolve its internal conflict while Chad seems to be involved in a partially successful conflict management effort, which highlights different outcomes for the two

countries. Chapter III uses the information from the second chapter to further analyze how the identified domestic strategies influence a country's government response to conflict. Chapter III shows how variations in neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder lead to divergent state responses to conflict. Different circumstances, environments, and survival strategies lead to different outcomes. As a result, Mali's government seems interested in continuing its internal conflict while Chad seems more interested in using its position as a successful conflict manager as a bargaining chip for international support. Finally, Chapter IV concludes with a summary of the key findings, highlighting the importance of each independent variable in shaping the state response to conflict and why this understanding is important for the international community in light of the relationship of conflict-affected African countries.

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II. SECURITY CHALLENGES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

This chapter analyzes the security challenges and respective government responses in Mali and Chad. This background is necessary for the analysis in later chapters of the different political dynamics in both countries. The first and the second sections of this chapter concentrate on the historical, political, economic, and security situations in Mali and Chad with a clear focus on each countries' challenges. The last section concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences of both countries, showing that seemingly similar countries have taken different paths in terms of their respective government's conflict-solving efforts, consequently positioning Chad as a regional power and Mali as dependent on external support.

A. MALI

The landscape of rebellion and conflict is more complex in Mali today than it was during previous rebellions. In this section, I briefly discuss the history of conflict in Mali, the conditions that have helped to perpetuate conflict, and the rise of terrorist threats. I also discuss the roles of foreign actors in the current conflict response. This sections shows that especially in the last few years, violence has been present daily in Mali while government institutions seem to be dysfunctional and unable to handle the current security challenges. Thus, the country's security situation continues to undergo a progressive decline. Even increasing military, paramilitary, and monetary international engagements have not changed the overall situation in the country. Therefore, in Mali, the state response to conflict can be characterized as weak with low intensions to trigger strong reactions or capability development to overcome these challenges. In Mali, insecurity related to local terrorism and armed groups' activities, and ethnic conflicts aligned with poor governance, as well as a highly undiversified economy in an unfriendly climate characterize the country's contemporary challenges and, thus, make the country vulnerable.

1. Evolution of the Internal Conflict

Mali's current security challenges are directly connected to the country's long history of rebellion, inequality, and poor governance. In 2012, for the fourth time after independence, a rebellion originating in the northern part of Mali shocked the already struggling country. After 1963/64, in the 1990s, and from 2006 to 2009, Mali experienced a series of rebellions by paramilitary forces mainly from the semi-nomadic Tuareg community, but also from insurgents, claiming that the northern part of the population was ignored by the government of Mali for a long time. Beside blaming the inefficiency of the public service or the lack of infrastructure in the northern part of the country for the bad social situation of its population, the weak presence of the Malian government allowed alternative political authorities like "hard-line Islamist actors" to engage in the region.⁶⁷ Thus, this weakness also led to additional insecurity connected to organized crime activities like human trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, and other types of banditry, which then "generated revenue for a new breed of would-be state challengers."⁶⁸ These activities have been facilitated by weak governance and the ability of different actors to activate and extend the ancient trade route through the Sahara.⁶⁹

Unlike the three rebellions before, in 2012, many Tuareg fighters engaged in the rebellion came from their previous assignment as Libyan mercenaries. Equipped with arms from the former Khadafi regime, these rebels were stronger than before and a real threat to the Malian government. Equipped with modern weapons, these Tuareg started their advancement against Malian government forces. The secessionist movement, called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), had been one of the three opponents of the Malian government in the northern part of the country. Many of the MNLA leaders, as in the rebellions before, followed the path of a Tuareg nationalist

⁶⁷ Jamie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch, "The 2012 Crisis in Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure," *African Affairs* 114, no.457 (August 2015): 601, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adv038>.

⁶⁸ Bleck and Michelitch, 601.

⁶⁹ Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, "The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 7 (September 2013): 1285, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.824647>.

movement. In 2012, however, this was not the only reason for the movement; opportunism related to a weak central government was also a common driver.

Besides the already deteriorating rebel situation, two Islamist hard-liner groups—Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine—continued to expand their area of influence.⁷⁰ AQIM and Ansar Dine, which had already been active in the area for many years, both tried to play the role of protector. On one side, the Islamist groups offered protection against unjust harassment by the weak Malian government and protection against harassment from the new MNLA movement advancing in the North. On the other side, these groups demanded loyalty, and acceptance of their behavior and their understanding of Islam. In this context, the Islamist groups, especially AQIM, gradually changed their tactics from distributing money and small scale benefits to the entire population to only those people who would strongly argue “for its [AQIM’s] interpretation of the virtues of Islam.”⁷¹ As a result, a complex conflict evolved from just a rebellion to an open insurgency in Mali.

In March 2012, frustrated at fighting the MNLA and the Islamist groups without the arms and supplies needed for victory, Malian soldiers staged a coup shortly before the national elections. Their initial desire to get better support in fighting in the northern regions quickly changed to “incorporate broader popular grievances around poor public service and infrastructure provision, as well as the corruption of the *classe politique*.”⁷² In addition to the dissatisfied military members, many Malians saw this development as a result of Mali’s deteriorating democracy and president Amadou Toumani Toure as its representative figure. Most criticized by Mali’s population was his “willingness to collaborate with all actors, even those suspected of illicit activities in the north, coupled with a culture of amnesty,” which fueled rumors of government involvement in banditry in the North of the country.⁷³ Not accepted by the international community and countered

⁷⁰ Bleck and Michelitch, “The 2012 Crisis in Mali,” 601.

⁷¹ Bøås and Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” 1287.

⁷² Bleck and Michelitch, “The 2012 Crisis in Mali,” 601.

⁷³ Bleck and Michelitch, 602.

by sanctions, the coup was doomed to fail and drove Mali further into instability and political chaos.⁷⁴

All three opponent armed groups quickly used this political chaos in the country's capital of Bamako to start occupying the northern regions Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao, and eventually advancing into central Mali. After the successful occupation, the independent state of Azawad was proclaimed, concentrating on the territory north of the Niger River. Within only a few months, "an AQIM splinter movement, the Movement for oneness and Jihad in the Sahel (MUJAO)," and the jihadist group called Ansar Dine ousted the more secular MNLA, introducing strict Sharia law to all inhabitants of northern Mali. In addition, the advancement of the different armed groups also led to competition among those groups, which resulted in tensions among the different communities. Various groups exploited ethnic and clan cleavages in an attempt to increase their power. Nevertheless, after several months of political stalemate, a unified coalition of Islamists advanced south towards government-controlled territory.⁷⁵

On the verge of the complete loss of Mali to Islamists and other armed groups, the International Community (IC) decided to intervene in the country. First, in January 2013, a French military intervention (Operation Serval) retook control over northern Mali. After conducting Operation Serval, the IC freed the area and invested a huge amount of resources in order to secure and restore order in Mali. In this context, the United Nations introduced its UN stabilization mission (MINUSMA) with more than 12,000 uniformed personnel and many more civilians. Mandated to protect civilians and to stabilize population centers, MINUSMA, as well as the IC, promoted the peace process in Mali.⁷⁶ The combined international intervention eventually led to the return to a more democratic process, resulting in presidential elections in 2013. On August 11, 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won against the opposition leader Soumaila Cisse. As a result of the international intervention and the domestic political stabilization, the government of Mali and the Tuareg

⁷⁴ Bleck and Michelitch, 602.

⁷⁵ Bleck and Michelitch, 603.

⁷⁶ Tull, "Rebuilding Mali's Army," 405.

movement were able to sign a peace accord in 2015. In support of the peace process, France transformed its Operation Serval into an overall Sahel anti-terror operation, called Barkhane, with the focus mainly on Mali. Other international partners, like the EU, also launched several initiatives to assist the peace process and the reconstruction of the state.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, after a seemingly positive path of progress, the government has continued to fail to broker a credible and sustainable peace agreement, and to “tackle the endemic corruption that has continued unabated despite his [Keita’s] election promise to clean up the political-administrative system.”⁷⁸ Therefore, and despite all the international endeavors in different fields since 2012, as depicted in Figure 2, the situation in Mali continues to deteriorate. Even worse, the initial conflict, mainly fought in the northern part of the country, has created a secondary inter-communal conflict in the central region of Mali.

⁷⁷ Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 405.

⁷⁸ Ba and Bøås, “Mali,” 7.




Figure 2. Selected Violent Events in Northern Mali by Type of Event (January 2012–December 2018)⁷⁹

As depicted in Figure 3, the conflict expanded “into the regions of Mopti and Segou, where the presence of armed groups has affected the patterns of communitarian clashes between settled farmers and herdsmen.”⁸⁰ The spread of violence between farmers

⁷⁹ Adapted from Hilary Matfess, “Democracy Delayed: Parliamentary Elections and Insecurity in Mali,” ACLED, accessed May 10, 2020, <https://acleddata.com/2019/06/06/democracy-delayed-parliamentary-elections-and-insecurity-in-mali/>.

⁸⁰ Ousmane Aly Diallo, “Ethnic Clashes, Jihad, and Insecurity in Central Mali,” *Peace Review* 29, no. 3 (August 2017): 299, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344529>.

and herdsman aligned with continuous terrorist activities to create a high level of insecurity in the central region of Mali, which now also threatens the security situation of the neighboring countries Burkina Faso and Niger. The exploitation of long-known issues between the Fulani herdsman and the Bamabara and Dogon farmers about land tenure ultimately led to a violent conflict resulting in hundreds of fatalities and many more internally displaced persons in central Mali.⁸¹




Figure 3. Violent Events in Central Mali by Months and Type of Event (January 2015–May 2019)⁸²

⁸¹ Diallo, 300.

⁸² Source: Matfess, “Democracy Delayed.”

2. Ongoing Conflict

In order to understand the complexity of Mali's civil conflict, it is important to recognize that there is not just one conflict. Different types of conflicts interact and overlap with each other. Areas of influence and operation of the different actors often have no clear boundaries and vary over time. Therefore, the description of Mali's civil conflict is more a general one that does not focus in detail on any particular time and space. What makes it complicated is that numerous operating jihadist groups, armed groups, and social and ethnic communities and the government have sometimes different, but also sometimes shared, interests. Clearly distinguishing between jihadist groups and non-jihadist groups is itself often very difficult. The cooperation between allegedly non-jihadist groups and jihadist groups has already been proven. Fighters of these groups seem to be very flexible in this regard and are largely guided by what is geographically opportune. This flexibility has led to frequent assumptions that former separatists, pro-government forces, and non-jihadist armed groups have worked together with different jihadist groups.⁸³ The aim of the jihadist groups is of a different nature. While some try to re-impose their understanding of Islamic law, to drive out international forces, and also to implant themselves for the future by seeking to capitalize on local tensions and resentment against the government of Mali, others try to promote broader goals, like independence or widespread autonomy.⁸⁴

Due to this persistent uncertainty, the identification of the exact spatial allocation of the actors is extremely difficult. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate connectivity similarities by drawing the assumed spatial allocations of the different groups.⁸⁵

⁸³ Andrew Lebovich, "Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel," European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May10, 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/sahel_mapping.

⁸⁴ Lebovich.

⁸⁵ Lebovich.




Figure 4. Areas of Operation of Jihadist Groups⁸⁶




Figure 5. Areas of Operation of Armed Groups⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Source: Lebovich.

⁸⁷ Source: Lebovich.

Especially in the central region, the situation is further exacerbated by local ethnic disputes. Jihadist groups present themselves in this context as protectors of local communities, which in turn fuels the rise of self-defense groups on the other side.⁸⁸ This kind of violence continues to increase the number of civilian fatalities in the central region, “where an estimated 30 percent of the country’s 20 million population lives.”⁸⁹ Ultimately, the misconduct or the plain absence of governmental security forces and infrastructure combined with the noticeable presence of jihadist groups, self-defense groups, and armed groups further deteriorates the security situation.

In March 2020, the UN Secretary General reported that the situation is still marked by “an increase in the activities of terrorist groups in northern and central Mali and clashes among these groups, as well as the consolidation of the influence of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad in northern Mali and the persistence of violence across community lines in the centre.”⁹⁰ Northern Mali and central Mali continue to be the hotspots for several disputes and fights between extremists, security forces, and intercommunal clashes. Beside many casualties of international and national security forces, 218 civilians alone had been killed in Mopti Region between January 1 and March 4.⁹¹ In comparison, in 2017, the casualty rate associated with the violence in Mali had been higher than for any year since the Tuareg rebellion started. In 2018, especially improvements in technical knowledge on the side of the insurgency led to the deadliest period since the arrival of MINUSMA. The UN forces also suffered hundreds of “casualties from malicious acts between its inception in 2013 and October 2018, accounting for roughly 46 percent of all UN personnel who have died in deliberate attacks since 2012.”⁹²

⁸⁸ Lebovich.

⁸⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Situation in Mali: Report of the Secretary-General S/2019/454*, (New York: United Nations, 2019), 5, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2019_454_e_1.pdf.

⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General: Situation in Mali*, Report No. S/2020/223 (New York: United Nations, 2020), 6, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2020_223_e.pdf.

⁹¹ UNSC, 8.

⁹² Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 406.

In addition to the many casualties on each side, the human rights situation has also massively deteriorated. Since the downfall of the Malian government in 2012 and despite any international engagement afterwards, the overall security situation in Mali has continued to decrease and improvement seems far from achievable.

3. Political and Economic Influences on Conflict

Until the democratic crisis in 2012, for almost two decades, Mali's development represented an example of continuous good progress in democratization in the region. From 1991 on, after the uprising of Amadou Touré, which ended a 23-year autocratic presidency, Mali entered a more democratic era of "multiparty politics and liberalization [that] followed the adoption of a new constitution in 1992."⁹³ After the uprising of Touré, Alpha Konaré won the presidential elections and started to reform the state institutions. He also was able to negotiate and end the long-simmering rebellion by the nomadic Tuareg in the northern part of the country, where the central government never had much influence or control. Unlike many other African countries' presidents, Konaré accepted the constitutional two-term limit of his presidency and ended his term in 2002. His successor, Touré, who was still famous for his actions against the last autocratic president, governed on a consensus-based rather than partisan style.⁹⁴ Overall, from 1991 through 2012, Mali's leaders seemed to fulfill the obligations of democratization which led to the assessment that the country "had successfully negotiated the transition to democracy."⁹⁵ Although not all circumstances were perfect and poverty was still a huge problem, Mali seemed to move into the right direction with governments taking more responsibility for the country and its citizens, which attracted not only international donors, but also tourists and cultural activities.⁹⁶

⁹³ Bruce Whitehouse, "A Festival of Brigands: In Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no. 2 (2013): 36, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1509394677?accountid=12702>.

⁹⁴ Whitehouse, 36.

⁹⁵ Whitehouse, 36.

⁹⁶ Whitehouse, 36.

