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**COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ANALYSIS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND'S IMPACT ON
THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

by

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December 2020

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**COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND'S IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the past impact United Nations Command (UNC) has had on South Korean security. With South Korea's security environment facing significant changes today, including the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the push to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC is under debate over whether it has to remain in the peninsula. This thesis seeks to analyze the impact of the UNC on South Korea's security on a comprehensive security concept to give insight into the debate. This thesis analyzes the UNC's influence on South Korea's security before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the UNC's role was changed. This thesis insists that the UNC has had different effects on the comprehensive security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea's military and economic security but had a somewhat negative impact on political and diplomatic security. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive impact on South Korea's military security and has played a positive role in diplomatic security. Based on these findings, this thesis proposes that South Korea should have diplomatic initiative to resolve Korean Peninsula issues. This thesis also suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for concessions in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. Finally, this thesis suggests that the UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APATO	Asia Pacific Treaty Organization
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CRIK	Civil Relief Program in Korea
DMZ	demilitarized zone
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MC	Military Committee
MNCC	Multi-National Coordination Center
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
OPCON	operational control
ROE	rules of engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
SOFA	status-of-force agreement
TOR	terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNKRA	United Nations Reconstruction Agency

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines what impact the United Nations Command (UNC) has had on South Korean security in the past. With South Korea's security environment facing significant changes today, the UNC is under debate over whether it has to remain. However, although there are conflicting opinions on the issue, the analysis of the UNC's impact on South Korea's security is either peripheral or lacking. In this context, this thesis analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's security on a comprehensive security concept. This thesis also analyzes the UNC's influence on South Korea's security before and after of the creation of the CFC in 1978, when the role of the UNC changed.

This thesis insists that the UNC has had various effects on the comprehensive security of South Korea. Prior to 1978, the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea's military and economic security as well as a somewhat negative impact on political and diplomatic security. At that time, the UNC provided South Korea with deterrence against North Korea, and based on this, the UNC guaranteed South Korea to be able to lead the economic growth. In the process, however, the UNC partially restricted Seoul's foreign policy and failed to curb Seoul's involvement in a series of events in which democracy regressed. Since 1978, the UNC has had a limited positive impact on South Korea's military security and has played a positive role in diplomatic security. The role of the UNC, which has been reduced since 1978, has not been enough to force North Korea to restrain itself. However, the UNC has supported South Korea's deterrence against North Korea by institutionally guaranteeing the execution of its mission of providing troops in case of emergency. On the diplomatic security, the UNC has been able to enhance South Korea's diplomatic security by influencing North Korea's diplomatic isolation.

Based on these arguments, this thesis recognizes that the Korean Peninsula issue is an international issue and proposes that South Korea has diplomatic initiative to resolve it. It also suggests that before establishing a peace regime, there should be no room for concessions in denuclearization negotiations with the North Korea. Finally, this thesis suggests that the UNC should remain as an extension of its past positive role so that it can be meaningful to South Korean security in the future.

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When I first arrived in Monterey, the air was quite chilly. As the warm air of spring and summer passed, the chilly winter air came back again. I am now finishing up my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and returning to my country, Republic of Korea.

Through the window where the chilly air entered, memories of the past year come to mind. By the end of the first quarter, the COVID pandemic began to change my life. All forms of livelihood and community on campus disappeared as I soon came to face myself in a small room. I came to constantly consider the reasons for my existence and the direction of my life. In the process, I continued to achieve academically and develop as a human being. Now, I fully feel that I have grown through a meaningful and unique experience.

First, I would like to express my gratitude to the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense and the Republic of Korea Army for giving me an opportunity to expand my knowledge. I am grateful that I was chosen from a pool of countless candidates and they have fully supported my growth. I want to return this gratitude by promising that I will fulfill my duties in the future.

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I still remember that chilly but clear sky.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines what impact the United Nations Command (UNC) has had on South Korean security in the past.

When the Korean War broke out, the United Nations (UN) established the UNC to implement collective security aimed at peace in the international community.¹ On July 14, 1950, The President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea (ROK), facing North Korea's massive invasion, handed over Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the commander of the UNC, General MacArthur. The commander of the UNC exercised OPCON over ROK forces and multinational forces belonging to the UNC, which conducted the Korean War. On July 27, 1953, with the signing of the Armistice Agreement (AA), the Korean War was suspended, but military threats from North Korea still existed. In response, the UNC played an important role in South Korean security by providing strong deterrence against North Korea.

With the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978, the role of the UNC was reduced somewhat. The commander of the UNC handed over OPCON to the CFC, which maintained a reduced role in supervising violations of the AA, maintaining dialogue channels with North Korea, and providing multinational forces with the UNC's legal authority to operate in South Korea in case of emergency.²

In 1994, peacetime OPCON of ROK forces was returned to South Korean government, and wartime OPCON of ROK forces is also in the process of being transferred. With considerable changes continuing in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, calls are being made for the establishment of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula. In order to meet these demands, the Moon administration now is

¹ Hanbyeol Son, "The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling," *The Korean Conference for International Politics* (July 2019): 3–6.

² Ibid., 3–6.

pursuing a peace policy which pursues peace based on mutual respect between the two Koreas, cooperates with the international community in an open way, and institutionalizes these efforts to ensure the sustainability of this policy.³

This peace policy implies expectations for the declaration of the end of the Korean War, which naturally leads to public opinion favoring the dismantlement of the UNC. On the other hand, other opinions insist on the importance of the UNC's continuing existence, laying out alternative future roles based on the past role of the UNC and the practical benefits it currently provides. The UNC revitalization program, which has been under way since 2014 with the aim of expanding the role of UNC, is also in line with these claims. As a result, debates over the future of the UNC have arisen.

It is natural that judgments about the past value of the UNC should precede debate over its future role. Thus, this thesis seeks to explore answers to the more foundational question: What has been the role of the United Nations Command in affecting South Korean security in the past?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

As the debates over the future of the UNC build, the importance of the judgment about the current value of the UNC is increasing, as various scholarly efforts show. Above all, judgment of current value should be a logical basis for debates about the UNC's future role. Scholarly efforts to judge the value of the UNC can try to find the answer in history. Based on the continuity of history that connects the past, the present and the future, a reflection on history could provide a insights for the future. In this context, scholarly assessment of the value of UNC in the past can provide a valuable foundation for today's debates.

While the importance and interest of historical research on UNC's value are increasing, many efforts remain one-dimensional, focusing only on the military dimension. These assessments provide an explanation of how the UNC defeated North Korean attacks

³ ROK Ministry of Unification, *Unification White Paper 2018* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2018): 12–13.

during the Korean War. They also respond to how South Korea has been able to maintain peace without a recurrence of war despite the continued threat from North Korea since the Korean War. However, these views offer different arguments about how the role of the UNC was reduced by the creation of the CFC, which provides room for another debate. In other words, these academic efforts have not risen above the superficial level.

This thesis also has academic significance in that it could provide insight into the past, present and future security environments on the Korean Peninsula. First, this research could provide a window of understanding of North Korea's offensive moves. Since the Korean War, South Korea has achieved military development based on the UNC's deterrence against North Korea, but North Korea has been seen as a relatively declining military power in the past half century.⁴ North Korea still has a quantitatively dominant conventional military power edge, but it is degraded in quality, and the country continues to focus on developing asymmetrical methods such as weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.⁵ North Korea's offensive behavior has aroused antipathy from the international community, and its diplomatic isolation has been aggravated through continued sanctions by the international community, including the UN.⁶ In other words, North Korea's offensive moves and diplomatic isolation have formed a vicious circle, reflecting Pyeongyang's perception of its own security. The UNC, which has played a role in providing deterrence against North Korea and managing the AA on the Korean Peninsula, must play a role in Pyeongyang's considerations. In this sense, study of the UNC role could provide insight into North Korean attitudes and behavior.

As a second insight into Korean Peninsula security environments, this research is also helpful in understanding the current and future U.S. global strategy, especially its Asian strategy. Since the UNC is geographically located in South Korea and the U.S. proactively operates the UNC, the UNC could be one way to implement the U.S. security

⁴ John H. Cushman, "The Military Balance in Korea," *Asian Affairs* 6, no. 6 (1979): 359–369, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30171864>.

⁵ "2020 Military Strength Ranking," Global Firepower, Accessed March 7, 2020, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

⁶ Jina Kim, "UN Sanctions as an Instrument of Coercive Diplomacy against North Korea," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26, no. 3 (October 2014): 315–332.

strategy.⁷ The facts that the CFC commander has held the position of UNC commander and run the UNC revitalization program support this. In this context, this research could help to understand how the U.S. utilizes the UNC's values and resources in implementing its security strategy. Furthermore, this research could help to gauge the U.S. strategic intention and process of judgment to utilize the UNC, and provide a prism in understanding the future geopolitical rivalry between the great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing literature that deals with the UNC itself is largely divided into three categories. First, there is literature dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC in the changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula, such as the transfer of wartime OPCON, change in the nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the establishment of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the experts cover the legal status and issues concerning the alternative roles of the UNC in the changing security environment. Third, scholars attempt to assess the historical role of the UNC itself in South Korean security. This third topic is the intended focus of this thesis.

Historical research on the UNC's value to South Korea tends to be shallow because it is treated as a subsidiary topic of other questions. There are attempts to suggest alternative roles of the UNC as a preemptive response to disputes over the UNC.⁸ These efforts define the meaning of the UNC's existence, and suggest roles in keeping with the changing context of the times. Also, they present an assessment of the ongoing program for revitalization of the UNC. However, these views are built on the judgement that the role of the UNC has been positive without careful analysis. Ironically, they overlook the

⁷ In-hyo Seol, "United Nations Command in Korean Peninsula: The Past and the Present," *Institute of Military History*, no. 108 (September 2018): 1–35, <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE07531499>.

⁸ Hanbyeol Son, "The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling," *The Korean Conference for International Politics* (July 2019); Wongon Park, "The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, and Future," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no.4 (December 2009); Kyudok Hong, "The Continuing Role of the United Nations in the Future of Korean Security," in *Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance*, ed. Donald W. Boose, Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick Morgan, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).

assessment of past UNC roles, and subsequently faces logical limitations by excluding the importance of fully evaluating the historical role.

These problems also occur frequently in scholarly efforts to review potential issues about the future role of the UNC.⁹ The UNC was created through a resolution by the U.N. Security Council, but there is a dispute over its legal status if a peace treaty is signed on the Korean Peninsula and the Armistice Agreement ends. The debate concerns whether or not the basis of the UNC's existence would disappear at that point. But each of these viewpoints stems from differences in interpretation of the UNC in its historical context. As such, assessment of the UNC's value requires historical evaluation, but such efforts have been lacking. In this context, this thesis research will provide an historical evaluation to fill these gaps in prior scholarly work.

Existing studies evaluating the role of the UNC itself can be further categorized into three types of arguments: that the UNC has undermined peace in South Korea, that it has passively contributed to peace, or that it has actively contributed to peace. The claim that the UNC undermined peace in South Korea mainly deals with the judgment of who provides the primary source of conflict between the UNC and North Korea. The studies concluding that the UNC has either passively or actively contributed to peace vary according to evaluation criteria. Some focus on the UNC's role only in terms of deterrence of war, while others expand the scope to consider its role to manage crises and contribute to the U.S.-ROK alliance.

1. The UNC's Negative Contribution to South Korean Security

There is a view that the UNC, which played a major role in South Korea's security after the Korean War, had a negative impact on South Korean security. Steven Lee points

⁹ Chad R. Nishizuka, "Demystifying the U.S.-ROK Command and Control Structure: How "OPCON Transfer" Can Advance the Unity of Effort on the Korean Peninsula," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 30, no. 4 (December 2018); Steven Lee, "The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The US-UN Coalition and the Dynamics of War-Making in Korea, 1953-76," *Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no.2 (2013); Sang-hyuk Lee, "Authority for Issuing the ROE of the ROK Armed Forces: Focused on the Scope of the ROE Issuing Authority of the UNC and the CFC," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 33, no. 4 (2017).

to the UNC as the beginning of conflict and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁰ This study sees the nature of the UNC itself as a one-sidedly led organization by the U.S., and the alliance with states in the UNC is a side that sympathizes with the U.S. strategic diplomatic actions in a way of collusion or silence. This view explains that the U.S., which used offensive diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with its own interests, has been linked with supporters in the UNC and has caused North Korea's offensive behavior. As an example, it presents the U.S. tactical nuclear deployment on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s. In addition, he contends that the role of the UNC in South Korea's military and economic growth also contributed to the strengthening of North Korea's dictatorship and to a potential arms race.

There is also a claim that the existence of the UNC has had a negative impact on the South Korean military. First, Chad R. Nishizuka considers the meaning and impact of the UNC since the establishment of the CFC. He argues that there are overlapping roles between the CFC and the UNC in South Korean security policy, and that the presence of the UNC, in particular, undermines the efficiency of South Korean military operations by complicating the command and control procedures for military operations to be carried out on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹ Sang-hyuk Lee points to South Korea's weak ability to carry out military operations by paying attention to disordered rules of engagement (ROE) from the complex relations between the UNC, the CFC and the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹² These views that the existence of the UNC has had negative impact on South Korean security are a logical basis for the argument for the dismantlement of the UNC.

¹⁰ Steven Lee, "The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The US-UN Coalition and the Dynamics of War-Making in Korea, 1953–76," *Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no.2 (2013): 183–224.

¹¹ Chad R. Nishizuka, "Demystifying the U.S.–ROK Command and Control Structure: How "OPCON Transfer" Can Advance the Unity of Effort on the Korean Peninsula," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 30, no. 4 (December 2018): 455–457.

¹² Sang-hyuk Lee, "Authority for Issuing the ROE of the ROK Armed Forces: Focused on the Scope of the ROE Issuing Authority of the UNC and the CFC," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 33, no. 4 (2017): 100–102.

2. The UNC's Passive Contribution to South Korean Security

Some articles argue that the UNC has made a passive contribution to South Korean peace, limiting the evaluation of the UNC's role of deterring war. Kyudok Hong divides the role of the UNC into three major categories and evaluates the role of the UNC somewhat skeptically based on these.¹³ First, considering enforcement, he explains that efforts to maintain non-military characteristics within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have been made to some extent, but have been often violated by North Korea, making it difficult to ensure its success. Second, considering verification, he notes that North Korea's refusal to cooperate from the outset means that verification has repeatedly failed, overshadowing its role. Third, considering communication, he analyzes that it was inefficient at first due to the hostility of North Korea, but that the UNC has remained somewhat of a dialogue channel over time. For these reasons, he makes skeptical claims about the UNC's role in maintaining peace.

Wongon Park also evaluates the value of the UNC based on the mission and role of the UNC, and consequently argues that the role of the UNC itself was passive.¹⁴ It gives a positive assessment of the inter-Korean war deterrence not mentioned in Kyudok Hong's claim, and also of potential deterrence through the provision of a rear base for the UNC located in Japan. But in the same vein as Kyudok Hong's claim, he raises the UNC's lack of a role in maintaining dialogue channels with North Korea and implementing the AA, and insists the UNC's contribution to peace has been only passive.

3. The UNC's Active Contribution to South Korean Security

Some authors insist the UNC has made an active contribution to South Korean security. First, Seong Ho Jhe reappraises AA's value, and argues that the role of the UNC,

¹³ Kyudok Hong, "The Continuing Role of the United Nations in the Future of Korean Security," in *Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance*, ed. Donald W. Boose, Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick Morgan, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 69–88.

¹⁴ Wongon Park, "The United Nations Command in Korea: past, present, and future," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no.4 (December 2009): 485–499.

which is inseparable from the AA, was positive.¹⁵ In particular, he presents four major functions of the AA and adds more weight to the explanation that the function of preventing a recurrence of war or armed conflict has prevented North Korea's massive military strike on the Korean Peninsula. According to his argument, as globalization progresses, preemptive strike planning is a target of condemnation from the international community, and countries' efforts to avoid accusations of having such intentions have naturally curbed large-scale military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. It also suggests that 36 of the 63 clauses of the AA are still adhered to, and given the realistic circumstances and the context of the times, this result means that the AA is positively functional.

A different school of thought claims an active contribution of the UNC through the relationship between the U.S.-ROK alliance and the UNC, which is the core of South Korea's defense policy. Hanbyeol Son argues that the UNC has played a role as a key vehicle for the U.S.-ROK alliance to function.¹⁶ He explains that the UNC still defended South Korea after the signing of the AA and that the UNC allowed the U.S. military stationed in South Korea to have strategic flexibility after the establishment of CFC. Ironically, he claims that the UNC gave rise to the CFC, and its military institutionalization between the U.S.-ROK, as the U.S. reduced its military commitment to South Korea. According to his assertion, the UNC has become a major justification of the establishment of the CFC in the context of the U.S. concerns over its declining influence on South Korea and South Korea's increasing perception of its own autonomy and sovereignty. As a result, he insists on the active contribution of the UNC through its role as a key mechanism that has made the U.S.-ROK alliance function more powerfully.

Hwee Rhak Park, on the other hand, analyzes the potential effect of the dissolution of the CFC on the UNC, and emphasizes the advantages of a complex system between the

¹⁵ Seong Ho Jhe, "Role of the Armistice Agreement under Korean Security Environment and Future Peace Management Regime," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 2 (July 2013): 10–45.

¹⁶ Hanbyeol Son, "The Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and Alternatives for the Role of the UNC: Maintaining, Enlarging, Transferring, Switching, and Dismantling," *The Korean Conference for International Politics* (July 2019): 1–23.

UNC and the CFC.¹⁷ In particular, he argues that the option to choose between the UNC and the CFC as the lead entity responding to any crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula provides more flexibility to meet the needs of the strategic situation. He also asserts that South Korea exerts a higher level of influence in the UN thanks to the U.S.-ROK alliance, thereby securing Korea's international presence. As such, the combined system of the UNC and the CFC itself plays an active role in South Korean security.

4. Appraisal of Existing Literature

Existing studies dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC serve as a key basis for the insistence on maintaining the UNC. However, these studies, above all, do not provide a thorough assessment of the UNC's role. Without systematic analysis, these existing studies tend to assume that the UNC has played a positive role in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Due to this problem, these studies are logically vulnerable. In particular, these assessments could overestimate the value of the UNC and raise fundamental questions about whether it really played a positive role in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. A more complete historical evaluation could further deepen the debate over the existence of the UNC.

Studies dealing with the assessment of the UNC's role typically only deal with the military aspect of maintaining peace, a serious limitation. In particular, the issue surrounding the security of the Korean Peninsula today cannot be judged simply by the existence of military conflicts and wars. The Republic of Korea and North Korea are repeating the process of conflict and reconciliation, and in particular, North Korea is taking an offensive stance in this interaction.¹⁸ There are various analyses that North Korea's offensive intentions are aimed at strengthening solidarity within North Korea, breaking through the international community's economic sanctions, and breaking away from

¹⁷ Hwee Rhak Park, "The Impact of Dismantlement of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command on the United Nations Command: Policy Suggestions for the Republic of Korea," *New Asia Journal* 19, no. 3 (2012): 76–98, <http://scholar.dkyobobook.co.kr/searchDetail.laf?barcode=4010023498113>.

¹⁸ "The First Meeting of the Leaders of the Two Koreas between the Military Demarcation Line," *Yonhap News*, April 27, 2018, <https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?oid=001&aid=0010051811>.; "North Korea Explodes Kaesong Liaison Office, Blue House "Strong Regret,"" *Yonhap News*, June 16, 2020, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200616134554504?input=1195m>.

diplomatic isolation.¹⁹ These diverse explanations prove that security on the Korean Peninsula can never be viewed only as a military matter.

This thesis attempts a systematic analysis of the role of the UNC in the past based on an expanded security concept that goes beyond military considerations alone. Through this analysis, this thesis seeks to have a macroscopic view of the value of the UNC in the past and supplement the limitations of existing research which have remained more limited. In particular, this thesis attempts to find a link between the role of the UNC in the political, diplomatic and economic aspects of South Korean security. These attempts are not intended to examine the merits and demerits of the UNC in the past, but to objectively examine the actual value of the UNC shown by concrete indicators of its utilization. Depending on the results of the analysis, this thesis may either supplement or lead to arguments refuting the logical limitations of existing studies dealing with the alternative roles of the UNC. Above all, this thesis could provide the basis for judging the policy implications of the UNC, regardless of the analysis results.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis begins at the threshold of existing literature in which the UNC's role evaluation remains fragmentary. As globalization progresses, interdependence among states in the international community today is increasing, and the scope of roles played by states is also expanding. Simple survival of states is losing its place as the single goal. Considering this point, evaluating the role of the UNC only in the military aspect of maintaining peace does not reflect the reality and characteristics of the international community. Also, to some extent, this has always been true. Providing narrow military security for South Korea has never been the UNC's only function. Therefore, this thesis seeks to reevaluate the role of the UNC based on an expanded security concept including

¹⁹ Tae Hyun Kim, "A Coercive Strategy of KJU(Kim Jong Un) Regime," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 31, no. 4 (2016); Hae Soo Yang, "A Study on the Transformation to the Provocation Intention of North Korea According to the Behavior of Provocation," *Review of Korean Military Studies* 7, no. 1 (July 2018); Sung-Yoon Chung, "North Korea's Hwa-Chun Double-Sided Strategy: Characteristics and a Prospect," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (March 2012); Jongkwa Jeong and Dongman Shin, "Analysis of Kim Jong Un Regime's Stick-and-Carrot Tactics and Our Confrontation Strategy," *Military Studies* 139 (2015).

economic, diplomatic and sovereignty dimensions. The following hypotheses provide focus to the inquiries into each of these dimensions.

(1) Hypothesis #1

If the UNC has suppressed North Korea's military attacks on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War, it can be judged that the UNC has had a positive impact on South Korean security. This is in line with the theory of deterrence, which guarantees security by pre-suppressing a threatened armed attack.²⁰ The fact that the Korean War stopped with the AA did not guarantee a complete resolution of the military tension, which means that there is an inherent possibility of a recurrence of military armed conflict at any time. Therefore, deterrence against North Korea can be an important criterion in assessing the role of the UNC. Above all, however, a clear definition of North Korean military attacks being deterred is required, it is required to judge how North Korea's perception of the UNC figures into its intentions. From this perspective, this thesis evaluates the correlation between North Korea's military provocations and the role of the UNC, improving on past assessments even within the narrow military idea of security.

(2) Hypothesis #2

If the UNC has favorably influenced Korea's economic development, the UNC has had a positive impact on South Korean security. After the Korean War, South Korea suffered from considerable damage, and its economic level made it one of the world's poorest countries.²¹ South Korea needed post-war economic recovery for its physical survival. Also, South Korea needed economic growth to gain an upper hand over North Korea as the regime competition between South Korea and North Korea intensified after the war. However, military threats from North Korea still existed, and South Korea was in a situation where economic growth and deterrence against North Korea had to be achieved

²⁰ Van Jackson, "Beyond Tailoring: North Korea and the Promise of Managed Deterrence," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 2 (June 2012): 296–301.

²¹ Joonseok Yang, "Why Did the Post-Korean War the Korean Reconstruction Program Between the R.O.K. and the U.S. Fall Apart?" *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 59, no. 1 (March 2019): 50–54.

at the same time. Obviously, South Korea had limited national resources to achieve these two goals. In this context, South Korea's economic development could advance more quickly if North Korea's provocations could be contained by other resources. Based on the fact that the essential purpose of the UNC is to provide South Korea with military security, an analysis of the correlation between Korea's economic growth and the UNC's role could present the criteria for determining the UNC's influence on the economic dimension of South Korean security.

(3) Hypothesis #3

If the UNC has promoted South Korean diplomatic buildup, it could be judged that the UNC has had a positive impact on South Korean security. The UNC is a military extension of the UN created under the value of collective security, and so is an organization that reflects this aspect of diplomatic relations among states. South Korea, reborn as a modern independent country based on democracy after the colonial period, was the patron of the UNC during the Korean War, and this relationship has been maintained even after the Korean War. In this context, this thesis examines the special relationship between South Korean diplomatic power and the role of the UNC, and judges the UNC's influence on the security of South Korea by looking at whether South Korean international influence has expanded based on the UNC.

(4) Hypothesis #4

If the UNC has guaranteed the autonomy of South Korea's policymaking, the UNC has had a positive impact on South Korean security. During the Korean War, the UNC commanded the Korean War with OPCON, and after the Korean War, the UNC retained the OPCON until the CFC was established. The possession of OPCON does not in itself mean direct intervention in the nation's sovereignty, but considering the meaning of operational control, the potential impact on the formation of security-related policies cannot be ignored. In this regard, the UNC was inseparable from security-related policymaking of South Korea, which was emerging in the implementation of the new political system. Therefore, it is possible to judge the UNC's influence on South Korean

security by considering the UNC's role in security-related policymaking and the development of the political governance capacity of the South Korean government.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis analyzes the impact of UNC on South Korean security. In developing the argument, this thesis defines the concept of security first. With the international community's multi-layered and complex transformation, the concept of "security" can no longer focus solely on military elements. In other words, it extends the concept of security beyond military elements to economic, diplomatic and political.²² This thesis analyzes the role of UNC based on this broader concept of security.

The deterrence of military security elements is evaluated through the case of North Korea's provocation against South Korea when South Korean military strength was clearly inferior to North Korean military strength. In particular, the evaluation of North Korea's provocations is not based solely on the number of such provocations, but also on the type and nature of provocations. This thesis evaluates the primary influence of deterrence through the fundamental blockage of the provocations, and evaluates the secondary influence of deterrence based on the nature of the provocations.

The economic element of security is assessed in terms of reducing security costs of the South Korean government at a time when South Korea's conventional military power was clearly inferior to North Korea's conventional military power. Through a comparative analysis of the differences between the conventional military capabilities of South Korea and North Korea at that time, this thesis emphasizes the need for South Korea's considerable security costs. This thesis looks at the correlation between Korea's security costs and the UNC's role in providing security through measures of defense spending of the South Korean government. In addition, this thesis assesses the discounting effect of South Korean defense cost through comparing South Korea's and North Korea's economic growth indexes.

²² Satish Chandra and Rahul Bhonsle, "National Security: Concept, Measurement and Management," *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 4 (2015): 337–341, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047217>.

The diplomatic element of security is evaluated through South Korea's openness and activities within the UN.²³ Even though the Cold War confrontation had dominated the international community since the Korean War, the fact that the UN included both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which are the main players of the confrontation, reflects that the UN expressed an international universality beyond the Cold War confrontation and provided the foundation for states' use of diplomatic power. For this reason, South Korea's openness and activities with other states in the UN could be a measure of diplomatic power beyond the context of the times. Here, openness can be measured through the status of diplomatic relations and bilateral exchanges between states, and activities can be assessed through compliance with the value of the UN and specific activities. Also, this thesis compares the diplomatic situation between South Korea and North Korea from the Soviet-Chinese conflict to the detente between the U.S. and China that provided significant changes in the international community, and after South Korea and North Korea joined the United Nations at the same time.

