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REBELS AND STATES:
A GAME OF REVOLUTION AND DOMINANCE

by

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REBELS AND STATES: A GAME OF REVOLUTION AND DOMINANCE

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military is currently in an era of change highlighted by a shift in focus from small-scale and limited wars involving counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) to preparations for large-scale combat operations with a near-peer threat. This shift has placed emphasis on conventional focus in training, education, and planning to stand ready for a potential conflict as the United States continues to maintain its unilateral grip as the world's lone superpower, and Russia and China try to expand their spheres of influence in the great power competition (GPC). But, as with the Cold War, it is unlikely this showdown will occur. Conversely, it is far more probable conflict will be highlighted by competition through state-sponsored insurgencies, proxy wars, and a struggle over influence. Special operations forces (SOF) therefore must balance their understanding and preparedness of conventional warfare while standing ready to execute unconventionally. The wargame Rebels and States is designed to train entry-level SOF candidates in the interaction between the insurgent and counterinsurgent, utilizing COIN and unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine as a basis while also employing the concepts of insurgent, resistance, and COIN theorists. This wargame is to aid SOF candidates as they prepare to serve in their operational units, providing a venue to test strategies and understandings of COIN and UW principles, and ensure an enhanced education in doctrine and theory.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1 st SFC	1 st Special Forces Command
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
CAS	Central Asian States
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DCMP	Data Collection and Management Plan
DIMEFIL	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement
DOD	Department of Defense
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPC	Great Power Competition
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQ	Headquarters
INDOPACOM	Indo-Pacific Command
IR	Irregular Warfare
IS	Islamic State
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational
LOE	Lines of Effort
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
MCOO	Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OE	Operational Environment
OEF-P	Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines
PAP	People's Armed Police
PLA	People's Liberation Army
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SF	Special Forces
SFC	Special Forces Command
SFG	Special Forces Group
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TLO	Terminal Learning Objectives
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
XPCC	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

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—Derek Hirtz

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—Treat Hill

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I. INTRODUCTION

On 01 March 2020, news broke that the U.S. had reached a peace deal with the Taliban that would result in the reduction and eventual withdraw of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The potential peace deal marked the beginning of the end of an era. What started with U.S. special operations forces (SOF) soldiers riding in on horseback and overthrowing the Taliban evolved into an 18-year counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. While the U.S. has shifted its focus from COIN to a new era of great power competition (GPC), it is imperative that SOF continue to understand, train, and test their abilities to stand ready to support strategic objectives of the U.S., in all aspect of warfare, not just a conventional, large scale combat operations (LSCO) fight.

While we, the authors, had already been conceptualizing the game called *Rebels and States*, the potential peace deal struck in Afghanistan only reinforced our desire to create a wargame that could serve as an educational tool for the next generation of SOF soldiers. We both have a vested interest in the production and success of this game outside of academic requirements and intend it to aid in teaching, coaching, and mentoring our fellow soldiers.¹ Furthermore, we both had identified a need for a complementary way of training entry-level SOF soldiers and support personnel and retraining current SOF operators in the main insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies during our time serving in the operational force.

Over the course of several months, we utilized our own military and wargame production experiences, research, and input from peers to produce *Rebels and States*. As highlighted by Peter Perla, we followed a modified version of James Dunnigan's "Ten step process for the game design," combining elements of his process and our own experiences in developing wargames.² This chapter serves as a road map for the remainder of the

¹ Department of the Army, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, ADP 6–22 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 1–22, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

² Peter P. Perla and John Curry, *Peter Perla's The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 177.

documentation of our process, our results, and our recommendations for future development. Chapter II describes the baseline version of *Rebels and States* that is rooted in doctrine. Chapter III provides the design of the game. Chapter IV discusses our modifications, to include the introduction of the doctrine and theorists of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Chapter V provides an overview and walkthrough of *Rebels and States*. Chapter VI presents our conclusions with recommendations for future analysis or modifications.

A. SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

United States Special Forces (USSF) have long been the proponent of unconventional warfare (UW). USSF's role in UW is to work "through and with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla forces in a denied area," to provide policy makers and strategists the time and space to execute successful political warfare.³ Such a mission is inherently sensitive to all levels of the military and government, and having soldiers who are well versed in the area is crucial to meeting strategic objectives. Additionally, a thorough understanding of UW provides the insight on how to counter insurgencies, without focusing solely on just terrorism, one of many tactics used within UW.⁴ With a thorough understanding of how to be an insurgent, a soldier can conversely develop a better understanding how best to counter an insurgent through counterinsurgent (COIN) strategies. The relationship between irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare are visually depicted in Figure 1.

³ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2016), 5, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/Unconventional%20Warfare%20Pocket%20Guide_v1%200_Final_6%20April%202016.pdf; David Maxwell, "Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces," War on the Rocks, August 12, 2013, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/>; Doug Livermore, "It's Time for Special Operations to Dump 'Unconventional Warfare,'" War on the Rocks, October 6, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/its-time-for-special-operations-to-dump-unconventional-warfare/>.

⁴ Maxwell, "Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces."




Figure 1. USSOCOM Activities.⁵

To fully comprehend the complexities of both UW and COIN requires discipline developed through a decades long career that fundamentally starts at the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). As the U.S. shifts its focus to GPC, the military has called upon the SFQC to become more streamlined, placing less emphasis on a wholistic skill set and more on basic doctrine and fundamentals. MG E. John Deedrick, the former commander of 1st Special Forces Command (SFC), stated “I want somebody physically fit, culturally astute, morally straight, understands small unit tactics and how to apply that with a partner force. And someone who can problem solve. You give me that raw material coming out of the course and we’ll do just fine.”⁶ Yet this is becoming harder to achieve as pressure is put on SFQC cadre and commanders to produce USSF soldiers more quickly to meet the demands of the force. Inherently, the SFQC must look at alternative methods when instructing their students.

The modern world is providing new methods to utilize the fundamentals taught within the SFQC. Military doctrine has added space and cyber to the traditional land, sea, and air domains to create Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).⁷ The Army Special

⁵ Source: USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 4.

⁶ Lolita Balbor, “Big Changes to Grueling Special Forces Course Draw Scrutiny,” AP NEWS, October 13, 2019, <https://apnews.com/de165494a09d4e7bb022bcdd7a150f7f>.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.

Operations Forces (ARSOF) strategy states that “the entire ARSOF formation will understand what it will bring to future MDOs,” meaning SOF will have to discover how best to execute its given missions within new environments, and the SFQC will have to instruct new soldiers to do the same.⁸ Furthermore, the ARSOF strategy emphasizes “innovation: bold experimentation, unafraid to fail en-route to revolutionary concepts and technology.”⁹ Alternative methods must be developed to test the new aspects of UW and COIN before it is employed. Furthermore, these methods must be taught to the next generation of USSF soldiers to be prepared to immediately operate within the MDO environment and meet the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) commander’s intent.

B. WARGAMING AS A TRAINING METHOD

Wargaming is “a simulation of a military operation, by whatever means, using specific rules, data, methods, and procedures.”¹⁰ It has long been a method to teach, train, and test new methods and strategies, allowing leaders at all levels to gain new insights into warfare. A wargame that implements aspects of a modern, complex operating environment while teaching and reinforcing doctrinal and theoretical fundamentals serves as an alternative option in educating new recruits and training veterans. It provides a low cost, low risk method to teach the interaction and struggle between the insurgent and counterinsurgent, providing a heuristic training method that fully develops a special operations warrior.

Educational wargames seek to teach and expose players to new concepts. One of the best examples of educational wargames was the Prussian development of *Kriegsspiel* (German for “wargaming”). Before, during, and in between the German wars of unification, *Kriegsspiel* was an incredibly detailed wargame that allowed Prussian officers

⁸ Francis Beaudette, *Army Special Operations Forces Strategy* (Ft. Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2018), https://www.soc.mil/AssortedPages/ARSOF_Strategy.pdf.

⁹ Beaudette.

¹⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Ministry of Defence Wargaming Handbook* (Wiltshire, England: Ministry of Defence, 2017), 5, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/641040/doctrine_uk_wargaming_handbook.pdf.

to practice employing their formations in incredible detail using charts and tables to reflect battlefield interactions.¹¹ While these games were generally effective, they were slow because of the amount of time required to adjudicate results of each tactical decision. The advent of “free” *Kriegsspiel* was developed using combat-experienced Prussian officers to serve as adjudicators to speed up the process of determining who won each engagement.¹² While there are many factors that allowed the Prussians to successfully conquer the other German principalities, the Austrians, and subsequently the French, *Kriegsspiel* allowed Prussian officers to prepare for combat operations and maintain valuable experience across multiple generations of military leaders. The modern-day lesson for both conventional and SOF soldiers is that during periods of transition where training resources may become scarce, experiential wargaming is a time-tested method of maintaining a body of knowledge and expertise in the force. Sun Tzu explains this concept succinctly in *The Art of War*:

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat.¹³

By participating in a wargame, a player executes a vast array of calculations. Wargaming allows the player to apply Sun Tzu’s teaching by visualizing and experiencing the battlefield well before the battle commences. Furthermore, it displays the weakness and strengths of approaches and strategies, resulting in modifications to plans that set the players on a pathway to future success.

C. PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF *REBELS AND STATES*

The purpose of *Rebels and States* is to teach the relationship and interaction between the insurgent and counterinsurgent in a two-sided competition for control and legitimacy of a fictional nation. The wargame uses the doctrinal tasks and methodologies

¹¹ Perla and Curry, *Peter Perla’s the Art of Wargaming*, 42.

¹² Perla and Curry, 42.

¹³ Lionel Giles and Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Open Road Media, 2014), 12, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=1799868>.

of UW and COIN as a foundation while exposing the player to insurgent and counterinsurgent theorists. The primary audience is the students of the SFQC as a means to further their educational experience before assignment to operational Special Forces Groups (SFG). The secondary audience is support staff within SOF organizations that have not had exposure to insurgency and counterinsurgency in the same way that SOF operators have. Our purpose and audience are what led us to specifically select the four insurgent strategies and the four counterinsurgent strategies that are introduced in the 18A: Special Forces Officer Course in the SFQC. The four UW/insurgent strategists are Mao Tse Tung, the Cuban Revolution, T.E. Lawrence, and U.S. UW doctrine; the COIN strategists are David Galula, Robert Thompson, the Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines (OEF-P) Basilan Model, and U.S. COIN doctrine.¹⁴

The learning objectives we chose are a combination of our own analysis of what the players of *Rebels and States* should understand, what we wanted to reinforce, and our synthesis of the Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) from the SFQC 18A Special Forces Officer Course. Once our analysis was complete, we utilized this as a guide when developing the functions and different aspects of *Rebels and States*. Appendix A describes the details of how each part of the game meets the following learning objectives:

- Comprehend the doctrinal strategies of insurgency and COIN
 - Understand the seven phases of U.S. sponsored UW
 - Understand the five tenets of U.S. COIN doctrine
- Comprehend the theoretical strategies of insurgency and COIN

¹⁴ Special Forces Officer Course, *TLO: Components of Insurgency* (Ft. Bragg, NC: 18A AOC Training, 2016); Special Forces Officer Course, *TLO: Fundamentals of Counterinsurgency* (Ft. Bragg, NC: 18A AOC Training, 2017); Special Forces Officer Course, *TLO: Introduction to Insurgencies* (Ft. Bragg, NC: 18A AOC Training, 2017); Special Forces Officer Course, *TLO: Seven Dynamics of a Successful Insurgency* (Ft. Bragg, NC: Special Forces Qualification (SF DET OFF), 2016); Special Forces Officer Course, *TLO: 7 Phases of US-Sponsored Unconventional Warfare* (Ft. Bragg, NC: 18A AOC Training, 2016).

- Understand the three phases of Mao Tse Tung's strategy of Protracted War
- Understand the two fundamentals of the Cuban Revolution insurgency strategy
- Understand the three elements and three treatises of T.E. Lawrence's insurgency strategy
- Understand the five principles of Robert Thompson's COIN strategy
- Understand the eight steps of David Galula's COIN strategy
- Understand the five legs of the OEF-P Basilan COIN model
- Comprehend the fundamental infrastructure of an insurgency
- Comprehend how the doctrinal and theoretical strategies interact
- Comprehend how a complex operation environment affects the application of strategies
- Reinforce doctrinal terms and graphics

The game structure is optimized to expose and familiarize each player with challenges and requirements associated with being either an insurgent or counterinsurgent. Critical lessons are derived from the interaction between strategies. As players employ different strategies against their opponent, the interaction between those strategies will allow both players to glean insights from the results.

In order to effectively convey these theories to the players, strategies are defined and outlined in the rules packet. Players are provided with sufficient definition and explanation of each strategy in order to ensure that game play reflects realistic outcomes. While wargames are mere representations of reality, the critical requirement for *Rebels and States* relies on the ability to correctly understand the inherent strengths and weaknesses of

each type of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy. To make the game understandable to new players, each strategy is simplified into a basic premise, making it usable during the conduct of the wargame. During game play, players have access to the description of each strategy in the form of their strategy cards, which also describe what additional rules are applied to each strategist. The game is not designed to test one theory over another, but rather as means to inform the players on how each will interact.

While the players themselves will be contending with the prospect of trying to understand their respective strategies, other actors and forces that typically occupy the insurgent environment are replicated using game mechanics. The actions of these third parties and environmental effects are randomized in order to challenge the players to deal with new situations. These game mechanics replicate a complex operating environment that often makes military operations even more challenging.

When playtesting, the focus was on ensuring the mechanics met our intent and objectives. During blind playtests, with volunteers who had not previously seen the game, the volunteers were all mid-career SOF officers with experience in the subject matter, experience in developing wargames, or both. The population all had at least a decade of experience in the U.S. Army and had all deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The focus of these playtests was to ensure the game functioned correctly and effectively reinforced the different strategies.

D. RESULTS

The final version of the wargame stays within our original parameters and intent. The two-sided wargame incorporates the key aspects of an insurgency/counterinsurgency environment. More importantly it educates and reinforces the selected strategies through the use of constraints, limitations, and bonuses for certain aspects of the doctrine and theorists, meeting our main objective for the game. Furthermore, *Rebels and States* forces the players to not just understand their chosen strategy, but also requires them to understand the opposing strategy. Ultimately, the players each attempt to gain legitimacy and meet the additional winning requirement as described by their chosen strategy.

The process of the game play follows a back-and-forth method between the two sides as they move through five different phases: Recruitment, Deployment, Movement, Engagement, and Consolidation. The game board accounts for terrain, population size, and adjacent countries. The environment cards describe the politics, economics, society, the media, and security forces within the game, setting the stage for an environment that favors either the insurgent or the state. The combination of the game board and environment cards results in over 90,000 different combinations at the start of the game. This allows for a thorough analysis by the players before selecting their strategy, which is the last step in the Pre-game phase.

As the players maneuver around the game board, they have the option to move, engage with opponents, and build up their forces to control populations that give them recruits and legitimacy. Each of their strategies gives them certain bonuses for each aspect, step, or tenet. But each of these bonuses are not readily apparent, so they are forced to contemplate how their actions will affect their opponent and their own goals in future turns.

Ultimately, *Rebels and States* has an end point. This is represented by a player achieving 15 legitimacy points while also meeting an additional winning condition associated with their given strategy. These winning conditions are related to the overarching theme of each strategy and are counterbalanced by the same winning conditions of an opposing strategy. In the event of a time constrained learning environment, the players can choose to forgo this requirement and play strictly for the attainment of legitimacy points.

E. CONCLUSION

Rebels and States has met our original intent of providing an alternate learning method for entry-level SOF operators. Furthermore, the wargame will not only help educate our secondary audience, SOF support staff, but also can be used to retrain a COIN or UW mindset for current SOF operators. Appendix A describes how aspects of the game meet our desired learning objectives, which are also correlated with the TLOs developed by the SFQC.

Future research or modifications to *Rebels and States* should include a digitized version. While a table top version provides the desired learning experience, a digital version can speed up the game through immediate calculations of recruitment points based on game parameters, quick adjudications of engagements, and other game mechanics and rules incorporated within the digital constraints. A digital version of the game would also allow players to experience *Rebels and States* from their own electronic devices without having to meet in person for an educational experience.

Furthermore, we designed modifications of the game to meet specific areas of the world. One theoretical version incorporated the environment found within Central Asian States (CAS). The other developed a structure for the COIN player to use Chinese tactics and operations. We developed these to provide a more focused environment for players dependent upon their current and future operations. Additionally, we believe that other variants of the game can be produced that focus on other regions across the globe, so long as a detailed study of that environment is created then applied to the game mechanics within *Rebels and States*.

II. FOUNDATIONS

Our main purpose for this wargame is to create an educational enhancement tool for entry-level SOF operators, with a secondary audience of SOF support personnel, to gain an understanding of these concepts, better preparing them to execute within the operational force. *Rebels and States* is designed to teach the doctrinal and theoretical aspects of COIN and insurgency in line with the primary subjects taught at the SFQC. As a baseline, we developed the game to incorporate UW, COIN, and U.S. Army operational terms and graphics, ensuring that *Rebels and States* stayed in line with what is being instructed at the SFQC. Once these were identified, we utilized a Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP) matrix to analyze the two doctrines and six theorists. In doing so, we discovered five critical common subjects that were developed as part as the baseline game as well. This chapter intends to define the UW and COIN fundamentals incorporated into the game, identify operational terms and graphics that are also found within gameplay, and highlight the additional five subjects we designed into the game that resulted in our baseline or simplest version of *Rebels and States*.

A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The purpose of this wargame is to provide the audience with an educational experience that reinforces basic doctrinal understandings of insurgencies, resistance, UW, and COIN. As displayed in Figure 1, Chapter I, these mission sets find themselves on opposing side of the irregular warfare (IR) spectrum, resulting in a logical choice for the foundational focus of this wargame.

1. Unconventional Warfare Overview

UW is defined as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied

area.”¹⁵ This option can be conducted within the realm of major, high intensity conflict, such as World War II, or during smaller, limited wars, such as in the initial invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Regardless of the scope of the conflict, UW is conducted by small SOF teams who specialize in conducting operations in a denied area with limited resources. Once selected as the option moving forward, SOF teams turn their attention to the organization, training, and employment of resistance forces and insurgencies to achieve the strategic objective of weakening, if not dismantling, a foreign government or power.

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has established that USASOC is the lead component for UW.¹⁶ In turn, USASOC has established that UW is the “core task and organizing principle for Army SF.”¹⁷ It is here that USSF finds its foundational purpose as UW serves as the overarching, driving mission set, while all other skills sets are complimentary. The continuous study of UW is critical to the success of USSF soldiers, but a basic understanding must be established. Once the foundational and doctrinal understanding of UW is achieved, then its application to the present and future environments can be ever more effective.

2. Components of a Resistance or Insurgency

A resistance or insurgency has three components: guerrillas, auxiliary, and underground.¹⁸ Each component plays a critical role to the overall effort of overthrowing an occupying government or power, and the actions of each must be synchronized to support the other. USSF must take time to understand and advise these components and avoid strictly focusing on combat operations. Given that this is the basic infrastructure of an insurgency, these three components became the baseline pieces for *Rebels and States*.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, JP3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), GL-12, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf.

¹⁶ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 4.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations*, FM 3-18 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 3–4, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_c/pdf/web/fm3_18.pdf.

¹⁸ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 7–8.

(1) Guerrillas or Guerrilla Force

The guerrilla force is a “group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.”¹⁹ It is the military arm of the resistance or insurgency, charged with conducting kinetic operations against their enemy. It also serves as the most overt component the organization. They are motivated by the ideals and endstate of the organization at large, and are not considered mercenaries or illegal gangs, both of which are motivated by profiting from a conflict.²⁰ Generally, they are the last component of a resistance or insurgency that initiates its activities.

(2) Auxiliary

The auxiliary is a “portion of the population that provides active clandestine support to the guerrilla force or the underground.”²¹ It serves as the support functions necessary to maintain the resistance or insurgency. Many of its members are normal citizens who serve part-time as the support network, but are not overt in their sympathies, providing critical functions such as logistics, labor, and intelligence.²² Through its ability to hide in plain sight, the auxiliary can overtly operate, allowing the guerrillas to stay hidden until necessary and the underground to remain covert.

(3) Underground

The underground is a “cellular organization within the resistance that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the control of local security force.”²³ It responsible for “subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and other compartmentalized activities.”²⁴ Ultimately, it directs many of the

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, GL-7.

²⁰ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 8.

²¹ USASOC, 7.

²² Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations*, 3–6.

²³ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 7.

²⁴ Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations*, 3–6.

actions of the resistance or insurgency, and much of the overall leadership falls within the underground. Although the underground and auxiliary are two separate entities, many of the members of the underground serve as leadership or directors of the functions of the auxiliary.

B. COUNTERINSURGENCY

COIN is “a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”²⁵ This is not a military-only approach. A coordinated effort between the military and civil agencies and organizations is required to successfully conduct COIN. The U.S. can find itself conducting COIN in one of two ways: intervening on the behalf of another government, such as during the Salvadorian Civil War, or after major combat operations as the U.S.-backed established government faces an insurgency, such as in Iraq.²⁶ Regardless, a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) effort is critical to success.

Above all other things, COIN represents the struggle between the established government or power and a resistance or insurgency over the legitimacy of being a ruling power. This legitimacy is ultimately determined by the population. COIN efforts must combine security, information, and stability operations while seeking to determine and satisfy the grievances of a disgruntled portion of a population. Such grievances can include the imbalance of political, economic, or social power, as well as ideological, religious, and social differences. Normally, a combination of these grievances creates a disgruntled population, one that a resistance or insurgency looks to use and exploit to pursue their own goals. This wide variety of potential issues displays the importance of a combined military and civil approach to have successful COIN operations. Without the expertise of the military to find, fix, and finish the insurgency, civilian organizations risk the population’s and their own security. Furthermore, militaries inherently have strong logistical and support infrastructures that can aid civilian efforts. Conversely, without civilian expertise in the establishment of governments, militaries can find themselves failing to consolidate hard earned gains.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, JP 3-24 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), GL-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf.

²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-1.

1. Foundations of COIN

At its core, COIN must be approached proactively and integrate all instruments of national power—Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL)—as well as integrate the full power, authority, and financial resources of various departments and organizations, including those of third-party nations.²⁷ DIMEFIL provides a COIN force with numerous options to address the grievances of a population, as it is normally the struggle over who controls these instruments that provides some sort of power or legitimacy over the population.²⁸ Ultimately, this equates into political power and control of a population, region, or state. An analysis of DIMEFIL provides a framework when analyzing the solution to a resistance or insurgency.

The main goals of COIN are to attack the insurgent, establish control of the population, regain control of insurgent-held areas, and conduct information operations to bolster the counterinsurgent's effort while discrediting the resistance or insurgent.²⁹ All of these actions are in an effort to regain the confidence of the population as the legitimate governing power in an area. While the physical terrain of this battlespace can be well-defined, it takes a far more concerted effort to measure gains within the human terrain, where more efforts must be focused.

The struggle between the resistance or insurgent and the counterinsurgent may lead to a destabilization of the border area, resulting in the intervention of third-party nations. Just as the case is with UW, outside support and aid is key to successful COIN. We identified this as a critical aspect of COIN and incorporated the importance of external actors through the border countries on the game board.