Even if the more or less positive phase of democratization had been interrupted by the rebellion and the coup in 2012/2013, Mali, with the help of the IC, returned to a “nominal form of political stability.”⁹⁷ Today, Mali is by constitution a secular state under the framework of a presidential democratic republic. As the head of state and as commander-in-chief of all armed forces, the president is more than a representative figure of the country. In Mali’s constitution, the executive power is foreseen for the government, but the legislative power together belongs to the government and to the National Assembly, the Malian parliament. The judiciary is “formally independent of the executive and the legislature.”⁹⁸

As a secular and unitary state, Mali does not allow political parties based on regional or religious affiliation, which in the past prevented Tuareg secession movements or Islamic parties from entering the political field in Mali. This is even more important, because in regard to political and economic success party politics matter in Mali. The Rally for Mali (RPM) is the current ruling party of the country, with the president as its leader. Oppositional parties are not as powerful as the ruling party; there is only one other influential party left, led by the opposition leader Soumaila Cisse. Even if party powers matter in Mali, it is questionable how powerful the parties are in the periphery, since they operate mainly in areas south of the Niger River. As voter turnout in Mali has always been low, the general public’s acceptance of these parties, especially the ruling party, is also debatable. Continuous political struggles and a stagnant quality of life deeply damaged many Malians’ view of the political class. Many Malians tend to believe that politicians choose their profession just to ensure their income and enrich themselves.⁹⁹

Mali also struggles economically in ways that impact conflict dynamics. In general, Mali’s economic hardship is closely linked to its location on the African continent. As a landlocked state in West Africa, large areas of the northern part of the country are covered

⁹⁷ Boubacar Ba and Morten Bøås, “Mali: A Political Economy Analysis,” (working paper, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 7, https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2468085/NUPI_rapport_Mali_Ba_B%25C3%25B8%25C3%25A5s.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.

⁹⁸ Ba and Bøås, “Mali,” 8.

⁹⁹ Ba and Bøås, “Mali,” 8.

by the Sahara Desert, while central Mali primarily occupies the semi-arid Sahel zone; Mali's environment is mainly characterized by the life-unfriendly Sahara with the Sudanian savannas in the southern parts of the country.¹⁰⁰ Disadvantaged by its climate and geography, Mali's population constantly faces daunting challenges like widespread disease, droughts threatening agricultural production in the southern parts of the country, and farming limitations in the arid northern part of the country.¹⁰¹

Although Mali's economic growth once again reached again 5 percent in 2018, the country's economy can be characterized as vulnerable and less profitable for most of the population. The country's economy is mainly based on three sectors: agriculture (cotton), services (financial activities and trade), and domestic demand (household consumptions).¹⁰² Cotton is the second-most important export of Mali. Over one-fifth of the Malian population is cotton farmers. Further, the Malian foreign exchange receipt has increased in relation to expanding cotton production. By exceeding 700,000 tons of cotton production during the 2018–2019 season, Mali reached the top of the list of cotton producers in Africa.¹⁰³ In total, 33 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) can be linked to agriculture activities while almost 80 percent of the population is employed in this sector.¹⁰⁴ Beside cotton, Mali depends on another export good: gold. Cotton and gold represented 79 percent of Malian exports in 2018.¹⁰⁵ The annual production value of gold averages around 50 tons. Gold mines are mainly located in the southern and western parts

¹⁰⁰ "Political and Administrative Map of Mali," Nations Online, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/mali_map.htm.

¹⁰¹ Bruce Whitehouse, "A Festival of Brigands: In Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no.2 (2013): 36, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1509394677?accountid=12702>.

¹⁰² "Mali: 2015–2019 Country Strategy Paper Mid-Term Review and 2018 Country Portfolio Performance Review," African Development Bank, Mali Country Office (COML), 1, accessed July 15, 2020, <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/mali-2015-2019-country-strategy-paper-mid-term-review-and-2018-country-portfolio-performance-review-109506>.

¹⁰³ "Mali Market Overview," U.S. Department of Commerce - International Trade Administration, accessed August 23, 2019, <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Mali-Market-Overview>.

¹⁰⁴ "Mali Agricultural Sector," U.S. Department of Commerce - International Trade Administration, accessed August 23, 2019, <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Mali-Agricultural-Sector>.

¹⁰⁵ "Mali Market Overview," U.S. Department of Commerce - International Trade Administration.

of the country.¹⁰⁶ Financial activities and household consumption are directly linked to the more populated areas. Particularly noteworthy is the capital and the surrounding areas, which, with over two million inhabitants represent the largest agglomeration in Mali. In addition to the large population in and around the capital, more than 11 million people, more than 50 percent of the population, live in the western and southern regions of Mali (Kayes, Bamako, Koulikoro, and Sikasso). Approximately another 25 percent live in the central region.¹⁰⁷

Despite the positive economic growth rate for the last several years, Mali was highly dependent on foreign aid even before the 2012 crisis. As one of the poorest countries in the world, Mali “consistently received aid levels amounting to around 12–15 percent of its GNI [gross national income], [...] which accounted for more than 50 percent of the government annual budget.”¹⁰⁸ In 2015, three years after the crisis of 2012, Mali continued to receive aid amounting to approximately 10 percent of its GNI, which represented nearly 75 percent of the central government expenditure.¹⁰⁹ It can be assumed that the situation has not significantly changed since then, as the overall situation has not improved much at all.

4. State Response to Conflict

With the internal conflict still deteriorating in large parts of the country, it seems obvious that Mali has not been able to manage its internal security challenges. Despite many attempted institutional improvements, such as the rebuilding of the Malian Army in particular, the efforts have not yielded the expected effects. There is still no doubt that the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) are not able to stem the tide of insecurity and violence in

¹⁰⁶ Omayra Bermudez-Lugo, “The Mineral Industry of Mali,” U.S. Department of the Interior, 2006 Minerals Yearbook, 28.4, accessed July 15, 2020, <https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prd-wret/assets/palladium/production/mineral-pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-ml.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ “Country Map – Administrative Structure – Population Density of Mali,” Geo-Ref, accessed July 15 2020, <http://www.geo-ref.net/en/mli.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ Nicolas van de Walle, “Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali’s Democracy” (working paper, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research, 2012), 1, http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-061/.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and National Ownership in Mali and Ghana,” *Forum for Development Studies* 44, no. 3 (July 2017): 342, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2017.1344728>.

the country. On the contrary, during several counterterrorism operations, FAMA has been accused of atrocities such as summary executions or other abuses of civilians and alleged extremists, which further fueled the insurgency and self-defense groups, especially in central Mali.¹¹⁰ As a result of the deteriorating security situation and the actions taken by the Malian government, the peace accord has stalled and insecurity is still spreading and intensifying. Moreover, with the violence present daily, investments have been few, and corruption has been rampant in the whole country. Thus, the Malian state continues to undergo a progressive decline from the “joint assaults of a dysfunctional democracy and increased regional insecurity.”¹¹¹ Ultimately, these continuous internal threats did not lead to the development of capabilities to overcome these challenges.

B. CHAD

In Chad, although the government structures and institutions face similar security challenges to those in Mali, the contrast between the two countries is stark. In this section, I briefly discuss the history of conflict in Chad, the conditions that have helped to perpetuate it, the rise of terrorist threats, and the differences in institutional developments financed by exploiting natural resources. I also discuss the roles of foreign actors and the role of Chad’s government in the current conflict response. This sections shows that especially in the last six years, Chad has been able to manage, but not completely resolve, its internal conflict. Therefore, Chad’s state response to conflict can be characterized as more aggressive and stronger than that of Mali. Security-related government institutions seem to be functional and able to handle the current security challenges. Thus, the country’s security situation seems to be stabilizing. This section also shows that unlike in Mali, in Chad crude oil is the most important resource guaranteeing revenues. Thus, Chad has been able to use these resources to strengthen its state security apparatus. Nevertheless, some

¹¹⁰ Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 406.

¹¹¹ Catriona Craven-Matthews and Pierre Englebert, “A Potemkin State in the Sahel? The Empirical and the Fictional in Malian State Reconstruction,” *African Security* 11, no. 1 (January 2018): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2017.1419634>.

insecurity related to transnational extremism persists, which seems to allow Chad to use the internal conflict to shape its relations with its international partners.

1. Evolution of the Internal Conflict

Since Chad's independence from French colonial rule in 1960, the country has been affected by successive internal conflicts and proxy conflicts close to its border. These conflicts mainly "derived from ethnic and religious struggles, territorial disputes, or the fight for political leadership and power."¹¹² In 1965, rebellion groups, financially and militarily supported by several neighboring countries such as Sudan and Libya, attacked and challenged the authoritarian regime of François Tombalbaye. The reason for the first major rebellion was frustration due to ethnic and religious marginalization of the mainly Muslim population in the northern and eastern regions of Chad by the government and its supporters in the southern region of the country. Connected to the ethnic and religious marginalization, the rebels fought over the control of natural resources in their region and for an end of the newly created central government. Such grievances can also be identified as the main cause of a long period of civil war between 1979 and 1982, which was characterized by economic, political, and humanitarian disasters. Even after the end of the civil war, armed conflicts continued. During the reign of Hissène Habré, who ruled from 1982 to 1990, Chad became involved in war with Libya over territorial disputes. As a result of the devastating interstate war, Chad struggled with another intra-state war, eventually ending the regime of Hissène Habré, who had ruled the country as an autocratic leader.¹¹³

In 1990, and after a long period of political instability, with the support of Chad's former colonizer France, Idriss Déby and his Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS)

¹¹² Armand M. Kountchou, Soazic E. Wang Sonne, and Gadam D. Gadam, "The Local Impact of Armed Conflict on Children's Nutrition and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Chad," (working paper, Households in Conflict Network (HiCN), 2020), 5, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/37a7/b30294c3f4c28dffb2eaa11b8601ae744381.pdf>.

¹¹³ Kountchou, Wang Sonne, and Gadam, 5.

overthrew Hissène Habré. Déby signalized his willingness to democratize by promising freedom instead of gold and silver, but the promises went unfulfilled.¹¹⁴

Despite the political agreements reached and the following era of promised political stability by the new regime under Déby, internal conflict continued to rise. As early as 1998, one of Déby's former generals started a rebellion in the northern part of the country. Negotiation efforts by Libya led eventually to an end to the first sequence of Chadian civil conflict between 1998 and 2002 during the presidency of Déby. This first episode of Chadian civil war under Déby also showed that Déby's opponents were willing to fight for political leadership and power. Since the situation did not change in principle, another sequence of civil conflict broke out in Chad. Between 2005 and 2010, Chadian armed forces and various rebel groups did not limit themselves to fighting about power and leadership in Chadian territory, but also became involved in proxy fights in the neighboring country. Somehow, the internal conflict was to "some extent the continuation of the conflict in the neighboring Darfur region in Sudan which then spread across the border in Chad in 2003."¹¹⁵ In this period, Khartoum and N'Djamena were engaged in a proxy conflict of varying intensity "using one another's rebel movements since the Darfur conflict began in 2003, most intensively since 2005."¹¹⁶ Khartoum attempted several times to "unify the Chadian rebel groups to destabilize or even overthrow the Déby regime."¹¹⁷ But even two destructive attacks on the Chadian capital in April 2006 and February 2008 did not overthrow Déby; instead, he survived both attacks and continued to hold and control the power in Chad by using and intensifying "repression and incentives to those who rall[ied]

¹¹⁴ Helga Dickow, "Autoritäre Strukturen im Tschad: Macht aus Sicht derer, die sie nicht haben [Authoritarian Structures in Chad: Power from the Perspective of Those Who Do Not Have It]," *Sociologus Journal for Social Anthropology* 64, no. 1 (2014): 54–55, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43645055?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

¹¹⁵ Kountchou, Wang Sonne, and Gadam, "The Local Impact of Armed Conflict on Children's Nutrition and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Chad," 6.

¹¹⁶ Jérôme Tubiana, "The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad: Myths and Reality," (HSBA working paper, Survey of Small Arms, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2008), 4, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ Tubiana, 4.

to him.”¹¹⁸ In addition to the fights in the capital, the conflict spread across Abeche, Mongo, and the Chad-Sudan border.¹¹⁹

Although the civil war was fought primarily between Chadian government forces and different rebel groups, thousands of civilians were killed, internally displaced, or forced to seek refuge in one of the neighboring countries. In particular, this last sequence of Chadian civil war generated “significant physical loss, destroying and jeopardizing the livelihoods of households who stayed behind and who have encountered a significant reduction in accessing water, food and health infrastructure.”¹²⁰

2. Ongoing Conflict

In addition to the different episodes of civil war until 2010, like many other countries in the Sahel, Chad also experienced a security threat generated by religious insurgency. In Figure 6, an ACLED analysis demonstrates that Chad experienced a consistently low level of activity related to protest events and fatalities between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2014. This period of a “low level of political violence and unrest can be at least partially attributed to the thawing of relations between Presidents Idriss Déby (Chad) and Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan); the latter of whom previously sponsored rebel and Janjaweed incursions into Chadian territory during the mid to late 2000s.”¹²¹

Since the appearance of the transnational extremist group Boko Haram in the early 2000s and its rise to a regional threat in the last decade, however, the overall regional security situation has changed. This change, first experienced by Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger, is now affecting Chad’s national security environment. Especially Chad’s regional engagement in fighting Boko Haram has changed the extremist’s view on Chad by bringing

¹¹⁸ Tubiana, 4.

¹¹⁹ Kountchou, Wang Sonne, and Gadam, “The Local Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’s Nutrition and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Chad,” 6.

¹²⁰ Kountchou, Wang Sonne, and Gadam, 7.

¹²¹ “Chad,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2 accessed May 14, 2020, https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.47-April-2016_pdf.pdf, 2.

the conflict further on Chadian soil. Therefore, today Boko Haram and the disbanded group Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWA) can be identified as Chad's main security challenges, particularly in regard to the regional security impact produced by Boko Haram's transnational activities.¹²²




Figure 6. Number of Conflicts and Protest Events and Reported Fatalities¹²³

What started as a local extremist movement in Nigeria has quickly changed to a transnational movement. First, Boko Haram, a Nigerian jihadist group started to expand into Chad in 2015. Since then, the terrorist group has killed several hundreds, and displaced even more and seriously impacted the local and regional economy in the Basin region. Violence quickly escalated with suicide attacks not only in the Lake Chad Basin, but also in Chad's capital. This increase in violence did not come out of the blue; instead, it followed certain patterns as Boko Haram reacted to the actions taken by the Chadian military in neighboring countries. What had been conflict outside of the country now increasingly turned to Chadian soil. For many years, the terrorist group's activity was mainly focused

¹²² Lauren P. Blanchard and Katia T. Cavigelli, *Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province*, CRS Report No. IF10173 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10173/6>.

¹²³ ACLED, "Chad," 2.

in Nigeria's Borno state, where Boko Haram had its stronghold. In early 2014, the situation changed and the former local conflict became regional. As a result, "attacks on civilians and military positions have multiplied in northern Cameroon since March 2014 and in southern Niger and western Chad since early 2015."¹²⁴

After spreading to neighboring countries, Boko Haram's strength decreased. Under constant pressure by a regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and national armies, Boko Haram continued to suffer, leading to internal disputes and eventually to an internal division. At the end of 2016, Boko Haram had split into two factions: one continuing as Boko Haram and the other becoming ISWA. The groups separated primarily due to differences in tactics and ideology. Each of the groups was able to grow its influence over different geographic areas, which kept Boko Haram in the northeastern area of Nigeria and parts of northern Cameroon and ISWA more along the Nigerian shores of Lake Chad and the Niger-Nigerian border. In 2016 and 2017, militant groups under the Boko Haram faction raided communities in the borderlands of the Lake Chad and later also on Chadian soil. In addition to these several raids, "insecurity from Boko Haram and ISWA factions operating in Chad remained relatively contained" until in 2019 the threat seemingly got stronger.¹²⁵

From then on, Boko Haram and ISWA have increased their activity leading to the decrease of security in the region, and also on Chadian soil.¹²⁶ From 2018 to 2019, the number of violent confrontations between Chadian government forces and Boko Haram tripled from seven to 21, and also, "in an apparent change of tactics since the beginning of 2019, civilian communities in Chad have been targeted 15 times resulting in dozens of

¹²⁴ "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures," International Crisis Group, last modified March 8, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military-measures>.

