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THESIS

**POISON SHRIMP: DETERRENCE, DEFENSE
COOPERATION, AND TOTAL DEFENSE FROM
EUROPE TO ASIA**

by

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**POISON SHRIMP: DETERRENCE, DEFENSE COOPERATION, AND TOTAL
DEFENSE FROM EUROPE TO ASIA**

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ABSTRACT

Great Power Competition (GPC) pervades the U.S.–China relationship. However, the GPC dialog ignores the countries caught in between. While an ocean separates the United States and China, many nations in Asia sit next to China and worry about Beijing’s intentions. While some have strong conventional military forces to deter attacks, other nations do not have the same forces. Fortunately, Sweden and Singapore have defense concepts that lean on the entire society to contribute to defense. Both countries have Total Defense (TD) policies that complement traditional military forces. Both countries also purposely build defense cooperation. Sweden works with NATO, and Singapore has cooperation with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the United States. Integrating the whole population into homeland defense and enhancing defense cooperation increase the cost and risk of invasion for any attacker. The risks may even be enough to prevent war. Given Sweden and Singapore’s experience, this thesis advocates that Vietnam and Taiwan develop TD or enhance existing TD plans, respectively, and that the United States support Vietnam and Taiwan in this endeavor. For Taiwan, U.S. assistance could guide the acquisition of weapons that have traditional and asymmetric use. The United States should also expand special operations cooperation with Taiwan to increase unconventional resistance capability.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOD	All-out Defense
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPV	Communist Party of Vietnam
FPDA	Five Power Defense Agreement
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCS	South China Sea
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
TD	Total Defense
UK	United Kingdom
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces
WOS	Whole of Society
WOG	Whole of Government

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Total Defense (TD) policies enacted in Sweden and Singapore provide a model for other countries seeking to deter conflict against more powerful adversaries. Total Defense policies require societal integration in defense planning and preparation. International defense cooperation complements TD by facilitating third-party intervention against the aggressor.

Vietnam has publicly expressed desires to build an “all-peoples” defense strategy but will need time to develop popular integration in overall defense plans. Additionally, Vietnam plans to expand defense cooperation with other nations and international organizations. Although not Vietnam’s explicit goal, such interaction presents options for military support to Vietnam.

Taiwan has implemented TD policies in the form of the island’s “All-out Defense” (AOD) plan. In Taiwan’s case, AOD complements and opens opportunities for defense cooperation because the United States, through the Taiwan Relations Act, already alludes to military intervention and support on the island’s behalf should China unilaterally force reunification. AOD prolongs resistance to enable U.S. forces time to mobilize.

The United States should support Total Defense policies in Vietnam and Taiwan as another deterrence layer beyond conventional military force. U.S. Special Operations Forces should support TD engagement. Regarding Vietnam, expanding non-traditional security cooperation enables Vietnam to enhance its civil-military capabilities without antagonizing China. For Taiwan, the U.S. should balance defense acquisition and planning to support asymmetric fighting capability. USSOF could strengthen AOD by supporting asymmetric capability development and civil-military planning.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As the world grapples with the Covid-19 pandemic's social, economic, and political consequences, there is one geopolitical trend that continues to gain momentum. The United States and China continue to compete on the global stage. Despite the coronavirus' threat to China and the U.S., cooperation against a common disease threat is unlikely to supplant global competition. The virus even worsened U.S. and Chinese relations. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian accused the U.S. Army of bringing the disease to Wuhan. U.S. Senators Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz believe China created Covid-19, and it escaped from a Wuhan lab. Even Covid-19 vaccine development has added to the tension. On July 21, 2020, the U.S. Justice Department accused China of deploying hackers to steal vaccine development data from U.S. labs.¹

Additionally, trade issues continue to plague U.S.-China relations. President Donald Trump has consistently criticized China for unfair business practices, intellectual property theft, and eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S. and Europe. Couple the coronavirus accusations with the ongoing trade disputes, and it is easy to see why relations continue to sour and great power competition gains momentum. The 2017 U.S. National Defense Strategy states that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a threat, and the United States must confront PRC expansion.² The PRC's growth into the South China Sea, One Belt One Road initiative, and economic coercion signal the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) intention to assert influence beyond China's borders. Given the contentious nature of relations, it is safe to assume the U.S. and China will compete for the foreseeable future. Yet, despite PRC attempts to challenge the United States' superpower status, an ocean separates both nations. Although the PRC does possess nuclear weapons and continues to expand its power project capability, China is unlikely to attack the U.S.

¹ Shayan Sardarizadeh and Olga Robinson, "China and the U.S. Trade Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories," BBC News, last modified April 26, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52224331>.

² Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 2, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

homeland because it would face similar retaliation. However, some of the countries closest to China cannot assume the same degree of security privileged to the United States. The smaller countries of Asia must live with the uncertainty associated with China's increasing economic, political, and military strength.

Often the great power competition dialog overlooks the smaller countries. Despite their relative size and power, smaller nations such as Vietnam and the island of Taiwan must protect interests and sovereignty. Nations that are smaller relative to large neighbors have to carefully maneuver foreign policy to avoid provoking or escalating conflict with powerful nations. It is a challenge for lesser powers. Fortunately, this challenge is not unique, and other countries have developed plans to maintain peace and prepare for war.

Sweden and Singapore have plans to offset relative weakness. Envision an all you can eat buffet with every dish labeled according to its edibility. How many people would select the dish boldly labeled "Poison Shrimp" with a skull and crossbones graphic? The "Poison Shrimp" in the international relations realm are countries that harness the entire nation to defend the homeland. The consumable menu items are countries that neglect the power of the citizenry. Both Sweden and Singapore integrate the whole country in national security plans through a Total Defense (TD) policy. Sometimes referred to as a whole of government (WOG) or whole of society (WOS) approach to defense, TD policy attempts to deter conflict and prepare the population to resist aggression.³ As an umbrella for all activities and actions designed to protect the country, Total Defense preparations harness all facets of society to unite the nation in self-defense.⁴ Both Sweden and Singapore believe TD deters conflict by dramatically raising the cost of invasion. Any potential invader has to contend with the armed forces and civilian populace.

Favorably for the United States, Total Defense policies open more opportunities to assist partner nations in enhancing defense capabilities and sharing the burden of upholding

³ Otto C Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept* (Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2019), <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9007>.

⁴ "What Is Total Defense?," Singapore Ministry of Defense, accessed August 25, 2020, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about.html.

international norms of sovereignty. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states explicitly that “With our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.”⁵ Given that U.S. policy is to support partners in their attempts to counter U.S. competitors, Total Defense is a natural avenue to increase U.S. cooperation. Since WOG policies are characteristically defensive and conducted within sovereign territory, the U.S. can complement host nation efforts to increase their resilience and resistance capability against an aggressor. Partner nations benefit from information exchanges, interoperability training, additional resources, and expertise. The U.S. benefits because the assistance is less escalatory than unilateral operations, and partner nations will become more self-sufficient and require less U.S. assistance overall. Enhanced interoperability with partner nations will streamline coalition operations if conflict breaks out. Total Defense reinforces international norms because self-defense is an inherent right of all nations, big or small. It reaffirms a level playing field for all nations in international affairs by assisting other countries to improve security.

Given the geopolitical context and background stated above, this thesis will seek to answer several questions. What are the key components of Sweden and Singapore’s total defense? If Vietnam and Taiwan enact TD, where do these countries rate regarding the key components of TD drawn from Sweden and Singapore? Finally, how can the U.S. support the development of TD in Vietnam and Taiwan? The thesis will review deterrence and escalation literature to establish the theoretical underpinning and risks associated with Total Defense policies. The paper then evaluates the key components of Sweden and Singapore’s total defense policies and uses the same TD components to assess Vietnam’s and Taiwan’s strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the paper will make recommendations on U.S. support to Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD efforts.

Ultimately, this paper asserts that Total Defense can dissuade neighboring countries from invasion. Sweden and Singapore demonstrate that TD policies accomplish deterrence when society actively supports national defense, and existing international cooperation

⁵ Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*, 7.

facilitates possible friendly military intervention. Whole-of-society approaches enable all elements of society to support and complement traditional military capabilities since Total Defense provides the umbrella to coordinate the military and society. Societal integration is a vital component of the TD umbrella. International defense cooperation builds interoperability that increases the effectiveness of friendly military intervention. Sweden and Singapore provide a framework for Vietnam and Taiwan. Should Vietnam and Taiwan accomplish societal integration and international cooperation, total defense policies gain credibility and increase deterrence potential. Although Total Defense in Asia appears to be directed solely at China, the policy would protect any country from any invading neighbor or powerful nation. Some might perceive Total Defense policies as provocative. However, every country has the inherent right to defend its people with appropriate national policies. Self-defense is the unquestionable right of all nations. Total Defense supports smaller countries' right to defend themselves from any threat or enemy.

II. DETERRENCE AND ESCALATION

A. DETERRENCE

Before looking into Total Defense policies, it is necessary to set the foundation for deterrence theory and its application in defense policies. In Lawrence Freedman's work, *General Deterrence and the Balance of Power*, Freedman cites that "Deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh the benefits."⁶ Deterrence relies on influencing opponents to believe that specific actions will result in much more damage and pain to the aggressor and that any gain will be limited. It is important to emphasize that deterrence heavily relies on influence. For deterrence to work, a country must have effective military means to execute the appropriate actions, must exact unacceptable cost from the aggressor, and the attacker must believe that the defender will carry out the threat.⁷ Merely possessing the capability to damage an adversary is insufficient to secure deterrence. The adversary must accept that its attack will trigger severe consequences. For example, Winston Churchill professed his desire to protect every inch of the British Homeland from German invasion. This policy was communicated clearly and perceived as credible because militaries are supposed to defend home territory.⁸ However, Britain's commitment to Poland's defense was much less credible to Germany because it was a matter of policy and less about inherent self-defense.⁹ Some threats are much more believable than others.

Historical evidence supports Deterrence theory. In 1956, NATO had a choice. NATO could intervene in Hungary to thwart the Soviet Union's attempts to control the country or simply let the Soviet Union continue its intervention policy. NATO decided

⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "General Deterrence and the Balance of Power," *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 2, (1989): 200.

⁷ Stephen L. Quackenbush, "Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 742.

⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 35.

⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 36.

against interfering with Soviet actions.¹⁰ Although NATO was more robust than the Soviet Union and would suffer less than the Soviets if it came to war, Moscow deterred the West from intervening in the dispute. NATO believed that the Soviet Union was willing and able to send its military against the West. NATO leadership did not question the USSR's resolve or commitment to meet NATO military moves with Soviet forces. War was an unacceptable price. This assumption made it clear to NATO that the war's cost was not worth Hungary's independence.¹¹ Hungary's case illustrates that intent to defend and fight is paramount to deterrence's credibility.

The most famous example of deterrence emerged during the Cold War. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) entered the political science lexicon as the United States and the Soviet Union increased each other's nuclear strike capabilities. Deterrence theorist Stephen Quackenbush wrote in *Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?* That

one might think policymakers would either have nerves of steel or brains of lead to launch a massive nuclear attack against a similarly armed adversary and expect the adversary would do nothing as it faces total destruction. After all, what leader would not retaliate in response to a nuclear attack? ¹²

Deterrence rational in the nuclear age and today still is underpinned by the reasoning that nuclear retaliation will follow a nuclear attack, and the costs are too high for any side to take that step. There is no question about capability, and there is even less question about intent. It is a given that a nuclear state will use nuclear weapons to defend against nuclear attack, and therefore, deterrence works. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and knew that any atomic attack triggers atomic retaliation.¹³

Given the basics of deterrence discussed above, it is essential to expound on the difference between general deterrence and immediate deterrence to clarify the type that this

¹⁰ Thomas C. Schelling, 36–37.

¹¹ Thomas C. Schelling, 37.

¹² Stephen L. Quackenbush, "Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?," 751.

¹³ Lawrence Freedman, "General Deterrence and the Balance of Power," 204.

paper discusses. Freedman cites that, “Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation to prevent it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack.”¹⁴ The difference between immediate and general breaks down to the timeframe. Immediate deterrence centers on specific moments when a state attempts to attack another country, and the defending government is trying to dissuade the attacker. General deterrence occurs when no state plans to go on the offensive, but both sides possess the capability to attack. These capabilities credibly deter conflict between the countries. To be clear, immediate deterrence is the deterrence this thesis explores. Currently, there are no pressing flashpoints in Asia that would describe immediate deterrence scenarios in Asia. Still, this paper imagines a hypothetical situation that requires a smaller country, dissuading a motivated aggressor. Although TD influences general deterrence, that discussion is beyond the scope of this writing.

Although convincing, deterrence theory does have issues empirically proving its effectiveness. Deterrence relies on forcing an opponent to abstain from action. One can argue that deterrence works because the war did not happen. However, it is impossible to prove a negative occurrence because the evidence is negative. The evidence is the fact the event did not occur, and this leaves nothing to measure. Some can argue that a country never had any intention to attack in the first place, or the attacker was deterred for reasons utterly unrelated to the defender’s actions. Therefore, deterrence did not work.¹⁵ Both sides can look at the same outcome and arrive at completely different answers. This paper will assume that deterrence is possible and a viable policy decision.

Deterrence centers on the defender’s capability to resist, the attacker understanding that a defender can inflict unacceptable cost, and the defender have every intention to fight. NATO’s decision to leave Hungary alone against the Soviet Union and the Cold War theme of mutually assured destruction reiterate the deterrence principles. The Soviet Union could

¹⁴ Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” 202.

