



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN
GRAND STRATEGY**

by

Derek W. Sharp

December 2020

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Karl F. Walling
Douglas A. Borer

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2020	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Derek W. Sharp				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The determinants of American grand strategy are in flux. Geopolitically, the post-Cold War unipolar era in which the United States enjoyed unrivaled power is waning on account of China's rise and Russia's resurgence. Domestically, intractable political polarization and the election of Donald Trump are seen as signals that domestic consensus on American grand strategy are deteriorating. This thesis explores the formulation of American grand strategy during periods of past geopolitical upheaval, so as to gain an understanding useful for asking better questions about its future. The cases examined include the American founding and Washington administrations; the beginning of the Cold War and the Truman administration; and the Clinton administration after the Cold War. This case study comparison utilized Clausewitzian critical analysis to examine if and how the United States has blended different grand-strategy archetypes and balanced integration and insulation at home and abroad. This thesis finds that the Founders and the Truman administration adhered to an "insulationist" paradigm whereby different grand strategy archetypes were blended in order to achieve a balance between integration and insulation. By contrast, the Clinton administration strained this logic in its pursuit of a grand strategy that emphasized integration and eschewed insulation. This thesis concludes with considerations for how the United States may craft its grand strategy for the future.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS foreign policy, grand strategy, Washington administration, Truman administration, Clinton administration, integration, insulation, isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, primacy, internationalism, founders, constitution, spheres, liberal international order, republican security theory, geopolitics, Pax Americana, Alexander Hamilton, alliances, American revolution, Cold War, liberty, union, national interests, balance of power, world order, enlargement, engagement			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 167	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
IN AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY**

Derek W. Sharp
Staff Sergeant, United States Marine Corps
BS, Norwich University, 2018

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
(IRREGULAR WARFARE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2020**

Approved by: Karl F. Walling
Advisor

Douglas A. Borer
Second Reader

Douglas A. Borer
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The determinants of American grand strategy are in flux. Geopolitically, the post–Cold War unipolar era in which the United States enjoyed unrivaled power is waning on account of China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence. Domestically, intractable political polarization and the election of Donald Trump are seen as signals that domestic consensus on American grand strategy are deteriorating. This thesis explores the formulation of American grand strategy during periods of past geopolitical upheaval, so as to gain an understanding useful for asking better questions about its future. The cases examined include the American founding and Washington administrations; the beginning of the Cold War and the Truman administration; and the Clinton administration after the Cold War. This case study comparison utilized Clausewitzian critical analysis to examine if and how the United States has blended different grand-strategy archetypes and balanced integration and insulation at home and abroad. This thesis finds that the Founders and the Truman administration adhered to an “insulationist” paradigm whereby different grand strategy archetypes were blended in order to achieve a balance between integration and insulation. By contrast, the Clinton administration strained this logic in its pursuit of a grand strategy that emphasized integration and eschewed insulation. This thesis concludes with considerations for how the United States may craft its grand strategy for the future.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
B.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
C.	CONTEXT.....	7
D.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	11
E.	APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	12
F.	CONCLUSION	16
II.	FIRST IMPRESSIONS: TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF THE FOUNDERS AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1776–1797.....	19
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	19
B.	A FUNDAMENTAL TRINITY: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE FOUNDING ERA.....	20
C.	COOPERATIVE SECURITY	26
D.	SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT	31
E.	ISOLATIONISM	36
F.	PRIMACY	39
G.	THE INSULATIONIST PARADIGM: INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA.....	45
H.	CONCLUSION	51
III.	THE GREAT RECASTING: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1945–1953.....	53
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	53
B.	AN ESSENTIAL TRIFECTA ASCENDANT: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AFTER WORLD WAR II.....	54
C.	COOPERATIVE SECURITY	62
D.	SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT	68
E.	PRIMACY	73
F.	ISOLATIONISM	79
G.	TRUMAN’S RECASTING: AMERICAN INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION AFTER WORLD WAR II.....	85
H.	CONCLUSION	88
IV.	THE TRIUMPH OF GRAMMAR OVER LOGIC: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1993– 2001.....	89
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	89

B.	THE ESSENTIALS AND AN EPHEMERAL TRIAD: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AFTER THE COLD WAR.....	91
C.	COOPERATIVE SECURITY	98
D.	SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT	106
E.	PRIMACY	111
F.	ISOLATIONISM	115
G.	TOWARD A SINGLE SPHERE: INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION AFTER THE COLD WAR	120
H.	CONCLUSION	122
V.	CONCLUSION	125
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	125
B.	AN EXPLORATION AND AN UNDERSTANDING	126
C.	AN UNDERSTANDING LOOKING FORWARD AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION	133
D.	CONCLUSION	136
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	139
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	153

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease, 2019
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As a mid-career enlisted Marine who, by the grace of fortuitous timing and sheer luck, was afforded the awesome opportunity to attend the Naval Postgraduate School, I have accumulated a rather long list of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude.

To begin, I would like to thank my thesis advisor and teacher, Dr. Karl F. Walling. Though you were in no way obliged to provide them, your mentorship, wisdom, and guidance are things for which I will be forever grateful. I have heard it said that “a good teacher will arm you with the tools to dispute his conclusions.” Though the extent to which I have been successful in this regard is likely limited, it was not for want of a great teacher and I am certainly wiser, and hopefully more responsible and vigilant, for the effort. From one enlisted brother to another, thank you.

I would also like to specifically thank my second reader, Dr. Doug Borer. The guidance you provided in my struggle to select a topic and the autonomy you allowed in its exploration can be credited for any successes herein. Thank you.

Next, I want to thank those leaders from the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command who are advocates of enlisted education and responsible for promoting, seeing to fruition, and sustaining the idea of sending qualified enlisted Marines to graduate school. This includes, but is certainly not limited to: Master Gunnery Sergeant Anthony Guisao, Master Gunnery Sergeant Shawn Disbennett, and Lynne Huller. Moreover, I would also like to thank those who specifically advocated for and supported my attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School. I owe my time here in Monterey to Master Gunnery Sergeant Otto Hecht, Colonel (ret) Brian Gilman, and Master Sergeant (ret) John “Ranger” Dailey.

My sincerest thanks also go out to the staff of the Defense Analysis Department, my fellow students, and all those who contributed in significant ways to my education here at the Naval Postgraduate School. The following have my deepest gratitude and abiding respect: Dr. Kalev Sepp, Dr. Barry Strauss, Dr. John Arquilla, Dr. Mie Augier, Dr. Joyce Sampson, Dr. Camber Warren, Dr. Gordon McCormick, Dr. Nick Dew, Colonel Randy

Pugh, Lieutenant Colonel David Forbell, Lieutenant Colonel David Hawk, Major Paul Bailey, and Master Gunnery Sergeant Mark Castille.

I would also like to note that many of the ideas in this thesis have their roots in Dr. Walling and Dr. John Sheehan's *Seminar on American Grand Strategy* class during the spring quarter of 2020. While I would like to thank the professors and all of the American and international students from that class for sharing their insights and experiences, Major Ryan Tice USMC can be credited with planting one of the conceptual seeds that ultimately developed into this thesis.

Most importantly, however, I want to thank my family. My lovely wife and children deserve more praise than I can bestow for enduring my obsessive behavior, absence, and absentmindedness over the last year and a half. Like all things in my life, this endeavor would have been both impossible and meaningless without your patience, love, and support. To my parents, I want to thank you for instilling within me the work ethic, curiosity, and reading habits, which have not only enriched my life, but also made something like this thesis possible.

Lastly, this work is dedicated to those Americans and their families who have suffered or perished as a consequence of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. Your anguish and grit were never far from my thoughts during the writing of this thesis.

—E PLURIBUS UNUM & SEMPER FIDELIS—

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

*For decades, the same tired voices proposed the same failed solutions, pursuing global ambitions at the expense of their own people. But only when you take care of your own citizens will you find a true basis for cooperation. As President, I have rejected the failed approaches of the past, and I am proudly putting America first.*¹

—Donald J. Trump

*We must harness that power and rally the free world to meet the challenges facing the world today. It falls to the United States to lead the way. No other nation has that capacity. No other nation is built on that idea. We have to champion liberty and democracy, reclaim our credibility, and look with an unrelenting optimism and determination toward our future.*²

—Joseph R. Biden

In the 1967 edition of his book titled, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, British theorist Liddell Hart writes that “the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita*—still awaiting exploration and understanding.”³ Today, more than two decades into the twenty-first century, the first half of Hart’s observation—that grand strategy suffers from a lack of intellectual exploration—is likely no longer true, if it ever was. In the United States, grand strategy is a popular topic in modern academic, policy, and military circles. Many leading universities and most American war colleges offer programs, graduate degrees, or courses focused on the exploration and study of grand strategy. Articles and books on the topic are frequently published or reviewed in leading academic journals. American grand strategy is also the subject of many conferences and panels hosted by prominent think tanks and policy institutions. Hence, today one would find it difficult to

¹ Donald J. Trump, “Videotaped Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly” (Speech, Washington, D.C., September 22, 2020), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/videotaped-remarks-the-united-nations-general-assembly>.

² Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>.

³ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Second Revised Edition (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967), 322.

argue that American grand strategy suffers from a lack of exploration. However, the same is not true for the second portion of Hart's observation.

While its modern study is rather robust and prolific, common understanding or agreement as to the future of American grand strategy remains elusive. Ironically, it is likely that the United States enjoyed a firmer understanding of its grand strategy when Hart's book was published than it does now. In 1967, the United States was engaged in the Cold War and most acknowledge that, while there were differences in opinion as to the details of its implementation, the Americans had a largely coherent grand strategy focused on containing the Soviet Union.⁴ By comparison, there is less coherence and agreement on American grand strategy today. In fact, much of the above-mentioned exploration and discussion on the topic stems from debate regarding the United States' grand strategy after the Cold War. This debate, colloquially known as the "Kennan Sweepstakes," largely revolves around the extent to which the United States should adapt or change its grand strategy in response to the altered geopolitical landscape manifested by its Cold War victory. While elements of this discussion have been influenced and modified by subsequent events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the United States' wars across the Middle East, the main thrust of the debate concerning the purpose, goals, and course of American grand strategy after the Cold War remains unsettled and ongoing.⁵ This thesis joins this discussion and is an attempt to conduct an exploration of American grand strategy in the past so as to gain an understanding useful for asking better questions about its future.

⁴ Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014); William C. Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁵ Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 5–53; Eugene Gholz, Darryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 5–48; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," *International Security* 37, no. 3 (2013): 7–51.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Interestingly, grand strategy is a term often invoked in academic, military, and policy circles; yet, it remains somewhat ill-defined. Scholars, policymakers, and military professionals disagree not only about its definition, but also its legitimacy. Those who believe the term is valid and useful generally consider it to be the highest form of national strategy and the amalgamation of a state's resources and various forms of power in the long-term pursuance of its interests.⁶ Some define the term broadly. For example, Hal Brands defines grand strategy in his book, *What Good is Grand Strategy?*, as “the highest form of statecraft” and “the intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy.”⁷ Paul Kennedy writes that grand strategy is “the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime *and* peacetime) best interests.”⁸ Additionally, Hart writes that “the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”⁹ Perhaps the most elegant definition of grand strategy is offered by John Lewis Gaddis in his book, *On Grand Strategy*. He defines it as “the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”¹⁰ While Brands, Kennedy, Hart, and Gaddis offer rather broad conceptions of grand strategy, others are more restrictive in their definition or even skeptical of the term.

⁶ Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*; Stephen D. Biddle, *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005); Clark Murdock and Kevin Kallmyer, “Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint,” *Orbis* 55, no. 4 (2011): 541–557.

⁷ Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, 1.

⁸ Paul M. Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 5.

⁹ Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, 322.

¹⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York, New York: Penguin Press, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2018), 21.

Similar to the proponents of grand strategy, those with a more circumscribed conception are also diverse in their views. Some, such as Robert Jervis, maintain that grand strategy is a useful concept, but believe it becomes a meaningless or harmful notion in the absence of a clear and easily identifiable threat.¹¹ In a similar vein, Richard Betts writes that “the term ‘grand strategy’ is not worthless,” but has “simply come to be overused and the concept overvalued as a standard.”¹² Others take a more critical view of the whole idea of grand strategy. For example, David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs invoke Betts’ earlier work while arguing in *Foreign Affairs* that grand strategy “is an illusion” and “the country would be better off without it.”¹³ In essence, those critical of the idea of grand strategy generally fall into two broad camps. There are those who view grand strategy as a useful concept, but think it is often overused and applied inappropriately. The other group largely considers grand strategy distracting at best, and harmful to American policy-making at worst. Combined, these critiques raise questions about the extent to which the United States has successfully formulated grand strategies in the past and how it may do so in the future. So, does the United States conduct grand strategy? Most say yes; some point to the United States’ founding era as the genesis for an American grand strategy. William Martel, David Hendrickson, Karl Walling, and Charles Edel each argue that the origins of the nation’s grand strategy go back to the earliest years of the republic.¹⁴ These authors point to the United States’ founding principles and steady accumulation of power as evidence of an effective and coherent grand strategy. Others maintain that American grand strategy truly began with the closing of its frontier and the slow turn of the nation’s gaze beyond its

¹¹ Robert Jervis, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible,” *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 22–36.

¹² Richard K. Betts, “The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy,” *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 20.

¹³ David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Delusions of Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 25, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-10-20/delusions-grand-strategy>; Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 5–50.

¹⁴ Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*; David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Karl Walling, “Old and New Testaments in American Grand Strategy,” in *From Reflection and Choice: The Political Philosophy of the Federalist Papers and the Ratification Debate*, ed. Will R. Jordan (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2020); Charles Edel, *Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

shores. Those of such views generally highlight Alfred Thayer Mahan and presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as some principal architects of American grand strategy.¹⁵ Still others argue it was the beginning of the Cold War which led the United States to seriously conduct grand strategy. They highlight the containment strategy the United States followed against the Soviet Union as being the first coherent American grand strategy.¹⁶ Debates about the birth of American grand strategy are, however, not the most lively or voluminous in the literature. That distinction belongs to a body of work that largely emerged after the Cold War and concerns what American national interests and grand strategy should be in the future.

Most who write on such topics generally concede that the United States at least adhered to a largely coherent grand strategy during the Cold War. Where they differ significantly is in their analysis of what the United States' grand strategy should be or should have been upon the Cold War's conclusion. Writing in the journal *International Security*, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross lay out what they view as the four main "competing visions for U.S. grand strategy" in the post-Cold War world.¹⁷ They list these visions as neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Posen and Ross critique the Clinton administration's efforts at grand strategy by claiming that it represented an indiscriminate mixing of these visions. They assert that American grand strategy must largely avoid similar mixing and matching of visions as:

They contain fundamental disagreements about strategic objectives and priorities, the extent to which the United States should be engaged in international affairs, the form that engagement should assume, the means that should be employed, the degree of autonomy that must be maintained, and when and under what conditions military force should be employed.¹⁸

¹⁵ Philip Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444–77; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 29–55.

¹⁶ Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and Jim Lacey, *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁷ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy."

¹⁸ Posen and Ross, 52.

Other academics and analysts seem to have, at least implicitly, agreed with Posen and Ross's logic as many have published numerous articles, books, and reports advocating for each of these various visions of American grand strategy.¹⁹ Indeed, there are even other competing options for American grand strategy not discussed by Posen and Ross in their article. For example, Martel and others believe the United States should follow a grand strategy of restraint.²⁰ A similar option that is advocated for by prominent academics such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Christopher Layne, is a grand strategy based on offshore balancing.²¹ Additionally, and in contrast to advocates of restraint and offshore balancing, there are those who think the United States should largely maintain the general direction of its post-Cold War strategy of global engagement and liberal internationalism.²²

Yet, despite a considerable range of declared differences between the grand strategies advocated for by academics, policymakers, and politicians, nearly all of them can be generally sorted into the four archetypes described by Posen and Ross. For example, those who advocate for offshore balancing are essentially arguing for a specific type of selective engagement that rests upon certain elements of primacy. In a similar vein, those advocating for a continuance of the United States' current grand strategy of liberal

¹⁹ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998): 79; Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael E. Brown et al., *America's Strategic Choices* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): 114–61; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88.

²⁰ William C. Martel, "Grand Strategy of 'Restraint,'" *Orbis* 54, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 356–73; Barry Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, "Come Home, America."

²¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 86–124; Stephen Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," August 14, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>.

²² Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment"; Hal Brands, *American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2018); G. John Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, *An Open World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020).

internationalism are making the case for certain types of cooperative security and primacy. Interestingly, most all who advocate for any type of grand strategy do so by lambasting neo-isolationism. Yet, not all who admonish neo-isolationism or isolationism more broadly do so from a wholly different set of assumptions. In fact, many of those who favor a grand strategy of restraint or retrenchment share many basic premises about international politics and American power with those rare few who sometimes advocate for isolationist grand strategies. When considered together, it seems that the variation between these archetypes is more important than the variation within them.

As detailed above, many have written as to which particular grand strategy archetype they believe is best suited for the United States. Some base their recommendations on various forms of historical analysis and others on political science and international relations theory. These authors largely vary by how much involvement in the global arena they believe is necessary to maintain American national security and secure American national interests. Most point to common evidence of how history has proven the validity of their various prescriptions and disproven those of competing visions. What is less present in the literature is robust analysis or comparison of how the United States may have blended different grand strategy archetypes during different periods of intense geopolitical change. In just over 150 years, the United States evolved from a collection of British colonies on the east coast of North America, to one of the world's two major superpowers. Over the course of another 50 years, it became the most powerful nation on the planet. This record of success suggests that the United States has formulated effective grand strategies throughout its history. Given the range of geopolitical circumstance in which this ascendance occurred, it is unlikely that the United States relied on just a single grand strategy archetype. Hence, disagreements about or advocacy strictly for certain grand strategy archetypes are likely simplistic ways to think about grand strategy.

C. CONTEXT

In some ways, this state of disagreement is a perennial condition. It is perennial in the sense that the finer points of American grand strategy have always been debated, often

hotly. One need only take a cursory glance at early American history to understand that disagreements concerning what the modern observer would regard as grand strategy are older than the republic itself.²³ Another enduring aspect of this debate is its correlation to parallel discussions about the extent to which the United States should be integrated and involved with the world beyond its shores. As they are inherently related, debate about one can usually be considered a proxy for debate about the other. Truthfully, it is a somewhat uniquely American debate as the United States, perhaps more than any other major country, has historically enjoyed the ability to stand apart and insulate itself from global entanglements. In fact, for most of its history the United States attended to its interests and maintained its security by limiting its exposure to the wider world. Initially out of fear and later out of indifference, the Americans, however much they debated other aspects of grand strategy, generally agreed that a United States insulated from the frequent controversies of the Old World was one best positioned to maintain its liberty and security. This consensus, however, did not last forever.

Dramatic geopolitical upheavals in the twentieth century saw the United States alter the goals and course of its grand strategy and become considerably more integrated abroad. The United States first flirted with formal global integration after its participation in World War I. Had it been approved by the Senate, President Woodrow Wilson's ambitious project, the League of Nations, would have seen the United States integrated into an international institution dedicated to the maintenance of global peace and security.²⁴ After a brief return to its non-entanglement tradition during the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States integrated itself into the Grand Alliance in order to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Upon achieving victory in World War II, the Americans then institutionalized their integration abroad in order to stabilize a devastated world and wage the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The United States formally integrated into the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the General Agreement

²³ Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 227–339; Paul A. Varg, *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers*. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963), 70–94; Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 104–11.