¹²⁵ Daniel Eizenga, "Chad's Escalating Fight against Boko Haram," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, last modified April 20, 2020, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chad-escalating-fight-against-boko-haram/>.

¹²⁶ Eizenga.

casualties and abductions.”¹²⁷ One of the bloodiest days in the near past occurred on March 23, 2020, when Boko Haram insurgents attacked a Chadian military position in Boma, leaving 98 Chadian soldiers killed and around 40 wounded. Even if Chad showed it was capable of launching a massive retaliation force, the attack also demonstrated that Boko Haram still possesses “combat capacity, which included significant amphibious equipment, diligent planning and meticulous intelligence work.”¹²⁸

Boko Haram’s and ISWA’s areas of operation have spread over the Lake Chad Basin, an “area of 427,500 km², which covers Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria,” ¹²⁹ as depicted in Figure 7.

¹²⁷ Eizenga.

¹²⁸ Remadji Hoinathy, “Is Counter-terrorism History Repeating Itself in Lake Chad Basin?” Institute for Security Studies, last modified April 15, 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-counter-terrorism-history-repeating-itself-in-lake-chad-basin>.

¹²⁹ Samuel Oyewole, “Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region,” *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 4 (2015): 428, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227>.




Figure 7. Lake Chad Basin: Ongoing Displacement Crisis¹³⁰

Overall the whole conflict led to 2.4 million internally displaced persons (IDP) in the region, with about 10.7 million needing humanitarian assistance.¹³¹ Even if the insurgency mainly concentrates around and north of Lake Chad in Chad, in 2015, Chad's capitol N'Djamena was attacked by two suicide bombers. By taking advantage of the advanced geography, Boko Haram and ISWA focus their operations in and around Lake Chad.¹³² From the beginning, the extremist group's campaign was driven by "Islamic revivalism, widespread poverty, political corruption, repression and a weak justice system in the region."¹³³ Overall, the "threats of cross border attacks, arms trafficking and terrorist recruitment, and the crises that are related to refugees are alarming in the Lake Chad

¹³⁰ Source: "Lake Chad Basin: Ongoing Displacement Crisis (as of August 24, 2018)," Reliefweb, accessed July 15, 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/map/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-ongoing-displacement-crisis-august-24-2018>.

¹³¹ "Lake Chad Basin: Ongoing Displacement Crisis (as of August 24, 2018)."

¹³² International Crisis Group, "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures."

¹³³ Oyewole, "Boko Haram," 428.

region,” and thus directly impact Chad.¹³⁴ In addition, these active insurgent groups continue to threaten foreign interests directly by attacking foreign citizens and businesses in Chad. In this context, Boko Haram has a record of kidnapping personnel of the UN, as well as French and other international citizens, under “the ideological statement of the insurgent campaign [...] particularly targeted against Western values and influences in the region.”¹³⁵ Even if the area of influence for Boko Haram and ISWAP can be allocated to the whole Lake Chad Basin, in 2019 and 2020, from a Chadian perspective, the Lac province was mainly affected as depicted in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Violent Event Linked to Militant Groups in Lac Province, Chad (2019–2020)¹³⁶

In Lac province alone, almost 170,000 people have been displaced, and the violence has also “endangered livelihoods by hindering agricultural production and blocking cross-border trade, both contributing to the UN’s estimate that 5.3 million people in Chad will require humanitarian assistance in 2020.”¹³⁷ Overall, an increase of activity of both groups

¹³⁴ Oyewole, 429.

¹³⁵ Oyewole, 429.

¹³⁶ Eizenga, “Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram.”

¹³⁷ Eizenga.

in the last years, especially in Chad but also in the neighboring areas, suggests that ISWA and Boko Haram have gained momentum and continue to further threaten Chad and the stability of the whole region.¹³⁸ This analysis of militant extremism in the Lake Chad Basin and especially its impact within Chad leads to the assessment that, currently, the southwestern part of the country is most seriously affected by the civil conflict.

3. Political and Economic Influences on Conflict

At the beginning of President Déby's reign, expectations for democratization were high, but they have never been fulfilled. Around 1990 and after the consolidation process involving Déby's movement, former rebels, and other state actors, Chad held a referendum for a new constitution and decided to have central government like that of France or Mali. Chad became a presidential republic with a multi-party system. As the head of state and commander-in-chief of the army, Chad's president became the most powerful man in the country. The National Assembly, as the legislative branch, first consisted of 125 members, but has continued to grow up to 188 members, especially after the 2010 constitutional amendment. The president also appoints a prime minister, who leads the executive branch, the Council of Ministers, which directly supports the president in any matter.¹³⁹

By 1996, various members of opposition parties had unsuccessfully complained about irregularities during the election. Right after his election, Déby started to fill the most important government positions with members of his Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (Patriotic Salvation Movement, or MPS) and consistently expanded his power. Since then, Déby has won all the presidential elections and even added a constitutional amendment allowing him to run more than twice for president, which was originally restricted by the constitution. Chad's multiparty system is dominated by the ruling MPS, which is the only party represented all over the country. Because of the MPS's powerful position in the country, it is the only party with enough funding to run election campaigns, even though party funding is legally stipulated. Opposition parties still exist, but they are normally not

¹³⁸ Eizenga.

¹³⁹ Dickow, 55.

very relevant in society and daily life in Chad. Even when they are able to mobilize some of their supporters, their influence is more or less limited to the rural areas. In addition, in 2008, the disappearance of the popular politician Ibni Oumar Saleh weakened the democratic opposition and symbolizes a repressive state.¹⁴⁰

In addition to securing his powerful political position, President Déby has also developed a strong and capable military. But even if Chad has a seemingly strong military, it relies heavily on its international partners, especially its former colonizer France. Since Chad's independence, France has continued to guarantee state survival. Already twice, in 2005 and 2008, France supported President Déby against rebel movements, and as recently as 2019 France directly attacked rebel groups threatening the Déby regime, leading to political continuity in Chad. Overall, the French presence and its military interventions in Chad have remained constant. One of the reasons for the continuous French engagement is that "France attaches overriding importance to the stability of Chad, from where it monitors the Sahel and Sahara region and dispatches troops for interventions throughout the region."¹⁴¹

Despite the differences in domestic political factors between the two studied countries, both share similar environmental challenges. Yet, Chad has suffered more economically from environmental effects than Mali. Similar to Mali, Chad still counts as one of the poorest countries in the world. Poor infrastructure, effects of climate change, and continuous internal conflicts have led to 48 percent of Chadians living in a state of economic vulnerability and thus poverty. According to the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme, Chad scores 0.401 on the index and is therefore ranked 187 out of 189 countries. Of its approximately 16 million people, almost

¹⁴⁰ Dickow, 56.

¹⁴¹ Tony Chafer, "Chad: France's Role and Political Instability," Italian Institute for International Political Studies, accessed May 12, 2020, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/chad-frances-role-and-political-instability-23842>.

85.7 percent live in poverty, with a high level of inequality between the poorest parts of the population and the richer parts of the societies.¹⁴²

In contrast to Mali, Chad possesses economic sectors like agriculture but also, and even more importantly, its most profitable sector—oil. Traditionally, Chad’s economy was dominated by the agriculture sector, with nearly 80 percent of the labor force working in that sector. The majority of the agriculture sector is substantially home-grown while Chad’s national income relies primarily on the export of oil. The exploitation of oil resources started in 2003 when the government of Chad jump-started oil production in the Doba region, leading to an economic change in which oil accounted for almost 48 percent of the country’s GDP. Although the production of oil should have led to a long-term improvement in the economic situation, economic growth continued to decrease. Between 1996 and 2005 the average economic growth rate was at 7.8 percent, but since 2006 the economy has shrunk.¹⁴³ In the years 2008, 2009, 2013, 2015, and 2016 the economic growth rate even showed negative percentage values, slumping to a maximum of –4.6 percent in 2013. Although the average economic growth rate is slightly positive again, Chad’s economy still heavily relies on oil exports and thus makes the country vulnerable to changing world oil prices.¹⁴⁴ The Chadian oil revenue, which represents the biggest parts of the economy, mainly goes back to the Doba oil field in southwest Chad and the transport of the oil from southwestern Chad through Cameroon to the coast of Cameroon.¹⁴⁵ In addition, Chad has “shale gas and shale oil potential in three distinct petroleum provinces,” with the possible

¹⁴² Seockhwan B. Hwang, *Inequality in Human Development in the 21st Century in Chad*, Human Development Report 2019 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2019), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/TCD.pdf.

¹⁴³ Brigitte Salzberger, “Tschad: Wirtschaft & Entwicklung” [Chad, Economy & Development], Das Länder-Informations-Portal (LIPortal), accessed May 12, 2020, <https://www.liportal.de/tschad/wirtschaft-entwicklung/>.

¹⁴⁴ Trading Economics, “Chad GDP Annual Growth Rate.”

¹⁴⁵ “Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project,” International Finance Corporation World Bank Group, accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/sub-saharan+africa/investments/chadcameroon.

Termit field directly located next to Lake Chad north of the border of Cameroon on Chadian soil.¹⁴⁶

Besides oil, Chad's other contributors to the economy are also located in the southwestern part of the country—the production of cotton, millet, and sorghum. Another product, gum arabic, is only produced in western Chad. Financial activities and household consumables are directly linked to the more populated areas. In general, the “population of Chad is unevenly distributed due to contrasts in climate and physical geography; the highest density is found in the southwest, particularly around Lake Chad and points south.”¹⁴⁷ Particularly noteworthy is the capital and the surrounding areas, which with approximately 1.5 million inhabitants represent the largest agglomeration in Chad. In addition to the large population in and around the capital, almost three million people, or nearly 20 percent of the population, live in the southwest regions of Chad (Logone Occidental, Tandjilé, and Mandoul). Approximately another 10 percent live in the surrounding areas of Lake Chad region.¹⁴⁸ Overall, Chad's economic development can be aligned to its complicated and challenging history. Yet, the ongoing conflict in Chad is not in the vicinity of the main centers of resource revenue and, thus, has not had a direct impact on the country's economy.

Even with oil as a rent guarantee, the population of Chad seems to have enjoyed almost no benefits from the positive economic growth rates. According to the 2019 Global Hunger Index, 37.5 percent of the Chadian population is undernourished. With a score of 44.2 on the Global Hunger Index in 2019, Chad suffers from a level of hunger that is alarming. Nevertheless, according to this same index, in the years between 2000 and 2019, Chad improved. Even if the situation changed in a positive way, Chad is still far from being

¹⁴⁶ “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: Chad,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, XXVII-1, accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/Chad_2014.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ “Chad Population Distribution – The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accessed July 15, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html>.

¹⁴⁸ “Country Map – Administrative Structure – Population Density of Chad,” Geo-Ref, accessed July 15, 2020, <http://www.geo-ref.net/en/tcd.htm>.

a good example in the region.¹⁴⁹ By not using the natural resource revenue to reduce poverty, however, the government is unlikely to mitigate inequality issues that will further challenge Chad's security situation. This continues to be a problem primarily in the rural areas, where poverty is concentrated and "where 72% of the country's population lives."¹⁵⁰

Instead Chad's government has invested in building up a strong security apparatus, which has diverted needed financial resources away from investments in social sectors into the army, which of course has not contributed to an overall improvement of the situation in Chad.¹⁵¹ In this case, political continuity and a strong military force do not automatically mean economic and social improvement. Overall, Chad continues to be one of the poorest countries in the world since its independence and especially during the reign of Idriss Déby and his associates.¹⁵² The discovery and exploitation of petroleum did not lead to the wished for and promised effects. Instead the misuse of oil revenues can be linked to bad governance, corruption, and the need for armed forces protecting the incumbents' power. According to Transparency International and the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2019, Chad is ranked 162 out of 180 of the most corrupt countries in the world.¹⁵³ Overall, even if some progress was achieved over the last two decades, Chad still continues to be poor, badly governed, and not free.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ "Chad," Global Hunger Index, accessed May 10, 2020, <https://www.globalhungerindex.org/chad.html>.

¹⁵⁰ "Chad Governance Index," Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), accessed May 10, 2020, https://atlas.bti-project.org/COUNTRYREPORT/index_2018_URL.php?country=TCD#economic-transformation.

¹⁵¹ Kountchou, Wang Sonne, and Gadam, "The Local Impact of Armed Conflict on Children's Nutrition and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Chad," 7.

¹⁵² Hwang, "Inequality in Human Development in the 21st Century in Chad."

¹⁵³ "Chad," Transparency International, accessed May 12, 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/country/TCD#>.

¹⁵⁴ "Freedom in the World 2019 - Chad," Freedom House, accessed May 10, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad/freedom-world/2019>.

4. State Response to Conflict

With internal conflict continuing on a limited basis—confined mainly in the Lake Chad Basin—Chad seems to be managing its conflict differently and more successfully than Mali. In contrast to the many attempted but unsuccessful institutional improvements in Mali, Chad has countered Boko Haram’s aspirations and attempts to gain power and territory on Chadian soil, and implemented a strong and powerful military campaign that has led to major improvements in part of the Lake Chad shore and region located within Chad. In comparison to its neighboring countries, Chad has suffered less from activities conducted by Boko Haram, which can be “explained both by the military’s strategy of containment and by the relatively recent and weaker nature of the jihadist group’s influence on local society in Chad.”¹⁵⁵ Boko Haram has never fully controlled any territory in Chad, nor was the group able to establish a social base on Chadian soil. In this context, Chad is engaged militarily not only with units of the Chadian National Army, but also with its contingent of the MNJTF fighting Boko Haram, by circling the enemy within Chadian soil and in the neighboring areas. Thus, Chad’s efforts have significantly curbed the expansion of the jihadist movement. But despite improvements, the insurgency threat is not fully under control; instead, the conflict roughly exists with jihadists moving to other areas and remaining hidden under the surface.¹⁵⁶

Chadian involvement in the fight against jihadist groups not only on Chadian soil but also in other countries highlights that, on one side, Chad is one of the most powerful countries of the region and has a strong military force; therefore, it can be seen as a stabilization factor in the region as well as a trusted partner of the international community in the fight against extremism in the region. After the 2011 conflict in Libya, which sparked not only instability in Libya but also insecurity in the whole region, the Chadian government successfully positioned itself as a reliable partner for stability and security in the region. Fighting alongside French forces against insurgencies in Mali in 2012 or supporting several other forces from the Economic Community of West African States

¹⁵⁵ International Crisis Group.

¹⁵⁶ International Crisis Group.

(ECOWAS), the UN, and the African Union (AU) in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Chad has upheld its reputation as a “crucial ally, capable of providing much needed legitimate security in this destabilized region.”¹⁵⁷ The recognition that Chadian armed forces received, particularly from the United States and France, for their engagement in the regional fight against terrorism has “reinforced the view that Chad represents an effective African force to combat violent extremism and has solidified Chad as the linchpin for stability in the Sahel.”¹⁵⁸

C. CONCLUSION

Although the comparison of Mali and Chad reveals many similarities, it highlights some decisive differences. Both countries share a common French colonial history and a history of conflicts that occurred after their independence in 1960. After their independence, both countries developed a multi-party semi-presidential democracy with a central government. Similarly, Mali and Chad are also among the poorest countries in the world, each having an economy traditionally vulnerable to fluctuations in climate and commodity prices.