The political factor of security is assessed through South Korea's autonomy in making security-related policy decisions at a time when the UNC had OPCON of ROK forces. Based on historical records, this thesis examines the mutual relation of South Korea government and the UNC in the process of making security-related policies in South Korea at that time. In particular, taking into account the nature of the UNC led by the U.S., this thesis causally analyzes the dynamics of South Korea's security-related policymaking process, and evaluates South Korea's initiative in political governance.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of four chapters. This first chapter has introduced the core question, and described how the research will both contribute to existing knowledge and improve current debates over the UNC's future. Chapter II tracks the role of the UNC during the period from the Korean War armistice to the establishment of the UNC, evaluating its contribution to South Korean security in terms of the four dimensions

²³ Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 6–24.

previously discussed. Chapter III analyzes the role of the UNC, along with the change in the role of the UNC after the CFC, evaluating the UNC's contribution to South Korean security in terms of the same four dimensions. Finally, Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the analysis, discusses policy implications, and presents the need for further research in the face of a changing security environment.

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II. THE IMPACT OF THE UNC BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE CFC

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korean security during the period from the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953 to the establishment of the CFC in 1978. The UNC took over Operation Command of South Korean forces from South Korea, and commanded South Korean troops as well as UNC troops in the Korean War. Since then, the terms of Operational Command was changed to Operational Control during the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the ROK and the U.S. and Agreed Minute Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters, and the UNC had continued to retain the OPCON of the South Korean military. This meant the UNC had direct responsibility for South Korean security. The formation of the CFC in 1978 led to the transfer of OPCON over South Korean troops from the UNC to the CFC.

This chapter analyzes the role of the UNC in the period before the establishment of the CFC, a time when the UNC was directly involved in South Korean security. To this end, the chapter first considers the historical background and initial role of the UNC and the characteristics of the UNC at that time. Then, South Korean security is divided into military and economic elements and political and diplomatic elements, and the impact of the UNC on each aspect is analyzed.

B. THE UNC BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC

1. The Historical Background of the UNC

After Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Korean Peninsula was divided into the democratic and communist camps. This ideological division on the Korean Peninsula soon led to confrontation and conflict, which expanded to the Korean War on June 25, 1950 through North Korea's illegal Invasion. North Korea launched an all-out offensive to communize the entire Korean Peninsula, and the South Korean military was unable to stop the attack. It was not long after World War II ended that a massive bloody conflict broke out again. The UN quickly passed UN Security Council resolutions to restore stability on the

Korean Peninsula and prevent the spread to World War III from this illegal invasion from North Korea. As a result, the UNC was created.

The UNC defended South Korea in the Korean War as a multinational unified command based on UN Security Council resolutions. The UNC was created through a series of resolutions, such as UN resolution 82, 83 and 84. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the UN passed resolution 82 condemning North Korea's invasion and demanding its withdrawal. The resolution 82 pointed out that North Korea's Invasion was a peace-destructive act, and called on North Korean military to immediately halt hostilities and withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel. At the same time, UN member states requested that all efforts be made to implement the resolution and that aid to North Korea be suspended.²⁴

Despite resolution 82, the North's attack continued. In response, the UN Security Council passed resolution 83 on June 27 to recommend UN member states provide assistance in repelling North Korean troops, judging that Pyongyang has no intention of stopping hostilities. Through this, UN member states including the U.S., Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and France decided to participate and prepared for the dispatch of troops. As such, resolution 83 provided a legal basis for the United Nations' intervention in the Korean War.²⁵

The UN passed resolution 84 on July 7 calling for the creation of an integrated command to welcome the participation of UN member states and to provide effective support. The resolution allowed the U.S. to appoint and lead the commander of the integrated command, and recommended that all warring states that would provide military power and other assistance follow its order. In addition, the integrated command was authorized to use the UN flag in its operations, and the United States was stipulated that it should report to the

²⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 82: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1950 | United Nations Security Council.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 83: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1950 | United Nations Security Council.

UN on its activities.²⁶ As a result of this series, the UNC was established in Tokyo on July 24 to command 16 UN member states and South Korean troops. The UNC consists of 16 combat troops from the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and five other countries providing medical assistance, including Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.²⁷

U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who was given the initiative of the UNC, designated the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as an agency for the UNC to lead the U.N. forces in the Korean War. In response, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.S. Far East Army, as the commander of the UNC, who later took direct command of the operations of the U.N. forces on the Korean Peninsula. First, General Douglas MacArthur integrated his organization into the UNC and assigned the Eighth Army Command, a member of the Far East Command, to take charge of the Operational Command of the U.S. ground forces in Korea and move the command to Daegu, South Korea. The Eighth Army was integrated into the ground operations of the UNC, and soon the Far East Naval and Air Force Command were also integrated into the naval and air operations of the UNC.²⁸

On July 14, 1950, President Rhee Syngman handed over the Operational Command of South Korean troops to the commander of the UNC in the form of exchanging official documents between the two countries. General Douglas MacArthur then transferred the Operational Command of South Korean ground troops to the commander of the Eighth Army, and the Operational Command of South Korean each commander Force to Far East Navy and Air Force.²⁹ This led to the unification of all units fighting against North Korean troops in the

²⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 84: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 1950), Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1950 | United Nations Security Council.

²⁷ “*Members of the UNC in the Korean War*,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, Accessed May 5, 2020, <https://www.data.go.kr/data/15013063/fileData.do>.

²⁸ Myeongchul Lee, *An Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Security Environment on the Role of the United Nations Command* (Seoul: KIDA, 2009), 32–33.

²⁹ In-hyo Seol, “United Nations Command in Korean Peninsula : The Past and The Present,” *Military History* no. 108 (September 2018): 8.

Korean War, and the UNC took the initiative in the defense of South Korea in the Korean War.

2. The Role of the UNC

Since its establishment, the UNC had played a role in the defense of South Korea, the management of the Armistice Agreement, and as a power supplier to accommodate and provide troops from 16 UN member states in case of emergency. First, during the Korean War, the UNC defended South Korea based on the Operational Command transferred from South Korean President Rhee Syngman. When the Korean War broke out, South Korea judged that it lacked the strength to defend itself and defeat North Korea on its own. In response, President Rhee chose to transfer the Operational Command of South Korean troops as a strategy to reverse the unfavorable situation through the unification of military command and efficient execution of operations. On July 14, 1950, President Rhee sent a letter to the commander of the UNC through U.S. Ambassador to South Korea John J. Muccio proposing to transfer the Operational Command of South Korean troops to General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the UNC. In response, General Douglas MacArthur accepted the proposal for the transfer of Operational Command by sending a reply to President Rhee through U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, saying, the UNC had been delegated the Operational Command of South Korea's Army, Navy and Air Force while the current hostilities continue. Later, on July 25, General MacArthur's reply was delivered to the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the Security Council, making the transfer of Operational Command official.³⁰

The UNC played a leading role in the signing of the armistice as well as in South Korea's defense during the Korean War. During the Korean War, the UNC carried out operations north of the 38th parallel after the success of the Operation Chromite which the U.N. forces landed in Incheon, South Korea. However, when the Chinese military intervened in the Korean War in earnest on October 19, 1950, operations on the northern part of the Korean Peninsula became difficult. Thus, the United States, which played a leading role in the UNC, decided on May 17, 1951 to adopt NSC 48/5 to end the war in Korea with

³⁰ Institute for Military History, *The History of Military Relations Between ROK and the U.S. 1871–2002* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2002), 470–472.

negotiations.³¹ Accordingly, the UNC led the Armistice Agreement negotiations starting with the first plenary session on July 10, 1951. As a result, the Korean War entered a truce on July 27, 1953 when the commander of the UNC signed the Armistice Agreement with the Chinese and North Korean commanders on behalf of the free camp, including South Korea.³²

After the Korean War armistice, the UNC retained Operational Command of South Korean military and continued to take charge of the defense of South Korea in case of emergency. First of all, the current hostilities, when the Operational Command was transferred, disappeared visibly under the armistice agreement. Therefore, the command relationship between the UNC and the South Korean military needed to be reestablished. In response, the South Korean and U.S. governments took tentative steps to ensure that the UNC, which is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, could continue to control the Korean military until the day the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty took effect. From here, the term of Operational Command has changed to the term of Operational Control.³³ On November 17, 1954, South Korea and the U.S. signed Agreed Minute Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters, an annex to ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, and paragraph 2 of the minutes stated while the UNC is responsible for the defense of South Korea, South Korean troops shall be kept under OPCON of the UNC. As a result, the UNC continually came into possession of OPCON of the South Korean military even after the Armistice Agreement, and continued to take responsibility for the defense of South Korea.³⁴

After the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC assumed the role of managing the Armistice Agreement. The UNC had been tasked with monitoring and investigating violations of the Armistice Agreement and leading the settlement and coordination of security issues through negotiations with the communist side, including North Korea. The UNC was supposed to conduct the investigation and negotiation process for violations of the Armistice

³¹ Korean National Defense University, *National Defense Policy and Military Strategy* (Nonsan: Hankookmunhwa, 2019), 112.

³² Wongon Park, "The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, and Future," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no.4 (December 2009): 488–490.

³³ Yong-Sup Han, *Logic of Our National Defense* (Seoul: Parkyungsa, 2019), 192.

³⁴ Hwee Rhak Park, "The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control and Unity of Command," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 24, no. 3 (2008): 168.

Agreement through Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). MAC and NNSC were equally supposed to carry out surveillance and investigation missions for violations of the Armistice Agreement.³⁵

In addition, the UNC had been tasked with providing troops of UN member states to the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. At the time of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the 16 countries that participated in the Korean War resolved in the Joint Policy Declaration Concerning to Korea Armistice, the so called Washington Declaration, that they would send military forces in the event of a recurrence of war, and the UNC was responsible for ensuring the implementation of this commitment.³⁶ To that end, the UNC has maintained its rear base in Japan. Under the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) between the UNC and Japan on February 19, 1954, the rear base of the UNC guarantees the role of providing troops to be deployed to the Korean Peninsula by accommodating the forces and providing support for their service. As such, the UNC was in charge of the defense of South Korea, the management of the Armistice Agreement, and the supply of troops of UNC in case of emergency until the establishment of the CFC.

3. U.S. Initiative with the UNC

The UNC was a U.S.-led organization since its establishment. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the Soviet Union had declared a boycott of the Security Council to protest the granting of one of the UN Security Council permanent members to Taiwan. Also, communist countries at the time broke away from the process of creating the UNC. In the end, discussions on the establishment of the UNC took place with only partial participation, and the U.S., which at the time felt responsible as the architect of the international order, naturally led decision-making and action in this process.³⁷

³⁵ Hyunkwon Joe, "United Nations Command Armistice Roles on the Korean Peninsula: Is December 2015 the End?," (master's thesis, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013), 15–19.

³⁶ Kwang Hyun Chang, "A Study on The Revitalization of UNC based on The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control," (PhD's thesis, Ajou University, 2019), 233–234.

³⁷ Kyengho Son, "The Analysis on Characteristics of the UN Forces in the Korean War," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 58, no. 3 (September 2018).

The U.S. initiative within the UNC had been further strengthened through the chain of command of the UNC. In fact, there was a disagreement between the U.S. and the U.N. Secretary-General at the time in forming the chain of command of the UNC. Specifically, their views were divided over whether to establish the Committee on Cooperation of Assistance for Korea. The Secretary-General insisted on the establishment of such a special committee, while the U.S. Department of Defense opposed it.³⁸ The U.S. reason for opposing the establishment of the committee at that time was to rule out the possibility of the committee's involvement in local military operations.³⁹ There was a concern from the United States that the U.S. military in the Far East, if established, could carry out the war on the intention of the Secretary-General, regardless of Washington's policy. As a result, when the Security Council passed a resolution on the formation of the United Nations Command on July 7, 1950, as intended by the United States, the contents concerning the establishment of the committee were deleted.⁴⁰ In other words, a framework for the chain of command was formed, requiring the commander of the UNC to prepare an operational report, obtain approval from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and submit it to the Security Council via the Pentagon and the State Department. This chain of command provided a practical basis for U.S. interests to be reflected in the UNC.

C. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA

In order to assess the UNC's role in South Korean security, the basis and assumptions for judgment are needed first. This section considers the security stability in the military dimension and the impact on South Korea's economic development in the economic dimension as the criteria for determining the impact of the UNC on South Korean security in the period before the CFC was established. On the security stability of military elements, this section examines the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea by analyzing how North

³⁸ Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations* (New York: The MacMillan, 1954), 333.

³⁹ James F. Schnabel and ROK Ministry of National Defense, *Korean War*, (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1990), 109–110.

⁴⁰ Kyengho Son, "The Analysis on Characteristics of the UN Forces in the Korean War," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 58, no. 3 (September 2018): 160.

Korea's military attacks developed during the period. Direct and indirect influence on economic development is recognized by analyzing whether the UNC facilitated provision of economic aid to South Korea and how South Korea operated national resources.

1. Assumption of Analysis

a. Possibility of North Korea's Military Threats and Deterrence Against North Korea

The key to deterrence is to prevent the other party from taking certain actions. The concept of deterrence has been discussed by many scholars. Among them, Glen H. Snyder defines deterrence as deterring the other party from military action by making them anticipate more losses and risks than expected benefits of taking military action.⁴¹ Kenneth N. Waltz explains that deterrence prevents the other party from doing something by threatening the other party.⁴² That is, in general, deterrence refers to the conscious judgment and behavior that causes the other party to abandon its own behavior through the value judgment between the loss and the profit involved in doing something.

Deterrence against North Korea has been an important concept in military relations between South Korea and North Korea since the Korean War. North Korea started the Korean War with a massive invasion and has continued to threaten South Korean security even after the Korean War ended in a truce. In military relations between South Korea and North Korea, North Korea has always been on the offensive, and South Korea has pursued effective prevention and response from a defensive standpoint. In other words, deterrence against North Korea has been a key mechanism in South Korea's security policy. Based on this, it could be seen that whether South Korea's deterrence against North Korea has been effectively exercised is in line with the stability of South Korean security.

The analysis assumes that South Korea's deterrence against North Korea had been effectively exercised if North Korea did not launch a military attack on South Korea.

⁴¹ Glen H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1961), 3.

⁴² Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 8th ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 85–97.

However, the mere absence of military attacks does not explain all of the deterrence capabilities against North Korea. Above all, North Korea's capability and willingness for military attack should be considered first. If there is no military threat capability, North Korea would expect its losses in judging the value of profits and losses resulting from military attacks, making it less likely to launch military attacks. On the contrary, even if they are capable of military threats, it would be difficult to take actual action without the will to do so as well. In this context, judging the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea could be more logical by considering the likelihood of military actions from North Korea. Therefore, this analysis considers that South Korea's deterrence against North Korea was effectively exercised if North Korea did not carry out a military attack despite having high military capability and will to do so.

b. *Economic Aid and Economic Development*

The Korean War caused enormous economic damage to South Korea. The Economic Almanac, issued by the Bank of Korea in 1955, suggests that the Korean economy suffered a total of 412.3 billion hwan, which was current Korean currency, in damages due to the Korean War.⁴³ This was an economic damage equivalent to about \$3 billion as of the time, corresponding to the level at which Korea's per capita GNP fell from \$87.02 just before the Korean War to \$64.12 shortly after the Korean War.⁴⁴ Considering that economic power is also important for the physical survival of the nation, the economic damage in Korea after the Korean War could have led to a breakdown of South Korea's social stability. In other words, after the Korean War, South Korea needed not only to respond to North Korea's military threats, but also to repair and develop economic damage at the same time.

Attention is being paid to whether the UNC had a direct and indirect impact on South Korea's economic development at that time. In analyzing these roles, it is necessary to expand the perspective on the role of the UNC. If only attention is paid to the background and nature of the UNC's founding, the role of the UNC would inevitably be focused on military factors,

⁴³ Towoong Jung, "The influence of the Korean War," *Military History* 40 (June 2000): 214.

⁴⁴ Jang Churl Shin, "A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan," *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 6–7.

which naturally puts a considerable distance between South Korea's economic development and the UNC. However, research for this thesis does not overlook the influence of the United Nations, which is the basis of the founding of the UNC, and the secondary impact of the UNC's military role. In other words, from an economic point of view, it is necessary to consider the direct impact of the United Nations and the indirect impact of the UNC on South Korean economic development.

There had been some challenging situations in the process of establishing the UNC, but ultimately considering that the UNC was founded on the ideal value of the United Nations for peace in the international community, it could be seen that the UNC's role was an extension of the role of the UN. Therefore, it is assumed that direct United Nations' economic aid to the South Korean government is a form of contribution from the UNC to Korean economic development.

If South Korea's national resources had been diverted to its economic development based on the UNC's military role, this is also a form of the UNC's contribution to South Korea's economic development. This viewpoint is partly in line with resource dependence theory starting from the underlying assumption that a country's resources are limited. Resource dependence theory is a theory that all organizations rely on external resources for their survival, and in the process, an organization can allocate and adjust resources and power within and outside the organization based on strategic choices in order to actively respond to a given environment. Here, this theory believes that the permanent survival of the organization is guaranteed only when the dependence of resources is ultimately lowered. In this analysis, only the premise assumption of the theory is utilized.⁴⁵ The evaluation of the UNC's indirect contribution to South Korea's economic development utilizes the partial assumption of resource dependence theory that the resources needed for the organization's survival are limited and that strategic coordination and selection are made.

⁴⁵ Kihyun Ryu and Jisu Jeong, "Designing Method of the Korean Military Organization Structure in the Post Unification: Applying Resource Mobilization Theory and Strategic Choice Theory," *Korean Journal of Military Art and Science* 76, no. 1 (February 2020): 228.

2. Reference Point of Analysis

Before analyzing the UNC's role in South Korean security, a reference point of analysis is needed. Because the dependent variable of South Korean security also embodies the effect of promotion or reduction, the criteria and the basis for determining this is needed. As the analysis assumptions show, the preconditioned consideration for the correlation between South Korean security and the role of the UNC was the existential threat of North Korea. In other words, the role of the UNC should be discussed from the possibility of military threats in a military point of view, from the economic status in an economic point of view. Therefore, the possibility of military threats from North Korea at the time and the comparison of the level of economic power between South Korea and North Korea are presented as the basis for analysis. This could provide a framework for understanding South Korean security level and its changes at the time.

a. The Possibility of Military Threats From North Korea

In judging the possibility of military threats from North Korea, a conceptual definition of military power and an understanding of military force assessment are needed. First of all, military power refers to the ability and capacity to carry out military operations as part of the direct and substantive national power to ensure the security of the country.⁴⁶ Military power means both war performance and combat capability, including intangible as well as tangible factors. These forces are generally composed of force personnel, weapons systems, logistics, military strategies, command and control, military science and technology, mobilization capabilities, and reserve forces.⁴⁷ Military power is used to resolve international conflicts in support of national interests and involves some or all of six effects, including deterrence, acquisition, neutralization, rejection, annihilation and capture, in the course of confrontation between countries, including war.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Kang-nyeong Kim, "Comparison of Military Forces between South Korea and North Korea and Prospects for Disarmament," *Journal of Northeast Asia Studies* 21 (December 2001): 72.

⁴⁷ Daeki Kim and Youngse Mun, "An Evaluation on the Military Force in Neighboring Countries of Korea," *Korean Journal of Policy Analysis and Evaluation* 16, no. 1 (March 2006): 141.

⁴⁸ Jonghak Lee, *Modern Strategic Theory* (Seoul: Parkyungsa, 1983), 123.

The assessment of military power is by no means easy to do, as it quantifies and analyzes complex factors. This is because the evaluation of military power varies depending on the object and method of judgment based on the conceptual definition of military power. This assessment of military power is largely divided into static and dynamic evaluations. The static assessment here refers to evaluating the mutual military power with only the capabilities of several fixed military components, and the dynamic assessment refers to evaluating the mutual military power by deriving combat results that take into account the interaction of several components in a specific battlefield situation. The static evaluation is simple and concise in the model, such as comparing the quantity of possession by distinguishing military forces or reflecting limited amounts of weapons systems and troops' strength. However, there is a limit to accurate military assessment when excluding other intangible factors. On the other hand, dynamic evaluation also faces limitations in accuracy in the quantification process of intangible elements, and the process is also quite complex.⁴⁹

The current analysis looks at the possibility of North Korea's military threat to South Korea from the Korean War to the establishment of the CFC in 1978. In order to more objectively judge the possibility of military threats, it is necessary to supplement the previously raised limitations on military power's assessment. Therefore, this analysis starts from this limitation and judges military threats based on the method of calculating military expenditure. Military expenses reflect the sum of human, physical, and organizational components in terms of component costs and are most directly invested to build military power. Unless the ability to operate military expenditures among countries varies greatly, countries would use the costs to ensure the most reasonable defense posture in a given environment. In this regard, the method of calculating military expenditure may be surer than other methods of judging military force, and may enable objective analysis of the possibility of military threat.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 304–309; Taik-young Hamm, "Armament Competition," *Journal of Far Eastern Studies* (1992): 5–12.

⁵⁰ Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 307–309; Taik-young Hamm, "Military Capabilities of North and South Korea: Facts and Methods of Assessment," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (October 1997): 40–46.

However, there is a problem that could be raised in applying the method of calculating military expenditure. In fact, this method may not reflect the context of the times by excluding the variables of U.S. and foreign institutions from South Korea's military expenditure and economic strength. Rather, this could present clearer criteria for judgment in this thesis, which seeks to find out the role of the UNC in South Korean security by enabling a pure comparison of military expenditures of South Korea and North Korea at the time.

In addition, there is a limit that the analysis of the period cannot be presented due to difficulties in accessing data on North Korea's military capabilities in the 1950s immediately after the Korean War. Based on the judgment of the U.S. side, including the commander of the Eighth Army and White House aides, that South Korea's military power was relatively superior until the early 1960s, this thesis focuses attention on military threats from North Korea since the 1960s.⁵¹

This thesis utilizes the method of calculating military expenditure and the possibility of military threat presented by Jung-woo Lee. According to Lee's method of calculating expenditure in national defense, the ability to pose military threats can be seen as a simultaneous consideration of military spending and economic power supporting the ability to carry out war. In other words, by multiplying military spending and economic power, one can gauge the potential of the military threat of the time. In Table 1, columns A and B provide annual ratios of North Korean and South Korean military spending and economic power, respectively; Column D provides the multiplied product of these figures.

Using Lee's method, an estimate of military threats from North Korea is developed from North Korea's military threat capabilities and its willingness to use military force. The willingness to use military force is the ratio of military spending to the economic power, which is based on what policy priorities the country has for the military sector. Column C in Table 1 provides this annual calculation for North Korea. North Korea's military threat each year can be quantified by the multiplication of North Korea's military threat capabilities and willingness to operate military forces, provided in Column E of Table 1. Column F provides

⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1986): 1782.

Lee's index of military threat probability for each year in proportion to the baseline figure of 100 for 1968, the highest year.⁵²

Table 1. The Assessment of North Korea's Military Threats.⁵³

Year	(A) Comparison of Military Expenditure between South and North Korea (North/South)	(B) Comparison of Economic Power between South and North Korea (North/South)	(C) North Korea's Military Expenditure / North's GNI	Military Threats from North Korea		
				(D) Capability (A)x(B)	(E) Threat Probability (C) x(D)	(F) Threat Probability Index
1961	1.31	0.62	13.08%	0.81	10.6	34.0
1962	1.31	0.61	15.00%	0.80	12.0	38.5
1963	1.38	0.59	13.75%	0.81	11.2	36.0
1964	2.27	0.62	13.89%	1.41	19.6	63.0
1965	2.36	0.63	13.68%	1.50	20.5	65.8
1966	1.73	0.54	13.00%	0.94	12.2	39.1
1967	2.61	0.53	20.43%	1.40	28.5	91.7
1968	2.65	0.48	24.40%	1.28	31.1	100.0
1969	2.18	0.39	23.46%	0.86	20.1	64.7
1970	1.81	0.40	18.13%	0.72	13.0	41.7
1971	2.11	0.37	21.71%	0.78	16.9	54.3
1972	2.18	0.39	22.86%	0.86	19.6	62.9
1973	2.72	0.39	24.04%	1.05	25.2	80.9
1974	2.28	0.31	23.56%	0.72	16.8	54.2
1975	1.70	0.31	25.08%	0.53	13.2	42.6
1976	1.30	0.27	24.42%	0.35	8.5	27.3
1977	1.06	0.23	24.07%	0.25	5.9	19.1
1978	0.98	0.20	23.71%	0.20	4.7	15.1

⁵² Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 310–323.

⁵³ Source: Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 313–314.

According to the calculations in Table 1, for the period from 1961 to 1978, when the CFC was established, North Korea's military threat capability was considerable in 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968 and 1973. The quantified figures for these years are higher than 1. In addition, the possibility of military threats from North Korea in these years also showed relatively high figures. They are equal to or higher than the quantified figure of 20. In particular, the figure for possible military threats among them is the highest in 1968. Figure 1 conveys Jung-woo Lee's graphical representation of North Korea's military threat probability.




Figure 1. Military Threats from North Korea (1961-1978)⁵⁴

The graph presents shows that the possibility of military threats from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was high overall. A closer look shows that there was a relatively high possibility of military threats in 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973 and 1974. Therefore, based on this representation of the changing degree of North Korea's military

⁵⁴ Source: Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 318.

threat in this period, this thesis analyzes the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea by looking at the examples of military attacks from North Korea in those years.

b. Comparison of Economic Power between South Korea and North Korea and Trend of Change

There is a disconnect between South Korea and North Korea in comparing and analyzing their economic power during the 1953–1978 period. This is because there was a limit to the verification of data for North Korea’s economic indicators at that time. Therefore, it is necessary to divide the period and analyze it on the basis of different data. Nevertheless, these comparisons and analyses are still significant. Regardless of the comparison and analysis of economic power between South Korea and North Korea, the UN data on direct economic aid to South Korea is relatively accurate. Also, the indirect impact of the UNC’s economic development is more closely related to growth rates than to the size of the economies of South and North Korea itself.

Economic figures for South Korea and North Korea in the 1950s identify economic growth rates for each specific period through secondary sources. South Korea’s economic indicators in the 1960s are checked based on the Bank of Korea’s National Income Yearbook, and North Korea’s economic indicators utilize estimates generated by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service based on statistical data released by North Koreans at that time. From 1970 to 1978, the economic indicators of South Korea and North Korea utilize the UN’s National Accounts Statistics data. Although there is a break in data from a certain period of time, the overall economic growth rate of South Korea and North Korea can be checked.

Comparing and analyzing the economic power of South and North Korea based on limited data are as follows. First, right after the Korean War, South Korea relied entirely on international economic aid, including support from the United Nations and the United States, and emphasized economic recovery and growth, focusing on secondary industries.⁵⁵ The average annual growth rate of the South Korean economy reached 4.9

⁵⁵ Jang Churl Shin, “A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan,” *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 7.

percent from 1953 to 1960.⁵⁶ At the same time, North Korea carried out a three-year development plan (1954-56) and the first five-year economic development plan (1957-61) and could achieve remarkable success in the primary and heavy industries.⁵⁷ From 1956 to 1960, North Korea's economic growth rate was 13.7%, which was higher than that of South Korea.⁵⁸ Regardless of the absolute economic indicators of South Korea and North Korea at the time, it can be seen that North Korea had a relative advantage in economic growth. Through this, South Korea would feel threatened in social stability at the beginning of the post-war system competition.