²⁴ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 47–55.

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and various bi-lateral mutual defense treaties. Later, after the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States continued to expand its global integration. In the 1990s, the Americans created and joined the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and expanded NATO to states in Eastern Europe. By the turn of the millennia, those crafting American grand strategy, however much they debated other aspects of grand strategy, generally agreed that a United States integrated with the world was one best positioned to maintain its liberty and security. This consensus endures today.

When considering the purpose, goals, and overall course of American grand strategy, the magnitude of this change is stunning. From their revolution until the twentieth century, the Americans were largely skeptical of integration abroad as it was considered unwise to implicate the nation by “artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes” of Old World politics or “the ordinary combinations and collisions of [its] friendships or enmities.”²⁵ Yet, this preference for insulation gave way to one of integration. In the first fifty years of the twentieth century, the United States evolved from a nation whose grand strategy was still largely anchored by founding era beliefs in non-entanglement into the hegemonic leader of a globe-spanning political, military, and economic alliance dedicated to the containment of Soviet communism. The passage of another fifty years saw the United States not only triumphant in the Cold War, but also the unrivaled leader of a globally integrated liberal world order. What is noteworthy about this move from a grand strategy of detached insulation to one of integrated hegemony is the extent to which this progression was spurred by notable periods of political uncertainty. Indeed, it seems that the life story of the United States could be told as one of ever-expanding integration spurred by the shifts and upheavals in domestic and international politics. Moreover, American fear or anger in response to such upheavals seem to exert considerable influence on the United States' conception of its national interests and the purpose, goals, and course of its grand strategy.

²⁵ George Washington, “The Farewell Address,” in *Washington's Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Century*, by Burton I. Kaufman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 27.

Today, geopolitical realities are again changing. The post-Cold War era in which the United States enjoyed unrivaled diplomatic, economic, and military power is fading. The world is now witnessing the resurgence of authoritarian great powers, such as China and Russia, who are increasingly challenging the United States on many fronts. China, whose economic strength is fueling its growth in military power, is taking a more aggressive stance in international affairs.²⁶ Russia, while seemingly doomed to a slow economic and demographic decline, is playing a weak hand well by attempting to reassert itself in its near abroad and by sowing discord in Western democracies.²⁷ These disruptive changes are happening while the threats from provocative regional actors, such as Iran and North Korea, remain dynamic and evolving. The United States must also contend with the enduring threats posed by international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. Furthermore, nebulous threats such as those posed by climate change and pandemics are increasing in salience. Though they often receive the most attention from would-be grand strategists, changes and threats in the international arena are not the only factors that exercise influence on American grand strategy.

The domestic elements influencing the formulation and execution of American grand strategy are also in flux. In political terms, the election of Donald Trump arguably represents the most significant event in American domestic politics in a generation as he campaigned on challenging the central tenets and direction of the United States' post-Cold War grand strategy. His presidency and its long-term effects on both domestic politics and American grand strategy remain to be seen. Though not directly caused by Trump's election, political polarization continues to plague the American political system. This political strife complicates any effort to achieve or sustain a consensus on American grand

²⁶ Peter Zeihan, *Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World* (New York: Harper Collins, 2020), 62–104.

²⁷ “Russia Takes on Its Demographic Decline,” Stratfor, accessed March 11, 2020, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-takes-its-demographic-decline>; Dustin Volz and Alan Cullison, “‘Putin Has Won’: Mueller Report Details the Ways Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 2019, sec. Politics, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-has-won-mueller-report-details-the-ways-russia-interfered-in-the-2016-election-11555666201>; Zeihan, *Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World*, 138–64.

strategy and its component parts, such as defense spending, trade, and alliances.²⁸ Domestic politics are, however, not the only internal factor that will shape American grand strategy in the future. Technological advances continue to affect American life and American strategy. For instance, advances in domestic energy production have allowed the United States to achieve energy independence and become a net exporter of oil products.²⁹ Furthermore, changing demographics, cultural mores, and social patterns are also affecting longstanding American conceptions of economics, citizenship, and national security.³⁰ Lastly, the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has caused considerable economic damage in the United States. While the long-term effects of the coronavirus are not immediately apparent, the pandemic and its reverberations, both at home and abroad, will influence American grand strategy for many years to come. Perhaps more than at any period since the end of the Cold War, future conceptions of American grand strategy must account for a host of internal factors as much as changes in the geopolitical arena. To craft grand strategy based heavily on one, especially in the current domestic and international environments, is merely an invitation for it to be undermined by the other.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

All the above considered, this thesis asked a series of related questions intended to illuminate the considerations the United States should take into account as it crafts its grand strategy in response to the upheaval happening today. The research questions for this thesis were the following:

- a. What conditions cause significant changes in American grand strategy?
- b. How should the national interests be defined? How have they been defined in similar periods of geopolitical upheaval?

²⁸ Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions*, 217–54.

²⁹ Gregory Meyer, “US Is Net Exporter of Oil for First Time in Decades,” November 29, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/9cbba7b0-12dd-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a>.

³⁰ Gallup Inc, “Democrats More Positive About Socialism Than Capitalism,” Gallup.com, August 13, 2018, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/240725/democrats-positive-socialism-capitalism.aspx>; Gallup Inc, “Americans Split on Outlook for U.S. Power,” Gallup.com, February 20, 2019, <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/246974/americans-split-outlook-power.aspx>; Gallup Inc, “New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem,” Gallup.com, June 21, 2019, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-immigration-important-problem.aspx>.

- c. How have previous American leaders formulated grand strategy during periods of intense geopolitical change?
- d. To what extent have competing grand strategy archetypes been balanced during such periods?
- e. How has the United States balanced integration and insulation in its conception of its national interests and the purpose, goals, and course of its grand strategy?

E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis examined these questions by conducting a controlled case study comparison of similar periods from American history. These periods include: the American founding and the presidential administration of George Washington; the beginning of the Cold War and the administration of Harry S. Truman; and the period after the Cold War's end and the administration of William J. Clinton. This qualitative research was conducted primarily by examining primary and secondary sources. Examined were contemporary speeches, papers, reports, and official documents. This work also drew heavily from the historical and biographical works of others. It reviewed histories, biographies, books, and articles focused in each era. Also considered were applicable works on the topics of grand strategy, foreign policy, economics, political science, political theory, and international relations.

The independent variables for this study were instances of substantial geopolitical change that affected the United States. The dependent variable was the formulation of American grand strategy in response to that change. As changes in the geopolitical landscape do not directly causes changes in grand strategy, this thesis also considered and examined the proximate intervening variables. The primary intervening variable examined in this work was the conception of the American national interests in each case. Grand strategy is not aimless or a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is the purposeful coordination and direction of a nation's resources towards some future long-term goal within a certain context. Thus, geopolitical change must be appraised in terms of the national interest before grand strategy can be formulated. In order to draw conclusions

about how changes in geopolitical realities affect American grand strategy, one must also consider the intervening conception of the American national interests.

The historical case study method is appropriate for this project as it analyzes a phenomenon—the formulation of American grand strategy—within its historical context, and then uses this analysis to better understand how it should be formulated today.³¹ The unifying context in this project was an analysis of the formulation of American grand strategy in times of intense geopolitical change. This method is suited to this project as the strengths inherent to the case study methodology allow for “detailed consideration of contextual factors.”³² Many factors that influence the formulation of grand strategy, such as national power, political culture, intensity of threats from hostile powers, and so on can be difficult to quantify and measure. The case study comparison method allows one to examine these factors and others within their appropriate context, and then compare them to other similar cases. Doing so allows one to draw conclusions from a wider variety of variables and explore the operation of causal mechanisms across the cases.³³ This more holistic approach uses data in a “triangulating fashion” in order to draw meaningful conclusions and inform subsequent recommendations.³⁴

The case study method is, however, not without its limitations and potential pitfalls. These include case selection bias, single case issues, and level of representativeness or independence.³⁵ Issues with selection bias in case study methodology often stem from the selection of cases based on the dependent variable and on the availability or accessibility of evidence.³⁶ This project accounts for these potential issues by selecting cases on the independent variable and the wide availability of data applicable to each historical case. As this project compared multiple cases, it naturally avoided issues associated with the

³¹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Fifth edition. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 16.

³² Alexander L. George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 19.

³³ George, 21.

³⁴ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 17.

³⁵ George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 22–34.

³⁶ George, 22–25.

single case method. Similarly, because the selected cases are representative of the selected independent variable—change in geopolitical landscape—but vary considerably in other ways, this project largely avoided issues based on a lack of representativeness or independence.

The selected cases were chosen for both their similarities and differences. These cases are similar in that each represents a period in American history where the United States was confronted with dramatic changes in the geopolitical landscape. In the founding era, having just defeated one of the world's great powers, the newly constituted United States was still emerging as an independent nation in a world full of great powers. In contrast, the beginning of the Cold War saw a fully developed United States shed its previous isolationism and assume the mantle as one of two global superpowers. Lastly, the conclusion of the Cold War left the United States unmatched in global power and the world's sole superpower.

At the risk of stating the obvious, it must be pointed out that these cases each concern American history and grand strategy. Though one could choose to answer this research question by examining how other great powers have adapted their grand strategies and national interests in response to changing geopolitical and domestic realities, this thesis only examined American cases. This is because its intent was to also examine if or how and why American grand strategy and national interests have changed in conjunction with significant changes in the geopolitical landscape. As the intent of this thesis is to offer considerations as to how the United States, with its unique geography, culture, history, and economy, should formulate grand strategy, examining cases of other powers would likely result in less satisfactory or appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

These cases were also chosen for how they are different. For example, they are separated by considerable periods of time. As such, they represent the United States at different stages in its development and level of power. At its founding, the United States was weak compared to other great powers. At the onset of the Cold War, it was far more powerful but was still rivaled in many ways by the power of the Soviet Union. In contrast, the end of the Cold War found the United States unrivaled by almost any measure of power. These cases also vary widely in the strategic circumstances from which they emerged. The

United States were but mere colonies of Great Britain before their independence. Prior to World War II and the Cold War that followed, the United States was a detached country with limited global integration. Almost the exact opposite is true of the United States by the time the Cold War ended. Finally, the nature and type of threats perceived by the United States in these cases are extremely different. The Founders were primarily concerned with maintaining the union while avoiding war with the various European imperial powers. American leaders largely faced a solitary threat from the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War. With the Cold War's end, the United States largely perceived no existential threats. The differences manifested in these particular cases allow not only for thorough conclusions to be drawn from them, but also sharper considerations for how the United States should formulate grand strategy today.

This thesis drew its conclusions by examining and comparing the formulation of American grand strategy in each case. It did so by employing elements of Carl von Clausewitz's critical analysis framework and Art Lykke's strategy model framework.³⁷ Clausewitzian critical analysis entails three distinct intellectual activities: "the discovery and interpretation of equivocal facts...the tracing of effects back to their causes...[and] the investigation and evaluation of means employed."³⁸ In Clausewitz's view, this robust multi-layered method of inquiry is essential in order to avoid a superficial understanding of phenomenon based on "the plain narrative of a historical event."³⁹ He contends that critics often misuse history to justify their theories.⁴⁰ This can be avoided by evaluating not just "the means actually employed, but *all possible means*."⁴¹ Similarly, one must consider "the full extent of everything that has happened, or might have happened."⁴² To achieve this level of detail in analysis, many factors must be considered.

³⁷ Clausewitz, *On war*, 156–69; Harry R Yarger, "Toward A Theory Of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," n.d., 8.

³⁸ Clausewitz, *On war*, 156.

³⁹ Clausewitz, 156.

⁴⁰ Clausewitz, 172.

⁴¹ Clausewitz, 161.

⁴² Clausewitz, 159.

Thus, assessed in each case was the United States' strategic constraints and restraints, as well as its contemporary conception of the national interest. Specifically, the thesis examined American grand strategy of each period and its competing alternatives. It considered their competing theories of victory, as well as each vision's suitability, feasibility, and acceptability based on the national interest and geopolitical realities. It analyzed competing strategies by assessing the ends, ways, means, and risk associated with them. Moreover, this thesis also examined the extent to which different grand strategies were blended or employed in tandem with one another. Appraised were not only the likely reactions to each grand strategic vision from nations friendly, neutral, and hostile to the United States, but also the reactions of the American domestic populations to their nation's grand strategy, as well as its alternatives.

F. CONCLUSION

This exploration of how the Americans have adapted their grand strategy throughout their history represents an understanding of how the United States has employed different grand strategy archetypes and balanced integration and insulation—at home and abroad—both in its determination of its national interests and in the crafting of its overall grand strategy.

The central theme of this understanding is that familiar debates and discussions concerning the tensions between different grand strategy archetypes, isolationism versus internationalism, or unilateralism versus multilateralism—are simplistic, incomplete, and insufficient schemas for the consideration of American grand strategy. Instead, this understanding discusses an “insulationist” paradigm, whereby such schemas are blended, balanced, and employed synthetically, that is likely a better basis by which to study, craft, and conduct American grand strategy in the future.⁴³

Explored in Chapter II is how the founding generation established the original mold of American grand strategy. Guided by their efforts to secure a fundamental trinity of

⁴³ This work's notion of an “insulationist” paradigm is a complement to the “Unionist Paradigm” outlined by Dr. David C. Hendrickson. See: Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 14–23.

American national interests, the Founders blended different grand strategy archetypes in order to achieve an internal and external balance between integration and insulation. These first impressions served as the general foundation for American grand strategy until the United States' entry into World War II.

In Chapter III, it is shown how the Truman administration recast the Founders' grand strategy to account for the geopolitical upheaval left in the wake of World War II. So as to secure a trifecta of essential national interests, the administration blended archetypal grand strategies in ways designed to expand the integrative scope of the Founders' grand strategy. Yet, this expansion of integration was matched by corresponding forms of insulation that maintained the Founders' balance between them.

In contrast, Chapter IV explains how the Clinton administration employed different grand strategy archetypes in ways that purposely emphasized integration and eschewed insulation after the Cold War. In pursuit of a triad of ephemeral interests, the Clinton administration directed American grand strategy on to the strained and unbalanced course on which it finds itself today.

Chapter V concludes this thesis with a brief synopsis and prospectus that synthesizes the prior analysis into questions about the insulationist paradigm the United States may consider as it crafts its grand strategy for the future.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. FIRST IMPRESSIONS: TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF THE FOUNDERS AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1776–1797

A. INTRODUCTION

*If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such attitude as well cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by our justice shall counsel.*⁴⁴

—George Washington

It is said that first impressions often last a lifetime; that the context and manner in which something is first encountered or experienced shapes and influences perceptions of it very far into the future. Most would readily attest to the agency of this phenomenon in the lives of individuals and institutions. Yet, it can be argued that such impressions also have lasting effects on the lives of nations. After all, nations are themselves but the manifest syncretizations of individuals and institutions. While both the individuals and institutions of a nation will undoubtedly change and evolve over time, the impressions made by those present at its creation often endure and have an abiding influence on successive generations. Such is the case for the American Founders from 1776–1797 when considering the purpose, goals, and course of American grand strategy. Early America was a nascent nation blessed with vast potential, but mired in the perilous task of establishing the foundations of its strength. The realization of its full might would require not only competent leadership, but also suppleness and pragmatism in the crafting and conduct of grand strategy. Created as a new type of nation, the United States required a new type of grand strategy. Hence, this chapter will endeavor to show not only that the Founders thought deeply about grand strategy, but more importantly that the peculiarity of their strategic situations necessitated their balancing of integration and insulation and blending of archetypal grand strategies. This blending was intended to create—insulated spheres of

⁴⁴ Washington, “The Farewell Address,” 28.

integration—from which the Americans could attend to their national interests and grow their power. These first impressions proved to be indispensable in the earliest years of the republic and cast a long shadow on American strategic thought and practice.

B. A FUNDAMENTAL TRINITY: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE FOUNDING ERA

*Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good.*⁴⁵

—Alexander Hamilton

The effective crafting and conduct of grand strategy requires one to possess a firm understanding of one's national interests. When modern American leaders speak of the United States' national interests, they are generally referring to a broad and diffuse range of issues and subjects. In many ways, this might be expected. The modern United States is largely considered the most powerful nation on the planet and one should not be faulted in thinking it natural that it would have a large set of diverse national interests. However, the multitude of modern American national interests, real or imagined, should not obscure the reality that the Founders' views of American national interests were much narrower in scope and more fundamental in nature. In fact, the vital national interests in the founding era can be expressed in as little as three fundamental goals: liberty, union, and survival as an independent country.

That the Founders' conceptions of American national interests were narrower when compared with those of today becomes apparent when one considers the tremendous differences in their respective strategic situations and power. For instance, the modern United States is a global superpower that maintains interests in most regions of the world. It fields the world's most powerful military and it leads various regional military alliances and security partnerships. The United States is one of the largest countries both in terms of population and territory. Furthermore, the enormous American economy is integrated into

⁴⁵ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 1," in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 27.

a global trading and finance network. In comparison, American interests in the founding era were not as broad in terms of their geographic spread or political, military, and economic integration. While early Americans were certainly not ignorant of world affairs, the extent of their geographic interests were largely contained within the Western Hemisphere and in particular, North America. Its sole political and military alliance, signed with France in 1778, was a marriage of convenience borne of mutual interests which quickly faded upon the end of the Revolutionary War. In short order, it became a liability for the young nation and was jettisoned at the first real opportunity.⁴⁶ The actual scope, if not ambition, of the Founders' economic interests were also more circumscribed. Though the Founders "conceived of themselves as the leaders of a commercial revolution world wide in scope" and largely held the view that future "national grandeur was to be achieved through commercial ties," American global economic integration was limited by the dominance of mercantilist economic practices of other nations.⁴⁷ Hence, one might view the narrower scope of American interests in the founding era not necessarily as something to be lamented, but instead as being commensurate with the young nation's limited power and influence.

American national interests in the founding era, aside from being more limited in breadth, were also more fundamental in nature. While today a few observers are asking questions about its future as free and unified whole, most serious ones do not doubt the long-term survival of the United States as an independent country.⁴⁸ Yet, this confidence in American longevity was not as prevalent in the early years of its existence. William Weeks writes that "friends and foes alike of the new union harbored expectations of its imminent demise."⁴⁹ To many at the time, "the newly independent entity seemed too big,

⁴⁶ Fredrick W. Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1984), 106–11; Bradford Perkins, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 105–10.

⁴⁷ Varg, *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers.*, 37, 30.

⁴⁸ David French, *Divided We Fall: America's Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2020).

⁴⁹ William E. Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865* (New York, N.Y: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 40.

to contain too large a diversity of interests, and its people collectively too resistant to the strong central authority needed to hold it together.”⁵⁰ Given these real challenges to cohesion, the fundamental American national interests in the founding era were those issues on which there was agreement among the many states. These were, respectively: liberty, union, and survival as an independent country. These mutual interests had centripetal effects on the former colonies and are together the foundation on which the Founders crafted American grand strategy and built a nation.