Although they have enjoyed more peaceful periods in the past, Mali and Chad have both struggled with internal conflicts. First, rebel groups, such as the Tuareg in Mali and Arab tribes in Chad, pressured political incumbents for more political participation in a multi-ethnic environment, which led to coups and political instability. Second, following the last decade, national and transnational terrorism became the big challenge for both countries. Incisive events shaping the countries’ security challenges in the last two decades have included the 2012 coup in Mali and the continuing destabilization of the country since then, and the almost successful rebellion in Chad in 2008 and the resulting approach to security stabilization by the Chadian government.

¹⁵⁷ Daniel Eizenga, “The Unstable Foundations of Political Stability in Chad,” *West African Papers*, no. 12 (February 2018): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1787/24142026>.

¹⁵⁸ Eizenga, 8.

But even if the general situation in regard to poverty reduction, human development, and economical dependence did not change much, both countries seem to have taken different paths in addressing their security challenges since then. Mali's government, unable to stabilize its country with own forces and resources, relies today more than ever on the international presence in the country. International organizations, like the UN or the EU, and many more bilateral agreements and engagements between Mali and its international partners guarantee the state survival. On the other side, Chad, one of the biggest force providers for counterterrorism missions in the region, has used the time after the rebellion to build up a strong and powerful military force to sustain state survival. In contrast to Mali, Chad's regime has been able to sustain its power not only by relying on external support, but also on its revenues gained from the exploitation of crude oil. Thus, Chad has been able to react differently and to be more capable of managing the conflict. As a result, the government of Chad has invested in building up security relevant institutions, while in Mali the opposite occurred. Thus, in the case of Mali, state response to conflict can be characterized as weak while Chad's response is more aggressive and therefore strong.

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III. COMPARISON AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR WITH CONFLICT RESPONSE IN MALI AND CHAD

This chapter analyzes the three domestic factors or strategies—the role of neopatrimonialism, the role of extraversion strategies, political instrumentalization of disorder—and their effects on how Mali and Chad have each responded to their respective security challenges. By comparing these political strategies, variations in their type and degree highlight why the governments and the ruling elites of Mali and Chad act differently in terms of either managing conflicts or perpetuating them.

A. THE ROLE OF NEOPATRIMONIALISM

This section analyzes the impact of neopatrimonialism on state responses to the conflicts in Mali and Chad. This section analyzes neopatrimonialism in Mali and Chad by using Bratton and van de Walle’s three components of neopatrimonial rule: presidentialism, clientelism and state resources.¹⁵⁹ Contrary to general assumptions about the detrimental impacts of neopatrimonialism on governance and conflict, the analysis shows that stronger neopatrimonial institutions, like presidentialism or clientelism, in Chad enabled the ruling regime to respond to that country’s internal conflict more aggressively than was done in Mali. Overall, Chad’s more efficient centralized power and its permanent control over its resources allowed the country’s regime to develop institutions to address internal conflict effectively. In addition, Chad’s widespread and more powerful patron-client network enables the country’s government to project power more easily and to legitimate itself as a conflict solver. As a result, Chad has responded more aggressively to conflict than Mali. For each country, I first look at the overall picture of neopatrimonialism. I then examine the hypothesized relationship between presidentialism, control of state resources, and leaders’ time horizons, and responses to conflict. This is followed by an analysis of the role of patron-client networks in shaping prospects for success in conflict management.

¹⁵⁹ Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 61–68.

1. Mali

Even if the degree to which neopatrimonial features are present in countries is hard to measure, the V-Dem Database tries to cover and interpret the different aspects in the Neopatrimonial Rule Index.¹⁶⁰ According to the index, Mali, on a scale from low to high (0 to 1), ranks right in the middle. Between 1993 and 2019, Mali continued to have a score between 0.45 and 0.56, with an average high of 0.56 in 2017. In comparison, the average Sub-Saharan Africa score was between 0.63 in 1993 and 0.57 in 2019, with a slight decreasing tendency. Mali therefore scores lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average but has a slight increasing tendency. Although the numbers suggest an average position, in comparison with a Western country such as Germany, which scores between 0.01 and 0.06 over the same period, there is clearly a deeper-rooted neopatrimonial situation in Mali and Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁶¹ In addition, neopatrimonialism, which is especially inherent in dependence on a functional patron-client network, has been associated with corruption. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2019, on a scale from high to low (0 to 100), where countries closer to 0 are deemed highly corrupt, Mali scores 29 points out of 100 and thus continues to be seen as highly corrupt.¹⁶² Despite the seemingly obvious results out of the different data sets, in Mali neopatrimonial behavior and effects like presidentialism, clientelism, and the misuse of state resources—can be seen at different political levels and in society.

¹⁶⁰ The Neopatrimonial Rule Index “is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g., more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g., less democratic).” Source: “Neopatrimonial Rule Index - Mali - Sub-Saharan Africa - Germany,” Varieties of Democracy Database (V-Dem), accessed May 30, 2020, <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>.

¹⁶¹ “Neopatrimonial Rule Index - Mali - Sub-Saharan Africa - Germany,” Varieties of Democracy Database (V-Dem), accessed May 30, 2020, <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>.

¹⁶² “Corruption Perception Index – Mali,” Transparency International, accessed May 30, 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/mali>.

a. Presidentialism and Conflict Response

Although President Keita has tried to enlarge his power, Mali's president continues to fail in having a strong and centralized political power. Since his election in 2013, President Keita has tried to strengthen his position in the country through various political and institutional measures. Keita concentrated power in his position with the clear intent to secure more power by using official governmental institutions. In this context, Mali as a semi-presidential system experiences more and more "a situation of party presidentialization, frequently found under circumstances where the same majority controls both the presidency and the legislative majority."¹⁶³ To prop up his political position, Keita continues to install his own family members in strategic government positions.¹⁶⁴

Despite the obvious attempt of President Keita to strengthen his position, he can still be characterized as less powerful than the president in Chad. President Keita continues to face different constitutional constraints, which weaken his position within the country. Between 2000 and 2019, the executive branch has been highly constrained by the legislative and the judicative branch while in Chad almost no legislative or judicial constraints existed.¹⁶⁵ Mali's democracy has mostly been characterized by a "civilian government with regular elections and a history of electoral turnover of power, an independent constitutional court willing to rule against the President," which has limited the president's power within the country.¹⁶⁶ He also operates in an environment of weak civilian control of the military, as demonstrated by the 2012 and 2020 military coups. In addition, decentralization programs have granted significant fiscal and administrative

¹⁶³ Sophia Moestrup, "Mali – Fifth Time's the Charm: IBK's New Winning Team?" *Presidential Power* (blog), accessed June 25, 2020, https://presidential-power.net/?p=7477#_ftn1.

¹⁶⁴ Thomas Shipley, "Mali: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 7, accessed May 30, 2020, <https://www.u4.no/publications/mali-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption>.

¹⁶⁵ "Executive Index – Mali, Chad," Varieties of Democracy Database (V-Dem), accessed September 7, 2020, <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/>.

¹⁶⁶ Susanna D. Wing, "Briefing Mali: Politics of a Crisis," *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (May 2013): 477, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt037>.

autonomy to subnational jurisdictions, which has taken away key mechanism of control, and thus, weakened the government's political power. Originally these programs were intended to better address vertical accountability and grievances in the periphery, however, instead, these programs spurred local corruption and increased grievances.¹⁶⁷ Thus, despite the president's efforts to concentrate power, he faces a number of important and urgent threats.

Besides the affecting characteristics of the existing power constraints, in Mali, strong presidential power is also directly connected to the president's and his ruling elites' ability to access and control state resources for power sustainment. Heavy corruption might be a sign that the president's and his ruling elites' have control over state resources and thus power. Despite any proclaimed clean-up by President Keita, "corruption in everyday bureaucratic and administrative processes is commonplace."¹⁶⁸ President Keita and his family have been linked to international business people who have faced trial for corruption and money laundering.¹⁶⁹ After Keita took office, the abuse of state resources has continued. In 2015 alone, Mali lost nearly \$112 million through government fraud and mismanagement. One prominent example was the purchase of a new presidential airplane, for which the price had been artificially inflated.¹⁷⁰ Although corruption may indicate some level of control and power, the constant access to state resources for power sustainment continues to be difficult. The Malian government's lack of availability of domestic revenues makes the country reliant on foreign aid, which is notoriously unpredictable.¹⁷¹ As a result, Mali's president and his ruling elites face continuous difficulties to consolidate control over state resources.

¹⁶⁷ Wing, 480.

¹⁶⁸ Shipley, "Mali," 7.

¹⁶⁹ Shipley, 7.

¹⁷⁰ "BTI 2020 Country Report: Mali," Bertelsmann Stiftung, 12, accessed June 30, 2020, https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_MLI.pdf.

¹⁷¹ Gustavo J. Canavire-Bacarreza, Eric Neumayer, and Peter Nunnenkamp, "Why Aid is Unpredictable: An Empirical Analysis of the Gap between Actual and Planned Aid Flows," *Journal of International Development* 27, (2015): 440, <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3073>.

Given all this, the Malian president constantly has to worry about maintaining power because he does not have strong power-concentrating institutions and the unpredictable availability of state resources. Thus, Mali's president constantly battles for his immediate survival and seeks resources from donors. This permanent power struggle also influences Keita's and his ruling elites' planning horizon. Overall, Mali's president is mostly focused on securing revenue from donors and managing political survival by not granting too much power to the military. Such decisions also influence the government's response to conflict. By keeping the military far from being a threat to the president's power structures, the Malian government fails to develop capabilities to face its challenges, and it helps continue the conflict because it represents a secure source of revenue.

b. Weak Client Networks and Short-Term Solutions

Even before Keita's presidency, Mali experienced a clientelistic political tradition with a clear focus on profitable relationships between the ruler and the country's elite, which was mainly located in and around the capital city of Bamako. Even if ethnic alignments seemed to play a certain role, regional associations have been more important. In general, the country was already known for maintaining stability through "wide-ranging alliances, based on local traditions of dialogues and consensual politics," which at least in the long term has proved to be a very fragile system leading to episodes of grievance and instability.¹⁷² Thus, clientelistic networks in Mali seems to be fragmented, geographically limited, and of a more temporary rather than permanent nature.

In this context, Mali's leadership has tended to seek temporary agreements, and especially when the overall system of power was threatened. Keita's system of patron-client networks is only threatened, however, if insecurity reaches the vicinity of the southern regions and Bamako. Development in the security situation after the 2012 rebellion eventually led to the 2015 Peace Accord and further negotiations, in which the Malian government tried to implement new stakeholders into the existing system. Thus, previous conflicts were "typically quelled by clientelism rather than genuine inclusion or

¹⁷² Shipley, "Mali," 7.

resource allocation, providing temporary respite but little genuine reform.”¹⁷³ Mali’s government continues the former path of “resolving conflicts at the community level and beyond through patron-client relations among national and regional government elites, and consensus politics incorporating opposition actors into the government,” which in 2018 caused an expanded government consisting of 36 government ministries, but also led to an increased reliance on plenty of government employees.¹⁷⁴

Like Mali’s relatively weak concentration of power, Mali’s more temporary and fragile patron-client network shortens time horizons in ways that have important implications for conflict response. First, they demand a continuous and often urgent flow of resources to maintain these networks, which necessarily affects the country’s conflict-solving effort. Therefore, in Mali, the financial means to spur capacity building and to strengthen state institutions on the state, regional, and local levels to manage internal conflicts are more likely spent in support of the patron-client network or for personal enrichment. Thus, heavy corruption, fraud, and financial mismanagement limit the country’s abilities to respond to conflict. Although the situation has slightly improved over the last couple of years, Mali still faces major structural problems with deviations in practices and procedures allowing continuous mismanagement within the public sector. The annual Malian Bureau du Vérificateur General (BVG) report highlighted that the verifications of the government carried out in 2018 revealed weaknesses in the management of public services. They illustrate the large gap between practices and legal texts and procedures. This situation appears to persist even though the shortcomings have been pointed out before. This had been evidenced by numerous dysfunctions identified by previous verifications and recommendations. Overall, the results support the continuing general impact of fraud and mismanagement within the different levels of Malian

¹⁷³ Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, “Fixing a Fractured State? Breaking the Cycles of Crime, Conflict and Corruption in Mali and Sahel” (working paper, The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015), V, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴ Shipley, “Mali,” 7–8.

society.¹⁷⁵ The presence of widespread corruption, fraud, and financial mismanagement at all levels of society not only leads to the population's and possible international supporters' mistrust of the government, it also impacts the government's ability to face the country's security challenges. The focus on sustaining the existing patron-client network and the diversion of resources for self-enrichment rather than for addressing the country's security challenges limits Mali's ability to respond to conflict.

As part of the need to direct resources to maintain patron-client networks, leaders distribute state jobs to clients. This allocation of jobs limits the state's ability to respond adequately to the internal conflict and perpetuates the diversion of resources away from conflict management. In particular, this system that enables individuals to pay their way into powerful positions has distorted recruitment for the security sector. In Mali's military, the recruitment process has been "mostly based on patronage rather than merit and distorted by lack of transparency."¹⁷⁶ As a result, military careers are directly linked to the patronage system. Over the time, the senior leadership of the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes - FAMA) has been part of the Malian patron-client network close to President Keita and his ruling elite, which has not only led to the military's loyalty to the president and his system, but also to "impunity from laws and their consequences" for the leadership of the FAMA.¹⁷⁷ Instead of having a merit-based system of recruiting and promoting, Mali's more clientelistic-based military development has led to weak structures that lack cohesion and have almost no operational readiness. Low levels of competence and military expertise aligned with non-existent management structures and control have also promoted corruption within the armed forces. Widespread corruption and clientelistic-based structures with a clear focus on self-sustainment have negatively affected the operational

¹⁷⁵ Vérificateur Général, *Rapport Annuel 2018* (Bamako, Mali: Bureau Du Vérificateur Général, 2018), 87, http://www.bvg-mali.org/images/Rapports/annuels/rapport_annuel_2018.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ MacLachlan, "Security Assistance, Corruption and Fragile Environments: Exploring the Case of Mali 2001–2012," 23.

¹⁷⁷ MacLachlan, 24.

ability and effectiveness of the Malian armed forces.¹⁷⁸ As a result, the FAMA are incapable to properly respond to the internal conflict.

The weak nature of Mali's neopatrimonial system undermines its ability to manage its security challenges and negatively influences the country's conflict-solving efforts. Mali's history of democratic and non-democratic change aligned with constant constitutional constraints has led to a political atmosphere with a short-term orientation. Although neopatrimonialism is not a new phenomenon in Mali, it is still present and influential. Neopatrimonialism in Mali is characterized by a limited power structure concentrating on President Keita and his associates; a geographically limited patron-client network of a more temporary character; and the diversion of resources away from conflict management efforts. All these features hamper the country to manage the conflict. In the case of Mali, limited centralized control does not enable the country's government to engage more actively in conflict-solving measures. As in previous periods of rebellion, the Malian state manages to co-opt different regional elites in a more flexible way by involving them in the state bureaucracy.¹⁷⁹ This historically grown process of adaptation seems to have a short-term orientation, designed to support regional power brokers more than to help the government solve internal conflicts. Thus, the Malian type of clientelism prevents "genuine inclusion" and "little genuine reform," which further increases grievances and eventually more conflict.¹⁸⁰

Besides having a more fragile and geographically limited patron-client network, Mali's weak institutions seem incapable of supporting even these power structures. As a result, the Malian government does not see the ultimate necessity to improve its weak and inefficient institutions to manage its security challenges. This also explains the FAMA's inability to properly respond to the internal conflict. Neopatrimonial features like widespread corruption, fraud, and mismanagement not only affect the country's security

¹⁷⁸ MacLachlan, 24.