In the 1960s, South Korea and North Korea focused more on economic growth under the name of modernization and socialist industrialization, respectively, and achieved high growth. South Korea's GNP surpassed \$7.5 billion in 1970, 3.8 times the figure of \$2 billion in 1960.⁵⁹ In the case of North Korea, the seven-year economic development plan (1961-67) suffered a three-year extension but achieved economic growth of about 2.5 times in the 10 years from 1960 to 1970.⁶⁰ In the 1960s, not only did the overall size of South Korea's economy exceed North Korea's, but also South Korea's economic growth rate was ahead of North Korea.

South Korea's economic growth gained momentum in the 1970s. South Korea's GNP shows a sharp rise of \$53 billion in 1978 from \$10 billion in 1971. North Korea's economic growth, on the other hand, shows considerable inferiority in comparison with South Korea, although it has still not lost momentum. North Korea's GNP grew from \$6 billion in 1971 to \$10 billion in 1978.⁶¹ This shows that the economic gap between South

⁵⁶ Sang-oh Choi, "Economic Development of Korea and America, 1948-65," *Journal of American Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 107.

⁵⁷ Pil-jung Lee, "A Study on Requirements and Allocations of The ROK's Defense Budget (1953-Present)," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 195.

⁵⁸ Bank of Korea, "Estimating Long-term Economic Growth in North Korea: 1956-1989," *Bank of Korea Economy Studies* 17 (2020): 30.

⁵⁹ Bank of Korea, *National Income Yearbook* (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1972).

⁶⁰ ROK National Intelligence Service, *Comparison of Economic Power Between South Korea and North Korea* (Seoul: NIS, 1974): 156.

⁶¹ "UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregates," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Accessed September 10, 2020, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/>.

Korea and North Korea has emerged in earnest since the 1970s. The economic indicators of South and North Korea can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Economic Indicators of South Korea and North Korea⁶²

Year	GNP (U.S. million dollars)		Year	GNI (U.S. million dollars)	
	South Korea	North Korea		South Korea	North Korea
1960	2,002	1,264	1970	9,395	5,536
1961	2,122	1,372	1971	10,221	6,112
1962	2,266	1,485	1972	11,145	6,747
1963	2,641	1,616	1973	14,212	7,449
1964	2,812	1,818	1974	20,054	8,224
1965	3,005	1,983	1975	22,080	9,079
1966	3,648	2,067	1976	30,408	9,452
1967	4,233	2,328	1977	39,130	9,839
1968	5,057	2,584	1978	53,164	10,243
1969	6,405	2,649			

3. Analysis for Military and Economic Factors

a. *The Effectiveness of the UNC's Deterrence Against North Korea*

This section analyzes the UNC's impact on South Korea's military security before the creation of the CFC. Since the Korean War armistice, South Korea has always faced military threats from North Korea. For South Korea, preventing such threats from becoming a reality was an important issue of military security. Prior to the establishment of the CFC, the UNC had OPCON of South Korean troops, providing South Korea with deterrence against North Korea. In other words, the role of the UNC and South Korea's military security at the time were directly related through deterrence against North Korea. Therefore, this section analyzes the impact of the UNC by gauging whether the deterrence against North Korea had been effectively exercised.

⁶² Adapted from Bank of Korea, *National Income Yearbook* (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1972); ROK National Intelligence Service, *Comparison of Economic Power Between South Korea and North Korea* (Seoul: NIS, 1974): 156; "UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregates," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Accessed September 10, 2020, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/>.

The deterrence against North Korea is in line with North Korea's military provocations in that it blocks Pyongyang's military threats against South Korea in advance, and such military provocations are an essential criterion of judgment for its deterrence against North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has shown some differences in its level, but it has not stopped making military provocations against South Korea in the form of infiltration and local provocations. In particular, the level of North Korea's military provocations against South Korea from 1961 to 78 is provided in Table 3.

Table 3. The Status of North Korea's Provocation Against South Korea by Year.⁶³

Year	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Number	86	58	63	47	60	91	184	141	144
Year	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Number	86	49	20	20	23	28	8	9	13

As Table 3 shows, military provocations by North Korea were constantly occurring every year. In addition, it can be seen that provocations were carried out in earnest in the 1960s. The earlier analysis suggested that North Korea's military threat would not become a reality if deterrence against North Korea worked effectively. In this regard, if the number of simple military provocations by North Korea is considered, this section would come to the conclusion that the deterrence against North Korea by the UNC was ineffective, and ultimately the UNC's influence on South Korea's military security was insufficient. Also, the analysis results could be reached that the deterrence has been little exercised in 1967, 1968, and 1969 in which the number of military attacks is overwhelmingly high, with 184, 141 and 144 times, respectively.

⁶³ Adapted from Yoon-gyu Lee, "A Case Study on the Provocations by North Korea" *Military History* 91 (June 2014): 76-85.

However, one cannot help but wonder whether the number of times that reflects all types of military provocations by North Korea corresponds to the standard of judgment of deterrence that this thesis wants to pay attention to. First of all, the conceptual definition of military provocation reflects the specific subject's intention for the act, as it means any harmful act that the enemy imposes on our people, property or territory to carry out a particular mission.⁶⁴ The previous North Korean military provocation covers direct acts ranging from indirect acts such as infiltration to bombing and attempting to assassinate VIP. In other words, considering the two facts together, North Korea's indirect provocation was made to avoid being the subject of deterrence in advance with the intention of concealing the main agents of the act. Therefore, it may be illogical to judge the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea based on only the number of provocations.

The preceding data offers some support to this judgment. If provocations are only a function of North Korea's military threat ability, then the numbers of provocations each year should correlate with its degree of threat each year. But, as Table 4 shows, there is little correlation:

Table 4. Assessment of North Korea's Military Threats and Provocations

Year	(B) North Korea Provocations (from Table 3)	(A) North Korea Threat Probability (from Table 1)	(C) North Korea's Provocations / Threat Probability
1961	86	10.6	8.11
1962	58	12.0	4.83
1963	63	11.2	5.63
1964	47	19.6	2.40
1965	60	20.5	2.93
1966	91	12.2	7.46
1967	184	28.5	6.46

⁶⁴ ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Military Terminology Dictionary* (Seoul: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 127.

Year	(B) North Korea Provocations (from Table 3)	(A) North Korea Threat Probability (from Table 1)	(C) North Korea's Provocations / Threat Probability
1968	141	31.1	4.53
1969	144	20.1	7.16
1970	86	13.0	6.62
1971	49	16.9	2.90
1972	20	19.6	1.02
1973	20	25.2	0.79
1974	23	16.8	1.37
1975	28	13.2	2.12
1976	8	8.5	0.94
1977	9	5.9	1.53
1978	13	4.7	2.77

The analysis here instead pays attention to the main cases of provocations that had been ostensibly revealed in examples of North Korea's military provocations against South Korea. Still, major North Korean provocations had occurred almost every year. In the 1950s, political terrorist acts such as spy and aircraft abduction were more prevalent than direct military attacks, but after the 1960s, more direct military provocations such as attempted assassination of the president, raids on the Demilitarized Zone and skirmishes began to appear at the forefront. In particular, the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea had decreased in the late 1960s. Among 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973, and 1974, the most notable North Korean military provocations were the Blue House raid, the USS Pueblo abduction, and the infiltration of armed communist guerrillas into Uljin and Samcheok, South Korea in 1968. Even though the target of the USS Pueblo abductions is not South Korea but the U.S., this is also a major provocation that cannot be overlooked, considering that the U.S. is the leading agent of deterrence against North Korea provided by the UNC. In addition to 1968, there were still major military provocations by North Korea. There had been high-level provocations, including the shooting of a South Korean

Air Force F-86 fighter jet and a U.S. L-16 reconnaissance plane that were patrolling the Demilitarized Zone in 1964 and 1965 respectively, the skirmish in the Demilitarized Zone in 1967, the kidnapping of a Korean Air aircraft in 1969 and the attempted assassination of President Park Chung-hee in 1974. Based on these results, this thesis cannot still expect optimistic results on the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea.⁶⁵ In other words, the firm deterrence against North Korean provocations on the Korean Peninsula at that time could not be exercised.

However, this cannot stop judging the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea. This is because the possibility of North Korea's military threat inherent in the analysis assumptions calls for the conceptual expansion of the North's military provocations. In other words, it should also be considered whether the deterrence provided to South Korea by the UNC has curbed more serious actions than the provocations summarized in Table 3, up to the level of the outbreak of an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, judgments about this could be made relatively easily. Based on historical facts, it is easy to see that military tensions between South Korea and North Korea have risen since the Korean War armistice, but no full-scale war has taken place. Indeed, the fact that the many provocations in this period did not lead to wider war suggests that deterrence of higher level conflict was still just as effective even in times of the highest North Korean threat. However, it should not be overlooked that these judgments could lose logic as criticism based on the result.

The aforementioned points indicated that the concept of military provocation reflected the intent of the subject. Sun-bo Moon also argues that military provocations do not constitute sufficient conditions to form the concept of such provocations simply by attacking the enemy, and that military provocations should be understood in a political sense. In other words, Moon explains, military provocations should include strategic thinking that can primarily constitute conditions that trigger the other's actions and turn

⁶⁵ Yoon-gyu Lee, "A Case Study on the Provocations by North Korea" *Military History* 91 (June 2014): 76–85.

the other's response into a situation that seeks to take advantage of it.⁶⁶ As his claim can be described as a strategic problem-causing act, all North Korea's military provocations were implicit in their respective strategic intentions. It is necessary to reconsider North Korea's strategic intentions behind the major cases of the provocations, in order to determine the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea by examining in detail whether North Korea had a strategic intention to wage an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula behind the provocation cases.

This section takes a close look at the case of North Korea's major provocations, which are beyond the local level. It will look at the Blue House raid and the infiltration into Uljin and Samcheok in 1968, and the assassination of President Park in 1974.

On Jan. 21, 1968, 31 members of North Korea's the 124th unit infiltrated Seoul to attack the presidential office. Their mission was to attack the Blue House and assassinate government officials, including President Park Chung-hee. Five targets—the Blue House, the U.S. Embassy, the Army headquarters, Seodaemun Prison and Seobingo Spy Detention Center - were initial targeted, but were reduced to a single goal of the Blue House a week before the attack. Armed personnel managed to infiltrate Seoul at night across the border. The guerrillas first contacted woodcutters in Paju, South Korea, but continued to infiltrate the area. However, upon the report of the woodcutter, the Korean military and police entered an emergency status, and as soon as the guerrillas were discovered, the exchange of fire began. This later evolved into a huge mop-up operation by the Korean military, which led to pursuit and siege. As a result, the Blue House raid ended with 28 of the guerrillas killed, two missing and one captured alive.⁶⁷

From Oct. 30 to Nov. 2, 1968, the 120 guerrillas from North Korea's 124th unit were organized into eight groups of 15 people and infiltrated into Uljin and Samcheok. Armed communist guerrillas were divided into two, two, and four groups, respectively, to conduct the first, second, and third infiltration. Their aim was to create an atmosphere of fear in South

⁶⁶ Jeongbeom Park, "Analysis of the Factors in Failure to Deter North Korea's Provocations Based on the Deterrence Theory," *Military Research* 139 (2015): 259.

⁶⁷ Institute for Military History, *History of Counter Unconventional Warfare 2* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1998), 31–32.

Korean society through ruthless terrorist and destructive activities as part of the violent revolution. The vessel of the third group was detected by the radar of the South Korean Navy ship at first at 8 p.m. on Nov. 2. Later, at 6 a.m. on Nov. 3, their infiltration was officially confirmed by a report from the Uljin area residents. Accordingly, South Korea deployed military, police and reserve forces to carry out the counterespionage operation, and continued the operation until December 28 for about two months until the end of the operation by killing 113 guerrillas and capturing seven others alive.⁶⁸

The two major provocations in 1968 were the result of North Korea's active armed struggle against South Korea. Looking at the situation on the Korean Peninsula at that time, President Park's administration, which emerged in the early 1960s, continued to strengthen its anti-communist policy, and in the late 1960s, its national power was growing due to rapid economic development. Following military buildup economic development policy, which was decided in 1962, North Korea established a strategy to communize South Korea and unify Korea. This was intended to overthrow the South Korean government by violence, establish the communist regime, and then unify the Korean Peninsula. Later, North Korea recognized the effectiveness of the guerrilla warfare carried out in the Vietnam War and decided to launch guerrilla warfare activities against South Korea.⁶⁹ This can be confirmed by Kim Il-sung's speech at the October 1966 Workers' Party Congress that North Korea advance the revolutionary period through the proper combination of economic and political, legal and illegalities, and violence and nonviolent struggles.⁷⁰ In this context, it could be seen that the Blue House raid was caused by North Korea's attempt to explore the operational environment and create conditions before North Korea's active guerrilla warfare for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. It could be seen that the Uljin and Samcheok area infiltration, which was repeated provocation following the failure of the Blue House raid, also occurred as an

⁶⁸ ROK Defense Security Command, *Counter Communism 30 years* (Seoul: Defense Security Command, 1978), 388.

⁶⁹ Jung-joon Choi, "How Did North Korea's Military Provocations in 1968 Affect on Buildup of the South Korea's Military Defense Capabilities," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 25, no. 2 (June 2020): 147–148.

⁷⁰ ROK Ministry of National Defense, *History of National Defense* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1990), 367–368.

extension of guerrilla activities for the unification. In particular, this infiltration was intended to promote the distribution and fatigue of combat power by using tactics to simultaneously field the former and rear areas of South Korea. As a result, it can be judged that North Korea's provocations in 1968, which took the form of an active armed struggle, were part of North Korea's preparations for war under the name of revolution.

On August 15, 1974, Moon Se-kwang, a Korean-Japanese, attempted to attack President Park Chung-hee, who was giving a speech at the National Theater of South Korea to commemorate the Liberation Day. The shooter, Moon Se-kwang, was immediately stopped by a bodyguard at the scene, but in the process, the president's wife, Yook Young-soo, was killed. Moon Se-kwang, who was later arrested, was found to have been recruited by North Korea.⁷¹ This was a relatively direct and distinct form of provocation compared to those in the 1960s. The 1970s was a time of change in the balance between South Korea and North Korea. Due to the rapid economic growth of South Korea in the 1960s, the balance between South Korea and North Korea in the 1970s was sharply tilted toward South Korea. In response, North Korea wanted to implement a policy to confuse South Korea, which had been developing in various fields such as politics, economy, and society, and in this context, a direct attempted assassination of the president took place. As a result, it could be judged that North Korea's provocations in the 1970s were mainly aimed at causing confusion in South Korean society rather than the intention of supporting war on the Korean Peninsula.

If one looks at whether North Korea's strategic intentions for an all-out war were included behind North Korea's provocations, some facts from the 1960s are relevant. In the 1960s, when North Korea's relative competitiveness against South Korea continued to some extent, North Korea sought to promote unification by using violent mechanisms. However, the gap between South Korea and North Korea in the 1970s shifted North Korea's intention from preparations for war to increasing social turmoil. In the end, the deterrence against North Korea was not entirely effective during the time of the similar balance between South Korea and North Korea, but after the asymmetry in the balance, the effectiveness of the deterrence had increased. Thus, it could be concluded that the UNC had had a positive overall impact on

⁷¹ Jintae Choi, *Terror, Terrorist, and Terrorism* (Seoul: Daeyoungsa, 1997), 126.

South Korea's military security, but at different levels depending on the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Above all, this represents that the deterrence is not a constant but a variable that changes with the times and circumstances. The fact that the range of changes in the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea is affected by the balance between Seoul and Pyongyang suggests that Seoul's security calls for a comprehensive concept of economic superiority as well as military elements of deterrence. In this context, this thesis's efforts to look at the role of the UNC in various aspects of South Korean security are significant, and move on to an analysis of the UNC's role in South Korean economic development.

b. *UNC's Impact on South Korean Economic Development*

This section analyzes the direct and indirect impact of the UNC on South Korean economic development. Basically, the UNC, which was established during the Korean War, was a military organization in charge of military functions. However, considering that the UNC is a symbolic organization established to express the ideal value of the UN, the role of the UN in South Korea is also understandable as an extension of the UNC's role. In this context, this section looks at direct U.N. economic aid to South Korea after the Korean War as a direct influence of the UNC. The fact that U.N. aid was donated to South Korea through the UNC at the time supports this argument.⁷² As the next indirect impact, this section studies whether the UNC's military role had affected South Korea's economic development. It analyzes if the symbolic existence and practical functions of the UNC could make South Korea expand its options for economic development.

During the Korean War, the South Korean economy suffered a period of extreme turmoil due to a vacuum in economic policy and the destruction of industrial and production facilities. After the Korean War, South Korea needed a post-war economic recovery process first for physical survival. At that time, however, the South Korean economy was suffering from a vicious cycle of poverty, a universal obstacle to economic reconstruction and development in underdeveloped countries. At the time when South Korea lacked its own

⁷² Jaehoon Kim, "U.S. aid to South Korea and South Korea's finance in the 1950s," *Economy and Society* 1 (December 1988): 139.

capital, external capital was needed more than anything else, and under these circumstances, South Korea became highly dependent on foreign aid from sources such as the United Nations and the United States. In the 1950s, foreign aid capital was injected free of charge, which played a vital role in South Korea's economic reconstruction.⁷³

The UN Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) was established in accordance with Resolution 410 of the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1950, and full-fledged economic aid began to flow to South Korea. First, the U.N. economic aid provided to South Korea was through the U.N. Civil Relief Program in Korea (CRIK). CRIK aid provided approximately \$450 billion from 1951 to 1956 and UNKRA aid provided about \$120 billion from 1953 to 1960. The specific amounts of economic aid by the United Nations after the Korean War are shown in Table 5. This UN aid was donated to South Korea through the UNC, intending to contribute to South Korea's economic recovery.

Table 5. Economic Aid by the United Nations (U.S. thousand dollars)⁷⁴

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
CRIK	158,787	50,191	8,711	331	-	-	-	-
UNKRA	29,580	21,297	22,181	22,370	14,103	7,747	2,471	244

In addition to direct economic aid to Korea, the UNKRA wanted to establish South Korea's economic development plan. In 1952, the UNKRA commissioned the Robert Nathan Association of the United States for this plan. In March 1953, the Robert Nathan Association reported a survey of the overall South Korean economy and a long-term revival plan. The long-term rehabilitation plan was a five-year plan from 1953 to 1957, and it was prepared by collecting a large amount of data related to the economic reconstruction plan. However, the

⁷³ Jang Churl Shin, "A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan," *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 5–9.

⁷⁴ Source: Jaehoon Kim, "U.S. aid to South Korea and South Korea's finance in the 1950s," *Economy and Society* 1 (December 1988): 138.

plan was not implemented because it contained unrealistic and unreasonable plans, projecting that the South Korean economy could achieve economic independence in 1958.⁷⁵

In addition to U.N. economic aid to the South Korean economy at that time, the United States also provided economic aid directly. Considering the leading role of the U.S. in the background of the establishment of the UNC at that time and the position of the U.S. within the U.N., direct economic aid from the U.N. could be interpreted as part of U.S. economic aid. In fact, U.N. aid is based on contributions from member countries. However, most of the U.N. aid supplied to South Korea was provided entirely by the U.S.⁷⁶ In this regard, Table 6 shows the financial support by the United States prior to 1978, which includes the percentage of that aid provided through CRIK and UNKRA through 1960 (using the data from Table 5).

Table 6. Economic Aid by the United States (U.S. million dollars)⁷⁷

Year	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Aid	194.2	153.9	236.7	326.7	382.9	321.3	222.2	245.4	199.2
Percent via UN	97.0%	46.5%	13.1%	6.9%	3.7%	2.4%	1.1%	0.1%	N/A
Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.0
Year	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1977
Aid	232.3	216.4	149.3	131.4	103.3	97.0	105.9	107.3	97.0
Loan	6.0	43.0	30.0	39.0	172.0	218.0	364.0	509.0	234.7

⁷⁵ Jang Churl Shin, "A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan," *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 12.

⁷⁶ Sang-oh Choi, "Economic Development of Korea and America, 1948–65," *Journal of American Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 99.

⁷⁷ Source: Jang Churl Shin, "A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan," *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 13.

U.S. aid to South Korea began as part of its emergency relief policy for occupied areas, and during the Korean War, aid had the characteristic of this relief aid. However, from the end of the Korean War to the end of 1961, U.S. aid evolved into a form of military aid and economic aid for postwar reconstruction.⁷⁸ As Table 6 shows, in tandem with this evolution, the U.S. quickly shifted to providing aid directly, rather than through the U.N. agencies. Table 6 also shows that U.S. economic aid increased rapidly after the Korean War, reaching its highest level in 1957, and then after that declined. This is due to the change of the U.S. foreign aid policy in 1957. Due to this change, foreign capital began to flow into the form of paid loans in 1959, and in 1966, the amount of loans began to exceed the amount of aid. After that, foreign capital had been changed into a form financed mainly by loans. Aid has been suspended since 1980.

Economic aid by the U.S. was far more than direct U.N. aid, leading the overall recovery and revival of South Korea after the war. While the UNC was responsible for South Korea's military security with OPCON over the South Korean military, the fact that the U.S. was the leading body of the UNC and that the USFK accounted for the majority of the UNC's forces indicates that the presence of the UNC was one sufficient condition to enable U.S. aid to South Korea. In this regard, even though aid directly from CRIK and UNKRA was short-lived, direct U.S. aid to South Korea was also within the scope of the UNC's influence on Korea's economic development.

After the war, South Korea's sluggish economy was able to achieve stability and growth with U.N. and U.S. economic aid. On the other hand, foreign economic aid had also distorted the industrial structure of South Korean economy. In the 1950s, most of the aid was made free of charge, so the South Korean economy had a weak economic structure that could not escape from its foreign-dependent constitution, with the aid itself being unilaterally determined by aid states.⁷⁹ Under these circumstances, as the U.S. aid policy shifted from free aid to loans from 1959, South Korea faced the challenge of transforming

⁷⁸ Gong Taeg Han, "South Korea's Inclusion Global Capitalist System in the Post-War and U.S. Aid," *Pusan Political Science Association Journal* 8, no. 1 (December 1988): 217–218.

⁷⁹ Jang Churl Shin, "A Study on the Korea Economy after the Liberation and Propel of the Economic Development Plan," *The Korean-Japanese Journal of Economics and Management Studies* 66 (2015): 9.

its foreign-dependent economy into a self-reliant economic system. As the loans that gradually replaced the free aid had to be repaid one day, the South Korean government needed a measure to secure a stable source of foreign currency to repay the paid-in loans. In this context, South Korea's pursuit of export-driven economic policies in the 1960s and 1970s is understandable.

After the post-war restoration period, South Korea implemented a full-fledged export-driven economic development plan in 1962. These economic development plans were implemented on a total of three occasions as a five-year plan and achieved considerable results. The military government, which took power in early 1960, had set a basic goal of revamping the existing U.S.-centered, import-dependent aid economy in pushing forward with the first five-year economic development plan. To this end, the government actively pursued the substitution of imports to establish the foundation for a self-reliant economy and adopted policies for expanding export-oriented products. The second five-year plan, which began in 1967, laid the basic goal of modernizing the industrial structure and further promoting the establishment of a self-reliant economy. Therefore, the export driven policy, which achieved economic growth by leading exports, was strongly implemented. The third five-year plan began in 1972 and laid the basic goals for the innovative development of the rural economy, the epochal increase in exports, and the construction of heavy and chemical industries. This was intended to strengthen international competitiveness by the so-called Second Import Substitution, which attempts to replace imported raw materials in South Korea by fostering heavy and chemical industries while maintaining the existing export-driven growth strategy.⁸⁰ In other words, during the period, the South Korean economy was embodied in a development plan with the stage of fostering import replacement industries—the establishment of an export industrial structure—and export-driven growth.

South Korea's economic development, which began in the 1960s, was premised on national interest and investment in material resources. At the same time, however, South Korea had to respond to the real threat of North Korea. North Korea achieved remarkable

⁸⁰ Ibid., 14–15.

success in the primary and heavy industries by pushing for a three-year development plan (1954-56) and the first five-year economic development plan (1957-61) for postwar restoration and economic development. North Korea even achieved the goal of the first five-year economic development plan a year earlier, and later began the seven-year economic development plan (1961-67), injecting more than 20% of the GNP into the military buildup. As a result, until the mid-1960s, North Korea maintained a defense budget of more than 2.5 times that of South Korea, and its military strength remained superior to that of South Korea. As such, North Korea threatened South Korea's physical survival at that time.⁸¹ Therefore, at that time, South Korea was in a dilemma of not being able to meet all national resource requirements for national defense and economic development.

Facing this threat from North Korea, the South Korean government had pushed ahead with its policy direction of economic growth, with social stability first and the construction of defense forces later, based on the U.S. government's commitment to solid support for South Korea's defense and the UNC's deterrence. At that time, South Korea's defense spending stood at 20–30 percent, which was not small compared to other countries' defense spending. But this level was still lower than North Korea's defense spending; as shown in Table 1, from 1961–1976, North Korea's military expenditures ranged between 130%–265% of South Korea's, even though North Korea's economic power was slowing declining relative to South Korea, causing its threat probability to increase. Given the growing threat from North Korea, South Korea needed UNC and U.S. deterrence against North Korea. As a result of this support, the South Korean government was able to allocate funds first for economic development and social development while the UNC and the presence of USFK deterred North Korea's military threats. Table 7 shows the classification of the South Korean government's finances in that period.

⁸¹ Pil-jung Lee, "A Study on Requirements and Allocations of The ROK's Defense Budget (1953-Present)," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 195–196.