For the Founders, the pursuance of liberty and the desire to construct a free society were what compelled the colonies to seek independence from the British crown. The types of liberty the Founders sought in their revolution and aimed to preserve in their subsequent union were multifaceted and include civil, political, economic, and geographic liberty. Perhaps the most familiar forms of liberty the Founders endeavored to preserve were those civil in nature. In essence, these included the prevention of the state from infringing upon the rights of both the individual and of the individual states. In securing political liberty, the Founders sought to guarantee that they would, as individuals and as states, be able to partake in the writing and administration of the laws to which they were subject. The Founders also sought economic liberty. As British subjects, the colonies were bound to trade and economic policies dictated from London. Upon achieving independence, the states still found, much to their frustration, themselves at the mercy of the commercial policies of more powerful nations. Achieving ever greater access to commercial markets and trade was central to the Founders’ vision of the nation’s economic future and prosperity.⁵¹ Geographic liberty was also of great concern to the founding generation. Under British rule, westward expansion by the colonies was severely restricted. However, upon their divorce from the mother country, the Americans would pursue western expansion for more than a century. In sum, the Founders had complex and often contradictory views on the nature and extent of their liberties. Yet, “that unity would be

⁵⁰ Weeks, 40.

⁵¹ Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 11,” in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003).

the basis of their strength” and vehicle for securing their liberty, “Americans well understood.”⁵²

Union was the method by which the Founders would secure and maintain liberty. Whereas securing independence, and by extension their liberty, required that the colonies unite in order to throw off British rule, preserving both for their posterities required the Founders to maintain their union in perpetuity. Karl Walling notes this relationship writing that, “while independence was a necessary means to liberty, union of the thirteen states was necessary for independence.”⁵³ Similarly, David Hendrickson highlights this interdependence, writing that “independence and union hence advanced arm in arm—mutually dependent, the realization of either unthinkable without the other.”⁵⁴ Liberty without union was unthinkable because the Founders did not consider single colonies able to achieve separation from Great Britain. In a similar vein, many Founders did not think their liberty or independence, once achieved, would be maintained if the union was to dissolve. Many feared internal conflicts, European meddling, or both would eventually lead to a loss of liberty. Even those who sought a weaker union or feared an overly powerful national government, reservations usually associated with “Anti-Federalists” and later “Republicans,” readily admitted the exigency of a continued national union.⁵⁵

Union was considered essential in the founding era because it was thought by most to offer the best protection of liberty from threats both internal and external to the United States. Threats to liberty from within the United States can generally be separated into two main categories: those threats emanating from an overly powerful national government and those derived from a breakup of the union into separate states or regional confederacies. The Founders sought to limit the likelihood of the former by instituting a system in which

⁵² Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 104.

⁵³ Walling, “Old and New Testaments in American Grand Strategy,” 160.

⁵⁴ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 104.

⁵⁵ Herbert J. Storing, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 24; Forrest McDonald, *The Presidency of George Washington* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974), 95.

power was shared by different branches and levels of government.⁵⁶ The latter, while seemingly unthinkable today, was of great concern to the founding generation. Early Americans tended to identify with their respective states and regions. There was fear among the Founders that regional interests could lead to a breakup of the union and the formation of regional confederacies.⁵⁷ To prevent this it was argued, ultimately successfully, that any disintegration of the union would likely lead to conflicts between the states, invite European interventions, and ultimately undermine liberty.⁵⁸

In essence, disunion was not only an internal threat to liberty, but it could also reduce the ability of the Americans to protect themselves from external threats. External threats in the founding era largely consisted of those posed by Britain, France, and Spain. Union among the states provided the best protection against the predations of these European imperial powers. Yet, the Founders sought to prevent not only the encroachment of the Europeans, but also the establishment of the warlike European state system in North America.⁵⁹ Hendrickson writes that “this development—inevitably accompanied by perennial rivalries and by the standing armies and wars bred by those—would jeopardize the fragile growth of republican government on the American continent.”⁶⁰ Therefore, union as a national interest served not only to secure and maintain liberty, but also to ensure the survival of a future for the American system of “reflection and choice.”⁶¹

Survival was the mechanism through which the Founders maintained balance between liberty and union. As a national interest, it acted both as the link between them and as a metric by which to judge them. While being necessary in its own right, survival also prevented the Founders from pursuing the logical extremes of either liberty or union.

⁵⁶ Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789*, 669–74.

⁵⁷ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 8–10.

⁵⁸ John Jay, “Federalist No. 3,” in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003); John Jay, “Federalist No. 5,” in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003).

⁵⁹ Jay, “Federalist No. 5”; David C. Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate Over International Relations 1789-1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 38–40.

⁶⁰ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 8.

⁶¹ Hamilton, “Federalist No. 1,” 27.

For an example of the operative effect of survival as a national interest, one should consider the likely outcome of a founding era grand strategy that overly emphasized either liberty or union. Had the Founders overemphasized liberty, either that of individuals or of the states, it is likely they would not have been able to maintain a union powerful enough to preserve liberty. Similarly, had they tried to implement an overly powerful union at the expense of liberty, it is unlikely that the union would have been maintained and, as detailed previously, this would eventually lead to a loss of liberty. A pursuit of either of these strategies would have made it difficult for the United States to achieve the growth in economic and military power to secure its interests in the long term.

Evidence demonstrating the importance of survival can be witnessed in the strategic decisions made regarding slavery. The dilemma facing the Founders was how to reconcile the lofty proclamations made in the Declaration of Independence with the necessity to maintain union with the slave-holding states. As Hendrickson explains, the Founders were “confronted, on the one hand, with the evils of disunion and separate confederacies, and on the other with the fact that a refusal to confederate because of slavery would do nothing to ameliorate its curses, even northerners hostile to slavery knew they could not make emancipation a *sine qua non* of union, for this was identical with the proposition that there should be no union at all.”⁶² In a similar vein, John Lewis Gaddis writes that “the men of 1776 feared—Jefferson not least among them—that if they freed the slaves along with the country, they’d have no state...so they chose Union now, postponing Emancipation on the assumption—infrequently expressed—that the *prospects* for it would be better in a single strong state than in several weaker ones.”⁶³ As the decisions about slavery show, the exigencies of survival forced a morally problematic—but strategically necessary—balance between liberty and union.

Taken together, these three fundamental national interests can be considered a kind of interdependent trinity in that each required the presence of the other two—albeit, in a reduced, imperfect, or potentially dangerous form. Liberty required a limited union and a

⁶² Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 234.

⁶³ Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*, 175, 177.

precarious survival. Union demanded both the immoral denial of liberty to some, as well as a survival undermined in the long term by a necessary compromise irreconcilable with truths Americans proclaimed to hold as self-evident. Survival necessitated a bounded liberty and a union more endowed with the ability to become tyrannical. In sum, the fundamental national interests of this “Hercules in the cradle” were interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and strategically sound.⁶⁴ Simple, yet elegant; aspirational, yet practical—they guided the Founders as they blended what would seem to be, at least to modern ears, grand strategies with contradictory assumptions, fundamental disagreements, and above all, incompatible real-world prescriptions. Yet, this is precisely what the Founders accomplished as they crafted the grand strategy of the early American republic.

C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY

*We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.*⁶⁵

—Benjamin Franklin

As a grand strategy archetype, cooperative security generally entails the close integration and coordination of individual states in the provision of their collective security and peace. Barry Posen and Stephen Ross write that “the most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible.”⁶⁶ At its core it holds that threats to peace and prosperity in any instance risks undermining the security and well-being of all others. In essence, everywhere matters. As such, it is dependent on the willing cooperation of states, often via international institutions, to deter and thwart aggression which threatens the general peace.⁶⁷ Grounded by a liberal conception of international relations, it stresses the interdependence of nations and the

⁶⁴ Alexander Hamilton, “From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [14 April 1794],” in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 16, February 1794-July 1794*, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 266–79.

⁶⁵ Paul Zall, *Ben Franklin Laughing: Anecdotes from Original Sources by and about Benjamin Franklin* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 154.

⁶⁶ Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” 23.

⁶⁷ Posen and Ross, 24–25.

necessity of collective responses to international issues. Given the common perception of the Founders as having had an isolationist view on foreign entanglements, one might be surprised to find that this chapter makes as one of its central claims the notion that the Founders not only pursued a grand strategy of cooperative security, but also that they are perhaps some of the most successful executors of a cooperative security grand strategy in history.⁶⁸

Evidence that the founding generation implemented a cooperative security grand strategy is manifested in three main documents of the founding era: The Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the United States Constitution. These famous works are not usually thought of as being strategy documents, let alone affirmation that the Founders pursued a cooperative security grand strategy. Yet, when one considers the lack of an overwhelming national identity in the founding era and the fact that many Americans thought their respective former colonies “of right ought to be free and independent states,” these documents, as well as their underlying intentions, should be viewed from a grand strategic and cooperative security perspective.⁶⁹ For example, each bound the individual colonies and states to a collective and interdependent conception of their liberty and security. In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders famously proclaimed that in support of it they would “mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.”⁷⁰ The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution created institutions designed to provide for “a firm league of friendship”⁷¹ and “a more perfect union”⁷² among the many states for the “common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare,”⁷³ and to “establish justice, ensure domestic

⁶⁸ Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 161–90.

⁶⁹ Thomas Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 532.

⁷⁰ Jefferson, 532.

⁷¹ Charles Kesler, ed., “Articles of Confederation,” in *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 533.

⁷² Charles Kesler, ed., “Constitution of the United States,” in *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 542.

⁷³ Kesler, “Articles of Confederation,” 533.

tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.”⁷⁴ Each of these documents contain explicit pronouncements consistent with the logic and features of a cooperative security grand strategy. Yet, language in the founding documents is not in and of itself sufficient to prove that the Founders followed a cooperative security grand strategy. One must also examine how this language was put into practice in pursuance of the founding era national interests.

As a strategic document the Declaration of Independence served many roles. Aside from being a proclamation of liberty and the American worldview, it also served diplomatic and informational ends. George Herring notes this multifaceted role writing that “whatever place the Declaration has since assumed in the folklore of American nationhood, its immediate and urgent purpose was to make clear to Europeans...the colonies’ commitment to independence.”⁷⁵ In essence, the Declaration announced to the world that the colonies were united in the pursuance of their collective liberty and security. It also noted that with independence came the ability to do “all acts and things which independent states may of right do.”⁷⁶ This can be seen as having both domestic and foreign purposes both of which were in line with securing the vital national interests of liberty, union, and survival. In an external sense, the Declaration was intended to secure the foreign aid and alliances without which the Americans likely could not secure any of their interests. Internally, it cemented claims “that Americans constituted, in some sense, a single people...solemnly pledged to secure their independence in common.”⁷⁷ The logical next steps of this new reality were the institutionalization of this cooperative security grand strategy in the Articles of Confederation and later, the Constitution.

If the Declaration of Independence announced, perhaps implicitly, that the United States was to follow a cooperative security grand strategy, then the Articles of

⁷⁴ Kesler, “Constitution of the United States,” 542.

⁷⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15.

⁷⁶ Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” 532.

⁷⁷ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 125.

Confederation and the Constitution can be considered the implementation and actualization of that strategy. Within limits, each sought to bind the states together in a union so that they might preserve their liberty and ensure their continued survival. In their own way each sought to put actual meat on the rhetorical bones described in the Declaration. Yet, despite a similarity of intentions, the Articles and the Constitution were at least as much different, as they were the same. The Articles, completed in 1777 and fully ratified in 1781, were a first attempt at constructing a workable union among the states. While nominally adequate to secure independence, the Articles of Confederation proved to be largely ineffective at most other tasks.⁷⁸ This was primarily because under the Articles the individual states retained significant power over collective decision-making. From a governing perspective, Congress under the Articles “could not pass effective laws or enforce its orders. It could ask for money but not compel payment; it could enter into treaties but not enforce their stipulations; it could provide for raising of armies but not fill the ranks; it could borrow money but take no proper measures for repayment; it could advise and recommend but not command.”⁷⁹ From a grand strategy perspective, Congress could not “raise revenue, could not bargain effectively, could not assure other nations that any agreement it made would actually be observed by the states, could not develop a unified commercial policy to extort concessions from other countries, [and] could not maintain an effective military or naval force.”⁸⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, the Articles of Confederation, hampered by the Founders’ fear of a powerful central authority, represented a union too weak to secure the national interests. Alas, the continuation of a cooperative security grand strategy required the Founders alter their approach not only to maintain their liberty and union, but also to ensure their survival and growth as an independent country.

⁷⁸ This is not to imply that Congress under the articles was entirely useless. The passage of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, is one example of an instance where the Confederation Congress was able to function effectively.

⁷⁹ Andrew C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-1789* (Harper, 1905), 50–51, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/miun.acm7980.0010.001>.

⁸⁰ Perkins, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*, 1:56.

In order to secure the national interests and better manage the young nation's diplomatic, economic, and security affairs, the Articles were replaced by the United States Constitution. Written in 1787, and officially ratified the following year, the Constitution represented a more powerful union with enhanced federal powers. These included the power to tax, borrow, and spend; raise and control military forces; contract and enforce treaties; and create and enforce federal laws. This transfer of power to the federal government was made possible largely by the perceived failures of the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution had increased legitimacy in that it derived its authority from and applied its laws directly to the people, vice the individual states. In instituting courts by which Federal law was applied to citizens vice individual states, the Constitution moved beyond basic cooperative security principles manifested in the Articles.⁸¹ Its greater powers not only allowed for better management of internal relations with and among the states, but they also streamlined and consolidated formal relations with the external world. Hendrickson notes this improvement, writing that the Constitution established “a continental order that partook of the character of both a state and a state system.”⁸² To the chagrin of some, these gains came at the cost of a consolidated administration of the nation's diplomatic, informational, military, and economic affairs. Lastly, and perhaps supremely from a cooperative security perspective, the Constitution was a more effective vehicle for meeting the demands of a cooperative security grand strategy as it both enhanced the interdependent character of the states, and provided a better mechanism for collective action in pursuit of the founding era national interests.

Grand strategies in the cooperative security mold hold at their core the view that collective action and interdependence among states is the surest path to peace and prosperity. While one can surely debate the validity of this logic, one would find it more difficult to argue that the Founders did not subscribe to this perspective when confronting the strategic challenges they faced. Indeed, the founding documents of the United States represent a manifestation of these very principles. Yet, it is not in these documents alone

⁸¹ Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 15,” in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 100–108.

⁸² Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 258.

that one can find evidence that the Founders followed a cooperative security grand strategy. One need only consider how they implemented and adapted these works while remaining true to the logic of a cooperative security grand strategy. The demands of liberty, union, and survival not only required that the Founders realize the ambitious claims written in the Declaration of Independence by committing to the Articles of Confederation, but also the subsequent abandoning of the Articles in favor of the Constitution. In the end, the execution of the Founders' robust cooperative security grand strategy—guided by requisite considerations for the national interests—laid the foundations of American nationhood and set her on a proper course for future power and prosperity.

D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

*A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.*⁸³

—Alexander Hamilton

As might be expected, the distinguishing feature of a selective engagement grand strategy is that it is selective. In contrast to cooperative security, which holds that “everywhere matters,” selective engagement maintains that some things are more important than others. This prioritization is a result of the selective engagement view that resources are scarce and should only be committed to the most vital of national interests. Derived from the balance of power realist school of international relations, selective engagement is primarily concerned with the relations between great powers.⁸⁴ Ever conscious of the balance of power, it mostly discounts the importance of less powerful states while conceding that they do “matter to the extent that they could energize intense great power security competition.”⁸⁵ Given this relevance to powers great and small, selective engagement as a grand strategy archetype should be viewed through a broad lens.

⁸³ Hamilton, “Federalist No. 11,” 82.

⁸⁴ Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” 17–19.

⁸⁵ Posen and Ross, 19.

So long as it is concerned with influencing the balance of power, a selective engagement grand strategy allows for many different kinds of engagement that are selective in their application, method, target, timing, or location. Additionally, selective engagement is as much about where and how a state chooses not to engage, as it is about the manner and location that it does. Indeed, this is how—with a discerning eye on the regional and global balance of power—the founding generation conducted a selective engagement grand strategy in pursuit of American national interests.

Whereas a modern American selective engagement grand strategy might entail the United States—as a great power—selectively engaging to prevent the rise of a rival, the Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy sought to ensure their own ascension. As a weak power, the Founders calibrated the manner and object of their engagements as their interests required. This calibration can be divided into two primary schemas: the style and degree of engagement needed to secure independence and those required to maintain it. In both instances, the Founders were not only sensitive to the timing of their engagement, but also its object and form. In endeavoring to throw off British rule and secure their independence, the Founders solicited engagement with the European balance of power system and leveraged it to their advantage. Yet, upon securing their independence the Founders sought to insulate the United States from the “frequent controversies” associated with the European balance of power system. Being selective in when and how the United States would engage with European powers was the central point around which the Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy revolved.

An initial determination made by the Founders in regard to their selective engagement grand strategy was the necessity to engage in the balance of power system and select a European power with which to secure an alliance. The Founders recognized that France would be the most inclined and able to aid the colonies, if only to harm Great Britain. The Americans succeeded in contracting two treaties with France: one economic and the other a defensive military alliance. For the Americans, the alliance was indispensable for the attainment of their independence. Yet, as Alexander DeConde notes, “the aim of the French government had been independence for the United States and

destruction of English power, with the latter objective foremost.”⁸⁶ To their credit, the Founders fully recognized the limited extent of Franco-American mutual interests and planned accordingly. John Jay, acting as an American negotiator in Paris, wrote to Robert Livingston that the French “are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that point we may, I believe depend upon them, but it is not in their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so... if we lean on her love of liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity, we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our hands.”⁸⁷ Having enlisted France in the fight for American independence, the Founders understood that their mutual interests would likely wane upon securing it and that their strategy would need to evolve.

In negotiating the end of the Revolutionary War, the Founders made astute assessments of both French and British interests and contrived shrewd diplomatic maneuvers to exploit them to American advantage. Writing to Samuel Cooper in 1782, Benjamin Franklin describes how the United States must engage with each power, stating that “in my opinion the true political interest of America, consists in observing and fulfilling with the greatest exactitude the engagements of our alliance with France; and behaving at the same time towards England so as not entirely to extinguish her hopes of a reconciliation.”⁸⁸ Weeks notes this deft political maneuvering in his history of American foreign relations, writing that the Americans “accurately judged the interests of the world’s two most powerful states and played them off one another flawlessly.”⁸⁹ In doing so, Franklin, Jay, and John Adams were able to extract terms considerably more favorable than

⁸⁶ Alexander Deconde, *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1958), 8.

⁸⁷ John Jay, “John Jay to Robert R. Livingston, 17 November 1782,” in *The Selected Papers of John Jay Digital Edition*, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), <https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JNJY-01-03-02-0076>.

⁸⁸ Benjamin Franklin, “From Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper, 26 December 1782,” in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol 38, August 16, 1782 through January 20, 1783*, ed. Ellen R. Cohn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 503–4.

⁸⁹ Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 29–31.

might have been expected.⁹⁰ Yet, despite their apparent skill in engagement with the European balance of power system, the Founders' understood that their interests beyond securing their independence would be better served by engaging in ways that insulated the young nation from the European powers.

In effect, this meant a different schema of selective engagement. An enlightened conception of selective engagement grand strategy allows one to not only select who one engages with, but also the time, place, manner, and form of that engagement. Implied in this logic is that one also chooses who, where, and how one will not engage. In essence, this is how the Founders recalibrated their selective engagement grand strategy upon achieving independence. The above example represents an instance where the Founders effectively engaged the balance of power system to solicit French diplomatic and military engagement in order to secure American interests. Yet, upon achieving independence the Founders largely sought to disengage the United States from the political and military types of engagements inherent to the Old World balance of power system. Nevertheless, the Founders did not completely eschew the provision of American political and military power. Actually, in ratifying the Constitution they instituted the mechanisms by which collective political and military power could be generated and wielded.⁹¹ The Founders acknowledged that the United States may become involved in wars. However, they also recognized that the growth of American power in the Western Hemisphere could not be secured if it remained wedded to participation in European political and military engagements.