¹⁵ Freedman, 201.

fight NATO and NATO believed the Soviet Union would use military force to exact terrible casualties on the West. NATO did not intervene in Hungary. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both had nuclear weapons, and both saw nuclear war as catastrophic and unacceptable. Both countries believed the other would retaliate with nuclear weapons.

Total defense is effective if it addresses the main components of deterrence. TD capability must exist, carry the potential to derail an attacker's objectives, and the attacker must believe TD will be employed. These elements restate deterrence principles in a total defense context, but it is useful because deterrence is the ultimate goal for any defender. Avoiding existential combat and maintaining sovereignty is preferable to war.

B. ESCALATION

To effectively assess Total Defense strategy, it is important to discuss the potential escalatory risks. Total Defense would be a liability if it triggered aggression from neighbors, and therefore TD must be assessed for possible misinterpretation.

Escalation or Spiral theory debates the reasons why nations decide to go to war. This paper will use escalation and spiraling interchangeably. According to political scientist Robert Jervis, "the spiral model applies when the defender faces a status quo power, explains conflict as resulting fundamentally from the combination of international anarchy and the security dilemma..."¹⁶ Jervis describes the security dilemma as "these unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive..... many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.... one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others."¹⁷ States that attempt to improve security can make neighboring countries nervous and trigger reciprocal policies. If this cycle continues, then states may spiral towards war, which undermines everyone's safety. Germany and England's naval competition before World War One (WWI) illustrates spiraling from a historical perspective.

¹⁶ Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics* 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 4, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010486>.

¹⁷ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2009): 6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050>.

In 1908, Germany and England competed in a naval arms race. The German ambassador to England, Count Metternich, communicated to German leaders that, “Two different views are taken in England about the German Fleet. One section of opinion holds that the fleet is being built for the purpose of attacking England.... the other view is that our fleet is not a deliberate threat of aggression but a possible danger to England.”¹⁸ Metternich highlighted that although the German Navy was built to defend German interests, decision-makers in England can view the same fleet as a threat to English security. Ultimately history tells us that among many factors, English and German naval competition contributed to escalation between both nations and culminated in the initiation of WWI.

With the basics of escalation and a historical example in hand, Total Defense should be evaluated according to its potential for escalation. Although the historical example and most literature concern arms such as battleships as the trigger for escalation, one can understand how a policy such as Total Defense can have a similar impact to a weapon of war. Although TD concerns the organization and preparation of a country’s resources for defense, the aggregate of actions may look like a weapon itself. The policy combats an aggressor with all non-lethal and lethal means. However, an arms race and comprehensive whole-of-society defense policy are different, and therefore its escalatory risk is different.

Total defense does not require new or more weapons. The majority of spiral literature and security dilemma thought anchors on weaponry as the trigger for escalation. Charles Glaser writes that the unstable international world order necessitates the creation of militaries for national defense.¹⁹ Yet, this is the same military force that threatens neighboring states. Similarly, Andrew Kydd highlights that an arms buildup sends an aggressive signal to surrounding nations, which initiates a reciprocating arms buildup.²⁰ Fortunately, the tradeoff between building more military capability to protect the country or leaving the country unprotected is a false dichotomy. There are more options to defend

¹⁸ Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 2.

¹⁹ Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy,” 12.

²⁰ Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” 2.

a country than merely producing more tanks, artillery, ships, or planes. Total Defense is an alternative to a massive arms production policy.

Total Defense's whole-of-nation principles focus on employing domestic capability uniquely and not simply developing new lethal capabilities. Actions such as preparing the population to withstand hardship or defending the towns and villages are not provocative. It is reasonable for anyone to understand why another person would protect one's family and home. It is the basic need for safety. Storing canned food, bottled water, medicine, and batteries would be useful in a natural disaster or crisis. Civil preparations help the military by freeing up resources and manpower to focus on fighting, but this abstract connection to military force would be a dubious reason to escalate to war. The preparations have legitimate non-military purposes during peacetime. Even when the civil practices and popular mobilization support the military during the war, this is just the necessary actions of a state attempting to defend its sovereignty. The international community is more likely to condemn the aggressor state than the citizens and government trying to protect the homeland.²¹

It is also important to highlight that this paper will focus on the relationship between smaller nations and aspiring hegemonic nations. Countries with military parity and relatively equal national power may initiate uncontrolled escalation if one side embarks on Total Defense. As mentioned earlier by Jervis, the spiral model applies to a defender and status quo power.²² The status quo implies a stable system that all states follow. However, the issue of escalation among equal states needs further research. This writing's primary concern will be on the adoption of Total Defense by smaller nations in relation to larger, more powerful neighbors. There is certainly the possibility that a smaller nation's attempts to deter an expansionist aggressor may provoke a conflict. A defender's military policies may make an aggressor feel insecure and spur the attacker to carry out military action to

²¹ Otto C Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept* (Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2019): 18 <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9007>.

²² Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy." 4.

guarantee safety.²³ These discussions center on pure military policies, and Total Defense relies on population, government, and military coordination over weapons buildup and therefore is less provocative than military means of defense.

²³ Glaser, 9.

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III. TOTAL DEFENSE POLICY

This paper has touched on Total Defense in discussions on deterrence, but it is necessary to describe further what is Total Defense. Describing TD serves two purposes. First, Total Defense may have a different meaning to different people, so it is important to understand how this paper uses TD. Secondly, by using Sweden and Singapore as the benchmarks, this section also demonstrates the all-inclusive and whole-of-society foundation of both country's TD policy. National integration in national defense is one of the components this paper argues is necessary for TD to deter an aggressor. To narrow the paper's argument and provide a common reference for comparing different Total Defense efforts worldwide, this paper has selected Swedish and Singaporean TD policies as the baseline to guide other countries. The Swedish have a long history of independence. Even during World War Two, Sweden avoided war with both the Allied and Axis powers.²⁴ Sweden does not possess nuclear weapons and is not a member of NATO. Although Sweden does cooperate with NATO and continues public debate on possible NATO member status, Sweden is not a NATO member, and significant segments of the population still believe that military non-alignment is vital for Sweden's neutrality.²⁵ It is worth noting that Sweden has avoided war and effectively maintained sovereignty over its territory despite its proximity to Russia and NATO alliance countries.

Looking at Singapore, the city-state is useful for comparison because it is located in Asia, does not have a mutual security treaty with any country, and does not have nuclear weapons. Although Singapore does cooperate with the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand in the Five Powers Defense Agreement(FPDA) framework, the FPDA is not a security alliance and does not guarantee military intervention to support

²⁴ Gustav Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement - the Middle Way" (Occasional Paper 2, October 1997), 3.

²⁵ Karl Ydén, Joakim Berndtsson, and Magnus Petersson, "Sweden and the Issue of NATO Membership: Exploring a Public Opinion Paradox," *Defence Studies* 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1568192>.

any member.²⁶ Although other nations may come to Singapore's defense, this paper will assume that external military intervention on Singapore's behalf is not certain or beyond doubt.

Swedish and Singaporean traits are important because many countries in Asia cannot rely on a security alliance or nuclear weapons to dissuade aggressors. These countries must possess domestic deterrence capability.

Given Swedish and Singaporean Total Defense policy merits, the next task is to explore the TD concept. Total Defense can be summarized as:

According to Swedish law, total defense is defined as the preparations and planning required to prepare Sweden for war. When the government has declared highest alert, all societal functions are defined as total defence, which consists of military defence and civil defence. In accordance, the Parliament, the Government, government authorities, municipalities, private enterprises, voluntary defence organizations as well as individuals are all part of the total defence.²⁷

Singapore espouses similar visions of TD. According to Singapore's Total Defense website, "Total Defense involves every Singaporean playing a part, individually and collectively, to build a strong, secure and cohesive nation. When we are strong, we are able to deal with any crisis."²⁸

TD requires the mustering of all the resources and people of a country to effectively deter and resist an attacker. The perceived threat necessitates the all-encompassing nature of TD, WOG, or WOS policies. Smaller nations may face opponents that have larger landmass and population, possess more capable and numerous military assets, and harbor expansionist ambitions. If these neighbors have hegemonic intent, then the aspiring

²⁶ Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10," in *The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty* (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011), 51–67, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/five-power-defence-arrangements-at-forty/five-power-defence-arrangements-exercises-200410/0535B315685B07D639383C6A34E7DE83>.

²⁷ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, "Resilience," Swedish Defense Commission, (December 2017): 1.

²⁸ "What Is Total Defense?," Singapore Ministry of Defense, accessed August 25, 2020. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about.html

aggressor is a severe threat to a smaller nation's sovereignty.²⁹ Some countries address this dilemma with security alliances or nuclear weapons. However, if security pacts and nuclear weapons are unacceptable or feasible, Total Defense provides another option to protect a nation's sovereignty.

A. SWEDEN'S TD CONCEPT

The main components of Sweden's Total Defense policy are resilience and resistance activities. Resilience concerns "the will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences."³⁰ To build up the people to withstand attacks, the government must invest time and resources to prepare the population for hardship. This investment will pay off when the government asks its people to resist. Resistance is "a nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power."³¹ It is important to note that resistance occurs once a foreign power has commenced hostility and has intervened inside the homeland. The definition is intentionally broad because it attempts to encapsulate any government, military, and citizen activities to undermine an attacker. Although both elements have distinct timeframes for execution, both resilience and resistance activities are interrelated and supporting. Both resilience and resistance components will be elaborated on in the following sections.

1. Resilience Phase

Resilience will be broken into several sections to help organize the actions that must take place. These sections are military, government, and population activities. There are undoubtedly many different ways to frame the discussion, but the military, government, and population activities cover the main topics.

²⁹ Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 18.

³⁰ Fiala, 21.

³¹ Fiala, 21.

During the resiliency phase, the military supports the creation of resistance organizations. It is a given that the military has to be ready to fight and defend the country. That is the widely accepted responsibility of national armies worldwide; therefore, the military's traditional function will not be the center of discussion. Consequently, the military's focus in the WOS defense preparation is to guide resistance organizations' development. This task is more difficult since resistance organizations should not have personnel with traditional military or government roles to avoid targeting by the occupier.³² Nonetheless, resistance organizations are essential to thwarting occupiers because they continue to subvert and undermine an occupier's authority. The different activities will be discussed in the resistance section.

The military's involvement is pivotal because it is best suited to recruiting, training, and equipping the various groups that form the nation's resistance force. Medical training, logistics, basic soldiering, and force protection are skills the military can impart to civilians. Additionally, the military can help identify the leaders that will be the core cadre directing resistance.³³ Resistance leaders will be responsible for eventually synchronizing communication, personnel, intelligence, and supplies for the nation's defense. The skills, purpose, and structures of resistance organizations are numerous. They cover many defense aspects, but the key takeaway for militaries regarding resilience is massive investment in preparing and creating civilian organizations before conflict erupts. **Figure 1** below provides an example of organizational structure for resistance organizations. These organizations can continue to support friendly military operations and actively frustrate an attacker's attempts to consolidate power.

³² Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 27.

³³ Fiala, 27.




Figure 1. Pre-conflict, cadre-led, partial, resistance organization sample.³⁴

For example, if people lack national identity, the government must enact domestic projects to unify them. Admittedly, the concept of national identity can be complex, contentious, and difficult to define or navigate for many countries. This paper only focuses on unity as a necessary prerequisite for effective whole of society defense. A cohesive society enhances resilience and motivation to resist.³⁵ To enhance the nation's identity, the government could initiate patriotic education, increase integration of minority groups, and identify shared values that can improve the population's interconnectedness. Psychological preparations can also enhance national identity as well. Building a popular narrative of

³⁴ Source: Fiala, 28.

³⁵ Fiala, 24.

what it means to be a citizen and how one can unite in the face of hardship will ultimately prepare the people to oppose enemy efforts to manipulate the population.

Civilian governments should also practice the procedures and mechanisms to manage a crisis. Whether it is a human-made or natural disaster, crisis management helps exercise society's necessary functions during duress periods.³⁶ Planning for resistance should incorporate all sectors of government. Emergency exercises that test the government, civil defense, and resistance structures should take place frequently and well in advance of an expected outbreak of hostilities. Crisis preparation combined with psychological and patriotic hardening offers government action examples to support national resilience and preparation for resistance.

The final component of the resilience phase of TD is the general population. The general population has to prepare, practice, and implement total defense at the individual and family level. The government and military will direct and inform the populace as best as possible, but it will be the citizens who decide the nation's fate when faced with an existential threat. To build a broad understanding of the population's contributions to resilience, the discussion looks at active citizens who have to resist actively and those that will resist occupiers passively. Both require considerable preparation before conflict to successfully undermine an aggressor's manipulation.

The majority of the general population has to prepare to resist an occupier passively. Passive resistance incorporates many nonviolent means of resistance, such as poor work performance, ignoring new regulations, and transmitting erroneous information to enemy officials.³⁷ For the population to know its role, the government must train and inform the people during peacetime through education and preparation documents such as Lithuania's 2015 Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War, or Sweden's 2018 IF Crisis or War Comes.³⁸ These documents describe requirements to stock food, water, clothing, and

³⁶ Fiala, 26.

³⁷ Fiala, 29.

³⁸ Fiala, 30.

communications equipment to keep families sustained during a crisis.³⁹ The documents also highlight the importance of withstanding information and cyberattacks that may take place before armed conflict. The whole population can take actions that enhance crisis preparedness and enable average citizens to resist passively.