Table 7. Allocation of the South Korean Government's Finances (South Korea billion won)⁸²

Year	(A) Gov. Total Budget	Military Defense		Economic Development		Social Development		General Administration		Etc.	
		(B) Budget	(B)/(A) (%)	(C) Budget	(C)/(A) (%)	(D) Budget	(D)/(A) (%)	(E) Budget	(E)/(A) (%)	(F) Budget	(F)/(A) (%)
1957	36.19	11.29	31.2	9.43	26.1	4.28	13.3	4.62	12.8	6.03	16.7
1958	40.76	12.78	31.4	10.58	26.0	7.14	17.5	3.76	9.2	6.50	16.0
1959	41.54	13.97	33.6	9.31	22.4	9.93	23.9	5.04	12.1	3.29	7.9
1960	42.70	14.76	34.6	7.49	17.5	11.14	26.7	6.01	14.1	3.30	7.1
1961	59.00	16.66	28.2	18.67	31.6	13.18	22.3	7.27	12.3	3.22	5.5
1962	82.75	20.52	24.8	31.83	38.5	17.79	21.5	8.45	10.2	4.16	5.0
1963	79.89	20.48	25.64	26.62	33.21	19.30	24.16	10.39	13.01	3.10	3.98
1964	81.99	24.93	30.41	23.05	28.11	20.92	25.52	9.86	12.03	3.23	3.94
1965	100.9	29.88	29.62	29.18	28.92	24.61	24.39	12.94	12.83	4.28	4.24
1966	163.6	40.67	24.87	52.47	32.08	41.34	25.28	18.97	11.60	10.10	6.18
1967	214.3	50.00	23.33	65.46	30.55	53.72	25.09	24.50	11.43	20.55	9.59
1968	305.5	65.38	21.40	90.38	29.59	88.72	29.05	33.20	10.87	27.77	9.09
1969	433.2	84.86	19.59	117.76	27.18	141.69	32.71	48.53	11.20	40.38	9.32
1970	496.1	101.29	20.42	133.66	26.94	148.88	30.01	54.57	11.00	57.70	11.63
1971	614.0	129.39	21.07	170.81	17.81	173.71	28.29	66.40	10.81	73.74	12.01
1972	790.9	172.06	21.76	229.17	28.98	222.71	28.16	92.30	11.67	74.63	9.44
1973	812.3	199.60	24.57	249.40	30.70	266.00	32.75	72.60	8.94	24.70	3.04
1974	1257.7	319.50	25.40	463.50	36.85	334.00	26.56	107.30	8.53	33.40	2.66
1975	1716.7	465.30	27.10	654.00	38.10	465.40	27.11	89.30	5.30	42.70	2.49
1976	2428.0	762.8	31.42	863.1	35.48	655.9	27.01	92.5	3.81	53.7	2.21
1977	3232.7	1023.3	31.66	885.8	27.40	667.9	20.66	523.7	16.20	131.9	4.08
1978	4408.0	1438.1	32.62	1154.9	26.20	954.5	21.65	419.1	9.51	441.4	10.01

As of 1962, when South Korea's five-year economic development plan was first launched, the budget for national defense had decreased and the budget for economic development had increased. The defense budget, which used to be above 30 percent, had

⁸² Source: Pil-jung Lee, "A Study on Requirements and Allocations of The ROK's Defense Budget (1953-Present)," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 193–201.

been on the decline until 1969, except for 1964 and 1965. On the other hand, the budget for economic development had not shown a steady increase from the previous figure, but it can be seen that it had increased and maintained at a level equivalent to about 30 percent. This fact illustrates the policy direction of the time: economic growth and social stability based on deterrence against North Korea first, and the construction of defense forces later.

The defense budget can be seen to rise little by little again from 1970. This was due to South Korea's push for self-defense in line with the situation of the times and changes in U.S. foreign policy. The security relationship between South Korea and the U.S. eroded when South Korea failed to carry out U.S. demands in dealing with the Blue House raid and the abduction of the USS Pueblo in 1968, and the U.S. pursued unilateral resolution. Also, in 1969, when the Nixon Doctrine called for Asian countries to take more responsibility for their defense, South Korea began to feel a fear of abandonment. In this context, South Korea had begun to realize the need for self-defense and to implement it, and the defense budget increases after 1970 can be understood from this extension.

As a result, from the end of the Korean War to 1978, the UNC contributed direct U.N. economic aid to South Korea for economic recovery, reconstruction and revival. The fact that the U.N. and the UNC were under U.S.-led influence at the time makes U.S. economic aid to South Korea relevant as well. In other words, the UNC could be judged to have had an impact on South Korea's economic development by guaranteeing foreign capital's economic assistance. In addition, the UNC guaranteed South Korean security with the commitment to U.S. security assistance as well as deterrence against North Korea in the 1960s when North Korea's real threats emerged, allowing the South Korean government to divert state resources to its economic development. This policy priority led to remarkable growth in the South Korean economy, which can by far be seen as the indirect impact of the UNC on South Korea's economic development. In turn, South Korea's growing economic advantage over North Korea contributed directly to increases of South Korea's military capacity in later years.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA

This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's political and diplomatic security before the establishment of the CFC. Military security is closely aligned with political and diplomatic elements. Basically, military security presupposes protection against internal and external threats to ensure the physical survival of the nation. The state can use both diplomatic and security policies against foreign threats, and may mobilize military elements to stabilize national order against domestic threats. In this regard, the fact that the UNC was in charge of part of South Korea's military security with OPCON of the South Korean military before the CFC was established indicates that the UNC could not be completely free from South Korea's political and diplomatic security at the time.

Based on this logic, this section examines the impact of the UNC on Korea's political and diplomatic security. First, it looks at the impact of the UNC on South Korea's political change in political security. At this time, military and political elements are connected through military mobilization. Next, the impact of the UNC on diplomatic security is analyzed by looking at whether diplomatic autonomy of South Korea had been limited in exchange for security assurances.

1. Assumption of Analysis

a. Political Democratization

This section examines whether the UNC influenced political changes in South Korea during the period between 1953 and 1978. Political change comprehensively means a change in the political system or the emergence of a new political situation. Political change includes system-level changes, such as military coups, the emergence and downfall of authoritarian regimes, and democratic governance processes, as well as political

structure changes, such as shifts in power relations, changes in governance relations and changes in policies that cause changes in people's political behavior.⁸³

It could be said that democratization falls within a range of these political changes. Democratization refers to the transition from a non-democratic political system to a democratic political system. This democratization involves fundamental changes, such as changes in the governance structure in a non-democratic political system, and also the expansion of political subjects and their actions. On the one hand, the process of democracy becoming more solid within a basic democratic political system can also be seen as democratization. The fact that research on democratization is concentrated on the transition to democracy and the solidification of democracy supports this.⁸⁴

Democracy is a political system that broadens the scope of political participation, and this characteristic can be seen from the fact that the etymology of democracy is rule by the people combining with the ancient Greek words "demos" and "kratos."⁸⁵ In more modern use, democracy also means a system of substantive rights.⁸⁶ Definitions of the concept of democracy vary from scholar to scholar, but the convergence points are as follows: Democracy is a political system that continuously reflects the preferences of all citizens while ensuring free and fair political competition, comprehensive political participation, and political and civil liberties.⁸⁷

As can be seen from the conceptual definition of democracy, democracy entails some essential conditions. First, in terms of institutions and procedures, democracy requires protections of political rights, such as fair and regular electoral systems, electoral

⁸³ Seong-ho Jang, "An Analysis on the Effect of the Socioeconomic Crisis on the Political Fluctuations of Korea," *The Journal of Political Science and Communication* 11, no. 2 (December 2008): 190–191.

⁸⁴ Yong Cheol Kim, "Democratization Movements and Democratization in South Korea: Success and Failure," *Journal of Democracy and Human Rights* 15, no. 3 (December 2015): 275.

⁸⁵ Hyung Chul Kim, "A Task and Constructing Strategy for the Quality of Asian Democracy Index," *Comparative Democratic Studies* 8, no. 2 (December 2012): 102.

⁸⁶ Hyung Chul Kim, "The Effects of Socioeconomic Factors and Political Institutions on the Level of Democracy," *Korean Political Science Review* 41, no. 1 (March 2007): 126.

⁸⁷ Hyung Chul Kim, "A Task and Constructing Strategy for the Quality of Asian Democracy Index," *Comparative Democratic Studies* 8, no. 2 (December 2012): 103.

rights, and multi-party systems. In addition, democracy requires freedom and accountability of citizens in socio-economic aspects.⁸⁸ That is, democracy requires that the value of competition, participation and freedom be guaranteed on a formal and practical level.

Here, the analysis of the UNC's role in South Korea's political changes focuses on analysis of the UNC's role in South Korea's political democratization. This is because the South Korea's political changes have been undergoing a transition to a democratic political order, accompanied by advance and retreat, since its founding. South Korea's political order began with the first parliamentary democracy, but was replaced by an authoritarian political order in the midst of an emergency. However, after the authoritarian political order failed to institutionalize, one form of authoritarian rule was transformed into another form of authoritarian rule amid the subsequent replacement of constitutional and military governments. Then, in 1987, the people's uprising on June 10 led to the launch of the civilian government, which transformed the country into a democratic political order.⁸⁹ This section analyzes the role of the UNC in this period of conflict that had been marked by the pain of democratization.

If the military were involved in the process of political change in Korea, the UNC would not be free from its responsibility for its role, and the connotation of the UNC's role would be determined by the outcome of the corresponding political change. The fact that military security ensures the physical survival of the nation from internal and external threats leaves room for the possibility of use of military elements domestically. In a properly settled political system, democracy can avoid the negative aspects of this possibility, but otherwise it cannot completely ignore the mobilization of troops and the possibility of political intervention. The UNC, which held OPCON over South Korean troops at the time, cannot be free from its responsibility if the South Korean troops were involved in its politics.

⁸⁸ Hyung Chul Kim, "The Effects of Socioeconomic Factors and Political Institutions on the Level of Democracy," *Korean Political Science Review* 41, no. 1 (March 2007): 124.

⁸⁹ Seong-ho Jang, "An Analysis on the Effect of the Socioeconomic Crisis on the Political Fluctuations of Korea," *The Journal of Political Science and Communication* 11, no. 2 (December 2008): 192.

The UNC may take direct or indirect responsibility for the South Korean military's political intervention. If the UNC took the initiative to intervene in South Korean politics by utilizing the South Korean military, it would demand direct responsibility from the UNC. On the other hand, if the UNC did not take the initiative in intervening, but the South Korean government itself led the political intervention and the UNC gave passive approval, such as acquiescence or abetting it, the UNC still had indirect responsibility. In other words, in the case of military mobilization across certain forms, the UNC assumes responsibility, and the soundness of this responsibility ultimately follows the outcome of South Korea's political democratization.

Examples of military mobilization in South Korean politics from 1953 to 1978 include the suppression of the April 19 Revolution in 1960, the May 16 military coup in 1961, and the declaration of the Yushin regime in 1972. Therefore, this section analyzes the political impact of the UNC on those historical cases.

b. Diplomatic Autonomy

This section analyzes how the UNC influenced South Korea's diplomatic autonomy during the 1953–1978 period. Diplomatic autonomy is a concept belonging to a category of diplomatic power, a dependent variable that can be derived from the complex correlation of international politics. The UNC is not an organization of sovereign state units, but an arm of a common organization that reflects the agreed values of various countries. This fact indicates that the UNC reflects the nature of international politics, while at the same time linking the two variables, South Korea and the UNC, on the stage of international relations. Moreover, the fact that the UNC had OPCON over the South Korean military at the time further strengthens the link between both of them from a diplomatic standpoint, naturally raising as an issue the diplomatic autonomy variable between the other two variables.

First of all, diplomatic power means a country's ability to express its national power externally, meaning the power and influence it can exert in international relations.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Sungdon Hwang, "Soft Power," *Hansun Studies* (August 2009): 45.

Diplomatic power can often be perceived as a concept commensurate with national power, or as a complement to national power. The former explains that diplomacy is a function of hard power, such as military and economic power.⁹¹ Conversely, the latter explains that a country with a low national power can broaden the scope of its interests with high diplomatic power.⁹² But it can be seen that diplomatic power itself is closely related, not a concept far from the national power of a nation. This can be seen from scholars who discuss the diplomatic strategies of small countries under the assumption that national power limits some of their diplomatic power.⁹³

The international political science community generally defines national power as a comprehensive force of such components as population, natural resources, national defense, economic power, people's morale, government leadership, and diplomatic technology.⁹⁴ That is, it presents tangible and intangible elements as components of national power. However, detailed standards vary from scholar to scholar in distinguishing national power, particularly regarding smaller powers. First, Robert O. Keohane distinguishes national power by focusing on physical standards. According to Keohane, countries in the international system are divided into system determining states, system infusing states, system affecting states, and system influential states.⁹⁵ On the other hand, Robert L. Rothstein distinguishes national power on a psychological basis. In particular, Rothstein defines weaker countries through standards that distinguish national power. Rothstein's proposed weak country is a country that recognizes that it cannot secure national security in its own capacity and has to rely on other countries or international

⁹¹ Taehyun Kim, "Diplomatic Power Research," *National Strategy Studies* 14, no. 1 (2008): 7–8.

⁹² Changhyun Choi, "Soft Power," *Hansun Studies* (February 2014): 44.

⁹³ Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?: Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (1992): 417–447; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bring the Revisionist State Back in," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 74.

⁹⁴ Changhyun Choi, "Soft Power," *Hansun Studies* (February 2014): 39.

⁹⁵ Robert O. Keohane, "Review: Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* 23, no. 2 (1969): 295–296.

organizations, while at the same time being recognized by other countries.⁹⁶ Although there are some differences in the criteria for distinguishing national power, such as the recognition of its influence and ability on the international system, it could be seen that there is a presence or absence of physical capability at its core, even for smaller countries.

Basically, a small country uses foreign policy to solve the primary goal of physical survival. Small countries want to separate domestic environment and ability for demands and challenges from external environment, and consider the minimization of risk first in policy decision making.⁹⁷ From a realistic perspective, a small country can consider two strategies, balance and bandwagon, as its foreign policy. Small countries can maintain a balance of power in alliance with other forces resisting external pressures and threats, or they can adapt to external pressures and threats and take advantage of them meeting the conditions they require.⁹⁸ South Korea, born as a newly independent nation after liberation from Japan's colonial rule and the Korean War, was clearly a small country in terms of physical ability. At that time, South Korea adopted a strategy of balance of power against the primary threat of North Korea, which led to its alliance with the United States.

The alliance between South Korea and the United States began as an asymmetric alliance. First, to discuss the symmetry of the alliance, James D. Morrow divides countries into Superpower, Major and Minor, and describes the relationship between countries in different forms as asymmetrical.⁹⁹ Robert L. Rothstein argues that a small country cannot protect itself and naturally forms an alliance with a great power for security, and explains that these alliances are asymmetrical, which implies a difference in national power.¹⁰⁰ That

⁹⁶ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29. See also Yong-gil Kim, "Foreign Policy of Small Countries," *The GOSHIGYE Monthly Law Journal* 37, no. 9 (August 1992): 284.

⁹⁷ Dong-yoon Lee, "ASEANs Foreign Relations toward Power State : Between U.S. and China," *Journal of International Politics* 17, no. 1 (March 2012): 182.

⁹⁸ Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 116–117.

⁹⁹ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliance," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 906–907.

¹⁰⁰ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York.: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.

is, it could be seen that asymmetric alliances result from a power imbalance. This asymmetry limits the equal relationship between the two allied countries. A good theory to describe this is the Autonomy Security Trade-off Model, an interchange model of security and independence.¹⁰¹ This model explains that small countries can increase security by forming alliances with great powers, but at the expense of autonomy in return. In other words, small countries recognize that the great powers have freedom of action on them for the sake of their own vital interests and the right to survive, in the process, the great powers want to expand their influence.¹⁰² The alliance between South Korea and the United States since the Korean War reflects this characteristic.

For the present analysis, the South Korea-U.S. asymmetric alliance could be replaced by the relationship between South Korea and the UNC in terms of Korea's diplomacy and security. The practical fact that the UNC operates under the initiative of the U.S. reduces the gap between South Korea-U.S. relations and South Korea-U.N. relations. Also, officially, the UNC held OPCON over South Korean military, which was responsible for protecting South Korea's safety from external threats. In the process, there remains room for the UNC's influence over South Korea's foreign affairs and security. Therefore, the UNC can impose certain restrictions on South Korea's foreign affairs and security instead of nominally guaranteeing South Korea's security.

In this context, this section selects an analysis assumption that the UNC might have imposed unilateral restrictions on Seoul's foreign policy drive in exchange for taking charge of the country's security. In particular, it looks at the limitations of South Korea's diplomatic and security autonomy arising from South Korea-U.S. relations, considering the aforementioned possible replacement of the Korea-U.S. relationship by the Korea-U.N. relationship. It analyzes whether the U.S. or UNC had one-way restrictions on the foreign

¹⁰¹ Min-hyoung Park, "The Self-Reliant Defense and Security Economy: Focusing on the Park Chung-hee and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations," *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History* 38, no. 2 (February 2017): 147.

¹⁰² Hyunyong Kwak, "Analysis of ROK-US Alliance Treaties Applying Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model," *Review of Korean Military Studies* 7, no. 2 (December 2018): 42–43.

policy that Seoul wanted to pursue, or whether the U.S. or UNC made Seoul pursue certain foreign policies.

2. Reference Point of Analysis

a. *The Level of Political Democratization in South Korea.*

Objective reference points are important to assess the impact of the UNC on South Korea's political democratization. However, dealing with objective indicators of an intangible political system can have logical limitations not only in accessing data but also in the process of deriving indicators. In this regard, this section utilizes the democratic indicators that have attempted to catalog the level of democracy as objectively as possible as the basis for the evaluation of democratization.

The level of democracy can be seen as a political performance, meaning how well the basic attributes of democracy are being realized in each democratic system.¹⁰³ Attempts to provide objective indicators for these levels of democracy have been made in a variety of ways. This section utilizes the Polity IV Project among various studies. Since the Polity IV Project has examined the characteristics and transitions of the political system in all independent countries since 1800, data on the period from 1953 to 1978 can be found in this section. The Polity IV Project focuses on the extent to which democratic and authoritarian characteristics are included at the same time in a particular political system and gives measurement scores for democratic levels. The measurement score is calculated on a 21-point scale through the executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. This score ranges from the lowest score of -10 points, hereditary monarchy, to the highest score of +10 points, consolidated democracy, where -6 points or less means autocracy and +6 points or higher means democracy.¹⁰⁴

From 1948 to 2013, South Korea's democratic indicators are noted in Figure 2.

¹⁰³ Hyung Chul Kim, "The Effects of Socioeconomic Factors and Political Institutions on the Level of Democracy," *Korean Political Science Review* 41, no. 1 (March 2007): 127.

¹⁰⁴ Wonbin Cho, "'Good Democracy' Index: A Measurement of Democratic Quality," *Comparative Democratic Studies* 10, no. 1 (June 2014): 73.




Figure 2. South Korea's Democratic Indicators (1948-2013).¹⁰⁵

In this graph, the line colors have different meanings. The blue line is what is generally plotted over time. The red line specifies a period of factionalism, and the green line specifies a period of transition for the political system. The letter X indicates autocratic backsliding, and A indicates executive auto coups or autogolpe.¹⁰⁶

This graph shows that the democratic indicators change drastically based on the suppression of the April 19 Revolution of 1960, the military coup on May 16, 1961, and the declaration of Yushin constitution in 1972, which were inflection points of political change in South Korea. As the graph shows, South Korea's democracy index, which had been low by -4 points until 1959, had risen sharply to 8 points by 1961, reflecting the April 19 Revolution in this period. The democracy index, which stood at eight in 1961, had fallen sharply by -7 points until 1963, due to the May 16 military coup that took place at this time. The democracy index, which showed relatively stable figures at three points in the late

¹⁰⁵ Source: "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013," Polity IV Project, Accessed October 4, 2020, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013," Polity IV Project, Accessed October 4, 2020, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/keynew.htm>.

1960s, fell sharply again to -9 points as of 1973, following President Park Chung-hee's declaration of the Yushin constitution. In sum, South Korea's democratic indicators rose following the April 19 revolution, but after the May 16 military coup and the declaration of the Yushin constitution, the democratic indicators fell sharply. In other words, the political democratization of South Korea progressed through the April 19 Revolution, but it was reversed through the May 16 military coup, and some later progress was reversed again by the proclamation of the Yushin constitution. This chapter discusses these developments in more detail in the following section.

b. Military Security Cooperation between South Korea and the United States

In analyzing the impact of the UNC on Korea's diplomatic autonomy, the special nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the UNC means that the South Korea-U.S. relationship itself is an important independent variable and parameter. The UNC, which had OPCON over the South Korean military, was under the command of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, so the scope of the UNC's role was bound to overlap with the strategic interests of the United States. In this context, military security cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. could be an important basis in order to judge South Korea's diplomatic autonomy based on the security-autonomous exchange model.

Relations between Korea and the United States began on May 22, 1882, when the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship Between Joseon Dynasty and the U.S., Trade and Navigation, a treaty of diplomatic relations. However, the relationship between Korea and the U.S. was severed in 1905 when Japan colonized the Korean Empire, but was restored at the point of liberation in 1945 and the establishment of the Korean government in 1948.¹⁰⁷ Full-fledged military security cooperation between both of them began in October 1953 with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and the United States. When a cease-fire became a fait accompli during the Korean War, South Korea wanted to sign a mutual defense treaty with the United States to prepare for the existential threat from North Korea. However, there was no easy compromise between

¹⁰⁷ "The History of Relations Between South Korea and the U.S.," ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed October 5, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_3528/contents.do.

South Korea and the United States over the signing of the mutual defense treaty. In particular, the issues between the two countries were the timing of the signing of the mutual defense treaty, the size of the South Korean troops, the continuation of Operational Command over the Korean troops held by the U.N. forces, and the deadline for political talks to discuss the unification of the Korean Peninsula after the armistice.¹⁰⁸ There had been several rounds of talks between the two countries to narrow these differences, and as a result, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was officially signed in October 1953.¹⁰⁹

The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty officially took effect only a year later, on November 17, 1954, when notifications of ratification were exchanged. Although the Mutual Defense Treaty had been formally signed, differences between the two countries had not been completely resolved, and therefore the exchange of the treaty's ratification notices was delayed.¹¹⁰ South Korea and the U.S. found a compromise to resolve differences in Agreed Minute Relating to Continuous Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters. The memorandum of agreement consisted of Appendix A, which deals with the text and the implementation details of economic issues, and Appendix B, which specified the scale of the South Korean military buildup. This memorandum particularly included clauses that allowed the commander of the UNC to retain OPCON of South Korean troops even after the armistice, and that the U.S. guarantees economic and military assistance to South Korea in return.¹¹¹ When the memorandum of agreement was formally signed on November 17, 1954, the ratification notices of the Mutual Defense Treaty were exchanged on the same day, marking the official beginning of the South Korea-U.S. military security cooperation relationship.

¹⁰⁸ Il-young Kim, "The Linkage between Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics in Rhee Government," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (February 2000): 252.

¹⁰⁹ Seuk-ryule Hong, "Marching North Campaign' and Foreign Policy of Cold War in the Regime of Syngman Rhee," *The Journal of Korean History* 85 (June 1994): 147.

¹¹⁰ Il-young Kim, "The Linkage between Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics in Rhee Government," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (February 2000): 254–255.

¹¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1986): 1875–1882.

South Korea-U.S. military security cooperation became more institutionalized when the two countries began their annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1968. The first Security Consultative Meeting was held in Washington on May 27, 1968. It was the highest-level security policy consultative body, with the defense ministers of the two countries as the chief delegates and involving senior foreign and defense officials.¹¹² At the meeting, the defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. discussed the security of the Korean Peninsula and together decided on the direction of policies. Behind the background of SCM was North Korea's offensive provocations, including the Blue House raid and abduction of the USS Pueblo in 1968. In detail, differences between South Korea and the U.S. in responding to North Korea's provocations had heightened security threats felt by South Korea, which was tentatively resolved by the SCM.¹¹³ The SCM itself meant the expansion of South Korea's participation conditions and capabilities in the defense of South Korea. As such, the ROK-U.S. military security cooperation became a more mutual alliance and underwent further gradual changes, resulting in the institutional development of the establishment of the CFC in 1978.

3. Analysis for Political and Diplomatic Factors

a. UNC and Political Democracy in South Korea

On April 19, 1960, students and citizens across the country staged massive protests against the Rhee Syngman regime. Student protesters marched through the streets shouting anti-dictatorship and democracy. As protesters headed from the National Assembly building to the Blue House, police fired indiscriminately at the protesters, causing many casualties. Victims occurred across the country in the process of suppressing the protest. Later in the day, the Rhee administration declared emergency martial law to try to settle the situation, but citizens did not stop protesting, demanding fundamental reform. In the end, due to continued resistance from citizens, President Rhee issued a presidential

¹¹² "The Military and Security Cooperation Between South Korea and the U.S.," ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed October 5, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_3528/contents.do.

¹¹³ Joonseok Yang, "The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the U.S. at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident: Focused on the Fear of Abandonment," *Military History* 105 (December 2017): 180.

resignation statement on April 26, ending the first administration, which had continued since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948.¹¹⁴

The April 19 Revolution was fundamentally led by students and citizens under the wish of overthrowing the dictatorship. At that time, the logic of the Cold War was rooted in public consciousness due to the Korean War, and the division of the two Koreas. President Rhee Syngman and the ruling party were using the political symbol of anti-Communism as an important weapon in the power movement under these circumstances to continue their long-term rule.¹¹⁵ In particular, President Rhee, the government and the ruling party had revised the Constitution twice for long-term rule and caused various manipulated elections. As the suppression of the basic values of democracy intensified, complaints from citizens were raised and eventually expressed in the form of protests.¹¹⁶ On March 15, 1960, a nationwide protest against the manipulated election took place, but in the process of suppressing it, the police caused many casualties and buried the body of one of the casualties in the sea. After this revelation, citizens' complaints intensified, leading to the April 19 Revolution.

As President Rhee Syngman stepped down following the April 19 Revolution, the political space, which had been suppressed by authoritarian dictatorships, was opened up. The law on assembly and demonstration was changed from a permit system to a reporting and notification system, and the establishment of newspapers and political parties was also changed from a permit system to a registration system. As a result, citizens' political participation and freedom of the press were greatly increased.¹¹⁷ South Korea's democracy, which had not been able to break away from the nature of authoritarian regimes, was able to set a turning point for development based on the April 19 Revolution.

¹¹⁴ Youngki Noh, "Why is the 4·19 Revolution Unfinished?" *History to Open Tomorrow* 66 (March 2017): 96.

¹¹⁵ Seong-ho Jang, "An Analysis on the Effect of the Socioeconomic Crisis on the Political Fluctuations of Korea," *The Journal of Political Science and Communication* 11, no. 2 (December 2008): 195.

¹¹⁶ Youngki Noh, "Why is the 4·19 Revolution Unfinished?" *History to Open Tomorrow* 66 (March 2017): 97–98.

¹¹⁷ Hyun-gyu Jang, "The Crisis and Advance of Democracy in Korea 1960–1987," *Korean Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (December 2005): 114.

There was a role of the military in the course of the suppression of the April 19 Revolution. In response to the mass protests, the government declared emergency martial law and tried to suppress it by force. An exchange of opinions between the South Korean government and UNC was essential for that because the UNC had OPCON of the Korean military at the time. In fact, U.S. approval existed for the movement of South Korean troops to quell the unrest. According to a telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to Korea Walter P. McCaughy to the U.S. Secretary of State on April 20, 1960, President Rhee Syngman, Interior Minister Hong Jin-ki and Defense Minister Kim Jung-yeol, who were at the Blue House on the day of the April 19 Revolution, declared the martial law at 1 p.m. and agreed to deploy the 15th Division of the Korean Army to suppress the riot. Also, according to a telegram on April 25, the acting commander of the UNC, E. I. Cummings, agreed to the South Korean request for the mobilization of the 15th Division for the suppression of unrest and the enforcement of martial law. It states that the acting commander of the UNC and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul agreed that there were not any other alternatives to restoring domestic order, which could be achieved only by the use of military at this stage, and that the UNC had no tactical need for the 15th Division under the current circumstances. Even though the telegram was asking the South Korean defense minister to avoid firing at civilians and to use minimal force in responding to the situation, it is clear that there had been U.S. approval for the deployment of South Korean troops.¹¹⁸

South Korea's democracy experienced a developmental stage with the April 19 Revolution and the launch of the second administration, but it was disrupted by the May 16 military coup in 1961.¹¹⁹ Some military forces led by then General Park Chung-hee entered Seoul on May 16 and took power, forming a supreme council for national reconstruction and implementing military rule.