Instead, the Founders focused on the Western Hemisphere and emphasized external engagements that were economic and commercial in nature. While this American preference for economic engagement and aversion to political connections has roots in the "Model Treaty" penned by John Adams in September, 1776, these sentiments are present

⁹⁰ Franklin and his fellow American negotiators played to British and French concerns for the balance of power after the war. In short, the British wanted to separate the Americans from their French allies so they were willing to offer generous terms. By contrast, the French acquiesced to this out of fear of alienating the Americans and pushing them back into the arms of the British.

⁹¹ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 23," in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York, N.Y.: Signet Classics, 2003), 148–53.

throughout the founding era.⁹² In *Federalist No. 11*, Hamilton notes that the United States' favorable geography and resources would allow it to develop economic and naval power capable of deciding "the fate of a [European] campaign on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended."⁹³ In short, a vibrant maritime commercial sector would enable the Americans to tilt the balance of power in the Gulf of Mexico and West Indies as their interests required. Perhaps the most famous example of this penchant for selectivity and economic preference is George Washington's Farewell Address. Largely written by Alexander Hamilton but approved by Washington, the address advised Americans that "the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible."⁹⁴ The selective preference for economic ties but not political ones would be as Weeks writes, "a guiding assumption of American foreign relations until the 1940s."⁹⁵

The Founders' selective engagement grand strategy was fundamentally about positioning the United States' relationship with the global balance of power system in ways favorable to American interests. As a result, the varying geostrategic circumstances of the founding era required different approaches to selective engagement. In some instances, this required more engagement with the balance of power system, while in others a more constrained conception of selective engagement was necessary. Walling writes that "recognizing that different times and circumstances require different kinds of virtues is a sign of political maturity."⁹⁶ Indeed, the dexterity with which the Founders crafted their selective engagement grand strategy not only demonstrated their political maturity, but also their strategic prescience. Later, as the United States became more powerful, American leaders would continue to recalibrate the Founders' original selective engagement grand

⁹² Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 22.

⁹³ Hamilton, "Federalist No. 11," 82.

⁹⁴ Washington, "The Farewell Address," 27.

⁹⁵ Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 23.

⁹⁶ Karl Walling, *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 289.

strategy to account for their own strategic circumstances. American strategic visions, such as the Monroe Doctrine or even containment, represent evolved forms of selective engagement and have their conceptual roots in the earliest years of the republic.

E. ISOLATIONISM

*Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?*⁹⁷

—George Washington

As one might infer from previous sections of this chapter, the Founders were not strict isolationists. They did, however, employ robust elements of isolationist grand strategy. Aside from the limited forms of engagement and integration discussed previously, it remains true that the general thrust of the Founders' grand strategy was isolationist with regard to the Old World. Posen and Ross note that isolationism as a grand strategy subscribes to both "a fundamentally realist view of international politics" and a "constricted view of U.S. national interests that renders internationalism not only unnecessary but counterproductive."⁹⁸ This defensive realism and narrow conception of the national interest aligns with the similarly narrow and defensive American national interests in the founding era. Isolationism is not a grand strategy advisable to all states. Indeed, for most, it is arguably not even worth consideration. Yet, given its "detached and distant situation," an isolationist grand strategy has remained an enduring option for the United States throughout its history.⁹⁹ When understood in terms of neutrality in European wars, the Founders followed a grand strategy of isolationism not just because they could, but because it was necessary to preserve their liberty, maintain their union, and ensure the continued survival of the young republic.

⁹⁷ Washington, "The Farewell Address," 28.

⁹⁸ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 12.

⁹⁹ Washington, "The Farewell Address," 28.

To properly demonstrate the seeming paradox that the Founders' grand strategy was both isolationist and engaging, one must recall that Americans in the founding era largely considered their individual states to be sovereign. As such, their unification under the Articles of Confederation, and later under the Constitution, was viewed as an inherently internationalist action. In their union, the Founders sought to "take a step beyond the balance of power" and "establish an American system based on perpetual peace and free trade among the confederating states."¹⁰⁰ It was in attempting to shield this system from the vicissitudes of the external world that the Founders' grand strategy took on an isolationist character. Though themes to this effect run throughout the founding era, there is perhaps no better exemplar of this notion in practice than the Washington administration's handling of American statecraft during the wars of the French Revolution.

The outbreak of war between England and revolutionary France in 1793 placed the United States in a delicate situation. Technically still allied with France but economically dependent on the British, the United States was caught in precisely the type of entanglement the Founders feared. On the one hand, many Americans maintained fond feelings for the French, both out of appreciation for their assistance in securing American independence, but also because many saw in the French revolution the promulgation of principles kindred to those held so deeply in the United States. On the other hand, the American economic system instituted by Alexander Hamilton "depended entirely upon the continuation of commercial relations with Great Britain."¹⁰¹ To ameliorate this predicament, the Washington administration instituted a policy of neutrality, or more precisely "a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers."¹⁰² The aim was to chart a course by which the United States could avoid being drawn into the war on either side. It was in the United States' interest to have political isolation while maintaining and expanding economic integration. In this respect, the isolationist policies of Washington's

¹⁰⁰ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 176.

¹⁰¹ McDonald, *The Presidency of George Washington*, 120.

¹⁰² George Washington, "Neutrality Proclamation, 22 April 1793," in *The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, Vol. 12, 16 January 1793-31 May 1793*, ed. Christine S. Patrick and John C. Pinheiro (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 472-74.

administration were largely successful in insulating the United States from a conflagration which amounted to an incipient threat to the preservation of American liberty, union, and survival.¹⁰³

The French Revolutionary Wars were a danger to American interests not just because they risked American involvement in an external war for which it was ill-prepared, but also because they risked enflaming nascent schisms internal to the American body politic. One of Washington's final acts was to publish his Farewell Address which sought to assuage these developing inner tensions. The Address was not, as Eric Nordlinger notes, "intended to disguise the facts of America's weaknesses—its internal divisions, minor military capabilities, and encirclement by Europe's colonial powers."¹⁰⁴ Instead, it cautioned Americans not to "forego the advantages" of their "detached and distant situation."¹⁰⁵ In effect, Washington was advocating for a grand strategy that was isolationist in its character, but practical in its application, because the United States lacked the internal cohesion, military might, and strategic depth to involve itself in the affairs of others. He recognized that temporary alliances might be necessary in some instances and but warned against over-commitment to any foreign country.¹⁰⁶ While some, such as Alexander DeConde, have dismissed Washington's Farewell Address as nothing more than a "campaign document" that espoused the partisan political views of Hamilton's Federalist party, the strategic rationale of the document is sound.¹⁰⁷ To characterize Washington's address as inherently partisan, instead of well-reasoned and based on a cogent assessment of American strengths and vulnerabilities, belies the fact that it served as a central guide for insulating the United States from European wars for the next century of American growth and prosperity.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ As noted by Major Ryan Tice USMC at the Naval Postgraduate School in NS4990: The Theory and Practice of American Grand Strategy.

¹⁰⁴ Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*, 51.

¹⁰⁵ Washington, "The Farewell Address," 28.

¹⁰⁶ Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L. McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 489–97.

¹⁰⁷ Deconde, *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*, 469.

¹⁰⁸ Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*, 51.

Although isolationism is often the grand strategy most associated with the founding era, the Founders were not mere isolationists. In fact, a more sophisticated view would instead refer to them as ardent insulationists. The Founders were absolutely wary of being corrupted or nefariously influenced by those beyond their borders. Many held the view that the American system was a superior political and economic phenomenon that, if allowed to germinate and grow without outside interference, would serve as an example for the rest of the world.¹⁰⁹ Hendrickson highlights this view writing that “Americans, it would appear, have always believed that what they do for themselves they do for others, and...they believed that proposition heartily at the beginning.”¹¹⁰ Yet, for all the Founders’ grand aspirations and ostensibly altruistic motives, there were more practical reasons the Founders practiced elements of an isolationist grand strategy. The United States in the founding era was a weak power in a world full of imperial giants. When the Americans of this era looked at the world it seemed fraught with threats to their liberty, union, and survival. Many reasoned correctly that the best way to avoid being crushed by these giants was to limit the extent of American political involvement with them, while endeavoring to trade with them all. That is, at least, until the United States—by way of an insulationist grand strategy—could become a giant in its own right.

F. PRIMACY

*Let the thirteen states, bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American system superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!*¹¹¹

—Alexander Hamilton

Heretofore, this chapter has put forth as part of its argument the notion that many of the decisions the Founders made in regard to grand strategy were a reflection of the United States’ weakness in the founding era; that in order to overcome their weaknesses

¹⁰⁹ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 16–17.

¹¹⁰ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 169.

¹¹¹ Hamilton, “Federalist No. 11,” 86.

and secure their interests, the Founders had to “hang together” and pursue a collective security grand strategy. As such, one might be surprised to find that this chapter also argues that the Founders pursued a grand strategy of primacy which holds “that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.”¹¹² A primacy grand strategy is designed to “preserve U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger.”¹¹³ Yet, if the United States was comparatively weak and not a supreme power in the founding era, then how would a primacy grand strategy be enacted by the Founders? The answer is fundamentally about scale and geography. Given the power and reach of the modern United States, a modern primacy strategy would entail the pursuance of unparalleled American dominance on a global scale. In contrast, the United States in its earliest years was committed to a grand strategy of securing American primacy “east of the Mississippi” and laying the foundation for American primacy in the Western Hemisphere.

Signed in 1783, the Treaty of Paris not only recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies, but it also formally ceded to the Americans all British lands in North America south of the Canadian border and east of the Mississippi River.¹¹⁴ While these terms—deftly extracted from the British by the combined efforts of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay—more than doubled the territorial size of the United States and represented a boon for Americans looking to expand westward, actual expansion proved to be problematic.¹¹⁵ The territory “granted” to the United States in the Treaty of Paris was occupied by various Indian tribes who were understandably intent on preventing American encroachment into their lands. Furthermore, parts of the land north of the Ohio River were still occupied by the British who continued to trade with and support Indian tribes in their resistance to American westward expansion.¹¹⁶ Though the Treaty of Paris mandated that the British must abandon all outposts on American territory, they remained for two primary

¹¹² Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” 32.

¹¹³ Posen and Ross, 32.

¹¹⁴ Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789*, 594.

¹¹⁵ For a description of the impressive American negotiation efforts see: Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 27–31.

¹¹⁶ Michael S. Kochin and Michael Taylor, *An Independent Empire* (Ann Arbor: Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2020), 56.

reasons. The first stems from the failure of the United States under the Articles of Confederation to uphold requirements imposed on it by the Treaty of Paris.¹¹⁷ The second reason is more practical and cynical. In essence, the British did not depart because they benefitted from a booming fur trade and the Americans could not—militarily or diplomatically—force them to leave.¹¹⁸

Whereas the British maintained a hostile presence north of the Ohio River, the Spanish were the main threat to American territory in the south. Spain “had not recognized the cession of this land to the United States” and “the year following peace saw the Spanish close the lower Mississippi to American navigation.”¹¹⁹ An inability to access the Mississippi would significantly hamper the economic prospects for those Americans moving into the frontier territories as they would be limited in their ability to trade. Spain also encouraged and supported hostile Indians and frontiersmen in hopes that settlers moving into these areas would decide to abandon their allegiance to the United States so that they may gain access to the Mississippi River and New Orleans.¹²⁰ Failed efforts at negotiating with Spain in the form of the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty did little to solve any of these issues and its only real accomplishment was the escalation of sectional tensions within the United States.¹²¹

The primacy grand strategy employed by the Founders was fundamentally about reducing or eliminating these threats to American interests and establishing hegemony in greater North America. This strategy was pursued over time in a series of legal, military, and diplomatic steps which, by the end of the Washington administration, would see the United States as the dominant political, economic, and military power on the eastern portion of North America.

¹¹⁷ These terms included payments both to British creditors and to Loyalists whose property had been confiscated by the Americans during the revolution. Any American protest to the British regarding their continued occupancy of American territory was met with a rebuttal that the Americans were also not in compliance with the treaty. See: Kochin and Taylor, 63.

¹¹⁸ Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution*, 6–11.

¹¹⁹ Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789*, 607.

¹²⁰ Middlekauff, 607.

¹²¹ Kochin and Taylor, *An Independent Empire*, 64–65.

The Northwest Ordinance, a legal act first passed by the Confederation Congress in 1787, was one in a series of laws designed to ensure that the frontier “would be settled in an orderly and progressive fashion.”¹²² That Americans would ultimately expand westward from their settlements on the eastern seaboard was not in doubt by the Founders. Yet, it was held that expansion should be done in a way that both minimized tensions with Indians in the territory and provided for the rights of those moving Westward while ensuring their incorporation into the union.¹²³ The Northwest Ordinance was largely successful in the latter but failed in the former. It succeeded in that it provided the legal framework for new states to “enter the Union as coequals (to states already established), it allowed settlers to form their own governments, and established a path to statehood.”¹²⁴ It also included provisions for the establishment of American governmental, educational, and religious institutions. These institutions were intended to promote the primacy of the American system in the territories and attract the “respectable, law-abiding, and productive settlers” that would be needed to transform the untamed frontier into future states.¹²⁵ In sum, the Ordinance established the formal mechanisms by which the United States would assert its primacy in the western territories and served as a model for subsequent westward expansions. Yet, for all its triumphs as the legal element of a primacy grand strategy, it was not entirely successful in every regard.

The Northwest Ordinance failed in that it did not prevent conflict between the settlers and the Indian inhabitants of the territory. Indian refusal to accept a “civilized” way of life and settler refusal to respect Indian territorial claims made conflict between them all but inevitable. Though the Ordinance contained protections for Indian territorial claims and stated that “their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent;

¹²² Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty a History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 114.

¹²³ The Northwest Ordinance also banned slavery in the Northwest Territory. As the Ordinance was passed by the Confederation Congress, which required approval from all states including those holding slaves, one may view as an element of the founders’ grand strategy the desire and intent to eventually eliminate slavery.

¹²⁴ Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 41.

¹²⁵ Wood, *Empire of Liberty a History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, 121.

and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress,” the reality was quite different.¹²⁶ Despite this language and the wishes of some prominent Americans such as George Washington, the territory was the scene of near continuous conflict between the Indian tribes and settlers.¹²⁷ In a sense, the Founders’ primacy grand strategy was as much about subjugating to American authority the white settlers as it was the submission of the Indian tribes. While initial American military efforts to pacify the region were largely unmitigated disasters, a systematic campaign headed by General “Mad Anthony” Wayne succeeded in defeating a coalition of Indian tribes in August, 1794, at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. The following year, Wayne imposed on the Indians the Treaty of Greenville in which they surrendered most of their territorial claims in the region.¹²⁸ In the end, his victory not only demonstrated that the United States could enforce its legal doctrine with military power, but it also “crippled the hold of Indians and British in the Old Northwest, restoring the prestige of the American government and strengthening its hold on the Ohio country.”¹²⁹

Aside from securing a measure of American military primacy in the Northwest Territory, the victory was also notable for its concomitance with American diplomatic successes essential to its primacy grand strategy. While Wayne was conducting his Ohio campaign, John Jay and British representatives had been negotiating what would become known in the United States as the Jay Treaty. Conducted in the context of a Washington administration keen on preventing American involvement in Europe’s great wars, the negotiations were primarily concerned with settling a number of outstanding issues between the United States and Great Britain. While the treaty’s terms set off a political firestorm of opposition in the United States, its provisions were not ill-conceived from a

¹²⁶ *A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, vol. 32, Journals of the Continental Congress, Created and Maintained by the Library of Congress, <https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=032/lljc032.db&recNum=349>.

¹²⁷ Wood, *Empire of Liberty a History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, 123–33; Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 59–63; Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 56–57; McDonald, *The Presidency of George Washington*, 120–23.

¹²⁸ Wood, *Empire of Liberty a History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, 131.

¹²⁹ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 80.

strategic perspective. Jay had secured both limited access to British markets for American merchants and British agreement to finally evacuate its forts on American territory. As an element of a primacy grand strategy, the treaty can be considered in an even more positive light as it not only ended foreign occupation of American lands, but perhaps “most importantly, it preserved peace at a time when the Union had neither the economic nor the military means to engage in another conflict with Britain.”¹³⁰

The ratification of the Jay Treaty fostered some unforeseen yet not altogether unfortunate effects. The treaty and its ratification did heighten internal political tensions in the United States and led to the formation of the country’s first political parties. However, it also led to fortuitous developments in the Founders’ primacy grand strategy. While Wayne’s Ohio War and the Jay Treaty had affirmed American primacy north of the Ohio River, the south remained threatened by the Spanish. Yet, with the Americans and British now bound by a treaty, Spain feared that a joint Anglo-American campaign against Spanish America was in the offing. As a result, it moved to placate the Americans by negotiating and signing the Treaty of San Lorenzo in October, 1795. Referred to as Pinckney’s Treaty, in it the Spanish recognized the southern border claimed by the Americans, granted access to the Mississippi River, and pledged to cease supporting hostile Indians and frontiersmen.¹³¹ The treaty was a boon to the United States and the Washington administration in that it cost the country nothing, provided significant strategic gains, and as a result, eased some of the internal tensions associated with the Jay Treaty.

In conjunction, the Northwest Ordinance, the Ohio War, and the Jay and Pinckney Treaties established a preponderance of American power in eastern North America. As part of the Founders’ primacy grand strategy they represent successive legal, military, and diplomatic accomplishments which “bound the Northwest and Southwest to a still very fragile federal union” and secured a measure of peace and stability within American borders.¹³² The establishment of American primacy over American territory not only

¹³⁰ Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, 60.

¹³¹ McDonald, *The Presidency of George Washington*, 166–67.

¹³² Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 81.

bought the United States the space and time it needed to solidify its strength, but also to lay the foundations for future expansions of American primacy. Yet, perhaps most importantly, its primacy grand strategy greatly reduced or eliminated the most proximate threats to the United States' core national interests and secured a future for expanded American dominance.

G. THE INSULATIONIST PARADIGM: INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA

*To connect ourselves with the complicated combinations of the interests of Europe, would be to relinquish the most precious gift of nature, insulation from the power and politics of that continent.*¹³³

—Thomas Jefferson

Grand strategy is often divided into distinct categories with different underlying assumptions, logics, and prescriptions. Many advocate for a particular style of grand strategy based on geopolitical requirements, while others do so from the perspective of ideology. Often implied in these debates is that one form or mode of grand strategy must be chosen and followed at the expense of others. It is sometimes argued that pursuing different grand strategies in tandem can lead to counterproductive policies and strategic incoherence.¹³⁴ Yet, the grand strategy practices of the American Founders suggest that such views are not necessarily true. The previous sections of this chapter demonstrate that the Founders not only employed different forms of grand strategy, but that they did so in ways that integrated their seemingly contradictory characteristics into an insulationist paradigm. However, this syncretization was not just a serendipitous assembly of grand strategies. The Founders blended these archetypal grand strategies in purposeful ways designed to construct what this work terms—insulated spheres of integration.