For the portion of the population that will actively resist, the resilience phase provides the opportunity to build the organization. As highlighted earlier in the military discussion, resistance organizations need to be made before conflict and with citizens void of official connection to the government and military. Although the Ministry of Defense or Interior will likely coordinate the resistance, the regional cells should be made of average citizens to prevent adversary use of public records to root out resistance members.⁴⁰ The resistance should have several different components. These components are the underground, auxiliary, guerilla, and public components.⁴¹ Although not a strict formula, these elements listed conduct most active resistance operations and must be built in advance of real operations. Highlighting the aspects of the resistance that need construction will suffice for the resilience section, and the actual operation of each element will be discussed in the resistance section.

To close the resilience phase of Total Defense, the military, government, and civilian population must work together to harden the society against manipulation and prepare for war. These actions are necessary to succeed in future conflict but also support Total Defense deterrence value. Publicizing elements of preparation such as national unity and resistance potential may deter would-be invaders by adding new dimensions of resistance not considered by a belligerent.⁴² Resilience is the starting point for the whole society's defense against invasion. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between resilience and resistance.

³⁹ Fiala, 208.

⁴⁰ Fiala, 27.

⁴¹ Fiala, 38.

⁴² Fiala, 32.




Figure 2. Resilience as the foundation of resolute resistance in national defense.⁴³

2. Resistance Phase

Where resilience ends, resistance begins. The resistance phase is triggered when a foreign power moves against the nation and violates its territorial sovereignty directly or by a proxy force.⁴⁴ Much like the resilience section, this section will discuss actions by looking at resistance through the military, government, and population lens. To the credit of the resilience phase, resistance builds on the organs that took shape before conflict. The military, government, and population now must actively counter foreign aggression in the homeland.

For the military, mobilization and operations begin concurrently with the activation of resistance organizations.⁴⁵ The traditional military will be executing defensive operations where appropriate to confront an invader. For Total Defense discussion, it is assumed that the military is insufficient to prevent large-scale attacks by a more powerful adversary and must move to participate in the resistance. This assumption is congruent

⁴³ Source: Fiala, 33.

⁴⁴ Fiala, 33.

⁴⁵ Fiala, 34.

with Total Defense because the policy's premise is that the nation cannot use pure military means to defeat an adversary's military.

The traditional state military must actively support resistance operations and prepare for the return of friendly forces. Except for military elements moving to neighboring countries and preparing to rejoin the fight, like Polish forces during World War II, the military plays a supporting role for the resistance.⁴⁶ The military will help subvert an invader by leaving stay behind units or have personnel join resistance elements. Close coordination with resistance development before conflict will pay dividends if the conventional military force is defeated and demobilized by the invader. Military personnel can effectively flow into resistance operations, given the connections and familiarity established during the resilience phase. Stay behind units, and some resistance groups will likely function as guerillas and be responsible for sabotage, ambushes, raids, and harassment of enemy forces.⁴⁷ Even forces that leave the country can support the resistance by facilitating partner and allied nation support to internal operations against occupying powers.⁴⁸ When the time comes for significant combat against the occupier, internal and external military forces will assist liberation operations.⁴⁹ Regardless of the nation's forces being left behind enemy lines or reorganizing external to the homeland, the military will find ways to empower resistance and prepare for the enemy's eventual ejection.

The civilian government is the next component for discussion in the resistance phase. The government has the primary responsibility for leading the nation's struggle against the invaders. Given this responsibility, civilians leaders must direct and coordinate the entire operation from resistance to eventual liberation. The government initiates the nation's whole society response and orders the military and resistance organizations to mobilize. This mobilization may be challenging to activate, given the varying levels of

⁴⁶ Fiala, 34.

⁴⁷ Fiala, 40.

⁴⁸ Fiala, 84.

⁴⁹ Fiala, 88.

hostility and aggression employed by the adversary, but the responsibility still rests on civilian leaders.⁵⁰ As the resistance builds, the government must contribute to the movement's effectiveness by addressing eight critical factors for successful resistance.

Civilian government leaders have to ensure the resistance organizing entity is functioning and effectively creating resistance organizations.⁵¹ It may be incredibly difficult to build every component of resistance to perfection, but simply building the foundations and initiating planning will provide more capability. Organizations can continue to evolve and expand as long as a framework already exists. Second, there needs to be a national story and narrative that unites citizens for collective action before, during, and after conflict. Third, authorities should communicate purpose and intent for the population during resistance. The governments must motivate people to act to the best of their abilities. Fourth, the rule of law and political legitimacy needs to continue regardless of enemy occupation.⁵² The people must trust the government and honor the legal structures necessary to continue functioning as a country. Fifth, resistance organizations need oversight and control to avoid discrediting the legitimacy of the overall movement. Sixth, the whole society must practice collaboration before conflict to build reflexive cooperation once resistance begins. Seventh, leaders need to instill agility and adaptability. It is impossible to predict the future, and resistance leaders must employ the appropriate tactics and processes to account for the occupier's actions. Lastly, the government should practice its continuity contingency plans to hedge against disruptions in governance. The government has to anticipate working in exile, establishing shadow governance, and work with the diaspora.⁵³ Intergovernmental and international coordination, legal and policy establishment, international agreements, and resistance network integration should support the legitimate authority's survival. Regardless of the government's physical location or the degree of foreign occupation, the civilian population will look for leadership and

⁵⁰ Fiala, 34.

⁵¹ Fiala, 36.

⁵² Fiala, 37.

⁵³ Fiala, 38.

inspiration from its leaders. The eight factors listed above guide government preparation and the execution of resistance. Effective government planning will motivate popular resistance and maintain hope for national restoration.⁵⁴

For Sweden, in the unfortunate event that an invader is not deterred and eventually occupies the country, national restoration is the overriding goal of the civilian population, and therefore the people will bear the majority of the burden to achieve liberation. Resistance carries on against the now occupying force. Assuming the military, government, and population collaborates to establish the main components of resistance during the resilience phase, four main elements array against the occupying authority: the underground, auxiliary, guerilla force, and public component. These four main components will define the population's actions.

The underground element is responsible for operations in urban territory controlled by the adversary's security forces.⁵⁵ The underground is involved in political and military-type operations designed to undermine the occupation force's actual and perceived control. Examples of underground operations include intelligence operations, subversive media dissemination, clandestine logistics, sabotage, concealed personnel movement, and clandestine medical support.

The auxiliary comprises ordinary citizens that will clandestinely assist and facilitate the underground and guerilla force operations.⁵⁶ They are part of the overall resistance movement but maintain regular behavior patterns to avoid drawing enemy security forces' suspicions.⁵⁷ It is crucial to consider the auxiliary as part-time participants. They are generally proximal to occupiers and assume the most risk due to this exposure. Therefore, auxiliary elements only periodically mobilize to support the resistance and must not know more than necessary for one's immediate actions. Examples of auxiliary actions are

⁵⁴ Fiala, 36.

⁵⁵ Fiala, 39.

⁵⁶ Fiala, 39.

⁵⁷ Fiala, 40.

logistics procurement, sheltering personnel, transportation, intelligence collection, and communications management. Auxiliary members are the links and nodes that join the overall resistance movement together.

Building on the foundation of the underground and auxiliary are the guerilla forces. These fighters are the armed component of the resistance and can be military or ordinary citizens.⁵⁸ Guerilla units are smaller, lighter armed, and more flexible than traditional military or even police forces. Guerillas will support liberation by conducting raids, ambushes, sabotage, and harassment techniques to inflict costs on movements, degrading morale, and materially draining the enemy forces. Although guerillas will not look like traditional forces, they will still fall under the civilian government's authority in the Total Defense model. Civilian control is essential because the government must continue to focus operations toward the overall liberation of sovereign territory. When all resistance elements support each other's efforts, the movement will gain more popular support, increase occupation frustrations, and empower the public component to press for liberation.

Lastly, the population will need a public component to be the people's overt political face and legitimate government.⁵⁹ If the occupier allows opposition political groups to exist, the resistance would have the opportunity to publicly and covertly conduct nonviolent and violent acts towards the occupation authority. The public component is distinct from the shadow government and even a government in exile in that the adversary allows the public functioning of indigenous opposition. If the resistance has no government in exile or shadow government, this open political arm of the resistance will be solely responsible for negotiating with enemy political authorities and build international support for eventual liberation. Understanding that the enemy may find the public component intolerable, the resistance's political role may pass to a shadow government or government in exile. Shadow governments must be prepared well in advance of execution since they must perform traditional government functions, but they are in occupied territory and

⁵⁸ Fiala, 40.

⁵⁹ Fiala, 41.

demand secrecy for security reasons.⁶⁰ Whatever governance form takes shape during the occupation, the resistance needs political advocates and national direction to keep the population, government, and military working collectively to expel the enemy.

It is worth noting that Sweden does not plan to abandon its conventional military during conflict. Sweden continues to invest in high technology weaponry and even domestically manufactures its modern fighter jet.⁶¹ These weapons are still components of the country's overall defense strategy and combine with TD to deter invasion. It is fair to assess TD as an umbrella term for all activities that support national defense.

Sweden's Total Defense is separated into resilience and resistance phases. Each phase has specific activities that the military, government, and population must perform. During resilience, the nation must prepare to resist and harden themselves against nefarious external forces. During the resistance, the whole society must resist within the scope of every citizen's responsibility. Total Defense takes average citizens, and turns them into active subversive deviants. This increases the cost of invasion and occupation. During peacetime, TD may deter conflict due to the potential price of intervention. During conflict, TD synergizes the people to overthrow their oppressors and restore the homeland.

3. Policy and Legal Framework

Total Defense's legal considerations may seem odd to discuss, but it is important because it increases legitimacy and commitment to resistance efforts. Italy created a secretive stay-behind force, Gladio, during the Cold War to counter communist invasion without an established legal framework.⁶² Secrecy undermined public support and fueled rumors of excessive American influence within the Gladio and Italian Intelligence community when the unit's existence became public. Public distrust of the Gladio makes it difficult for Italy to consider establishing another resistance element in the future.

⁶⁰ Fiala, 38.

⁶¹ Alex Lockie, "Sweden Says It Built a Russian Fighter Jet Killer — and Stealth Is Totally Irrelevant," Business Insider, last modified November 2, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/sweden-built-a-russian-fighter-jet-killer-and-stealth-is-irrelevant-2019-2>.

⁶² Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 180.

Norway also created a similar stay behind unit. Norway's secretive resistance network was called the Rocambole⁶³ These were mostly unpaid civilians under the leadership of military personnel. However, the Rocambole also suffered from problematic legal foundations. The unit's murky legal status undermined trust with the population since the people suspected illegal surveillance on other Norwegians. Given the Cold War experience of some other European nations, Sweden understood that policy had to match resistance capability.

Sweden's resistance is legal and a matter of policy. To reinforce Total Defense's credibility, the government passed legislation and makes its intent to oppose invasion public knowledge. Sweden wants its citizens and neighbors to know that TD is more than a goal; it is the law.⁶⁴

Besides reinforcing policy credibility with the population and international community, legal foundations give the resistance clear guidance on what is permissible and not.⁶⁵ The legal code outlines the funds, authority to conduct operations, and resistance members' legal status in Sweden. Combined with the country's TD plans, Swedish citizens' legal justification and guidance reinforce its defense capability.

B. SINGAPORE TD CONCEPT

Singapore organizes its Total Defense in six specific pillars. These pillars are Psychological Defense, Civil Defense, Social Defense, Economic Defense, Digital Defense, and Military Defense.⁶⁶

1. Psychological Defense

Psychological Defense (PD) builds the collective will and commitment for all Singaporeans to defend the country. As Singapore's Ministry of Defense describes it, PD

⁶³ Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 184.

⁶⁴ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, "Resilience," 1.

⁶⁵ Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, 93.

⁶⁶ "MINDEF Singapore: Total Defence," Singapore Ministry of Defense, accessed August 25, 2020, [/web/portal/mindef/defence-matters/defence-topic/defence-topic-detail/total-defence](http://web/portal/mindef/defence-matters/defence-topic/defence-topic-detail/total-defence).

involves instilling patriotism, passion, and pride.⁶⁷ PD aims to reinforce and enhance society's unity by giving every Singaporean a common cause of security, survival, and success. In a broad sense, the government wants its people to have the mental agility to confront a crisis with poise and grit. Following the end of the disaster, war, or any other crisis, the people must switch one's mentality to normalcy so the country can rebuild.

2. Civil Defense

Civil Defense (CD) involves meeting the population's essential basic needs as best as possible during an emergency.⁶⁸ CD involves government efforts and participation from average citizens to care for one another. Civilians assist the Singapore Civil Defense Force with first aid, evacuation, and damage control. During state-sponsored exercises, these skills are practiced frequently.⁶⁹ The government assumes Singaporean government resources will be strained at best and, at worst, depleted despite preparations.

Consequently, citizens have dual responsibilities. First, the population has to be vigilant and report suspicious activity or possible threats. Second, Singaporeans have to prepare to care for one another's essential needs when the city experiences a crisis. The population's ability to cope with any contingency will enhance the country's efforts to succeed in the face of adversity.

3. Social Defense

Social Defense (SD) incorporates all citizens, regardless of race or religion, into a harmonious society that will assist one another during a crisis.⁷⁰ During the 1960s, Lee

⁶⁷ "Singapore Ministry of Defense News Release: Factsheet - About Total Defense," Singapore Ministry of Defense, last modified February 7, 2004, 1.
https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/MINDEF_20040207001_2/MINDEF_20040207003.pdf.

⁶⁸ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Singapore Ministry of Defense News Release: Factsheet - About Total Defense," 2.

⁶⁹ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "What Is Total Defense?"

⁷⁰ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Singapore Ministry of Defense News Release: Factsheet - About Total Defense," 2.