¹⁷⁹ Mats Utas, "Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts," in *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*, ed. Mats Utas (Uppsala, Sweden: Zed Books, 2012), 24.

¹⁸⁰ Reitano and Shaw, "Fixing a Fractured State?," V.

forces but also its general capacity building, which also limits the country's ability to face the current security challenges. Ultimately, these features are directly linked to President Keita and his ruling elites' behavior regarding power sustainment and conflict-solving efforts. Thus, neopatrimonialism negatively affects the Malian government's will and ability to respond to conflict.

2. Chad

According to the Neopatrimonial Rule Index of the V-Dem Database, on a scale from low to high (0 to 1), Chad ranks almost at the top. Since 1980, Chad continues to have a score over 0.9, clocking an all-time high of 0.96 in 2013. In comparison, the average Sub-Saharan Africa score fell between 0.63 in 1993 and 0.57 in 2019, showing a slight decreasing tendency. Chad therefore scores much higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average, which makes Chad one of the most neopatrimonial countries in the region. In comparison with a Western country like Germany, whose scores over the same period fell between 0.01 and 0.06, Chad shows a deeply rooted neopatrimonial situation.¹⁸¹

As the level of corruption present in a country can be one indicator for types of neopatrimonialism, the two countries seem differently affected. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2019, Chad scores 20 points out of 100 and is therefore seen as highly corrupt.¹⁸² In comparison to Mali, Chad scores nine points lower than Mali and thus ranks as more corrupt than Mali. As one of the most dominant problems in Chad, corruption has been institutionalized and thus cannot disappear easily. Corruption in Chad "affects the lives of ordinary citizens on a daily basis, [particularly] in legal procedures, where no civil servant works without 'motivation' or police controls for no other reason than to find some money."¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Neopatrimonial Rule Index – Chad," Varieties of Democracy Database (V-Dem), "accessed May 30, 2020, <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>.

¹⁸² Transparency International, "Chad."

¹⁸³ "BTI 2020 Country Report: Chad," Bertelsmann Stiftung, 13, accessed June 30, 2020, https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_TCD.pdf.

According to the different results of the data sets and in comparison to the result of Mali, Chad seems to have greater levels of neopatrimonialism than Mali. Although Chad is supposedly a country that has a constitution and some democratic elements, “in fact it is better understood as a violent, patrimonial regime.”¹⁸⁴ Chad’s deep-rooted neopatrimonial features are characterized by a system of centralized presidentialism, a widespread system of ethnically based clientelism, and the massive misuse of state revenues gained through the exploitation of its natural resources. Nevertheless, Chad has been able to face its security challenges and put itself in the position of a trusted and reliant partner in the region.

a. *Strong Presidentialism and Longer-Term Thinking*

The analysis of neopatrimonial features in Chad shows that, in terms of presidentialism, the role of President Déby as the key figure of the political system and the society is of great importance. Democratic structures and institutions that would appear to balance power are in reality controlled by the president and his security apparatus. The majority of the government is run by President Idriss Déby’s ruling party, and Déby himself is not only the head of his party, but also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the main decision maker in the government. In addition to his already strong position within the Chadian constitutional system, President Déby has continued to abolish more traditional structural forms of balance, like the position of the prime minister. This position was traditionally filled by an individual “from the south, following the unwritten rule that the state’s two highest positions should be split between the northern and southern regions.”¹⁸⁵

In general, the new 2018 constitution of the Fourth Republic further weakened the separation of powers in the country. In accordance with the new constitution, Idriss Déby gained even more political power. By getting the unrestricted power to “nominate the ministers, members of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court and other bodies,”

¹⁸⁴ Stephen P. Reyna, “The Traveling Model That Would Not Travel: Oil, Empire, and Patrimonialism in Contemporary Chad,” *Social Analysis* 51, no.3 (2007): 88, <https://doi.org/10.3167/sa.2007.510304>.

¹⁸⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2020 Country Report: Chad,” 10.

the president has replaced any further control element.¹⁸⁶ By being responsible for nominating the president of the Supreme Court and most of the judges, President Déby has direct access and influence over these courts. As Chad has been steered in such a direction, “the judiciary has ceased to be institutionally differentiated even in formal terms now and its decisions and doctrine are subordinate to the government.”¹⁸⁷ As a result of the constitutional change the president and his party exercise hegemonic control over the parliament. On the other side, Idriss Déby hinders internal opposition by constantly reshuffling political assignments. After all, the newly created system of checks and balances seems to be vulnerable to executive interventions and is permeated by corruption. While political opponents face suppression, government officials or influential individuals close to the president often enjoy impunity.¹⁸⁸

Another important tool of President Déby is Chad’s national intelligence service, the Agence National de Securite (ANS). Run by Déby’s closest clan and elites, the ANS uses its position to manipulate or threaten journalists and members of opposition parties to directly support Déby’s presidency. Offers of money in return for support have incentivized many people to be compliant. If they would choose not to be, they could face prison.¹⁸⁹ And even if the constitution ensures equality for all people of Chad, “ethnic, religious and gender discrimination is pervasive” in the prevailing climate of impunity.¹⁹⁰ Domestic pressure on the regime continues to lead to an increase in use of force and more media censorship. These measures of Chad’s security apparatus also lead to less activity among politicians from the south. Those opposed to the government of Chad “have been repressed and marginalized throughout [...] the period” of Idriss Déby’s rule.¹⁹¹ During his

¹⁸⁶ Bertelsmann Stiftung, 12.

¹⁸⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung, 13.

¹⁸⁸ Bertelsmann Stiftung, 12–13.

¹⁸⁹ Abakar, “The Effects of Oil on Economic Development of Chad,” 29.

¹⁹⁰ Roy May and Simon Massey, “Chad: Politics and Security,” Writenet Independent, iii, accessed June 30, 2020, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/46384ed12.html>.

¹⁹¹ May and Massey, 2.

presidency, Idriss Déby has transformed the official democracy into a more obvious autocracy, in which the “Chadian state has a monopoly on the use of force across almost all of the country.”¹⁹²

Chad’s leader seems to be more successful than his counterpart in Mali in using the centralized power he has secured to strengthen the ruling elites’ position. In contrast to Mali’s leader, President Déby uses constitutional changes and functional institutions, like the ANS, to solidify his position within the state. President Déby also uses the strong centralized state to secure his regime’s access to Chad’s natural resources. As a result, all these political and institutional measures essentially serve a more long-term purpose: the permanent sustainment of Déby’s rule and his access to the country’s oil. The pursuit of rather long-term objectives also characterizes the Chadian government’s behavior. To guarantee permanent sources of revenue, the Chadian government needs to be able to project power and thus have stronger government institutions, like the ANS.

An expansion of the conflict away from the Lake Chad Basin and the border regions toward the oil producing region in southern Chad would threaten the revenues of the ruling elites and thus the government’s survival. In Chad, President Déby’s power is directly linked to accessibility to revenues gained from oil production. In addition, a worsening of the conflict with the transnational insurgency could also endanger future endeavors as Chad has “shale gas and shale oil potential in three distinct petroleum provinces” next to conflict-affected regions in Chad and Cameroon.¹⁹³ As a result, Chad’s response to conflicts threaten these existing power structures and sources of revenue is therefore different and stronger than in Mali, and thus, more focused on conflict-solving.

b. Strong Patron-Client Networks and Power Projection

President Déby’s power structures mainly rely on a clan based patron-client network. This kinship system includes the Zaghawa tribe from which Déby originates.

¹⁹² Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2020 Country Report: Chad,” 6.

¹⁹³ “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: Chad,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, XXVII-1, accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/Chad_2014.pdf.

Déby perfected the overarching patron-client network in Chad by providing rewards primarily to members of his tribe but also to clients within the civil society; simultaneously, Déby continues to neutralize all opponents. Loyal clients have been rewarded with state positions or economic opportunities, becoming “diplomats, military officers, and middle- or upper-level administrators in the regional and central administration or owners of, or executives in, businesses that win contracts from the government.”¹⁹⁴ In the past, many members of Chad’s diplomatic corps were identified as Déby’s close relatives, a fact that further supports the allegations of nepotism in Chad. But even if family or tribe members have been introduced in Chad’s government or business sector in the past, it does not automatically mean that they were not competent. Some tribal figures actually supported the regime by accumulating wealth for the government.¹⁹⁵

In addition to the more traditional tribal clientelistic system, Déby uses a non-tribal patron-client network, which is founded more on a professional, educational, or friendship system of relationship to the president. This system creates a powerful, functional, and competitive patron-client network present all over Chad. These important non-tribal figures are mainly from the southern region. The advantage of this type of patron-client network is that President Déby is not limited to traditional norms like under his tribal associates; this instead allows him to build up relationships based on trust and on how well the client is serving the patron.¹⁹⁶ Déby, who personally manages “a policy of ‘divide and rule’ among his different clients,” which also includes the accumulation of opponents to ensure that his presidency does not constantly face being violently overthrown, uses all these measures to sustain his power in the country.¹⁹⁷ Thus, Déby has managed to implement a patron-client network that “spread throughout the country, at least in every

¹⁹⁴ Reyna, “The Traveling Model That Would Not Travel,” 89.

¹⁹⁵ Reyna, “The Traveling Model That Would Not Travel,” 90.

¹⁹⁶ Reyna, 90.

¹⁹⁷ Reyna, 90.

major ethnic group in Chad; that is including Gourane, Arab, Kanembou, Sarah, and so forth.”¹⁹⁸

But a functional patronage system only works if the patron is able to sustain the system with sufficient resources, which in the case of Chad is possible because of the country’s ability to exploit its natural resources. Although Déby had already followed an autocratic path after he gained power in 1990, the exploitation of crude oil in 2003 changed the government’s ability to access resources in a more direct way. The common misuse of state resources in support of President Déby’s rule is mainly for sustaining his patron-client networks, but it is also used to build and sustain the country’s strong security apparatus. In general, the disappearance of state resources in Chad can be described as the ‘path towards the East.’ Thus, Déby serves his kin-clients in the eastern part of the country by heavily investing in the military and its tribal affiliated structures. Typically, “oil revenues may have flowed to the east, but they were being invested in warring, not in poverty reduction,” which supports the neopatrimonial notion of misuse of state resources in Chad. Any allocation of oil rents to different aspects like poverty reduction would obstruct “the flow of these revenues to clients in the patrimonial system,” and would therefore counter-productive for regime maintenance.¹⁹⁹ This basic understanding is very important, because from Déby’s perspective a failing patrimonial system inevitably leads to a violent overthrow of the regime, “putting the lives of the regime’s elites at risk.”²⁰⁰ As a result, the continuous availability of resources is directly linked to the functionality of the patron-client networks and thus linked to the government’s threat perception. Only the seemingly inexhaustible access to resource revenues from crude oil production has allowed Chad to solidify its contemporary neopatrimonial structures and features, which in turn have enabled President Déby to respond to conflict in a more aggressive and strong manner.

Although this development has created certain opportunities for Déby and his close associates, it has also driven Chad even deeper into the neopatrimonial swamp, in which

¹⁹⁸ Abakar, “The Effects of Oil on Economic Development of Chad,” 28.

¹⁹⁹ Reyna, “The Traveling Model That Would Not Travel,” 86.

²⁰⁰ Reyna, 90.

personal enrichment seems to hold the highest priority. Government spending has been tracked back to government employees of the president's tribe with the clear objective to give contracts to companies politically connected to the president. Despite many internal and border conflicts in the eastern part of the country over time, the money flow mainly goes in this direction, where the president's tribe originates.²⁰¹ As a result of having virtually limitless access to resource revenues from Chad's oil production, President Déby has been able to implement and sustain a widespread patron-client network that enables the Chadian regime to project power over almost the whole country. Thus, the Chadian regime is not only able to widely address conflict within the country but it is also able to act as a legitimate conflict solver even in more rural areas.

Despite the fact that Chad has a deeply-rooted neopatrimonial system, it has been able to successfully face its security challenges in the past. Contrary to the general assumption that neopatrimonial features like presidentialism, clientelism, and the misuse of state resources weaken an affected state, Chad's government has managed to gain strength from these features. Absolute control over its resources, an efficient centralized state apparatus, and a functional and widespread patron-client network all based on the continuous availability of resource revenues from oil production allows Chad's regime to adopt a long-term orientation and thus respond to conflict differently from Mali. Thus, Chad has developed a strong military and an oppressive state apparatus. Even if the oil revenues have probably not been the main and only reason for Chad's development and Déby's power consolidation over the last two decades, it is inconceivable that without the influx of oil money "Déby would have become a force for liberal democracy."²⁰²

3. Summary

By trying to explain how the effects of neopatrimonialism in Mali and Chad have influenced those countries' respective responses to similar security challenges, I aimed to

²⁰¹ Matthew S. Winters and John A. Gould, "Betting on Oil: The World Bank's Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad," *Global Governance* 17, no. 2 (2011): 236–37, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23033732?seq=1>.

²⁰² Winters and Gould, "Betting on Oil," 237.

promote an understanding of the specific nature of neopatrimonialism in the two countries. Patrick Chabal has argued that a “system of informal politics based on (neo-) patrimonialism where the acquisition of the public ‘good’ is used to sustain the clientelistic networks on which political support depends” is only sustainable if “sufficient resources are available to nourish the clientelistic networks on which” the regimes and governments are built. This argument is of great importance for understanding the origins of the neopatrimonial differences between Mali and Chad.²⁰³ Therefore, the effects of presidentialism and clientelism in particular are different in both countries. Thus, Mali’s neopatrimonial features seem to be weaker than those in Chad. In comparison to Mali, President Déby’s political strategies seem to have a more long-term orientation. Therefore, continuous conflicts endangering the existing power structures would be counterproductive. In addition, Chad’s president has been able to project his power and the power of his kin-client network throughout the whole country, and thus, the patron-client network continues to guarantee state survival. Furthermore, the continuous flow of oil revenues has allowed Chad to build up a sustainable security apparatus, which was primarily designed to suppress any opposition in the country. Nonetheless, this security apparatus also helps Chad face security challenges like transnational terrorism. By contrast, Mali’s patron-client limitations related to reliance on weak and temporary alliances in the northern regions and Mali’s difficulty in sustaining those networks has produced only a few abilities to counter security challenges. At the same time, it has also made the country heavily reliant on external actors. The existence of neopatrimonial rule in both countries and the aligned patron-client networks require strategies to maintain those resource-intense power structures and thus guarantee the incumbent’s survival. These methods are further examined by analyzing Mali’s and Chad’s respective extraversion strategies.

B. THE ROLE OF EXTRAVERSION STRATEGIES

This section analyzes extraversion strategies by focusing on their impact on state behavior challenging security threats in both countries. In general, the concept of

²⁰³ Patrick Chabal, “Review Article: Is There a French Way of Explaining African Politics?” *International Affairs* 76, no. 4 (December 2000): 826, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00167>.

extraversion shapes a country's relationship to foreign countries and its domestic behavior in regard to its ability to gain and mobilize local resources. Instead of facing high domestic political costs, which could weaken a government's position by following societal demands, some countries tend to "compensate for their domestic weaknesses—the lack of authority, legitimacy or resources—by orienting themselves in an outward-looking fashion towards the international system in general and Western states in particular."²⁰⁴ This approach seems to be politically desirable for many African leaders, because of obvious difficulties they face in acquiring domestic resources and meeting internal demands.²⁰⁵ Therefore, international loans, development assistance, any kind of international investment, and diplomatic or security assistance can be designated as useful to promote internal structures and financial needs, i.e., expensive patron-client networks. Thus, efforts by government elites are aimed to access "resources and thereby capitalize on their foreign dependency."²⁰⁶

In the cases of Mali and Chad, the two countries rely on different extraversion strategies. The Malian government seems to see the security challenges as a chance to profit financially by having international actors and forces involved as state survival guarantors. Conversely, Chad's extraversion strategy focuses on the successful exploitation of its own resources—accessed with support from international technical support and trading partners—financing its patron-client network, while also exploiting its military capabilities to demonstrate to its Western partners that the country is the only reliable partner in the region.