There are many discussions on the background of the May 16 military coup, but political instability and interests within the military at that time are discussed as examples.

¹¹⁸ Myung-lim Park, "April Revolution, May 16th Coup, and the Role of America," *Critical Review of History* (November 2015): 354–355.

¹¹⁹ Hyun-gyu Jang, "The Crisis and Advance of Democracy in Korea 1960–1987," *Korean Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (December 2005): 116.

Unlike the Rhee Syngman administration, the second administration adopted a parliamentary cabinet system. However, the majority party, the political ruling group, was divided by political interests, and corruption was rampant in the political circle. In addition, the second administration at that time expressed its incompetence by not having the ability to carry out the five-year economic development plan, and the low economic development heightened discontent within South Korean society. Factional relations prevailed in the military as well. In addition, unlike the Korean War in which military officers were able to get high-speed promotions, the promotion period at that time increased, resulting in a naturally delayed promotion. Problems such as structural corruption and promotion congestion in the military led to formation of a group of reform-minded officers. In this context, military forces led by General Park Chung-hee staged a coup to clean up the political and military circles that were incompetent and mired in corruption.¹²⁰

After the May 16 military coup, Chairman Park Chung-hee, who chaired the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, attempted to lay the foundation for modernization and industrialization by reorganizing the national administrative body into an efficient organization. However, these military regimes generally attempted to strengthen their dictatorial powers, running counter to democratization. The military government took control of the intelligence and police forces, followed by the judiciary and legislation. The fact that 2,036 pieces of legislation were processed in a year immediately after the coup suggests this. The military government also controlled the media at that time. The military government maintained its policy to abolish the resisting press and to form a cooperative relationship with the remaining press. The military government also established the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on June 10, 1961, which mimicked the CIA in the United States. The NIS had considerable power to supervise information and the investigation activities of various government departments, including the military, which symbolized the military government's strong suppression of the state.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Sangseok Moon, "Military Coup and the Formation of Nation State : Park Chung Hee and His Legacy," *The Korean Journal of Humanities and the Social Sciences* 38, no. 1 (May 2014): 156–158.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 168–170

The May 16 military coup was more closely connected with the military than the April 19 Revolution. This is because the state's power had been under the control of the military from the coup until the transfer of power to civilian governments. Shortly after the May 16 coup, the commander of the UNC, Carter B. Magruder, issued a statement supporting the legally established South Korean government led by Prime Minister Chang Myeon. In the statement, the commander of the UNC said he expects the three military chiefs of staff to use their influence to restore civilian control to government and restore domestic order.¹²² Deputy U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green also supported the constitutional government.¹²³ But then the U.S. government took the attitude of acknowledging the coup in a statement issued by the State Department on May 19. And the commander of the UNC took the same stance.¹²⁴ But it was a serious problem for the commander of the UNC that OPCON of South Korean military was still under the coup forces after the military coup. In response, the UNC's commander moved to restore OPCON under the command of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on May 26, coup forces decided to return OPCON after reaching an agreement with the commander of the UNC. The agreement included the UNC's agreement to use the OPCON of South Korean troops only to defend South Korea from communist aggression.¹²⁵ This decision left room for future intervention by Korean military forces in domestic politics.

South Korean democracy entered a dark age as the Park Chung-hee administration ended up becoming Yushin regime system advocating one-man dictatorship. President Park Chung-hee declared emergency martial law across the country on October 17, 1972, and put forward a new constitutional amendment that would allow him to remain in power for life. After a referendum on November 21 of that year, he promulgated the Yushin Constitution on December 27. The contents of the Yushin Constitution were filled with

¹²² Seong-ho Jang, "An Analysis of the Impact of the U.S. on Political Changes in Korea," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 24 (September 2002): 150.

¹²³ Myung-lim Park, "April Revolution, May 16th Coup, and the Role of America," *Critical Review of History* (November 2015): 361.

¹²⁴ Seong-ho Jang, "An Analysis of the Impact of the U.S. on Political Changes in Korea," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 24 (September 2002): 152.

¹²⁵ Myung-lim Park, "April Revolution, May 16th Coup, and the Role of America," *Critical Review of History* (November 2015): 362–363.

institutional mechanisms to support Park Chung-hee's one-man dictatorship. Under the Yushin regime, the National Assembly could not exercise its right to impeach or inspect state affairs, and civil society, including the media, was placed under strong control of the state body, causing the role of political and civil society to be extremely diminished.¹²⁶

President Park Chung-hee insisted on the logic that unexpected threats could occur in the changing international environment, including the U.S.-China detente and the Nixon Doctrine before and after the proclamation of the Yushin regime, and declared emergency martial law nationwide under these circumstances.¹²⁷ However, unlike the April 19 Revolution and the May 16 Military Coup, there was no direct use of the military in domestic politics. In addition, the commander of the UNC, who agreed on the scope of the use of OPCON of South Korean military after the May 16 military coup, had less room to restrain the direct use of the military in domestic politics.

To summarize the influence of the UNC in the case of political change in Korea, it can be seen that the UNC played a certain role in intervening in politics and later politicizing the Korean military in the course of the suppression of the April 19 Revolution and the May 16 military coup. The UNC approved the use of the military by the Korean government in the process of suppressing the April 19 Revolution, which promoted the implementation of democracy in Korea, while not actively stopping the use of the military in the May 16 military coup that led to the authoritarian regime. Through this, the UNC played a rather negative role in the democratization of South Korean politics in that period of time.

b. UNC and South Korea's Diplomatic Autonomy

Before the establishment of the CFC, South Korea's defense system was centered on the UNC. The UNC was in charge of removing the threat in case of an emergency with OPCON. The UNC obviously was responsible for South Korean security. However, in fact,

¹²⁶ Hyun-gyu Jang, "The Crisis and Advance of Democracy in Korea 1960–1987," *Korean Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (December 2005): 120.

¹²⁷ Jung-bae Kim, "The U.S., Yushin, and the Cold War," *The Korean Journal of American History* 38, (November 2013): 160–161; Jong-Dae Shin "U.S. and North Korean Perceptions and Responses to the Establishment of the Yushin System," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* 55, no. 3 (September 2012): 191.

the U.S. presence was actually responsible for South Korea's security because of the UNC's chain of command leading to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

South Korea was in a structure where its diplomatic autonomy could be restricted by the UNC and the United States. This could happen in several ways. First of all, one can think of a case in which the UNC or the U.S. had restricted Seoul's diplomatic autonomy by unilaterally pursuing foreign policy. Or, one can consider a case in which South Korea had been restricted by the UNC or the United States in pursuing certain foreign policies. Finally, considering that the UNC was a reflection of the ideal value of the UN, one can think of a case in which a change in the UNC's diplomatic position could affect South Korea's diplomatic position.

In the late 1960s, South Korea's diplomatic autonomy was restricted by the unilateral nature of the UNC or the United States. Friction occurred between South Korea and the U.S. in the process of resolving a series of North Korean provocations in 1968. South Korea wanted to take tough military action against North Korea after the Blue House raid on January 21, 1968. However, the UNC and the U.S. response fell short of South Korea's expectations. Rather, the UNC and the U.S. kept South Korea in check out of concern for South Korea's independent military action.¹²⁸ Two days later, on January 23 the USS Pueblo was seized by North Korea in open waters off the east coast. In response, the UNC issued Defcon 2 and prepared for military action in response to the incident, unlike the Blue House raid. Due to the discriminatory response, the South Korean government expressed strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. side. This complaint can be confirmed in the speech of President Park Chung-hee at the groundbreaking ceremony of the Gyeongbu Expressway on February 1, 1968.¹²⁹

The United States then shifted from military to diplomatic means in resolving the USS Pueblo incident. The United States tried to resolve the issue through direct

¹²⁸ Seuk-ryule Hong, "The Triangular Foreign Relations in Korea during the Pueblo Crisis of 1968," *The Journal of Korean History* 113 (June 2001): 196–198.

¹²⁹ Joonseok Yang, "The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the U.S. at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident: Focused on the Fear of Abandonment," *Military History* 105 (December 2017): 163.

negotiations with North Korea. However, South Korea was even more opposed to the negotiations because they were a big boost to the North's diplomatic status.¹³⁰ Under these circumstances, the United States could not completely ignore South Korea's position, and on February 12, 1968, it dispatched a special envoy Cyrus Roberts Vance to South Korea. The talks between the South Korean government and special envoy led to a joint statement aimed at reaffirming U.S. defense commitment to South Korea, including increased U.S. military aid to South Korea, which later led to a summit between President Park Chung-hee and President Lyndon B. Johnson on April 18, 1968 and the hosting of the annual Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting.¹³¹ This series of measures ended the dispute between South Korea and the United States over the issue, but it was an agreement and a second best option at a time when Seoul's diplomatic autonomy was limited.

The Nixon Doctrine, released in 1969, was another case in which the UNC and U.S. unilateral foreign policy imposed restrictions on South Korea. On July 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon announced a new Asian policy, the Nixon Doctrine, in Guam. The Nixon Doctrine said the United States could provide its allies with weapons and economic aid, but not necessarily with its troops, and in particular urged Asian countries to reduce their dependence on the United States and resolve their security issues independently. The Nixon Doctrine led to the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. On March 27, 1970, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter notified President Park Chung-hee of the unilateral plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. The South Korean government and politicians expressed strong discontent over the unilateral action by the United States. Nevertheless, the 7th Division in South Korea was withdrawn on November 15, 1970, and the 2nd Division in Korea was relocated to fill the void.¹³² The UNC, which had OPCON over the South Korean military at the time, simply complied with the flow in the process.

¹³⁰ Joonseok Yang, "The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the U.S. at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident: Focused on the Fear of Abandonment," *Military History* 105 (December 2017): 161–163.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹³² Min-hyoung Park, "The Self-Reliant Defense and Security Economy: Focusing on the Park Chung-hee and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations," *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History* 38, no. 2 (February 2017): 155–156.

Clearly, the UNC was representing the U.S. strategic coordination in its unilateral foreign policy. This indicates that South Korea's autonomy in Korea-U.S. diplomatic relations was limited. It can be understood in this context that the self-defense policy that the Park Chung-hee administration wanted to pursue was limited by Washington's unilateral diplomatic moves.¹³³

President Richard Nixon had also begun seeking to improve relations with China as part of his international policy of easing tensions. At that time, the U.S. judged that attracting China as a member of the international community would ease tensions in Asia and have a positive effect on the rational resolution of the Indochina conflict.¹³⁴ Therefore, the U.S. government also asked the South Korean government to be more active in improving relations with North Korea. This could be attributed to the U.S. judgment that the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula would help to improve relations with China. For South Korea, however, it was not an acceptable situation that China, one of the leading adversaries during the Korean War, and its ally, the U.S., were trying to improve relations. The South Korean government analyzed that China would intervene in the Korean Peninsula issues in a way that would be disadvantageous to the South Korean government.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, the U.S.-China detente led to inter-Korean talks between South Korea and North Korea. Talks began between South Korea and North Korea in August 1971, starting with Red Cross talks. But Seoul and Pyongyang had fundamentally different goals, so dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang was suspended by Pyongyang, only confirming differences in their perceptions, and the relationship between Seoul and Pyongyang soon returned to its pre-existing hostile condition.¹³⁶ This U.S. policy of

¹³³ Gwanpyo Bae, "Changes and Continuity in South Korea's Security Policy in the 1950–60s," *Seoul Association For Public Administration Presentation* (May 2013): 459–461.

¹³⁴ Seok-pyo Han, "Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978," (PhD's thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 38.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 43–44.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

seeking to improve relations with China forced Seoul to make a passive change in its foreign policy, showing its one-sided nature.

In some cases, the foreign policies that Korea wanted to pursue were restricted by the UNC or the United States. A good example is that, before and after the armistice of the Korean War, President Rhee Syngman embraced a foreign policy to bring down North Korea by force and achieve reunification. As North Korea's military threats, which had been heightened even before the Korean War, changed from image to reality through the Korean War, President Rhee's perception that South Korea's security can be guaranteed only by removing North Korean communism was strengthened.¹³⁷ This foreign policy began even before the armistice of the Korean War was signed, and the U.S. government at that time took a stand against it. As of May 17, 1951, the United States adopted NSC 48/5, deciding to end the war in Korea with negotiations and leading the discussion of a ceasefire.¹³⁸ South Korea opposed the truce as an extension of its preferred foreign policy, and in the process, insisted on allowing the South Korean military to conduct a solo attack.

These different opinions converged to the agreement on a mutual defense treaty after the armistice. However, even after the armistice, President Rhee continued to express his intention to bring down North Korea. In response, the U.S. government set a course of action to prevent Rhee's resumption of armed actions. The United States adopted NSC 167/1, which said the United States would not intervene at all if South Korea launched an independent military action, would stop providing military and logistics support to South Korean troops, and would take steps to protect only the U.N. forces. This was a clear opposition to President Rhee's foreign policy. Ultimately, the U.S. had signed the Agreed Minute Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters with South Korea, which stipulates that the commander of the UNC would keep retaining OPCON of the South Korean military, practically limiting Seoul's foreign policy. Under these circumstances, the foreign policy gradually lost momentum after the mid-1950s due to

¹³⁷ Yong-pyo Hong, "The Korean War and South Korean Security Policy: Continuity and Change," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26, no. 1 (2010): 18–19.

¹³⁸ Korean National Defense University, *National Defense Policy and Military Strategy* (Nonsan: Hankookmunhwa, 2019), 112.

domestic opposition, which was raised in South Korea, and consequently was withdrawn.¹³⁹

South Korea also experienced foreign policy restrictions in the Park Chung-hee administration. In the late 1960s, North Korea's provocations became aggressive, along with the escalation of the Vietnam War. Under these circumstances, South Korea's awareness of security threats had increased, which had been more intensified with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine itself was a call for initiatives and self-help efforts by Asian countries, so South Korea envisioned the Asia-Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO), a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, centered around Vietnam's warring nations in the name of deterring communist aggression. This APATO proposal exposed that the existing UNC-centered defense system did not reflect the value of a collective security system led by the United States. However, the South Korean government's APATO initiative was met with opposition from the U.S. government. On March 19, 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers told South Korean Ambassador to the United States Kim Dong-jo that President Richard Nixon was primarily concerned about regional cooperation in Asia in terms of economy and culture, not about security cooperation, which means additional security commitments. Behind this position was a fierce anti-war movement against the Vietnam War in the United States at the time. As a result, Seoul's APATO diplomatic initiative to draw security ties in Asia fell through due to opposition from Washington, again showing the deep U.S. shadow over Seoul's security policy.¹⁴⁰

In some cases, a change in the UNC's diplomatic position had affected South Korea's diplomatic position. By the 1970s, the status of the United States within the United Nations had been somewhat weakened due to the newly emerging non-aligned

¹³⁹ Seuk-ryule Hong, "Marching North Campaign' and Foreign Policy of Cold War in the Regime of Syngman Rhee," *The Journal of Korean History* 85 (June 1994): 140–174.

¹⁴⁰ Sanghyun Lee, "The Collapse of Asian Version of NATO Idea : Focusing on the APATO Idea of Park Jeonghee Regime during the 60s," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 50, no. 5 (December 2010): 38–54.

movement.¹⁴¹ Meanwhile, the UNC's status had been weakened as most of the remaining troops contributing to the UNC returned to their homelands in the 1970s.¹⁴² At the UN, initiatives emerged to dismantle the UNC.¹⁴³ As discussed in the following chapter, South Korea and the United States reacted by planning the creation of a new joint command.¹⁴⁴ But the important fact here is that, in the time since the establishment of the Republic of Korea government was legally recognized by the United Nations and the UNC in the Korean War prevented South Korea from communizing, the international community's diplomatic support for South Korea through the United Nations had weakened. This can be seen as limiting the scope of Seoul's diplomatic autonomy, including putting Seoul in a defensive position on the diplomatic stage.

In sum, during this period, the UNC had a role in the U.S. global strategy under its command structure. This means that certain restrictions on Seoul's foreign policy in the asymmetric alliance between Seoul and Washington were represented through restrictions by the UNC. In particular, restrictions on South Korea's diplomatic autonomy may stand out in diplomatic issues related to security. The UNC and the U.S. imposed restrictions on the foreign policy of reunification pursued by President Rhee Syngman. Later, the APATO initiative that President Park Chung-hee pushed ahead was also restricted by the UNC and the United States. At the same time, they pushed for a unilateral solution in dealing with the North's provocations in 1968. Later still, the U.S. pursued unilateral policies such as Nixon Doctrine, the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and the U.S.-China detente, forcing Seoul to follow passively. As such, it could be seen that the UNC

¹⁴¹ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 197.

¹⁴² Seok-pyo Han, "Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978," (PhD's thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 36.

¹⁴³ Juseok Seo, "Korean Peninsula Armistice and United Nations Command," *Unification Theory* (January 2001): 108.

¹⁴⁴ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 199–200.

and the U.S. had certain restrictions on South Korea's diplomatic autonomy in return for providing security.

However, the negative assessment of the restriction on diplomatic autonomy can be said to have been partially closed in return for negotiations between Seoul and Washington. The U.S. signed a mutual defense treaty with South Korea in the process of realistically curbing President Rhee's foreign policy for reunification, which resulted in the U.S. being directly bound to security on the Korean Peninsula. Also, South Korea's fear of abandonment and complaints in the process of dealing with North Korea's provocations in 1968 had been able to lure more U.S. military aid to South Korea and the hosting of the annual South Korea-U.S. SCM. As a result, the UNC imposed some restrictions on South Korea's diplomatic autonomy in return for taking responsibility for South Korea's security, but the UNC also paid the price of a conciliatory gesture toward Seoul.

E. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE CFC

This chapter has analyzed the impact of the UNC on South Korean security during the period from the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953 to the establishment of the CFC in 1978. The chapter analysis has examined the UNC impact on military and economic aspects, and then political and diplomatic aspects.

In this period, the UNC had a limited but positive impact on South Korea's military security. The UNC held OPCON over the South Korean military and was primarily responsible for the defense of South Korea. The UNC's security responsibility for South Korea was expressed through deterrence against North Korea and served to ensure the South Korea's physical survival from North Korea's threats. The UNC was able to restrain North Korea from carrying out massive military attacks. Through this, South Korea's military security was able to avoid the serious threat of war. However, North Korea's provocative space was still open. North Korea continued to express its threat to South Korea in the form of indirect infiltration and local armed conflict, and kept South Korea's military tensions high. In this regard, the UNC's role in South Korea's military security was limited but positive.

The UNC had a positive impact on South Korea's economic security. The UNC's role in South Korea's economic development had emerged through direct economic aid and indirect economic development guarantees. The UNC provided direct economic aid to help and develop the impoverished South Korean economy after the Korean War. Also, the UNC itself was an institutional way of ensuring U.S. aid. This enabled the South Korean economy to gain a foothold for future growth. In addition, the UNC played an indirect role in South Korea's economic development through the derivative effects of deterrence against North Korea. Based on UNC deterrence and security assistance, South Korea was able to divert its limited state resources to economic development, which was a driving force behind the rapid growth of the South Korean economy. In this regard, the UNC's role in South Korea's economic security was positive.

On the other hand, the UNC's role in South Korea's political and diplomatic security was somewhat negative. First of all, the political system of South Korea saw retrogression of democracy during that period, and the military was involved as part of the means of force. The UNC, which had OPCON over the South Korean military, could have served as a restrictor to the military's involvement in South Korean politics. However, the UNC took a stand as a passive bystander in this series of circumstances. During the April 19 Revolution, the South Korean government decided to deploy military units to suppress the revolutionary forces, and the UNC allowed it. In addition, the coup forces of the May 16th military coup committed illegal acts outside the OPCON of the UNC, but the UNC did not actively curb them and later took steps to recognize the coup forces. In other words, the UNC was not completely independent from South Korea's political and security regression at the time.

Because South Korea's defense system was centered on the UNC, and the UNC exercised full-fledged authority over South Korea's security, the leading U.S. role behind the UNC suggests that the full-scale authority over South Korea's security came from the U.S. In this context, the UNC could be seen as a channel for U.S. restrictions on South Korean autonomy, instead of being responsible only for South Korea's military security. Before and after the Korean War Armistice Agreement, President Rhee Syngman pushed for a strong diplomatic unification policy, but this was limited by the United States due to

the issue of opportunity cost. In the late 1960s, President Park Chung-hee conceived the APATO, a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, but this was also limited by the burden of security costs and indifference of the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. pushed for a unilateral solution in 1968 in the course of dealing with a series of North Korean provocations, and later pushed ahead with unilateral policies such as Nixon Doctrine, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the U.S.-China detente, prompting Seoul to establish a foreign policy imposed by Washington's choice. In the process, South Korea did conduct negotiations with the United States, but ultimately its active diplomacy and autonomy were limited. As a result, while the UNC played a positive role in South Korea's physical survival since the Korean War Armistice Agreement until the establishment of the CFC, in the process it played a rather negative role in South Korea realizing its ideal values as a nation.

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III. THE IMPACT OF THE UNC AFTER THE CREATION OF THE CFC

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's security from the establishment of the CFC in 1978 to the start of a unilateral attempt by North Korea to neutralize the UNC in 1991. With the establishment of the CFC in 1978, OPCON of South Korean troops was transferred from the UNC to the CFC. This was a turning point in the role of the UNC, which had been directly responsible for Korean security, and the role of the UNC was reduced to the management of the Armistice Agreement and guarantee of the provision of forces. In 1991, the communist bloc collapsed and a South Korean general was appointed as the chief delegate to the UNCMAC. Under these circumstances, North Korea tried to neutralize the UNC in earnest, insisting on the uselessness of the NNSC. This chapter analyzes the role of the UNC in the period from the creation of the CFC to 1991. First, this chapter looks at the background of the CFC, the change of the UNC's role, and the characteristics of the ROK-U.S. combined defense system. Subsequently, the impact of the UNC on South Korean security is comprehensively analyzed.

B. THE UNC AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC

1. The Historical Background of the CFC

a. The Weakening of the Status of the UN and Efforts to Dismantle the UNC

The CFC was created in the 1970s as an active response between South Korea and the U.S. amid the changing security environment and the changing international situation surrounding the UNC. In the 1960s, the United States was the leading influence within the UN, but the emerging Third World countries forming the non-aligned movement at that time began to rebel against the United States at the U.N.¹⁴⁵ As a result, the status of the UNC was also weakening. As most of the remaining UNC troops returned to their homeland in the 1970s, the UNC remained only a nominal symbol of the UN and was

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 197.

mostly operated by the U.S. military.¹⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, the USFK withdrawal in 1971 ultimately weakened the UNC's function on the defense of South Korea.¹⁴⁷

At a time when the status of the UN and UNC was declining, the issue of dismantling the UNC was officially raised at the UN on July 17, 1972. Algeria and other communist countries sent a letter to the U.N. secretary-general asking for discussions on the subject of reviewing the existence of the UNC. On September 21, 1973, communist-led Liberia and Tunisia also submitted a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly requesting to remove U.N. authority from foreign troops in South Korea and dismantle the UNC.¹⁴⁸

South Korea and the United States, which are directly related to the UNC, had to come up with countermeasures against initiatives. The answer was a new joint command. On December 31, 1973, the Nixon administration through National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 190 directed policy research for the transition to a new security system on the Korean Peninsula. The key point was to present the details of the negotiations with China and North Korea and their strategies for negotiations regarding the dismantlement of the UNC.¹⁴⁹ In response, the NSC submitted a NSSM 190 research report providing basic requirements to ensure that the dismantling of the UNC would not undermine South Korea's security. NSC staffs focused on the issue of OPCON over the South Korean military among the issues that should not be negotiated with the communist side so as not to weaken South Korean security.¹⁵⁰ NSC staffs suggested that the ROK-US CFC, under the command of the U.S. military, exercise OPCON over all Korean

¹⁴⁶ Seok-pyo Han, "Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978," (PhD's thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 36.

¹⁴⁷ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 197.

¹⁴⁸ Juseok Seo, "Korean Peninsula Armistice and United Nations Command," *Unification Theory* (January 2001): 108.

¹⁴⁹ Richard M. Nixon, "Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House, 1973).

¹⁵⁰ U.S. White House National Security Council, "Negotiations on Terminating the UNC in Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House National Security Council, 1974).

troops.¹⁵¹ Details of the CFC were not specified at that time, but the CFC began to emerge as an alternative to the UNC at this point. State Secretary Henry A. Kissinger reported the results of the study on the NSSM 190 to President Richard Nixon on March 25, 1974, and on March 29, President delivered a negotiating strategy for this through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251.¹⁵²

But the United States had failed to agree with China and North Korea on the issue. In addition, the fact that the communist resolution was voted down by a tie at the 29th U.N. General Assembly in 1974 meant not only weakening the status of the United Nations but also increasing international calls for ending direct U.N. involvement on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁵³ Against this backdrop, Seoul and Washington could not be sure that the 30th U.N. General Assembly in 1975 would flow in a favorable direction. Therefore, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to prepare for any situation in which the resolution to dismantle the UNC is passed or rejected. In other words, their reaction was to push for diplomatic efforts to reject the communist claim at the U.N. General Assembly by publicly reorganizing the functions of the UNC, and to clarify preparations for the creation of a new CFC that can represent the functions of the UNC and the national interests of the two countries in case the dismantlement of the UNC was approved internally.¹⁵⁴ The content of the establishment of the CFC emerged and materialized in this period of time.

b. *South Korea's Perception of Security Threats and Dissatisfaction with the UNC-Centered Security System*

Since the Korean War, North Korea has continued to infiltrate and provoke South Korea as well as build up its military capabilities to communize the Korean Peninsula. In

¹⁵¹ U.S. White House National Security Council, "Reclama on Two Issues in NSSM 190: Diplomatic Initiative in Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House National Security Council, 1974)..

¹⁵² Richard M. Nixon, "Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House, 1974).

¹⁵³ "Passing the West's Measures on Korean Affairs, Reviewing at the U.N. Security Council to Disband U.N. Command," *Chosunilbo*, December 11, 1974.

¹⁵⁴ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 199–200.

particular, the emergence of a strong anti-communist regime in South Korea in the early 1960s further increased the level of North Korea's provocations.¹⁵⁵ Under these circumstances, South Korea at the time relied heavily on the alliance with the U.S. as an integral part of its national security.¹⁵⁶ Even though the commander of the UNC held OPCON over South Korean troops, South Korea was practically relying on the presence of the U.S. in that the command structure of the UNC led to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the Nixon Doctrine was a big shock to South Korea. The Nixon Doctrine called for initiatives from Asian countries, stating that the primary responsibility for security in Asia belonged to the countries concerned. Naturally, the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine made South Korea, which relied on the U.S. for security, feel threatened with abandonment, a perception that increased due to the actual reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. In 1971, Nixon reduced the number of the USFK by 18,000.¹⁵⁷ At that time, the South Korean government was unable to stop the unilateral decision by the United States despite its extreme opposition to it, which naturally increased the fear of abandonment felt by South Korea.