Kuan Yew witnessed widespread ethnic violence in Malaysia.⁷¹ Therefore, Lee and the government sought to promote harmony among all the different peoples of Singapore. Social defense looks beyond the mentality of cohesion and implores the public to act harmoniously. The government believes that Singaporeans should befriend other Singaporeans and regularly interact to forge close bonds and understanding to reinforce societal strength.⁷² These actions will mitigate ethnic tensions and help people work together during times of stress.

4. Economic Defense

Economic Defense (ED) has two components that can be distinguished by short-term and long-term necessities. In the short term, the government must manage strategic resources and reorient civil industry to meet crisis or conflict requirements.⁷³ Government management requires preparation and planning that has to take place long before an emergency, and therefore the government also has a long-term holistic vision of economic defense. The government believes that the economy is instrumental to total defense's success in that it provides the resources to fund defense programs and rebuild following an emergency.⁷⁴ Additionally, with a long-term perspective in mind, the government encourages Singaporeans to maximize their potential and contribute to the country's economic productivity. All citizens are encouraged to pursue education throughout their life and adjust their abilities to meet economic needs.⁷⁵ People are also encouraged to save and use environmental resources appropriately. These actions increase economic efficiency and output, which in turn enhances the resources available for defense.

⁷¹ Ankit Panda, "Singapore: A Small Asian Heavyweight," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified April 16, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/background/singapore-small-asian-heavyweight>.

⁷² Singapore Ministry of Defense, "What Is Total Defense?"

⁷³ Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan. "Small Country 'Total Defence': A Case Study of Singapore." *Defence Studies* 7, no. 3 (September 2007): 381. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430701559289>.

⁷⁴ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "What Is Total Defense?"

⁷⁵ Singapore Ministry of Defense.

5. Military Defense

Military Defense (MD) is, above all, devoted to deterring an aggressor.⁷⁶ When called upon, Singapore's Armed Forces (SAF) will meet the threat decisively. To keep the armed forces focused on defending Singapore, families, employers, and the community will support service personnel to keep forces ready to fight.⁷⁷ Singapore boasts a powerful and impressive military composed of National Servicemen and a regular standing force. Military defense is also a visible deterrent for a potential aggressor.⁷⁸ The relatively high defense spending and concrete hardware purchases are no secret and signal to an opponent, the military capabilities at Singapore's disposal. The synergistic effect of national and defense investment ensures that Singapore's relatively small force can hit any adversary with robust capabilities.

6. Digital Defense

Lastly, the newest defense pillar for Singapore is Digital Defense (DD). As an interconnected and technologically advanced nation, information systems permeate almost every aspect of Singapore's society.⁷⁹ Since Singapore's people enjoy widespread access to the internet and so much of the country enjoys the benefits of advanced technological infrastructure, Singapore is more susceptible to cyber operations. These operations can target the existing digital networks or even Singaporeans themselves. Therefore, the government believes that its people are the first line of defense.⁸⁰ As articulated on Singapore's Total Defense website, citizens are encouraged to practice proper

⁷⁶ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Singapore Ministry of Defense News Release: Factsheet - About Total Defense," 2.

⁷⁷ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "What Is Total Defense?"

⁷⁸ Adrian W.J. Kuah, "25 Years of Total Defence in Singapore: Revisiting the Assumptions," S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, last modified February 6, 2009, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1174-25-years-of-total-defence-in-s/?fbclid=IwAR0KBuHweOsi6hcjJ5OIpCicfQ8AC0dP3bIKsPcza1BU4E01pYLZW40sIEQ#.Xxh9FyXvCEc>.

⁷⁹ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Total Defence."

⁸⁰ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "What Is Total Defense?"

cybersecurity, be aware of internet scams, and guard against fake news. Combined with the population's vigilance, the government possesses the capabilities to respond to an attack and, if necessary, rebuild Singapore's networks. Singapore realizes its position relative to the digital domain and has not ignored its responsibility to adapt to the new digital world.

Singapore's six pillars of Psychological Defense, Civil Defense, Social Defense, Economic Defense, Digital Defense, and Military Defense offer a comprehensive and organized concept to build Total Defense.⁸¹ The pillars account for the vast and diverse sources of national power. Even though Singapore's armed forces are capable and well-armed, the small city-state does not rest on its laurels. To ensure any adversary thinks twice about offensive action, Singapore is prepared to mobilize all aspects of society to defend the homeland.

7. Policy and Legal Framework

Upon realizing the city's vulnerability following the withdrawal of British forces, Lee Kuan Yew moved quickly to authorize the creation of a capable defense force and, eventually, Total Defense concepts. In 1984, the government introduced TD and highlighted the necessity for all Singaporeans to contribute to defense.⁸² The government's pronouncements made it an official policy for every citizen to contribute in some form or fashion. It is essential to publicly declare the nation's intentions because it signals to its people and potential attackers that besides being a duty to defend Singapore, it is also the legal duty of all people to support defensive operations. When governments choose to keep plans for popular support to the military secret, this runs the risk of alienating and confusing average citizens, much like the Norwegian Rocambole and Italian Gladio resistance networks during the Cold War.

⁸¹ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Total Defence."

⁸² Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Singapore Ministry of Defense News Release: Factsheet - About Total Defense," 1.

Further, the government made national preparations a normal function of life. Regular exercise, online resources, promotional material, media interviews, and countless official documents reinforce government, military, and individual responsibilities. Singapore's policy is public, legal, and openly exercised to the point that TD is considered an interwoven component of Singaporean civic life.⁸³ Singapore adds credibility to its defense options by planning society-wide defense efforts and establishing total defense as a policy.

C. SWEDISH VERSUS SINGAPOREAN TOTAL DEFENSE: TAKEAWAYS TO UNDERSTAND TOTAL DEFENSE

It is apparent that Sweden and Singapore both espouse total defense and share similarities, but the actual concepts are somewhat different. Both countries believe that all their citizens play crucial roles in the nation's defense. Still, Sweden envisions some of its people actively fighting a guerilla war against the enemy. At the same time, Singapore encourages its people to care for one another while the armed forces defend the city. Despite this difference, Sweden and Singapore still adhere to one of Total Defense's paramount objectives, incorporating the whole country into defense plans. How each country plans to implement the whole-of-society approach depends on both Sweden and Singapore's unique circumstances. Sweden believes protracted guerilla-style combat is necessary, and Singapore wants to defend itself by conducting operations forward of the city's territory.⁸⁴ Despite this difference, both nations require all their citizens to contribute to the common defense.

⁸³ Adrian W.J. Kuah, "25 Years of Total Defence in Singapore."

⁸⁴ "Singapore's Forward Defence Strategy Goes Naval," East Asia Forum, December 20, 2019, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/21/singapores-forward-defence-strategy-goes-naval/>.

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IV. TOTAL DEFENSE AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

A. SWEDEN AND SINGAPORE: INVITING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

This paper has so far explained the dilemma small nations face in the world of great power competition, proposed total defense policy as a security strategy for smaller countries, explained how deterrence and escalation literature relates to total defense and described Sweden and Singapore's Total Defense strategy hinging on societal integration in defensive efforts. The paper will now argue that Sweden and Singapore enhance Total Defense with foreign security cooperation. Although TD relies on a nation's domestic capability, the policy does not exist in a vacuum. TD and external military assistance are complementary. Total Defense enhances the fighting capability of a country and gains time for possible external assistance.

B. INTERVENTION WITHOUT MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES

This paper does not claim to understand all the rationale for non-alignment, but some countries prefer to maintain a nominally non-aligned or neutral stance. However, even if a country does not have a mutual defense alliance, this does not preclude another state from coming to the defender's rescue. The United States did not have a treaty alliance with Kuwait before the Gulf War, and China did not have a defense pact with North Korea before the People's Republic of China (PRC) intervention in the Korean War. The U.S. did not make Kuwait an ally until April 1, 2004, and the PRC did not sign the treaties of friendship and cooperation with North Korea till the 1960s.⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ External support to a defender is possible without official alliance guarantees.

Therefore, to improve the likelihood and effectiveness of military support from friendly nations, Sweden and Singapore regularly conduct exercises to increase military interoperability with friendly nations. This relationship is apparent with Sweden's

⁸⁵ Katzman, Kenneth. *Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*. CRS Report No. RS21513. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), 2020. 25. <https://crsreports.congress.gov>

⁸⁶ Avram Agov, "North Korea's Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War," *The Journal of Korean Studies* (1979-) 18, no. 2 (2013): 250.

cooperation with NATO and Singapore's cooperation with the U.S. and the Five Powers Defense Agreement (FPDA) countries.⁸⁷ Defense cooperation with other nations opens the opportunity for military support during conflict and complements total defense policies.

C. SWEDEN: NORDIC TOTAL DEFENSE

Sweden is a sparsely populated Scandinavian country located between Norway and Finland. The country is well known for its prosperity, the population's longevity, and high-quality social services. What is less known is Sweden's pragmatic security and foreign policy. Sweden is ostensibly neutral and has maintained this moderate stance throughout its history. Even during World War II (WW2), Sweden maintained official neutrality.⁸⁸ As the Soviet Union invaded Finland, Sweden declared itself a "non-belligerent."⁸⁹ Despite its neutrality, Sweden took steps to ensure its safety and security. As Germany invaded Norway, Sweden allowed Norwegian refugees and resistance fighters a haven inside Swedish territory.

Conversely, Sweden permitted German troops and transports to sail through territorial waters. Sweden also supplied Germany with steel and consumer goods. Sweden had to appear neutral to avoid war but also took actions that suited the country's interests. Figure 3 displays Sweden's neighbors. This trend continues today as Sweden is publicly neutral, but the country also secures its sovereignty by implementing total defense and increasing partnership with the NATO alliance.⁹⁰ The long peace Europe enjoys following the end of the Cold War has given way to uncertainty, and Sweden has adapted accordingly.

⁸⁷ Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10." 63; Pyykönen, Juha and Forss, Stefan. "Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region:: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together with the U.S. Army." (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2020), 12.

⁸⁸ Gustav Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement - the Middle Way." (Occasional Paper 2, October 1997), 3.

⁸⁹ Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement - the Middle Way," 39.

⁹⁰ Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, "Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region:: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together with the U.S. Army," 37.



Figure 3. Sweden's regional neighbors.⁹¹

1. Perceived Threat

Although Sweden enjoys considerable internal stability, Sweden's regional situation is not as stable. The Swedish government publicly acknowledges that armed attack and the threat of military invasion is a real possibility.⁹² Europe's security situation is unstable following Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Ukrainian territory in 2014.⁹³ Additionally, Russia continues to increase its military capability far beyond the military strength Russia's immediate neighbors can match. Conversely, the Swedish Defense Commission published that Western militaries still do not adequately match Russian military preparations.⁹⁴ Russian President Vladimir Putin seems intent to deploy military forces to gain political advantage. Official Swedish government documents express concern that even if war breaks out with other European countries, combatants may

⁹¹ Source: "Sweden Country Profile," BBC News, October 1, 2018 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17955808>.

⁹² Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, "Resilience," 1.

⁹³ Swedish Defense Commission, *The Swedish Defence Commission's White Book on Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, (Stockholm, Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, 2019), 1.

⁹⁴ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat.

seize Swedish territory to gain a significant advantage over the other.⁹⁵ Since Russia continues to degrade the overall security situation in Europe, Sweden cannot expect immunity from Moscow's actions on the continent. Compounding the situation is the rivalry between the U.S. and China. China's military expansion and rising influence will draw more U.S. attention and forces to the Asia-Pacific.⁹⁶ When considering Europe's geopolitical situation and the rest of the world, it is evident that Sweden believes Russia is an immediate and credible threat.

2. International Defense Engagement

Sweden's defense plans envision total defense efforts gaining time for eventual assistance from the NATO alliance.⁹⁷ Although paradoxical given the nation's belief in neutrality, the Swedish population and government believe that NATO cooperation is necessary. Survey data from the 2015 Swedish Society, Opinion, Media (SOM) Institute reinforce this paradox since most respondents wanted NATO engagement, but most of the population also supported neutrality.⁹⁸ The paper will not explain this contradiction's roots. Still, it is necessary to mention that Sweden's policies are nuanced enough to reflect the population's paradoxical beliefs on international defense cooperation.

The survey results may not be congruent, but it does reflect the Swedish government's decision to increase interoperability with NATO. The Swedish government believes that the country needs to defend itself for at least three months to gain enough time for NATO.⁹⁹ Total defense efforts will be the primary internal focus of Swedish defense. Assuming that war is inevitable, the government will mobilize the population, military, and civil resources to defend the country. As mobilization occurs, Sweden

⁹⁵ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, "Resilience." 1.

⁹⁶ Swedish Defense Commission, *The Swedish Defence Commission's White Book on Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025*, 2.

⁹⁷ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, 2–3.

⁹⁸ Karl Ydén, Joakim Berndtsson, and Magnus Petersson, "Sweden and the Issue of NATO Membership: Exploring a Public Opinion Paradox." *Defence Studies* 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 1.

⁹⁹ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat, "Resilience." 2.

envision the international community to mobilize its forces to defend or liberate Swedish territory from occupation. The Swedish government realizes there is no guarantee of assistance. It will take time before a decision comes, but international support would be irrelevant without a credible defense because Sweden could already be physically and psychologically defeated.¹⁰⁰

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO's security cooperation with the Nordic region manifested itself in Partnership for Peace (PfP) cooperation.¹⁰¹ Through PfP, Sweden enhanced standardization, military planning, training, and exercises with the NATO alliance.¹⁰² Currently, Sweden continues to engage in staff exercises and numerous NATO institutions. Sweden's military officers are fixtures in the majority of NATO headquarters in the Baltic/Nordic region. For example, Sweden has officers in NATO's multinational headquarters in Szczecin, Poland. This facility is not coincidentally responsible for planning in the Baltic Sea region.¹⁰³ NATO and Swedish coordination are significant and relevant to Sweden's deterrence.