A Line of Effort is “a line that links multiple tasks and mission using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus toward establishing operational and strategic

²⁷ Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24.2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2009), 3–1, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24x2.pdf.

²⁸ SGM(R) Joe Wilkerson, “Ends, Ways, and Means of Irregular Warfare” (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, April 26, 2020), <https://us-lti.bbcollab.com/collab/ui/session/playback>.

²⁹ Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 3–1–3–2.

conditions”.³⁰ LOEs serve as a series of overarching themes, or sub-goals, to reach an endstate. The doctrinal LOEs for COIN are: 1) establish civil security, 2) support to host nation security forces, 3) support to governance, 4) restore essential services, 5) support to economic and infrastructure development, and 6) conduct information engagement.³¹ Each LOE addresses a portion of the population that is pro-resistance, pro-government, or neutral to increase the overall support and legitimacy of the government. These LOEs aided us in identifying the pieces for the COIN player. Just as the UW player had three different types of pieces (guerrillas, auxiliary, underground), the COIN player had three pieces as well: security forces, essential services, and local government. The roles of these pieces are defined in Chapters III and IV.

2. Direct Counterinsurgency

Within U.S. Army doctrine, there are two predominant methods in countering resistances or insurgencies: indirectly and directly. Indirect methods “seek to support existing governments, security forces, and groups through increasing capacity to counter an insurgency and enabling existing activities” and is employed when resources are constrained and issues do not significantly impacts the interests of the US.³² Direct methods are the most resource intensive and are required to support the COIN effort.³³ They follow a “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework” designed to have a continued hands on and emphatic approach.³⁴ This framework aims to determine where best to apply resources, remove resistances or insurgencies from the area, maintain the security in the area, rebuild the security, infrastructure, and governance apparatuses, then hand all responsibilities back to the host nation. Other direct methods can be targeting threat infrastructure, or possibly the component of a resistance or insurgency, and conducting strike operations in resistance or insurgent held

³⁰ Department of the Army, 3–7.

³¹ Department of the Army, 3–8.

³² Department of the Army, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 10–11, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24.pdf.

³³ Department of the Army, 9–1.

³⁴ Department of the Army, 9–1.

locations.³⁵ Regardless of the option, direct approaches take far more time, effort, and resources to achieve its goals. We only incorporated direct COIN methods into the game because of its straightforward methodology and simplicity when translating into the rules; indirect COIN methods include larger plans and operations that fall outside the scope of the game.

C. ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The modern-day operating environment is ever changing and complex. Rarely are any two scenarios exactly the same, forcing SOF operators, leaders, and their staffs to have the ability to think dynamically and anticipate many different potential outcomes, as opposed to a linear thought process that expects situations to play out as it has in the past. This creates a very difficult scenario to create in live training, much less in digital or analog wargames. Yet, the ability to create numerous, ever changing scenarios without resulting in overwhelmingly complicated details and constraints results in a valuable training aid. Furthermore, providing this scenario will serve as an effective means to allow players to test and assess their own thought processes, their comprehension of strategies and theories, and their understanding and comprehension of an opponent and an environment without ever replicating the same scenario.

Given this, we sought to create an environment where a player would have to conduct terrain analysis and consider human factors. Terrain analysis is the “collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of the natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined with other relevant features, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations.”³⁶ Human factors are “the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions.”³⁷ This drove us to analyze how to create a game board that captured different types of terrain, populations, and human and societal dynamics that could change each iteration and would force the players

³⁵ Department of the Army, 9–12–9–14.

³⁶ Department of the Army, *Operational Terms*, FM 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 1–104, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19780_FM%201-02x1%20-%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

³⁷ Department of the Army, 1–51.

to analyze their environment before selecting a strategy. Consequently, we created three aspects of a physical environment and five aspects for human and societal environments for *Rebels and States*.

The three physical environment aspects that we incorporated are terrain, borders, and population. Terrain incorporates an understanding of how different types of terrain have effects on a military operation. To reinforce the influence of outside or international actors within a conflict, borders were created. We focused on borders of external countries that were either COIN friendly, insurgent friendly, or neutral. Finally, we considered population as the number of citizens found within an area that provide recruits to either side. Furthermore, given the population decides the legitimacy of each side, we implemented this aspect as well. Chapter III provides a further explanation of how these are incorporated into the game.

To capture the human and societal factors, we looked at different operational variables, which are a “comprehensive set of informational categories used to describe an operational environment.”³⁸ Normally, these are categorized as the following: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT).³⁹ While comprehensive in their categories, we determined that incorporating each operational variable into *Rebels and States* would result in overly complicated functions. To prevent this, we combined these variables into the following: Social (social), Economy (economic and infrastructure), Politics (political), Media (information), and Military (military). The physical environment is captured by other game mechanisms, described in Chapter III. We then determined to give each of our variables, which we named environment cards, three different effects: one that assists the counterinsurgent, one that assists the insurgent, and one that applies no advantage.

D. DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT PLAN (DCMP)

Knowing that we wanted to introduce the two doctrines and six theorists taught in the SFQC, we found it critical to go beyond incorporating only doctrinal aspects into the baseline

³⁸ Department of the Army, 1–77.

³⁹ Department of the Army, 2–17.

version of the game. Therefore, we conducted an analysis into the commonalities across all eight strategies. For this analysis we utilized a DCMP matrix. The DCMP “is fundamental to analytical wargames...it will dictate aspects of the scenario and the activities to be wargamed.”⁴⁰ This matrix serves as a means to identify key issues that the game is designed to answer, break them down into sub-issues, translates the issues into questions that game design and functions and scenario injects can answer, then record player decisions and results. During the development of an analytical wargame, the DCMP not only reinforces critical facets but also serves to collect information on player performance and decisions. But, given that *Rebels and States* serves as an educational tool, we used the DCMP to highlight points that must be reinforced across all doctrine and theorists which we then translated into basic functions of gameplay. By using the DCMP to highlight then breakdown issues within each strategy, we found common themes and trends that were translated into scenario and game mechanics.

Across the chosen doctrine and theorists, the most common subjects we identified were information and media, control of the population, recruitment, effectiveness of government, and intelligence. Information and media focused on how an internal or external population see the struggle or conflict, ultimately effecting the legitimacy of the insurgency or counterinsurgency. Control of the population is centered on the ability for either side to gain support of the population. Recruitment is purely one side or the other’s ability to have the population join their cause or ranks. Effectiveness of government is the basis of many insurgent/counterinsurgent struggles and is centered on the ability of the government to meet the needs and address the grievances of the population. Finally, intelligence is key because of its wide range of abilities to discover and enemy’s intentions, conduct operations to deceive the enemy, and prevent enemy intelligence activities. Once identified, we applied these common aspects through different game functions.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Ministry of Defence Wargaming Handbook*, 28.

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III. *REBELS AND STATES* DESIGN

Rebels and States is designed to be played within 30 minutes to an hour. This ensures that players remain engaged in the game without it affecting other aspects of their daily lives and prevents other distractions from taking away from the educational experience. Our design and development methodology began with applying our previous wargame development experience and analyzing other games to design a game board that would replicate a complex operating environment. The result of this process is a two player, or two-sided, wargame that pits the insurgent versus the counterinsurgent. *Rebels and States* requires the players to constantly analyze the environment in which they are playing, determine the strengths and weaknesses in their own and their opponent's strategies, and attempt to meet the winning conditions. The alternating turns during game play allows for players to anticipate and react to their opponent. Ultimately, the game ends once a player gains the required amount of legitimacy points. The remainder of this chapter describes the initial design, playtesting process, and final design of *Rebels and States*.

A. ANALYSIS

While conducting analysis of other wargames and board games, we relied heavily on our own past experience. We previously, played, analyzed, and produced sponsored analytical wargames, all of which focused on gaining influence within different regions of the world. We also played and critiqued other board games for functionality, mechanics, and design. This analysis aided us in developing the initial rule set, board design, and game pieces, and mechanics.

Mainly, we had two focuses when analyzing other board games: create a game board that could change each time the game is played; and allow players to directly and indirectly interact with one another. The analysis of *Settlers of Catan* provided a basis for game board design. This game uses hexagonal game spaces with specific types of resources that are changed from game to game.⁴¹ Our analysis determined that hexagons allow for pieces to fit

⁴¹ "Board Games | Catan.Com," *Settlers of Catan*, 2020, <https://www.catan.com/board-games>.

together and provide movement to each side, without confusion for movement across the apexes (diagonals for square pieces). Furthermore, the different resources on the hexes could be replaced by different types of terrain. This analysis provided us with solutions to our goal of a constantly changing game board and the use of terrain.

We borrowed from *Risk* and its simple engagement method. Engagements in *Risk* follows a simple dice roll methodology where an attacker roles dice against a defender, the highest dice from each side are matched against the other side, adjudication is made, and ties go to the defender.⁴² This function provided us a simple means to adjudicate engagements, providing us a solution to quick gameplay and staying within the desired time limits.

B. INITIAL DESIGN

Keeping in mind the learning objectives that we established, the initial design for *Rebels and States* had four distinct and critical parts: game board, game pieces, definitions, and rules. Game design went through three phases; these phases coincided with a series of playtests. Overall, we aimed to keep the players engaged throughout the game so that they could play as the different strategists while reinforcing other lessons such as terrain analysis and understanding human factors. We also wanted to reinforce certain U.S. military doctrinal terms and definitions, which were incorporated in either the name and function of game pieces or in our definitions. Finally, game rules were critical. Initially, our focus was to merely facilitate a functioning game. But as the process progressed, we modified rules and turned our efforts to ensure the bonuses applied to the strategies coincided with their creators' purpose, within the context of the game.

The initial game board attempted to capture all aspects we identified during the analysis. The purpose was to secure enough spaces to gain legitimacy points, which would end the game. The gameboard went through several iterations but never lost our original intent of incorporating terrain and human factors. For some playtests, we used a printed game board that had fixed hexes while other times we re-purposed the hexes from *Settlers of Catan* to rearrange

⁴² "Risk: The World Conquest Game," Parker Brothers, 1993, <https://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/risk.pdf>.

the game board. We also had a number of population markers that would be distributed across the board in different hexes.

In the initial version of the board, the colors were associated with a certain type of terrain, as displayed in Figure 2. Unrestricted terrain is terrain that does not hinder any movement, which is represented by the tan desert and light green plains.⁴³ Restricted terrain slightly affects movement, which is represented by the dark green forests.⁴⁴ Severely restricted terrain significantly affects the movement of forces, which is represented by the gray mountains.⁴⁵ We also included water, displayed in blue, which was impassible. The initial board had four types of borders: Insurgent Friendly, Neutral, Counterinsurgent Friendly, and International Waters. Each of these were associated with certain strategies. We placed markers ranging from 1–6, to represent the population in each space. Figure 3 is an example of how we incorporated human factors to the start of each game. We used the five factors we identified during analysis (Social, Economy, Politics, Media, and Military) and applied certain bonuses.




Figure 2. Original Game Board Design

⁴³ Department of the Army, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, ATP 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 4–13, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20395_ATP%202-01x3%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, 4–13.

⁴⁵ Department of the Army, 4–13.




Figure 3. Examples of Environment Cards

Once this was established, the players selected either the insurgent or COIN strategy, gathered an initial set of forces, then distributed them throughout the game board. The forces were broken into four distinct categories: fighters, support, intelligence, and HQs. Again, we wanted to reinforce certain doctrine with these forces. For the insurgent player, the fighters became guerrillas, the support became auxiliary, and the HQs became the underground.⁴⁶ For the counterinsurgent player, the fighters were security forces, the support was essential services, and the HQs was local government.⁴⁷ Intelligence stayed the same on both sides. Simply put, fighters conducted engagements and secured hexes, support provided the ability to recruit, intelligence destroyed enemy support and HQs, and HQs provided legitimacy points. Figure 4 displays each player's process during gameplay. The players alternated turns between the five phases until one met the requirement amount of legitimacy points.

⁴⁶ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 7–8.

⁴⁷ Department of the Army, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 10–13, 11–1.




Figure 4. Initial Game Process

Upon completion of the game design, we produced rules and definitions that facilitated the functions of game play. This included the rules and bonuses applied to the strategies and the respective aspects that we identified during analysis. Once our initial design was complete, we began a series of playtests to adjust and improve *Rebels and States*.

C. PLAYTESTING AND FINAL DESIGN

The playtests provided extremely valuable feedback that enabled us to develop a functioning wargame that meets our objectives. Throughout the process, two complete revisions of the game occurred before we developed our final version. The following sections describe the final version of *Rebels and States* and our process of developing the game board and pieces. Chapter IV will describe how to play the game, provide key definitions, and display game functions.

1. Playtesting

Playtests are designed to test all aspects of the wargame, with a concerted focus to essentially break the game, which would in turn allow for modification, improvements, and

enhancements to be made. The playtesting conducted for *Rebels and States* was deliberately conducted in three phases: Phase 1 focused on game mechanics; Phase 2 focused on game improvements; and Phase 3 focused on game strategy. We used a combination of regular playtests, which were conducted by us, and blind playtests, which were conducted by volunteers who had not played the game. During the blind playtests, we utilized mid-career SOF officers with experience in the subject matter or in the production of wargames. Ideally, these individuals had experience in both. We applied the major subjects recommended by Peter Perla to develop our post-play questionnaire to receive feedback. These subjects are: Preparation, Structure and Style, Play, and Attitudes.⁴⁸ Appendix C provides the questionnaire we utilized post-playtesting.

The first phase of playtesting focused on game mechanics, functions, and playability. A total of four playtests, three of which were blind, were conducted. Primarily the results of these playtests were adjustments to the rules and game board. The majority of feedback discussed the different uses of the fighters, supports, and HQ elements of the game. Figure 5 displays the first playtest conducted.



Figure 5. Blind Playtest #1

⁴⁸ Perla and Curry, *Peter Perla's the Art of Wargaming*, 307.

The second phase of playtesting focused less on game mechanics and more on the bonuses associated with each doctrine or theorist. A total of seven playtests, three of which were blind, were conducted in this phase. These playtests focused on initial impressions and complexities of the game and adjusting confusing or erroneous verbiage within the rule set. One blind playtest was conducted with two players from the first phase of playtesting. These players provided feedback on game adjustments and the effectiveness of bonuses associated with doctrine and theorists. The other four non-blind playtests were conducted by us to ensure the game continued to meet the original objectives, clarify rules, and adjust bonuses as required. Figure 6 displays a playtest in the second phase.



Figure 6. Blind Playtest #4

The third phase of playtesting focused on game play and the ability to meet the objectives of the developers. A total of four playtests, two of which were blind, were conducted in this phase. Two playtests involved players who had played during previous versions. The results of this series were small refinements within the strategies themselves, such as the implementation of additional winning conditions.

2. Final Design

The *Rebels and States* game board is actually a series of hexes and border pieces that are combined and changed between iterations to make one, larger hexagon. It has three different parts: terrain hexes, border pieces, and population markers. The combination of these three parts, plus the use of the environment cards, results in nearly 100,000 different starting conditions for the game, meeting our intent of have a game that constantly changes its environment. Figure 7 displays the final version of the game board.




Figure 7. Graphical Representation of *Rebels and States* Game Board

After multiple playtests we determined to maintain the doctrinal terms for terrain. The only modification we made was to add graphics that reinforced doctrine. This means that unrestricted terrain has no graphics, restricted terrain has diagonal lines, and severely restricted terrain has crossed lines, the same graphics that are used when producing a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) during the military planning process.⁴⁹ Plains and desert are unrestricted and represented in green and tan respectively, forest is restricted and represented in dark green, mountains are severely restricted and represented in gray, and water remained impassible and represented in light blue. These hexes are represented in Figure 8.

⁴⁹ Department of the Army, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, 4–14.



Figure 8. Terrain Hexes

There are still four different types of borders, but we adjusted them to be interchangeable around the six different sides of the hexagon made by the smaller hexes. The three types of borders are international waters, insurgent friendly country, counterinsurgent friendly country, and neutral country. The borders still only provide bonuses to certain strategies. Figure 9 displays these different types of borders.




Figure 9. Border Pieces

The population markers largely remained the same from the initial design, with the exception that we added populations of zero to the board. These were added once the number of hexes was increased from 30 to 37. The populations are broken down into three types: Urban (5-6), Suburban (3-4), and Rural (1-2). Population is marked by small, circular cutouts with a number on the top.

3. Cards

The environment cards remained for the final version of *Rebels and States*. The only modification was to add the bonuses that either side received at the beginning of the game. Figure 10 displays the final version of the cards.



Figure 10. Example Environment Cards

One significant subject of feedback was the complicated nature of using intelligence. Therefore, we redesigned the game and produced DIMEFIL cards, as displayed in Figure 11, that serve multiple roles. They are predominantly used to destroy enemy support and HQ functions but can also move forces around the battlefield and attack fighters.




Figure 11. Example DIMEFIL Cards

Based on the feedback from playtesting, we developed a smartcard which provided quick reference of key terms, definitions, and functions. Figure 12 displays the smartcard.

TURN SEQUENCE					
1. SELECT STRATEGY	2. RECRUIT	3. DEPLOY	4. MOVE	5. ENGAGE	6. CONSOLIDATE
<u>FORCES - RECRUITMENT PTS</u>		<u>HOW TO RECRUIT / ACHIEVE LEGITIMACY</u>			
UNDERGROUND	4 PTS	<u>SUPPORTED</u> – AT LEAST ONE AUXILIARY WITH GUERRILLA FIGHTERS EQUAL TO POPULATION IN ONE SPACE			
INTELLIGENCE	3 PTS	<u>FULLY SUPPORTED</u> – THREE AUXILIARY OR MORE IN A SPACE. MUST HAVE AT LEAST THREE MORE AUXILIARY THAN ESSENTIAL SERVICES IF ESSENTIAL SERVICES ARE PRESENT IN A SPACE.			
AUXILIARY	2 PTS	<u>CONTROLLED</u> - UNDERGROUND ESTABLISHED IN A SPACE. AMOUNT OF LEGITIMACY POINTS IS EQUAL TO THE POPULATION IN THAT SPACE			
GUERRILLA FIGHTERS	1 PT				
 WATER: IMPASSABLE: NO FORCES OCCUPY OR MOVE THROUGH  DESERT: UNRESTRICTED: NO EFFECT  PLAINS: UNRESTRICTED: NO EFFECT  FOREST: RESTRICTED: 1 MOVEMENT POINTS  MOUNTAINS: SEVERELY RESTRICTED: 2 MOVEMENT POINTS		<u>SPACE</u> <u>POPULATION</u> URBAN 5 - 6 SUBURBAN 3 - 4 RURAL 1 - 2			

Figure 12. *Rebels and States Smart Card*

4. Pieces

We simplified the game pieces for each side by creating color variations of the same design for fighters, support, and HQs. The insurgent would have red and the counterinsurgent blue. Due to some game mechanics, the support pieces had to be stackable, to show the aggregation of support, and reversible, to show if they were active or inactive. Furthermore, to prevent an overwhelming number of pieces on the board, we designed a piece that represented five fighters. The improved pieces are displayed in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Game Pieces: HQs, Active Support, Inactive Support, One Fighter, and Five Fighters

D. CONCLUSION

The iterative design and development process resulted in a simpler and more streamlined version of *Rebels and States* rooted in doctrine and complex enough to force analysis of actions. The process involved numerous adjustments to the basic version, which omits the use of strategies, and the advanced version, which is when the strategies from the SFQC are introduced. The following chapter provides instruction on how to play the basic version of the game. Once this is understood and conceptualized, strategies can be introduced. Chapter V describes the different strategies and how they modify the game rules.

IV. OVERVIEW AND WALKTHROUGH

This chapter serves as an explanation the basic version of the game and is structured to describe the game board, how to play, game definitions, and general game rules. The information provided in this chapter also serves as the basis for the rules packet that is provided to players.

A. SETUP AND PLAY

The following sections describes how to establish the game board, general flow of the game, and how to win.

1. How to Set Up *Rebels and States*

The game board is designed to have 37 hexagonal pieces that fit together, making a larger hexagon. To create the board, the players place a random hexagonal piece in the center of a table, then place additional spaces in an outward clockwise spiral. The population markers numbered 1 through 6 are randomly placed each hex to indicate the density of population where 6 is the highest population density and 1 is the lowest population density. There are seven different population markers, ranging from 0. The total number of population markers are as follows: one 6, two 5s, three 4s, four 3s, six 2s, eight 1s, and six 0s. To apply the population markers, players start at the center terrain space and place the markers in an outward counter-clockwise manner, ensuring that every space, except water, has a population.

Then, the different border pieces are randomly applied. There are a total of six border pieces, representing insurgent and counterinsurgent friendly countries, neutral countries, and international water. To apply the borders, players will place the border pieces with the side indicating the type of terrain face down around the border aligning with the apexes of the game board. Once all are in place, the players will flip them over to reveal the types and locations of the borders.

Finally, the environment cards are selected. The players will separate the cards into their respective stacks, then randomly choose once from each. The cards have bonuses that

apply to the beginning of the game during the initial array of forces, except for the Security Forces cards, which only apply to the first three engagements. Once the cards' bonuses have been applied, they can be removed from the game board.

2. How to Play *Rebels and States*

Once the board has been established and the environment cards have been chosen, players then analyze the game board. Simultaneously they also consider which strategy best fits the environment they see on the board. Questions that the players should be trying to answer during their analysis are:

- What is the state of the physical and human environment based on the way the terrain, population, and borders are distributed?
- What is critical to the environment?
- What is going to give me an advantage?
- What is going to give my opponent an advantage?
- What are my disadvantages?
- How can a strategy provide me immediate and long-term advantages?

After analyzing the game board, the players can select a strategy. Once players select their strategy, they collect and convert their initial recruitment points plus any additional bonuses from the environment cards. The counterinsurgent followed by the insurgent then initially array their forces. Following the initial array of forces, *Rebels and States* follows six different phases during game play. The first turn is initiated by the insurgent. A player will go through all five phases before their turn is complete. Figure 14 displays the phases, major actions, and considerations of each phase.




Figure 14. *Rebels and States* Gameplay Flowchart

3. How to Win *Rebels and States*

Players can win *Rebels and States* in one direct and two indirect ways. Ultimately, *Rebels and States* is a struggle over legitimacy within the fictional environment. Players

are attempting to win directly by attaining 15 legitimacy points which is indicated in the legitimacy slider. Additionally, players have additional winning conditions they must meet to win the game, which will be described in Chapter V. Both the number of legitimacy points and the winning conditions can be adjusted at the beginning of the game to meet the intent of the organization that is playing the wargame. Organizations might wish to increase the required legitimacy points and win conditions to allow the game to replicate a protracted conflict where additional requirements for victory are necessary to pacify a specific region. In contrast, they can reduce the necessary legitimacy points in order to simulate a restrictive timeline that is often placed on operations by policy makers.

The indirect ways to win the game involve preventing the other player from gaining recruitment points. The first way is to eliminate all opponent fighters from the board, therefore preventing their ability to secure any location. The second way is to eliminate all support and HQ pieces, preventing their ability to generate recruitment points. These indirect ways may not immediately provide victory, but the attrition of forces and inability for the opposing player to gain recruitment points eventually will lead to the end of the game. Furthermore, the opposing player's strategy must not allow them to generate any additional recruitment points or forces during their turn. The indirect ways of winning are rare and difficult to achieve.