1. Aid-Focused Extraversion in Mali

Even before the state collapse of 2012 and the ensuing erosion of the security situation, Mali had been heavily dependent on foreign aid. In the 1970s, foreign aid had mainly come in response to ecological and economic hardship, and was followed by a long

²⁰⁴ Tull, "Weak States and Successful Elites," 8.

²⁰⁵ Peter Brett and Line E. Gissel, "Explaining African Participation in International Courts," *African Affairs* 117, no. 467 (April 2018): 201–2, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady005>.

²⁰⁶ Tull, "Weak States and Successful Elites," 8.

period of constantly increasing official development assistance (ODA) that reached its peak of \$480 million in 1991.²⁰⁷ After the end of the Cold War the ODA commitment to Mali slightly decreased and finally stagnated at around \$400 million each year, before starting to slowly increase again in the first decade of the new millennium. Between 2006 and 2009, “total net ODA commitments amounted to an average of 12.8 percent of GNI.”²⁰⁸ Jerker Carlsson, Gloria Somolekae, and Nicolas van de Walle characterized Mali in 1997 as a country with an economy of “low productivity in the dominant agricultural sector, consistently large trade deficits, persisting debt pressures, and extreme reliance on foreign financing of official budgets.”²⁰⁹ In addition, Carlsson, Somolekae and van de Walle highlighted that because of the weak production and trade sector, in combination with the bad environmental situation of the country, Mali continued to have problems in fulfilling the demands of its population, and thus, relied heavily on external support.²¹⁰

Since this assessment, the general situation has not improved; on the contrary, after 2012 the international engagement in Mali increased. Even so, the overall security situation worsened, and Mali continued not only to lose control over more of its territory, but also to fuel the negative trend of getting more and more inefficient in terms of governance. Right after the downfall of Mali’s government in 2012, foreign aid rose from \$636 million in 2012 to \$2.5 billion in 2013.²¹¹ Between 2013 and 2018, the EU and its members spent between \$459.7 million and \$554.8 million in support of Mali and its government, almost doubling its spending commitment in comparison to its engagement before the 2012 crisis.²¹²

²⁰⁷ van de Walle, “Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places,” 3.

²⁰⁸ van de Walle, 3.

²⁰⁹ Jerker Carlsson, Gloria Somolekae, and Nicolas van de Walle, “Foreign Aid in Africa: Learning from Country Experiences” (working paper, Nordiska afrikainstitutet, 1997), 12, <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:272899/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

²¹⁰ Carlsson, Somolekae, and van de Walle, 129.

²¹¹ “Mali – Distribution of Aid Flow,” AidData, accessed July 15, 2020, <http://dashboard.aiddata.org/#/advanced/analytic-dashboard>.

²¹² “EU Aid Explorer: Recipients Data from 2007 to 2018,” European Commission, accessed July 15, 2020, https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/content/explore/recipients_en.

In addition to international donor countries, Mali continues to base its macroeconomic framework on support and consultations from organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. Dependent on this external support, “Mali’s public debt represented 34.7% of GDP in 2017,” and “external debt in 2016 totaled \$3,787.9 million [...] [while] the cash deficit was -3.5% of GDP in 2017.”²¹³ In this context, military spending increased as well. In 2011, military spending had a share of 8.4 percent of Mali’s public expenditure (2.1 percent of GDP). Two years later, it went up to 11.4 percent (2.9% of GDP), “and by 2017 the figure was 16.5% of spending (or 3.8% of GDP),” which has made necessary spending on social services and development even more challenging.²¹⁴

In addition to the significant increase of foreign aid since 2012, the international community has also responded physically to secure the country’s survival and restoration. In January 2013, in support of the Malian government, France started a military intervention. After the liberation of northern Mali by the French military in 2014, Operation Serval was transformed into a multinational counterterrorism operation called Operation Barkhane, operating not only in Mali but also in countries neighboring Mali, with a total troop engagement of around 4,500 soldiers.²¹⁵ In addition in 2013, the UN implemented a stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with around 12,000 soldiers, “mandated to protect civilians and stabilize population centres.”²¹⁶ In order to rehabilitate Mali’s security forces, the EU launched a 500 personnel strong training mission (EUTM) “tasked with providing training and advice to rebuild the military capacity of the FAMA, enabling it to restore Mali’s territorial integrity and reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups.”²¹⁷ By the end of October 2018, EUTM Mali managed to train and advise close to 13,000

²¹³ Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2020 Country Report: Mali,” 21.

²¹⁴ Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22.

²¹⁵ European Council of Foreign Relations, “Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel.”

²¹⁶ Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 405.

²¹⁷ Tull, 405.

soldiers of the FAMA. However, the overall security situation has continued to get worse.²¹⁸

Despite the increased engagement of the international community, Mali still has not managed to improve the security situation within the country. One possible explanation for the continued deterioration of the security situation and the associated inability of the Malian government to resolve the conflict could be that the Malian government is just overwhelmed by the complex situation. As a result of the escalating difficulties, the international community continues to intensify its engagement. Yet, as the following sections will demonstrate, it is more likely that the Malian extraversion strategy, designed to create revenues out of the international engagement, leads the regime to profit from the ongoing conflict. Any successful conflict-solving effort might eventually lead to less international engagement and thus fewer revenues. Malian government commitments for improvement do not seem to be efficient specifically aimed to increase the country's state abilities for response to conflict.

In order to keep its international partners appeased, Mali cannot completely refuse to adopt measures for change, however. Therefore, it makes empty promises that appease international actors while serving the regime's interest in maintaining their engagement. In this context, the Malian government has acknowledged the importance of its security forces and pledged to invest necessary resources in the different Malian security forces. Under the lead of President Keita, the Malian parliament adopted a new military development program targeting an annual budget of \$1.9 million between 2015 and 2019. This significant amount was designed to persistently strengthen the military and its ability to project law and order in the whole country.²¹⁹ Despite the official pledge for improvement, however, the Malian armed forces are still not able to face and solve the country's security challenges, which led to the deaths of 4,000 people in 2019 alone.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Tull, 405.

²¹⁹ Tull, 409.

²²⁰ "UN Renews Mali Peacekeeping Force MINUSMA without Personnel Cuts," Aljazeera, accessed June 29, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/renews-mali-peacekeeping-force-minusma-personnel-cuts-200629202039321.html>.

Improvement efforts of the international community are directly affected by the government's mixed incentives to improve response capability. The experiences of the European Mission in Mali provide an example of a typical dynamic. EUTM Mali has been challenged in implementing proposed reforms targeting "the Malian army's logistics and human resources management systems."²²¹ In 2016, the Malian Armed Forces Human Resource Department cancelled the implementation of a planned electronic payment system. This decision led to the assumption that the stalling of proposed initiatives, like the electronic payment system, represents "the resistance of self-serving elites who seek to perpetuate an opaque and unaccountable mode of governance that allows them to illegally appropriate significant resources: in one case to seize part of the salaries of military staff or even of fictitious personnel; in another to appropriate FAMA equipment to engage in illicit activities in informal markets."²²² As a result, the government will not fully implement an improvement program if it might threaten the ways it builds and maintains power. Since patronage is one of those ways, and the patronage system relies on subversion of resources, a computerized and modern HR management system would curtail this system. Since 2014, financial irregularities have been reported in relation to Mali's Ministry of Defence procurement process of army equipment, however, there have not been any consequences for the politicians or military officials involved.²²³ Thus, not only are state resources lost through fraud and mismanagement, international training efforts like the EUTM in Mali seem to be ineffective. Overall, the Malian government tries to play a double game. On one side, state officials promise improvement to get access to international funds and training, and on the other side, the same ruling elite seems to hamper implementation at the state level in order to protect and maintain their ruling system.²²⁴

²²¹ Tull, "Rebuilding Mali's Army," 410.

²²² Tull, 410.

²²³ Tull, 410.

²²⁴ Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Christine Nissen, "Schizophrenic Agendas in the EU's External Actions in Mali," *International Affairs* 96, no. 4 (2020): 449, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iaa053>.

Besides receiving increased international engagement, Mali pledged to improve regional administration capabilities. In 2016, the Malian government established interim administrations in the conflict-ridden areas in the northern part of the country. Yet, Mali's government did not fully implement all measures necessary to further solve local and regional conflicts. The government demonstrated particularly slow progress in restructuring of defense and security provisions, which in turn has contributed to significant deterioration of the country's security situation.²²⁵ The continuous inability of the Malian government to solve its internal issues has different consequences and serves the overall extraversion strategy. On one side, the Malian government submits responsibility to local agents, allowing local actors to establish own power structures, which also strengthens the patron-client network in the periphery and frees state capacities for more valuable areas like those in the southern part of the country. In 2019, with the decrease in security in central Mali, the UN also adapted their mission MINUSMA with a clear focus on the central region. Such a commitment to invest more in the central region in response to the country's inability to solve its internal issues supports the basic notion of Mali's extraversion strategy.²²⁶ In addition to unsuccessful security development in general, Mali also continues to experience decreasing government efficiency, which also highlights the general negative effect of the international engagement. Overall, according to the assessment of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC), Mali has consistently failed the MCC criteria for an effective and efficient country, and projects a clear negative trend for the future.²²⁷

Possible explanations for such a development and behavior can be found in Mali's short time-horizons and clientelistic power structures, both of which were discussed in the

²²⁵ Security Sector Reform in Mali," Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), accessed August 12, 2020, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Mali-SSR-Background-Note>.

²²⁶ "The UN Peace Operation in Mali: A Troubled Yet Needed Mission," Reliefweb, last modified November 26, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-peace-operation-mali-troubled-yet-needed-mission>.

²²⁷ The data used can be found on the MCC page and summarizes the different Scorecards regarding the country assessment of Mali. "Mali – Scorecards FY 2011 to FY 2020," Millennium Challenge Cooperation, accessed July 15, 2020, <https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/scorecard/fy-2020/ML>.

previous section, which lead to the inefficiency of the military and the public sector. Any external recommendation for structural change could challenge the “prerogative of regime security, because rulers fear threats from inside the state apparatus more than those from without,” which automatically will lead to resistance and to the attempt to preserve the status quo.²²⁸ In addition, if benefiting from the influx of external resources through corruption or self-enrichment is a country’s primary course of action and survival strategy, this country will probably not improve its situation and risk the loss of the external support. Of course, this basic attitude also influences a government’s behavior regarding its response to conflict, which makes successful conflict-solving efforts less likely.

Government inefficiency and corruption aligned with patron-client networks require a continuous influx of resources. In the case of Mali, the extraversion strategy is two-fold. On one side, the Malian state’s survival can only be guaranteed by a strong physical international commitment in the form of security providers. On the other side, by freeing and concentrating resources on what seems to be useful for the government and its patron-client network instead of solving conflict in the periphery, Mali misuses the international support for own purposes, knowing that the international community will not allow the downfall of the country. Thus, the various features of the increased international engagement since 2012 have opened up an opportunity for additional resources to sustain the political power structures and patron-client networks. As a result, Mali’s extraversion strategy can directly be linked to the security challenges the country faces. A significant improvement of the security situation in Mali and an improvement in the government’s efficiency would therefore eventually lead to a reduction of available state resources and to an increase in state responsibilities, thus endangering existing power structures. As a result, Mali’s extraversion strategy, designed to use international engagement as source of revenue and as physical security, has led to less interest in and no urgency to solve the internal conflict.


²²⁸ Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 409–10.

2. Partnership-Focused Extraversion in Chad

As already highlighted in the case of Mali, extraversion strategies are mainly focused on state survival and power sustainment and the aligned availability of necessary resources. By using international engagement as a source of revenue and as the physical security guarantor, Mali has focused its extraversion strategy purely on profiting from the international engagement within its country. By contrast, Chad's extraversion strategy focuses more on exploiting its natural resources for sustaining purposes and on being a reliable partner within the international context. Specifically, being a respected and important international partner has helped Chad's government to strengthen its domestic position.

Although Chad has also received increasing foreign aid and international support, the amount of support is hardly comparable to what Mali has received. Figure 9 shows the amount of aid provided by the EU and its member states between 2007 and 2018 in Mali and Chad, respectively. Although the figure is a limited representation, covering only aid provided by the EU, it shows a general trend of Chad receiving half of the amount of foreign aid provided by the EU in comparison to Mali.²²⁹

²²⁹ European Commission, "EU Aid Explorer: Recipients Data from 2007 to 2018."



€ Figure 9. Foreign Aid Disbursement by the EU to Chad and Mali between 2007 and 2018²³⁰

During the same period, between 2007 and 2018, Chad faced an internal conflict and an attempt to overthrow President Déby in 2008, as well as an increase of transnational terrorist activity by Boko Haram in the western part of the country. But contrary to the case of Mali, Chad managed to handle its security challenges and proportionally received less revenue from foreign aid or support from the international community.

In this context, Chad's exploitation of its most important natural resource seems to be important. In comparison to Mali, Chad had a decisive revenue advantage—oil as a natural resource. Before oil production started in 2003, Chad had similar problems acquiring domestic resources like other African countries, which seemed to be solved when Chad started to partner with international corporations to exploit crude oil in Chad. Nevertheless, what was seen as an opportunity by the international community and especially by the World Bank to overcome poverty and to spur development in Chad by using oil revenues for the advancement of the Chadian people, the improvement of poverty failed almost instantly after oil revenues started to flow into the country.²³¹

²³⁰ Adapted from European Commission. "EU Aid Explorer: Recipients Data from 2007 to 2018,"

²³¹ Aristide Mabali and Moundigbaye Mantobaye, "Oil and Regional Development in Chad: Impact Assessment of Doba Oil Project on the Poverty in Host Region," *Etudes et Documents* 15 (June 2015): 18, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01161624/file/2015.15.pdf>.

In Chad, oil “was first discovered [...] in the 1970s by a consortium of oil corporations that included Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, and Royal Dutch/Shell.”²³² But at that time, internal conflicts prevented the international consortium from further developing the oil fields. After an internal reorganization, many different studies, and an improvement in regard to the security threats to the project, three international companies decided to further develop the project. The consortium members—Petronas, Chevron and Exxon—then decided to exploit the oil from the Doba Basin and to build a pipeline from Chad to Cameroon to transport the oil to the international market. In total, the consortium invested approximately \$1.5 billion in the extraction of the oil and another \$2.2 billion for the transportation project to Cameroon, which covered a pipeline 670 miles long.²³³ But the international partners were not the only ones who profited from the joint venture; the government of Chad formed state-owned businesses like the Chad Oil Transportation Company, which partially owns the pipeline on Chadian ground. Chad is also an associate of the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company, which owns the part of the pipeline in Cameroon. In 2005, authors such as Emeka Duruigbo expected that the whole project would produce total revenues in the amount of \$13.7 billion with a total production of 883 million barrels.²³⁴ Although oil revenues are highly volatile because of their dependence on world oil prices, Chad managed to exceed conservative expectations in collecting a total cumulative amount of around \$13 billion in oil revenues until 2015, which peaked in 2011, when the Chadian government received \$2 billion, “making up 76 percent of government revenue.”²³⁵

Over time, Chad has perfected its complex system of state management of oil resources, in which many different companies and shareholder strategies are used to secure

²³² Emeka Duruigbo, “The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa,” *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law* 26, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 38, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/upjiel26&id=12&men_tab=srchresults.