Assuming NATO decided to fight with Sweden in a hypothetical war, prior coordination and training facilitate interoperability between NATO and Swedish forces. Swedish and NATO cooperation is publicly known and documented. There is no mistake that the government wants the security of mutual security pact without a security pact's official label. The government's actions support this assertion. According to what some consider the Swedish "Hultqvist Doctrine," the aforementioned Swedish Defense Minister's policies demonstrate that Sweden wants to increase defense cooperation and enhance international engagement to levels just short of a mutual defense treaty.¹⁰⁴ The topic has extensive literature and debate that make it impossible for Russian planners to

¹⁰⁰ Swedish Defense Commission Secretariat.

¹⁰¹ Pyykönen and Forss, "Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region:: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together with the U.S. Army." 11.

¹⁰² Pyykönen and Forss, 12.

¹⁰³ Pyykönen and Forss, 12.

¹⁰⁴ Barbara Kunz, "Sweden's NATO Workaround: Swedish Security and Defense Policy against the Backdrop of Russian Revisionism," *French Institute of International Relations*: (November 2015): 5.

ignore. The gray area manufactured by Swedish policy enables the country to leave the door open to foreign assistance while still nominally claiming non-alignment.

D. SINGAPORE AND THE CITY OF TOTAL DEFENSE

In the 1800s, the British governor of Bencoolen, located on the west coast of the Indonesian Island of Sumatra, wanted to circumvent Dutch trade restrictions in Asia and decided to build a port in current-day Singapore.¹⁰⁵ The port attracted traders and workers from all over Asia. As the trade increased, the population also ballooned, and soon Singapore turned from a small island with 1000 inhabitants to a significant city with 85,000 residents. Figure 4 shows Singapore's neighbors. Today, Singapore continues to prosper from trade with its commanding position at the Malacca Straits' eastern entrance. Well known for its cleanliness and strict adherence to the legal code, it is understandable why some might envy Singapore's safety and prosperity. However, Singapore's history contains trauma that explains why the country is continuously concerned with its national defense.

¹⁰⁵ Barbara Leitch Lepoer, "Singapore: A Country Study." Library of Congress. last modified 1989. <http://countrystudies.us/singapore/>.



Figure 4. Singapore's regional neighbors.¹⁰⁶

1. Perceived Threat

Singapore has to devote considerable resources and attention to national defense. Since Singapore is essentially a large city, defense planners cannot trade space for time. Unlike countries such as Russia, Singapore does not have strategic depth and cannot wait as the situation develops. This lesson was abundantly clear during World War II when the Japanese routed British and Commonwealth forces to seized the Malay peninsula and Singapore.¹⁰⁷ Once Japan forced the British out of the Malay peninsula, Singapore stood little chance of repelling the Japanese Imperial Army. Under Japanese occupation, the civilian population suffered inhumane treatment. The older generation of Singapore can vividly retell stories of fear, hunger, arbitrary imprisonment, and torture by the Japanese

¹⁰⁶ Source: "Singapore Country Profile," BBC News, July 20, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15961759>.

¹⁰⁷ Paul H. Kratoska, *The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941–45: A Social and Economic History* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2018), 30.

Kenpeitai military police.¹⁰⁸ Eventually, Allied forces defeated Japan, and Singapore would gain independence from the British empire in 1965.¹⁰⁹ However, Singaporeans never forgot World War II lessons and understood that the city-state must defend itself at all costs.

Periodically, Singapore dealt with an unstable and insecure security environment in Southeast Asia. Although proud to be independent, Singapore no longer enjoyed formal protection from the British military following troops' withdrawal in 1968.¹¹⁰ The city state's small landmass and relatively small population made Singapore vulnerable without British protection. Unfortunately, the troop withdraws took place simultaneously as Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew believed the country was most vulnerable. In Indonesia, General Suharto seized power in a coup. The Vietnam War continued to rage, and the region feared continued communist aggression.

Additionally, Singapore's predominately Chinese population sits between the predominately Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia. Both countries have a combined population of nearly 300 million people and experienced tension with ethnic Chinese populations in the past.¹¹¹ When Singapore was still part of Malaysia, Anti-Chinese

¹⁰⁸ "Speech by Minister for Communications and Information Mr S Iswaran at the Total Defence Day Commemoration Event and Launch of Digital Defence." Singapore Ministry of Defense, last modified February 15, 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2019/february/15feb19_speech/!ut/p/z1/tVJNc5swFPwtPego64HBQGc6HZq2STsh7oeTgC4ZAQ9QC4Jliqn_feW4uaRjZ3qoLpJWb592V2Kc5YwrsZWtsHJUonf7gq_uovX7swsL_Kt1uPEgvdlsLsN3V5-uoxW7YZzxqZI1KwDqOvLKilYeRDRYrmoa16uAhqIMwQ_jpErKfXWl7GQ7VgxS1djQalQWISXQjQMSUDgbKIRNcetQQ6AXFo2lGnsUBh3gg5cQaLDUD0LvChihW3vJnZkQq47dviSZu2M4MlJwfp5Ysv4anHsB-Jfr7FvoOiRjvIEvPpxHfwpO9Cichui4hojdbiXO7FqNenApf__HEC-AfX6UcMKlezn54_6epy7wfcK_LMv_U-LuKl9nZ1nrTAjbUamakeV7EsufSCx_RnIG2n4sD38sVeUydnSNDWrUiwft4M7aybwmQGCe58VB-6IdtwvTOghLAtOoregJHM4IGBS66t4epjdHil62K7SVVY-0Ritk_2T_4wn7z_V3o3Fx_yWbTcMQL3f0Z5N9WAa83M1NZsMiffUbv8AyQQ!/dz/d5/L2dBISevZ0FBIS9nQSEh/?urile=wcm%3Apath%3A%2Fmindef-content%2Fhome%2Fnews-and-events%2Flatest-releases%2F2019%2Ffebruary%2F15feb19_speech.

¹⁰⁹ Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, "Small Country 'Total Defence': A Case Study of Singapore," 376,

¹¹⁰ Emma Harris, "The Security Evolution of Singapore," *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, (2016), 5.

¹¹¹ Matthews and Yan, "Small Country 'Total Defence': A Case Study of Singapore," 377.

sentiments erupted into violence in 1964. After Singapore left Malaysia, violence continued. In 1969, violent riots occurred again in Malaysia.¹¹² Even more menacing towards Singapore during this era was Indonesia's policy of confrontation.¹¹³ On January 20, 1963, following Indonesian and Malaysian clashes over a revolt in Brunei, Jakarta announced its intention to pursue confrontation. Under the "Confrontation" policy, the Indonesian military conducted raids in Singapore and Malaysia to subvert and destabilize both areas. Given this geopolitical situation, Singapore immediately undertook the development of indigenous defense capabilities.¹¹⁴ Indonesia did not change its stance until General Suharto replaced Indonesian President Sukarno.¹¹⁵

Moving to the modern era, Singapore's relations with its neighbors are stable and trend positively, but the region's uncertain security situation doesn't allow the country to relax.¹¹⁶ One of the main drivers of geopolitical uncertainty in the region is the competition between the United States and China.¹¹⁷ As of writing this paper, relations between the U.S. and China are incredibly strained. Relations may improve following the election of President-elect Joe Biden, but there is no guarantee ties will improve. The paper does not claim that China is the only or most pressing security threat to Singapore. Still, given Singapore's proximity to the South China Sea, defense cooperation with Taiwan, the city-state's close relationship to the United States, and Singapore's location in the strategic Malacca Straits, there will be friction with Beijing.¹¹⁸ Singapore does not name China as

¹¹² Matthews and Yan, 377.

¹¹³ Marsita Omar, "Indonesia–Malaysia Confrontation | Infopedia," Singapore Infopedia, accessed November 1, 2020, https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1072_2010-03-25.html.

¹¹⁴ Harris, "The Security Evolution of Singapore", 5.

¹¹⁵ Marsita Omar, "Indonesia–Malaysia Confrontation."

¹¹⁶ Jia Rong Lester Yong, "Why Keep Changing? Explaining the Evolution of Singapore's Military Strategy since Independence." (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 40.

¹¹⁷ Ronald O'Rourke, *Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R43838. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R438381>.

¹¹⁸ Liang Fook Lye, "Singapore-China Relations Hit Another Snag," *Policy Forum* (blog), December 8, 2016, <https://www.policyforum.net/singapore-china-relations-hit-another-snag/>.

a threat, but there are public disagreements. On November 23, 2017, Hong Kong authorities seized Singaporean infantry fighting vehicles en route to Singapore following exercises on Taiwan.¹¹⁹ The incident triggered public disagreements regarding Singapore's continued defense cooperation with Taiwan. Fortunately, both sides eventually resolved the issue quietly.

Although Singapore is not a claimant state regarding the South China Sea, Singapore does have interests such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the region.¹²⁰ The city-state's small landmass necessitates open trade lines to ensure Singaporeans have access to markets and essential goods necessary for subsistence and commerce.¹²¹ The rule of law is essential because Singapore benefits from a stable international environment based on rules such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Unilateral actions such as China's declaration of a "9-Dash Line" cause tension and contravene agreements such as UNCLOS.¹²² The issues above, combined with the following discussion on Singapore's international relations, demonstrate friction between Singapore and Beijing. The disagreements do not necessitate future conflict, but it cannot be written off as impossible. Singapore will not let other countries threaten its citizens, and therefore Total Defense combined with foreign defense cooperation are critical elements of the country's defense.

2. International Defense Engagement

Singapore's defense cooperation is similar to Sweden's cooperation with NATO. Singapore maintains substantial defense cooperation with British Commonwealth states and the United States.

¹¹⁹ Bhavan Jalpragas "Hong Kong to Return Seized Armoured Vehicles to Singapore," South China Morning Post, last modified January 24, 2017. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2065027/hong-kong-return-singapores-seized-armoured-vehicles>.

¹²⁰ Jane Chan, "Singapore and the South China Sea:: Being an Effective Coordinator and Honest Broker," *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (2016): 41–43.

¹²¹ Chan, "Singapore and the South China Sea:: Being an Effective Coordinator and Honest Broker," 43.

¹²² Chan, 42.

Under the Five Powers Defense Agreements (FPDA), Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom regularly consult one another on security issues and test interoperability during complex multilateral exercises. The exercises expanded from land-based defensive exercises to large scale combined and joint maneuvers between the five nations.¹²³ If one assumes that exercises reflect the respective nations' security concerns, then it is clear Singapore wants to improve interoperability in the maritime and air domains. The May 2010 BERSAMA SHIELD exercise took place over the Malay peninsula and the South China Sea while involving 59 aircraft, 19 ships, and approximately 2,500 personnel.¹²⁴ The maneuvers developed interoperability with air, ground, and naval units.

The FPDA helps build cooperation and coordination that supports crisis response scenarios. Southeast Asia scholar, Carl Thayer, believes that the FPDA has collateral benefits. Thayer writes that "As noted by the UK's Defence Minister Dr. Liam Fox on 6 June 2010, the FPDA provided a foundation for member states to work to enhance security from assistance to Timor-Leste, natural disaster response, and working together in Afghanistan (where Australia, Singapore and Malaysia have made varying military commitments)."¹²⁵ Assuming that the FPDA countries decide to military intervene on each other's behalf in a hypothetical conflict, regular exercises and exchanges increase the coalition's military effectiveness. Any country planning to invade Singapore would have to factor in the possibility of external intervention.

Besides the FDPA, Singapore also maintains close relations with the United States. Although Singapore and the U.S. are not allies, the relationship has a wide breadth and

¹²³ Carlyle A Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10," *In The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty*, ed. by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, Daljit Singh, (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011), 51–52. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/five-power-defence-arrangements-at-forty/five-power-defence-arrangements-exercises-200410/0535B315685B07D639383C6A34E7DE83>.

¹²⁴ Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10," 56.

¹²⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, 63.

deep foundations.¹²⁶ In the 1960s, both countries fought communist threats.¹²⁷ Examples of the U.S.-Singapore relational strength are apparent when one observes the defense acquisitions and basing agreements.

Singapore can purchase the latest technology and defense systems. For example, Singapore received permission to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.¹²⁸ The F35 is the most advanced fighter aircraft in service, and the only other countries that can procure the pricy platform are either a treaty ally or happen to be Israel. Given Singapore's company, it's evident that the U.S. has enough trust and faith in Singapore to share its air superiority fighter.

Besides defense acquisition, Singapore and the U.S. have basing agreements that allow U.S. forces to use Singapore's facilities. In 2019, Singapore and the U.S. agreed to extend the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore to 2035. The agreement allows the U.S. military to station on rotational basis forces such as fighter aircraft, littoral combat ships, and P-8 Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft at Singaporean facilities.¹²⁹

Although Singapore does not have an explicit agreement to render or receive assistance in a hypothetical war, the city-state cooperates with significant military powers. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia regularly cooperate in the defense realm. The FPDA increases interoperability against a wide range of security threats, and U.S. partnership decreases the friction associated with moving U.S. forces in Singapore. Both actions squarely align Singapore's defense forces with Western

¹²⁶ Lynn Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia-Pacific," (working paper, *ORDER from CHAOS*, July 2016), 1.

¹²⁷ Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia-Pacific," 3.