B. DEFINITIONS

Throughout development and playtesting, definitions did not change significantly. While some terms were given additional information, the majority of modifications were made for clarification. The following section describes the key terms that are crucial to the wargame.

1. Generic Definitions

Defining fundamental terms is a critical initial step to understanding the wargame as it ensures that players have a common understanding of how the game functions.

Attack: When at least one Guerrilla Fighter or Security Force engages a hostile force by rolling attack dice

Control: Established when an Underground/Local Government is established within a space.

DIMEFIL: Instruments of National Power; Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement.

Dormant: When an Auxiliary/Essential Service or Underground/Local Government remains in a space that is occupied by opposing Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces that are equal to or greater than the population in that space. Dormant forces do not allow you to gain recruitment points but do not lose legitimacy points.

Engagement: Sum of all attacks conducted by Guerrilla Fighters or Security Forces from any one space. An engagement can consist of any number of attacks as long as the attacking force has the necessary forces

Established: When an Underground/Local Government/Essential Service is placed inside a space and can no longer move. An Auxiliary is established when it is activated in the consolidation phase in order to receive recruitment points in subsequent turns.

Forces: Consist of any of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent pieces including Underground, Intelligence, Auxiliary, Guerrilla Fighters, Local Government, Essential Services, Security Forces.

Friendly Space: Any space containing friendly forces.

Fully Supported Space: Any friendly space that has three Auxiliary/Essential Services more than any hostile Auxiliary/Essential Services.

Hostile Space: Any space that contains forces of the opposing player.

Legitimacy Points: Points generated when an Underground/Local Government are established in a space. Once an Underground/Local Government control a space, they receive legitimacy points equivalent to the population in that space. The only way to lose legitimacy points is when those forces are destroyed.

Neutral Space: Any space on the board that is not occupied by forces from either the Insurgent or Counterinsurgent.

Occupy: When any Insurgent or Counterinsurgent forces are present in any one space.

Population: The single number (1 through 6) present in each space denotes the amount of people in any given location. 1 represents the lowest population and 6 represents the highest population.

Recruitment Points: Points acquired during the deployment phase that allow either player to acquire additional forces and are generated by totaling the number of population spaces that are supported, fully supported, or controlled by either Auxiliary/Essential Services.

Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay one movement point in the movement phase to move through this space.

Rural Space: Any space with a population of one or two.

Severely Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay two movement points in the movement phase to move through this space.

Suburban Space: Any space with a population of three or four.

Support: Achieved when either player has at least one Auxiliary/Essential Services in any single space while accompanied by Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces equal to the population in that space or an Underground/Local Government present in the space. If opposing Auxiliary/Essential Services are present, the player with most Auxiliary/Essential Services in that space has achieved support for that space.

Unrestricted Terrain: Forces pay no movement point in the movement phase to move through this space.

Urban Terrain: Any space with a population of five or six.

2. Insurgent-Specific Definitions

Auxiliary: Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Must be present in a space for one full turn before the player can generate additional recruitment points. Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that have Auxiliary present. Auxiliary can move into spaces with hostile forces. Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position containing Auxiliary in the consolidation phase. Cost—2 recruitment points.

DIMEFIL Card: Allows a player to remove opposing Forces or maneuver forces for a dynamic strike. Player may recruit only one DIMEFIL card per turn. Player may use one DIMEFIL Card per turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL Cards per turn. Cost—3 recruitment points.

Guerrilla Fighters: Allows a player to engage opposing Security Forces in order to secure a neutral or enemy space. Spaces are secure when the number of Guerrilla Fighters equals the population size the space which they occupy. Cost—1 recruitment point.

Underground: Allows the player to control space, generates legitimacy points, and generate recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Underground can only be established in spaces that are fully supported. Underground cannot move once established. Cost—4 recruitment points

3. Counterinsurgent-Specific Definitions

DIMEFIL Card: Allows a player to remove opposing Forces. Player may recruit only one intelligence card per turn. Player may use one DIMEFIL Card per turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 DIMEFIL Cards per turn. Cost—3 recruitment points.

Essential Services: Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that hold Essential Services. Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position containing Essential Services in the consolidation phase. Essential Services cannot move once established. Essential Services can only be established in a space that has been secured by Security Forces for one previous turn. Cost—2 recruitment points.

Local Government: Control space and generates legitimacy and recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Local Government can only be established in spaces that are fully supported. Local Government cannot move once established. Cost—4 recruitment points.

Security Forces: Allows a player to engage opposing Guerrilla forces in order to secure a neutral or enemy space. Must occupy a space for one full turn with Security Forces equal to the population in order establish Essential Services. Cost—1 recruitment point.

C. ARRAY FORCES

Before the first turn can begin, the players have to establish their initial positions on the board. The counterinsurgent arrays their forces first. This simulates the fact that the counterinsurgent government often has forces that are established and organized within the country prior to any insurgent campaign. The insurgent can assess where government forces are and then array their forces which gives the inherent initiative to the insurgent, which is often the case in the initial stages of an insurgent campaign.

Both players begin with 10 recruitment points plus any bonuses from the environment cards. Both players select forces from the allotment of recruitment points. The insurgent will place their forces on the board first, followed by the counterinsurgent.

Among the varying population and terrain locations that players can choose from, there are two distinct rules that apply for the first turn:

1. The insurgent cannot occupy any space with a population of 3 or more.
2. The counterinsurgent must secure at least one population space of 5 or 6.

The insurgent was given the restriction of occupying only population spaces of 3 or more to reflect the isolated nature of insurgencies during their initial phases. The counterinsurgent requirement reflects the nature of the government occupying the capital city and major population centers in the country.

D. ORDER OF OPERATIONS

The order of operations for each turn is broken down into six distinct phases that are repeated each turn. The players alternate turns where the insurgent will play all six phases, followed by the counterinsurgent, alternating until one player has achieved 15 legitimacy points and their strategy win conditions. The order of operations is as follows:

1. Determine aspects of strategy for employment this turn
2. Recruitment Phase
3. Deployment Phase
4. Movement Phase
5. Engagement phase
6. Consolidation phase

The insurgent and counterinsurgent have some advantages afforded in the recruitment, deployment, and movement phases to reflect the different tactical and operational capabilities inherent in either side.

1. Determine Aspects for Employment This Turn

During this phase, the players will select one aspect of the strategy that they have chosen. Players will clearly articulate the specific rules of the strategy that they are using for that turn to the other player. This ensures not only that the other player understands what rule that player is using, but it also reinforces in game learning where players discuss

the aspects of the strategy currently in play. The strategy specific rules and aspects are discussed in Chapter V.

2. Recruitment Phase

During the recruitment phase, players generate new forces equal to the number of population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. This phase ensures that there is a direct correlation between population influence and the amount of support either insurgent or counterinsurgent can receive. Players must continually assess how much of the population support they have to prepare for future turns.

3. Deployment Phase

During the Deployment Phase, forces may be placed in locations where support forces are established. Headquarters can only be established in fully supported spaces. Unused recruitment points are lost if not played in this turn. The deployment phase simulates the introduction of newly recruited forces onto the battlefield. Players must deploy forces in areas where they have either infrastructure or networks that are represented by support forces. This simulates the level of resources and effort required to move capabilities in and around the area of operations.

4. Movement Phase

The movement phase allows players to maneuver pieces, such as their fighters or support, through the simulated country while accounting for terrain and opposing forces. Players are restricted in movement by terrain which ultimately effects the distance (number of hexes in this case) that any particular force can travel per turn. Movement is restricted based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has three movement points per player turn. First the player subtracts movements points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 movement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one movement point to move into an adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force is out of movement points. Figure 15 demonstrates the movement rules.




Figure 15. Examples of the Movement Phase

5. Engagement Phase

The engagement phase was designed to reflect direct and indirect attacks that are common in insurgent warfare. The “attack” portion of the rules reflect direct force-on-force fighting between combatants. The “reconnaissance in force” rule (described in subsection b) was created to allow players to engage with the terrain if the opponent is using an avoidance strategy. The “withdrawal” rule (described in subsection c) was created to reflect the elusive nature and freedom of movement on both sides.

During the Engagement Phase players engage from neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to spaces that contain enemy fighters. To engage a neutral space, move at least one fighter piece into the adjacent space. Players can play one and only one DIMEFIL card at any point in the engagement phase.

Engagements by forces are restricted in their attack by the physical terrain they move through. Any force has three engagement points per player turn. First the player subtracts engagement points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting

from (0 engagement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 engagement point for restricted terrain, 2 engagement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one engagement point to attack into an adjacent space and move any forces into that adjacent space if the defenders are eliminated. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) attacking until the force is out of engagement points. Figure 16 displays multiple engagements.




Figure 16. Example of Conducting Multiple Engagements

a. Attack

To engage a hostile space, the player may the roll red attack dice. If the insurgent has three or more fighters, they roll three red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with two fighters, they roll two red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with one fighter, they may only roll one red attack dice. If the defending insurgent player has two or more Fighters in the hex they are defending, they may roll two white defense dice. If the defending insurgent player has only one guerrilla force or security force in the space they are defending, they may only roll one white defense dice. Both players roll their allotted dice: the players will match up to two of their highest dice rolls. For each dice that has a

higher dice roll, remove one Guerrilla/Security Force. The defender wins any ties. Figure 17 displays an example of an attack.

ENGAGEMENT PHASE

- **3. INSURGENT ENGAGE**
 - Insurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain **Guerrilla Forces**. To engage a neutral space move at least one Guerrilla Forces or Auxiliary piece into the adjacent space.
- **4. COUNTER INSURGENT ENGAGE**
 - Counter Insurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain **Security Forces**. To engage a neutral space move at least one Security Force or Auxiliary piece into the adjacent space.

Example 1: Three insurgent **Guerrilla Forces**  engage two counterinsurgent **Security Forces** .

The insurgent rolls three attack dice of 6, 4, and 2. The counterinsurgent rolls two defense dice of 5 and 4. The insurgent destroys one **Security Force** where the 6 beats the 5. The counterinsurgent destroys one Guerrilla Force where the 4 ties the 4, as the defender wins any ties.




Figure 17. Example of an Attack in the Engagement Phase

b. Reconnaissance in Force

A player can choose to use Guerrilla/Security Forces to engage an adjacent hostile space that does not have opposing Guerrilla/Security Forces but contains other hostile forces. The player can move any number of Guerrilla/Security Forces into that space; however, they must keep at least one Guerrilla/Security Forces in the original space from which the engagement was initiated. If the number of Guerrilla/Security Forces equal the population in that space, any hostile forces go dormant. This costs no engagement points and forces conducting this action can conduct no further engagements or actions this phase. This simulates opponent support or infrastructure in an area that has to go dormant because of the lack of security or fighters. As an example, if U.S. forces were to secure an area, driving out Taliban forces from a village, Taliban support networks would remain,

requiring the U.S. to maintain security force in the immediate vicinity to prevent a resurgence of insurgent activity.

c. Withdraw

The defending side can withdraw forces from one space prior to a hostile engagement. The withdrawing force can only move its forces into an adjacent friendly or neutral space. This comes at a cost of 25% of the recruitment points for the next turn. When determining the exact amount of recruitment points lost, conduct the required math then always round down. For example, $19 \text{ recruitment points} \times 0.25 = 4.75$, rounding down equals only 4 recruitment points. Withdrawing ends the attacker's engagement for that space, but they may still conduct a Reconnaissance in Force.

6. Consolidation Phase

The consolidation phase was designed to use operational level assets to adjust their array of forces and prepare for the opposing players turn. During insurgencies, forces are able to reconsolidate after major attacks or prepare for a future threat. The consolidation phase allows players to prepare and anticipate their opponent's future moves.

In this phase, players move Fighters from any one space containing Support to any other single space that also contains a Support in order to reposition those pieces for future attack or defense.

E. INSURGENT SPECIFIC RULES

In *Rebels and States*, the insurgent is given advantages in the game to reflect the secret and hidden nature of an insurgency. The auxiliary force in particular is given special abilities to move into enemy spaces in order to reflect the importance of establishing effective support networks.

1. Recruitment Phase

The insurgent generates new forces equal to the number of population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The insurgent player must activate any auxiliaries in a space before they can recruit. Auxiliaries are activated in the consolidation phase of

the subsequent turn. For example, if an auxiliary move into a space on turn 2, the auxiliary is activated on the consolidation of turn 3, allowing the player to collect recruitment points during the recruitment phase of Phase 4 and every turn thereafter.

2. Movement Phase

Insurgent can move any guerrilla forces or auxiliary through adjacent spaces based on the terrain in each space. Auxiliary may move into spaces that do not have guerrilla fighters.

F. COUNTERINSURGENT SPECIFIC RULES

The counterinsurgent-specific rules are designed to reflect the clear, hold, build methodology that is employed in U.S. COIN doctrine. The player must use security forces to provide security in advance of putting in essential services. Essential services cannot move like the insurgent support function to reflect the notion that government-provided essential services include physical infrastructure.

1. Recruitment Phase

The counterinsurgent player generates new forces equal to the number of population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The counterinsurgent must have Security Forces equal to or greater than the population in a space for one full turn before Essential Services can be established in a space. For example, if three Security Forces are moved into a space on turn 2, the Security Forces must remain in place and must be equal to or greater than population in that space for the entirety of turn 3 and an Essential Service must be established in that space during turn 3 in order to then recruit from that space during turn 4.

2. Movement Phase

The counterinsurgent can move any Security Forces through adjacent spaces based on the terrain in each space, as previously described. The counterinsurgent must place Security Forces equal to the population in a space for at least one turn before Essential

Services or Local Government can be established; doing so is considered having secured the population.

G. CONCLUSION

This chapter has covered the fundamental rules and gameplay for *Rebels and States*. Once players understand the basic rules and mechanics of the game, they incorporate the rules for UW and COIN strategists. First time players will use U.S. UW and COIN doctrine in order to understand the doctrinal methods. Once players understand U.S. doctrine, they can incorporate the other six UW and COIN strategists. The insurgents can also select either Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, or The Cuban Revolution. The counterinsurgent selects either David Galula, Robert Thompson, or OEF-P Basilan model. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages that reflect the way each strategy operates in an insurgent conflict. Each of these strategies and their game modifications will be explained in the following chapter.

V. REBELS AND STATES ADVANCED

Once the basic version of *Rebels and States* was developed, we turned our attention to developing the advanced version. Keeping in line with our learning objectives, we conducted a thorough analysis, scoping, and modification of the fundamental dynamics from the two doctrines and six theories/theorists. We then developed modifiers to simplify these dynamics for gameplay because the details of a successful insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign can become so minute that they would prevent successful gameplay, resulting in a failed attempt for the players to understand concepts, or as the colloquial saying goes “miss the forest for the trees.” To prevent this, the major concepts and learning objectives for each strategy were extracted, then given a perceived advantage, or bonus, but still leaving room for vulnerabilities that players may not notice before execution. In this way, the interaction between the players would bring forward three major learning points: How the strategies work independently, how they work when executed against an opposing strategy, and how phasing and timing of the strategies impacts outcomes. This chapter is intended to identify and define the key aspects of each strategy, then describe the modifiers and bonuses that change gameplay. These advanced modifications are what change the dynamics of the basic version of *Rebels and States* that introduce the player to the different strategies.

In addition to applying bonuses or modifiers to the different strategies, we also applied additional winning conditions that coincide with either the doctrine or strategy. Furthermore, we created qualifiers, constraints, or limitations to the amount of times that a phase, tenet, aspect, etc., could be played. We acknowledge that this is not realistic but was necessary in order to make the game playable. These were created to force players to play all aspects and further the learning experience. All strategies can be found in Appendix B.

A. INSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

An introduction to different insurgency and UW strategies is the diving factor for our development of *Rebels and States*. Given this purpose and our intended audience, the primary strategies taught in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) the additional sources

are: Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, and the Cuban Revolution. These four sources serve as the primary subjects reinforced through gameplay.

1. U.S. UW Doctrine

The doctrine utilized by USSF for UW describes a seven-phase strategy that is generally followed in a sequential manner. These phases are: Preparation, Initial Contact, Infiltration, Organization, Buildup, Employment, and Transition.⁵⁰ Although these are followed in a sequential manner, the transition between phases can actually move backwards if required, and can even skip phases when moving forwards. In *Rebels and States*, the player that chooses this strategy starts in Phase 1: preparation and decides to move forward as much as they deem necessary in subsequent turns, but can only ever move backwards in phases one at a time. Given that UW doctrine is a broad approach, we focused the additional winning condition on controlling the majority of the population; the player who uses this strategy must control six of the 10 urban and suburban spaces.

The remainder of this section lists the phases of UW, provides a short description, and states the bonus it achieves within the game.

a. Phase 1: Preparation

Preparation includes activities USSF personnel would take when anticipating and putting together plans, personnel, and equipment to conduct UW operations. These would include, but are not limited to, intelligence gathering, synthetization, and planning.⁵¹ During this phase the player gets an additional DIMEFIL card and can only be used during the first two turns.

b. Phase 2: Initial Contact

Initial contact is when U.S. government personnel, which can include U.S. military or interagency personnel, and potentially members of other nations, conduct an assessment to determine the viability of a UW campaign, making contact with various resistances or

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations*, 3–5–3–7.

⁵¹ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 11.

insurgencies.⁵² During this phase the player can establish one additional guerrilla fighter and one additional auxiliary. Once four player spaces are supported or fully supported, the player must move to a different phase.

c. Phase 3: Infiltration

Infiltration occurs when USSF teams are deployed to an area, normally through low visibility means. It is critical that USSF teams are not compromised during this phase or the entire operation can result in failure.⁵³ During this phase, the player can infiltrate two guerrilla fighters or one auxiliary in to any unoccupied or friendly rural spaces that border the insurgent friendly or neutral country, or international waters. The player must change phases once they obtain two supported spaces.

d. Phase 4: Organization

Organization is when USSF teams determine the structure of the components within the resistance or insurgency and re-arrange to maximize effectiveness as required. It is literally the organization of the resistance or insurgency to take advantage of the environment.⁵⁴ During this phase, the player can relocate either two guerrilla fighters or auxiliary to any friendly occupied space. Once the player gains three or more supported spaces, they must change phases.

e. Phase 5: Build Up

Build up is growing the resistance or insurgency to meet their means and establishing the conditions to achieve their endstate.⁵⁵ During this phase the player generates one additional recruitment point for every two occupied spaces. If the player has occupied an odd number of spaces they must round down. Once the player generates 20 or more recruitment points, they must change phases.

⁵² USASOC, 12.

⁵³ USASOC, 13.

⁵⁴ USASOC, 13.

⁵⁵ USASOC, 14.

f. Phase 6: Employment

Employment is when the resistance or insurgency begins to overtly operate, conducting combat operations against the occupying government or power.⁵⁶ During this phase the player may re-roll one dice per engagement with security forces. Once the player gains control of one urban space they must change phases.

g. Phase 7: Transition

Transition is when the resistance or insurgency becomes the established government. This phase is normally the most difficult to achieve, and has been proven incredibly complex in all facets of military operations.⁵⁷ During this phase the player receives one additional legitimacy point for every three controlled spaces.

2. Mao Tse Tung

Mao Tse Tung designed and led the communist revolt in China resulting in the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. What made Mao so essential to the study of UW strategy is that he organized the revolution as a "people's war" where a poor majority of farmers could organize against a relatively stronger industrial power. Key to the strategy is a three-phased system based on the ability to organize and generate revolutionary combat power. The three phases of Mao's approach are: Strategic Defense, Progressive Expansion, and Revolutionary Strategic Offensive.⁵⁸ The essential design in Mao's three phased strategy is the ability to merge and move seamlessly back and forth between each phase. Should a particular region fail in their ability to execute Phase 2 or 3, for example, the design allows for the return to a previous phase in order reset conditions. This flexibility to move back and forth between phases allows the strategy to be adopted at different times and locations throughout the entire campaign. This was an overarching aspect of the strategy which we applied to the game in the sense that the player can choose any aspect before the

⁵⁶ USASOC, 15.

⁵⁷ USASOC, 15.

⁵⁸ Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*, Reprint edition (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2002), 47–50; Mao Tse-Tung and Samuel Griffith, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2005), 21.

start of their turn. The additional winning condition that we developed is that the player must control one territory of each population size. The remainder of this section describes the three different phases and the bonuses or modifiers we applied.

a. Phase 1: Strategic Defense

Phase I is the strategic defense and receives the most emphasis of the three phases.⁵⁹ Phase 1 is also referred to as the organization, consolidation, and preservation phase where the goal is to recruit a base of supporters and gain material to be used in subsequent phases to launch attacks.⁶⁰ Essential to the first phase is to convince a significant portion of the population to “commit themselves to the movement so that it gradually acquires the quality of mass.”⁶¹ Essential to this phase is encouraging the enemy to spread their forces thin as they attempt to control the rising dissent.

For this phase, the player receives one additional recruitment point for each supported space. Once the total number of recruitment points is greater than 15, the player must move to a different phase.

b. Phase 2: Progressive Expansion

Progressive expansion is when the insurgent increases attacks and escalates the conflict, expanding the number of limited raids on relatively weaker government targets in order to create a stalemate in the government. The raids allow the insurgent to procure arms, ammunition, and essential equipment.⁶² Ideally, as the guerrillas increase their capabilities and attacks, “the government finds that it cannot destroy the guerrillas; for the moment can only seek to contain them” and is therefore forced into a stalemate.⁶³ This phase continues the cycle of stalemate between government and insurgent forces until the insurgents have grown in strength and organization to directly oppose the government.

⁵⁹ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 47.

⁶⁰ Tse-Tung and Griffith, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 20.

⁶¹ Tse-Tung and Griffith, 20.

⁶² Tse-Tung and Griffith, 21.

⁶³ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 51.

During this phase guerrilla forces gain a slight advantage during engagements. the guerrilla forces win ties during engagements with security forces when the security forces have three or less fighters, regardless of who is attacking or defending. Once the player controls an urban space they must move to a different phase.

c. Phase 3: Revolutionary Strategic Offensive

The Revolutionary Strategic Offensive is when the insurgent is finally prepared to overwhelm the government forces in direct confrontation. It is in this phase that the insurgent will slowly combine guerrilla tactics with decisive strategic attacks that will begin to isolate parts of the government forces so that they can be destroyed in a systematic fashion.⁶⁴ Once the enemy forces have been overwhelmed, then the insurgent political organizations can begin the process of war termination and set conditions for installing the new government.

During this phase guerillas win ties during engagements if the security forces have four or more units on a space.

3. T. E. Lawrence

Thomas Edward Lawrence was a British army officer who successfully led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire during World War I. In his memoirs, titled *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence describes his experience molding the Arab revolt. Lawrence focuses on insurgent warfare in a journal article “The Evolution of a Revolt” where he explains his analysis and strategy of the Arab revolt campaign. In his assessment, Lawrence found three “elements” in his strategy: algebraical, biological and psychological, which are described in the following subsections.⁶⁵ These three elements captured the tangible and intangible aspects of a battlefield or scenario. The combination of these three analytical tools allowed Lawrence to accurately assess the correct methodology to be employed during the Arab revolt and represents his logic of command throughout the campaign.

⁶⁴ Taber, 51.

⁶⁵ T. E. Lawrence, *The Evolution of a Revolt* (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 7.

