Optimization Models to Support a Limited Objective Test/Experiment (LOT/E) of a Billet Marketplace for Assigning USMC Officers
Abstract
This research investigates how to optimally assign U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) officers to billets. Currently, the USMC relies on monitors to manually develop the assignment solution based on limited information. This leaves the USMC with a suboptimal use of its resources, and with officers whose human capital is not fully developed or who consider attrition. The research shows essential features of a marketplace from other military branches. Emphasis is placed on those features directly related to meeting the billet requirements, the preferences of Marines and Marines' career paths. This marketplace system requires a substantial amount of information from billet owners, monitors, and officers. Data from a subset of the aviation community were collected and processed to develop optimization models that balance two goals: permanent change of station cost, and Marines' priorities. The models are amenable to extensions that consider additional goals and requirements, as data become available. Experimentation shows insightful tradeoffs in the two objectives and provides efficient solutions, which are useful in presenting alternatives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1126547
Entities
People
- Martin K. Nganga
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School