¹²⁸ Mike Yeo, "How the F-35 Could Be a Game-Changer for Singapore." Defense News, last modified November 2, 2020. <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/singapore-airshow/2020/02/11/how-the-f-35-could-be-a-game-changer-for-singapore/>

¹²⁹ Charissa Yong and Min Lim Zhang, "PM Lee, Trump Renew Key Defence Pact on US Use of Singapore Air, Naval Bases." The Straits Times, last modified September 24, 2019. <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/pm-lee-trump-renew-key-defence-pact-on-us-use-of-singapore-air-naval-bases>.

powers and compel any conventional military threat to Singapore to consider the consequences of military aggression.¹³⁰

E. TOTAL DEFENSE, DEFENSE COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY

Deterrence theorist, Stephen Quackenbush, stated that credible deterrence requires the capability to oppose an invader, the attacker perceiving that the defender's capability can cause unacceptable losses, and the defender has the credibility to execute its defensive plans.¹³¹ If the attacker does not believe the defender will fight, there is no fear of severe consequences and no reason to cancel the invasion. Therefore, any nation attempting to deter conflict must have the credibility of an existing defense mechanism, the potential for such mechanisms to deny an enemy a quick, decisive victory, and the willingness to use it. This paper will assume that a quick, decisive victory is acceptable for simplicity of argument, but a protracted struggle is unacceptably risky.

Total Defense societal planning and preparation combined with substantial international security cooperation builds capacity and credible resolve to fight. Total Defense Policy chapter describes how Sweden and Singapore incorporate the civilian population and institutions into overall defense plans. By further reinforcing TD with legal status and official policy adoption, citizens are encouraged to join the war effort. The current chapter discusses each states' defense relationship with other powers. Both actions epitomize Total Defense's core belief in employing every facet of a country to defend the homeland. Sweden and Singapore synergize military, civil, conventional, and unconventional capabilities. If a hypothetical attacker wanted to plan for an invasion, they would face conventional military resistance, societal resistance, and possible third-party military intervention. A quick, decisive victory may be impossible, and the campaign would still require much more planning, preparation, and investment.

¹³⁰ Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10." 61.

¹³¹ Quackenbush, "Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?," 742.

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V. TOTAL DEFENSE ASSESSMENT: VIETNAM AND TAIWAN

The paper now transitions from countries that maintain Total Defense policies to countries that should consider following Sweden and Singapore's example. The hypothetical adversary will be China, and the countries up for discussion are Vietnam and Taiwan.

Vietnam has the distinction of being the last country to face China in full-scale combat. From February to March of 1970, Vietnam and China's war resulted in heavy losses and economic disaster without any real change to the strategic situation.¹³² The war erupted when Vietnam invaded China's ally, Cambodia, and China subsequently invaded Vietnam as retribution for attacking Pol Pot's regime. Today, these two countries maintain stable relations but still harbor mutual suspicion.

Taiwan's ambiguous sovereignty status and tenuous security situation perpetually stress the defense of the island.¹³³ Since 1949, the Communist Chinese government has always considered Taiwan an inalienable part of China. But in reality, Taiwan has acted independently since the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to the island in 1949. An uneasy unofficial, and continuously evolving status quo has maintained peace. As long as Taiwan does not move to formal independence, China would not invade the island militarily.¹³⁴ To complicate the situation further, the United States reinforces this status quo by deterring Chinese Communist Party military intervention and pressuring Taiwan from declaring independence. Although unstable and tenuous at times, this framework has prevented wide-scale military conflict on the island of Taiwan.

Given the brief introduction of Vietnam and Taiwan's geopolitical situation, this chapter will further explain each nation's history and current relations with China.

¹³² Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 170.

¹³³ Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*, 35.

¹³⁴ Brendan Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management* (New York: Rutledge, 2019), 15.

Following the China relationship primer, the chapter will evaluate the hypothetical adoption of Total Defense, similar to Sweden and Singapore. Societal integration and international defense cooperation will be the main components of an effective Total Defense.

A. VIETNAM

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a Southeast Asian nation that brackets the South China Sea's western edge. Vietnam shares mountainous land borders with China to the North, Laos and Cambodia to the west, and maritime borders with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and China. Over 90 million people enjoy long coastlines, fertile coastal plains, and rugged mountains along its western border.¹³⁵ Although Vietnam enjoys relative peace today, the country's history has considerable turmoil. From ancient times through the 1970s, Vietnam has fought with its neighbors and the world's great powers.¹³⁶ Figure 5 displays Vietnam's neighbors. During ancient times, Vietnamese people fought Chinese imperial rule. During the colonial and post-WWII era, the Vietnamese fought French rule.¹³⁷ After the French withdrawal, Vietnamese communists would fight the United States during the Vietnam War. Shortly after the Vietnam War, Vietnam would invade Cambodia and provoke China to retaliate against Vietnam since Pol Pot's regime allied with China.¹³⁸ Vietnam has a history of war and fighting. Vietnam's history of conflict makes it easy to understand why national defense is a priority for the country.

¹³⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 3 (2011): 348.

¹³⁶ Henry J. Kenny, *Shadow of the Dragon* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), 21.

¹³⁷ Bernard A Cook, *Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 2001), 475.

¹³⁸ Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, 170.



Figure 5. Vietnam's regional neighbors.¹³⁹

1. Perceived Threat

It is no coincidence that China makes more than one appearance in the history of Vietnamese conflict. Chinese and Vietnamese conflict has ancient roots. From 111BC to 938AD, China dominated the Vietnamese people and territory.¹⁴⁰ Vietnamese people resented Chinese domination and consistently revolted to achieve independence. Nationalist rebellions took place in 687, 722, 766–791, and 819. Eventually, by 938, Vietnamese peasants and elites united to gain independence from the Tang Dynasty.¹⁴¹ Although Vietnamese and Chinese communist regimes experienced unusually warm ties during the mid-20th century struggle against the Western Powers, relations would again sour to the point of war. As mentioned several times before, China invaded Vietnam in

¹³⁹ Source: "Vietnam Country Profile," *BBC News*, July 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16567315>.

¹⁴⁰ Henry J. Kenny, *Shadow of the Dragon*, 21.

¹⁴¹ Henry J. Kenny, 30.

1979, and both sides experienced significant losses. In the modern era, China and Vietnam maintain mostly peaceful but complicated ties. Both countries have yet to ignite another war but deal with friction over South China Sea maritime territorial claims. In 2014, the Chinese owned Haiyang Shiyu (HYSY) 981 oil rig began oil exploration near the Paracel islands across the hypothetical median line between Chinese and Vietnamese maritime territory.¹⁴² This activity sparked a month's long clashes that would end up involving over 60 Vietnamese and 130 Chinese vessels.¹⁴³ Both sides eventually withdrew, but it was clear that Vietnam and China violently disagree on who owns what in the South China Sea.

Given the history of fighting and current tensions over the SCS, China is the most apparent threat to Vietnamese sovereignty and security. China is the most populous country globally and has more landmass and resources to exploit than Vietnam could ever tap. Additionally, Vietnam lacks strategic depth on the northern border and coastline, which means direct interaction with China's growing military and power projection capabilities. This proximity and historical SCS confrontations with China shape the Vietnamese people to consider the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) expansion as an existential threat. In 1974, China seized the Western Paracel Islands of Duncan, Drummond, and Robert from the then Republic of Vietnam.¹⁴⁴ Although technically not a provocation against the Communist Vietnamese regime, China's seizure warned of future confrontations. Eventually, Communist Vietnam ended up fighting China in March of 1988 over Johnson South Reef.¹⁴⁵ Two Vietnamese vessels and 64 Vietnamese service members died in the clash. When one factors historical conflict and modern clashes over the SCS, it is easy to understand why China is the primary existential concern for Vietnam.

¹⁴² Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, *Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence* (Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield), 2017, 207.

¹⁴³ Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, *Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence*, 218.

¹⁴⁴ Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Strategy of 'Cooperating and Struggling' with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2016): 203, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645453>.

¹⁴⁵ Thayer, "Vietnam's Strategy of 'Cooperating and Struggling' with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea," 204.

2. Whole of Society Defense Integration

A 2016 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute report on Vietnam's security situation stated that "Because of Vietnam's limited resources, the Twelfth National Party Congress decided to keep defence spending to a minimum, and rely on the development of an 'entire-people defence' strategy instead where every citizen is a soldier in the fight against foreign invasion. This strategy is based on a combination of 'the strength of the nation with that of the times,' defined as the global trend towards peace, cooperation, and development which delegitimizes the use of force and aggression."¹⁴⁶

Additionally, the 2019 Vietnam National Defence Whitepaper expressed the desire to "Proactively prevent and repulse enemies' forms of war and facilitate the conduct of the comprehensive, all-people war to be ready to win in all operational environments and critical areas."¹⁴⁷ TD is not an alien concept to Vietnamese leaders. The next step would involve codifying the public proclamations with plans, regulations, laws, and procedures to bring all society components into the fight.

Given the political desire to integrate the citizenry into national defense, Vietnam has specific civil and military capabilities that may serve as building blocks for Total Defense. Vietnam has an established system to handle disasters that incorporate all government elements. The command system for disaster prevention and control links all ministries and sectors under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development direction.¹⁴⁸ Plans are also communicated down to the local government, and these governments are expected to formulate locally relevant preparations. Although not an explicit objective within Vietnam's disaster preparation documents, crisis preparations also

¹⁴⁶ Manh Hung Nguyen, "New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges." *Trends in Southeast Asia*, no.17. (2016): 28.

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of National Defence, *2019 Vietnam National Defense White Paper* (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2019): 22, <https://daisukybiendong.files.wordpress.com/2019/12/vietnams-defense-white-paper-2019.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ "2018 Vietnam Disaster Management Reference Handbook.Pdf" Center for Excellence in Disaster Management, December 2018, 24. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018%20Vietnam%20Disaster%20Management%20Reference%20Handbook.pdf>.

exercise the same systems that must respond to a human-made crisis such as war. This system can serve as the backbone to coordinate government and civilian efforts to support the armed forces or mitigate war damage.

Vietnam's disaster response system also incorporates the military. If military assistance is required during a disaster, the Vietnam National Committee for Search and Rescue (VINASARCOM) will communicate directly with the Ministry of Defense for material and capability assistance.¹⁴⁹ For example, if the air force must execute rescue operations, VINASARCOM requests it from MOD, and the MOD directs the execution. During serious conflict, it is reasonable to believe that experience coordinating civilian and military capabilities will facilitate the same type of coordination necessary to handle an outbreak of violence. Exercising civil-military coordination in peacetime is better than building civil-military coordination while under attack.

Additionally, should Vietnamese leaders plan to organize the population into a fighting force, Vietnam can build on its Militia and Self-Defense force (SDF) to fight aggression within its borders. Owing its heritage to units established to fight the French, American, and South Vietnamese regimes, the Militia and SDF is the “mass armed force not detached from production and work, protecting local CPV's organizations, authorities, lives and property of people, public property, standing ready to fight, fighting and providing combat support, and playing the role as the core force together with the entire people in fighting against the enemies in their localities and workplaces.”¹⁵⁰ These elements also practice in peacetime search and rescue, pandemic defense, natural disaster response, and ensuring national security. In an invasion scenario, the Militia and SDF make the ideal guerilla force given their military training and local knowledge. The Vietnamese regime realizes these elements' potential and plans to enhance Militia and SDF capabilities with advanced modern weapons.¹⁵¹ This element will be an additional layer of defense

¹⁴⁹ Center for Excellence in Disaster Management, “2018 Vietnam Disaster Management Reference Handbook.Pdf” 56.

¹⁵⁰ Ministry of National Defence, *2019 Vietnam National Defense White Paper*, 107–108.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of National Defence, 110.

and complement the conventional force capabilities of the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA). The Militia and SDF will work with the VPA in any conflict scenario.¹⁵²

Vietnam's government wants its citizens integrated into the nation's defense, and the country has various elements that may become critical components of a whole-of-nation defense strategy. These two factors indicate that Hanoi may be initiating a concerted effort to plan and organize its government, citizenry, and military in a mutually supporting defense strategy similar to Sweden or Singapore.

3. International Defense Cooperation

Hanoi's international defense cooperation enables the country to procure high-technology weapon systems and expand defense engagement with other nations. TD integrates all the resources of the state, and this includes traditional military power. Similarly, but not to the same extent as US-Singapore defense cooperation, Vietnam has strong defense ties with Russia. Dating back to the Cold War, Hanoi and Moscow have significant experience working with one another.¹⁵³ This relationship has enabled Hanoi to procure defensive capabilities. In 2016 alone, Vietnam spent \$5.0 billion on its defense.¹⁵⁴ There are currently six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines in the Vietnamese Navy.¹⁵⁵ Although vastly outnumbered by the PLA Navy, the Kilos are likely a consideration for PLA planners. Besides submarines, Vietnam agreed to build anti-ship missiles in cooperation with Russia.¹⁵⁶ With Russia's Federal Service for Military-

¹⁵² Ministry of National Defence, 108.

¹⁵³ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Defense Minister Trip Puts Russia-Vietnam Security Ties into Focus," *The Diplomat*, last modified February 12, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/defense-minister-trip-puts-russia-vietnam-security-ties-into-focus/>.

¹⁵⁴ Jenn-Jaw Soong and Khac Nghia Nguyen, "China's OBOR Initiative and Vietnam's Political Economy: Economic Integration with Political Conflict," *The Chinese Economy* 51, no. 4 (2018): 343, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10971475.2018.1457333>

¹⁵⁵ Alexander Korablinov, "5th Russian-Built Kilo-Class Submarine Arrives in Vietnam," *Russia Beyond*, last modified February 9, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/02/09/5th-russian-built-kilo-class-submarine-arrives-in-vietnam_566041.

¹⁵⁶ "Vietnam to Make Naval Missiles with Russian Aid," *South China Morning Post*, accessed September 8, 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/article/992933/vietnam-make-naval-missiles-russian-aid>.