G.K.B. Barron provides an analysis of Lawrence's contribution to revolutionary warfare in seven individual treatises on essential aspects of revolutionary warfare: the motivational cause, the leader, time, support of the population, the struggle, outside support, and unassailable bases.⁶⁶

To ensure that the players experience all aspects of T.E. Lawrence's strategy, we first combined the seven treatises into three options for the player: motivational cause and the leader; time and struggle; and support of the population, outside support, and unassailable bases. Combining the three elements with the three (consolidated) treatises gave us six options for the player to choose from at the beginning of each turn. The additional winning condition for T.E. Lawrence is the player must control all non-water spaces along insurgent friendly borders to reinforce his emphasis on outside or external support. The remainder of this section provides the description and bonuses or modifiers for the elements and treatises.

a. Algebraic

The algebraic element involves calculating known variables including terrain, conditions, space, and even time to essentially quantify and prepare the battlespace. The cost of one auxiliary is reduced to one point when using this element.

b. Biological

The biological element refers to humanity itself and is referred to by Lawrence as "Bionomics," where humans and materials are an essential part of war that are both irrational and incalculable and that "can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by though practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex."⁶⁷ This element provides the player one additional recruitment point for every space that is fully supported along friendly or neutral country borders.

⁶⁶ G.K.B. Barron, "The Contribution Made by T.E. Lawrence to the Theory of Revolutionary Warfare," *South African Journal of Military Studies* 13, no. 4 (1983): 50–51.

⁶⁷ Lawrence, *The Evolution of a Revolt*, 9.

c. *Psychological*

The psychological element is where it is essential to organize the thoughts and emotions of both friendly and enemy forces. Lawrence puts this as having to “arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men’s minds, through them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.”⁶⁸ This element provides one legitimacy point for every fully supported space during the turn it is used.

d. *Motivational Cause and the Leader*

The motivation cause and the leader provide purpose and direction for the insurgent campaign. Furthermore, providing such focus for the cause brings about additional support and legitimacy to the effort. This treatise provides one legitimacy point for each controlled urban space during the turn it is used.

e. *Time and Struggle*

Time and Struggle introduces the concepts of protracted war where the insurgent must have discipline, value range over force, and focus on the long-term strategic victory.⁶⁹ Essentially, the long game is understood and the hard road to get there is accepted. This treatise allows the player to disregard the consolidation requirements and move forces as if they were in the Movement Phase. Also, the player only loses 25% of their recruitment points if they have to conduct a withdraw.

f. *Support of the Population, Outside Support, and Unassailable Bases*

Support of the population, outside support, and unassailable bases highlight the method by which the insurgent campaign is resourced through materials and ideas. As opposed to conventional modes of fighting with clear lines of supply, the insurgent must rely

⁶⁸ Lawrence, 11.

⁶⁹ Barron, “The Contribution Made by T.E. Lawrence to the Theory of Revolutionary Warfare,” 50.

on non-standard logistics, reinforcements, and adaptable technology to achieve success over government forces. For Lawrence the goal and especially the political support were to an extent the lifeblood of his movement.⁷⁰ This treatise provides the player one recruitment point for every occupied space adjacent to *the insurgent friendly or neutral* border country.

4. Cuban Revolution

The Cuban Revolution provides an exceptional example of a revolution where the precise application of violence leads to the successful overthrow of a government. Critical to the Cuban strategy are two fundamental principles illuminated by Robert Taber's *War of the Flea*:

The rebel strategy will be (1) to attack only when assured of success by the overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element of surprise, and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement; (2) to use the campaign as an educational tool and a propaganda weapon by disclosing the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be defied with impunity; to proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its grievances and aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of bloodshed on the repressive government as the clear aggressor it will necessarily become in the course of the anti-guerrilla campaign.⁷¹

This combination of precisely timed violence with an active information campaign allowed Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to successfully overthrow the Cuban government during the 1950s.

While the two principles of the application of violence and information operations are only two of many reasons why the Cuban Revolution was successful, they represent fundamental elements of the Cuban strategy. In designing his strategy, Castro hoped to be able to topple the Cuban regime through a general strike coupled with a military offensive.⁷² The Cuban strategy relied on this duality to make military victories appear to be much larger successes than what they were in reality. Despite being exceptionally outnumbered, Castro's

⁷⁰ Barron, 51.

⁷¹ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 27.

⁷² Spencer Tucker, ed., *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A New Era of Modern Warfare* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 127.

ability of combining his limited military capabilities with an aggressive public relations campaign is an essential lesson that will be highlighted in the wargame.

Keeping in line with these two principles, we have given this strategy only two options to choose from: Overwhelming Superiority and Educational Propaganda. Overwhelming Superiority allows the player to win ties during offensive operations when they outnumber their opponent and receive plus one (+1) to their dice roll if they outnumber their opponent 2:1. Educational Propaganda generate one additional recruitment point for each space supported by insurgent forces, with a cap of 25 points. To understand how each works, the player must switch between the two principles each turn. Also, the additional winning condition is to control at least two urban and the suburban spaces.

B. COUNTERINSURGENCY

Just like UW and insurgency, the same COIN subjects that are taught in the SFQC are the strategies we selected for this game. First, we use U.S. COIN doctrine as a basis, then scoped and synthesized David Galula, Robert Thompson, and the OEF-P Basilan Model. Because the framework and LOEs from U.S. COIN doctrine were used to produce the general flow of events and structure for the COIN player, the baseline strategy reinforces the tenets of the doctrine. David Galula follows a step-by-step methodology, Robert Thompson uses principles to achieve success, and the OEF-P Basilan Model utilizes a three-step process and two principles. Just like the UW and insurgency strategies, the COIN strategies were given additional winning conditions and constraints and limitations to force players to use the entire strategy.

1. U.S. COIN Doctrine

The framework and LOEs for U.S. COIN doctrine have already been described in Chapter II and were incorporated into the baseline version of *Rebels and States*, but U.S. COIN doctrine still has valuable information to offer its student and practitioner. COIN environments can be ambiguous and complex. Just as UW doctrine is an approach to insurgencies and revolution, COIN doctrine provides principles to understand and adhere to during its conduct. Joint doctrine provides tenets of COIN that will serve as “guideposts,”

while U.S. Army doctrine provides foundations.⁷³ For this strategy, we have scoped these tenets and applied bonuses or modifiers for each, which are described in the following subsections. The player that chooses this strategy must use a different tenet each turn. Their additional winning condition is that they must control that majority of the urban and suburban spaces, simulating control and support of the population centers.

a. *Understanding the Operational Environment*

The first tenet of COIN is “Understanding the Operational Environment (OE).”⁷⁴ This tenet describes the importance of a detailed understanding of the situation, culture, dynamics, and participants to ensure there is full preparation for COIN operations. Within the first tenet, there are other aspects of consideration: sociocultural knowledge, or an understanding of how and why the society interacts; understanding host nation partners, their capabilities, and how they interact with the population; preparation for a long term commitment; and learning and adapting, which is critical to an ongoing understanding of the OE.⁷⁵ Ultimately this is all an intellectual preparation to ensure that an effective COIN strategy can be employed. This tenet reduces the cost of DIMEFIL Cards by one.

b. *Developing the COIN Narrative*

The next tenet is “Developing the COIN Narrative” which aims to directly counter the insurgent narrative.⁷⁶ Given that the interaction between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is a struggle for legitimacy and support of the population, each side will inherently have to create a narrative, or storyline, to further their objectives. This means that careful thought is critical to the credibility of the counterinsurgent, attack the shortcomings and mistakes of the resistance or insurgency, and capitalize on successes of the legitimate government. This tenet provides a legitimacy point for every engagement where guerrilla

⁷³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, III–7.

⁷⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–7.

⁷⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-7-III–9.

⁷⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–9.

fighters are completely removed from a space or when a space comes under control of the counterinsurgent. It is only applicable to one urban and/or two suburban locations.

c. *Primacy of Politics*

The third tenet describes the “Primacy of Politics” to ensure that a political solution is found to end the insurgency.⁷⁷ The goal of a resistance or insurgency are political in nature. While military action will take primacy in the beginning of the struggle, it cannot remain the main focus, as it is the diplomatic or political solution that will result in the end of hostilities. This tenet provides two recruitment points for every local government that has been established.

d. *Population Security*

The fourth tenet is “Population Security.”⁷⁸ During the struggle over power and legitimacy, the government and resistance or insurgency find themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum, with the population in the middle. It is the population who will ultimately determine who wins the struggle, through support to one side or the other. The security of the population goes beyond the use of physical security forces, and includes the reinforcement of a just rule of law, a fair legal system, and rules of engagement (ROE) of security and military forces that prevents further harm to the population.⁷⁹ Furthermore, security of the population means isolating the resistance or insurgency. As described before, the components of a resistance or insurgency are the auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla force, each of which draws from and is supported by the population. The more effectively the counterinsurgent can provide security to the populous, the more effectively it can isolate the insurgent. This tenet provides an additional recruitment point for every occupied space where security forces are equal to or greater than the number of the population.

⁷⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-10.

⁷⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-11.

⁷⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-12-III-13.

e. Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

The final tenet of COIN is “Unity of Command and Unity of Effort,” which describes the importance of all forces being under one central command structure to enable that all actions and efforts are working towards that same goals.⁸⁰ Additionally, this tenet focuses of the importance of working within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national (JIIM) environment to utilize authorities, expertise, and funding to the fullest extent. This tenet lets security forces win ties during engagements when they are located within the same space as local governments.

2. David Galula

David Galula was a French Army officer and COIN theorist who studied the Chinese, Greek, Vietnamese, and Huk insurgencies, and then applied his theories in Algeria in 1956 and later published *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.⁸¹ Galula’s contribution to COIN theory and strategy is the concept that the counterinsurgent should focus efforts on the population as opposed to the insurgent. In response to Mao Tse Tung’s concept of the “people’s war,” Galula devised a step-by-step strategy to ensure that the population could systematically be separated from the insurgents. His eight-step strategy of COIN is as follows:

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provincial local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

⁸⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III–15.

⁸¹ Tucker, *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 189.

8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.⁸²

Galula's strategy in this case is focused on a specific area, where if these steps are executed correctly and in sequence, then order will be restored and this method can then be executed in another area. Galula does explicitly state that "the general order in which they must be conducted cannot be tampered with under normal conditions without violating the principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense."⁸³ In keeping with Galula's mentality, we have designed this strategy to start at Step 1 then move through each step without reverting backwards. The additional winning condition that we developed is that the player must control one of each population size. The following list describes the bonus or modifier and constraint or limitations we've applied to each step.

1. Concentration—generates one additional recruitment point for every occupied space with four or more security forces. Once the recruitment points exceed 15 the player must move forward.
2. Security Forces in Villages—the player receives three additional security forces from supported spaces that equal two or less. Once 12 security forces are gain from this step, the player must move forward.
3. Contact Population—the player can establish one additional essential service in rural spaces during the deployment phase. Once three or more supported spaces are obtained the player must move forward.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization—The player gains one DIMEFIL Card during the recruitment phase. Once three DIMEFIL Cards have been obtained the player must move forward.

⁸² David Galula and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55–56.

⁸³ Galula and Nagl, 56.

5. New Leaders—The player can establish one additional Local Government in rural spaces without it needing to be fully supported. Once three Local Governments have been established the player must move forward.
6. Test the authorities—the player receives a legitimacy point for every fully supported space established. Once three legitimacy points are obtained the player must move forward.
7. Education—the player can establish one Local Government in any rural or suburban space without the fully supported requirement. Once two Local Governments are established the player must move forward.
8. Win—The player can re-roll one attack dice per engagement.

3. Robert Thompson

Sir Robert Thompson was a British Army officer and counterinsurgency expert who studied the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸⁴ He produced several seminal works, including his most influential, *Defeating Communist Insurgencies*, which had an immense influence on the development of modern COIN doctrine. Both the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies revealed fallacies in strategies where historically powerful state actors would often use direct force to deal with an indirect threat. Thompson's COIN theory lies in the adjustment of the government to align all aspects of power through matching policies. Instead of defaulting to military power, all instruments of national power, or DIMEFIL, are implemented to achieve long term COIN success. Thompson created five principles of COIN in order to focus government efforts and policies:

1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
2. The government must function in accordance with law.
3. The government must have an overall plan.
4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.

⁸⁴ Tucker, *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 566.

5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.⁸⁵

Due to the asymmetrical nature of combat between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces, Thompson's five principles strive to correctly align the government against the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent. While these five principles appear to be rudimentary in concept, they represent a fundamental shift in COIN theory where the entire government, and not the military, is required to engage in a long-term campaign to achieve success against the insurgent. Understanding the fundamental implications of this national level strategy and identifying the appropriate balance between these five principals is an essential learning point for players during the wargame. This is why the player must apply one principle per turn, then change in subsequent turns. The additional winning condition for this strategy is that player must control two urban spaces and three suburban spaces. The following list describes the bonuses or modifiers we applied to each principle.

1. Clear Political Aim—the player gains one legitimacy point for every three local governments established.
2. Law—The player can re-roll one die per engagement that involve security forces that are located with a local government.
3. Overall plan—The player can establish one additional essential service for occupying spaces with a population of four or more.
4. Priority to defeat Political Subversion—the layer gains one legitimacy point per turn for every DIMEFIL card played.
5. Secure Government Base—the play can re-roll the lowest defense dice when security forces occupy a supported space.

⁸⁵ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 1st ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 29.

4. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) Basilan Model

In 2002, OEF-P planners used Gordon McCormick's COIN diamond model as a basis for their campaign against insurgent organizations, including Abu-Sayyaf. The success of the operation prompted the Filipino government to refer to the strategy as the "Basilan Model."⁸⁶ The model provides a method by which the counterinsurgent can comprehensively address the relationships between government, population, insurgent, and international actors. The phased methodology of the model uses "Legs" to represent the conditions that must be established in order for the government to produce an effective strategy against the insurgent.




Figure 18. COIN Diamond Model.⁸⁷

First, the government must build legitimacy and control with the people (Leg 1) and then use that legitimacy so that the people will identify the insurgent infrastructure

⁸⁶ Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and The Indirect Approach - ProQuest," *Military Review* 86, no. 6 (December 2006): 4.

⁸⁷ Source: Wilson, 4.

(Leg 2).⁸⁸ Once the government has created the first two conditions of Leg 1 and Leg 2 with the people, then the government can use direct action (Leg 3) to weaken the insurgent through force.⁸⁹ While the government is executing the first three legs of the model, it must also address international actors by using diplomacy to build relevance with external actors (Leg 4) while reducing the external support that the insurgents will receive including sanctuary and resources (Leg 5).⁹⁰ The diamond model provides the counterinsurgent with a framework upon which a comprehensive counter insurgent campaign can be developed. Addressing the global reach and ability of the modern-day insurgent to access significant external support will be a critical lesson taught in *Rebels and States*.

For this strategy, the player must start using Leg 1, then move to Leg 2 and 3 without ever moving backwards. Simultaneously, they will use either Leg 4 or Leg 5. The additional winning condition is that the play must control all spaces along the counterinsurgent friendly border, except for space containing water.

Leg 1: Legitimacy and control provides the player gains one additional legitimacy point for every four Security Forces or two Essential Services established. Once three legitimacy points have been gained the player must move to Leg 2. Leg 2: Identify Insurgents allows the player to remove an additional Auxiliary for every one DIMEFIL Card used. Leg 3: Direct Action let the player re-roll one attack dice per engagement. Also, if the insurgent is within three points of winning the game, the COIN player can revert back to Leg 2 for one turn.

Simultaneously, Leg 4: External Diplomacy provides one additional recruitment point for every supported space along the border with the COIN friendly or neutral countries or international waters. Leg 5: Reduce External Support to Insurgents reduces the insurgent's recruitment points by one for every COIN occupied space that borders a country or international water.

⁸⁸ Eric Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare; Fort Bragg* 18, no. 2 (September 2005): 5–6.

⁸⁹ Wendt, 5–6.

⁹⁰ Wendt, 5–6.

C. CONCLUSION

Our advanced version of *Rebels and States* meets our goal of creating this wargame. While the bonuses or modifiers may not perfectly simulate the major aspects of these strategies, simply reading about each strategy multiple times as it is played out throughout a game continuously exposes players to the aspects of the selected strategies. This exposure demonstrates the ideal strengths of each strategy, such as Galula's momentum building approach or T.E. Lawrence's study and analysis of his environment, and how each action sets a foundation for the next. At the same time, the interaction between the players also exposes potential weaknesses, such as a reliance on massing forces within the Cuban Revolution strategy or how a reliance on external support in the OEF-P Basilan model requires attention to creating safe-havens along friendly borders, which advances the learning experience. Furthermore, *Rebels and States* is by no means an attempt to produce experts in any of these strategies, mainly because each was created for a specific time, place, situation, and point in history. Instead, it provides a means for our target audience to keep their skill set sharp and understand how to employ these strategies in the future. The study helps identify the strengths and weaknesses, so future soldiers know how to combine certain aspects of each to apply to their complex operating environment.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We designed *Rebels and States* to be an interactive game that serves as educational tool that can augment the traditional study of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The basis in doctrine reinforces the common language spoken within the U.S. Army and aids in keeping a military mindset when playing. Through the incorporation of UW and COIN doctrine, a foundation of knowledge can be established that breaks away from a traditional step-by-step methodology applied when teaching military doctrine. *Rebels and States* requires a deviation from an “if-then,” troubleshooting approach that comes from manuals, to a thoughtful methodology using analysis and decision making within parameters or “guideposts.” Furthermore, the introduction of the other theorists displays alternative methods of conducting UW, insurgency, revolution, or COIN operations in complex and ambiguous environments. In this way, *Rebels and States* met our intent and the introduction and application of the chosen strategies. The remainder of this chapter describes future options for game development.

A. DIGITAL VERSION

A digital version of *Rebels and States* will have three different advantages that our table-top version does not. First, digitizing the game can simplify some of the mechanics, such as the addition of recruitment points, or the authorization of certain moves, and increase to the speed of the game. Second, digitization of the game can provide additional elements of secrecy, which can significantly change the dynamics of the game. For example, a digital version can mask the number of fighters in a given space, providing an element of surprise when attacking. Also, a digital version can also hide the subversive movements of the insurgent player, leaving the COIN player to decide to focus efforts on exposing their opponent or to stay the course of their plan. Finally, a digital version can allow more people to play *Rebels and States*. The current game must be played in person with all the pieces that we produced, but a digital version requires players to only have a computer. Furthermore, we developed this game during the COVID-19 outbreak. This hampered our ability to expose more people to the game due to state and local government

and Department of Defense restrictions. A digital version would allow players to safely play *Rebels and States* without violating any guidance or restrictions.

B. ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS

Any number of alternative versions of *Rebels and States* can be developed to specifically address a certain scenario or strategy. Our selection of the eight strategies was based on what is taught at the SFQC and the board that we developed was not based on any specific country or scenario. All of this can be customized if players wanted to use specific regions or situations address specific problems and can be accomplished by adjusting the game board, the environment cards, or the strategies themselves. Of course, for it to be effective a thorough analysis of the desired problem set or scenario must be conducted first.

The simplest modification to *Rebels and States* can be accomplished by conducting an analysis of the physical terrain in a country or region. This should include analysis of terrain, population centers, and neighboring countries. Players would then array all game board pieces to replicate the terrain of their chosen country or region. If needed, additional population markers or hexes could be produced to meet the desired intent.

The next modification that can be made is the adjustment of the environment cards. This would begin with an analysis of operational variables, or PMESII-PT, as described in Chapter II. Once the analysis is complete, the results can be applied to create a new set of fixed environment cards that specifically address the chosen country, scenario, or region. Appendix D provides an example of these two modifications. We thoroughly analyzed the terrain, societal, and environmental aspects of different CAS countries, then arranged the game board to represent the geography and populations of the countries and dictated which environment cards to use.

The final modification that can be made to *Rebels and States* is to create new strategy cards. If a strategy is chosen that already describes tenets, principles, or processes, then a simple modification of bonuses or modifiers can be produced. For strategies that do not have established processes or principles, a thorough analysis of the goals and tactics must first occur. Once these have been identified and categorized, a researcher can develop

what is required to sufficiently describe the strategy and, again, bonuses or modifiers can be applied. Appendix E provides an example for this modification. We reverse engineered and proposed Chinese COIN tenets by conducting an analysis of its tactics and categorizing them across DIMEFIL. Once the categorization was complete, we then drew major themes or foundational aspects to develop the tenets, and finally applied bonuses and starting/winning conditions. Both of these appendixes simulate real world scenarios and provide examples on how other users can develop something similar.

C. FURTHER STUDIES IN EFFECTIVENESS

Rebels and States can serve as a means to study the effectiveness of alternative learning methods to students of the SFQC, or any qualification course that involves a study of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. The most ideal scenario that we identified was incorporating this wargame into a portion of the SFQC, and more specifically the 18A SF Officer's Course. At the course, students are broken down into multiple teams. These teams could serve as control and test groups. One team could play the basic version of the game, one the advanced, and the last not play at all. Their performances in the course and then in the culminating exercise of the SFQC could be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of *Rebels and States*' educational experience. This same methodology could be used where the wargaming is used as one of the test groups with other alternative learning methods.

D. CONCLUSION

Rebels and States went far beyond what we originally designed it to do. Throughout the design phase we noticed additional learning points manifesting themselves. First, we constantly witnessed a willingness to take risks to exploit opposing player mistakes and to force reactions from the other side. The wargame served as a low risk means to attempt new ideas or test out an understanding of an environment. Furthermore, we learned that the complexity built within *Rebels and States* became more akin to a game of chess as we witnessed players sacrificing their pieces to force a reaction by their opponent, which in turn provided new opportunities to exploit. Second, we observed players beginning to make moves that would impact their situation multiple turns down the road, forgoing the urge to only look for immediate impacts. As more iterations were played and observed, we

identified moves from different players that would only make sense multiple turns later. This proved devastating for the players who only focused on the immediate problem. Third, as players became more familiar with the game, we saw an increase in the use of the tools at their disposal, and a sequencing of these tools to compliment or shape their efforts. It became a wholistic approach that incorporated the use of all aspects of the game. Finally, as each iteration played out, we noticed that the analysis from turn to turn increased, and players found themselves so deep in thought that decisions took longer, not due to a fear of being wrong but because every move had greater and more lasting impacts on the game. It truly became a learning experience that went beyond the lessons we sought to teach, but also about patience, sequencing, shaping an environment, and reading and understanding an opponent. These secondary learning experiences took this wargame to another level.

These four additional points took *Rebels and States* to a level that we had only hoped to achieve. As mentioned in Chapter I, our interests in creating this wargame went beyond academic requirements. First, we wanted to create a learning tool that would improve the next generation of SOF soldiers beyond what is expected of them. We wanted to aid in the development of thinkers and practitioners to ensure that, when called upon, they would succeed at any problem thrown their way. Second, we wanted to ensure that new support staff to SOF organizations understood that their organization and its members are called upon to accomplish some of the most complex and dangerous missions. This heavy burden requires not just a different way of conducting business, but also a significant investment in the intellectual capacity of its members. *Rebels and States* provides a way to decrease the learning curve when entering a new SOF environment. Finally, we wanted to produce a game that kept SOF soldiers' skills and minds sharp. Just like working a puzzle or solving a Rubik's Cube, engaging in a problem or struggle keeps the mind sharp and prepared for contingencies. In this sense, by producing a two-sided game with a UW and COIN theme we sought to provide a different way to keep SOF soldiers engaged in the insurgency problem set they are likely to encounter in the future.