The fear of abandonment felt by South Korea was greater facing President Jimmy Carter's policy of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea in 1977. The communization of Indochina in 1975 divided U.S. domestic opinion over Washington's excessive security commitment to the Asian region. Under these circumstances, President Carter as a candidate had made a campaign pledge to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, and he had carried it out in earnest upon taking office.¹⁵⁸ In response, President Park Chung-hee stubbornly opposed the plan, calling for the transfer of OPCON to South Korea after the

¹⁵⁵ Sung-im, Jung, "North Korea provocation against South Korea and South Korea crisis management," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 20, no. 1 (2016): 58.

¹⁵⁶ Heajeong Lee, "The Origins of Korean-American Alliance Revisited," *Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History* 26, no. 1 (2004): 5.

¹⁵⁷ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 191–193.

¹⁵⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Draft Bill Authorizing Equipment Transfers for the Republic of Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House National Security Council, 1977).

withdrawal of the USFK and compensation for the withdrawal.¹⁵⁹ In addition, President Carter ordered a review of action guidelines linking human rights issues in South Korea to preliminary plan for the withdrawal of the USFK.¹⁶⁰ Here, the President Park Chung-hee clashed with President Carter's leadership prioritizing human rights. At that time, President Park ruled the nation with strong state-led leadership, and held that in Korean-style democracy, the universal freedom and values such as human rights of Western-style democracy could be partially restricted or withheld. However this thought was different from President Carter's idea.¹⁶¹ As such, President Carter's troop withdrawal policy had raised fears of less deterrence for South Korea.

At the same time, South Korea was unhappy with the UNC-centered security system. There was little room for South Korea to participate in operational plans and matters related to maintaining the country's security under the circumstances when the commander of the UNC held OPCON of the South Korean military. At that time, all of the UNC's operations were unilaterally led by the U.S. military.¹⁶² The complaints were more pronounced in friction between Seoul and Washington over a series of North Korea's provocations in 1968. The commander of the UNC, who held OPCON, did not respond much to the Blue House raid, but issued a Defcon 2 for the abduction of the USS Pueblo and prepared for military action. The South Korean government expressed strong dissatisfaction with the discriminatory response, protesting it to the United States.¹⁶³

After the U.S. withdrew from the Vietnam War in 1975, Indochina was communized. The fall of democracy in Indochina had been linked to North Korea's

¹⁵⁹ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 193.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. White House National Security Council, "Korea," (official memorandum, Washington, DC: White House National Security Council, 1977).

¹⁶¹ Ji-hyung Kim, "The Dismantling and Continuance of the Governing Ideology of Park Chung Hee from 1960s to 1970s : Centering round mutual Constraints of Anticommunism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy and Human Rights* 13, no. 2 (August 2013): 169–200.

¹⁶² Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 190.

¹⁶³ Yong-Sup Han, *Logic of Our National Defense* (Seoul: Parkyoungsa, 2019), 193–194.

continued provocations and claims to dismantle the UNC, causing South Korea to be gripped by serious security concerns. At that time, South Korea needed, among other things, a continued guarantee of deterrence against North Korea provided by the UNC. However, the U.S. policy to withdraw USFK and the UNC-centered security system had increased the fear and dissatisfaction of South Korea. In this context, South Korea needed institutional changes and devices to fundamentally guarantee U.S. security commitments to South Korea.

c. *U.S. Security Costs and Continued Strategic Interest on the Korean Peninsula*

The United States, which had emerged as a great power after World War I and II, formed an international political and economic order based on its overwhelming ability. Although the U.S. was fighting against Soviet-centered communist forces in the Cold War, it was playing the role of a guardian of the free democratic world and gaining hegemony outside the communist sphere. However, in the 1970s, American hegemony began to be threatened, and the American-centered international political and economic order began to falter.¹⁶⁴ In particular, the U.S. suffered a total economic crisis at the time, with the outflow of gold increasing and the U.S. dollar depreciating.¹⁶⁵

Under these circumstances, the strengthening of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War further deepened the economic crisis in the U.S. In particular, unlike the Korean War, the United States had to cover all the war expenses on its own in the Vietnam War. During the Korean War, the U.S. was able to cover some of the costs through various civil society organizations and even religious organizations. But in the case of the Vietnam War, U.S. allies were reluctant to provide war support as well as participation in the war, and even the countries that sent troops were relying on the U.S. for all material assistance resulting

¹⁶⁴ Min-seok Gong, "Hegemonic Instability: the Restoration of U.S Hegemony and the Instability of IPE Order," *National Defense Studies* 63, no. 1 (2020): 143.

¹⁶⁵ William S. Borden, "Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy," in *John F. Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Cary: Oxford University Press, 1989), 58–59.

from the dispatch.¹⁶⁶ The United States had spent more than \$240 billion on the Vietnam War, including indirect expenses.¹⁶⁷ As such, the Vietnam War further increased the burden of security costs for the U.S. which was facing an economic crisis.

The U.S. needed measures to address it. The unilateral policy of providing security to allies was forced to change in the face of the negative situation of the Vietnam War and the consequent anti-war sentiment. The United States wanted its allies to share some of the costs in security matters related to their countries. This U.S. interest was especially high regarding South Korea. Moreover, because the legitimacy of the UNC was being questioned in the international community, the United States needed an alternative not only to be able to share the burden of security costs with South Korea but also to retain the legitimization of the UNC. Nevertheless, the United States still considered the Korean Peninsula an important base for Northeast Asia.¹⁶⁸ In the Cold War confrontation, the Korean Peninsula had strategic importance as an outpost. In other words, the United States needed alternatives that would still be able to represent its strategic interests within the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the U.S. began to consider adaptations to the UNC.¹⁶⁹

2. Change in the Role of the UNC after Establishment of the CFC

On November 7, 1978, the ROK-U.S. CFC was established based on the ROK-U.S. Terms of Reference (TOR) in terms of the MAC and the CFC. This was the result of long consultations between South Korea and the United States in a series of meetings, and the institutionalization of the existing South Korea-U.S. alliance and military cooperation. Following the establishment of the CFC, the UNC handed over OPCON of South Korean troops to the CFC. This also transferred South Korea's primary defense duty from the UNC

¹⁶⁶ Tae-gyun Park, "Changes in Korean-US Relationship during the Vietnam War," *Military History* 89 (December 2013): 346.

¹⁶⁷ Jingoo Cho, "U.S. Escalation in Vietnam and the Dispatch of Korean Armed Forces to South Vietnam, 1963–1965," *Journal of National Defense Policy* 22, no. 1 (2006): 127–128.

¹⁶⁸ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 202.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 198.

to the CFC.¹⁷⁰ In the event of North Korea's violation of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC could order the CFC to deal with the violation, but the actual defense duty over South Korea was to be taken over by the CFC with OPCON.¹⁷¹ As a result, the UNC has only taken on the role of ensuring the implementation and compliance of Armistice Agreements and the provision of troops by U.N. member states in case of emergency.

3. South Korea-U.S. Combined Defense System

With the creation of the CFC, South Korea's defense system has changed from a UNC-centered defense system to a South Korea-U.S. combined defense system. The ROK-US combined defense system was organized as a NATO-type defense system.¹⁷² The NATO-type defense system takes the form of a combined command consisting of the top leaders of the participating countries. That is, the leaders of all countries participating in the organization, regardless of the differences in national power, operate the Allied Forces with equal qualifications. In addition, the NATO-type defense system has separate boards of directors which has a way of handing down operational guidelines to the combined command.¹⁷³ The CFC, which institutionalized the South Korea-U.S. combined defense system, has had a chain of command like this NATO-type defense system.

The two countries agreed to appoint a senior U.S. military officer to the post of commander of the CFC. The four-star U.S. general, a senior U.S. military officer and commander of the CFC, came to exercise OPCON over the U.S. and South Korean troops entrusted to defend the country. However, Seoul and Washington have set up a Military Committee (MC) at the top of the CFC, composed of the chairmen of the two countries' Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure combined command. As a result, the commander of the

¹⁷⁰ In-hyo Seol, "United Nations Command in Korean Peninsula : The Past and The Present," *Military History* no. 108 (September 2018): 14.

¹⁷¹ Myeongchul Lee, *An Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Security Environment on the Role of the United Nations Command* (Seoul: KIDA, 2009), 37.

¹⁷² Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 206.

¹⁷³ Byung-hyun Ryu, *ROC-U.S. Alliance and Operational Control* (Seoul: The Korean Veterans Association Security University, 2007), 80–81.

CFC came to perform its duties in accordance with the strategic instructions and guidelines given by the ROK-U.S. MC. The SCM exists again at the top of the ROK-US MC, and this SCM hands down strategic instructions and guidelines from the two Presidents, who complete the combined command structure. Thus, the CFC was an organization in which a four-star U.S. general served as commander, but guaranteed the command of the leaders of the two countries, and the commander of the CFC was assigned roles and missions in accordance with the strategic guidelines and instructions based on such command.¹⁷⁴ The Strategic Command No. 1, which was given to the CFC by the MC on August 28, 1978, emphasized the responsibility of the ROK defense and the importance of Seoul defense and ordered the mission to the commander of the CFC.¹⁷⁵

Such a combined defense system between South Korea and the U.S. meant an easing of existing asymmetric Seoul-Washington relations. Under the existing UNC-centered defense system, South Korea had little to do with its own security-related operational plans and other matters.¹⁷⁶ South Korea had to accept the UNC's guidelines unilaterally in its security policy, and the UNC moved under the direction of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, under the UNC South Korea had to carry out operations only in accordance with an operational plan established by the United States.¹⁷⁷ However, the new combined defense system had a MC as an upper body of the CFC, which included the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and senior military officials of South Korea, to draw up strategic guidelines and instructions with the U.S. side. In other words, a fundamental institutional mechanism had been put in place to more actively reflect the

¹⁷⁴ Seok-pyo Han, "Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978," (PhD's thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 198–199.

¹⁷⁵ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 209.

¹⁷⁶ Yong-Sup Han and Sang Hyuk Jeong, "Political, Economical, Military Analysis of the Wartime Operational Control Authority Transfer Issue: Theory, Evaluation, Countermeasures," *Journal of International Politics* 20, no. 1 (April 2015): 8.

¹⁷⁷ Jong Ho Yoon, "Changes of ROK-US Combined Defense System and Korea's National Security: Problems and Direction of Preparations," *Journal of National Defense Studies* 50, no. 1 (2007): 38.

situation and position of the South Korean military in its security policy.¹⁷⁸ Although the combined defense system did not completely resolve the asymmetry of South Korea-U.S. relations, it ensured South Korea's status as a relatively equal strategic partner.

C. THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's military and economic security after establishment of the CFC. Since handing over OPCON of South Korean troops to the CFC in 1978, the UNC has only taken on the role of managing compliance and implementation of the Armistice Agreement and providing armed forces of UN member states to the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency. This meant a step back from direct responsibility for South Korea's defense, and also meant that the UNC no longer had a direct connection to the country's economic development initiative. Therefore, the analysis here focuses on how the UN's role in implementing and complying with the Armistice Agreement contributes to deterrence against North Korea. Taking into account the fact that this reduced UNC role cannot be directly converted into economic value, the analysis here focuses on the strategic value provided by the provision of armed forces of UN member states in case of emergency, which is guaranteed by the UNC.

1. Assumption of Analysis

a. Armistice Agreement and Deterrence Against North Korea

This section analyzes whether the UNC had exercised deterrence against North Korea in implementing and complying with the Armistice Agreement. In fact, the Armistice Agreement itself is a secondary factor in deterrence against North Korea, rather than a military response based on existing OPCON. The military response is to prevent North Korea from carrying out military attacks by recognizing the potential damage to itself that might result. The armistice, however, forces the North to comply legally, prompting Pyongyang to abandon its threatening behavior. It is necessary to find out how these secondary elements can be linked to inhibitors.

¹⁷⁸ Young-jin Choi and Se-Hyun Shim, "From Crisis to Becoming: a Historical Study on the Formation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 203–204.

Such influence depends on the conditions of deterrence. The deterrent force that forces the other party to abandon its own action through the value judgment between the damage and the profit that accompanies any action requires some conditions for its functioning. The first condition is capability. Basically, deterrence is the result of psychological struggle that takes advantage of making threats, not execution of threats. Without the capability to implement real threats in this process, the other party can never experience anxiety, and ultimately no deterrence is established. In other words, having the capability to recognize threats basically guarantees deterrence.¹⁷⁹

The second condition of deterrence is communication. Deterrence manifested in psychological struggle presupposes interrelationships. In these interrelationships there is a cycle in which intentions and threats are conveyed, and the profit and loss calculations are made, and the reprocessed intentions and threats are re-delivered. If facts about threats against each other are not communicated or are distorted, the effect of deterrence would disappear. This is because the cycle of intent and threat itself is not established. Thus, in deterrence, the process of accurately conveying the inhibitor's intention of what action to take is important.¹⁸⁰

The last condition of deterrence is credibility. In deterrence, it is important to ensure clearly that the other party has the intention and ability to inflict costs and damage as delivered in advance if the one undertakes the acts forbidden. If one doesn't trust and underestimates the other's possible threats, it naturally lowers the cost of conducting the threatening behavior. Thus, deterrence requires essentially the capability and intention to support a threat, but above all, a process to get the other party to accept the content and possibilities of the threat.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ DaeSung Kim, "A Study on Change of North Korea's Aspects of Local Provocation: Focused on Deterrence Theory," *Korean Journal of Military Art and Science* 68, no. 2 (June 2012): 164.

¹⁸⁰ Jeongbeom Park, "Analysis of the Factors in Failure to Deter North Korea's Provocations Based on the Deterrence Theory," *Military Research* 139 (2015): 265.

¹⁸¹ DaeSung Kim, "A Study on Change of North Korea's Aspects of Local Provocation: Focused on Deterrence Theory," *Korean Journal of Military Art and Science* 68, no. 2 (June 2012): 165.

Given these conditions, the question becomes whether the Armistice Agreement had any actual capability to deter North Korea's military threats, and whether the intent to respond to those threats was effectively communicated.

The Armistice Agreement was an agreement between the two sides of the Korean War that promised to stop military threats and ban future military provocations. In fact, this agreement institutionally ensured the capability, communication, and mutual credibility by having the MAC and the NNSC as the main agents. This observations establishes an analysis assumption that the Armistice Agreement was able to curb North Korea's military provocations at a time when the possibility of military threats from the North was high.

Questions could be raised about whether the Armistice Agreement could be the only independent variable for deterrence against North Korea. Indeed, deterrence against North Korea might be derived more directly from U.S. forces based in the combined defense system at that time. Therefore, the variable of the United States is considered together in this analysis. This section looks at the variables of the U.S. and UNC in the case of North Korea's provocations and determines the influence of UNC through the Armistice Agreement.

b. UNC Assurance of Armed Forces of the UN Member States in the Event of an Emergency

This section analyzes the strategic value of the role of the UNC as a guarantee of armed forces supply in case of an emergency. This begins with the fact that there was no primary correlation between the UNC and South Korea's economic development at the time. As discussed in the prior chapter, the UNC provided direct economic aid to South Korea until 1960 for the country's post-war economic recovery and revival, but suspended aid after that.¹⁸² This vacuum in UN economic aid was filled with U.S. aid, and it also gradually changed to the form of a loan. Also, it is less important to examine the indirect impact of the UNC on South Korea's economic development. Since 1978, South Korea's

¹⁸² Jaehoon Kim, "U.S. aid to South Korea and South Korea's finance in the 1950s," *Economy and Society* 1 (December 1988): 138.

economic power had already far outstripped that of North Korea. At that time, North Korea's GNI grew steadily from \$10.2 billion in 1978 to \$15.5 billion in 1991, but its level was limited to that range. Korea's GNI, on the other hand, has continued to grow from \$53.1 billion in 1978 to \$333.7 billion in 1991.¹⁸³ As such, South Korea's economy was far superior to North Korea's.

In this sense, to analyze the economic value of the role of the UNC and its impact on the South Korean economy at that time, it is necessary to analyze the economic value of the UNC's role in the event of an emergency. However, there are limitations to this process. First of all, it is difficult to convert the exact economic value of human and intangible resources among the forces that could be deployed to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. As discussed earlier, disputes persist over accuracy in assessing and comparing military forces. There is also a limit to the access to data that can translate actual military power into economic value. Translating the economic value of the UNC's capacity to supply armed forces in the event of emergencies that never took place is even harder to gauge with objectivity. In other words, the calculation of economic value to the UNC role of providing armed forces in case of an emergency would be highly subjective.

Therefore, this section looks at strategic value rather than objective economic value for the role of UNC. The UNC's role in providing armed forces would apply in the condition that war on the Korean Peninsula recur. However, since there has been no major military attack on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, there can be no calculation of the actual role, unlike the Armistice Agreement. In this regard, this section wants to examine what strategic value the role had, although it was not realized. Based on this, the present analysis assumes the UNC's guarantee of armed forces of UN member states in case of emergency had useful strategic value for South Korea at that time.

¹⁸³ "UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregates," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Accessed September 10, 2020, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/>.

2. Reference Point of Analysis

a. *The Possibility of Military Threats From North Korea*

As discussed in the previous chapter, the possibility of North Korea's military threats reflects its threat capabilities and will, which is a probable factor in North Korea's provocations. The possibility remains a reference point in determining whether the Armistice Agreement would exercise deterrence against North Korea. Table 8 utilizes the same methodology from the previous chapter to measure North Korea's threat (again using 1968 as the baseline year), continuing the annual measures from Table 1 into the period since the establishment of the CFC in 1978. Figure 3 then displays the prospect of military threats from North Korea across both periods (before and after formation of the CFC), from 1961–1991.

Table 8. The Assessment of North Korea's Military Threats.¹⁸⁴

Year	(A) Comparison of Military Expenditure between South and North Korea (North/South)	(B) Comparison of Economic Power between South and North Korea (North/South)	(C) North Korea's Military Expenditure / North's GNI	Military Threats from North Korea		
				(D) Capability (A) x (B)	(E) Possibility (C) x (D)	Index
1968	2.65	0.48	24.40%	1.28	31.1	100.0
1979	0.91	0.20	23.55%	0.18	4.3	36.5
1980	0.85	0.22	24.00%	0.19	4.6	38.0
1981	0.85	0.20	23.82%	0.17	4.1	35.9
1982	0.76	0.19	23.82%	0.14	3.5	32.9
1983	0.81	0.18	23.45%	0.15	3.4	32.5
1984	0.81	0.17	23.42%	0.13	3.1	31.1
1985	0.80	0.17	23.05%	0.13	3.0	30.4
1986	0.79	0.17	22.59%	0.13	3.0	29.6
1987	0.75	0.15	21.75%	0.11	2.4	26.1
1988	0.61	0.11	21.46%	0.07	1.5	20.6
1989	0.51	0.10	21.28%	0.05	1.0	17.0
1990	0.51	0.09	21.56%	0.05	1.0	17.0
1991	0.47	0.08	22.49%	0.04	0.8	15.7

¹⁸⁴ Source: Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 310–323.




Figure 3. Military Threats from North Korea (1961-1991).¹⁸⁵

Based on these measures, military threats from North Korea steadily decreased after 1978. There is a relatively sharp decline between 1985 and 1988, but no particular difference appears during the overall period. This is significantly lower than the probability in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, this section looks at the cases of North Korea's actual provocations, and analyzes the effectiveness of the deterrence against the North based in these instances.

b. The UNC Forces stationed in South Korea in 1980, and to Be Provided to South Korea in Case of Emergency

This section considers the UNC's role in providing armed forces in case of an emergency. It analyzes how much power could be provided by the UN member states in the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. First of all, the type of military strength of the UNC, which had been deployed on the Korean Peninsula at that time, could be the basis for determining the difference between the potential power supply figures before and after an emergency.

¹⁸⁵ Source: Jeongwoo Lee, "The Assessment of North Korea's Conventional Military Power and the Change of Its Military Threat to South Korea," *Review of North Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (August 2014): 318.

In this period, the UNC's forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula consisted mostly of USFK and South Korean troops. In particular, in 1980, the USFK maintained 39,000 troops, led by the 2nd Infantry Division under the Eighth Army. During the Korean War, the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea reached 314,000, but most of them withdrew after the Korean War armistice, leaving only the 2nd and 7th divisions under the Eighth Army's command on the peninsula. Since then, the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea had continued as the U.S. global strategy was readjusted. In 1970, the 7th Division was withdrawn under the Nixon Doctrine, and in 1977, 3,000 more troops were withdrawn under President Jimmy Carter's policy, leaving the level of 39,000 in 1980.¹⁸⁶ In 1980, South Korea's military strength remained at the level of 600,000 troops. At that time, South Korea's military strength consisted of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine, led by 20 army infantry divisions, which were slightly less numerous than North Korea's 680,000 troops at the time.¹⁸⁷ Overall, combined USFK and South Korean troop levels on the Korean Peninsula in 1980 totaled 640,000.

Next, it is necessary to look at the overall military power of countries that promised to provide their armed forces in case of emergency. The external situation since 1978 is quite different from the external situation at the time of the Korean War armistice, and the internal opportunity cost of fulfilling the promise had also increased. Therefore, it was a situation in which the power supply itself was not guaranteed. In addition, even if the power supply was implemented in case of an emergency, the level was not certain. The present analysis uses the tangible maximum of military power that could be provided at that time. This was clearly a level that could not be realized in practice because it is the total military strength of the countries that might support South Korea. However, this calculation enables a rough estimate because it establishes the upper boundary of the range. The tangible military level in 1980 of the countries that previously supported South Korea through the UNC is as follows in Table 9.

¹⁸⁶ Gang Choi, "Inter-Korean Arms Control and the Future of USFK : Possibilities and Limits of Coexistence," *Korean Strategy Research Report* (July 2001): 23–26.

¹⁸⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1980* (Abington: Routledge, 1980), 71, <https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.nps.edu/toc/tmib20/80/1?nav=tocList>.

Table 9. Total Armed Forces of the Korean War-Participating Countries.¹⁸⁸

Australia	Belgium	Britain	Canada	Colombia	Ethiopia	France	Greece
71,011	87,900	329,204	78,646	65,800	229,500	494,730	181,500
Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Philippines	South Africa	Thailand	Turkey	
660	114,980	12,640	112,800	86050	230,800	567,000	

Obviously, these figures in the table represent troop levels far beyond what could be deployed to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. Nevertheless, the military strength of a country that promised to provide armed forces is useful in gauging the approximate figure of such a provision. For example, as a very crude approximation, if each country above would provide 5% of its military force to support South Korea in case of an emergency, this would be over 130,000 additional troops—over three times as many troops as stationed in South Korea by the USFK at that time.

3. Analysis for Military and Economic Factors

a. *The Effectiveness of the UNC's Deterrence Against North Korea through the Armistice Agreement*

Before analyzing the deterrence of the Armistice Agreement, this section examines whether the UNC's role in managing the Armistice Agreement itself met the conditions of deterrence. It checks whether the Armistice Agreement had the capability to guarantee deterrence against North Korea. It also checks whether North Korea had recognized sanctions and threats against violations of the Armistice Agreement and considered them in deciding its policy and provocation. In other words, it analyzes whether the deterrence against North Korea had been well exercised by first looking into the level of deterrence and then examining the cases of North Korea's provocations, and how the elements of the Armistice Agreement affected the process.

¹⁸⁸ Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1980* (Abington: Routledge, 1980), 71, <https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.nps.edu/toc/tmib20/80/1?nav=tocList>.

On July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed between Mark W. Clark, commander of the United Nations Command, Kim Il-sung, commander of the Korean People's Army, and Péng Déhuái, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. It was an agreement that legally suspended mutual military activities on the Korean Peninsula that had lasted for three years. The Armistice Agreement consists of a total of 5 articles and 63 clauses, which guarantees a ban on future military provocative acts and the maintenance of dialogue channels between the two sides in addition to the suspension of military hostilities.¹⁸⁹

The Armistice Agreement has a MAC and a NNSC to ensure its implementation. The MAC is a joint organization of a total of ten representatives, consisting of five representatives from the UNC and five representatives from communist countries, and serves as a communication body that discusses and resolves the issues of implementation and compliance with the Armistice Agreement.¹⁹⁰ The NNSC is an organization composed of representatives from four countries that did not participate in the Korean War and serves to maintain the Armistice Agreement along with the MAC. The initial NNSC had Czechoslovakia and Poland as communist-side delegations, and Switzerland and Sweden as the UNC-side delegations. Unlike the MAC, the NNSC is a separate independent organization, not an organization under the UNC, and is in a cooperative relationship with the MAC. When the commander of the UNC requests the NNSC to do the tasks necessary to maintain the armistice, the NNSC decides and carries out the tasks after independent judgment. That is, the Armistice Agreement had an institutional mechanism to ensure the capability, communications, and credibility to implement the Armistice Agreement by keeping the MAC and the NNSC as implementation entities. In fact, the MAC held up to hundreds of talks with the North Korean side every month from 1953 to 1991, and the

¹⁸⁹ Seong Ho Jhe, "Role of the Armistice Agreement under Korean Security Environment and Future Peace Management Regime," *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 29, no. 2 (July 2013): 24–25.

¹⁹⁰ ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Headquarters, *Manual of Military Armistice Commission* IV (Seoul: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003): 291.

NNSC has also held weekly neutral meetings once a week since the signing of the Armistice Agreement.¹⁹¹

However, these institutional mechanisms disappeared in the 1990s. When the UNC appointed a South Korean general as its chief delegate of the UNCMAC in 1991, North Korea objected that South Korea was not a party to the Armistice Agreement. Later, on December 15, 1994, North Korea completely withdrew its MAC. In addition, North Korea insisted on the uselessness of the NNSC, forcibly withdrawing the Czechoslovakian delegation on April 3, 1993, and the Polish delegation on February 28, 1995. As a result, the NNSC was halved, and all activities of the NNSC in North Korea were virtually suspended.¹⁹² As such, institutional guarantees for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement have been lost as of 1993.

The practical capability of the Armistice Agreement was not guaranteed from the beginning. This is because there was no real response or threat to the other party if it violated the Armistice Agreement. Article 2 Clause 12 of the Armistice Agreement states that “The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed.”¹⁹³ That is, the MAC and the NNSC have the authority to investigate any violation of the Armistice Agreement and consult with each other for a solution, but the handling of the case is left to the side which violates. This means that sanctions and threats from violations of the Armistice Agreement are nominal, which means that the Armistice Agreement lacks practical capability to contain North Korea.

Since the 1970s, North Korea has insisted on replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, and has insisted on direct negotiations with the United States on the replacement of

¹⁹¹ Kwang Hyun Chang, “A Study on The Revitalization of UNC based on The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control,” (PhD’s thesis, Ajou University, 2019), 67–70.

¹⁹² Ibid., 67–70.