²³³ Duruigbo, 39.

²³⁴ Duruigbo, 28–39.

²³⁵ International Monetary Fund, *Chad IMF Country Report*, Report No. 16/275 (Washington, DC: IMF Publication Services, 2016), 44, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16275.pdf>.

oil revenues for Chad's government, which then can be used to sustain domestic demands such as the extensive patron-client network and effective, yet repressive, security apparatus.²³⁶ Even if the highly undiversified economy has made the country vulnerable in terms of its dependence on the world economic system, it still guarantees Chad its requisite income, which in the past not only allowed Chad's president to improve Chad's military capabilities, but also to sustain internal power structures and thus successfully fight any security challenge in the country. As a result, the part of Chad's extraversion strategy designated to facilitate the use of resource rents from the exploitation of crude oil to support, sustain, and enlarge government power structures, enabled Chad in the long term to face its security challenges differently from Mali. In this way, the Chadian resource revenue extraversion strategy has shaped the state's response to conflict, giving its ruling regime stronger incentives to address its internal conflict.

While oil revenues continue to be an important factor for President Déby and his associated elites to hold power, it is only one part of Chad's two-fold extraversion strategy. Chad has always been closely tied to international partners to assure its regional value for foreign countries and, thus, to support its own state survival by relying on strong alliances. One of Chad's long-term partners is France, from whom Chad gained independence. Yet, Chad is only one of France's former colonies with which it shares such partnerships; "France has an extensive military presence in Africa which facilitates aid to its Francophone allies via what the French government calls 'operational [military] cooperation' for interventions and peacekeeping, and 'structural cooperation' for routine missions of helping countries build up and maintain their military establishments."²³⁷ The French strategy is based on three important pillars: "the French prepositioned forces at African bases, the RECAMP [Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix] training program, and the bilateral military cooperation programs run by the French

²³⁶ International Monetary Fund, 48–53.

²³⁷ Christopher Griffin, "Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram: French Counterterrorism and Military Cooperation in the Sahel," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no.5 (September 2016): 900, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208283>.

Foreign Ministry's Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense (Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation – DCSD).”²³⁸

From 1986 until 2014, French forces were permanently stationed in Chad under Operation Epervier to prevent a Libyan invasion from the north before France regrouped its forces in Sahel into Operation Barhkhane.²³⁹ Because of the French-Chadian long-term approach, the military initiative of France played a major role in the strong development of the Chadian military. Chad's central location is of great importance for France, enabling the “French Army to maneuver between its other bases on the continent and respond quickly to crises.”²⁴⁰ French-Chadian military assistance treaties have allowed French military personnel to train Chadian soldiers in Chadian uniform. France has also provided military equipment and the aligned maintenance and logistical support. In return, France received the right to use the Chadian airspace and military airports.²⁴¹ The close relationship between Chad and France did not only help to develop a capable Chadian military, it also guaranteed the survival of Déby's regime. In 2008, France directly intervened in Chad and averted the overthrow of President Déby. In this context, France saw the struggling regime as a constant supporting factor in the region, which also guaranteed France access and movement in the region. Overall, by recognizing that regime survival is directly linked to its reliability as a partner to the international community, Chad's government has embraced conflict management.

In addition to leveraging Chad's regional location, the French have joined with Chad in military development efforts that led to the most powerful regional military force. In 2013, when the French military started the intervention in Mali, Chad joined the fight on the side of France, leaving 30 Chadian soldiers killed in Mali. Again, Chad supported the international peacekeeping effort in Mali by contributing to MINUSMA. And even during the French intervention in the Central African Republic in 2014, Chad sent troops

²³⁸ Griffin, 900.

²³⁹ Griffin, 901.

²⁴⁰ Griffin, 902.

²⁴¹ Griffin, 902.

to help its ally. Despite differences in military performance during the Chadian military engagements, Chad contributed to the French joint military effort and thus strengthened its position relative to the French government.²⁴² Since the Chadian army followed the French intervention path, President Déby “has also played up the military diplomacy card and made himself indispensable to Western allies,” which has brought Chad to “the status of regional power in just a few years.”²⁴³

Like France, other international actors have recognized Chad as an important security player and partner in the region. Since 2001, several U.S. administrations have seen President Déby as a reliable partner, especially in the fight against violent extremism and in the Global War on Terror campaign. Like France, the United States has provided training, equipment and logistical support in support of Chad’s effort to fight extremism in the Sahel region. Although under the Trump administration U.S.-Chadian relations have cooled down, as evidenced by the “Trump Administration’s decision to include Chad on its revised list of countries subject to ‘enhanced vetting’ for entry to the United States,” Chad continues to be an important partner.²⁴⁴ While these two examples do not provide a comprehensive picture of all international relations Chad has with its partners, it demonstrates the importance external actors see in the country’s existence and role in the region, which explains why Western powers like France continue to support “Déby at all costs while ignoring the regime’s authoritarian practices and human rights violations.”²⁴⁵

The two pieces of Chad’s extraversion strategy are connected. On one side, Chad’s exploitation of its natural resource has allowed the country to build up a strong military, which eventually led to its ability to fight internal and transnational security challenges. As a side effect, Chad’s strong military and para-military institutions have also helped to

²⁴² Griffin, 903.

²⁴³ Marielle Debos, “Airstrikes and ‘Stability’: What’s the French Army Doing in Chad?” African Arguments, last modified February 14, 2018, <https://africanarguments.org/2019/02/14/airstrikes-stability-what-french-army-doing-chad/>.

²⁴⁴ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, *Chad*, CRS Report No. IF10760, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10760>.

²⁴⁵ Debos, “Airstrikes and ‘Stability’.”

secure Chad's source of income—the crude oil exploitation. Thus, the revenues received from joint ventures with international cooperation have also guaranteed the sustainment of President Déby's regime and his patron-client network. On the other side, being a reliable regional and international partner able to counter internal security challenges has led to the acceptance of the current regime in Chad despite its record of human rights violations. Thus, President Déby and his ruling elites have been able to implement a mutual dependence, which has further strengthened the regime's domestic and international position and silenced many domestic and international doubters. This gained power position has left Déby with "no incentive to introduce reforms to address the underlying economic and political causes of instability," which makes Chad's president a conflict-manager but not necessarily a conflict-solver.²⁴⁶

3. Summary

By trying to understand why conflict-ridden countries behave differently in their conflict-solving efforts, it is possible to see that the countries' different extraversion strategies are of great importance. If a country's extraversion strategy is based on receipt of aid from the international community, the recipient country's conflict-solving behavior might be less active. Thus, its leaders have an incentive not to address the conflict in order to gain continued access to foreign assistance tied to insecurity. On the other side, if extraversion strategies are primarily concerned with raising revenue from natural resources, political leaders have stronger incentives and means to address internal conflict. In addition, if the extraversion strategy is based on gaining external protection through being a reliable partner, as in the case of Chad, the regime's survival strategy has more long-term orientation, and thus, the ruling regime has greater interest in solving internal conflicts. In this way, the regime is able to keep its good relations with its international partners.

²⁴⁶ Tony Chaffer, "Chad: France's Role and Political Instability," Italian Institute for International Political Studies, accessed May 12, 2020, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/chad-frances-role-and-political-instability-23842>.

The Malian and Chadian governments try to achieve similar objectives—the sustainment of current power structures by providing enough means to continue their neopatrimonial type of government. Nevertheless, Mali and Chad chose different paths to meet the same objectives. Mali’s regime consolidated its power through gaining resources provided by the international community. Because of its continuous access to international aid, Mali’s government seems to exhibit less interest and no urgency in solving the civil conflict. In contrast to Mali’s approach, Chad consolidated its power through the exploitation of oil, which has enabled the country to respond to any security challenge and thus to be a reliable regional and international partner. By being a reliable partner, Chad has gained absolute support from its international partners. While Chad’s regime was able to build up its power structures by relying on international survival guarantees, Mali did not use the French intervention in 2013 as a starting point for further developments. Again, the explanation for this missed opportunity might be the specific Malian extraversion strategy combined with the lack of valuable natural resources in Mali. Thus, the different extraversion strategies directly affect Chad’s and Mali’s government behavior toward security threats, in which Chad has responded to conflict in more aggressive way.

C. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF DISORDER

The paradigm of political instrumentalization of disorder is closely linked to the other two variables—neopatrimonialism and extraversion strategies. Like the other variables, the term refers to a general approach in which political elites seek to benefit from state confusion, uncertainty, and chaos, which might also influence a country’s response to conflict.²⁴⁷ Political instrumentalization of disorder is similar to extraversion in regards to accessing revenues in the form of externally provided security assistance and training, and humanitarian and emergency assistance but differ in the active role the government plays by allowing disorder to persist. On one side, disorder might help to feed existing extraversion strategies and, on the other side, might help to make repression against internal opponents legitimate. All these aspects influence a state’s conflict-solving behavior; namely, it prevents a state’s government from seeking to solve domestic security problems.

²⁴⁷ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, xviii.

This section analyzes political instrumentalization of disorder in the cases of Mali and Chad, respectively, showing that both countries have implemented different strategies in terms of this variable. On one side, Mali continues to solidify its international dependence and the associated revenues obtained by using disorder to demonstrate its continued helplessness; on the other side, Chad uses disorder to legally suppress internal opponents with the help of international actors. As a result, the Malian government allows disorder to persist because it relies on international support to feed Mali's patron-client network, the survival of which is not threatened by conflict escalation. On the other side, a consistent low-level internal conflict allows Chad's government to strengthen the military to suppress opposition and to continue the government's extraversion strategy of being a reliable international partner.

1. Instrumentalizing Conflict in Mali

In the case of Mali in 2012, the developing Tuareg rebellion accompanied by the jihadist insurgency and the seizing of the northern territory with a clear direction towards the capital Bamako threatened the existing order of Mali. The following military coup and consequent fall of the more or less legitimate regime created an even worse situation, spurring France to intervene, followed by additional international military efforts to secure the country, a move that had been more than welcomed.²⁴⁸ Over the years the original purpose of securing the country from a regional threat in form of the Tuareg rebellion and the fight of extremist groups in the country changed to fighting extremists and intercommunal disputes in central Mali, which was more than welcomed by Mali's government and the country's elites. The deteriorating security situation maintains the need for the international involvement, which also allows the government to rely on its international security guarantor without investing much of its own resources. Therefore, Mali's ruling elite has allowed disorder to persist by not addressing it while pretending to be interested in solving the conflict. In reality, Mali's government contributes little to stabilize the country; instead, various state entities have been accused of contributing to internal tensions by violating human rights and collaborating with armed groups.

²⁴⁸ Tull, "Rebuilding Mali's Army," 405.

Since Mali's independence, the country's military has been known for human rights violations, which had long contributed to grievances within the population. After the insurgents' eviction by French and other international forces in 2013, FAMA retook lost territories. Unfortunately, the re-conquest of central Mali by the FAMA was accompanied by many human rights violations. Again, the local population was the victim. Abuse and executions of civilians had been linked to security forces activities in Sevare and other places in the region. In particular, the Fulani nomadic population, which was allegedly seen as close to the insurgency, became the target of the government forces.²⁴⁹ More recently, in 2018, Malian soldiers were accused of killing "60 men suspected of supporting armed Islamists, while numerous others were subjected to enforced disappearance or torture during interrogations."²⁵⁰ Although there is no clear evidence of a Malian political leader's involvement in directly ordering human rights violations, there is also no evidence that they have tried to prevent such actions, which supports the general assumption that the Malian government allows disorder to persist.

Specifically, the deteriorating security situation in the central region of Mali showed that the Malian government "had failed to adequately protect" the different communities.²⁵¹ Even worse, government officials have been accused of supporting self-defense groups in fighting alleged terrorists, who mainly targeted ethnic Fulani in the region. Even if affiliated ethnic groups that are closer to the government, like Dogon and Bambara, deny any support or coordination from and with the Malian government, the Malian government still remains inactive and unable to calm the situation.²⁵² From the beginning of the conflict in central Mali, local community leaders have "raised concerns

²⁴⁹ Remi Carayol, Florent Geel, and Antonin Rabecq, "In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught between Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Fact-finding Mission Report" (working paper, International Federation for Human Rights, 2018), 2, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf.

²⁵⁰ "Mali – Events of 2018," Human Rights Watch, accessed August 12, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/mali>.

²⁵¹ Corinne Dufka, "We Used to be Brothers: Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali," Human Rights Watch, accessed August 12, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/07/we-used-be-brothers/self-defense-group-abuses-central-mali>.

²⁵² Dufka.

about the slow or lack of response by Malian security forces to attacks on their communities, even when alerted to attacks ahead of time.”²⁵³ Even the proactive communication of several communities to the government regarding the location of members of armed groups and their structure did not trigger government actions.²⁵⁴

Overall, government inactivity and possible collaboration between armed groups and government entities have contributed to decreased security in Mali. By using the deteriorated situation in the central region, the Malian government has continuously supported its argument for having a strong international commitment supporting the country. As a result, from 2015 to 2018, the EU alone increased its aid contribution by around 17.5 percent, which accounts for an increase of around \$100 million over the three years.²⁵⁵ On the other side, Mali continues to follow Matt Andrews’ argument that countries try to convince outsiders that they would adopt “impressive-looking reforms,” as demonstrated in the case of the Army’s Human Resource Department payment system, which ultimately was not implemented because of the possible limitation of internal financial fraud.²⁵⁶ This is even more questionable because of the involvement of members of the senior leadership of the Malian Army in the political patronage network.²⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Mali’s approach also carries certain risks for its government. By not persistently addressing disorder or by failing to act to help its affected civilians, a government contributes to persistent disorder in the country, and that can lead to a breach of trust and the loss of support from the international community. In the worst case, it can lead to a frozen climate between the international community and the country. In particular, the deterioration of the security situation in Mali in recent years and the spread of the conflict into the central region of the country call for a critical view of Mali’s government

²⁵³ Dufka.

²⁵⁴ Dufka.

²⁵⁵ European Commission, “EU Aid Explorer: Recipients Data from 2007 to 2018.”

²⁵⁶ Andrews, *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development*, 33.

²⁵⁷ MacLachlan, “Security Assistance, Corruption and Fragile Environments: Exploring the Case of Mali 2001–2012,” 24.

engagement in security developments in the country. The conflict expanded into the regions of Mopti and Segou in central Mali, where the “presence of armed groups has affected the patterns of communitarian clashes between settled farmers and herdsman.”²⁵⁸ The seeming spread of violence to farmers and herdsman aligned with ongoing terrorist activities to create a high level of insecurity in central Mali, and that has also threatened the stability of the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Niger. The exploitation of long-known issues related to land tenure between the herdsman of the Fulani ethnic group and the farmers of the Bambara and Dogon ethnic groups has led to a violent conflict resulting in hundreds of fatalities and many more internally displaced persons in central Mali.²⁵⁹ By using this more challenging and uncertain strategy of disorder, Mali’s government continuously risks losing its international support, which not only endangers the Malian extraversion strategy but also the government’s own survival.