APPENDIX A. RELATIONSHIP OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES TO DESIGN AND ACTIONS IN *REBELS AND STATES*

Reinforcing doctrine and introduction to insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies was central to our game design. We had to balance playability with the educational experience to keep students and players interested. For *Rebels and States* to be an effective learning tool, we also had to ensure our learning objectives were either met using the game design or incorporated into a game mechanic. The learning objectives served as a guide to the game design, parameters for creativity, and ensured we reached our original design objectives. In Table 1 we identify the learning objectives and how they are manifested in *Rebels and States*.

Table 1. Learning Objectives and Manifestation in *Rebels and States*.

Learning Objective	Design or Mechanic
Comprehend the doctrinal strategies of insurgency and COIN	• Implementation of U.S. UW and COIN doctrine in the advanced version • “Clear-Hold-Build” methodology for COIN player • Aspects of each doctrine given modifiers or bonuses correlated with their definitions • Reference Chapter V and Appendix B
Comprehend the theoretical strategies of insurgency (Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, and Cuban Revolution) and COIN (David Galula, Robert Thompson, and OEF-P Basilan Model)	• Implementation of strategies in the advanced version • Aspects of each strategy given modifiers or bonuses • Starting and winning conditions are applied to correlate with the strategy • Reference Chapter V and Appendix B
Comprehend the fundamental infrastructure of an insurgency	• Insurgent player game pieces reflect fundamentals of <i>guerrilla</i>, <i>auxiliary</i>, and <i>underground</i> • Each game piece plays a similar role to actual function

Learning Objective	Design or Mechanic
Comprehend how doctrinal and theoretical strategies interact	• Player interaction during and post-game play • Declaration of strategy aspect being used at the beginning of each turn
Comprehend how a complex operating environment affects the application of strategies	• Game board designed to display a changing environment each game • Initial assessment of game board then strategy decision • Declaration of strategy aspect being used at the beginning of each turn
Reinforce doctrinal terms and graphics	• Use of UW and COIN doctrinal terms for game pieces • Description (restricted, unrestricted, severely restricted) and geographical representation of terrain

APPENDIX B. *REBELS AND STATES RULES*

Terms/Definitions:

Attack: When at least one **Guerrilla Fighter** or **Security Force** engages a hostile force by rolling attack dice.

Control: Established when an **Underground/Local Government** is established within a space.

DIMEFIL: Instruments of National Power; Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement.

Dormant: When an **Auxiliary/Essential Service** or **Underground/Local Government** remains in a space that is occupied by opposing **Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces** that are equal to or greater than the population in that space. **Dormant** forces do not allow you to gain recruitment points but do not lose legitimacy points.

Engagement: Engagement: Sum of all attacks conducted by Guerrilla Fighters or Security Forces from any one space. An engagement can consist of any number of attacks as long as the attacking force has the necessary forces

Established: When an **Underground/Local Government/Essential Service** is placed inside a space and can no longer move. An **Auxiliary** is established when it is activated in the consolidation phase in order to receive recruitment points in subsequent turns.

Forces: Consist of any of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent pieces including **Underground, Intelligence, Auxiliary, Guerrilla Fighters, Local Government, Essential Services, Auxiliary, Security Forces.**

Friendly Space: Any space containing friendly forces.

Fully Supported Space: Any friendly space that has three **Auxiliary/Essential Services** more than any hostile **Auxiliary/Essential Services**.

Hostile Space: Any space that contains forces of the opposing player.

Legitimacy points: Points generated when an **Underground/Local Government** are established in a space. Once an **Underground/Local Government** control a space, they receive legitimacy points equivalent to the population in that space. The only way to lose legitimacy points is when those forces are destroyed.

Neutral Space: Any space on the board that is not occupied by forces from either the Insurgent or Counterinsurgent.

Occupy: When any Insurgent or Counterinsurgent forces are present in any one space.

Population: The single number (1 through 6) present in each space denotes the amount of people in any given location. 1 represents the lowest population and 6 represents the highest population.

Recruitment Points: Points acquired during the deployment phase that allow either player to acquire additional forces and are generated by totaling the number of population spaces that are supported, fully supported, or controlled by either **Auxiliary/Essential Services**

Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay one movement point in the movement phase to move through this space.

Rural Space: Any space with a population of one or two.

Severely Restricted Terrain: Requires forces to pay two movement points in the movement phase to move through this space.

Suburban Space: Any space with a population of three or four.

Support: Achieved when either player has at least one **Auxiliary/Essential Services** in any single space while accompanied by **Guerrilla Fighters/Security Forces** equal to the population in that space or an **Underground/Local Government** present in the space. If opposing **Auxiliary/Essential Services** are present, the player with most **Auxiliary/Essential Services** in that space has achieved support for that space.

Unrestricted Terrain—Forces pay no movement point in the movement phase to move through this space.

Urban Terrain: Any space with a population of five or six.

INSURGENT FORCES

- **Underground**—Allows the player to control space, generates legitimacy points, and generate recruitment points equal to the population in that space.
Underground can only be established in spaces that are fully supported.
Underground cannot move once established. Cost—**4 recruitment points**
- **DIMEFIL Card**—Allows a player to remove opposing **Forces** or maneuver forces for a dynamic strike. Player may recruit only one intelligence card per turn. Player may use one **DIMEFIL Card** per turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 **DIMEFIL Cards** per turn. Cost—**3 recruitment points**.
- **Auxiliary**—Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Must be present in a space for one full turn before the player can generate additional recruitment points. Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that have **Auxiliary** present. **Auxiliary** can move into spaces with hostile forces. Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position containing **Auxiliary** in the consolidation phase. Cost—**2 recruitment points**.

- **Guerrilla Fighters**—Allows a player to engage opposing **Security Forces** in order to secure a neutral or enemy space. Spaces are secure when the number of **Guerrilla Fighters** equals the population size the space which the occupy. Cost—**1 recruitment point**.

COUNTER INSURGENT FORCES

- **Local Government**—Control space and generates legitimacy and recruitment points equal to the population in that space. **Local Government** can only be established in spaces that are fully supported **Local Government** cannot move once established. Cost—**4 recruitment points**
- **DIMEFIL Card** - Allows a player to remove opposing **Forces**. Player may recruit only one intelligence card per turn. Player may use one **DIMEFIL Card** per turn in their engagement phase. Player may only maintain 5 **DIMEFIL Cards** per turn. Cost—**3 recruitment points**.
- **Essential Services**—Generates additional forces by allowing the player to create recruitment points equal to the population in that space. Allows for the player to deploy newly recruited forces into spaces that hold **Essential Services**. Allows for the player to move forces from one space into another position containing **Essential Services** in the consolidation phase. **Essential Services** cannot move once established. **Essential Services** can only be established in a space that has been secured by **Security Forces** for one previous turn. Cost—**2 recruitment points**. Cost—**2 recruitment points**.
- **Security Forces**—Allows a player to engage opposing **Guerrilla forces** in order to secure a neutral or enemy space. Must be occupy a space for one full turn with **Security Forces** equal to the population in order establish **Essential Services**. Cost—**1 recruitment point**.

GAME RULES

PREGAME

1. SETUP GAMEBOARD

There are a total of 37 spaces that must be arrayed for the board. To create the board, randomly select a space and place it in the center of a table, then place additional spaces in an outward clockwise spiral until the board is in a 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 pattern.

There are a total of 30 population markers that must be array on the spaces. Begin by placing a random population marker in the center space, then place additional population markers in an outward counter-clockwise spiral until all space have a marker. The only spaces that should not have a marker are water spaces.

There are a total of six border pieces. Place the border pieces upside down around the border aligning with the apexes of the game board. Once all are in place, flip them over to reveal the types and locations of the borders.

2. SELECT ENVIRONMENT CARDS

There is a total of five (5) environment card categories: Politics, Society, Economics, Media, and Security Forces. There are three different cards per category. One player will randomly select one card from each category. These categories set the initial conditions for the game and have certain bonuses applied to the beginning of the game only.

3. SELECT OVERALL STRATEGY

1. Insurgent selects either Mao Tse Tung, T.E. Lawrence, Cuban, or U.S. Unconventional Warfare doctrine as their strategist.
2. Counterinsurgent selects either U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine, David Galula, Robert Thompson, or U.S. Basilan model as their strategist.

4. ARRAY FORCES

Both players begin with 10 **recruitment points** plus any bonuses from the environment cards. Both players select forces from the allotment of recruitment points. The insurgent will place their forces on the board first, followed by the counterinsurgent.

Amongst the varying population and terrain locations that players can choose from, there are two distinct rules that are applied for the first turn:

1. **The insurgent cannot occupy any space with a population of 3 or more.**
2. **The counterinsurgent must secure at least one (1) population space of 5 or 6.**

5. INSURGENT GETS FIRST TURN

TURN ORDER OF OPERATIONS

The players will alternate turns. The insurgent will play all six phases, followed by the counterinsurgent, alternating until one player has achieved 15 legitimacy points and their strategy win conditions.

1. Determine aspects of strategy for employment this turn
2. Recruitment Phase
3. Deployment Phase
4. Movement Phase
5. Engagement phase
6. Consolidation phase

1. INSURGENT

Recruitment Phase- Insurgent generates new forces equal to the number of population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The insurgent player must activate any **Auxiliaries** in a space before they can recruit. **Auxiliaries** are activated in the consolidation phase of the subsequent turn. For example, if an Auxiliary moves into a space on turn 2, the **Auxiliary** is activated on the consolidation of turn 3, allowing the player to collect recruitment points during the recruitment phase of Phase 4.

Deployment Phase- Forces may only be placed in locations where **Auxiliary** are established. **Underground** can only be established in fully supported spaces. Unused recruitment points are lost if not played this turn.

Movement Phase- Insurgent can move any **Guerrilla Forces or Auxiliary** through adjacent spaces based on the terrain in each space. **Auxiliary** may move into spaces that do not have **Guerrilla Fighters**.

Movement is restricted based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has three movement points per player turn. First the player subtracts movements points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 movement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one movement point to move into an adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force is out of movement points.

COUNTERINSURGENT

Recruitment- Counterinsurgent generates new forces equal to the number of population spaces that they support, fully support, or control. The counterinsurgent must have **Security Forces** equal to or greater than the population in a space for one full turn before **Essential Services** can be established in a space. For example, if three **Security Forces** are moved into a space on turn 2, the **Security Forces** must remain in place and must be equal to or greater than population in that space for the entirety of turn 3 and an **Essential Service** must be established in that space during turn 3 in order to then recruit from that space during turn 4.

Deployment- Forces may only be placed in locations where **Essential Services** are established. **Local Government** can only be established in fully supported spaces. Unused recruitment points are lost if not played this turn.

Movement- Counterinsurgent can move any **Security Forces** through adjacent spaces based on the terrain in each space. The counterinsurgent must place **Security Forces** equal to the population in a space for at least one turn before **Essential Services** or **Local Government** can be established, this is considered having secured the population.

Movement is restricted based on the physical terrain in each space. Any force has three movement points per player turn. First the player subtracts movements points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 movement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 movement point for restricted terrain, 2 movement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one movement point to move into an adjacent space. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) moving until the force is out of movement points.

ENGAGEMENT PHASE:

Engagements by forces are restricted in their attack by the physical terrain they move through with equivalent restrictions of the movement phase. Any force has three engagement points per player turn. First the player subtracts engagement points based on the terrain in the space which the force is starting from (0 engagement points for unrestricted terrain, 1 engagement point for restricted terrain, 2 engagement points for severely restricted terrain). Then the player pays one engagement point to attack into an adjacent space and moving any forces into that adjacent space if the defenders are eliminated. Repeat the process of 1) assessing the terrain and 2) attacking until the force is out of engagement points.

Attack- To engage a hostile space the player may roll red attack dice. If the insurgent has three or more **Guerrilla/Security Forces**, they may roll three red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with two **Guerrilla/Security Forces**, they may roll two red attack dice. If the insurgent is attacking with one **Guerrilla/Security Force**, they may only roll one red attack dice. If the defending insurgent player has two or more **Guerrilla Forces** in the hex they are defending, they may roll two white defend dice. If the defending insurgent player has only one **Guerrilla Force/Security Force** in the space they are defending, they may only roll one white defense dice. Both players roll their allotted dice, the players will match up to two of their highest dice rolls. For each dice that has a higher dice roll, remove one **Guerrilla/Security Force**. The defender wins any ties.

Reconnaissance in Force—A player can choose to use **Guerrilla/Security Forces** to engage an adjacent hostile space that doesn't have opposing **Guerrilla/Security Forces** but contains other hostile forces. The player can move any number of **Guerrilla/Security Forces** into that space; however, they must keep at least one **Guerrilla/Security Forces** in the original space from which the engagement was initiated. If the number of **Guerrilla/Security Forces** equal the population in that space, any hostile forces go dormant. This costs no engagement points and forces conducting this action can conduct no further engagements or actions this phase.

Withdraw- The defending side can withdraw forces from one space prior to a hostile engagement. The withdrawing force can only move its forces into an adjacent friendly or neutral space. This comes at a cost of 25% of the recruitment points for the next turn. When determining the exact amount of recruitment point lost, conduct the required math then always round down. For example, 19 recruitment points $\times 0.25 = 4.75$, rounding down equals only 4 recruitment points. **Withdraw** ends the attacker's engagement for that space but they may still conduct a Reconnaissance in Force.

INSURGENT ENGAGEMENT PHASE

Insurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain **Guerrilla Forces**. To engage a neutral space, move at least one **Guerrilla Forces** or **Auxiliary** piece into the adjacent space.

Insurgent can play one and only one **DIMEFIL Card** at any point in the engagement phase.

There is no limit to the total amount of engagements per turn.

COUNTERINSURGENT ENGAGEMENT PHASE

Counterinsurgent can engage neutral or enemy spaces adjacent to space that contain **Security Forces**. To engage a neutral space, move at least one **Security Force** or **Auxiliary** piece into the adjacent space.

Counterinsurgent can play one and only one **DIMEFIL Card** at any point in the engagement phase. This counts as one engagement

There is no limit to the total amount of engagements per turn.

CONSOLIDATION PHASE

5. INSURGENT CONSOLIDATES

The Insurgent can move **Guerrilla Forces** from any one space containing **Auxiliary** to any other single space that also contains an **Auxiliary** in order to reposition those pieces for future attack or defense.

6. COUNTER INSURGENT CONSOLIDATES

The Counterinsurgent can move **Security Forces** from any one space containing **Essential Services** to any other single space that also contains an **Essential Services** in order to reposition those pieces for future attack or defense.

Win Condition: The first player to achieve 15 legitimacy points and meets the additional winning condition for their strategy wins the game. Player adjusts the Legitimacy Points slider immediately upon establishing **Underground/Local Government** or removing an **Underground/Local Government** with an **Intelligence Card**. Additionally, a player can win by eliminating all opposing fighters (**Guerrillas/Security Forces**) or support functions (**Auxiliary/Essential Services**) which prevents the opposing player from regenerating recruitment points.

Players must also achieve the specified win condition for their respective strategists in order to secure victory.

STRATEGIES

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

Mao Tse Tung—Mao's contribution to UW strategy is that he organized the revolution in a construct of "people's war" where a poor majority of farmers could organize against a relatively stronger industrial power. Key to the strategy is a three phased system based on the ability to organize and generate revolutionary combat power. The essential design in Mao's three phased strategy is the ability to merge and move seamlessly back and forth between each phase. Should a particular region fail in their ability to execute phase II or III, then the design allows for the return to a previous phase in order reset conditions. This flexibility to move back and forth between phases allows the strategy to be adopted at different times and locations throughout the entire campaign.

The Mao insurgent must initiate the first turn in Phase 1—Strategic Defensive. The insurgent player may switch to any phase prior to any deployment phase provided the conditions on the board allow it.

Additional Winning Condition: Control one of each population size (1 x Urban, 1 x Suburban, 1 x Rural)

Phase 1—Strategic Defensive

Phase I is also referred to as the organization, consolidation and preservation phase where the goal is to recruit a base of supporters and gain material from which guerrilla

operations in the following phase can use to launch attacks.⁹¹ Essential to the first phase is to convince a significant portion of the population to “commit themselves to the movement so that it gradually acquires the quality of mass.”⁹² Essential to this phase is encouraging the enemy to spread their forces thin as they attempt to control the rising dissent. When conditions are right and the peasant masses are organized, the strategy can progress to more offensive tactics.

Insurgent receives one (1) additional recruitment point during the deployment phase for each supported space. Once the total number of recruitment points generated reaches more than 15 the insurgent must move to a different phase.

Phase 2—Progressive Expansion

Progressive Expansion is where the insurgent increases attacks and escalates the conflict. Guerrilla forces increase the number of limited raids. The raids allow the insurgent to procure arms, ammunition, and essential equipment.⁹³ Ideally, as the guerrillas increase their capabilities and attacks, “the government finds that it cannot destroy the guerrillas; for the moment can only seek to contain them” and is therefore forced into a stalemate.⁹⁴ This phase continues the cycle of stalemate between government and insurgent forces until the insurgents have grown in strength and organization to directly oppose the government.

Guerrilla Forces win ties during engagements with Security Forces that number three or less. Once the Insurgent controls an urban space they must move to a different phase. If recruitment points fall below 15, the insurgent may move back to Phase 1: Strategic Defensive.

Phase 3—Revolutionary Strategic Offensive

The Revolutionary Strategic Offensive is when the insurgent is finally prepared to overwhelm the government forces in direct confrontation. It is in this phase that the insurgent will slowly combine guerrilla tactics with decisive strategic attacks that will

⁹¹ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 47.

⁹² Tse-Tung and Griffith, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 20.

⁹³ Tse-Tung and Griffith, 21.

⁹⁴ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 51.

begin to isolate parts of the government forces so that they can be destroyed in a systematic fashion.⁹⁵ Once the enemy forces have been overwhelmed, then the insurgent political organizations can begin the process of war termination and set conditions for installing the new government.

Guerrilla Forces win ties during engagements with Security Forces that number four (4) or more. If the insurgent loses control of an urban space they can move back to Phase 2: Progressive Expansion. If recruitment points fall below 15, the insurgent may move back to Phase 1: Strategic Defensive.

T.E. Lawrence

Thomas Edward Lawrence was a British army officer who successfully led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire during World War I. In his memoirs, titled *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence describes his experience molding the Arab revolt. Lawrence focuses on insurgent warfare in a journal article “The Evolution of a Revolt” where he explains his analysis and strategy of the Arab revolt campaign. In his assessment, Lawrence found three “elements” in his strategy: algebraical, biological and psychological, described below.⁹⁶

During the first turn, the Insurgent must occupy at least one (1) space located along the insurgent friendly border. The insurgent player can choose either one of the three elements or one of the two treatises to employ during their turn. The same element or treatise cannot be played consecutively.

Additional Winning Condition: Must control all spaces along Insurgent friendly country borders. Disregard this requirement if all spaces along the insurgent friendly border are water.

⁹⁵ Taber, 51.

⁹⁶ Lawrence, *The Evolution of a Revolt*, 7.

Elements:

Algebraic element involves calculating known variables including terrain, conditions, space, and even time to essentially quantify and prepare the battlespace.

The Insurgent player cost for Auxiliary is reduced to one recruitment point.

The biological element refers to humanity itself and is referred to by Lawrence as “Bionomics,” where humans and materials are an essential part of war that are both irrational and incalculable and that “can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by though practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.”⁹⁷

The Insurgent player generates one additional recruitment points per deployment phase, for every space fully supported along the friendly or neutral country border.

The psychological element is where it is essential to organize the thoughts and emotions of both friendly and enemy forces. Lawrence puts this as having to “arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men’s minds, through them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.”⁹⁸

The Insurgent gets one (1) legitimacy point for every fully supported space established this turn.

Treatise:

Motivation Cause and the Leader provide purpose and direction for the insurgent campaign.

The Underground receives one additional legitimacy point per for each controlled urban space during this turn.

⁹⁷ Lawrence, 9.

⁹⁸ Lawrence, 11.

Time and Struggle introduces the concepts of protracted war where the insurgent must have discipline, value range over force, and focus on the long-term strategic victory.⁹⁹

During consolidation phase, the Insurgent player can disregard the consolidation requirements and the forces from one space can conduct movement as if it were the movement phase. The Insurgent player loses only 10% of their recruitment points during their next turn after withdrawing.

Support of the population, outside support, and unassailable bases highlight the method by which the insurgent campaign is resourced through materials and ideas. As opposed to conventional modes of fighting with clear lines of supply, the insurgent must rely on non-standard logistics, reinforcements, and adaptable technology to achieve success over government forces. For Lawrence the goal and especially the political support were to an extent the lifeblood of his movement.¹⁰⁰

The Insurgent player receives one recruitment point for every occupied space that is adjacent to the Insurgent friendly or neutral border country.

Cuban Revolution:

The Cuban Revolution provides an exceptional example of a revolution where the precise application of violence and lead to the successful overthrow of a government. Critical to the Cuban strategy are two fundamental principles illuminated by Robert Taber's *War of the Flea*, that include overwhelming superiority and propaganda.¹⁰¹ The combination of precisely timed violence with an active information campaign allowed Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to successfully overthrow the Cuban government during the 1950s.

The Insurgent player must choose either fundamental principle of overwhelming superiority or educational propaganda for the first turn. If the insurgent player must alternate between the two fundamental principles on subsequent turns.

⁹⁹ Barron, "The Contribution Made by T.E. Lawrence to the Theory of Revolutionary Warfare," 50.

¹⁰⁰ Barron, 51.

¹⁰¹ Taber, *War of the Flea*, 27.

Additional Winning Condition: Control at least two (2) urban spaces and three (3) suburban spaces.

Overwhelming superiority: “The rebel strategy will be to attack only when assured of success by the overwhelming superiority of firepower, position, and the element of surprise, and only in pursuit of limited objectives, such as the capture of arms, or to create a diversion from some other action, or to avoid encirclement.” ¹⁰²

*Guerrilla Fighters win ties during offensive engagements when they outnumber their opponent. When **Guerrilla Fighters** outnumber the **Security Forces** with 2 attackers to 1 defender, the **Guerrilla Fighters** receive plus one to one of their dice when conducting an engagement.*

Educational Propaganda: “To use the campaign as an educational tool and a propaganda weapon by disclosing the impotence of the enemy, showing that he can be defied with impunity; to proselytize among the rural population by identifying with its grievances and aspirations and by putting the burden and the blame of bloodshed on the repressive government as the clear aggressor it will necessarily become in the course of the anti-guerrilla campaign.” ¹⁰³

*Insurgent Auxiliary generate one additional recruitment point for each space **supported** by insurgent forces. There is a recruitment point cap of 25 for this principle.*

U.S. Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

There are seven phases of UW that describe a systematic approach starting from preparation to transition of the resistance or insurgency to the legitimate authority. The seven phases are: Preparation, Initial Contact, Infiltration, Organization, Buildup, Employment, and Transition.¹⁰⁴ While these phases are laid out in a linear fashion within doctrine, a resistance or insurgency can move forwards and backwards between these

¹⁰² Taber, 27.

¹⁰³ Taber, 27.