Technical Cooperation, Vietnam will jointly manufacture the Uran Switchblade missile. The production capacity will enhance Vietnam's ability to counter a naval attack. Concerning air defenses, Vietnam sports some of the most advanced systems globally, thanks to Russia. In 2003, Russia agreed to sell Vietnam the S-300 PMU surface to air missile system.¹⁵⁷ The missiles enable Vietnam to guard its air space out to 150km.

Weapons system cooperation and procurement from Russia serves as an example of Vietnam's international defense cooperation. In February of 2020, Vietnamese and Russian Defense ministers signed an agreement to "bolster defense cooperation on the basis of mutual political trust and the signed deals."¹⁵⁸ To be clear, the cooperation is not a mutual security pact, but defense procurement improves Vietnam's defense toolkit and establishes an avenue for Russian and Vietnamese interoperability. Regardless of how unlikely it is for Russia to intervene on Vietnam's behalf against China, if Moscow hypothetically decided to help Hanoi, the two countries would have more familiarity and interoperability than if both sides had no interaction. Additionally, given Russia and China's history of border skirmishes during the Cold War, both countries may experience tension over their extensive common border in the future.¹⁵⁹ If Beijing manages to threaten Hanoi and core Russian interests, China may fight both Vietnam and Russia.

In addition to arms sales and cooperation with Russia, Vietnam plans to expand its defense interaction with other countries and institutions. Vietnam's 2019 Defense White Paper concluded that,

transparency of the national defense policy, aimed at promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building between the CPA and Vietnamese people and militaries and people around the world, facilitating the improvement of effectiveness of international integration and defence cooperation between Viet Nam and other countries as well as regional and

¹⁵⁷ Sergei Blagov, "Russian Missiles to Guard Skies over Vietnam," Asia Times, last modified September 5, 2003, https://www.webcitation.org/68gcoGDsN?url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EI05Ag02.html .

¹⁵⁸ Parameswaran, "Defense Minister Trip Puts Russia-Vietnam Security Ties into Focus."

¹⁵⁹ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 21.

international organisations to deal with emerging security issues for the sake of peace, stability, cooperation, and development.”¹⁶⁰

Hanoi wants to increase defense engagement. Although there is no mention of mutual defense or alliances, Vietnam may follow the same path as Singapore and Sweden. Both countries claim non-alignment but practice deep defense cooperation with other nations. For instance, Vietnam and the United States may continue to grow security cooperation. In July of 2013, President Barack Obama and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang signed an agreement to “deepen mutual relations” in defense and security areas.¹⁶¹ Additionally, Vietnam’s decision to use language such as Indo-Pacific Strategy in its defense white paper is a nod to the region’s Trump administration’s characterization and a subtle signal of support for U.S. policy.¹⁶² Vietnam also recently hosted the first U.S. Aircraft Carrier since the Vietnam War.¹⁶³

Although Vietnam’s relationship with Russia and the United States are not mutual security pacts, nor will it ever be one, if Vietnam desires enhanced cooperation, deliberate long-term engagement can turn Hanoi’s relationship to Russia or the U.S. similar to Sweden’s relationship with NATO Singapore’s interaction in the FDPA. Realistically, both Sweden and Singapore methodically enhanced defense engagement over decades. Such development requires immense effort and time to expand. These relationships are unlikely to emerge in the near or mid future but may take shape over many years of engagement. If that scenario occurs, Beijing might consider if either country would militarily support Vietnam in a hypothetical war.

¹⁶⁰ Ministry of National Defence, “2019 Vietnam National Defense White Paper.” 111.

¹⁶¹ Małgorzata Pietrasiak, “Vietnam Game Between USA and China,” *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 22, no. 1 (December 1, 2018): 59, <https://doi.org/10.18778/1641-4233.22.04>.

¹⁶² Derek Grossman and Christopher Sharman, “How to Read Vietnam’s Latest Defense White Paper: A Message to Great Powers,” War on the Rocks, last modified December 31, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/how-to-read-vietnams-latest-defense-white-paper-a-message-to-great-powers/>.

¹⁶³ Derek Grossman and Dung Huynh, “Vietnam’s Defense Policy of ‘No’ Quietly Saves Room for ‘Yes,’” The Rand (blog), January 21, 2019, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/01/vietnams-defense-policy-of-no-quietly-saves-room-for.html>.

What is clear is that Vietnam has substantive security cooperation with international partners such as Russia and the United States. Pair external support with a unified national defense effort, and Vietnam has the components necessary to enhance a Total Defense strategy.

4. Total Defense Assessment: Vietnam

Vietnam has the potential and political desire to grow social, civil, and military defense integration. As a TD developing country, Vietnam's policy needs to mature. The Vietnamese government would need to match civic preparation, legal guidance, and tangible widespread integration seen in Sweden and Singapore. Vietnam certainly has the potential to harness the energy of the people. During Vietnamese and Chinese clashes in the South China Sea in 2014, Vietnamese people organized protests and even attack perceived Chinese factories.¹⁶⁴ Suppose CPV provides more guidance and planning for TD. In that case, the government could channel anti-Chinese sentiments into crisis preparedness exercises or national defense drills, which provide more utility than rioting or looting.

Concerning international defense cooperation, Vietnam has significant engagement and arms sales relationship with Russia but not on the same level as Sweden with NATO, Singapore with the U.S. and FPDA countries, or even Taiwan with the U.S. Sweden, Singapore, and Taiwan can envision situations where they would have other countries fighting alongside them. Vietnam does not have anything close to a budding defense pact. Currently, Hanoi's middle road foreign policy helps the country avoid entanglement in more considerable geopolitical competition. Vietnam takes a measured approach to international cooperation to avoid picking sides in geopolitical competition. This moderate policy demonstrates Vietnam's "3 Nos." Vietnam will not have a military alliance, will not

¹⁶⁴ Nhung T. Bui, "Managing Anti-China Nationalism in Vietnam: Evidence from the Media during the 2014 Oil Rig Crisis," *Pacific Review* 30, no. 2 (2017): 178, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132>.

side with one country over another, and will not have foreign bases on Vietnam's territory.¹⁶⁵

However, Vietnam's 3 Nos policy does not cut off all forms of defense cooperation and still allow the type of engagement necessary to complement TD. Sweden and Singapore do not technically have mutual defense treaties with other countries. Still, both have security cooperation deep and broad enough to improve interoperability, facilitating hypothetical military intervention. Vietnam had already expressed a desire to deepen security cooperation and demonstrated this desire when Hanoi conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea with the Indian Navy.¹⁶⁶

Vietnam's societal preparations and cooperation with foreign militaries exist as a foundation for further development. Hanoi does not have the developed TD policies exercised in Sweden but may already be moving in that direction.

B. TAIWAN

The island of Taiwan sits over 200 miles off mainland China and is home to over 23 million people.¹⁶⁷ Sitting between Japan and the Philippines, Taiwan sits along the western approaches to some of China's east coast. Figure 6 shows Taiwan's neighbors. Taiwan's population comprises native Taiwanese people and Han Chinese people who immigrated to the island. As Taiwanese citizens, the people enjoy the benefits of democracy, much like other liberal democracies.¹⁶⁸ The people have a voice in the affairs of the island and regularly vote in new governments. Economically, the island and its people are prosperous and continue to be leaders in semiconductor manufacturing. A Taiwanese company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd, is the world's largest

¹⁶⁵ Grossman and Huynh, "Vietnam's Defense Policy of 'No' Quietly Saves Room for 'Yes.'"

¹⁶⁶ Grossman and Huynh.

¹⁶⁷ "National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan)," National Statistics Bureau, accessed September 10, 2020, <https://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=9>.

¹⁶⁸ Richard C. Bush, "A One-China Policy Primer" Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings, last modified March 2017, 4–5, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf>.

chip manufacturer. Taiwan also sports a per capita net worth of \$147,931.¹⁶⁹ By many measures, the island of Taiwan seems like a well-run democratic nation. However, despite Taiwan's peaceful and prosperous appearance, the geopolitical struggle for recognition and independence from the PRC makes the island a dangerous flashpoint for conflict. For decades, an uneasy peace allowed the PRC and Taiwan to exist without full-scale war. Still, with Xi Jinping's "China Dream" demanding Taiwan people accept Beijing's vision of "one country, two systems," relations are unstable.¹⁷⁰ It is difficult for Taiwan's leadership and citizenry to trust Beijing, given the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) inconsistent and brutish application of the "one country, two systems" policy in Hong Kong.¹⁷¹ These are uncertain times for the security of Taiwan.



Figure 6. Taiwan's regional neighbor.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ National Statistics Bureau, "National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan)."

¹⁷⁰ Brendan Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management* (New York: Rutledge, 2019): 9–10.

¹⁷¹ Brendan Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management*, 11.

¹⁷² Source: "Taiwan Country Profile," *BBC News*, last modified February 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16164639>.

1. Perceived Threat

Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) government left mainland China and established itself on the island of Taiwan, the status of the island of Taiwan has been contentious. To the PRC, Taiwan is inextricably a part of China, and Taiwan's separation from the mainland is artificial.¹⁷³ Beijing has always reserved the right to use violent force to reunify the island. Taiwan's authorities would counter that the democratically elected government and free people on the island deserve respect, much like the other official countries recognized by the international community. This disagreement has its roots in the fallout from the Chinese Civil War from 1945–1949.¹⁷⁴ Following the Communist Chinese victory against Nationalist Chinese forces on mainland China, on October 1st, 1949, Mao declared the PRC's formation.¹⁷⁵ Simultaneously, the KMT established itself on Taiwan and pledged somewhat unrealistically to retake mainland China and assert itself as China's legitimate government.¹⁷⁶ Both sides view the status quo differently.

Given the conflict over Taiwan's status, PRC leaders reserve the right to retake the island violently. In 2004, Beijing adopted an "Anti-Secession Law" that states,

If the separatist forces of "Taiwan independence" use any name or any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's separation from China, or a major incident occurs that would lead to Taiwan's separation from China, or the possibilities of peaceful unification are completely exhausted, the country may adopt non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁷⁷

More recently, in January 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping made it abundantly clear that "Taiwan must accept Beijing's preferred one country two systems model for

¹⁷³ Shirley A. Kan, *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei* CRS Report No. RL30341 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2007): 39, https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/8a5df628-bf3f-4f11-8675-3549d8efe3da/China_s%20Taiwan%20policy%20statements.pdf.

¹⁷⁴ Brendan Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management*, 10.

¹⁷⁵ Richard C. Bush, "A One-China Policy Primer," 7.

¹⁷⁶ Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," 79–80.

¹⁷⁷ Shirley A. Kan.

reunification, or face the military consequences.”¹⁷⁸ Beijing does not recognize Taiwan as an independent country and consistently threatens war if peaceful reunification is impossible. This threat makes it very clear to the leaders and people of Taiwan that China will not accept the nation’s current status for perpetuity. War with China is an explicit threat that requires concrete action. Many believe that Taiwan has to defend itself for two to four weeks before enough forces are ready to begin operations to support Taiwan.¹⁷⁹ Taiwan’s response is the island’s Total Defense brand called All-Out Defense (AOD) and international defense engagement.¹⁸⁰ Championed by former President Lee Tung-hui, initially as “All-out Defense Consciousness” in 1996, Lee wanted to make sure the population understood the island’s security challenges and that the population would do everything possible to support defensive operations.¹⁸¹

2. Whole of Society Defense Integration

The government of Taiwan has initiated programs to prepare the population to integrate into homeland defense. Under the AOD banner, the Political Warfare Bureau hosts summer fight camps to teach average citizens the skills necessary to resist an invasion.¹⁸² Participants are taken to various locations such as Kinmen or Matzu to participate in military-style training that teaches participants to shoot, climb, use ropes, employ camouflage, and other activities to impart fighting skills.¹⁸³ The Ministry of

¹⁷⁸ Brendan Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management*, 9–10.

¹⁷⁹ Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management*, 69.

¹⁸⁰ “Political Warfare Bureau, M.N.D.-Development History-Political Education,” Political Warfare Bureau, January 20, 2017, <https://gpwd.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?cnid=243&p=4421>.

¹⁸¹ Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai, *Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy* (Taylor and Francis, Routledge, 2013): 61, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315029627>.

¹⁸² “Political Warfare Bureau, M.N.D.-Service & Contact-AllOut DefenseEducation-All-Out Defense News: All out Defense Summer Camp,” Political Warfare Bureau, May 1, 2017, <https://gpwd.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?cnid=287&p=2663>.

¹⁸³ Lo Tien-pin and Johnathan Chin, “Ministry Touts Summer Training Camps, Citing Willingness to Fight for Taiwan - Taipei Times,” News, Taipei Times, last modified December 23, 2018, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/12/23/2003706633>.

Defense believes that these summer camps increase participants' capability and willingness to fight for the country. Before attending camp, 82.1% expressed willingness to join the nation's defense.¹⁸⁴ After attending the camp, the percentage increased to 93.99%. The camps demonstrate that Taiwan has taken steps to motivate the population to defend the country and teach the skills necessary to frustrate an invasion.

Another example of Taiwan's societal defense integration is the education system. The government passed the All-out Defense Education Act in 2000, which specifies the requirement to educate citizens on various components of AOD.¹⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁶ In conjunction with the Ministry of Education, high school students learn military skills and acquire shooting experience. The education program also promotes civil-military interaction through guided tours that showcase the military's readiness to defend the island.¹⁸⁷ Both summer camps and AOD education are examples of Taipei's investment in civil defense and the mustering of popular support to defend the home island.