An insulated sphere of integration can be best understood by explaining its three component features. The overall concept will be further developed but defining each

¹³³ Thomas Jefferson, "From Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Ellsworth and William Vans Murray, with Levi Lincoln, 18 March 1801," in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 33 17 February-30 April 1801*, ed. Barbara B Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 346–49.

¹³⁴ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 52–53.

component is necessary for clarity. The first component is the notion of a sphere. A sphere in this model should be considered to represent a distinct domain bound by described characteristics. A sphere could be political, economic, geographic, or any other domain with established limits. The second feature of this construct is integration. This is meant to imply some form and intensity of connections within and between separate spheres. As above, these connections can be diverse in nature and include political, economic, diplomatic, and geographic relationships. The last feature of this concept is insulation. Insulation should be understood as intentional protections or buffers inside and around individual spheres that allow for safe integration both within a sphere and with other spheres. Taken together, these three notions manifest spheres that are—internally and externally—integrated for benefit but insulated for protection.

The particular synthetization of grand strategies the Founders achieved under the insulationist paradigm can be understood to have created two distinct insulated spheres of integration, one internal and one external. The basis of the internal sphere was the recognition that some form of cohesiveness was essential for securing common interests. The Founders' internal sphere consisted of the original thirteen states and territories ceded in the Treaty of Paris. The boundaries of the Founders' internal sphere were set by their cooperative security and primacy grand strategies. Partial boundaries were naturally established by the Founders' cooperative security grand strategy in that it inherently delineated who was cooperating towards common interests. In contrast, the boundaries were further solidified by the extent to which the Founders could enact their primacy grand strategy. After all, committing to cooperative security is one thing and being able to secure it is another. In sum, the Founders' internal sphere was bound by the interaction between the ideals in their cooperative security grand strategy and the reality of their limited power and capacity to conduct a primacy grand strategy.

The cooperative security grand strategy enacted by the Founders functioned as the integrating mechanism within their internal sphere. The Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution were successive attempts to achieve greater integration among the component parts of the internal sphere. Integration was advantageous because it allowed for greater political, economic, and military efficiency. In

ratifying the Constitution, the Founders created a stable political order, eliminated trade barriers between states, and instituted consolidated structures for employing military power. Ultimately, the integration achieved as a result of the Founders' cooperative security grand strategy created an internal sphere that consolidated enough power to manage the United States' national interests.

Yet, while the internal sphere naturally favored integration, the intent was not to achieve a complete or unlimited consolidation. The Founders feared too much integration would lead to an overconcentration of power and undermine the national interests. Hence, they insulated the internal sphere by designing protections for its component parts. The final version of this insulation was the Bill of Rights, the division of powers, and checks and balances system built into the Constitution. Power was shared across various levels and branches of government, each acting as a check on the other. However, the division of government power was not the only form of insulation built into the system. The Founders also insulated the internal sphere by creating mechanisms designed to promote flexibility. By provisioning methods to alter and expand the internal sphere when required, the Founders ensured that it would be durable over time as it was confronted with unforeseen challenges. Their intent was to achieve balance between integration and insulation so that the United States could realize its vast latent power.

Achieving this balance between integration and insulation allowed the Founders to effectuate their primacy grand strategy. This strategy solidified the internal sphere in two important ways. First, with the ratification of the Constitution, federal law and institutions achieved primacy over the states with regard to their enumerated national powers and responsibilities. This bound states and citizens alike to a more efficient mechanism for securing the common national interests. In a sense, the collective United States had to be supreme in order to overcome the weaknesses of the individual states. Second, the balance between integration and insulation made it possible for the Founders to pursue their "east of the Mississippi" primacy grand strategy. Approaching westward expansion as individual states not only would have been more difficult, but it would have also likely led to unnecessary conflict among the states. Either of these outcomes would have made it more challenging, if not impossible for the United States to achieve primacy in the west. Without

the powers created by the Constitution it is unlikely that the United States would have been able to achieve primacy in any sense. In fact, the Constitution should be seen as the necessary component for both strategies and by extension, the Founders' internal insulated sphere of integration. The success of the Founders' cooperative security and primacy grand strategies not only created and framed their internal sphere, but they also established a better position from which to manage the relationship with their external insulated sphere of integration.

Whereas the Founders' internal sphere was limited strictly to the United States, all other regions, nations, and empires comprised the external sphere. The external sphere encompassed all conceivable spheres—be they political, economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—not subsumed within the scope of the Founders' cooperative security and primacy grand strategies. These strategies, and the internal sphere they created, were principally about consolidation. In contrast to this favoring of integration over insulation, the Founders' external sphere overwhelmingly prioritized insulation at the expense of integration. While at least by some measures the United States was integrated into the wider world, the Founders feared that an abundance of integration would undermine the security of the United States and prevent it from securing its interests. Hence, they employed selective engagement and isolationist grand strategies as a way to insulate their integration within their external sphere.

As a general rule, the Founders' integrated within their external sphere for their economic benefit and isolated from it for their political protection. In ways that were necessary to secure American national interests, the Founders did pursue robust integration within the external sphere. They achieved integration by implementing a selective engagement grand strategy that was intended to leverage the balance of power system in ways advantageous to American interests. As detailed above, the Founders were discerning in how they chose to engage in international politics. They sought closer integration with the balance of power system in securing their independence, but endeavored to disengage from it as much as possible as their interests and objectives evolved. One facet of engagement that endured throughout the founding era was the Founders' desire for economic integration. American ports were an essential link in the vast Atlantic trading

network. As a consequence, the Founders sought improved and reciprocal trade relations with most and trade was at the heart of many treaties the United States signed with foreign nations. This prioritization of commercial engagement explains the importance of American navigation rights on the Mississippi River and expanded access to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies. In essence, trade was thought to be beneficial for the nascent nation in ways that political and military connections were not. Whereas commercial relations were generally beneficial for all parties involved, the Founders recognized that other types of connections with the external sphere risked excessive integrations that were not conducive to American interests.

In many ways, the United States of the founding era was inherently insulated. Its favorable geography naturally insulated it from the great imperial powers of Europe. In a sense, its geographic isolation enabled its political insulation. The United States was blessed in that it had the ability to “opt out” of most types of dilemmas that new nations are often confronted with. This ability represents the insulating qualities of the Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy in the Western Hemisphere as the United States could largely choose not only how it wanted to engage, but also how it did not. However, the Founders’ selective engagement strategy was not the only, or even primary, way they insulated their external sphere. The Founders’ isolationist grand strategy with the Old World was their primary method of insulating the United States within the external sphere. This strategy was intended to prevent the types of imprudent political and military integrations which might involve the country in controversies for which it was ill-prepared and might not have survived. The founding generation largely agreed that the United States had a unique opportunity to build a new kind of governing system. This work shows that it also required a new kind of grand strategy. In order for this new federal republic to flourish, it had to develop its “domestic foundations of national power.”¹³⁵ The Founders’ isolationist grand strategy provided both the time and space for American leaders to build and develop the institutions that would enable it to further engage within the external sphere in the future, albeit at considerably less risk. Together, the Founders’ selective

¹³⁵ Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*, 167–74.

engagement and isolationist grand strategies insulated the apparatuses by which their internal sphere achieved some measure of integration with the external sphere.

Having described the insulationist paradigm, the components and structure of the insulated spheres of integration concept, and the particular characteristics of the founding era spheres, this section will close by making a few additional observations. A first is a recognition that the United States in the founding era was a weak power. As such, it is a simple task to delineate neatly the dividing lines between an internal and external insulated sphere of integration. However, the weakness of the United States in this era may suggest some prudent guidance on how current and future American spheres should ideally be constructed. For instance, the Founders had a clear sense of prioritization. Their internal and external spheres were constructed to attend to core American national interests in ways that emphasized the characteristics of each sphere. The internal sphere favored integration and set clear boundaries on what was included within it. In contrast, the external sphere heavily favored insulation. Collectively, the Founders maintained a concerted skepticism and pessimism with regard to the wider world as they feared its military and economic power. As such, they took steps to insulate both the nation and its nascent economy from foreign wars and foreign competition.¹³⁶ A general principle of this insulationist paradigm might be that what the United States cannot incorporate into a cooperative security construct in which it enjoys primacy, should not be included in the United States' internal sphere. Instead, prudence may suggest that these entities must be positioned within an external sphere and approached with a selective engagement or isolationist grand strategy. Incorporating into the internal sphere entities over which the United States cannot assert primacy may risk compromising the very cooperation and security it is supposed to provide.

¹³⁶ Alfred E. Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1–18, 278–79.

H. CONCLUSION

*If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.*¹³⁷

—Alexander Hamilton

It is said that first impressions last. They do so because one's initial conception of something unavoidably influences one's earliest interactions with it. Processes and habits are developed which often survive even after those who created them are no longer present. Such is the case with the American Founders and the development of American grand strategy from 1776–1796. The United States of the founding era was a colossus in waiting. Yet, its survival was not guaranteed or even expected by the great powers of the day. To realize its inherent capacity, the United States required time, steady leadership, and a sensible and adaptable approach to the crafting and implementation of American grand strategy. The United States was a new type of nation facing complex strategic circumstances that required a new kind of grand strategy. As a result, the Founders blended archetypal grand strategies in order to create insulated spheres of integration from which they could secure their national interests and avoid or eliminate the pitfalls laid before them. Furthermore, it seems that their political revolution also entailed a revolution in the formulation and execution of grand strategy. If the foregoing is true, one might wonder whether this insulationist paradigm would remain as effective as the United States transitioned from a colossus in waiting into a colossus in reality. It is to this question that this work turns next. Regardless of the answers, it is clear that the skillful labors of the founding generation established the first impressions in American grand strategy and set a course on which the United States would not just survive, but would rise to become history's most dominant power.

¹³⁷ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 8," in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 65.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. THE GREAT RECASTING: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1945–1953

A. INTRODUCTION

*The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.*¹³⁸

—Harry Truman

First impressions, no matter how profound or significant, cannot survive the passage of time entirely intact. Change is inevitable. In the life of a nation it sometimes manifests slowly in a slight but unmistakable arc of evolution or, as has often happened throughout history, nations can change in what may seem like an instant. Most common, however, is that change arrives as a result of some combination of factors. Grand strategy changes in much the same way. The effects of enduring patterns, emerging trends, and the immediate demands of contemporary events often merge to influence how a nation and its grand strategy change over time. This amalgamation of patterns, trends, and events is a useful way to explain the epochal transition of American grand strategy that took place during the presidential administration of Harry S. Truman. In response to dramatic geopolitical changes wrought by World War II, the Truman administration fundamentally transformed the United States' role in international affairs. While this transformation required a significantly expanded scale to American grand strategy, it did not necessitate a wholly novel foundation. Instead, the administration built upon a history of blending archetypal grand strategies to secure American national interests. This chapter will show that by adapting enduring patterns in American grand strategy to emergent trends in American power, the Truman administration recast the nation's Insulated Spheres of Integration in order to account for substantial changes in the geopolitical environment. Whereas the Founders' grand strategy entailed a commitment to "continental national

¹³⁸ Harry S. Truman, *Truman Doctrine: President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress* (The Avalon Project, 1947), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.

security,” political isolation, and economic integration as a way to insulate the U.S. from threats abroad, the Truman grand strategy represented a commitment to “long-distance national security” with forms of both political and economic integration abroad as a way to insulate the United States and the Western hemisphere from the threats of Eurasia. This refashioning of American grand strategy not only allowed the United States to set a course for its eventual triumph over Soviet communism, it radically altered American life at home and abroad.

B. AN ESSENTIAL TRIFECTA ASCENDANT: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AFTER WORLD WAR II

*Our power position in the world, which has always depended upon the existence of a balance in Europe and Asia, is now threatened by a combination between unified hemispheres across the seas.*¹³⁹

—Nicholas Spykman

It is well known that the role of the United States in global affairs changed dramatically after the conclusion of World War II. Yet, when considering its grand strategy, care must be taken not to overstate the extent to which the United States’ new approach to international affairs entailed an expansion in its most essential national interests. Contrary to what is often assumed, the essential American national interests after World War II were characterized as much by continuity as by change. These essential national interests were, respectively: the survival of the American system, a functioning balance of power in Eurasia, and a global order conducive to both. One may note that these particular items likely describe American national interests of any era and that, at least in some sense, the security and prosperity of the United States have always depended on some realization of this essential trifecta. From certain perspectives, this observation is true and demonstrates a certain continuity in the essence of the United States’ national interests. Yet, for much of its history the tending of this essential trifecta did not require vigorous American engagement in global affairs as they were largely secured indirectly by the labors

¹³⁹ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 2017 Routledge (New York: Harcour, Brace, and Co., 1942), 195.

and interactions of other nations. However, such an arrangement did not survive the extensive social, technological, and economic changes caused by World War II. Hence, perceived expansions in American interests after the war stem at least as much from adapting to an altered geopolitical context as they do from a proliferation of American equities. Put simply, continuity describes the essence of American national interests after World War II, but the manifestation of those interests during the Truman administration represents the dramatic change; change that is often hailed as a new expansion of American national interests, but should instead be viewed more as a reconception of continuity in response to a changed world.

While this reconception may be understood in a variety of ways, perhaps the most useful way is to first briefly consider how the United States tended to its essential national interests prior to the Truman administration. For most of the nineteenth century, the United States largely adhered to the strategic advice in Washington's Farewell Address and was chiefly focused on building what William C. Martell refers to as the "domestic foundations of American power."¹⁴⁰ In truth, the realization of the United States' essential national interests in this era did not require meaningful overseas engagement. Walter Lippman attributed this to "the historical accident that in that period Asia was dormant, Europe divided, and Britain's command of the sea unchallenged."¹⁴¹ The realities of distance, the limits of technology, and the dominance of other great powers on Eurasia prevented not only the formulation of any serious threat to the United States' essential national interests, but also any sustained American yearning for robust global engagement. However, these foundational characteristics of the American strategic outlook began to erode with the closing of its western frontier in 1890. The next half-century saw not only a war with Spain and the acquisition of its colonies, but also a realization of what was perhaps the founding generation's worst strategic nightmare—American participation in European wars.

¹⁴⁰ Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*, 167–208.

¹⁴¹ Walter Lippman, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 49.

An ironic aspect of the United States' eventual entry into World War I is that the president who oversaw it—President Woodrow Wilson—was elected and then reelected on platforms which endorsed the more traditional American approach to securing the nation's essential interests.¹⁴² While the United States' eventual entry into World War I was driven by public outrage over German unrestricted submarine warfare and couched in rhetoric about making the world “safe for democracy,” American motives were not wholly altruistic.¹⁴³ After the war, Wilson pursued his famous grand plan for a new global order that entailed a more sustainable “community of power” enshrined in the League of Nations.¹⁴⁴ However, Wilson's vision was, as John Lewis Gaddis writes, “well beyond where his countrymen were ready to go.”¹⁴⁵ Despite its involvement in the Great War, many in the United States were opposed to an abandonment of traditional American approaches to international affairs in favor of Wilson's ambitious ideas for securing global peace. The president's subsequent failure to compromise during negotiations with Republican senators not only ensured that the United States did not join the League of Nations, but also that it would not enter more modest security arrangements with France and Great Britain.¹⁴⁶ Consequently, the United States returned to a pre-war conception of its essential national interests, recommitted itself to strategic non-entanglement, and acquiesced to a peace that George Kennan later characterized as having “the tragedies of the future written into it as by the devil's own hand.”¹⁴⁷

These future tragedies culminated in the catastrophe that was World War II, an event that most influenced how the United States' essential national interests manifested

¹⁴² Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 398–410.

¹⁴³ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany” (1917), <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-2-1917-address-congress-requesting-declaration-war>.

¹⁴⁴ Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics; America's Response to War and Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 60–64.

¹⁴⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 16.

¹⁴⁶ Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate Over International Relations 1789-1941*, 323–40.

¹⁴⁷ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, Sixtieth Anniversary Expanded Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 73.

during the Truman administration. When war broke out in the late 1930s, unhappy memories of World War I and the effects of the Great Depression caused many Americans to favor an abstention from the fighting.¹⁴⁸ It was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that most Americans came around to the notion “that Wilson had been right: that [their] security could be threatened by what happened halfway around the world.”¹⁴⁹ For some, the attacks settled once and for all the debate as to whether American prosperity and security were dependent on events and conditions far beyond its shores. In entering the war President Roosevelt intended to ensure the United States would never again cede the tending of its essential interests to the whims of fate and circumstance beyond its hemisphere. Central to this effort was the notion that the nation must eliminate the types of political, military, and economic conditions which made an event like World War II likely, if not inevitable. In Roosevelt’s view, this meant casting Wilsonian ideals in a realist’s mold to produce a “world conducive to the interests of the United States, a world order that would allow it to increase its wealth and power and carry its values to every corner of the globe.”¹⁵⁰ The central failing of this vision was the assumption of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union when, in reality, “the conquest of the Axis Powers would open a vacuum into which the victors would flow on a collision course with each other.”¹⁵¹ By 1946, Roosevelt’s successor, President Harry Truman, oversaw a dramatic cooling of relations with the Soviet Union. Divergent visions of what was required for their post-war security, fundamentally opposed ideological schemas, and structural pressures stemming from post-war power vacuums all combined to place the United States and the Soviet Union in opposition to each other. As such, the Truman-era essential national interests are best understood by examining both their general qualities and their contextual manifestation in a world characterized by both intense geopolitical change and adversarial relations with the Soviet Union.

¹⁴⁸ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 502–5.

¹⁴⁹ Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, 17.

¹⁵⁰ Warren I. Cohen, *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*, vol. Volume 4, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5.

¹⁵¹ Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 33–34.

The first element of the United States' trifecta of essential interests concerns the health and survival of its distinct political economy. Maintaining the "American System," which was based on liberty and union at home and had enabled the nation to rise from "colony to superpower" in just over a century and a half, was the root essential national interest of the Truman administration. A number of rationales explain the necessity of maintaining the vibrancy of the American political economy at the outset of the Cold War. For instance, World War II brought the United States out of the Great Depression and largely resurrected the reputation of capitalism in the eyes of many Americans.¹⁵² As a result, the Truman administration had considerable incentives to maintain the restored productivity of the American economy. Put simply, it needed to ensure that the war boom did not devolve into a post-war collapse complete with all the attendant economic and political ramifications—both abroad and at home—that would surely follow.¹⁵³

The United States maintained the sole industrial economy to survive the war relatively intact. Referred to as the "arsenal of democracy" during the war, the American economy was the only one capable of functioning as an "arsenal of reconstruction" after its conclusion. Given the ideological underpinnings of the Cold War, the vitality of American-style democratic capitalism was of particular relevance. In this struggle between democratic capitalism and authoritarian socialism, the side that could perform better for its adherents would enjoy a decisive long-term advantage. The emergence of the Cold War sparked apprehensions about what permanent damage might be inflicted on the American system if there was a war with the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler notes these fears in his study of the Truman administration, writing that American leaders feared "their own political economy would be jeopardized if a totalitarian foe became too powerful."¹⁵⁴ The Truman team worried that "if such contingencies materialized, domestic freedoms would be imperiled because there was no way to separate the economic from the political realms

¹⁵² James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61–81.

¹⁵³ McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*, 41–42.

¹⁵⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 2015th ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 13.

of governmental activity.”¹⁵⁵ While the United States was finally prepared to alter its approach to global integration in order to directly manage its essential interests, its leaders did not want to erode the foundations of its political and economic traditions in the process. Traditions which, in the eyes of many American leaders, had been proven superior by the United States’ performance during the war. The successful maintenance of American political and economic traditions depended on the United States’ ability to prevent other nations—particularly authoritarian ones—from becoming overly powerful. Ironically, in order to protect some traditions, the United States would have to abandon others.