Yet, Mali moves on a narrow path between exploiting continuous disorder in combination with a tuned extraversion strategy of insecurity—to access additional resources and to guarantee state survival—and losing the support of its international partners because of Mali’s institutional and development stagnation.²⁶⁰ Mali’s state behavior related to conflict-solving efforts, however, can still be characterized as not motivated to change anything as long as the overall relationship with its partners is not threatened by the government’s inactivity.

2. Balancing Disorder and Effectiveness in Chad

In comparison to the case of Mali, Chad’s strategy of political instrumentalization of disorder steers in a different direction. Chad’s government continues to be involved in successful conflict management, especially in the neighboring countries, while at the same time Chad’s regime allows certain types of disorder to persist internally to legitimize its suppression of domestic opponents and its need for continued international support.

²⁵⁸ Diallo, “Ethnic Clashes, Jihad, and Insecurity in Central Mali,” 299.

²⁵⁹ Diallo, 300.

²⁶⁰ Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” 118.

This specific approach goes back to events that occurred under President Déby's rule over the last two decades. During Chad's internal crisis between 2007 and 2008, France "threw its weight behind Chad's President Idriss Déby" to back Chad's government against armed rebels who took the capitol and almost overthrew Déby's regime.²⁶¹ Thus, the presence of more than 1,000 French troops and additional air and logistical military support, in combination with weak and disputed opposition parties, led to Déby's survival and the sustainment of his power structures.²⁶² Chad's international partners, however, know of Déby's negative record characterized by "embezzlement of public funding, disappearance of too challenging opponents, rigging of elections, [and] narrow family networks controlling all state assets," which had already led to the weakening of his relationship with his Western partners.²⁶³

In 2012, when François Hollande won the presidential election in France, he "promised, like several of his predecessors, to put an end to the incestuous, often corrupt relations characterized as *Françafrique* and recalibrate French relations with Africa."²⁶⁴ One of his main arguments was to end the French support for dictatorships and countries involved in human rights abuses. In this context and as a reaction to the still unexplained disappearance of the Chadian opposition leader Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh during the 2008 rebellion, Hollande refused to invite President Déby to the Elysée Palace, which eventually led to Déby's boycott of the "October 2012 Sommet de la Francophonie."²⁶⁵ This development showed President Déby how fragile his system of trust, in terms of international support, was. Further, it showed him that the survival of the Chadian state itself would make a rapprochement indispensable.

²⁶¹ Moumine Ngarmbassa and Emmanuel Braun, "France Backs Chad's Deby and Ready to Intervene," Reuters, last modified February 5, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-rebels/france-backs-chads-deby-and-ready-to-intervene-idUSL0360139720080205>.

²⁶² Ngarmbassa and Braun.

²⁶³ Roland Marchal, "An Emerging Military Power in Central Africa? Chad under Idriss Déby," *Sociétés Politiques Comparées* 40, (2016): 18, <https://core.ac.uk/reader/80776554>.

²⁶⁴ Chaffer, "Chad."

²⁶⁵ Chaffer, "Chad."

Despite all the good intentions of the French president, in 2013 the French intervention in Mali made France “desperate for African forces to be involved in order to deflect any possible accusation that this was another unilateral French military intervention in the internal political affairs of an African country.”²⁶⁶ At that decisive point, Chad’s president offered military support not only for the operation in Mali, but also in future French endeavors. The French President’s U-turn and reliance on the Chadian military also reinforced Chad’s regime and President Déby in particular. Using this renewed alliance with France, President Déby “has positioned Chad as a key player in the battle against Boko Haram, with N’Djamena established as the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria with a mandate to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency.”²⁶⁷

With President Déby’s move to renew the alliance with France in fighting extremists in the Sahel, Déby also reached a new level of international support for sustaining his power. Having been accused of suppressing domestic opponents in the past, Déby and the Chadian government risked losing its international support. Many times, President Déby faced direct internal threats, which almost led to his dethronement. The continuous struggle against internal threats combined with a possible loss of international support led to this new political survival strategy. Nowadays, instead of fighting his opponents with domestic means, President Déby skillfully uses the renewed counterterrorism alliance to do the job for his regime. To do so, some disorder has to persist. In 2019, warplanes of the French-led Operation Barkhane attacked a Chadian rebel convoy crossing into Chad from Libya in order to prevent the further destabilization of Chad. The convoy belonged to the Union of Forces Resistance (UFR), a rebel group that had already tried to overthrow Déby in 2009.²⁶⁸ Many of those fighters had been close to the Chadian president before. Timan Erdimi, “who happens to be the president’s cousin,

²⁶⁶ Chaffer, “Chad.”

²⁶⁷ Chaffer, “Chad.”

²⁶⁸ John Irish and Sophie Louet, “French Jets Strike Chadian Rebels to Head off Deby Destabilization,” Reuters, last modified February 06, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-chad/french-jets-strike-chadian-rebels-to-head-off-deby-destabilization-idUSKCN1PV2JN>.

was a pillar of the regime until he joined the rebellion in 2004.”²⁶⁹ This incident highlights the complicated situation for the French-led Operation Barkhane and the abusive character of Déby’s intention for this operation. The operation’s objective has always been fighting terrorists not rebel groups, but now that objective has been violated.

Consequently, Chad’s ruling regime has perfected its strategy of disorder by engaging in some conflict management while allowing a certain amount of disorder to persist. Thus, the Chadian regime has been able to suppress its opposition, even leveraging the unwitting help of the international community in this task. Despite all the negative headlines alleging that Chad is governed by President Déby in concert with Chad’s deeply rooted patron-client network, the Chadian authorities have been able to strategically instrumentalize the counterterrorism campaign in the Sahel by “rebranding rebels as mercenaries and terrorists” in Chad.²⁷⁰ Furthermore, President Déby “has also played up the military diplomacy card and made himself indispensable to Western allies,” which has enabled the conflict-ridden country in the Sahel to acquire the status of a regional power.²⁷¹ Closely linked to its extraversion strategy is Chad’s approach of using the ongoing security challenges created by insurgent groups to ensure President Déby’s power through external guarantees and support, and this approach seems to be successful. As a result, a locally limited insurgency in Chad by Boko Haram and ISWA has allowed Déby’s regime to increase its efforts to fight opponents under the counterterrorism umbrella, which also limits the country’s behavior in regard to finally solving the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin. Thus, the local conflict in the Lake Chad region has to be separated from the internal power struggles with Déby’s opponents.

3. Summary

Just as the neopatrimonialism and extraversion strategies of Chad and Mali differ, so do their approaches to instrumentalizing the disorder that exists within their respective

²⁶⁹ Debos, “Airstrikes and ‘Stability.’”

²⁷⁰ Debos.

²⁷¹ Debos.

borders. And, these differing approaches influence both countries' conflict-solving efforts. On one side, Mali continues to solidify its international dependence and secure related revenue flows that are obtained by leveraging disorder to demonstrate the country's continued helplessness; on the other side, Chad uses disorder to secure the help of international actors in legally suppressing internal opposition. As a result, the Malian government allows disorder to persist because the regime relies on international support to feed its patron-client network. On the other side, a consistent low-intensity internal conflict allows Chad's government to strengthen the military to suppress opposition and to continue its extraversion strategy of positioning itself as a reliable international partner.

Nevertheless, the constant political instrumentalization of disorder seems to be more dangerous for the Malian government than it is for Chad's government. If Mali continues to be too inactive and unwilling to invest more in the protection of its population, it might lose the international support necessary to sustain its power structures. In this context, the Malian government might also lose the support of its patron-client network, which contains the risk for the Malian regime that the present disorder becomes intolerable to groups whose support the Malian government needs to maintain power. On the other side, Chad's domestic engagement seems to be almost irrelevant because of the country's importance in fighting terrorism in the region. Thus, Chad has managed to quell its international critics by becoming indispensable, which has only been possible because of Chad's strategy of instrumentalization of disorder that allows conflict to persist. Trust building through an efficient military partnership has almost freed Chad from any international critique, leaving the country without incentives for domestic changes and improved state behavior in terms of conflict-solving efforts. Therefore, Chad's government will continue to be involved in some conflict management while allowing the limited regional conflict to persist. In this context, an end to the civil conflict or a peaceful solution to their respective security challenges would not be beneficial for either country.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

Contrary to the notion that governments strive for long-term development and peace, some conflict-ridden countries' governments prioritize political survival in ways that undermine their response to domestic conflict. Based on this general hypothesis, this thesis focused on how domestic political dynamics—like neopatrimonialism, extraversion, and political instrumentalization of disorder—shape a government's response to civil conflicts.

This comparative case study examined two countries with similar security challenges but different conflict-solving responses. It then analyzed the effects of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and the political instrumentalization of disorder on the governments' divergent responses to conflict. By comparing two Sub-Saharan African countries in the Sahel, Mali and Chad, this thesis concentrated on two countries similarly affected by security challenges in terms of transnational extremism but have experienced different outcomes from their conflict-solving efforts. As a result, the analysis showed that different types of neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and political instrumentalization of disorder affect a country's conflict-solving response. In the case of Mali, the country's government seems to allow disorder and conflict to persist in order to have continued access to resource revenues that guarantee state survival and prop up weak patron-client networks. The Chadian government, by contrast, seems to be interested in a balanced approach to conflict management that allows the government to maintain access to oil revenues, further strengthen its regional position, and suppress its domestic opponents without criticism from the international community.

Despite the different outcomes, both countries continue to be trapped in the swamp of poor development, being two of the poorest countries in the world. The respective governments of Mali and Chad and their aligned elites seem to be the winners in both cases by ensuring and sustaining their own power or profits. This mainly defines their behavior and the overall outcome for both countries. In order to not only manage a civil conflict, the

international community needs to understand the whole conflict environment and especially the political survival dynamics that surround the regime in power. Only with a comprehensive understanding of the domestic politics will the international community be able to adjust its engagement in conflict-ridden countries.

B. KEY FINDINGS

After analyzing the different strategies (independent variables) and their effects on each government's conflict-solving behavior (dependent variable), this section further highlights the key findings related to neopatrimonialism, extraversion strategies, and the political instrumentalization of disorder.

The analysis shows that there is an important difference between “strong” and “weak” neopatrimonialism. A strong ruling political figure is able to concentrate and centralize power, monopolize control of state resources, and build more extensive and resilient patron-client networks. This level of control is important because it shapes political time horizons and a state's ability to manage conflict. A political leader, like President Déby in Chad, who can be assumed to hold office for a long time, does not want conflict to spread or worsen, which might endanger his and his ruling elite's power structures. A leader who has such a long-term orientation also has an interest in seeing the conflict not spin out of control. In addition, the widespread Chadian patron-client networks, especially in areas of conflict, allow President Déby to have better control and to project power more effectively in these parts of the country. These networks and capabilities also help the Chadian government to legitimate itself as a conflict solver and thus increase the regime's chance of permanently sustaining its power.

Where neopatrimonialism is weaker, however, leaders may have less interest in, and ability to, manage domestic conflicts. If a leader, like President Keita in Mali, struggles to maintain political control of state power, resources, and patron-client networks, he expects to stay in power a shorter time and has less incentive to invest in containing or solving the conflict. Because President Keita in Mali does not possess stable patron-client networks in the area of conflict, his government lacks the connections and power necessary to sustain long-term solutions.

Different types of extraversion strategies also influence a government's response to internal conflicts. The relationship between extraversion strategy and conflict response depends on the types of benefits that countries hope to gain from foreign actors. In Chad, two extraversion strategies exist. The extraversion strategy primarily concerned with raising revenue from exploitation of its natural resources guarantees Chad's regime stability because of a seemingly endless access to state revenues. Thus, the regime has stronger incentives to address internal conflicts, at least partially. The Chadian elites have a secure source of internal revenue but they depend to some extent on their foreign partners for technical support and buyers. Thus, if the domestic conflict spins out of control, they may lose that crucial support and see the conflict expand in ways that threaten the resources themselves. Additionally, Chad's second extraversion strategy, which requires some disorder is designed to gain external regime protection and thus leads to the regime's greater interest in solving its internal conflicts. In this context, the Chadian government's long-term survival strategy is based on being a reliable regional partner to whom international actors will continue to provide protection for the regime. In Mali, the extraversion strategy is primarily concerned with accessing more and more aid. Therefore, the Malian government has less interest and urgency in solving civil conflicts, because an end to the conflict would jeopardize the future partnerships that produce aid.

Closely linked to both neopatrimonialism and extraversion strategies, political instrumentalization of disorder also impacts state response to conflict by using disorder as a supporting measure for regime survival. Chad's leaders sustain a certain degree of disorder that allows the ruling elites to legitimately suppress their opponents and to continue their protective extraversion strategy. On the other side, the Malian government will allow disorder to persist, and even allow it to spread, to keep international support necessary for sustaining its patron-client networks, as long as the Malian regime's survival itself is not endangered by the conflict. Despite the general assumption that governments of conflict-ridden countries strive for development, peace, and the prosperity of their population, governments like the one in Mali use internal conflict and resulting large international engagements not only to rebuild the country but also to sustain or enhance their own power.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the years there has been a broad debate about the role of the international community in regard to struggling developmental states in Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings of this thesis support the notions of researchers like Denis M. Tull, who has argued that “relations between Mali and its international partners are characterized by dissonant mutual perceptions that undermine the effectiveness of intervention.”²⁷² From a wider perspective, by not recognizing the uniqueness of each African country and by not acknowledging the fact that regional domestic political factors especially in the security realm have to be taken into account, the international community will continue to be limited in its ability to manage conflicts and will probably not help to solve them in the long term. The pure mass of international players makes the situation even more complicated. With almost no coordination, competing international countries, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international corporations prevent a common approach and thus allow countries like Mali to exploit what is for the government’s power sustainment. Therefore, any international engagement should be coordinated, less driven by national interest, and most importantly, should recognize the uniqueness of each African country. Although this approach will not totally prevent Mali from using foreign assistance opportunistically, it might help to uncover and minimize the misuse of aid. Thus, understanding the specific African environment is very important. Possible successful international engagements depend significantly on the African counterparts, and it is imperative to note that various actors perceive their roles differently and that the behavior of each African government vis-à-vis external intervention varies widely.

Certainly there are a variety of additional domestic and external factors that influence and explain domestic political behavior. But since this work was specifically aimed at understanding domestic political behavior related to conflict-solving efforts and because otherwise this inquiry would go beyond the scope of this work, this thesis focused only on the three domestic factors or strategies. Nevertheless, while focusing on these

²⁷² Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army,” 406.

specific domestic factors, the importance of ethno-linguistic aspects in each of the analyzed countries has been identified as very influential, and thus, it should be further examined in regard to their specific impact on a country's domestic behavior and its interaction with the international community.

Also interesting could be the evolving aspect of the Great Power Competition in Africa, in which the "African continent has become a focus of geopolitical and economic attention, especially as a locus of Sino-American rivalry," which could also have an impact on how African countries orient their state behavior toward conflict-solving efforts.²⁷³ The Sino-American presence in Africa has already led to "the militarization and securitization of Africa impelled by the war on terrorism and the need to protect vested political and economic interests; [...] the continent [is] becoming a theater for the interplay of differences between American and Chinese militarization and securitization."²⁷⁴ The appearance of this development and its impact on domestic state behavior should therefore be part of further studies regarding domestic political factors or strategies influencing African countries' state behavior.

²⁷³ Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Militarization and Securitization in Africa," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 77, <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2019211.06>.

²⁷⁴ Conteh-Morgan, 77.

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