¹⁹³ “Armistice Agreement,” United States Forces Korea, Accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf.

the Armistice Agreement.¹⁹⁴ At that time, North Korea advocated the replacement of the Armistice Agreement in connection with dismantling the UNC and completely withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea, thereby fulfilling the preconditions for communization of the Korean Peninsula. Here, the fact that North Korea attempted to replace the armistice with a peace treaty even though the Armistice Agreement lacked practical capability for deterrence suggests that Pyongyang did recognize effects of the existence of the minimum Armistice Agreement itself. In other words, North Korea was aware of the meaning of the Armistice Agreement itself and the ripple effect of violating it, so it wanted to fundamentally change it. As a result, it can be seen that the Armistice Agreement was limited in meaningfully deterring North Korea due to the lack of practical capability, although the mutual recognition of the armistice did constrain North Korea's diplomatic aims.

Since the establishment of the CFC, North Korea's provocations have been different in many ways. First of all, after the establishment of the CFC, the number of the provocation fell to about 30 by 1991.¹⁹⁵ This is a significantly small number and even smaller than the 49 provocations in 1971. However, North Korea's provocations had changed considerably in terms of the intensity and location. Previously, the intensity of provocation was relatively low, including infiltration, espionage, assassination of key figures, and armed conflict at DMZ, and the location was limited to the Korean Peninsula. The intensity became stronger in the 1980s, including the Rangoon Bombing and the KAL bombing, and the location was also expanded to the international stage.¹⁹⁶ This could be seen as a change in North Korea's policy related to provocation. As a result, the actual number of provocations decreased as the possibility of North Korea's threat decreased, but on the contrary, the intensity of provocations increased. Considering this point, even after 1978 to the first half of 1980, the deterrence was still ineffective.

¹⁹⁴ Seong Ho Jhe, "Role of the Armistice Agreement under Korean Security Environment and Future Peace Management Regime," *The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies* 29, no. 2 (July 2013): 25.

¹⁹⁵ Yoon-gyu Lee, "A Case Study on the Provocations by North Korea" *Military History* 91 (June 2014): 86.

¹⁹⁶ Sungim Jung and Bora Kim, "North Korea Provocation Against South Korea and South Korea Crisis Management," *Korean Unification Studies* 20, no. 1 (May 2016): 59.

The following review takes a look at some of the major examples of North Korean provocations from the 1980s. Through this, the review evaluates the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea in detail by understanding what North Korea's strategic intentions were behind the provocation cases. In addition, the review can also determine what the effects of the Armistice Agreement were in the process. The major examples of North Korea's provocations in 1980s include the Rangoon Bombing and the Korean Air Flight Bombing.

On October 9, 1983, North Korea's secret agents set up high-performance explosives at Aung San Cemetery in Myanmar and detonated them to carry out mass assassinations. Their aim was to kill South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, who was visiting Myanmar at the time. However, a bomb exploded before President Chun arrived at the venue, saving the president's life. But the bombing killed 17 high-ranking officials, including South Korea's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and 15 others were seriously injured. Also, four Myanmarers were killed and 32 injured. North Korea acted with the intention of confusing the South Korean government by killing the South Korean president, taking advantage of mounting democratic movements and political unrest in South Korea.¹⁹⁷ Myanmar severed diplomatic ties with North Korea after the provocation. Costa Rica, Comoros, and Western Samoa also severed diplomatic ties with North Korea in succession, and 10 other countries including Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Oman and the United Arab Emirates announced the principle of non-establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea. In addition, 25 capitalist countries, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Canada, issued an official condemnation.¹⁹⁸ In other words, North Korea had become a target of criticism not only from members of the UNC but also from Third World countries. As a result, the provocation was a tragedy in which North Korea's will to provoke was not deterred in advance. Nevertheless, the armistice

¹⁹⁷ Yoon-gyu Lee, "A Case Study on the Provocations by North Korea" *Military History* 91 (June 2014): 87–88.

¹⁹⁸ Sangsook Lee, "The Study on the Purpose and Effects of North Korean 'Rangoon bombing,'" *Discourse* 201 19, no. 3 (July 2016): 100–101.

later collected the international community's stern condemnation of the provocations, which contributed to the North's diplomatic isolation.

On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Flight 858, which departed from Baghdad to Seoul, was blown up in midair in waters off Myanmar, killing all 115 people, including 80 Korean workers returning from Iraq. Kim Seung-il and Kim Hyun-hee, North Korean agents disguised as Japanese named Shinichi Hachiya and Mayumi Hachiya, committed the attack. They left the liquid explosive PLX disguised as alcohol on the plane and blew up the fuselage. Their aim was to create social and political instability and confusion in South Korea, which had begun to outpace North Korea in all areas of politics, economy and diplomacy, and especially to prevent the 1988 Seoul Olympics from being held. After the truth of the incident was officially announced, the U.S. immediately imposed various sanctions on North Korea by labeling it a terrorist state, while Japan also banned North Korean officials from entering the country. On February 10, 1988, an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council was convened to denounce North Korea's terrorist acts.¹⁹⁹ As in the Rangoon Bombing, the South Korean government also failed to deter North Korea's willingness to provoke, but later led North Korea to a diplomatic disadvantage in the international arena.

To sum this up, it could be seen that deterrence against North Korea was limited in itself because of the lack of the actual capability to pose retaliatory threat. This lack had many sources, but clearly the Armistice Agreement was insufficient to restrain North Korea in these cases. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to say that the Armistice Agreement acted as a deterrent against North Korea in terms of decreasing the number of North Korea's provocation since 1978. In fact, because intensity of provocations had increased although its frequency had decreased, deterrence itself during the period was still not as effective as before. In other words, since the establishment of the CFC, the UNC had been less influential in exercising deterrence against North Korea. However, the Armistice Agreement helped isolate North Korea's diplomacy after a series of provocations. This

¹⁹⁹ Yoon-gyu Lee, "A Case Study on the Provocations by North Korea" *Military History* 91 (June 2014): 88.

suggests that the UNC's role in the armistice could be linked to positive contributions to the diplomatic security of South Korea.

b. Strategic Value of Providing Armed Forces of the UN Member States in Case of Emergency

This section examines if the role of the UNC served as a strategic value for South Korea, focusing on the role of the UNC in providing armed forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. This role is significant by itself, but above all, the performance of its role had to be guaranteed in order to have practical value. In other words, the role of the UNC required institutional mechanisms to support it as well as a symbolic agreement. Therefore, this section examines if the role of the UNC had strategic value for South Korea by considering the convention of the participating countries and the institutional mechanisms supporting it.

This UNC's role is based on the Washington Declaration. The Washington Declaration was a joint policy declaration issued by representatives of 16 countries participating in the Korean War in Washington, D.C., at a time when the armistice was signed on the Korean Peninsula on July 27, 1953. At that time, representatives from 16 countries shared the view that the Armistice Agreement did not include provisions in case of a recurrence of armed aggression and adopted such a joint policy declaration.²⁰⁰ The key to the Washington Declaration is that in the event of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, the 16 countries would immediately unite again to counter the aggression and restore world peace. As such, the Washington Declaration symbolically guarantees the UNC's role in providing armed forces by declaring that parties to it would re-engage in the name of the UNC at any time in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.²⁰¹

Normally, in order for a nation to use force against another country in the international community, the legitimacy of the war must be recognized internationally.

²⁰⁰ Kwan-hyun Moon, "A Study on the Korean Government's Countermeasures Based on United Nations Command Revitalization : with focus on Strategic Triangle theory," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 2020): 208.

²⁰¹ Byoung Gi Kim, "Wartime OPCON Transfer and the Change of the UNC's Role: Legal Status and Political Implications," *New Asia* 26, no. 4 (December 2019): 74.

Basically, this requires the adoption of a resolution by the U.N. Security Council. But the case of the Washington Declaration was different. The UNC, which would respond to the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, was already guaranteed international legal status by the United Nations, and the Washington Declaration, which promises to provide armed forces to the UNC, was still valid. Therefore, in the event of another war on the Korean Peninsula, the supporting powers could guarantee the deployment of their forces on the Korean Peninsula in the shortest period without separate approval from the U.N. Security Council.²⁰² The characteristic of this Washington Declaration was one institutional procedure that practically guaranteed the role of the UNC in providing armed forces.

The institutional mechanism that substantially guarantees the role of the UNC could be seen in the organization of the UNC, illustrated in Figure 4.

²⁰² Kwang Hyun Chang, Seung Woo Choi, and Sung Pyo Hong, "A Study on the Creation of the UNC' Military Strength in Case War Breaks out in the Korean Peninsula: Prospects through the Historical Context of Modern War," *Journal of National Defense Studies* 60, no. 4 (December 2017): 98.




Figure 4. The Organization of the UNC.²⁰³

First, the UNC maintains a group of liaison officers from UN member states. The Liaison Officer Group contributes to the smooth role of providing armed forces in case of emergency, as it exists to share awareness of the situation on the Korean Peninsula strengthen ties from peacetime. In particular, the Liaison Officer Group was more meaningful when all the U.N. forces that participated in the Korean War withdrew from South Korea. For background information, the status of the deployment and withdrawal of the U.N. forces that participated in the Korean War is provided in Table 10.

²⁰³ Source: Kwang Hyun Chang, “A Study on The Revitalization of UNC based on The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control,” (PhD’s thesis, Ajou University, 2019), 64.

Table 10. The Status of the UN Forces in the Korean War.²⁰⁴

Country	Date of Deployment	Date of Withdrawal	Scale of Deployment
Australia	Sep 28, 1950	Mar, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion, 1 Squadron
Belgium	Jan 31, 1951	Dec, 1954	1 Infantry Battalion
Britain	Aug 29, 1950	July, 1957	1 Infantry Brigade, Navy
Canada	Dec, 1950	Apr, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion, Navy, Air Force
Colombia	May 21, 1951	Oct, 1954	1 Infantry Battalion
Ethiopia	May 5, 1951	Oct, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion
France	Nov 29, 1950	Oct, 1953	1 Infantry Battalion
Greece	Dec 9, 1950	Aug, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion, 1 Squadron
Luxembourg	Jan 31, 1951	Dec, 1954	1 Infantry Platoon
Netherlands	Nov 23, 1950	May, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion
New Zealand	Dec 31, 1950	May, 1956	1 Infantry Battalion
Philippine	Sep 19, 1950	May, 1955	1 Infantry Battalion
South Africa	Nov 7, 1950	June, 1972	1 Infantry Battalion
Thailand	Oct, 1950	July, 1966	1 Infantry Brigade
Turkey	Nov, 1950	Dec, 1953	1 Squadron

The UNC also has a Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC) under the wing of the Operations Staff. The MNCC provides advice and cooperation on the deployment of the forces of the UNC member countries, and updates the military force levels of the UNC member states and reports them to the UNC periodically. In case of emergency, this department cooperates with the liaison teams of each member state in the scale, capability and operational standards of the units to be provided. Through this, the MNCC effectively

²⁰⁴ Source: Seok-pyo Han, “Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978,” (PhD’s thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 36.

guarantees the role of providing U.N. forces. As such, the UNC had an institutional mechanism that guaranteed its own role in providing armed forces.

The UNC also guaranteed the provision of armed forces in case of emergency by maintaining the UNC's rear base in Japan. First, the UNC's rear base was established in Jama, Japan to maintain the SOFA between the UNC and Japan when the UN Command moved from Tokyo to Seoul on July 1, 1957. The SOFA was signed between the UNC and the Japanese government on February 19, 1954, ensuring that the troops of the UNC member states could use the UNC base in Japan at will without prior permission from Japan.²⁰⁵ In other words, the rear base was created because the SOFA continued as long as the rear base of the UNC in Japan was maintained. Based on this, the forces provided by all UN member states to be deployed to the Korean Peninsula would be temporarily accommodated and waiting at the UNC's rear base before the deployment. The UNC's rear base carries out the military support missions necessary for the UNC's forces, and also supports the deployment to the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the UNC's rear base itself has served as an important institutional mechanism to substantially guarantee the UNC's military force supply.

In sum, the UNC's role in providing armed forces had provided important strategic value for South Korea. Since the establishment of the CFC in 1978 and the transfer of OPCON to the CFC, the UNC had stepped down from its direct responsibility for the defense of South Korea, but it had still held part of that responsibility through its role of providing armed forces of the UN member states in case of emergency. The impact and usefulness of this role on South Korea's economic development is very indirect and therefore difficult to weigh. In addition, it was difficult to assign an objective economic value equivalent to this. Therefore, this section tried to find out what the strategic value of the role of providing armed forces of the UN member states to South Korea in case of emergency was. As a result, this UNC's role was guaranteed by having institutional

²⁰⁵ Myeongchul Lee, *An Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Security Environment on the Role of the United Nations Command* (Seoul: KIDA, 2009), 39.

procedures and apparatus, which provided considerable strategic value to the Republic of Korea.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFC

This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's political and diplomatic security since the establishment of the CFC. It analyzes the stated role of the UNC and value that the symbolic meaning of the UNC in the international community had in South Korea's internal and external environment. However, it is not easy to find a connection between the UNC and political security. First of all, the stated role of the UNC was to block the external variables of North Korea, leaving little room for intervention in the inherent political situation in South Korea. Also, the symbolic meaning of the UNC at the time was clearly divided from the symbolic meaning of the United States following the transfer of OPCON, further distancing itself from the domestic situation in South Korea. As a result, the UNC at this time had nothing to do with South Korea's domestic political security. In fact, the domestic political changes in South Korea in the 1980s were significant. This is because the authoritarian political system, which lasted about 30 years after the Korean War armistice, had been replaced by a democratic political system. The new government, which had emerged since the transition to democracy, further cemented the value of democracy that had spread among the public, although it was a branch of existing ruling forces. Judging that the UNC's influence on this political situation was minimal, this section focuses on the UNC's impact on South Korea's diplomatic security.

1. Assumption of Analysis: Changes in the Diplomatic Horizons of South Korea and North Korea

This section analyzes the impact of the UNC on South Korea's diplomatic security during the period from the establishment of the CFC in 1978 to when North Korea began to neutralize the UNC in 1991. The UNC, created by the United Nations resolution during the Korean War, had carried out the functions of maintaining peace and resolving disputes as stipulated in the U.N. Charter. But the UNC also did more than that. The UNC performed a function of providing international support and collective justification on the one hand

and confirming wrongdoing on the other.²⁰⁶ In other words, the UN and the UNC functioned as a diplomatic venue and means for South and North Korea to justify their regime. In this regard, the UNC could be seen as highly related to South Korea's diplomatic posture.

Unlike the period before the CFC was established, the UNC no longer held OPCON over South Korean troops. This means there is less probability that the UNC can intervene in South Korea's diplomatic autonomy based on the existing security-autonomous exchange model (discussed in the prior chapter). However, given that the UNC was the venue and means of diplomatic confrontation, it is possible to assess the UNC's impact on the expansion of South Korea's diplomatic horizons, to confirm whether solidarity of the international community's support through the ideal value of the UNC had affected the expansion of South Korea's diplomatic scope. On the other hand, it is noted that the role that the UNC had played since the Korean War presupposes external variables such as North Korea. This suggests that an analysis of North Korea's diplomacy could also be used to assess the relative growth level of South Korea's diplomacy. In other words, it is possible to analyze the relative level of diplomatic development in South Korea by comparing how the UNC had affected changes in North Korean diplomacy as well.

Since 1978, diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula had shown a different aspect. South Korea had achieved a de-ideologicalization of diplomacy by expanding diplomacy with communist countries. South Korea had also diversified its diplomacy by making steady progress with Third World countries. Most strikingly, South Korea increased its diplomatic presence in the international community by hosting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. On the other hand, North Korea had been relatively isolated. North Korea had not completely deviated from the framework of ideological and camp diplomacy, and had faced some restrictions on its diplomatic relations with existing Third World countries and non-aligned countries. North Korea, which suffered a relative diplomatic inferiority compared to South Korea, further deepened its diplomatic isolation

²⁰⁶ Keun-sik Kim, "North Korean Diplomacy Towards the United Nations: Before and After UN Membership," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 41, no. 4 (December 2001): 99.

following disintegration of communist rule in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Taking this context into account, the analysis examines how the UNC itself had affected the expansion of South Korean diplomacy and the isolation of North Korean diplomacy.

2. Reference Point of Analysis: The Diplomatic Status of South Korea and North Korea before 1978

In comparing and analyzing the diplomatic horizons of South Korea and North Korea since 1978, it is necessary to confirm the international situation at the time and the level of diplomacy between Seoul and Pyongyang before then. First, the representative feature of the international situation at that time was world detente. The Cold War confrontation, which had lasted until the 1960s, had begun to warm by early 1970. First, President Richard Nixon began to seek to improve relations with China after he took office in 1969. At that time, the United States sought to achieve a new balance of power in its favor, taking advantage of some fragmentation of the communist camp in Asia after the Sino-Soviet border dispute. By recognizing China as a member of the international community and improving relations, the U.S. sought to ease tensions in Asia and gain favorable help in resolving the Indochina conflict at that time.²⁰⁷ These attempts led to China's replacement of Taiwan in the status of a permanent member of the United Nations in October 1971 and President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. The U.S. then pushed for better relations with the Soviet Union. The U.S. sought to change its arms race and its consumptive competition with the Soviet Union, to ease the resulting international tension. This change resulted in the summit between the U.S. and Soviet Union in Moscow in May 1972 and the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969, which later led to various agreements aimed at preventing potential armed conflicts between the two countries.²⁰⁸ As such, the early 1970s was a time when the Cold War between the camps entered a mood of reconciliation.

²⁰⁷ Seok-pyo Han, "Changes to the ROK-US Military Command Structure, 1971–1978," (PhD's thesis, Seoul University, 2013), 37–38.

²⁰⁸ Chaesung Chun, "Structure of Global Detente in the 1960s and 1970s: Changing Policy Initiatives in Europe and East Asia," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 45, no. 3 (September 2005): 50–51.

In this atmosphere of the times, the scope of diplomacy of South Korea and North Korea was also expanding. First, to assess the visible level of diplomacy between South Korea and North Korea, the status of diplomatic ties and membership in international organizations under the United Nations as of 1978 is provided in Table 11 and Figure 5.

Table 11. The Status of Diplomatic Ties of South and North Korea in 1978.²⁰⁹

	Diplomatic Ties with South Korea	Diplomatic Ties with North Korea	Diplomatic Ties with South and North Korea
Total	104	93	53
Asia	21	21	15
America	27	6	5
Europe	20	18	9
Middle East	11	11	4
Africa	25	37	20




Figure 5. The Status of Diplomatic Ties of South and North Korea in 1978.

²⁰⁹ Adapted from “Status of Establishing Diplomatic Relations of South Korean and North Korea,” ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed October 22, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_4181/contents.do.

Table 12. The Status of Membership in International Organizations.²¹⁰

The Name of Organization	South Korea	North Korea
World Health Organization (WHO)	1949	1973
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)	1949	1977
Universal Postal Union (UPU)	1949	1974
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	1950	1974
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	1952	1975
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	1952	1977
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	1955	-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	1955	-
International Development Association (IDA)	1961	-
International Finance Corporation (IFC)	1964	-
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)	1967	-
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)	1956	1975
International Maritime Organization (IMO)	1962	1986
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	1967	1980
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	1979	1974
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	1978	1986
UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)	1957	1987
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	1957	1974
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)	1954	1992
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	1965	1973

These various data show that South Korea's diplomatic activity has been ahead of North Korea's diplomatic activity since even before the Korean War.

²¹⁰ Adapted from "Status of North and South Korea's Accession to International Organizations," ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed October 22, 2020, http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_3874/view.do?seq=346131.

However, a microanalysis of the diplomatic situation on the Korean Peninsula is needed to more accurately determine the level of diplomacy of South Korea and North Korea at the time in question. In the early 1970s, South Korea and North Korea were influenced by the global trend of detente, and made changes in their relations through the first inter-Korean talks and the 7·4 joint statement, a milestone since the establishment of the divided regime. Ironically, however, South Korea and North Korea were keen on diplomatic competition with each other at the time.²¹¹ In the 1960s, North Korea began to promote friendly relations through diversification diplomacy based on the principle of peaceful coexistence with countries with different social systems as well as the communist camp.²¹² North Korea began to pursue the globalization of its foreign policy in the 1970s to develop friendly and cooperative relations with all countries around the world.

North Korea also changed its existing anti-U.N. policy.²¹³ Previously, North Korea had been hostile toward the United Nations. Not only did the United Nations play a decisive role in the birth of the South Korean government, North Korea and the United Nations fought each other during the Korean War, and South Korea maintained its lead at the United Nations until the 1960s due to the leading U.S. position. However, since the 1960s, a large number of newly independent and non-aligned countries joined the UN, causing the U.S. its diplomatic status in the UN to weaken.²¹⁴ In 1971, when China won a permanent seat at the UN, North Korea gradually began to actively participate in the UN.²¹⁵ North Korea's active stance toward the United Nations was accompanied by expanding international organizations' participation as of 1973, and consequently strengthening its position. Nevertheless, North Korea's diplomacy was practically limited to diplomacy with the communist camp and non-aligned countries.

²¹¹ Jong-Dae Shin, "Inter-Korean Diplomatic Competition and the June 23 Declaration," *Review of North Korean Studies* 22, no. 3 (December 2019): 204–205.

²¹² ROK Ministry of Unification, *Collection of Materials for the Congress of Korean Workers' Party II* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1988), 96–98.

²¹³ Kyu Sup Chung, "Foreign and Unification Policy of North Korea in the 1980s," *Review of North Korean Studies* 7, no. 1 (May 2004): 9.

²¹⁴ Chi-young Park, *United Nations Political Theory* (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1994), 87.

²¹⁵ Jong-Dae Shin, "Inter-Korean Diplomatic Competition and the June 23 Declaration," *Review of North Korean Studies* 22, no. 3 (December 2019): 205.

At that time, South Korea had maintained its foreign policy stance to deter North Korea from entering international organizations and to isolate the North from the international community. However, under the international situation of the 1970s, South Korea could no longer block North Korea from entering the international community, and could not continue to gain an edge over North Korea at the United Nations and other international organizations.²¹⁶ On June 23, 1973, President Park Chung-hee issued a special declaration on foreign policy for peaceful unification, bringing about a shift in foreign policy. The core content of the declaration, called the 6·23 Declaration, was to recognize North Korea's true identity, advocating North Korea's participation in international organizations, simultaneous entry of the two Koreas to the U.N., and diplomacy on reciprocal equality with the communist regime in order to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and promote peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.²¹⁷ Since the 6·23 Declaration, South Korea enjoyed certain achievements in establishing diplomatic ties with non-aligned countries such as India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal and Burma, and had also established diplomatic ties with Finland and Indonesia, which were on a pro-communist diplomatic line. However, relations had not improved significantly except for indirect trade, and while North Korea officially joined the non-aligned movement at a meeting in Peru in August 1975, South Korea was denied membership and suffered a diplomatic setback.²¹⁸ In sum, by the late 1970s, South Korea was numerically ahead of North Korea in diplomatic activity, but was relatively behind in practical diplomatic competition.

3. Analysis for Diplomatic Factors

This section analyzes how the UNC is linked to the expansion of South Korea's diplomatic horizon. South Korea expanded its diplomatic reach during the 1980s. South Korea practically achieved the de-ideologicalization of diplomacy based on the 6·23 Declaration through improved relations with China in the 1980s. Also, South Korea had

²¹⁶ Ibid., 220.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 201.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 220–221.

expanded its diplomacy with Third World countries. Meanwhile, South Korea successfully hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which meant an unprecedented diplomatic golden age. This section looks at how the UNC had affected this series of changes.

Until the 1960s, South Korea's diplomacy was dependent on the United States, and reflected anti-communist ideology.²¹⁹ At a time when the Cold War confrontation was solid, such ideological diplomacy exerted its influence. However, South Korea's ideological diplomacy gradually began to be on the defensive as the entry of third world countries and North Korea's entry into the international community became more active. To overcome this situation, South Korea announced its de-ideologicalization of diplomacy through the 6·23 Declaration in 1973. Nevertheless, the 6·23 declaration did not bring tangible results to South Korea soon.

The de-ideologicalization of South Korean diplomacy began in earnest through improved relations with China. South Korea had attempted to improve relations with China in earnest since the late 1970s. In December 1978, when China adopted a policy centered on economic development through the 11th Conference of the Communist Party of China, the possibility in economic trade with South Korea was opened.²²⁰ Based on this, South Korea had gained momentum to improve relations with China. However, South Korea tried to achieve results in non-political areas such as economics, humanities and sports first, judging that it could not improve political relations from the beginning due to different ideological lines.²²¹ Such efforts also resulted in the establishment of a task force for Chinese affairs in the South Korean government to collect information related to China at the time. China had also shown desire for improving relations with South Korea. Since

²¹⁹ Bong-Jun Ko, "Korea's Diplomacy in the First Half of the 1980s: the Advent of Complex Realist Security Policies," *The Journal of Political Science and Communication* 23, no. 2 (June 2020): 137–138.

²²⁰ Jung-mi Cha, "The Interactions between State and Non-State Diplomacy of South Korea in the Beginning of the South Korea and China relations in 1980s : based on the analysis on South Korea's diplomatic documents from 1980 through 1986," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 58, no. 1 (March 2018): 17.

²²¹ Liubaoquan and Guanliang, "A Study on South Korea's Efforts to Improve Relations with China," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 48 (February 2018): 647.

1981, China had allowed Chinese diplomats to contact South Korean diplomats at diplomatic gatherings hosted by third countries.²²²

North Korea's opposition to the diplomatic change between South Korea and China was severe. When Kim Il-sung visited Beijing in September 1982, North Korea strongly protested trade between South Korea and China, prompting China to take formal regulatory measures. On September 25, 1982, China, along with Israel and South Africa, imposed a ban on indirect trade with South Korea.²²³ But this diplomatic disconnect was mitigated in the process of resolving the incident in which a Chinese civil aircraft was hijacked and made an emergency landing in South Korea in May 1983. In the course of dealing with the case, consultations between the two governments were inevitable, the first official diplomatic contact since the Korean War. As such, the incident served as an opportunity for direct negotiations and dialogue between South Korea and China, and to begin a process to improve bilateral relations that has continued since then.

In the 1980s, Korea achieved not only diplomatic de-ideologicalization but also diplomatic diversification. South Korea had newly established diplomatic ties with countries in Central and South America and Africa, and sought to further strengthen its diplomacy with Arab countries. The efforts were prompted by the diplomatic rivalry with North Korea, which at the time had been keen on improving its diplomacy with third-world and non-aligned nations. In fact, in the 1980s, South Korea made diplomatic relations with 32 Latin American countries, excluding Cuba, and signed science and technology agreements with many of them.²²⁴ Also, President Chun Doo-hwan made his first trip to Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon and Senegal, and expanded diplomatic ties in Africa, with nine African leaders visiting South Korea. Moreover, at a time when the status of Arab countries

²²² Sangsook Lee, "The Study on the Purpose and Effects of North Korean 'Rangoon bombing,'" *Discourse* 201 19, no. 3 (July 2016): 91–92.

²²³ Sung-chul Yang and Sung-hak Kang, *North Korea's Foreign Policy* (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1995), 246.