The United States had to abandon its strategic non-entanglement tradition in order to secure the second part of its trifecta of essential interests—the cultivation of favorable balances of power in Eurasia. Despite its historic penchant for avoiding entanglements in affairs beyond its shores, the security of the United States has always depended on a balance of power in the Old World. A properly functioning balance in Europe and Asia ensured that no Eurasian power could consolidate enough military and economic resources to control the Old World or threaten the United States in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵⁶ Yet, though such balances have been an essential national interest for the United States since the earliest days of the republic, it was not required to engage in their maintenance. Given its detached situation, the United States enjoyed the benefits provided by the churn of Old World power politics without having to become a participant. Nicholas Spykman highlighted this favorable disposition in his 1942 treatise on geopolitics, writing that the “preoccupation of the European nations with the balance of power at home gave [the United States] the opportunity to grow [its] present position of power.”¹⁵⁷ Such a propitious arrangement, however, did not survive the intense social, economic, and political changes left in the wake of the second world war.

¹⁵⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 2015 ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 13–14.

¹⁵⁶ See: Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: The Geographic Pivot of History* (Singapore: Origami Books, 2018); Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*.

¹⁵⁷ Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 89.

In effect, World War II eliminated the United States' ability to take advantage of other nations' efforts to control the Eurasian balance of power. The fighting left much of Europe and Asia in ruins, Germany and Japan both prostrate and occupied, China divided by civil war, and British imperial power mortally wounded. The war not only shattered nations and order across the Eurasian landmass, it also highlighted for many in Washington the risks inherent to the United States' traditional approach to securing favorable power balances beyond the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had very nearly secured vast consolidations of resources, manpower, and industrial capacity with which they could have threatened the United States directly. When this fact was combined with the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union and the post-war power vacuums in Europe and Asia, many thought the United States had little choice but to reconceptualize its model for preventing "another totalitarian adversary gaining direct or indirect control of Eurasia and mobilizing its resources against the United States."¹⁵⁸ If a balance of power favorable to American interests was to be reestablished in Eurasia, then the United States would have to take an active role in its reconstruction and maintenance. Indeed, this is what the Truman administration sought to do as it went about establishing a post-war global order.

The construction of a post-war global order conducive to both the health of the American System and the reestablishment and maintenance of a Eurasian power balance was the last element in the United States' trifecta of essential interests. In a macro sense, the order had to be beneficial to the long-term interests of the United States but antithetical to those of its competitors—in this case the Soviet Union. Yet, an order favorable to American interests was not in and of itself sufficient to cultivate favorable balances of power across Eurasia. The order also had to appeal to those nations the United States needed to balance its potential foes in Europe and Asia. Leffler notes this requirement, writing that "western Europe, western Germany, and Japan would not long accept U.S. leadership if they did not prosper."¹⁵⁹ In short, the order needed to favor American allies

¹⁵⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 502.

¹⁵⁹ Leffler, 501.

even if sometimes directly at the United States' expense. In many cases, this entailed an order that purposely did not maximize the benefit for the United States. In his history of the post-war global economy, Herman Van Der Wee details the self-limiting aspects of the American-led order writing that, "discrimination against American products and against the dollar...[was] regarded as a permanent necessary evil" and that such practices were recognized as "the inevitable consequences of the Cold War."¹⁶⁰ These consequences were tolerable so long as the United States prioritized its struggle against the Soviet Union more than it did a perfectly reciprocal relationship with its allies. In sum, as long as the global order was conducive to the American system, promoted favorable balances of power in Eurasia, and was antithetical to the long-term interests of the Soviet Union, American leaders were content with a less than perfect deal.

Continuity describes the essence of the United States' national interests. Americans have always had an essential interest in the health and survival of their political and economic systems. Their security and prosperity have always depended on favorable balances of power on the Eurasian landmass. Furthermore, the realization of each of these has always been contingent on some sort of global order. However, continuity does not describe the manifestation of these essential interests during the Truman administration. World War II left in its wake a world dramatically changed. In turn, the United States confronted substantial changes in the manifestation of its essential interests. This change is often highlighted as a dramatic expansion of American interests when, in reality, changes in the scale and scope of American grand strategy—not American essential interests—more accurately represent and explain the United States' changed role in international affairs after the war. Continuous in their essence but metamorphic in their manifestation, these essential American national interests guided the Truman administration as it blended archetypal grand strategies in response to a changed geopolitical context.

¹⁶⁰ Herman Van Der Wee, *Prosperity & Upheaval: The World Economy 1945-1980*, trans. Robin Hogg and Max R. Hall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 356–57.

C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY

*We have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the attainment of our own national security. Our goal is collective security for all mankind.*¹⁶¹

—Harry Truman

The United States has a complicated history with cooperative security as a grand strategy archetype. As described in the previous chapter, the United States—as a constitutionally based federal republic—is itself a paragon of cooperative security grand strategy. Yet, it is also a nation that has been skeptical of the application of cooperative security principles abroad. In truth, it was skeptical largely because it could afford to be. Prior to the twentieth century, the realization of its essential national interests did not necessitate an implementation of cooperative security principles beyond its own borders. The United States remained wedded to this arrangement even after there were indications of its erosion. Following World War I, the United States rejected participation in both the League of Nations and “entangling alliances” with the British and French. However, after World War II the United States abandoned its previous aversions and implemented a cooperative security grand strategy on an unprecedented scale. The United States’ post-war cooperative security grand strategy was not, however, conceived of fully formed. Instead, it was developed incrementally and implemented gradually—often driven by what George Kennan and Arthur Schlesinger termed “universalist” and “spheres of influence” or “particularist” views of international organization and security.¹⁶² Whereas a universalist view entails a broad conception of cooperative security principles and concerned collective security on a wide scale, the spheres of influence or particularist view employed cooperative security principles on a more limited basis and was concerned with the collective defense of a distinct body or collection of states. In practice, the United States

¹⁶¹ Harry S. Truman, *Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union* (The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, 1947), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-the-union-15>.

¹⁶² Arthur Schlesinger, “Origins of the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 01 (October 1967): 22; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26–28.

blended both schemas as it implemented a cooperative security grand strategy during the Truman administration.

The first element in the United States' post-war cooperative security grand strategy was of the "universalist" variety and emphasized collective security. The United Nations was born of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull's vision for an international organization dedicated to the promotion of world peace. Though he did not expect it to resolve major controversies, Roosevelt believed the United Nations could serve as a useful tool to "establish a pattern of international collaboration that could then be used to contain the Soviet Union should the Kremlin prove to be a destructive force in the post-war world."¹⁶³ Realistic with regard to its utility and eager to avoid Woodrow Wilson's mistakes in securing Senate acquiescence to American participation in the League of Nations, Roosevelt sought the creation of an institution that delicately balanced Wilsonian idealism with a healthy respect for both power realities abroad and political realities at home. Whereas the former was accomplished by ensuring that all nations could join and participate in "the maintenance of international peace and security,"¹⁶⁴ the latter two were secured by enshrining into the structure of the United Nations special accommodations for the world's great powers. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China were all given permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council with veto power over the institution's resolutions. The veto was essential from an American perspective as it "improved prospects for Senate endorsement of the United Nations by making it clear that the world organization could not force the United States into war against its will."¹⁶⁵ In effect, the veto power insulated the United States' integration into the type of international body it likely would have again eschewed had such safeguards of American sovereignty not been implemented. Alas, despite its enlightened design, the United Nations was unable to prevent a breakdown of cooperation between the United

¹⁶³ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 19.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations, "United Nations Charter," October 24, 1945, <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>.

¹⁶⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, 2000th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 27.

States and the Soviet Union. As such, the American cooperative security grand strategy evolved in response to shifting geopolitical realities.

The second element of the United States' cooperative security grand strategy emphasized the "spheres of influence" or "particularist" view of international security. In contrast to the United Nations which was intended to manage global security, this evolution of the strategy focused on the collective defense of American allies. The collapse of cooperative relations with the Soviets led an increasing number of American leaders to believe that "the national interest would best be served not by trying to restructure the international order—the "universalistic" solution—but through the "particularist" approach of trying to maintain equilibrium within it, so that no one country, or group of countries, could dominate it."¹⁶⁶ This evolved American strategy developed in two separate geographic areas and along two primary lines of effort. The first concerns Europe, its economy, and the revitalization of its war-shattered societies. Formally titled the European Recovery Program, the American effort to jumpstart the post-war European economy is better known by the name of the Secretary of State who oversaw its implementation, George C. Marshall. The Marshall Plan was designed to inject large sums of American capital into European reconstruction in order to keep those countries aligned with the United States and prevent their move into either the communist orbit or neutrality. Cohen writes that "Truman and Marshall saw the plan as a means of defending American interests in Europe against Soviet encroachment, shoring up Western European economies so that the region would not be susceptible to Moscow-directed subversion."¹⁶⁷ A lesser known but equally important aspect of the Marshall Plan was that the aid also provided the Europeans with dollars to buy American products. The Marshall Plan, as James Patterson notes, abetted "American prosperity as well as European recovery."¹⁶⁸

A second line of effort nested within the United States' evolved cooperative security strategy in Europe stems directly from the successes and shortcomings of the first

¹⁶⁶ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, 28.

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*, Volume 4:42.

¹⁶⁸ Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*, 130.

line. The “particularist” elements of the United States’ cooperative security grand strategy were designed to promote an economic revitalization and subsequent sense of security that would allow the Western Europeans to act as an independent balance against Soviet power. Unfortunately, the Marshall plan was only partially successful in that it provided for the former but did very little to secure the latter. Though enjoying the positive effects of American economic aid, the Western Europeans were nonetheless concerned with “the threat from...the potential resurgence of German power, [and] from the looming Soviet menace to the East.”¹⁶⁹ In essence, the Europeans desired an American military commitment—something the Americans had not intended—to match the economic one provided by the Marshall Plan. This desire led to what Richard Betts characterized as “the most significant and enduring innovation of the Cold War: establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”¹⁷⁰ As a mutual defense treaty, NATO went beyond the United Nations charter in that it committed the United States to the defense of Western Europe. It was, in reality, a twentieth century manifestation of an “entangling alliance.” However, as was the case with its involvement in the United Nations, American integration into NATO was insulated. In response to the Senate’s *Vandenberg Resolution*, which approved American participation so long as the United States’ “constitutional process” was respected, the wording of the treaty only committed the Americans to “action including the use of armed force.”¹⁷¹ Put simply, the North Atlantic Treaty committed the United States to the defense of others, but left the provision and implementation of this defense dependent on the American political process. The obfuscating language in the treaty was necessary both to maintain some semblance of insulation and to secure Senate approval of American entry. Combined, the Marshall Plan and NATO “provided the institutional framework that bound the United States to its key geopolitical partners” and

¹⁶⁹ Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, 34.

¹⁷⁰ Richard K. Betts, *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 30.

¹⁷¹ United States Senate, “U.S. Senate Resolution 239 - 80th Congress, 2nd Session - (‘The Vandenberg Resolution’),” June 11, 1948, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17054.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

as Hal Brands highlights, “offered the reassurance that these partners so badly craved.”¹⁷² They did nothing, however, to promote or secure the United States’ essential national interests as they manifested in Asia.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the American expansion of economic and military security to nations in Asia was driven by much of the same logic that led the United States to enact the Marshall Plan and NATO in Europe. It was similar in that the strategy entailed economic and military lines of effort designed to establish independent centers of power to balance the Soviet Union and communism in Asia. As in Europe, this strategy also necessitated the rehabilitation of a former enemy, in this case Japan. With its latent industrial capacity and skilled workforce, Japan was seen as the core around which the United States’ cooperative security strategy would revolve in Asia. Yet, again as in Europe, the revitalization of this former foe sparked considerable apprehension among Japan’s former enemies across the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, as Leffler notes, “would go along with a generous treaty [with Japan] only if the United States offered security guarantees.”¹⁷³ The United States acquiesced to these requests for many of the same reasons and with analogous intent that it did so in Europe—it sought to keep these nations from opting for neutrality or worse, pursuing warmer relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁴ One notable difference between the United States’ strategy in Europe and its counterpart in Asia was the structure of its security commitments. While its European allies were incorporated into a single organization under the North Atlantic Treaty, in Asia the United States opted for a “hub and spoke” model that favored bi-lateral treaties between it and individual countries.¹⁷⁵ Though the geography of the region explains much of this multi-pronged approach, it should also be thought of as a mechanism for insulating the American

¹⁷² Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, 35.

¹⁷³ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 394.

¹⁷⁴ The United States signed mutual defense treaties not only with Japan, but also Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines in 1951.

¹⁷⁵ The ANZUS Treaty was technically “multi-lateral” in that it incorporated the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Given that Australia and New Zealand often pursued their security interests in tandem, this treaty was in effect bi-lateral from an American perspective.

integration into Asia in that it provided additional flexibility to the United States. The American integration was further insulated by the language of the treaties it signed with its Asian allies; these too included intentionally obfuscating language designed to leave the United States' commitment to the treaty subject to the American political system. Though largely considered a theater of secondary importance when compared with Europe, the United States' Asian cooperative security grand strategy would prove to be every bit as vital throughout the Cold War.

Indeed, too much emphasis placed on either geographic area at the expense of the other would not have been prudent as the manifestation of American essential interests called for a cultivation of favorable balances of power across the entire Eurasian landmass. While the Truman administration had an early understanding of these essential interests, their implications, and geographical characteristics, its method for securing them evolved over time. In totality, the Americans blended the competing "universalist" and "particularist" visions of cooperative security to cultivate favorable economic and military balances of power in Europe and Asia. In eschewing its historical aversion to "entangling alliances," the Truman administration created a post-war global order that attempted to balance integration and insulation in accordance with the requirements of its essential national interests. In its efforts, it not only projected American cooperative security principles around the world, it also established the institutions that would contribute to its eventual triumph in the Cold War.

D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

*Our resources are not unlimited. We must apply them where they can serve the most effectively—to bring production, freedom, and confidence back to the world.*¹⁷⁶

—Harry Truman

Makers of American grand strategy have often displayed a Janus-like ability to envision and realize desirable futures by harnessing wisdom derived from careful study of the past. For instance, the founding generation famously looked to the perceived lessons of Greek, Roman, and British history when they crafted American grand strategy in the earliest years of the republic.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, subsequent American leaders often followed this example when confronting the strategic challenges and political issues of their day. In this respect, American leaders during the Truman administration were no different. Often of elite pedigrees and endowed with Ivy League educations, they were intimately familiar with the enduring aspects of American strategic thought and practice. Yet, perhaps more importantly, they were also familiar with how these aspects had proven increasingly insufficient to the challenges faced by the United States in the twentieth century. By the end of World War II most recognized that the long-running American preference for limited engagement abroad would need to be modified in order to secure the United States' essential national interests in the future. However, there was also recognition that unlimited engagement abroad was incompatible with the American tradition, would not be supported by the American people, and would risk exhausting American power. Hence, some argued what was required was a grand strategy of selective engagement. Selective engagement's focus on relations between the great powers would act to insulate the United States' expanded level of global participation by keeping its engagements restricted to those required to secure its essential interests. In practice, however, such neat lines of demarcation proved difficult to identify.

¹⁷⁶ Harry Truman, *Address Before the Rio Do Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security September 02, 1947* (The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, n.d.), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-rio-de-janeiro-inter-american-conference-for-the-maintenance>.

¹⁷⁷ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 33–64.

The United States' post-war selective engagement strategy can be divided into two distinct but intimately related forms: abstract and applied. The abstract form of the American selective engagement grand strategy was at its most fundamental level a recognition that it would be imprudent, at least in the short term, for the United States to return to its prior habit of non-intervention. World War II demonstrated that Eurasian concentrations of manpower, resources, and industrial capacity could threaten the security of the American system in the Western Hemisphere. Given that the advancement of technology and industrial knowledge made such concentrations more likely in the future rather than less, prudence required the United States to play an active role in managing the global order to prevent their formation—in perpetuity. However, this permanency in engagement did not require universality. As resources and industrial power were not evenly distributed across Eurasia, some regions were inherently more important than others from the standpoint of American essential interests. Thus, though the Americans likely needed to engage on a permanent basis, they could prioritize some engagements and deemphasize or eschew others. Under a selective engagement grand strategy the United States was free to select the location, manner, form, and timing of its engagements as directed by its interests. Moreover, this abstract form of selective engagement was not necessarily dependent on the emergence of a post-World War II competitor or adversary. Instead, its validity was manifested by the nature of international politics, the reality of American power, and the manifestation of American essential interests after World War II. For instance, had the Cold War not developed the Americans would likely still have developed a grand strategy that entailed global engagement on a spectrum between the limited engagement of their past and some model of unlimited engagement. In a sense, the post-World War II world required at least some form of selective engagement even if only to prevent the resurrection of a hostile Germany or Japan.

When the Cold War did develop, winning it was the opus of the applied form of the United States' post-war selective engagement grand strategy. Naturally, the applied form of the American selective engagement strategy derives from and is similar to its abstract form. For instance, both were concerned with the cultivation of favorable balances of power across Eurasia. Both were a response to the United States' failure to implement an

effective engagement strategy after World War I. Both sought to balance the need for American global engagement with concern about strategic overextension. And lastly, both were necessary to secure the United States' essential interests in a changed geopolitical context. Yet, there were notable differences. Whereas the abstract strategy was conceptually broad and concerned the United States' general need to selectively engage in pursuit of its interests, the applied strategy was directly related to the United States' goal of containing the Soviet Union. Put a different way, the applied strategy was implemented in order to prosecute the Cold War while the abstract strategy was nonspecific in its focus and would likely persist beyond the Cold War's end.

Ironically, the end of the Cold War was more or less described just as it was beginning in 1946. George Kennan's famous "X Article" was particularly prescient in its description of how the Soviet system's internal contradictions would eventually lead to "the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."¹⁷⁸ In Kennan's view, the United States need not fight the Soviet Union militarily in order to combat communism because the Soviets, at least in the short term, were not likely to use force to expand their sphere of influence. As such, the call for the policy of containment "was based on the thesis that the Soviet Union had a persistent tendency to expand the boundaries of its empire wherever possible but would not undertake to do so at the risk of a major war."¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Soviet communists held views about the long-term viability of the capitalist democracies that were similar to those Kennan held about the communists in the Soviet Union. In short, they believed that the capitalist societies held within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Thus, the Soviets would not try to accomplish by the sword what communist ideology said would inevitably be a consequence of capitalist greed and the unstoppable march of time. Given these assumptions about Soviet goals and intentions, initial American conceptions of the Soviet threat were of a political and psychological nature—not a military one.

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in: George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in *American Diplomacy, Sixtieth-Anniversary Expanded Edition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 134.

¹⁷⁹ Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren, *Presidential Doctrines: U.S. National Security From George Washington to Barack Obama* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 94.