¹⁰⁴ Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations*, 3-5-3-7.

phases, even skipping some altogether at times dependent on the situation and preparedness of the organization.

The Insurgent player must begin the first turn in Phase 1: Preparation phase. The U.S. player may choose to move forward to later phases during their deployment phase however they may only move back to one previous phase per deployment phase.

Additional Winning Condition: Must control the majority of the urban and suburban spaces (6/10).

Phase 1: Preparation

All activities USSF personnel would take when preparing to conduct UW operations. These would include, but are not limited to, intelligence gathering, synthetization, and planning.¹⁰⁵

*The Insurgent player gains one additional **DIMEFIL** card. Phase 1 is only active for the first two turns, then the player must move to Phase 2.*

Phase 2: Initial Contact

Initial contact is when U.S. Government personnel, which can include U.S. military or interagency personnel, and potentially members of other nations, conduct an assessment to determine the viability of a UW campaign, making contact with various resistances or insurgencies.¹⁰⁶

*The Insurgent player can establish one additional **Guerrilla Fighter** and one additional **Auxiliary** in addition to their standard allotment of recruitment points. Once four spaces are **supported** or **fully supported** the player must move to Phase 3.*

Phase 3: Infiltration

¹⁰⁵ USASOC, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 11.

¹⁰⁶ USASOC, 12.

Infiltration occurs when USSF teams are deployed to an area, normally through low visibility means. It is critical that USSF teams are not compromised during this phase or the entire operation can result in failure.¹⁰⁷

*The Insurgent player can infiltrate two **Guerrilla Fighters** or one **Auxiliary** in any **unoccupied or friendly rural spaces** that borders the Insurgent Friendly Country, Neutral Country, or International Waters. These forces are not in addition to the recruitment allotment but allow the player to maneuver newly recruited forces without the requirement for established **Auxiliary**. These forces **may not move once infiltrated**. Once the player obtains two supported spaces using this Phase, they must move to Phase 4.*

Phase 4: Organization

Organization is when USSF teams determine the structure of the components within the resistance or insurgency and re-arrange to maximize effectiveness as required. It literally is the organization of the resistance or insurgency to take advantage of the environment.¹⁰⁸

*The Insurgent player can relocate either two **Guerrilla Fighters** or **Auxiliary** to any **friendly occupied space** during the movement phase. Once three or more supported spaces are gained from this Phase, the player must move to Phase 5.*

Phase 5: Build Up

Build Up is the growing of the resistance or insurgency to meet their means and establishing the conditions to achieve their endstate.¹⁰⁹

*The Insurgent player generates one additional recruitment point for **every two occupied spaces**. Once the player generates 20 or more recruitment points, they must move to Phase 6.*

¹⁰⁷ USASOC, 13.

¹⁰⁸ USASOC, 13.

¹⁰⁹ USASOC, 14.

Phase 6: Employment

Employment is when the resistance or insurgency begins to overtly operate, conducting combat operations against the occupying government or power.¹¹⁰

*The Insurgent player may re-roll one dice per engagement with **Security Forces**. Once the insurgent **gains control of one urban space** they must move to Phase 7.*

Phase 7: Transition

Transition is when the resistance or insurgency becomes the established government. This phase is normally the most difficult to achieve and has been proven incredibly complex in all facets of military operations.¹¹¹

*The Insurgent receives one additional legitimacy point for every **three spaces controlled** by the counterinsurgent.*

COUNTERINSURGENCY

David Galula

David Galula was a French Army officer and COIN theorist who applied his study of the Chinese, Greek, Vietnamese, and Huk insurgencies to practice in Algeria in 1956 and later published Counterinsurgency Warfare.¹¹² Galula's contribution to COIN theory and strategy is the concept that the counterinsurgent should focus efforts on the population as opposed to the insurgent. In response to Mao Zedong's concept of the "people's war," Galula devised a step-by-step strategy to ensure that the population could systematically be separated from the insurgent.

Galula's strategy in this case is focused on a specific or local area, where if these steps are executed correctly and in sequence, then order will be restored and this method can then be executed in another area. Galula does explicitly state that "the general order in

¹¹⁰ USASOC, 15.

¹¹¹ USASOC, 15.

¹¹² Tucker, *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 189.

which they must be conducted cannot be tampered with under normal conditions without violating the principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense.”¹¹³

The Counterinsurgent must begin the first turn in Step 1. The Counterinsurgent must progress through the steps and cannot revert to previous steps during the game.

Additional Winning Condition: Control one of each population size (1 x urban, 1 x suburban, 1 x rural)

Step 1. Concentration: “Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.”¹¹⁴

*The Counterinsurgent generates one additional recruitment point for **every occupied population space with four or more security forces**. Once the amount of recruitment point exceeds 15 the player must move to Step 2.*

Step 2. Security Forces in Villages: “Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.”¹¹⁵

*During recruitment, the Counterinsurgent gains an additional **three Security Forces** from **supported spaces** where the population equals two or less. Once the player gains 12 or more Security Forces from this Step, they **must** move to Step 3.*

Step 3. Contact Population: “Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.”¹¹⁶

*The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional **Essential Service** in **rural spaces** during their deployment phase. Once the Counterinsurgent player has established three (3) or more **supported spaces** they must move to Step 4.*

¹¹³ Galula and Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 56.

¹¹⁴ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹¹⁵ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹¹⁶ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

Step 4. “Destroy the local insurgent political organization.” ¹¹⁷

*The Counterinsurgent gains one **DIMEFIL Card** during their recruitment phase. Once the Counterinsurgent gains a total of three (3) **DIMEFIL Cards** from this bonus they must move to Step 5.*

Step 5. New Leaders: “Set up, by means of elections, new provincial local authorities.” ¹¹⁸

*The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional **Local Government** in **rural spaces** during their deployment phase without the need for having **fully supported spaces**. Once three (3) **Local Governments** are established the player must move to Step 6.*

Step 6. “Test the authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks.” ¹¹⁹
“Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.” ¹²⁰

*For every **fully supported space** established during this Step, the Counterinsurgent receives one additional legitimacy point. Once the Counterinsurgent receives, three legitimacy points from this Step, the Counterinsurgent **must** move to Step 7.*

Step 7. “Education Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.” ¹²¹

The Counterinsurgent can establish one Local Government in any rural or suburban space without the requirement for a fully supported space. Once the Counterinsurgent player gains two (2) Local Governments using this Step, they must move to Step 8.

Step 8. “Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.” ¹²²

¹¹⁷ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹¹⁸ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹¹⁹ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹²⁰ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹²¹ Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

¹²² Galula and Nagl, 55–56.

The Counterinsurgent can reroll one attack dice per engagement.

Robert Thompson

Sir Robert Thompson was a British Army officer and counterinsurgency expert who studied Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s.¹²³ He produced several seminal works, including his most influential *Defeating Communist Insurgencies* which have had an immense influence on the development of modern COIN doctrine. Both the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies revealed fallacies in strategies where historically powerful state actors would often use direct force to deal with an indirect threat. In order to adjust to this new dynamic, Thompson's theory of counterinsurgency lies in the adjustment of the government to align all aspects of power through matching policies. Instead of defaulting to military power, all instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence, law enforcement), or DIMEFIL, are implemented to achieve long term COIN success. Thompson created five principles of COIN in order to focus government efforts and policies:

At the beginning of each deployment phase the Counterinsurgent can choose to focus on any one of the following principles, which cannot be played in consecutive turns.

Additional Winning Condition: Control at least two (2) urban spaces and three (3) suburban spaces.

Principle 1. Clear Political Aim: "The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable."¹²⁴

*The Counterinsurgent gains one additional legitimacy point for every three **Local Governments** established.*

Principle 2. Law: "The government must function in accordance with law."¹²⁵

¹²³ Tucker, *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 566.

¹²⁴ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 29.

¹²⁵ Nagl, 29.

*The Counterinsurgent can re-roll one attack or defense die per engagement where a **Local Government** is located with the **Security Forces**.*

Principle 3. Overall Plan: “The government must have an overall plan.”¹²⁶

*The Counterinsurgent can establish one additional **Essential Service** for occupying spaces with a population of four or more.*

Principle 4. Priority to defeat Political Subversion: “The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.”¹²⁷

*The Counterinsurgent gains one legitimacy point per turn for every **DIMEFIL Card** played.*

Principle 5. Secure Government Base: “In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.”¹²⁸

*The Counterinsurgent can re-roll the lowest defense dice per engagement where **Security Forces** occupy a supported space.*

Basilan Model

In 2002, OEF-P planners used Gordon McCormick’s COIN diamond model as a basis for their campaign against insurgent organizations, including Abu-Sayyaf. The success of the operation prompted the Filipino government to refer to the strategy as the “Basilan Model.”¹²⁹ McCormick’s Diamond model provides a method by which the counterinsurgent can comprehensively address the relationships between government, population, insurgent, and international actors. The phased methodology of the model uses “Legs” to represent the conditions that must be established in order for the government to produce an effective strategy against the insurgent.

*At the beginning of each deployment phase the Counterinsurgent **must begin with Leg 1 and may progress forward sequentially through to Leg 2 and 3.** The*

¹²⁶ Nagl, 29.

¹²⁷ Nagl, 29.

¹²⁸ Nagl, 29.

¹²⁹ Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation,” 4.

*Counterinsurgent may not return to previous legs. Additionally, the Counterinsurgent **must select to focus on either Leg 4 or Leg 5 which are played concurrently with either Leg 1, 2, or 3.** Legs 4 or 5 and can only be played for two (2) consecutive turns.*

Additional Winning Condition: Must control all spaces along COIN friendly border except for spaces containing water.

Leg 1: Legitimacy and Control: “The government must build legitimacy and control with the people.” ¹³⁰

*The Counterinsurgent gains one additional legitimacy point for every **four Security Forces** or **two Essential Services** established at the beginning of the deployment phase. Once this has provided three (3) legitimacy points the player must move to Leg 2.*

Leg 2: Identify Insurgents: “Use the legitimacy and control from Leg 1 so that the people will identify the insurgent infrastructure.” ¹³¹

*The Counterinsurgent may remove any one additional **Auxiliary for every one (1) DIMEFIL Card** used this turn. Once this has been used three (3) times the player **must** move to Leg 3.*

Leg 3: Direct Action: Once the government has created the first two conditions of Leg 1 and Leg 2 with the people, then the government can use direct action (Leg 3) to weaken the insurgent through force.¹³²

The Counterinsurgent can re-roll one attack dice per attack. If the Insurgent is within three points of winning the game, the Counterinsurgent can revert back to Leg 2 for only one (1) turn.

Leg 4: External Diplomacy: “The government must also address international actors by using diplomacy to build relevance with external actors.” ¹³³

¹³⁰ Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 5–6.

¹³¹ Wendt, 5–6.

¹³² Wendt, 5–6.

¹³³ Wendt, 5–6.

*Receive one additional recruitment point for every **supported space** along the border with an adjacent friendly country, neutral country, or international waters.*

Leg 5: Reduce External Support to Insurgents: “The government must reduce the external support that the insurgents will receive including sanctuary and resources.”¹³⁴

Reduce the Insurgent’s recruitment points by one (1) during the following turn for every space along the border with any adjacent country or international waters that is occupied by the Counterinsurgent.

U.S. COIN Doctrine

COIN is “a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”¹³⁵ This is not a military-only approach. A coordinated effort between the military and civil agencies and organizations is required to successfully conduct COIN. The U.S. can find itself conducting COIN in one of two ways: intervening on the behalf of another government, such as during the Salvadorian Civil War, or after major combat operations as the U.S.-backed established government faces an insurgency, such as in Iraq.¹³⁶ Regardless, a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) effort is critical to success.

*At the beginning of each deployment phase, the Counterinsurgent **must select one COIN Tenet**. The Counterinsurgent **must select a different tenet each turn**.*

Additional Winning Condition: Must control the majority of the urban and suburban spaces (6/10).

COIN Tenet - Understanding the Operational Environment. This tenant describes the importance of a detailed understanding of the situation, culture, dynamics, and participants to ensure there is full preparation for COIN operations. Within the first tenet, there are other aspects of consideration: sociocultural knowledge, or an

¹³⁴ Wendt, 5–6.

¹³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, GL-5.

¹³⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, I–1.

understanding of how and why the society interacts; understanding host nation partners, their capabilities, and how they interact with the population; preparation for a long term commitment; and learning and adapting, which is critical to an ongoing understanding of the OE.¹³⁷ Ultimately this is all an intellectual preparation to ensure that an effective COIN strategy can be employed.

*The recruitment point cost for **DIMEFIL Cards** are reduced by one.*

COIN Tenet - Developing the COIN Narrative which aims to overcome and overwhelm the resistance or insurgent narrative.¹³⁸ Given that the interaction between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is a struggle for legitimacy and support of the population, each side will inherently have to a narrative, or storyline, to further their objectives. This means that careful thought must occur to display the credibility of the counterinsurgent, attack the shortcomings and mistakes of the resistance or insurgency, and capitalize on successes of the legitimate government.

*The **Local Government** gains one legitimacy point for every engagement where **Guerrilla Fighters** are completely removed from a space or when a space comes under the **control** of the Counterinsurgent. This is not applicable if the insurgent withdraws. This is **only applicable to one (1) urban location and/or two (2) suburban locations**.*

COIN Tenet – “Primacy of Politics” is designed to ensure that a political solution is found to end the insurgency.¹³⁹ The goals of a resistance or insurgency are political in nature. While military action will take primacy in the beginning of the struggle, it cannot remain the main focus, as it is the diplomatic or political solution that will result in the end of hostilities.

*For every **Local Government** on the game board at the **beginning of the deployment phase**, the Counter Insurgent gains two additional recruitment points.*

¹³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-7-III-9.

¹³⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-9.

¹³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-10.

COIN Tenet “Population Security.”¹⁴⁰ During the struggle over power and legitimacy, the government and resistance or insurgency find themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum, with the population in the middle. It is the population who will ultimately determine who wins the struggle, through support to one side or the other. The security of the population goes beyond the use of physical security forces, and includes the reinforcement of a just rule of law, a fair legal system, and rules of engagement (ROE) of security and military forces that prevents further harm to the population.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, security of the population means isolating the resistance or insurgency. As described before, the components of a resistance or insurgency are the auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla force, each of which draws from and is supported by the population. The more effectively the counterinsurgent can provide security to the populous, the more effectively it can isolate the insurgent.

*For every counterinsurgent **occupied** space where the **Security Forces** equal to or greater than the number of the population at the beginning of the deployment phase, the Counterinsurgent gains **one additional recruitment point**.*

COIN Tenet - “Unity of Command and Unity of Effort,” which describes the importance of all forces being under one central command structure to enable that all actions and efforts are working towards that same goals.¹⁴² Additionally, this tenet focuses of the importance of working within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national (JIIM) environment to utilize authorities, expertise, and funding to the fullest extent.

*Counterinsurgent wins ties during engagements when **Security Forces** occupy the same space as the **Local Government**.*

¹⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-11.

¹⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-12-III-13.

¹⁴² Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-15.

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APPENDIX C. PLAYTESTING QUESTIONNAIRE

A. PRE-GAME

Were any of the wargame rules confusing and if so which ones, and why?

Was the read ahead scenario sufficient in depicting a complete background in preparation for playing the wargame? If not, what would you add or subtract from the read ahead packet in order to improve player situational awareness prior to the start of the wargame?

What recommendations or changes would you implement in order to improve player preparation prior to the start of the wargame?

B. GAME PLAY

What elements of the wargame were effective in helping you understand insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies?

What elements of the wargame were not effective in helping you understand insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies?

How would you improve the wargame board in order to present a more logical and coherent environment?

Were the requirements for winning the wargame achievable given the rules, strategies, and capabilities afforded to you as a player? If not, how would you alter the conditions to win in order to make them more achievable?

What player capabilities or game mechanics would you add or subtract in order to better influence the other players strategy?

C. POST-GAME PLAY

What parts of the wargame would you modify in order to improve their functionality?

What parts of the wargame would you eliminate?

How would you modify the aspect of time (Days, Months, Years) per player turn in the wargame in order to better replicate the duration of an insurgency and counter insurgency campaign?

D. OVERALL GAME PLAY

Is there any part of the wargame (design, gameplay, rules) that you would change that has not been covered in the previous questions?

APPENDIX D. *REBELS AND STATES* IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

While *Rebels and States* was designed primarily to be used as a teaching tool for individuals unfamiliar with the fundamental strategies of UW and COIN, a secondary objective is to provide a planning tool for military units preparing to deploy. Currently the U.S. military is sending units into the Middle East, which has significant insurgent activity. This appendix will provide examples for how the wargame *Rebels and States* can be set up or modified to reflect the modern-day conditions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These three countries have been selected because they have significant presence of forward deployed U.S. troops with 8,600 in Afghanistan, 5,200 in Iraq, and 500 in Syria.¹⁴³

As any wargame is an abstraction of reality, the modifications proposed in this appendix are also abstractions designed to best reflect the physical and human terrain of each country. With such abstractions in place, it must be understood that the wargame will not provide detailed analytical answers to solve specific problems within any given country or within the region as a whole. The wargame will, however, provide a mechanism for unit leaders to experiment with potential strategies or distribution of forces. For individuals with little experience in the region, the wargame can serve as a way to introduce soldiers to the area of operations. With the following modifications for the Middle East region, *Rebels and States* will provide players with a method to conduct experiential learning and begin to explore the region, ask questions, and prepare for their mission long before they step foot into a country.

A. AFGHANISTAN VERSION OF *REBELS AND STATES*

The United States initiated combat operations in Afghanistan in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Since the invasion, the war in Afghanistan has gone through three phases: the offensive operations to remove the Taliban, rebuilding the

¹⁴³ Eric Schmitt, "Top General in Middle East Says U.S. Troop Levels Will Drop in Iraq and Syria," *New York Times*, August 12, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/world/middleeast/american-troops-iraq-syria.html>.

Afghan government, and a counterinsurgency campaign to stabilize the country.¹⁴⁴ As of September 2020, the Taliban insurgency continues despite several U.S. attempts to deliver a peace settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The physical and human terrain of Afghanistan will be analyzed and converted into rules for *Rebels and States* so players can create a gameboard that reflects the current Taliban insurgency and the counterinsurgent efforts of the United States.

1. Afghanistan Physical Terrain

Afghanistan is a country covered predominantly by the rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush with arid plains in the north and southwest. See Figure 19 for reference.



Figure 19. Physiographic Map of Afghanistan, 2009.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Griff Witte, “Afghanistan War: History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline,” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 16, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>.

¹⁴⁵ Source: “Afghanistan,” University of Texas, September 16, 2020, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_physio-2009.jpg.

The proposed wargame board (Figure 20) reflects the physical terrain represented in Figure 19. It must be noted that this proposed wargame board does not include the seven water hexagon spaces and one unrestricted space that was included in the original version of *Rebels and States*. As Afghanistan is landlocked without major bodies of water, these spaces were left out.




Figure 20. Afghanistan Gameboard for *Rebels and States*

a. Afghanistan Human Terrain

As Afghanistan has been in the midst of conflict since 2001, reliable census data is difficult to generate and therefore all population figures for the wargames are derived from estimations. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),

the estimated total population of Afghanistan in 2014–2015 is 26,556,754 individuals.¹⁴⁶ Figure 21 demonstrates the estimated demographics of the country by province.




Figure 21. Afghanistan Population Distribution, 2014–2015.¹⁴⁷

The small map located in the bottom right corner in Figure 21 with estimations of population by province was used to replicate population numbers for each respective space within the wargame. While the hexagonal spaces do not directly correlate to the varying shapes of each Afghan province, the location of the population spaces can help clearly

¹⁴⁶ “Afghanistan: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2014–2015 - Afghanistan,” ReliefWeb, August 29, 2015, <https://reliefweb.int/map/afghanistan/afghanistan-central-statistics-organization-cso-estimated-population-2014-2015>.

¹⁴⁷ Source: ReliefWeb.

identify densely populated areas that often correlate to strategic terrain. For example, the capital of Kabul is indicated by the population number 6. While the province of Herat has a large population, the population indicator of 6 was located approximately where Kabul is located to reflect the density of Afghan government power and influence that are centralized in the Afghan capital. The strategically important cities of Kandahar, Herat, Ghazni, and Kunduz were given population values of 5 and 4 to reflect their strategic value to both the Afghan government as well as to the insurgent Taliban.




Figure 22. Afghanistan Population Distribution for *Rebels and States*

b. *Afghan Political, Social, Economic, Security, and Information Environments*

A primary step to *Rebels and States* is establishing the initial environment for the wargame. This is represented in a total of five environment card categories: Politics, Society, Economics, Media, and Security Forces. The appropriate card that best represents the current Afghan environment will be selected and discussed.

(1) Political Environment Card

The political environment card “Democracy” will be selected, which states the following:

The state is designed to function well, giving the people the ability to exercise direct power over heads of state and all matters. Yet it has suffered at times from the population’s perception of politics, resulting in constant reforms. Insurgent starts with two (2) undergrounds that can be placed at a 2 or below.

The current Afghan government was established in 2004 under a constitution that provides for a directly elected president with two vice presidents.¹⁴⁸ However, there is an argument to be made that Afghanistan in reality represents more of a religious oligarchy where a group of religious elites make critical national decisions in the forms of Loya Jirga, a specially convened national assembly.¹⁴⁹ For the purposes of the wargame, however, the fact that democracy environment card provides the insurgent with two headquarters units (underground forces) better reflects the fact that the Taliban have well established leadership networks, especially in rural areas where the Afghan government is limited in its ability to assert authority or control over the population.

(2) Social Environment Card

The social environment card “Glass Society” will be selected, which states the following:

There seems to be fragile peace between the classes, but a hesitance to trust outsiders. The upper class seems to flaunt their money through handouts.

¹⁴⁸ Witte, “Afghanistan War: History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline.”

¹⁴⁹ Witte.

The lower class has animosity towards the rich. The middle class just tries to keep the status quo. No advantage.

This social environment card is selected to reflect the immense variety and differences that separate the numerous ethnic and tribal identities that make up Afghan society. The non-homogeneous nature of Afghan society is a feature that does advantage the Taliban insurgency, who often uses social variation to prevent the Afghan government from unifying the population. This advantage, however, does not warrant a significant starting bonus for the insurgent as the varying social identities also hinders the Taliban from providing a unified alternative government option to all the respective tribes.

(3) Security Environment Card

The security environment card “volunteer” will be selected, which states the following:

No mandatory service. Every person can make their own way through the ranks. This allows the security forces to focus on quality over quantity, making in a force to be reckoned with. It is seen as a pure example of what society could be. COIN player is allowed to re-roll their lowest dice on the first three engagements.

The volunteer environment card reflects the status of the Afghan armed forces. Despite the inherent problems of corruption and inconsistency in the Afghan military, the army is one of the few government institutions capable of projecting power in key regions of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Kunduz. The essential caveat to the Afghan military’s ability to project power is due to influence from the international community in the form of Operation Resolute Support.¹⁵⁰ Without this external support, the Afghan military would not be able to project influence throughout Afghanistan. Despite the projected reductions in U.S. troops, the Afghan military is still receiving external assistance and therefore, the “volunteer” card bonus for the counterinsurgent during engagements is adequate for the initial wargame setup.