²²⁴ The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, *Korean Diplomacy 60 Years: 1948–2008* (Seoul: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2009), 86.

was strengthened by the booming crude oil exports, South Korea promoted more active pro-Arab policies to promote exchanges with various Arab countries.²²⁵

At that time, the peak of South Korean diplomacy was achieved through the hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The 1986 Asian Games was the largest ever, with 4,839 athletes from 27 countries participating, an opportunity that brought countries around the world, including those in both the West and the Communist camps, have a strong affinity for South Korea.²²⁶ The 1988 Seoul Olympics also marked the largest-ever Olympics in history at the time of the event, while the 1980 Moscow Olympics and 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were half-Olympics in a standoff between the communist camp and the free camp, and this was also an opportunity to further improve South Korea's international status and image.²²⁷

Above all, the process of hosting these international events required considerable diplomatic power. The renewed Cold War atmosphere following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was projected into the competition to host the Olympics, and there was an official and unofficial obstruction of the communist camp led by the Soviet Union to prevent South Korea from hosting the Olympics. In particular, South Korea, located on the Cold War front, was not attractive for hosting the Olympics amid heightened international tensions. However, South Korea was eventually able to win the bid based on solid U.S. security commitments with the support of IOC members from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East who insisted on hosting in developing countries.²²⁸ The decision to host the Asian Games came two months after the decision to host the Olympics.²²⁹ In the process of hosting the Asian Games, renewed international tensions

²²⁵ Ibid., 483.

²²⁶ Joonseok Yang, "Examining How Seoul Won the 1986 Asian Games Bid in 1981: Focusing on Bidding Competition with Pyongyang and Baghdad," *Culture and Politics* 7, no. 3 (September 2020): 176.

²²⁷ Myongsob Kim and Joonseok Yang, "The Political and Diplomatic History of the Seoul Olympic Bid: How Did Seoul Win the Bid in 1981?," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 54, no. 4 (December 2014): 272.

²²⁸ Ibid., 296–297.

²²⁹ Joonseok Yang, "Examining How Seoul Won the 1986 Asian Games Bid in 1981: Focusing on Bidding Competition with Pyongyang and Baghdad," *Culture and Politics* 7, no. 3 (September 2020): 177.

were also negatively affecting the atmosphere. Moreover, the Cold War confrontation was stronger as South Korea was competing with North Korea for hosting the Asian Games. However, South Korea was able to take advantage of its successful bid to host the Seoul Olympics. In addition, South Korea was able to confirm its bid for the Asian Games with the support of members of the AGF in the Middle East, just like the process of hosting the Olympics.²³⁰

As such, since 1978, South Korea's diplomacy had shown a different development from the previous period. Behind this diplomatic development was the changing international environment at the time. Above all, however, the limitations of existing ideological diplomacy and South Korea's leading efforts to overcome it were the main sources of change. South Korea's position at the UN gradually decreased in the 1970s due to North Korea's diplomatic progress with a non-aligned countries, and calls to dismantle the UNC raised doubts about the legality of the UNC itself. This also meant that the role of the UN and UNC, which had been rallying collective legitimacy and support from the international community, was further restricted. Against this backdrop, diplomatic competition with North Korea had raised the need for South Korea to break away from the existing ideological diplomatic framework. Therefore, South Korea attempted to de-idealize its diplomacy by improving its relations with China, and to gain a diplomatic advantage by expanding its diplomacy with the Third World and non-aligned countries. Such efforts also led to the hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. As a result, these advances resulted from a Korean-led effort, and the impact of the UN and UNC was limited.

On the contrary, there is a different correlation between the UNC and North Korea's diplomatic isolation. Since 1978, North Korea's diplomacy had been defensive. North Korea's diplomatic influence had narrowed as non-aligned state diplomacy had lost its momentum and communist countries had taken revisionist steps. Under these circumstances, North Korea's bold provocations to South Korea generated international criticism that isolated North Korea diplomatically, and its diplomatic isolation crucially

²³⁰ Ibid., 204–205.

intensified when the communist political system collapsed in the late 1980s. The UNC existed in the background of these series of events.

At first, North Korea stuck to its anti-U.N. foreign policy. This is because North Korea was a party to the conflict with the UNC during the Korean War, and after the Korean War, the united support of the United Nations was directed only toward South Korea. Therefore, North Korea had rejected the existence of the United Nations and UNC, turning to a communist foreign policy dependent on China and the Soviet Union. However, as the conflict between China and the Soviet Union led to division on the communist camp in the 1960s, North Korea tried to improve relations with the Third World countries while using Juche foreign policies. In the meantime, in the 1970s, North Korea expanded its diplomatic horizons by promoting the globalization of foreign policy and taking an active stance toward the United Nations, riding on the changes in the international community. Nevertheless, North Korea's diplomacy remained largely in the middle of communist and non-aligned policies.²³¹

In the 1980s, North Korea became defensive throughout its diplomacy when its non-aligned diplomacy lost momentum. North Korea's diplomatic support base began to falter as the non-aligned countries, which North Korea had placed importance on in terms of diplomacy, became divided. In fact, the non-aligned movement wanted to resist both NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, but many of its members had virtually allied relations with powerful countries. Under these circumstances, serious conflicts occurred between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, and a full-fledged internal division occurred in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Member countries had been divided over the legality and support of Soviet actions. In response, North Korea appealed for unity in the non-aligned movement to protect its diplomatic support base, and made efforts to invite its members and to host international conferences.²³² Nevertheless, North Korea's efforts could not fundamentally address the limitations of the non-aligned

²³¹ Kyu Sup Chung, "Studies of North Korea's Foreign Policy including South Korea: Accomplishments and Implications," *Review of North Korean Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 2010): 7.

²³² Kyu Sup Chung, "Foreign and Unification Policy of North Korea in the 1980s," *Review of North Korean Studies* 7, no. 1 (May 2004): 18–19.

movement, and North Korea suffered serious losses in its overall diplomacy as the non-aligned movement lost its effectiveness.

Intensifying the North's diplomatic isolation was its bold provocation, including the Rangoon Bombing in 1983 and the Korean Air Flight Bombing in 1987. The international community's criticism was directed to North Korea after Myanmar's investigative authorities revealed that the North Korean government was directly involved in the terrorist attack on Aung San in Myanmar. Ten countries, including France and Australia, as well as Myanmar, had expressed the principle of non-establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea, while 25 capitalist countries, including the United States and Japan, had issued official statements of condemnation.²³³ The South Korean government had also appealed for international support by calling for punitive action against North Korea on the agenda of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.²³⁴ A negative image of North Korea in the international community was further deepened by the Korean Air Flight Bombing in 1987. In the wake of the incident, the U.S. has designated North Korea as a terrorist state every year since January 1988, and the international community, which shared strategic values with the U.S., had increasingly ruled out relations with North Korea. In other words, North Korea had to bear several disadvantages, including increased diplomatic isolation.²³⁵

The collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s had a decisive impact on North Korea's diplomatic isolation. After the split between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, North Korea pursued Juche foreign policy. Nevertheless, North Korea's diplomacy in general was based on support from the communist camp, such as the Soviet Union and China. North Korea is geographically bordering China and the Soviet Union, and the absolute influence of China and the Soviet Union in establishing a regime in North Korea and historical experience such as the Korean War had tied its diplomacy to the variables of

²³³ Sangsook Lee, "The Study on the Purpose and Effects of North Korean 'Rangoon bombing,'" *Discourse* 201 19, no. 3 (July 2016): 100–10.

²³⁴ The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, *Korean Diplomacy 60 Years: 1948–2008* (Seoul: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2009), 177–178.

²³⁵ Kyu Sup Chung, "Foreign and Unification Policy of North Korea in the 1980s," *Review of North Korean Studies* 7, no. 1 (May 2004): 34.

China-Soviet relations.²³⁶ However, the revisionist trend was strengthened in the communist camp as China pushed for reform and opening policies in the late 1970s and Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union also pushed for reform and opening policies in the mid-1980s, which led to changes in the political systems of Eastern European communist countries in the late 1980s.²³⁷ In response, North Korea still emphasized the superiority of its socialist system, and North Korea vowed to stick to communism, trying to counter this trend of change.²³⁸ But North Korea's position did not prevent the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, after which North Korea completely lost its international support base.

Since 1978, North Korea had been on the defensive diplomatically, unlike South Korea. The second Cold War and the division of the non-aligned movement caused considerable losses in North Korea's diplomacy, and North Korea's bold provocations caused its diplomatic isolation. Crucially, the collapse of the communist bloc further deepened North Korea's diplomatic isolation. Considering how the changes of the international situation had forced North Korea to alter its diplomatic tactics, there were fundamental limitations of North Korea's communist and non-aligned diplomacy.

In this process, the UN played a role in rallying international condemnation and criticism against North Korea's provocations; the Armistice Agreement, and the role of the UNC, also added to North Korea's barbaric image. North Korea's diplomatic starting point stemmed from the inertial role and presence of the UN and the UNC. The position and historical experience of the UN and the UNC on Korean Peninsula limited North Korea's diplomacy to the scope of communist and non-aligned diplomacy. In this respect, the UN and the UNC had had an indirect impact on North Korea's diplomatic inferiority.

In sum, the UNC had an indirect impact on promoting South Korea's diplomatic security. The impact was made by relatively creating a diplomatic dominance in South

²³⁶ Kyu Sup Chung, "Studies of North Korea's Foreign Policy including South Korea: Accomplishments and Implications," *Review of North Korean Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 2010): 9.

²³⁷ Yeong-chul Jung, "North Korean Diplomacy in Breakthroughs and Negotiations," *History to Open Tomorrow* 42, (March 2011): 51–52.

²³⁸ *Rodong Newspaper*, January 1, 1989.

Korea through its influence on North Korea's diplomatic isolation rather than its impact on Seoul's expanding diplomatic horizons. At that time, South Korea's expansion of its diplomatic horizon was based on a foreign policy shift and state-led efforts stemming from diplomatic competition with North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea's diplomatic isolation was the result of the vicious circle between the limits of the communist and non-aligned diplomacy and North Korea's provocations.

The UN and the UNC influenced North Korea to establish the starting point for diplomacy. Also, the UN and UNC played a role in gathering international condemnation of North Korea since provocations. As a result, the UN and the UNC had made indirect contributions to North Korea's diplomatic isolation since 1978, which could be said to have tilted the diplomatic balance of the Korean Peninsula in favor of South Korea.

E. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNC ON SECURITY IN SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CREATION OF THE CFC

After the establishment of the CFC in 1978, the UNC had a limited impact on South Korea's military security. The creation of the CFC reduced the role of the UNC to the management of the Armistice Agreement and the role of forces provider in case of emergency. Given the UNC's role in managing compliance with the Armistice Agreement, the UNC was involved in the defense of South Korea in the form of forcing North Korea to abide by the bilateral agreement. However, North Korea continued to make provocations against South Korea, ignoring the Armistice Agreement, and the intensity of the provocations became even stronger. This limitation was due to the fact that the Armistice Agreement itself was a pure formal agreement that did not have the practical threat capability to cause any of its parties to suppress their actions. The Armistice Agreement failed to show any practical deterrence against North Korea, enabling only a follow-up response, such as condemning North Korea's provocations.

On the other hand, the UNC's role as forces provider in case of an emergency was of strategic value. Assuming the economic damage that South Korea could suffer in case of emergency, such as the second Korean War, the UNC's role in ensuring the provision of forces could have considerable economic value. However, the objective evaluation of

these roles is limited, and in addition, the role of providing forces could not be accurately evaluated because there has been no recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. So this analysis judged the value of the UNC roughly by whether it could guarantee the performance of its role. The UNC ordinarily had been organizing relevant departments within the organization to ensure the role of providing multinational forces, and had maintained a rear base in Japan. This was a significant strategic value for South Korea as it guaranteed the role of providing forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency.

The UNC's impact on South Korea's political security had been limited in its analysis. The UNC's changed role after the creation of the CFC was based on the premise of external threats, as it was not directly linked to South Korea's domestic variables. Also, the transfer of OPCON held by the UNC to the CFC had disconnected the possibility of UNC involvement in domestic affairs in South Korea.

The UNC had some positive effects on South Korea's diplomatic security. The UNC had a relatively indirect impact on isolating North Korea's diplomacy, rather than directly affecting Seoul's diplomatic promotion. The historical experience and role of the UN history since the Korean War had been inertial, prompting North Korea's diplomacy to focus on the communist camp and non-aligned countries. North Korea had made diplomatic initiatives since the 1970s, pushing for the globalization of diplomacy, but it had been unable to completely break away from its existing communist camp and non-aligned diplomatic lines. North Korea's diplomacy had been put on the defensive as international changes had turned against the communist and non-aligned camps. In the process, North Korea continued to make provocations, and the UN and the UNC further obstructed its diplomatic offensive by rallying international condemnation of the North's provocations. Then, the collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1980s decisively isolated North Korea's diplomacy. In this regard, the UNC played an indirect positive role in South Korea's diplomatic security.

Altogether, the UNC did not have a direct impact on South Korea's military security after the creation of the CFC, but had guaranteed potential strategic value and contributed to the formation of a relative diplomatic dominance for South Korea.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

This thesis examined the impact of the UNC on South Korea's comprehensive security from the Korean War armistice in 1953 to the time when North Korea began to neutralize the UNC in earnest in 1991. The analysis was conducted by dividing this time frame into two periods, before and after the creation of the CFC in 1978. After the creation of the CFC, the UNC handed over OPCON of South Korean troops to the CFC, meaning the UNC's role was reduced from South Korea's direct defense to managing the Armistice Agreement and to ensuring the provision of armed forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency.

This study extended the scope of South Korea's security to include not only military security but also physical economic security and non-physical political and diplomatic security areas. This enabled the thesis to go beyond the limits of existing research focused solely on military security.

The thesis analysis was organized according to the two periods before and after the establishment of the CFC in 1978 and the physical and non-physical security standards. The following sections summarize the conclusions in each of these categories.

1. The UNC's Impact on South Korean Military and Economic Security before the Establishment of the CFC

At a time when the UNC had OPCON over the South Korean military, this thesis has found that the UNC had a limited positive impact on the South Korean defense. During the period, the UNC prevented the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula by curbing North Korea's massive military attacks, but failed to completely curb North Korea's indirect infiltration and the outbreak of armed conflict. After the Korean War armistice, North Korea provoked in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in the late 1960s. If one looks at North Korea's intentions behind the provocations, it was the communization of the Korean Peninsula. The plan was to use violent mechanisms to confuse South Korean society, and to communize South Korea.

Nevertheless, unlike the Korean War, North Korea's provocations could only include indirect infiltration and local armed conflict. Also, deterrence against North Korea was based on a changing balance of national power between South Korea and North Korea. When North Korea had its own competitive edge by maintaining a relatively equal balance of national power with South Korea, the North intended to penetrate deeper into South Korean society and prepare for an all-round communization, but this boldness had diminished once the national power gap began to widen. As a result, the UNC had suppressed the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, but had not been able to completely curb North Korea's provocations. Also, the UNC's deterrence had been linked to South Korea's growing national power, affecting North Korea's provocations.

The thesis has found that the UNC had a positive impact on South Korea's economic security during the period. From the end of the Korean War until 1960, the UNC provided direct economic aid to restore and revive the South Korean economy devastated by the Korean War, and guaranteed foreign capital assistance. Most of the foreign capital was equivalent to U.S. capital and the U.S. initiative in the UNC guaranteed the U.S. aid. This aid was mainly in the form of military aid, which also meant a commitment to South Korea to deter North Korea. With such economic aid from the United Nations and the United States, South Korea was able to achieve economic recovery, and based on security support it was able to divert limited national resources to economic development. This became the important basis of the rapid growth of the South Korean economy, which led to the nation's growing national power. The positive impact of the UNC on South Korea's economic security is of high importance, given that South Korea's growing national power had served as a stepping stone to complement deterrence against North Korea and expand Seoul's diplomacy in the future.

2. The UNC's Impact on South Korean Political and Diplomatic Security before the Establishment of the CFC

On the other hand, this thesis has found that the UNC's influence on South Korea's political and security during the period was negative. At that time, the UNC failed to guarantee South Korea's political democratization and political stability as a passive bystander. The April 19 Revolution in South Korea occurred when the first administration,

which emerged as a symbol of democracy, was virtually consolidated into an authoritarian regime. This was a self-sustaining move that required the implementation of democracy. But at the time, the South Korean government planned to mobilize military force to suppress it, and the UNC approved it. This was the result of turning a blind eye to domestic demands for the implementation of democracy. The April 19 Revolution opened a gap in democratization in South Korean society, but soon led to the May 16 military coup, and the new authoritarian regime replaced the prior authoritarian regime. In a military coup in which some of South Korea's military power was mobilized, the UNC did not play an active role in curbing it, which can be seen as the UNC's passive sympathy for the reversal of democracy. As a result, the UNC was not completely free from the political instability of South Korea, where democratic reversals continued at the time.

This thesis has found that there had also been some negative results in the correlation between South Korea's diplomatic security and the UNC. First of all, the UNC held OPCON over South Korean troops and the UNC was primarily responsible for the defense of South Korea. However, there was a leading U.S. role behind the UNC, which meant that the UNC-centered defense system was actually a U.S.-led security system. In this regard, the UNC could be seen as a channel for U.S. restrictions on South Korea's autonomy in return for being responsible for the country's security. Before and after the Korean War Armistice Agreement, President Rhee Syngman refused to coexist with North Korea and pursued a strong diplomatic policy toward the reunification by forces. However, the United States limited that policy due to the opportunity costs that such a foreign policy could cause. In the late 1960s, President Park Chung-hee conceived the APATO, a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region, but this was also constrained by the U.S. due to the burden of security costs and indifference. Meanwhile, the U.S. pushed for a unilateral solution in the process of dealing with a series of North Korean provocations in 1968, and later pushed ahead with unilateral policies such as Nixon Doctrine, the withdrawal of USFK and the U.S.-China detente, prompting Seoul to passively adjust its foreign policy. South Korea's active diplomacy and autonomy could not play an independent role, although it was also provided with benefits in return for negotiations with

the United States. Therefore, this thesis has found that the UNC was a facet of the security structure that imposed restrictions on South Korea's diplomatic autonomy.

3. The UNC's Impact on South Korean Military and Economic Security after the Establishment of the CFC

Since the establishment of the CFC in 1978, the UNC had sought to maintain stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula in the role of managing the Armistice Agreement and maintaining the capacity for providing armed forces of the UN member states in case of emergency. This was not an actual military force, but a mutual agreement between adversaries and a potential guarantee of military power to take responsibility for the defense of South Korea. However, it shows that the level of deterrence against North Korea had been limited. Most of all, North Korea's provocations continued even after 1978. Although the number of provocations had decreased, the intensity had increased. Basically, the effectiveness of deterrence through military response was suspect.

In addition, if the role of the UNC is taken into account, the deterrence of the Armistice Agreement itself was also not effective. In particular, this result can be attributed to the fact that the Armistice Agreement itself is a pure form of agreement that does not have the capability to pose a physical sanction to the other party's behavior. The Armistice Agreement could be a means to criticize North Korea in a follow-up way, but there was a limit to preventing violations preemptively. In other words, the relationship between the UNC's role in the Armistice Agreement and its deterrence was not close.

On the other hand, this thesis has found that the role of the UNC to provide armed forces of the UN member states in case of an emergency was of strategic value. First of all, strategic value was the alternative influence emerging insofar as the objective correspondence and evaluation of economic value for the role was limited. The thesis evaluated the UNC role through the guarantee of implementation, as the effectiveness could not be fully assessed because the war did not recur on the Korean Peninsula. The UNC was equipped with institutional procedures and apparatus, such as organizations within the UNC and maintaining rear bases, to ensure the implementation of its role. In

other words, the role in providing armed forces of the UN member states in case of an emergency was a significant strategic value for Korea.

4. The UNC's Impact on South Korean Political and Diplomatic Security after the Establishment of the CFC

The UNC's impact on South Korea's political security was limited in its analysis. Since the establishment of the CFC, there had been little connection between the UNC and South Korea's domestic variables as the reduced role of the UNC had been limited only to external threats. Furthermore, the transfer of OPCON also replaced the symbolic meaning of the U.S. initiative within the UNC in domestic affairs with the CFC. In this context, the analysis of the role of the UNC on South Korea's political security was omitted.

This thesis found that the UNC had some positive influence on Korea's diplomatic security. The impact was more on North Korea's diplomatic isolation than on South Korea's diplomatic expansion. The UNC's partial contribution to deepening North Korea's diplomatic isolation had ensured South Korea's diplomatic dominance. After the Korean War, North Korea chose a diplomatic direction emphasizing communist and non-aligned countries. Later, North Korea made diplomatic efforts in the 1970s pushing for the globalization of its diplomacy, but from the late 1970s North Korea's diplomacy was on the defensive as changes in the international community had revealed the limitations of such communist and non-aligned diplomacy. In the process, North Korea's provocations further aggravated the situation, and the subsequent collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s dealt a decisive blow to Pyongyang's diplomacy. The historical experience and inertia of the UN and the UNC played a role in North Korea's diplomatic starting point, and the UN and the UNC played a role in collecting international condemnation of North Korea's provocations. Taking this into consideration, it could be judged that the UNC had an indirect and positive impact on South Korea's diplomatic security.

5. Conclusion

In sum, the UNC had a positive and negative impact on South Korea's comprehensive security since its foundation until 1991. At a time when the UNC had OPCON, the UNC had more impact on South Korea's physical survival. The UNC helped

curb the recurrence of a second Korean War and supported South Korea's economic development based on that primary role. In the process, however, it either condoned South Korea's domestic problems or restricted South Korea's foreign policy drive. After the UNC handed over OPCON, South Korea's physical survival was potentially guaranteed in case of emergency by the UNC. In addition, the UNC put the North on the defensive diplomatically even though the UNC could not force the North to make rational and reasonable judgments and actions. As such, the UNC was deeply involved in South Korea's security and affected it in various ways.

B. IMPLICATIONS

The UNC has had a significant impact on the overall security of South Korea, but its role and influence has changed over time. Above all, there was the concept of OPCON at its core. With the transfer of OPCON, the actual tangible influence of the UNC was transformed into a symbolic intangible influence. Today the UNC is again facing a new wave of change. While the UNC is no longer directly related to South Korea's OPCON, ongoing discussions between Seoul and Washington on the transfer of wartime OPCON from the CFC to South Korea would cause new changes in the defense system on the Korean Peninsula.

Furthermore, voices for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that moves beyond existing conflicts and confrontations are advocating an end-of-war declaration between South Korea and North Korea. The declaration of the end of the war means the end of the Korean War armistice, which would call for the dismantlement or change of the role of the UNC. In fact, debate is underway on whether to dismantle the UNC and whether the UNC is legal or not. This means that the UNC can no longer be seen as a fixed constant in the security system on the Korean Peninsula.

1. The Pursuit of North Korea's Complete Denuclearization

In this situation, the policy implications of this thesis are as follows: First, in implementing the establishment of a peace regime with North Korea, it is necessary to achieve complete denuclearization that can eliminate with certainty North Korea's offensive threats against South Korea. In the past, the UNC-centered defense system and

the CFC combined defense system failed to completely deter North Korea's military threats, even though they had the capacity to take military action. Although the form of North Korea's provocations was not at the level of direct all-out war, Pyongyang's military threat intention continued to be expressed.

In this regard, there should be no room for tolerance against North Korea's military threats, and measures are needed to fundamentally eliminate its capabilities. In fact, on September 19, 2018, the 9·19 Military Agreement was signed between South Korea and North Korea to ban hostile acts against each other in the spirit of a peaceful atmosphere. But this agreement is now losing its meaning due to the North's volatile policy toward South Korea.

2. Securing South Korea's Diplomatic Initiative

Second, in order to establish a peace regime, South Korea needs international cooperation and must take diplomatic initiative as a middle power. The Korean Peninsula issue has drawn attention from the international community beyond South Korea and North Korea. At a time when the balance of national power between South Korea and North Korea was relatively symmetrical, diplomatic competition was in full swing between the two sides, which meant that both of them needed collective support from the international community in moving the Korean Peninsula situation in its own favor. Despite the considerable gap in national power between South Korea and North Korea today, South Korea needs international cooperation to further push its opinion as North Korea seeks leverage in the international community through asymmetric weapons.

In the past, issues on the Korean Peninsula also were heavily influenced by the actions of neighboring powers. The foreign policies of South Korea and North Korea had shifted in line with the positions of the powerful neighboring countries, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, above all, this calls for South Korea to take a more initiative and be an active player in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue today.

3. Maintaining the Prototype and Role of the UNC As a Complement to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces

Third, even after the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC should remain in some form to support the ROK-U.S. combined forces. The UNC has served more than just a specified role in ROK-U.S. relations as well as the international community. In particular, the UNC has been a supplementary system that acts as the vehicle of the international community and ensures close ties between ROK and the U.S. Considering this, if the UNC continues to play such a role even after the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the strategic value for South Korea would be significant.

But the most important consideration in this policy implication is that South Korea's autonomy should not be compromised by major changes in Seoul-Washington relations, which would follow the establishment of a peace regime and the transfer of wartime OPCON. In particular, the core logic of the opinion that calls for the dissolution of the UNC began with concerns about the violation of South Korea's autonomy. This viewpoint insists that the U.S. is trying to achieve institutional guarantees through the UNC in order to project its global strategy in South Korea despite a series of changes in Korean security conditions. The final implication of this thesis is that, in any future peace regime, the original and positive role of the UNC should be maintained to the extent that South Korea's autonomy is guaranteed, by reinforcing the positive roles and reducing the negative roles that the UNC has played in the past.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has analyzed the UNC's role in South Korea's comprehensive security. However, there was a conceptual element that created challenges in the course of the analysis. And this study focused on analysis at specified periods in the past and did not undertake research that could suggest the future direction of the UNC.

1. A Clear Correlation Between the UNC and the United States

This study reveals that the relationship between the United States and the UNC is intertwined. In the analysis, the UNC reflected objectives of the U.S. based on the fact that

the U.S. had a leading influence on UNC actions from the establishment of the UNC to its subsequent role, and that most of the U.N. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War armistice were U.S. soldiers. Even though there are widespread opinions that the UNC was an organization that reflected the U.S. global strategy at the time, this thesis did not study its correlation in detail. Therefore, a detailed study is needed on how much the UNC was a means of U.S. strategy.

2. The Role of the UNC Since 1990S

This study is limited in that it did not undertake an analysis of when North Korea in earnest posed a significant threat to the international community through its nuclear weapons development. In fact, North Korea's nuclear weapons development has been a very important variable in security issues on the Korean Peninsula in recent decades. In this period, international condemnation of North Korea has intensified. Nevertheless, this study focused on earlier times. This is because the initial intent of this study was to focus on differences of the UNC role before and after the transition of OPCON. Thus, this thesis leaves room for further analysis of the role of the UNC in the period since the 1990s, in which North Korea's nuclear weapons development plays a large role.

3. The Change of the UNC

This study began with an attempt to assess the value effectiveness of the UNC, and how that varied with the role change of the UNC. Through this research, this thesis looked at how the UNC had historically influenced South Korean security. However, this thesis did not provide direction in predicting how the role of the UNC would change in the future. In particular, it is necessary to study the possibility that the role of the UNC in providing armed forces to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency could in the future develop into providing a multinational force that could expand to respond to a source of threat beyond North Korea. If this study is added, more various discourse on the UNC would be addressed.

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