Hence, the United States' applied selective engagement strategy was intended to confront the perceived political and psychological aspects of the Soviet threat in the regions most vital to American essential interests. These were, of course, those areas with the highest levels of latent industrial potential—Europe and Asia. As this strategy was selective with regard to the location of its implementation, so it was also selective in the mode of its application. The extension of American economic aid under the Marshall Plan was intended to “revitalize European economies through a European initiative supported by the United States.”¹⁸⁰ Similar economic efforts were also undertaken to rebuild the industrial capacities of Japan.¹⁸¹ This “strongpoint defense” version of containment was focused in key regions and intended to blend the need to reconstitute balances of power with the reality that, though immense, the United States' resources were not unlimited.¹⁸² At this early stage of the Cold War many in the Truman administration did not expect the domestic political situation to allow large military budgets or extensive overseas commitments. Consequently, the administration selectively provided mutually beneficial economic aid in order to rehabilitate specific centers of power capable of eventually withstanding Soviet pressure on their own. Economic engagement was fitting not just because it helped to allay the political and psychological threats to the United States' partners, but also because “it was easier to sell [to the American public] an unprecedented foreign-aid package as a program to ensure American prosperity than as a strategy for redressing the balance of power.”¹⁸³ In this instance, selectivity in the location and application of its engagements resulted in positive effects for the Truman administration not just abroad but also at home.

¹⁸⁰ Robert B. Zoellick, *America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Twelve, 2020), 268.

¹⁸¹ For details of American policy concerning the reindustrialization and rearmament of Japan see: Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 633–34; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 298–300, 391–94.

¹⁸² For discussion contrasting “strongpoint defense” versus “perimeter defense” forms of containment see: Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, 54–64.

¹⁸³ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat After World War II,” in *The Truman Presidency*, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 266.

Truman and his team also demonstrated the utility of selectivity in other ways. Though implied in name but often neglected in discussion and practice, a selective engagement grand strategy is every bit concerned with choosing how and where one should not to engage as it is with where and how one should. Post-war American leaders understood this dynamic and recognized that not all regions of the world had the same value. Some were of vital importance while others had at best tangential relevance to American objectives. As might be expected, engagement was prioritized to those vital regions and shunted away from less important ones. One notable example of this in practice was the Truman administration's decision to not intervene at the end of the Chinese Civil War. Having previously tried to mediate a settlement between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party, the Americans abstained from involvement in the war because they saw no acceptable way to prevent a Communist victory. Warren Cohen describes this decision calculus in his history of American foreign relations, writing that "the fall of China to the Chinese Communists was undesirable and unfortunate, but it was not catastrophic. China was a weak country, likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, and more likely a burden than an asset to the Soviet Union."¹⁸⁴ As far as American essential interests were concerned, a red China could be tolerated so long as Japan remained in the American orbit and a balance of power was maintained in Asia. While the United States' decision to concede communist rule in China would have far reaching implications, some of which would manifest very quickly, it was undoubtedly a decision borne of a recognition that it need not and should not engage indiscriminately.

Taken together, the United States' abstract and applied selective engagement strategies were designed to secure its essential interests in a manner that recognized both the reality of a changed world and American tradition. Derived from what were considered to be the lessons of the past, it sought to "undercut the appeal of communism, strengthen the unity of a loose American-led coalition, and serve U.S. interests."¹⁸⁵ The selectivity of American engagement ebbed and flowed even during the Truman administration as the

¹⁸⁴ Cohen, *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*, Volume 4:50.

¹⁸⁵ Colin Deuck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 89.

implementation of the containment policy continued to evolve. Though its engagements became less selective in their locations and applications over time, they remained on a spectrum between the limited engagement model of the United States' past and the unlimited model of universal engagement. In achieving this balance, American leaders secured essential interests, achieved integration, retained insulation, and demonstrated that American strategy could remain Janus-faced in response to intense geopolitical change.

E. PRIMACY

*Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.*¹⁸⁶

—NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

The United States emerged from the second world war at the zenith of global power. Prime among nations, it was in a class all to its own by nearly any desirable measure. The American economy and industrial base had powered the defeat of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Having been almost entirely shielded from the war's devastation, it alone accounted for more than half of the world's manufacturing capacity and produced a third of all global exports.¹⁸⁷ Militarily, the United States had put more than twelve million Americans in uniform during the war, fielded the largest and most powerful navy, the largest and most capable air force, and perhaps most importantly—they alone enjoyed possession of the atom bomb.¹⁸⁸ The diplomatic dominance of the United States, while more difficult to quantify, was also impressive and largely unrivaled. The Americans held together and led the Grand Alliance in its defeat of the Axis Powers and can be credited with conceiving, advocating, and realizing the United Nations. Given its supreme economic, military, and diplomatic position at the war's conclusion, the United States was favorably positioned to implement and follow a primacy grand strategy. Primacy, as a

¹⁸⁶ National Security Council, "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

¹⁸⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 358.

¹⁸⁸ Kennedy, 357–59.

grand strategy archetype, places its emphasis on ensuring the continued supremacy of one's nation and preventing the rise of a great power peer competitor.¹⁸⁹ Naturally, having arrived at a moment when its global power soared above those of allies and foes alike, American leaders opted to implement a primacy grand strategy to preserve the United States' status and secure its essential interests. Not unlike the grand strategy archetypes previously discussed, the American primacy strategy was not implemented fully developed. Instead, its various elements coalesced over time, often in response to demands made by contemporary events, to form a cohesive primacy grand strategy that has endured, in one form or another, even until today.

The first element of the United States' primacy grand strategy concerns the maintenance of its economic primacy. Having swum against the prevailing streams of global economic practices for much of its history, the United States was presented with the perfect opportunity to impose its economic preferences on a global scale after World War II.¹⁹⁰ Dependency on American aid, both during the war and for post-war reconstruction, made other nations subject to extensive coercion by the United States and American leaders did not hesitate to use this leverage to force other nations to acquiesce to American preferences in the structuring of the post-war global economy. The Bretton Woods Agreement, first negotiated in 1944, established a system complete with institutions designed to regulate and manage global commerce, finance, and development. Ostensibly intended to eliminate the types of nationalistic economic impulses that were thought to have contributed to the outbreak of World War II, the agreement was in effect an American takeover of the global financial system. Cohen notes this underlying intention of the agreement, writing that "there was never any doubt, in Washington or abroad, that the Bretton Woods system was designed to serve the long term interests of the United States."¹⁹¹ By forcing the gradual elimination of trade barriers and the acceptance of the Dollar as the global reserve currency, the United States secured an integrated international economic order in which it had no real competitor. American policymakers believed that

¹⁸⁹ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 32–43.

¹⁹⁰ Varg, *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers.*, 37.

¹⁹¹ Cohen, *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*, Volume 4:7.

economic cooperation and interdependence were essential not only to American strategic interests, but also to the maintenance of global peace.¹⁹² Hence, while the Bretton Woods system enshrined American economic primacy, it was also designed to benefit all those who signed on to its provisions—often at the United States’ expense. Many American leaders, as Benn Steil notes, held the view that “the United States was a benign emerging superpower, and would use its power, unlike the European imperialists before it, to create a world based on economic cooperation and nondiscrimination.”¹⁹³ This assumption that American primacy was good for the world has deep roots in the American psyche and would characterize much of the United States’ post-war primacy grand strategy.

The United States’ strategy for ensuring its military primacy was no exception. After World War II’s conclusion, the Americans intended to leverage their newfound military supremacy to secure their essential interests and maintain the hard-won peace. As it related to military power, the Truman administration’s primacy strategy took two main forms. The first version, or what may be termed partial primacy, relied heavily on the United States’ unique military advantages and can be considered a corollary to Kennan’s “strongpoint defense” version of limited containment. Having recognized that the United States needed to remain globally engaged after the war, the Truman team was forced to reckon with the United States’ historical aversion to standing military establishments and their attending costs. Leffler notes Truman’s dilemma, writing that while “Americans wanted to bring the boys home, cut taxes, and focus on internal priorities. Truman wanted to achieve U.S. security objectives on the cheap.”¹⁹⁴ The administration’s initial solution was to attempt both. Hence, while much of the American military underwent a robust demobilization after the war, the United States retained much of its most strategic military advantages. The Americans could still rely on their incredible industrial might, strategic bombing capabilities, naval power, and most importantly, their sole possession of atomic

¹⁹² Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 42–44.

¹⁹³ Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 125.

¹⁹⁴ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 97.

weapons. American officials understood that the bomb, so long as they possessed it and others did not, ensured the United States' continued military primacy. In practice, this partial military primacy strategy might have been sufficient to secure American essential interests had the United States retained its nuclear monopoly and remained committed to Kennan's version of limited containment. Yet, it would do neither and this compelled the Truman administration to evolve its military primacy strategy.

This evolution was necessitated by the United States' steady drift away from the logic of Kennan's politico-economic model of containment towards a second version of primacy that placed evermore emphasis and demands on American military power. As head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Kennan opposed the establishment of the American alliance system on the grounds that it would crystalize and escalate the Soviet-American conflict. Most within the Truman administration, including Kennan, recognized that the threat of Soviet military action was quite low and that the real communist threat was largely political and inhered from the underlying economic weakness of Western Europe and Asia. However, events such as the Soviet blockade of Berlin exacerbated European diffidence and made the Truman administration "less and less comfortable with Kennan's...argument that it could safely concentrate on the economic rather than the military instruments of containment."¹⁹⁵ Ultimately, the establishment of the United States' alliance network opened a gap between its commitments and the means provided by the military capabilities inherent to its partial primacy strategy. Bringing its means in line with its ends would ultimately require its abandonment of partial primacy and the embracement of a robust primacy strategy. While many factors contributed to this transition from partial to robust military primacy, two events can be argued to have been final catalysts. The first was the Soviet detonation of its own atomic bomb in August, 1949. The second was the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. While the former was largely responsible for the conception of what would become the United States' robust military primacy strategy, the latter can claim responsibility for its actual implementation. The confirmation of a Soviet atomic capability ended the United States' nuclear monopoly

¹⁹⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, 81–82.

and with it the ability of the Americans to argue, both to their allies and to themselves, that the United States could deter Soviet conventional military power with atomic weapons. While most still doubted that the Soviets sought a full-scale war, many American officials feared that having the bomb would embolden the communists to take more aggressive action in other ways. In response, Truman approved the development of the more powerful hydrogen bomb and ordered “a comprehensive review of the U.S. national security policy, the result of which was NSC-68.”¹⁹⁶

Crafted by Kennan’s replacement on the Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze, NSC-68 called for robust military primacy. Though forceful in its prose and filled with ideological flourishes, the document did not necessarily expand the ends associated with the containment strategy as much as it did the means and ways. The report placed greater emphasis on the Soviet threat than it did on a thorough consideration of American essential interests, stating that “in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”¹⁹⁷ Put bluntly, NSC-68 rejected a containment based on “strongpoint defense” and advocated for a “perimeter defense, with all points along the perimeter considered of equal importance.”¹⁹⁸ Nitze strongly advocated for a dramatic expansion of the military means to match the United States’ expanded security commitments. Leffler writes that “NSC 68 laid out options and called for much larger military expenditures. Conventional rearmament and strategic superiority were now deemed indispensable for the risk-taking necessary to co-opt the industrial core of Eurasia, integrate it with the Third World periphery, and maintain America’s preponderant position in the international system.”¹⁹⁹ Yet, the proposed militarization of the containment strategy would be costly. When it was reviewed by President Truman in April, 1950, he demurred, directing that the economic and societal effects of its

¹⁹⁶ Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, 45.

¹⁹⁷ National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.”

¹⁹⁸ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, 89.

¹⁹⁹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 314.

implementation must be ascertained before it could be approved.²⁰⁰ Unfortunately, the Korean War cut short Truman's reservations about the pursuit of robust primacy and its associated costs. The North Koreans invaded South Korea on June 25th, 1950 and he approved the implementation of NSC-68 before the end of September.²⁰¹ The communist invasion of South Korea seemed to, at least for some, simultaneously discredit the logic of an economically based containment strategy and demonstrate the need for one based on military strength. Those in favor of NSC-68's provisions asserted that "if the United States could maintain its overwhelming lead in strategic weaponry *and* if it could bolster [its] conventional forces...the Kremlin's atomic arsenal and land power could be neutralized. The United States could then move ahead to accomplish its objectives through diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military interventions in disparate localities around the globe."²⁰² Time would prove both the truth and tragedy of their assertions.

Enjoying considerable asymmetries in terms of economic, military, and diplomatic power, the United States initially implemented a primacy grand strategy in order to sustain its position and secure its essential interests. Its partial military primacy strategy—which emphasized its nuclear monopoly, industrial might, air and naval power—was intended to meet the post-war demands to demobilize while remaining globally engaged. The Americans evolved and expanded their primacy strategy in response to the emerging Cold War by shedding their partial military primacy model for a robust primacy strategy. Christopher Preble writes that NSC-68 "provided the intellectual groundwork for [a] permanent warfare state" and "shattered any further resistance to a large and permanent military."²⁰³ The robust primacy strategy implemented by the Truman administration crystallized the role of American military power in both American grand strategy and the

²⁰⁰ Robert A. Pollard, "The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950," in *The Truman Presidency*, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 230–31.

²⁰¹ Pollard, 231.

²⁰² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 360.

²⁰³ Christopher A. Preble, *Peace, War, and Liberty* (Washington, D.C: The Cato Institute, 2019), 84.

struggle against Soviet communism—it would remain that way for the duration of the Cold War and beyond.

F. ISOLATIONISM

*The isolationist position has always had a strong psychological and emotional appeal for broad sections of the population. The American state was created by people who had turned their backs on Europe and most of the immigrants who entered during the nineteenth century wanted to forget the Old World.*²⁰⁴

—Nicolas Spykman

Many might think it odd to say that isolationism played a significant role in the Truman administration's grand strategy, but in fact it did—as a vital bogeyman. Contrary to what is often assumed, the administration did not forsake isolationism, it repurposed it to ensure the United States would never return to its historical detachment from global affairs. An often-overlooked aspect of grand strategy, especially in democratic countries, is that it concerns the domestic aspects of statesmanship as much as it does foreign policy. Those who study, think about, and practice grand strategy are sometimes prone to emphasizing the interactions of nations on the world stage at the expense of political actors on the domestic stage. In an American context, this is easy to do. As their nation is uniquely blessed by geography—ocean buffers to the east and west, friendly or weak countries to the north and south, with no other great power in the same hemisphere—foreign policy has historically been of secondary importance to domestic policy in the eyes of the American public. Consequently, domestic sentiments concerning the foreign policy aspects of American grand strategy are prone to both long running trends and sudden transitions caused by events that shock the collective American system. In other words, the arc of American foreign policy is characterized by lengthy bouts of consistency marked by periodic aberrancies which compel it to evolve or change. This pattern is especially clear when one considers the evolution of American isolationism. As “it is the oldest issue in foreign policy,” every generation of American leaders has had to reckon with the

²⁰⁴ Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 3.

isolationist qualities inherent to both the American geography and the American people.²⁰⁵ The Truman administration was no exception. What could be considered exceptional, however, was that administration's ability to suppress and overcome this innate isolationism to midwife into existence an era of unprecedented American internationalism.

Much ink has been spilt about American isolationism. Considerable portions of it have been about the supposed isolationism of the founding generation. Another, not insignificant amount regards American isolationism during the interwar period between World War I and World War II. These eras both represent notable instances of isolationist grand strategy, but there are marked differences between them. In most discussions, the former example is generally viewed favorably and often as evidence of the prudence of early American statesmen while the latter is often thought of as a preventable failure of American global leadership, an example of short-sighted grand strategy, and a missed opportunity to prevent the world's greatest tragedy. Moreover, these instances of isolationism also vary in the source of their origination. The isolationism that sprang from the founding generation and lasted for roughly a century is that associated with the logic of Washington's Farewell Address. Instituted and maintained by those at the commanding heights of American life, this isolationism was intended to keep Americans insulated from the vicissitudes of the wider world. Conversely, the isolationism of the interwar period, though supported by some elites, can be viewed as the American peoples' rejection of increasingly prevalent strands of elite internationalism. However, despite their different sources and varying reputations in the telling of American history, both are examples of Americans appealing to isolationism to restrict engagement abroad in support of what they considered to be the United States' national interests. After World War II, the Truman administration also appealed to isolationism in support of American national interests, albeit, for very different purposes.

Truman's isolationist grand strategy was an elite-driven effort to forever discredit isolationist grand strategies and promote perpetual internationalism. The administration's

²⁰⁵ Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate Over International Relations 1789-1941*, 27-34, 272-73, 293-94, 302-4, 358-69; Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 5.

strategy was to use isolationism as a foil to build domestic support for an increasingly internationalist foreign policy. In doing so, they sought to leverage common perceptions of previous eras of American isolationism to make their case. Most often, this entailed a steady highlighting of how the interwar period of isolationism had failed so dramatically. Many prominent Americans, both in and out of government, blamed that era of isolationism for contributing to the war's outbreak. Leffler notes these views, writing that "for Truman, as for many of his contemporaries, isolationism had been responsible for the spread of the Depression, the rise of totalitarianism, the appeasement of the Axis powers, and the attack on Pearl Harbor."²⁰⁶ While much of the angst levied against isolationism was directed at the perceived failings of the interwar period, others made their case against isolationism by appealing to the founding generation. For instance, Walter Lippman, writing in his famous *Shield of the Republic*, noted that the Founders were not mere isolationists and that they "did not hold the prejudice against alliances which latter-day Americans have ascribed to them."²⁰⁷ Moreover, while Lippman used the Founders to make a positive case against isolationism, others characterized the Founders' guidance as outdated or inappropriate for the modern world. Nicolas Spykman offered a cogent synopsis of this argument in his book, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, writing that "historical precedent and the voice of the Fathers can be used as a means to gain support for a doctrine but not as proof of its soundness. Not conformity with the past but workability in the present is the criterion of a sound policy."²⁰⁸ While there was not universal agreement among the American elite about the shortcomings of isolationism, there was a broad, if varied, understanding that the United States would remain globally engaged after the war. Marginalizing or discrediting isolationism was a central function of the Truman administration's isolationist strategy.

To some extent, negative sentiments regarding isolationism had already come to be shared in varying degrees by average Americans. Though many had been against entry into World War II initially, the shock of the attacks on Pearl Harbor radically altered public

²⁰⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 267.

²⁰⁷ Lippman, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, 58.

²⁰⁸ Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 7.

opinion on American involvement. After the war, most Americans, though eager to restart normal life and enjoy the fruits of their wartime sacrifices, did not want to see their efforts dissipated by a mismanagement of American foreign policy.²⁰⁹ Yet, officials within the Truman administration held reservations “about the will of the citizenry to support major involvement of the country in overseas controversies.”²¹⁰ Many officials believed that the making of grand strategy should pass from the amateurish manipulations of elected politicians to the well-educated and sophisticated hands of an un-elected “Establishment.” The public, and by extension their elected representatives, were susceptible to the innate American tendency towards isolationism. In their view, “a foreign policy run by knowledgeable elites who knew and trusted each other...could be protected from the dangerous explosions of popular opinion.”²¹¹ Further inculcating and sustaining these views toward isolationism and the professional management of international affairs in the public mind was the intent of the Truman administration’s isolationist strategy.

Aside from the specific policies themselves, evidence that the Truman administration sought to permanently discredit isolationist grand strategy is manifested in the public messaging efforts of American officials after World War II. As most doubted the American public would support Truman’s foreign policies, purposeful efforts were taken by the administration to emphasize, some might argue inflate, the nature and extent of the threats to American security.²¹² The administration wasted few opportunities to make appeals for internationalism by directly rebuking isolationism. For instance, during his 1947 State of the Union address, Truman announced “that we will not retreat to isolationism...we have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the attainment of our own national security. Our goal is collective security for all mankind.”²¹³ Later that year, in a speech outlining what would become known as the Truman Doctrine, President

²⁰⁹ Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*, 13-14, 104.