¹⁵⁰ Traian Magherca, “The Evolution of the Afghan National Army from 2001 to the Present,” *Bulletin of “Carol”: National Defence University* 8, no. 4 (2019): 35, <https://revista.unap.ro/index.php/bulletin/article/view/667>.

(4) Economy Environment Card

The economy environment card “capitalist” will be selected which states the following:

This economic system allows the private owner to produce and operate on their own for profit. It also somewhat regulates the prices and wages. Private ownership means private ventures so long as they stay under the government’s radar. Insurgent receives two (2) auxiliaries.

Extensive economic foreign assistance from the Soviet Union and the U.S. has created a modern Afghan economy that reflects a capitalist system when related to foreign trade, mining, and some other profitable industries.¹⁵¹ For the purposes of *Rebels and States*, the capitalist card reflects the insurgent’s advantage in the rural economy especially in regards to opiate production and timber harvesting along with other illicit services that continue to fund the Taliban. While the Afghan government receives substantial economic support from the international community, the corruption and financial mismanagement places the counterinsurgent at a significant disadvantage in the wargame.

(5) Media Environment Card

The media environment card “skeptical” will be selected which states the following:

The media reports everything, but always with a grain of salt. There are no winners in this reporting, because everything has a sense of a conspiracy tied to it. It’s not tied to any party or class. It’s almost as if it wants to create suspense within the audience. No advantage.

Since the Taliban’s demise, the local press has substantially increased with new publications. Dozens of newspapers and magazines have appeared and the low literacy rate is off set by the long-standing tradition of reading newspapers aloud that has greatly expanded the number of Afghans who have access to the printed word.¹⁵² The increase in Afghan reporting is also supported by increased access to digital media through wireless communications. The skeptical environment card reflects the initial game state where

¹⁵¹ Witte, “Afghanistan War: History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline.”

¹⁵² Witte.

neither the insurgent nor counterinsurgent has a significant advantage in the information space.

B. SYRIAN VERSION OF *REBELS AND STATES*

The conflict in Syria began in 2011 with a peaceful domestic uprising, but turned into a violent conflict when President Bashar al-Assad brutally responded, causing significant upheaval in the region.¹⁵³ A critical challenge in the Syrian conflict is the interactions of multiple actors within the country. A rudimentary summary of these actors includes: the Islamic State (IS), the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, Syrian Opposition Forces, Turkey, the United States, and Russia.¹⁵⁴ *Rebels and States* is designed as a two-player game however, this presents an opportunity to both convert the map and modify the game structure to account for multiple players. Both the modifications to the game board to account for physical terrain and a proposal for incorporating different players will be discussed in order to account for the unique conflict dynamics in Syria.

1. Syrian Physical Terrain

The landscape of Syria is predominantly a semiarid and desert plateau with a narrow coastal plain and a series of mountain ranges in the west. Syria borders the countries of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. See the following map (Figure 23) as a reference for the physical terrain of the country.

¹⁵³ Michael Singh et al., *Syria Study Group Final Report and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2019), 4, <https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo126197/syria-study-group-final-report.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ Singh et al., 1.



Figure 23. CIA Physiographic Map of Syria, 2007.¹⁵⁵

Figure 24 represents how to array the hexagonal spaces to reflect the physical terrain of the country to create the Syria version of the *Rebels and States* wargame board. As the hexagonal pieces are limited to the 30 original hexes of *Rebels and States*, the array of desert hexes on the wargame board is not directly proportional to the great expanse of desert that is along the southern border of Syria. The proposed wargame board (Figure 24) is a substantial abstraction in this regard but will not hinder the overall gameplay as this reflects a mostly unpopulated region of Syria.

¹⁵⁵ Source: "Syria Physiography," CIA, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Syria_Physiography.pdf.




Figure 24. Syria Gameboard for *Rebels and States*

2. Syrian Human Terrain

The conflict in Syria has significantly decreased the population as over 5 million refugees fled the fighting between 2011 and 2018.¹⁵⁶ Demographic maps (Figure 25) indicate that a predominant portion of the Syrian population resides in the western regions of the country with significant concentrations in the major cities of Aleppo and Damascus with populations over 1.5 million people.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ "Syria Population 2020," World Population Review, September 18, 2020, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population>.

¹⁵⁷ World Population Review.




Figure 25. Syria Population Distribution, 2002.¹⁵⁸

The proposed *Rebels and States* wargame board (Figure 26) for Syria reflects the substantial population located in the western regions of the country. While Damascus and Aleppo are nearly equal in population, Damascus is indicated by the population number of 6 to reflect its status as the capital of the country. The zero population numbers located in the south and eastern portion of the wargame board are designed to reflect the emptiness of the southern Syrian desert. While there is an argument to account for the strategic importance of the oil fields located in the southern Syrian desert, this particular population wargame board design is focused on population centers as opposed to critical infrastructure.

¹⁵⁸ Source: David Dean Commins, "Syria - Settlement Patterns," Encyclopædia Britannica, September 18, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria>.




Figure 26. Syrian Population Distribution for *Rebels and States*

3. Representing Active Forces Within the Syrian Conflict

The Syrian conflict involves a complicated blend of forces and international actors that must be accounted for in a Syrian version of *Rebels and States*. A simplification of the insurgent and counterinsurgent actors within Syria can equate to three forces consisting of the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, and Syrian opposition forces. Russia and the United States do have a military presence within the conflict; however, these are only a small number of advisors so for the purposes of the wargame do not constitute a large enough force to merit two additional and separate players. Turkey does have a significant military presence and is aligned with Syrian militias; however, the Turkish intervention is based on

“stopping the Syrian regimes massacre as well as radical groups and the displacement of civilians.”¹⁵⁹ This does not align with the intent of the wargame to establish predominant influence in the entire country and therefore only the three forces of Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, and Syrian opposition forces will be included as players within the wargame. The Islamic State is also not included in this example as they have become a latent insurgency and do not hold enough significant terrain to be included in this proposed wargame board. If players wish to add the Islamic State as an additional insurgency, then they can simply add the player without limitations on where they can be initially arrayed before the first turn of the wargame. Leaving Turkey and IS out of this example is a significant abstraction from reality but it is a necessary modification in order to maintain initial wargame playability.

In order to modify the game to account for the three players as opposed to a two-player system, two game functions including the initial array of forces and the turn order of operations must be modified. These modifications do not alter the core rules of the game, they only alter the starting condition and sequence of alternating turns.

a. Initial Array of Forces

The Syrian conflict is made more complex by elements of insurgency combined with elements of conventional warfare where battle lines have been established between opposing forces. The initial array of forces for the three players therefore will be predetermined in order to reflect the disposition of the Syrian government, Syrian Kurds, and Syrian Opposition Forces in 2019.

¹⁵⁹ Jen Kirby, “Why Turkey Launched a Major Offensive Against the Syrian Government,” Vox, March 2, 2020, <https://www.vox.com/2020/3/2/21161293/turkey-offensive-idlib-syria>.




Figure 27. Areas of Influence in Syria, May 2019.¹⁶⁰

Using the Areas of Influence map (Figure 27) of Syria as a basis for the initial distribution of forces, the locations in Figure 28 are predesignated for the initial array of forces. Syrian government forces would be restricted initially arraying forces in the areas designated in red that are located predominantly in southwestern Syria. Syrian opposition forces would be restricted to initially arraying their forces in the areas designated in the two green areas located in northern and southern Syria. Syrian Kurds would be restricted in their initial array of forces to the areas indicated in blue in northeast Syria. From these initial positions, players can begin to assert their influence and navigate potential future outcomes of the conflict.

¹⁶⁰ Source: Singh et al., *Syria Study Group Final Report and Recommendations*, 6.




Figure 28. Initial Array of Forces for Syrian Version of *Rebels and States*

b. Three Player Turn Order of Operations

An essential element to modifying *Rebels and States* into a three-player game requires adaptations to the sequence in which players put their forces on the board and then alternate turns between players. In the two-player version of *Rebels and States*, the counterinsurgent player arrays their forces first followed by the insurgent player. For the proposed three player version of *Rebels and States*, the Syrian Government player will be the counterinsurgent and would place their forces first. The Syrian Kurds and Syrian Opposition player will function as the insurgents and therefore will both roll a dice. The player with the lowest dice roll will establish their forces after the Syrian government player is finished, followed by the player with the highest dice roll. The randomization of the dice roll is necessary in establishing a clear order of arraying forces onto the board. While this offers the player who arrays their forces last a slight advantage, the fact that all players initial deployment areas are restricted limits this advantage.

In the original version of *Rebels and States*, the insurgent player gets the first turn which then alternates between counterinsurgent and insurgent. In the three player Syrian version of *Rebels and States* with one counterinsurgent and two insurgents, it will be necessary to establish a randomized turn sequence between the three players to represent the capricious nature of combat operations in modern day Syria. Each game turn will consist of three player turns that will be randomly decided by the roll of a dice. The highest dice roll of the three can elect to go first, second or third in the game turn sequence. The next highest dice roll of the three can choose between the remaining two positions in the game sequence and the lowest dice roll gets the final remaining position. This process will be repeated for every new game turn. This randomization and change in player turns during each subsequent game turn simulates the constant change of initiative and advantage within the Syrian conflict. While the dice roll randomizes the method for choosing the player turn order during each game turn, the players who choose the appropriate player turn position will significantly maximize their advantage within the wargame.

C. IRAQ VERSION OF *REBELS AND STATES*

Iraq presents a Middle Eastern case study for insurgency where a once unified and relatively powerful country was destroyed by a global power in a large conventional war and the reconstruction effort failed due to the subsequent insurgency. In comparison to Afghanistan and Syria, Iraq has a more stable physical infrastructure and political system and therefore presents an opportunity to modify *Rebels and States* to assess an established, albeit weak, Middle Eastern government dealing with a strong insurgency supported by powerful external actors. Despite the recent destruction of the territorial caliphate, the Islamic State has successfully transitioned into a well-entrenched and active insurgency that has taken advantage of the Iraqi governments problematic decisions to bolster their narrative.¹⁶¹ A key element of conflict in Iraq is the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia. This section will propose both a method for generating the physical and human terrain

¹⁶¹ Zachary Cleary, "A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: The Islamic State's Transition to Insurgency and the Iraqi Mistakes That Have Aided It," *The Illini Journal Of International Security* 5, no. 1 (January 28, 2020): 38, <https://katla.cites.illinois.edu/index.php/IJOIS/article/view/638>.




Figure 30. Iraq Gameboard for *Rebels and States*

Due to the predominance of unrestricted desert terrain in Iraq, the proposed wargame board converts three severely restricted mountain hexagons into three unrestricted desert hexagons. For these proposed wargame boards, every effort is designed to use as much of the original gameboard as possible in order to reduce additional construction requirements on the players. The conversion of hexagon terrain spaces in this case is a necessary requirement in order to create a board that adequately reflects the physical terrain of Iraq.

2. Iraq Human Terrain

The population of Iraq is located predominantly in the central, eastern and northern regions of the country in the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.




Figure 31. Iraq Population Density, 2016.¹⁶³

The proposed wargame board for the Iraq version of *Rebels and States* (Figure 32) follows the particularly concentrated nature of the Iraq population. The capital Baghdad is indicated with population marker of six. The major cities of Mosul, Erbil and Basrah are indicated with a population marker of 5.

¹⁶³ Source: "Iraq Population Density," OCHA, 2016, https://external-preview.redd.it/38M9o64_aGj8uQ9myy4zJJJe3kVQAcDpqVHZRRA7LdpU.png?auto=webp&s=737d92c1de4651d36e9205c2f17e85cd85bb03d1.




Figure 32. Iraq Population Distribution for *Rebels and States*

3. Game Modifications to Reflect the Sunni and Shia Divide

The Iraq version of *Rebels and States* would be best served with a game modification that represents the sectarian conflict that arises from the division between Sunni and Shia Muslims within the country. In order to account for this, a generic game rule will be applied to reflect how either the insurgent or counterinsurgent gains advantages or disadvantages based on the predominance of either a Sunni or Shia population. The Iraqi version of *Rebels and States* has the insurgent player representing the IS insurgency and

the counterinsurgent player representing the Iraqi government. Because of the social, judicial, and economic abuses against the Sunni population by the Iraqi government, areas with predominant Sunni populations will serve as recruiting grounds and support areas for the IS insurgency.¹⁶⁴ Conversely, the Iraqi government has predominantly been an institution that supports Shia initiatives and therefore will have an advantage within the wargame in areas with a Shia majority.¹⁶⁵ It is noted that the new Iraqi prime minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, intends to unite the different Iraqi groups in the new government, however, the Iraqi government and IS will still have to overcome the historic divide between both Sunni and Shia in order to reach their separate objectives.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, the following rule is proposed to reflect the sectarian divide within Iraq:

Insurgent: In order to establish an auxiliary or underground within a space with a Shia majority, the insurgent player must pay one additional recruitment point.

Counterinsurgent: In order to establish an essential service or underground within a space with a Sunni majority, the counterinsurgent player must pay one additional recruitment point.

The additional imposed cost to both support and headquarters units for both players will reinforce the lesson that areas with a significant religious majority have a substantial impact on the outcome of any insurgent conflict within Iraq. The following map (Figure 33) indicates the Sunni and Shia divide within the country.

¹⁶⁴ Cleary, "A Return to Insurgency in Iraq," 41.

¹⁶⁵ Cleary, 40.

¹⁶⁶ Nathalie Bussemaker, "Iraq's New Government: What to Know," Council on Foreign Relations, August 11, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/iraqs-new-government-what-know>.




Figure 33. Ethnic Composition of Iraq.¹⁶⁷

Using Figure 33 as a guide, the following modification to the Iraq version of the *Rebels and States* wargame board (Figure 34) reflects the predominance of either Sunni or Shia in the associated hexagonal spaces.

¹⁶⁷ Source: *Iraq Ethnic Composition*, Michael Izady, accessed November 11, 2020, www.Gulf2000.Columbia.edu/maps.shtml.




Figure 34. Wargame Board for *Rebels and States* with Sunni and Shia Modification

The Sunni and Shia modification for *Rebels and States* does not incorporate the predominant Kurdish population in Northern Iraq because the Kurdish population offers no significant advantage or disadvantage to the insurgent and counterinsurgent within the context of the proposed wargame modification. If the players wished to incorporate the Kurds into the wargame, we propose adding a third player as described in the Syria modification (Figure 10) of *Rebels and States*. The capital of Baghdad is also not included in the proposed modification because the capital is on the ethnic dividing line between Sunni and Shia of Figure 14 and because of the political authority and concentration of power within the Iraqi capital.

D. CONCLUSION

The wargame *Rebels and States* can be modified in order to reflect modern insurgent conflicts in the Middle East. The physical and human terrain of Afghanistan was analyzed to create a wargame board that reflects the current Afghan insurgency and modifications were made to the starting environment cards to represent the two decades of conflict. The physical and human terrain of Syria was assessed to create a wargame board while modifications to the number of players and turn order of operations were proposed to account for the multiple actors within the conflict. The physical and human terrain of Iraq was analyzed to create a generic game modification to account for the sectarian conflict within the country. It must be noted that each of these game modifications are significant abstractions of the reality within the three countries and are designed to enhance the context of the wargame. The intent of the modifications is to change the rules of *Rebels and States* in order to reflect particular aspects of the insurgent conflict from which players can initiate discussion and assess challenging scenarios. Players can use any combination of the proposed modifications if they wish to explore different aspects of the social, historical, political, or religious environments of a country within the context of an insurgency. However, each modification added creates another layer of complexity which can reduce playability of the overall wargame.

Due to the fragile state of many modern Middle Eastern countries, there remains significant potential for insurgent conflict. Global Jihadism according to Glenn Robinson, is currently in the “Fourth Wave of Personal Jihad” where the relatively marginal jihadi movement is in a state of looming demise.¹⁶⁸ This fragile state has the potential to push jihadis to establish latent insurgencies as the region continues to destabilize. With the potential for continued insurgent conflict within the region, the modifications for the wargame *Rebels and States* can help units prepare for future Middle Eastern insurgent conflicts.

¹⁶⁸ Glenn E. Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020), 70–88.

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APPENDIX E. CHINESE COIN AND APPLICATION TO *REBELS AND STATES*

A. INTRODUCTION

To function within the wide array of potential conflict options, a SOF operator must thoroughly understand insurgency and counterinsurgency. Thus far, the wargame *Rebels and States* has been focused on a fabricated country that changes from iteration to iteration. While *Rebels and States* is intended to be an educational wargame that introduces the baseline theories from the SFQC, it can be altered to play realistic scenarios as well.

In the era of GPC, and as China's influence and power grows, it must consider utilizing its expanded military might to garner power and authority within INDOPACOM, and possibly beyond. China can export its COIN methodology to aid allies in immediate and potential conflicts. If USSF are going to be expected to execute its mandated mission of UW, and China is the opposing power, then an analysis of Chinese COIN methodology and tenets is necessary. Therefore, it is imperative that USSF understand this methodology to defeat it, either directly or indirectly, and prevent China from becoming an alternative to the U.S. and its allies for security and stability. This appendix answers the following questions: What is China's COIN methodology? Are there tenets that can be drawn from this methodology? How can this be translated into *Rebels and States* to educate players in the interaction between insurgency and specifically Chinese COIN?

This appendix first looks at a brief history of Chinese COIN since 9/11, with the focus being on the western province of Xinjiang. Next, Chinese COIN tactics are be discussed using the instruments of national power to discuss where and how China places emphasis. Third, we propose five key Chinese COIN tenets. Finally, these tenets are translated into rules for *Rebels and States* to give players a more realistic educational experience.

B. RECENT HISTORY OF CHINESE INSURGENCY ISSUES IN XINJIANG

Xinjiang is home to a large Uighur Muslim population who for centuries saw themselves as their own state and governed their own people. Many Chinese dynasties and

leaders have attempted to pacify and annex the region, but to this day both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Uighur population lay claim to the region.¹⁶⁹ Despite the Qing Dynasty successfully unifying China in 1757, the Uighur population still considered themselves an autonomous entity, providing the friction that has created centuries on conflict.¹⁷⁰ The people of Xinjiang first proclaimed their independence as the new country of East Turkestan in 1933, establishing itself as decidedly anti-China and becoming a “defacto Soviet satellite.”¹⁷¹ In 1942, Xinjiang became a part of China after anti-Soviet sentiment grew, but in 1944 Xinjiang again declared independence after trade with the Soviet Union was cut off.¹⁷² Then, in 1949 Mao Tse Tung unified China after his opposition, including the forces in Xinjiang, surrendered.¹⁷³ Despite Mao and his successors numerous attempts to tame the Uighur population in Xinjiang, opposition still simmered.

In the 1980s anti-China sentiment and violence started to increase. China responded with the first of its “Strike Hard” campaigns in 1983, which aimed to completely destroy the Uighur population.¹⁷⁴ The Strike Hard policy imposed “harsh punishment in a swift manner on criminals who jeopardize public security and social order,” and targeted religious ideology, combining “separatism, terrorism, and extremism” as one in the same.¹⁷⁵ This campaign only codified the Uighur struggle against the CCP, and when the

¹⁶⁹ J. S. Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang” (Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 19, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA485612>.

¹⁷⁰ Laronde, 17–18.

¹⁷¹ Adam Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018” (Master’s Thesis, Charles University, 2019), 31, <https://dodo.is.cuni.cz/handle/20.500.11956/110060>.

¹⁷² Englund, 32–33.

¹⁷³ Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 19.

¹⁷⁴ Laronde, 58.

¹⁷⁵ Enshen Li, “China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era,” *New Criminal Law Review* 19, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 352, <https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2016.19.3.344>; Waqas Ali Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang: The Success Potential” (Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth United States, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2015), 51, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1020463>.

Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the embers of resistance caught flame again.¹⁷⁶ The increased insurgent and terrorist activity resulted in a second Strike Hard campaign that ended in 1997.¹⁷⁷ That same year, China began to expand legal definitions of insurgency and terrorism, and in 2001 it truly began to capitalize on the Global War on Terror's (GWOT) momentum of pursuing and eliminating resistance and terror threats.¹⁷⁸

The beginning of GWOT marked a shift in the emphasis China placed in its COIN strategy. From 1990—2001 more than 160 people were killed and 440 were injured in 200+ acts of insurgency, terrorism, or violence associated with the Uighur population, priming China to make respond dramatically.¹⁷⁹ The events on 9/11, and the United States' heavy handed reaction, gave China the opportunity to expand its COIN strategy and practice.

C. CHINESE COIN UTILIZING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

The use of DIMEFIL, who controls it, and how it addresses the issues and grievances of a population is key to the insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle. We have already incorporated these instruments of national power into *Rebels and States* due to its significance. In the section, we will utilize DIMEFIL to analyze China's COIN tactics, providing examples of how each addresses the Xinjiang insurgency issue. The following section will use this analysis to propose tenets of Chinese COIN.

1. Diplomacy

As in every insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle, the battle between the two sides is about some form of legitimacy, and in Xinjiang it is no different. The government must consider resistance as a threat that must be immediately disposed of before other

¹⁷⁶ Englund, "Analysis of China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018," 39–40.

¹⁷⁷ Laronde, "Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang," 58.

¹⁷⁸ Li, "China's New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era," 355.

¹⁷⁹ Martin I. Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, Asian Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008), 42.

secessionist movements make attempts to separate from China.¹⁸⁰ In Xinjiang, the political struggle has resulted in the CCP's focus on the "political nature of the threat."¹⁸¹ As a result, domestic and international diplomacy has taken center stage in China's COIN strategy to display the CCP's ability to overcome the Xinjiang insurgency and garner continued support of its people.¹⁸²

China's local level of diplomacy ensure and maintains the CCP's initiative and goals, providing momentum to its overall COIN strategy. In Xinjiang, the local government has a two-track system that simultaneously follows the state, only occasionally run by a Uighur, and the party, run by a Han Chinese who is slightly superior, when governing the region.¹⁸³ The CCP has co-opted Uighur leaders within the "fangzu system" that unofficially sees to the village level concerns; These leaders in turn have received economic benefits to ensure the party's priorities are fulfilled.¹⁸⁴ Given the influence of the party and government at every level, local leaders err on the side of stability in the eyes of the CCP or risk their family or well-being.¹⁸⁵ This dual track diplomacy reinforces the vision and ideals for CCP's description of stability.

Internationally, China has increased its relations with other countries to combat its insurgency and terrorism problem. It has "relentlessly pursued" diplomatic relations with region countries, such as Pakistan, or organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation (SCO), to expand its COIN strategy.¹⁸⁶ With Pakistan, China has provided diplomatic support in

¹⁸⁰ Englund, "Analysis of China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018," 57; Brenda Ong, "Hard Love and Empty Promises: China's Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal," Small Wars Journal, June 18, 2012, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hard-love-and-empty-promises-china%E2%80%99s-domestic-counterinsurgency-in-xinjiang>.

¹⁸¹ Ong, "Hard Love and Empty Promises: China's Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal"; Martin I. Wayne, "China's Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang," in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 344, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203132609.ch27>.

¹⁸² Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 65.

¹⁸³ Wayne, 64, 97.

¹⁸⁴ Liselotte Odgaard and Thomas Galasz Nielsen, "China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang," *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 87 (May 4, 2014): 548, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.843934>.

¹⁸⁵ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 94.