Lastly, AOD's reach in society is codified in Taiwanese law. In 2000, the Taiwanese legislature passed the National Defense Law and the Organization Law of the Ministry of National Defense.¹⁸⁸ The legislation passed AOD as the guiding defense concept. AOD would incorporate political, economic, psychological, technological, and other societal components to directly or indirectly support that island's defense. Additionally, the laws established the framework for military and civil sector cooperation.

¹⁸⁴ Tien-pin and Chin, "Ministry Touts Summer Training Camps, Citing Willingness to Fight for Taiwan - Taipei Times,"

¹⁸⁵ Political Warfare Bureau, "Political Warfare Bureau, M.N.D.-Service & Contact-All Out Defense Education-All-Out Defense News: All out Defense Summer Camp,"

¹⁸⁶ Edmonds and Tsai, *Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy*, 63.

¹⁸⁷ Political Warfare Bureau, "Political Warfare Bureau, M.N.D.-Service & Contact-All Out Defense Education-All-Out Defense News: All out Defense Summer Camp."

¹⁸⁸ Edmonds and Tsai, *Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy*, 63–64.

President Lee wanted to ensure that the armed forces and civil society could organize the entire society to maximize its defense potential.¹⁸⁹

Taiwan wants popular support and participation in defense activities. Establishing military training for civilians outside of military service and integrating military skills in the education system indicates that civilian integration in the island's defense is necessary. Increasing the citizenry's fighting potential and setting legal foundations for AOD maximize the island's ground forces' resistance potential. Increasing potential resistance makes sense when one remembers that Taiwan has to forestall invasion for at least two to four weeks. If Taiwan's conventional military capabilities fail to prevent PRC troop landings on the island, AOD's popular mobilization adds another defense layer to frustrate a hypothetical People's Liberation Army invasion. Military training camps, military education, irregular warfare preparations, and legal codification are examples of AOD's whole-of-society approach to defense, which helps increase the population's fighting potential and realizes President Lee's vision of a unified, motivated population zealously defending the island.

3. International Defense Cooperation

Although Taiwan is not officially recognized as a sovereign state by most of the world, it maintains close ties with the United States. The U.S. is the most critical defense partner for Taiwan because the U.S. provides Taiwan advanced weaponry and potentially stands ready to fight with Taiwan should Beijing force reunification. This relationship stems from the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed the TRA and ensured the U.S. kept security ties with Taiwan following US-PRC relations' formalization.¹⁹⁰ The TRA has three main requirements. First, any reunification of Taiwan must be peaceful, or else it becomes a grave issue for the U.S. and the Western Pacific. Secondly, the U.S. must provide Taiwan with weapons for defensive purposes. Third, the U.S. has to keep the capability to confront any coercion or lethal plan that threatens the

¹⁸⁹ Edmonds and Tsai, 64.

¹⁹⁰ Taylor, *Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management*, 33–34.

security, society, economy, or population of Taiwan.¹⁹¹ The TRA's tenets cement Taiwan's defense engagement with the U.S. and leave open the possibility of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan Strait war.

Through the U.S., Taiwan can purchase the weapons necessary to deter and forestall an invasion. For decades, the Taiwanese military has procured advanced weaponry such as the AH-64E Apache attack helicopter and F-16 Falcon fighter jet.¹⁹² Although Beijing's forces outnumber Taipei's, these systems can inflict significant damage to an invasion force. Assuming the U.S. decided to fight for Taiwan, the island would have to gain time to enable U.S. forces to mobilize. Therefore, arms sales are necessary for Taiwan and the U.S. to counter PRC aggression.

About U.S. intervention, this is the most crucial part of Taiwan-US defense engagement because it deters PRC invasion. To be clear, the TRA does not guarantee U.S. intervention under any circumstance, but the legislation alludes to the U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan. Former Secretary of State James Baker explained the situation in that,

if we said we would come to the defense of Taiwan under any and all circumstances, she would declare independence and China would move—no doubt about that in my mind. If we said we wouldn't China would move. And so we shouldn't say under what circumstances and to what extent we will aid Taiwan, but we should make it clear that we would view with the gravest concern any resort to the use of force.¹⁹³

Consequently, the U.S. can decide to intervene or not, depending on the context of a hypothetical clash between Taiwan and China. The key takeaway is that Taiwan's defense engagement with the U.S. affords Taiwan weapons and possible security guarantees. Taiwan's AOD combined with US-supplied weapon systems buy time for U.S. intervention and ultimately deter PRC violent reunification with Taiwan.

¹⁹¹ Taylor, 34.

¹⁹² Drew Thompson, "Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan's Radical New Defense Concept," War on the Rocks, last modified October 2, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/>.

¹⁹³ Taylor, 35.

4. Total Defense Assessment: Taiwan

It is clear Taiwan already has TD established in its All-out Defense policy. It is fair to say that Taiwan's AOD makes the island an official TD practitioner. The government has AOD enshrined in the island's defense policy and has formalized civil-military coordination. Taipei publishes literature, offers training camps, and integrated military education into overall education. These policies demonstrate substantive societal integration and planning in support of homeland defense.

Additionally, Taiwan's defense cooperation invites external military support. The TRA guides Taipei's relationship with Washington and obligates the U.S. to arm Taiwan with defensive weaponry while also mentioning U.S. military intervention should Beijing unilaterally force reunification. Although U.S. intervention is far from certain, arms sales and ambiguity about U.S. support are enough to meet this paper's standard for international defense cooperation.

VI. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. VIETNAM

Vietnamese intentions to move toward Total Defense creates considerable opportunities for defense cooperation with the United States, but the engagement must account for China's sensitivities toward Vietnam. Hanoi does not want to pick sides and become a pawn for more powerful nations.¹⁹⁴ Unless Beijing provokes conflict, Vietnam still prefers to avoid antagonizing China. Given these constraints, the United States should facilitate security cooperation through other countries and supporting non-traditional security issues.

The U.S. can facilitate Total Defense cooperation through countries such as Sweden and Singapore. In February of 2020, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) hosted the Trans-Regional Working Group (TRWG) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The event brought together participants from Sweden, Norway, Finland, and many other countries to discuss Total Defense policies.¹⁹⁵ If Vietnamese leaders decided to enhance cooperation with the U.S., the TRWG would be an opportunity to begin a dialog. The TRWG could enhance Vietnamese efforts without drawing the same scrutiny associated with purely bilateral cooperation. If Sweden manages the discussions of TD while the U.S. takes a secondary role, Vietnam could accelerate TD development and enhance defense cooperation without prompting the PRC to counter vehemently.

Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) can host events that bring together international irregular warfare practitioners. Given the constantly changing nature of modern combat, all participants can learn about other nations' irregular warfare experiences. Irregular warfare concepts can help a population prepare and plan disruptive activities against an aggressor. These events can expand dialog on how to employ military

¹⁹⁴ Grossman and Sharman, "How to Read Vietnam's Latest Defense White Paper."

¹⁹⁵ Tom Tonthat, "NPS, SOCPAC Co-Host Trans-Regional Resistance Working Group with Indo-Pacific Partners," Naval Postgraduate School, last modified February 27, 2020, <https://nps.edu/-/nps-socpac-co-host-trans-regional-resistance-working-group-with-indo-pacific-partners>.

or civil capability asymmetrically. Given Vietnam's history of guerilla warfare and resistance against external powers, it is likely Vietnam has considerable experience to share with other nations attempting to counter larger neighbors asymmetrically.

Additionally, non-traditional security engagements with the U.S. should be supported in a manner that creates asymmetric capability. Vietnam is already comfortable with maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster response engagements.¹⁹⁶ These topics are less provocative to China and span civil-military capabilities that still support crisis response.¹⁹⁷ Assuming Vietnam tailor's its cooperation requests with asymmetric development in mind, the U.S. should be responsive to requests with an understanding that Vietnam will use the engagement to enhance its options to counter threats irregularly. Pacific Partnership or Pacific Angel engagements can be tailored to encompass more non-traditional security issues that Vietnam believes are necessary to increase irregular options.¹⁹⁸ It is important to be responsive and not prescriptive. The U.S. should let Vietnam decide what is important and assist development. This type of interaction can enhance Hanoi's maritime proficiency without overtly signaling plans to militarize the maritime domain any more than it already is. Even if Vietnam does not have irregular capability in mind, the U.S. should still facilitate improvements in medical skills and capabilities necessary to handle crises. Medical projects, medical exchanges, and first responder courses could improve societal resilience. Like Singapore's civil defense concept, the U.S. can help Vietnamese people care for one another during natural or manmade crises. If the Vietnamese people can become more resilient and independent, Hanoi can free up resources and manpower to focus on combat operations.

B. TAIWAN

Since Taiwan already has an AOD policy and substantial defense engagement with the U.S., one way for the U.S. to improve Taiwan's AOD is to balance conventional and

¹⁹⁶ Ministry of National Defence, "2019 Vietnam National Defense White Paper." 27–28.

¹⁹⁷ Grossman and Huynh, "Vietnam's Defense Policy of 'No' Quietly Saves Room for 'Yes.'"

¹⁹⁸ Grossman and Huynh.

unconventional resistance efforts. This balancing entails weapons acquisitions and resistance planning. It is unlikely that Taiwan will stop acquiring advanced weaponry from the United States. Still, the U.S. can support Taiwan's AOD by selling systems that have conventional and unconventional fighting applications. For example, for the price of one fighter jet, Taiwan could acquire considerably more man-portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and sea mines. Although Taiwan already possesses Stingers MANPADs, TOW-2B ATGM, and Javelin ATGMs, Taipei could procure even more and stockpile enough weaponry to arm substantial proportions of its population.¹⁹⁹ If the PLA managed to land on the island and make its way to Taipei, Taiwanese forces could employ such systems to stymie progress in a fashion similar to Chechen attacks on Russian forces in the First Chechen War. During this conflict, by targeting enemy vehicles in urban terrain, Chechen fighters inflicted heavy casualties against motorized and mechanized forces as Russian troops attempted to seize the city of Grozny.²⁰⁰

Regarding resistance planning, the U.S. should increase USSOF engagement with Taiwan counterparts to devise and understand asymmetric plans for resistance. Taiwan's leaders likely have plans and preparations to fight the PLA irregularly. However, if USSOF can understand and assist planning, it opens opportunities to influence weapons acquisition and military exchanges to meet Taiwan's unconventional fighting requirements. Additionally, USSOF has Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations elements that can advise Taiwan on employing civil capabilities to support its defense. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations exchanges may also help the U.S. understand AOD concepts that could help other nations build civil-military components of TD policies.

By supporting Taiwan's AOD policy with applicable weapons acquisition and cooperative asymmetric warfare planning, the U.S. can help Taiwan resist PRC aggression,

¹⁹⁹ SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, *US and Taiwan Arms Sales Trade-Register-2010-2019.Rtf* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 6, 2020).

²⁰⁰ Marie Broxup, "Ilyas Akhmadov, ADC to Shamil Basaev and Later to Aslan Maskhadov," *Small Wars Journal*, 2006. 2.

buy time for U.S. leaders to decide on military intervention, and allow U.S. forces to mobilize to assist Taiwan.

VII. CONCLUSION

Great power competition involves more than just the great powers. Some countries and nations must defend themselves from larger adversaries. Sweden and Singapore decided to employ Total Defense to deter an attacker and resist an offensive. Vietnam and Taiwan can take lessons from Sweden and Singapore to shape the development of TD. This paper argues that Sweden and Singapore have effective TD policies because both countries legitimately integrate the whole society into defense plans and international court assistance by maintaining deep security cooperation with other countries. These tenets are the basis of evaluation for Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD efforts.

Vietnam's leaders have publicly stated the government's desire to build an "All-peoples" defense policy, which is essential Total Defense.²⁰¹ The country has the desire to build TD and seeks to diversify Vietnam's defense cooperation. If the CPV decides that Vietnam must push TD and deeper defense cooperation, Hanoi can mature its All-peoples Defense and deter conflict.

The island already has a comprehensive, all-encompassing defense strategy in the island's All-out Defense policy for Taiwan. The AOD policy incorporates average citizens into defense preparations and has legislation that supports AOD implementation in education. Taiwan also has significant international assistance in the form of U.S. defense cooperation. The U.S. passed TRA offers Taiwan the weapons necessary for defense and the implicit possibility of military intervention. Taiwan has civil integration and international defense cooperation on the same order of magnitude as Sweden and Singapore.

For Washington policymakers, the U.S. can assist Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD efforts. By supporting Hanoi and Taipei, the U.S. benefits by empowering Vietnam and Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression with internal capabilities. Should deterrence fail, TD

²⁰¹ Ministry of National Defence, "2019 Vietnam National Defense White Paper." 132.

can delay PRC invasion and buy time for the international community to decide on assistance and possibly mobilize to protect both nations.

This paper adopted the term “Poison Shrimp” from Singapore’s past perception of its defensive capabilities. Although the characterization has changed for Singapore, the metaphor of a poison shrimp helps conceptualize TD. A poison shrimp may appear vulnerable, but its organic poison serves as a deterrent to predators. Yet, the poison is worthless if the predator doesn’t know the shrimp is deadly, and therefore the shrimp signals its lethality with bold colors. If the fish decides to eat the shrimp anyway and somehow survives, the fish would be weaker and vulnerable to other hungry predators. In geopolitical terms, nations that practice Total Defense publicly espouse determined united resistance to dissuade possible aggressors. Even if the aggressor decides to invade, stiff resistance will weaken the attacker. TD is the poison for any invader. Once an invader is weak, the defender’s prior defense cooperation invites other countries to fight the wounded attacker. The third-party countries are additional predators. Any great or regional power should note the perils of war with a Total Defense practitioner.

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