Signaling for Coercion In Cyberspace
Abstract
In order for signaling to work on an adversary with a coercive purpose, one must convey to the adversary a strong capability and sufficient credibility. The reason deterrence worked in the Gulf War was that U.S. policymakers had a well-established and highly feared capability in hand, and establishing credibility was the primary concern in that scenario. However, cyber-based capabilities have not reached a potency to where they could coerce an adversary in and of themselves. The failure of the coalition to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait underscores the limits of compellence even when based on overwhelming conventional force; cyber capabilities are still not comparable to conventional forces in hurting power, which undermines their viability for coercion. Credibility is not an issue; the history of cyber conflict demonstrates that the only way nations establish capability is by the actual employment of capabilities against adversary targets, which solves the problem of credibility. Yet the most powerful cyber effects on critical infrastructure, such as those demonstrated in the Stuxnet attack, cannot permanently disarm an adversary and run the risk of escalation into a kinetic war. Research for this thesis indicates that signaling in cyberspace to an adversary for the intent of coercion is possible but unlikely to succeed while cyber weapons lack the capability to inflict sufficient harm on the adversary.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1126980
Entities
People
- Eric E. Longabaugh
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School