¹⁸⁶ Khan, "The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang," 52.

exchange for a prevention of anti-China activities finding safe haven in Pakistan.¹⁸⁷ The SCO, which members include Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, looks to promote “peace, security, and stability in the region.”¹⁸⁸ Their actions are COIN and terrorism-focused, with China serving as a permanent and influential member. China has capitalized on the diplomatic relations established through the SCO to expand their influence, even creating a “joint SCO judicial training center” that undoubtedly educates its students in China’s COIN strategy and tactics.¹⁸⁹

2. Information

Information is critical to China’s COIN effort, both domestically and internationally. It is the cornerstone of a strategy that will fall apart if their information efforts do not remain effective.¹⁹⁰ Information is what drives the message that the CCP maintains control of the security in the country, meeting the citizens call for stability, and reinforces President Xi’s priority of national unity.¹⁹¹ China’s use of information has three themes: a people’s struggle, information control, and educational development.

The theme that COIN in China is a “people’s struggle” nests neatly within citizens’ call for stability because it immediately places responsibility back on the citizens themselves. The CCP regularly uses internet service providers (ISPs) to filter and disseminate information and report on any suspicious insurgent and terrorist activity.¹⁹² The residents of Xinjiang are called upon to monitor the tens of thousands of security

¹⁸⁷ Rashid Khan, “Pakistan and China: Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism,” *Strategic Studies* 32, no. 4–33:1 (2012): 74–75.

¹⁸⁸ Martin Purbrick, “Maintaining a Unitary State: Counter-Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism in Xinjiang and China,” *Asian Affairs* 48, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 170, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2017.1313595>.

¹⁸⁹ Thomas Wallace, “China and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure: An Organizational Analysis,” *Asian Security* 10, no. 3 (September 2, 2014): 202, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2014.976614>.

¹⁹⁰ Ong, “Hard Love and Empty Promises: China’s Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal.”

¹⁹¹ Wayne, “China’s Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang,” 340; Purbrick, “Maintaining a Unitary State,” 252.

¹⁹² Purbrick, “Maintaining a Unitary State,” 248.

cameras within the province, while also applying a “social credit” system to score citizens based on their economic and social behavior in an attempt to reinforce individual and collective accountability.¹⁹³ Citizens from outside of the troubled province are asked and incentivized to move to Xinjiang for the purposes of economic development, education, and monitoring in a modified “domestic peace corps” type structure.¹⁹⁴ By putting the responsibility back on citizens the CCP effectively reinforces the “sociopolitical feedback loop” that strengthens the government’s standing in the eyes of the citizens who call for increased security by merely supporting ground level efforts.¹⁹⁵

The CCP also has gone to great lengths in controlling the information within troubled areas, from manipulating media and messaging to fundamentally changing the perception of entire populations. The local government can, and has, censored and filtered all forms of information within a province, even going so far as to shutting down internet for extended periods.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the CCP controls who receives press credentials to ensure only approved news stories are published.¹⁹⁷ Besides controlling what messages and information are disseminated, entire campaigns of labelling the Uighur population have been produced beyond that of terrorists or insurgents. The way of thinking of the citizens of Xinjiang has been given a medical theme, where the population is in the midst of a “serious health crisis,” where the “tumors need to be eradicated” before it becomes a larger issue.¹⁹⁸ This control of information and reframing of populations emphasizes the insurgency issue and support of the rest of the population.

¹⁹³ Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 53, 55.

¹⁹⁴ Wayne, *China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 95.

¹⁹⁵ Wayne, 55.

¹⁹⁶ Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang,” 60; Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 42; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” *International Security* 44, no. 3 (January 1, 2020): 41, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368.

¹⁹⁷ Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 55.

¹⁹⁸ Greitens, Lee, and Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression,” 42.

The CCP also uses education as a means to suppress or even extinguish any thought of institutional resistance using a “transformation through education” approach.¹⁹⁹ Its main approach is through the use of re-education, where entire Uighur populations are taught approved ideological and political subjects in an attempt to “overwrite ethic and cultural autonomy,” keeping in line with the nationalistic theme.²⁰⁰ In another attempt to suppress culture and ethnicity, higher level education is only taught in Mandarin, forcing students to learn the official Chinese language and forgo their native tongue.²⁰¹ Even when not completely suppressing the Uighur Muslim culture, the CCP will only “certify” government trained Imams to serve as the leaders who provide religious education and interpretation.²⁰² The CCP’s control of information through education has a wholistic approach to suppressing anything that falls outside of its approved message.

3. Military and Law Enforcement

Since the CCP combines military and law enforcement, we will do the same for its analysis, but will break down this analysis into military and law enforcers, or the CCP’s use of its personnel and equipment, and law, or the CCP’s adjustment of its domestic laws to support its COIN approach.

Among the military and law enforcers breakdown there are again domestic and international considerations. The domestic considerations use a “4 in one” system that involves the use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and the ordinary citizen.²⁰³ Each

¹⁹⁹ Jerome Doyon, “‘Counter-Extremism’ in Xinjiang: Understanding China’s Community-Focused Counter-Terrorism Tactics,” *War on the Rocks*, January 14, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/counter-extremism-in-xinjiang-understanding-chinas-community-focused-counter-terrorism-tactics/>.

²⁰⁰ Greitens, Lee, and Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression,” 18, 26; Wayne, *China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 113.

²⁰¹ Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 55; “East Asia/Southeast Asia,” CIA, November 4, 2020, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

²⁰² Guiping Xie and Tianyang Liu, “Navigating Securities: Rethinking (Counter-)Terrorism, Stability Maintenance, and Non-Violent Responses in the Chinese Province of Xinjiang,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 1 (April 15, 2019): 13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1598386>.

²⁰³ Wayne, *China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 73.

serves a role within the COIN strategy. While the PLA initially found itself on the COIN front line, it has since moved to the frontier areas of Xinjiang, focusing more on border security, less on confrontation with insurgents, and providing support to paramilitary and security forces.²⁰⁴ Consequently, the PAP has taken on the role on internal security, law enforcement, and COIN.²⁰⁵ The PAP serves not only as law enforcement, but also as a paramilitary organization that supports the PLA in times of war, and “armed wing” of the CCP.²⁰⁶ The XPCC is a multifaceted paramilitary organization that “run schools, publish newspapers, have their own courts, police, and prisons” focused specifically on Xinjiang.²⁰⁷ Just as described in the information section, the people and citizens also serve a role in the military and enforcement system as well, either by joining paramilitary organizations, serving as stewards of the CCP, or providing information and intelligence to authorities. This system allows the military, law enforcement, and citizens to have local through national level support when fighting insurgency.

China’s international involvement with its neighbors includes multi-lateral cooperation, intelligence and information sharing, military exercises, and other collaborative actions. China, and its fellow SCO members have built a structure to mutually support each other’s efforts. It is this organization that coined the “three evils” of extremism, terrorism, and separatism.²⁰⁸ They bring together different entities for training and exercises that regularly results in the exchange of information and intelligence.²⁰⁹ Outside of the SCO, China and Pakistan have incredibly close military ties that have seen the two countries support each other’s COIN efforts, exchange information and experts,

²⁰⁴ Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 57; Khan, “Pakistan and China,” 58–59; Wayne, *China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 80; Wayne, “China’s Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang,” 342.

²⁰⁵ Wayne, *China’s War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 80.

²⁰⁶ Odgaard and Nielsen, “China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” 542; Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 50.

²⁰⁷ Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang,” 58–59; Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 49–50.

²⁰⁸ Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 61.

²⁰⁹ Wallace, “China and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure: An Organizational Analysis,” 205; Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 57.

and develop more effective measures.²¹⁰ This cooperation among neighbors during COIN campaigns undoubtedly strengthens military developments and effectiveness.

Since 2001, China has actively changed its laws to support its COIN efforts. Its laws are also intertwined with its information efforts. After the United State began to expand the insurgent and terrorism definitions after 9/11, the CCP successfully did the same with Uighur separatists and other minority groups.²¹¹ Now, so long as an action falls within one of the “three evils” it is considered an issue of national security, which in turn receives the focus of resources agencies who look to employ their hard power.²¹² Also immediately after 9/11, China passed laws that cast a wide net over what is considered terrorist acts.²¹³ This gave law enforcement expanded powers when conducting police practices, resulting in an expansion of imprisonment based on questionable, at best, evidence and mass detention into “re-education” camps.²¹⁴ Furthermore, the expanding definitions of insurgent and terror activities to “safeguard the security of the State and people’s lives” has resulted in a blanket declaration that any Uighur organizations have linkages to global terrorism.²¹⁵ Consequently, if the wide definitions that generally only have to fall within one of the “three evils” is the cause, then the effect is the use of force against any person or people that do not behave strictly within what the government deems as acceptable.

²¹⁰ Khan, “Pakistan and China,” 71, 75.

²¹¹ Laronde, “Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang,” 50.

²¹² Odgaard and Nielsen, “China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” 544; Li, “China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era,” 350.

²¹³ Li, “China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era,” 349.

²¹⁴ Li, 349; Jimmy Zhang, “From Non-Interference to Wolf Warrior: Chinese Foreign Internal Defense,” War on the Rocks, April 24, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/from-non-interference-to-wolf-warrior-chinese-foreign-internal-defense/>; Greitens, Lee, and Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression,” 17.

²¹⁵ Ong, “Hard Love and Empty Promises: China’s Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal”; Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang,” 64.

4. Economic and Financial

While not as overwhelmingly prevalent, the economic and financial aspects of China's COIN strategy still play an important role, especially as a means to promote the use of other instruments of national power. The CCP has invested heavily in Xinjiang to raise the standard of living; in turn creating more comfortable living conditions and ideally hamstringing insurgent grievances.²¹⁶ This heavy investment in the region has created opportunities to tap into the "estimated 21 billion tons of oil reserves, 40% of the national coal reserves, and largest national gas reserves in the country."²¹⁷

The opportunities for economic growth and wealth seemingly have a positive impact for those who get involved. However, these prospects are being used by the CCP to ensure development is correlated with its COIN strategy. As infrastructure projects and communities are created, Han Chinese are awarded construction contracts, top administrative positions, and new housing.²¹⁸ Local educators, who are rewarded with social recognition and a decent salary, run the risk of losing their status and even being arrested if they deviate from approved curriculums.²¹⁹ Profits from natural resources bypass the locals and either make their way to Beijing or enrich the Han Chinese, who have an average 68% higher income than the Uyghur population in the region.²²⁰ Economic and financial incentives have been indirectly weaponized to reinforce the CCP's goals.

5. Intelligence

China's use of intelligence is far reaching, invasive, and ultimately proven effective.²²¹ China's COIN strategy is heavily reliant on intelligence to identify insurgent

²¹⁶ Ong, "Hard Love and Empty Promises: China's Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal"; Khan, "The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang," 69, 105.

²¹⁷ Purbrick, "Maintaining a Unitary State," 250.

²¹⁸ Odgaard and Nielsen, "China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang," 547.

²¹⁹ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 115–16.

²²⁰ Ong, "Hard Love and Empty Promises: China's Domestic Counterinsurgency in Xinjiang | Small Wars Journal"; Khan, "The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang," 55.

²²¹ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 91.

actions and organization before their plans can come to fruition.²²² Its intelligence apparatus has two disciplines: technical intelligence (TECHINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT).²²³ These work in concert to provide timely information to military and law enforcement, even if the accuracy is questionable.

China has effectively utilized TECHINT and its populations growing technical reliance to monitor all aspects of life. ISPs are critical to disseminating and filtering information to the masses. These same ISPs, by law, are required to have monitoring programs in place, provide technical and decryption support, and assist any public security apparatus in the prevention the “three evils.”²²⁴ Further TECHINT practices, aside from the video surveillance monitoring, include phone surveillance, mobile positioning, and email examination.²²⁵ As society continues to increase its reliance on technology, China’s TECHINT practices and capabilities will undoubtedly increase in its effectiveness.

The use of HUMINT is also closely intertwined with China’s idea of a “people’s struggle” and their use of party trained and approved personnel, such as the Imams or “peace corps” types, migrating to problem areas. There are groups of cadre that live with the people of Xinjiang, likely already identified as threats to the security of the state, for “at least five days every two months,” participate in social events, and acts as sensors for within the security apparatus, closely monitoring everyday life.²²⁶ The military and law enforcement has large networks of assets and agents “inside educational and religious institutions, social and ethnic circles, industries, and farmlands.”²²⁷ Normally HUMINT is a dangerous and tricky business that requires extensive vetting, but China’s use of its citizens in the struggle seemingly provides an endless quantity of willing participants to root out any dissent.

²²² Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang,” 61; Wayne, “China’s Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang,” 341.

²²³ Wayne, “China’s Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang,” 341.

²²⁴ Li, “China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era,” 401.

²²⁵ Li, 368.

²²⁶ Englund, “Analysis of China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Xinjiang Between 2008 and 2018,” 64.

²²⁷ Khan, “The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang,” 61.

D. PROPOSED CHINESE COIN TENETS

The elements of national power and the examples therein provide insight into the means or tactics of China's COIN strategy. Yet, tactics alone cannot achieve success unless they are nested within an operational plan and strategy. Just as within U.S. COIN doctrine, principles, or tenets, are the guideposts that drive the actions of the counterinsurgent. They serve as a bridge between tactics and strategy to ensure a unified effort. This section proposes five tenets based on the tactics described in the DIMEFIL analysis: Social Class Warfare, Changing the Legal Framework, The People's Fight, Compulsory Education, and Coercive Narratives.

1. Social Class Warfare

The first Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Social Class Warfare, which we define as warfare using economics, information, and legal practices to build up one social class to either suppress or completely vanquish another. In the case of China, Social Class Warfare is being waged using the Han Chinese to suppress the Uighurs. Furthermore, there is not specific targeting of Uighur insurgents, but rather a wide net cast over the entire population. A Xinjiang official reportedly stated that "You can't uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops in the field one by one- you need to spray chemicals to kill them all."²²⁸ We have already discussed examples of this approach in the individual DIMEFIL analysis, but this tenet is focused on all tactics used to support the Han Chinese and suppress the Uighurs.

China's support to Han Chinese makes it seem that its strategy is one of benign improvement in the area, but deeper analysis brings to light a more sinister truth. Due to the influx of Han Chinese, military and paramilitary forces receive more recruits, enhancing military and law enforcement capabilities.²²⁹ The investment within Xinjiang has created economic opportunities that have been capitalized on by Han Chinese

²²⁸ Doyon, "'Counter-Extremism' in Xinjiang: Understanding China's Community-Focused Counter-Terrorism Tactics."

²²⁹ Wayne, "China's Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang," 342.

businessmen.²³⁰ These examples, coupled with others described in our DIMEFIL analysis have resulted in the Han holding most, if not all, power and control over the instruments of national power against the Uighur population.²³¹

Conversely, suppression of the Uighur population, where it is believed the insurgent and terrorist organizations reside, is the other side aspect of this strategy. Their population is considered the number one public enemy because of its resistance to give in to the CCP's actions.²³² The migration of Han Chinese degrades the political influence the Uighurs.²³³ China's higher educational policies of teaching in Mandarin or influence over media and literature is systematically dismantling the Uighur culture.²³⁴ This two-pronged approach of support and suppression using social classes is the foundation of this tenet.

2. Changing the Legal Framework

The Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Changing the Legal Framework to meet the desired endstate. If tactics are considered illegal or legally abstruse, then China will change its laws to fit the tactics that will drive toward meeting objectives. China has greatly expanded the definition of insurgency and terrorism while also expanding the authorities of law enforcement. The definition of resistance includes ambiguously defined "other terrorist acts," while other illegal actions surround the Uighur religious practices that conflict with state defined regulation.²³⁵ Furthermore, the fact that the CCP declares all Uighur social organizations as terrorists with links to global terrorism not only epitomizes the broad definitions established by law, it also opens the door for a wide variety of actions that can be taken by law enforcement and military, while reinforces the example in our first tenet of suppressing the Uighur population.²³⁶ China has undoubtedly capitalized on its

²³⁰ Roy Kamphaussem, David Lai, and Andrew Scobel, *Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars* (Pennsylvania: Army War College, 2011), 284.

²³¹ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 66, 68.

²³² Purbrick, "Maintaining a Unitary State," 245.

²³³ Khan, "The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang," 63–64.

²³⁴ Khan, 102.

²³⁵ Li, "China's New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era," 365–66.

²³⁶ Khan, "The Uyghur Insurgency in Xinjiang," 64.

ability to quickly adjusted its legal structure to isolate and destroy the broad definitions of its enemies.

3. The People's Fight

The third tenet we propose builds upon Martin Wayne's idea of grassroots change and coincides with "people's struggle" described in the information analysis.²³⁷ In an almost prophetic way, China plays on Mao Tse Tung's idea of a "people's war." The People's Fight focuses on action at the lowest level with support coming from the top. While the citizens of a nation inherently rely on the state to provide security, China has written in legislation that countering insurgency and terrorism is the duty of its people.²³⁸ As the people aid the state, the enemies are "suppressed by the state's enforcement bodies and people...are well protected."²³⁹ This effort includes strengthening "grassroots institutions," through the dual track system outlined in the diplomacy section, to prevent infiltration of insurgents into the political decision making and security apparatus.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, an intensive information campaign, competent and effective law enforcement and military, and financial incentives also strengthen diplomatic efforts and increase intelligence accuracy and reporting. The usefulness of the instruments of national power are increased when convincing the people that the fight is their own.

4. Compulsory Education

The fourth Chinese COIN tenet we propose is Compulsory Education. This includes the use of traditional education, such as primary or advanced schooling, and re-education. China has ingeniously used education as a three faceted approach to counter its insurgent problem. First, the use of only Mandarin in higher education dissolves the Uighur language and culture.²⁴¹ Second, it educates students and employs teachers that

²³⁷ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 22.

²³⁸ Xie and Liu, "Navigating Securities," 7.

²³⁹ Li, "China's New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era," 353.

²⁴⁰ Wayne, *China's War on Terrorism: Counter- Insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security*, 9.

²⁴¹ Laronde, "Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang," 55.

disseminate the CCP's approved history lessons, goals of the future, and ideals of responsible living. Third, by opening up education opportunities to its insurgent populations, it can highlight problematic minority groups as "ungrateful" for the prospects of better future when they do not assimilate; this build resentment among the larger population against these groups and only strengthens the CCP's narratives.²⁴²

While education is a seemingly proactive approach, re-education is reactive in nature, involves mass incarceration of minority groups, and serves as means to forcibly change the mind of minority groups, through the threat of their life or "freedom" in most cases. China is clearly not shy about using this tactic, reportedly detaining anywhere from 1 to 3 million people for re-education.²⁴³ It considers extremism the foundation of resistance and, therefore, the way of thinking must be changed to fall in line with a "proper" ideological and political mindset.²⁴⁴ This tenet attacks a resistance's way of thinking to ensure it conforms with the counterinsurgent's narrative and strategy.

5. Coercive Narratives

Narratives are key to any insurgent versus counterinsurgent struggle, and China's COIN strategy is no different. Consequently, our proposed final Chinese COIN tenet is Coercive Narratives and centers around the use of information. We provided numerous examples of how this tenet is approached during the DIMEFIL analysis. Furthermore, China uses coercion, such as threats against reporters and scare tactics, and persuasion, like bribery or financial investments, to ensure the "party line" is adhered to and reinforced.²⁴⁵ The combination of control over the media, the "people's struggle" the CCP's ability to provide security and stability, and message of an ungrateful and problematic minority group play a crucial role in defeating the Uighur insurgency.

²⁴² Odgaard and Nielsen, "China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang," 546.

²⁴³ Greitens, Lee, and Yazici, "Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression," 10.

²⁴⁴ Greitens, Lee, and Yazici, 15, 17, 43.

²⁴⁵ Reyes Cole, "The Myths of Traditional Warfare: How Our Peer and Near-Peer Adversaries Plan to Fight Using Irregular Warfare | Small Wars Journal," Small Wars Journal, March 28, 2019, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/myths-traditional-warfare-how-our-peer-and-near-peer-adversaries-plan-fight-using>.

E. CHINESE COIN IN *REBELS AND STATES*

To incorporate Chinese COIN into *Rebels and States* two modifications are necessary. First, only the wargame should use only China's COIN strategy, including our proposed tenets and their bonuses. Second, the DIMEFIL cards should be modified to fit the analysis of this chapter. The structure of the game board and the environment are not required by the players.

Using China's COIN tactics and methodology as a guide, the starting/winning conditions and tenets are the main modifications to *Rebels and States*. To simulate the control of major population centers, the new starting condition requires that the COIN player can only establish forces in urban spaces. The nationalist ideals and paranoia over losing additional regions has resulted in a complete suppression and no compromise mentality for the CCP. This makes for a difficult winning condition. For *Rebels and States*, the additional winning condition is to control all urban spaces, control the majority of suburban spaces, and occupy half of the rural spaces. This also counterbalances the strength of the tenet modifications.

Modifications using the tenets is the key to our learning experience. Our proposed Chinese COIN tenets and their modifications serve the same purpose. Just like the other COIN strategies, the player must choose a tenet before their turn and can never use the same tenet two turns in a row. Social class warfare reduces the cost for essential services and DIMEFIL cards are reduced by one. Changing the legal framework allows the coin player to win ties when on offense, re-rolling of the lowest dice when on defense, and incur no penalty when withdrawing. Coercive narratives provide a legitimacy point when removing all guerrilla fighters if the number of fighters is greater than the population size or when removing one auxiliary or underground. Compulsory education allows the coin player to remove half of the fighters in the space that has the least amount of guerrilla fighters after using a DIMEFIL card. Finally, the people's fight allows the coin player to conduct one additional attack per engagement or utilize one additional DIMEFIL card during their turn.

When modifying the DIMEFIL cards, maintaining the current structure is key. They follow the same impacts on guerrilla fighters, auxiliary, and underground within the rural, suburban, and urban spaces. the theme of the cards should be switched to the following: government programs to dual track diplomacy, targeted killings to re-education, counterintelligence to HUMINT and TECHINT, and airlift to grassroots infiltration. This reinforces the tactics used in China's COIN strategy while balancing functional gameplay.

F. CONCLUSION

China's COIN tactics fall directly in line with its attempted control of DIMEFIL. China's use of diplomacy is based on a two-track system that combines the efforts of local leaders guided and monitored by party officials while also using international relations to further their COIN efforts. Information plays a central role in China's COIN strategy, combining the use of a "people's struggle," controlling information through suppression and dissemination, and using education to change the way of thinking. Military and law enforcement combine the use of the PLA, PAP, XPCC, and other citizen led paramilitary units to ensure compliance of the broadly defined laws China has changed to meet its needs. China uses economic and financial tactics to provide opportunities to those who are willing to support the CCP while preventing a share of the wealth to those who do not. Finally, HUMINT and TECHINT have created a surveillance state where actions are monitored or reported, with few ever truly flying below the radar.

The five tenets for China's COIN strategy are proposals in the absence of published doctrine or theory. The tenets serve as the basis for a strategy that attempts to overwhelm a domestic insurgency but can be easily exported to other nations create a multi-national effort when confronting a resistance organization. Furthermore, the tenets can also be used to categorize actions by the insurgent, or their advisors, to develop a counterstrategy and weaken the state. By providing the modifications to *Rebels and States*, players can use U.S. UW doctrine and the three strategists to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each side. Inherently, this will provide more information to current and future USSF soldiers as they look to future conflicts.

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