²¹⁰ Patterson, 83.

²¹¹ Patterson, 103.

²¹² Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, 145-46.

²¹³ Truman, *Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union*.

Truman sought to “scare the hell out of the American people” and convince them that American security depended on the United States’ willingness to secure freedom for others.²¹⁴ He proclaimed that:

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace, and hence the security of the United States...The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.²¹⁵

Such declarations were not limited to President Truman, however. In announcing the implementation of the Marshall Plan at his famous speech at Harvard University, Secretary of State George Marshall spoke directly about the American public’s supposed duty to support American internationalism:

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.²¹⁶

The administration’s messaging efforts continued throughout its tenure. Though the intensity of such efforts ebbed and flowed in response to events, the essential core of the strategy remained the same—isolationism was out and American internationalism was here to stay.

It should be noted that highlighting the Truman administration’s efforts to discredit isolationism does not necessarily imply a critique of the administration’s overall grand

²¹⁴ Quoted in: Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974*, 128; Harry S. Truman, *1946-52: Years of Trial and Hope*, Kindle, vol. 2, Memoirs (New Word City, Inc, 2014).

²¹⁵ Truman, *Truman Doctrine: President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of Congress*.

²¹⁶ George C. Marshall, *The Marshall Plan Speech* (The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1947), <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/>.

strategy. There are valid reasons to believe that the administration's efforts to actively promote American internationalism were necessary. One prominent reason is that the securing of American essential national interests after World War II likely required an increased global role for the United States, at least initially. Given this need for increased internationalism and the fact that the United States had returned to its isolationism after World War I, one need not struggle to understand why the Truman administration felt it necessary to overcome America's innate isolationist tendencies. Moreover, the discrediting of isolationism was likely necessary in order to implement robust versions of other grand strategy archetypes. In a sense then, the Truman administration used the specter of isolationism to justify the implementation of expansive cooperative security, selective engagement, and primacy grand strategies. Later, writing in his memoirs, President Truman noted how he felt that his decision to abandon isolationism was consonant with the Founders' reasons for promoting it. He wrote that, "Washington had advised a method suitable under the conditions of his day to achieve the great end of preserving the nation, and that although conditions and our international position had changed, the objectives of our policy—peace and security—were still the same."²¹⁷ An aversion to isolationism has remained both a feature and the object of American foreign policy through today. Given the American people's propensity to avoid serious and sustained attention to foreign affairs, it is likely to remain so. That is, unless some aberrancy so shocks the American system and forces the "Establishment" to give it a modern look.

²¹⁷ Truman, 1946-52: *Years of Trial and Hope*.

G. TRUMAN'S RECASTING: AMERICAN INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

*We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of international order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which, no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the standards of living of all their people. We are ready to undertake new projects to strengthen a free world.*²¹⁸

—Harry Truman

In making the first impressions in American grand strategy, the Founders established a pattern of blending archetypal grand strategies to create a distinct set of insulated spheres of integration from which they could secure the United States' national interests. This insulationist paradigm was designed to capitalize on the benefit derived from integration while maintaining the protection associated with insulation. Its longevity was due largely to the fact that it remained an effective process for securing both the fundamental national interests of the founding era and omnipresent essential national interests. Yet, the Founders' spheres only remained effective within certain political, technological, and geopolitical contexts. As none of these contexts survived the global upheaval caused by World War II, the United States' insulated spheres of integration were recast by the Truman administration to account for a changed world.

Whereas the Founders integrated their various states to insulate the collective nation from a dangerous world, the Truman administration integrated the United States with foreign nations in order to insulate the "Free World" from Soviet communism. However, if in their efforts the administration altered the Founders' particular arrangement of the spheres, it did not abandon the logic for creating them or their basic structure. The Truman administration continued to blend archetypal grand strategies to maintain distinct internal and external insulated spheres of integration. The internal sphere still cohered around common interests and favored integration, but was significantly expanded to include those nations to which the United States extended formal security commitments. However, inclusion within the internal sphere did not mean all parts had equal value. The

²¹⁸ Harry Truman, "Inaugural Address" (Speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1949), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-4>.

administration's internal sphere was further divided into core and peripheral elements with the United States and its territories comprising the core element, whereas those nations external to the United States made up the peripheral element. Though common interests acted as an integrating justification, the administration's cooperative security grand strategy functioned as the integrating mechanism within the internal sphere. It should be noted, however, that integration within the Truman administration's internal sphere was not as robust as that of the Founders. It did not attempt to achieve total integration between the core and peripheral elements of the internal sphere. True to the intent of the Founders' original vision, they insulated the connections, both formally and informally, within the internal sphere by building into them protections and buffers designed to preserve American sovereignty. Formally, the Americans insulated their integration with their allies by incorporating into their mutual defense treaties protections which left the United States' commitment to it subject to the American political system. Informally, the United States' insulation within its internal sphere was a function of its military and economic primacy over its allies. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Truman administration maintained the Founders' principle of not incorporating into the internal sphere elements over which it could not assert primacy.

Substantial changes to the United States' internal sphere were paired with similarly meaningful changes to its external sphere. As was the case with the Founders' external sphere, all entities not included within the internal sphere fall into the external sphere. The Truman administration's external sphere was also divided in two: the Soviet bloc and those nations who were neither aligned with the United States nor the Soviet Union.²¹⁹ Though insulation was still favored over integration in the external sphere, the Truman administration substantially expanded American integration within the external sphere by securing its participation in and leadership of the United Nations. Generally, the non-Soviet bloc of the external sphere saw higher levels of integration with the United States than did the part under Soviet control. Whereas the United States often applied a selective

²¹⁹ The barriers between these two portions can be considered somewhat permeable as nations, such as Tito's Yugoslavia and later Communist China, did move between them. However, the barrier between the internal and external spheres remained distinct.

engagement approach to those non-aligned nations in the middle, it tried to isolate the Soviets and their allies. Despite its expanded external integration, the United States blended different grand strategy archetypes to retain insulation. For instance, though American participation in the United Nations was part of its overall cooperative security grand strategy, its veto power on the Security Council allowed the United States' integration to be insulated by its selective engagement strategy.²²⁰ As its external integrations were reflective of American preferences or apportioned power based on strength, the United States was assured an insulated dominant position and a leading role in their functioning.

The Truman administration's recasting of the Founders' spheres was intended to account for the ascendancy of the United States, the shattering of the Eurasian balance of power, and the emergence of the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union. As has been described in this chapter, there legitimate reasons as to why the Truman administration expanded the scope of American global engagement. Yet, the sagacity of applying of the Founders' model beyond the United States should be considered as there is evidence that Truman's expansion of the United States' internal sphere to foreign nations eroded, in favor of integration, the Founders' original balance between integration and insulation. For instance, internally, the size and scope of the federal government expanded significantly, the United States maintained a powerful military establishment for the first time in its history, and the presidency and executive branch steadily accumulated more and more power. Moreover, entering into alliances with foreign nations reduced by default the external insulation the United States enjoyed for most of its history. Were these foreign attachments "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies?"²²¹ Or, would they become "permanent alliances" that would survive the rationale and circumstances of their conception? Examining these questions is the focus of the following chapter.

²²⁰ The United Nations could take no major action without the approval of the United States. True to the founders' principles, the veto power also insulated the other permanent members of the security council. The United Nations could take no meaningful action without their acquiescence as well.

²²¹ Washington, "The Farewell Address," 28.

H. CONCLUSION

When history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also say that in those 8 years we have set the course that can win it. We have succeeded in carving out a new set of policies to attain peace—positive policies, policies of world leadership, policies that express faith in other free people. We have averted world war III up to now, and we may already have succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see.²²²

—Harry Truman

It is said that first impressions last. However, it is also said that nothing lasts forever. When considering the evolution of American grand strategy, both are true. Long running patterns, emerging trends, and the immediate demands of sudden events were each factors in the Truman administration's overhaul of American grand strategy after World War II. The enduring American pattern of blending archetypal grand strategies was combined with the emerging trend of ascending American power to meet the immediate demands of intense geopolitical change caused by World War II. Forced to confront a radically different manifestation of its essential interests, the United States radically altered its relationship with the world beyond its shores. In its recasting of the United States' insulated spheres of integration, the Truman administration set the United States on a course not only to secure its essential national interests, but also to contain, defeat, and discredit Soviet communism. Forged in an era of intense international change that had significant effects on both the United States and the world, this "second impression" in American grand strategy appears to be, at least today, every bit as lasting as the first.

²²² Harry Truman, "The President's Farewell Address to the American People" (Speech, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1953), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-farewell-address-the-american-people>.

IV. THE TRIUMPH OF GRAMMAR OVER LOGIC: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1993–2001

A. INTRODUCTION

*The United States occupies a unique position in world affairs today. We recognize that, and we welcome it. Yet, with the cold war over, I know many people ask whether the United States plans to retreat or remain active in the world and, if active, to what end. Many people are asking that in our own country as well. Let me answer that question as clearly and plainly as I can. The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead.*²²³
—William Clinton

In the life of a nation, especially one founded to be an Empire of Liberty, first impressions matter. However, as was explored in the previous chapter, they are not impervious to the unstoppable march of time. First impressions, no matter how profound, are subject to interaction with an ever-changing world and their adaptation, so as to maintain their relevance, is sometimes necessary. Yet, while change is inevitable, transitions likely, and recastings sometimes required, first impressions still matter. In terms of American grand strategy, the first impressions made by the founding generation matter because they not only birthed and ordered a nation, but also guided that nation's strategic affairs for generations. These first impressions established the enduring logic of American grand strategy, as well as a particular grammar. In other words, the Founders' blending of archetypal grand strategies to achieve the internal and external balance between integration and insulation not only created the logic of a new type of nation dedicated to the pursuit of liberty, it also outlined a particular grammar of strategy intended to secure and maintain it. When examining how the Truman administration overhauled American grand strategy after World War II, it is clear that the Truman grand strategy's "grammar...may [have been] its own, but not its logic."²²⁴ Put another way, the Truman administration retained

²²³ William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City" (Speech, New York, September 27, 1993), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-48th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-city>.

²²⁴ Clausewitz, *On war*, 605.

the Founders' logic, the protection of liberty by maintaining an appropriate balance between integration and insulation, while, in its recasting of the nation's insulated spheres of integration, it created a new grammar. While the Truman grand strategy's notable expansion of foreign and domestic integration inherently reduced the insulation enjoyed by the United States, the expansion was only justified in that it maintained a balance between them largely appropriate to the exigent geopolitical demands wrought by World War II and the Cold War. Such an appropriate balance, however, was not maintained in response to the geopolitical change brought about by the Cold War's conclusion.

As the first president elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union, William Jefferson Clinton was presented with an opportunity granted to few in American history: to reshape the nation's grand strategy for a new era. Yet, instead of a new strategy fully attuned to the lesser demands of a post-Cold War world, the Clinton grand strategy amounted to an elaboration of the Truman administration's strategic grammar and a further distortion of the Founders' seminal logic. This chapter will show that whereas both the founding generation and the Truman administration sought to secure fundamental and essential national interests by blending archetypal grand strategies in ways designed to maintain an appropriate balance between integration and insulation, the Clinton administration, in pursuit of ephemeral interests, employed archetypal grand strategies in ways that were intended to further American integration at the expense of insulation. Though divorced from the type of geopolitical exigencies which had ostensibly compelled the Truman administration to expand American integration, the Clinton grand strategy purposely accentuated the Truman integrative strategic grammar. This magnified grammar, though not entirely detached from laudable goals or even the Founders' grammar, nevertheless amounted to a straining of their logic. This strained logic is the foundation for the geopolitical course on which the United States finds itself today—for better and worse.

B. THE ESSENTIALS AND AN EPHEMERAL TRIAD: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AFTER THE COLD WAR

*Today, as an older order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make.*²²⁵

—William Clinton

Just as the conclusion of World War II was both the end and beginning to many things, so to was the conclusion of the Cold War. Most notable about the conclusion of World War II, at least from the perspective of American grand strategy, was the extent to which the United States ended its long tradition of non-entanglement and began an era of unprecedented internationalism. Compelled by a radically altered manifestation of its essential national interests and the emergence of a great power adversary that threatened them, the Americans engaged in a decades-long, globe-spanning struggle to contain Soviet communism. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union marked not just an American victory in the Cold War, but also an impressive realization of its essential national interests. In addition to its triumph over the Soviet Union, the United States could boast of having maintained its fundamental trinity encapsulated within the “American System,” while it reconstituted both favorable balances of power in Eurasia and a functioning global order. Given these successes, the most notable aspect of American grand strategy after the conclusion of the Cold War was the extent to which the United States adopted a broader conception of its national interests rather than a narrower one. Under the Clinton administration, American national interests were not limited merely to those fundamental or essential, but were expanded to include those ephemeral. In total, the post-Cold War national interests include those enduring interests discussed in previous chapters with the addition of an ephemeral triad. This triad consisted of: maintenance, enlargement, and engagement. These ephemeral interests were the guiding lights of the Clinton administration’s grand strategy and the aspirations on which a new era of American internationalism was to be built.

²²⁵ William Jefferson Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union” (Speech, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1994), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-12>.

Before discussing these ephemeral national interests in detail, it should be noted that their ephemerality inherently condemned them to a dependency on the essential. Put bluntly, even after the Cold War ended, the United States' essential national interests were still, as their name implies, essential. The root *raison d'état* of American grand strategy was still the survival and vitality of the "American System" based on liberty and union at home. Moreover, the security and viability of this system was still contingent on favorable balances of power across the Eurasian landmass. And finally, a global order conducive to both remained essential especially given the potential collapse of the stability provided by the Cold War. That the United States had succeeded in realizing these essential interests did not belie their indispensable and enduring nature. For instance, if the realization of these essential interests were to erode, then the United States would be required to tend to them before pursuing others. What their continued realization meant, however, was that the United States could pursue broader interests, objectives, and policies. Having been emancipated from the routinized and institutionalized pursuit of the essential within the confines of the Cold War, the United States was free to pursue the ephemeral in a world that was moving beyond it.

The first element of the United States' triad of ephemeral interests concerns the maintenance of post-World War II consensuses on American economic, diplomatic, and military affairs into the post-Cold War era. As was detailed in the previous chapter, the United States, in order to secure its essential interests and wage the Cold War, broke with its historical traditions and made significant changes to how it interacted with the world beyond its shores. By the Cold War's end, these changes had crystallized into various relationships, patterns, and institutions for which there were considerable incentives to keep in place. Consider, for instance, the panoply of American initiatives implemented after World War II. In its adoption of a "Marshall Plan mentality," the United States "pursued foreign economic policies designed to make overseas allies self-sustaining participants in a thriving, open international economy, even at the expense of domestic American economic interests."²²⁶ Diplomatically, the Americans created the United

²²⁶ Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 157.

Nations, NATO, and underwrote a vast alliance and security network that spanned the globe. In a military sense, the United States garrisoned thousands of troops in Western Europe and East Asia and, as Kenneth Oye highlights, this “military dependency of Western Europe and Japan on the United States [had]...been internalized by American, Western European, and Japanese political elites.”²²⁷ In truth, one would not be overly presumptuous in asserting that the United States’ extensive array of Cold War-era economic, diplomatic, and military initiatives had been thoroughly internalized in Washington and in capitals across the “free world.” Accordingly, their maintenance—even though the impetus for their creation had disappeared and the rationale for their continuance was not manifestly apparent—was considered a national interest in and of itself. Ironically, the Clinton administration did not limit itself to just a mere maintenance of these Cold War consensuses—they were also to be expanded.

The enlargement of the American-led system of interlocking political, economic, and military relationships and institutions was the second portion of the Clinton ephemeral triad. Informed by a conception of international relations derived from both democratic peace theory and economic interdependence theory and motivated by a need to redefine the United States’ strategic mission abroad, the Clinton administration set as a central factor and purpose of American grand strategy the “enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”²²⁸ President Clinton, in his 1994 State of the Union address, proclaimed that, “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”²²⁹ In a macro sense, the Cold War had been a competition between democratic capitalism and authoritarian communism. The American-led triumph over the Soviet bloc proved for many the supremacy of democracy and capitalism as principles by which to organize societies.

²²⁷ Kenneth A. Oye, “Beyond Postwar Order and New World Order: American Foreign Policy in Transition,” in *Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 25.

²²⁸ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement” (Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993), <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9013>.

²²⁹ Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.”

Having reached this “end of history,” American leaders of both major political parties believed that “democracy and market-based economies were on the ascent, and the fundamental goal of American foreign policy should be to broaden their scope.”²³⁰ In a theme ever present in the American psyche, this pursuit of enlargement was justified in that “it protects [American] interests and security; and because it reflects values that are both American and universal.”²³¹ In truth, this assertion is not without a historical grounding. In at least some sense, the entire story of American history is one of belief in universal principles and the steady enlargement of interlocking political, economic, and military institutions first laid out by the Founders. Yet, the Clinton notion of enlargement is notable not so much for its consonance with the arc of American history, but for its dissonance with the limits historically imposed on the crusading American spirit. The self-imposed constraints of Washington’s Farewell Address and those inherently exacted by the Cold War each served to focus and restrain the United States’ seemingly natural inclination towards universalistic enlargement. With the Cold War over and the advice of Washington holding little sway among those responsible for crafting American grand strategy, there was little effort, desire, or incentive to place limits on the pursuit of enlargement. Limits, where they did exist, came from those who did not wish to be subsumed or in those areas where the United States, for one reason or another, did not desire enlargement.²³²

These areas were largely but not exclusively the focus of the third element of the United States’ ephemeral triad—engagement. As a national interest, engagement was part signal and part function. In formally enunciating that the United States held engagement as a national interest and that its interaction with the world was informed by the belief that the United States should remain globally engaged after its Cold War triumph, the Clinton administration signaled abroad that the United States would act as a benevolent, yet

²³⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Patrick J. Maney, *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 124.

²³¹ Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

²³² In his controversial but ultimately prescient book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel P. Huntington wrote that “Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers from three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.” This notion speaks to some of the future challenges the United States confronted as it endeavored to spread its principles. See: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Paperback (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 310.

solitary, global hegemon and would not retrench back within the Western Hemisphere.²³³ This signaling also made clear that American engagement would not be as constrained as it was during the Cold War when every potential action was refracted through the United States' global struggle against the Soviet Union. By contrast, the function-oriented part of engagement was more tangible. This aspect of engagement had three main purposes that could each include diplomatic, economic, and military elements. The first purpose was to engage with those areas or nations where the United States desired enlargement, whether political, economic, or military, so as to convince, cajole, or pressure them to assent to American desires. Second, in those areas where enlargement was not desired or possible, engagement was to be largely focused on matters of human rights, humanitarian relief, ethnic conflict, or environmental concerns. Many of these issues had previously taken a backseat to Cold War considerations but would now receive far more attention from American political leaders and bureaucrats no longer consumed by the superpower competition. The third purpose of engagement was "to minimize the ability of states outside the circle of democracy and markets to threaten it."²³⁴ In short, this entailed engaging by various means with what Clinton National Security Advisor Anthony Lake referred to as "backlash states...whose power is threatened by the spread of democracy and markets."²³⁵ Addressing the various challenges posed by these middling rogue states would gradually absorb a tremendous share of the American strategic bandwidth and became what is perhaps the defining feature of the United States' post-Cold War grand strategy.

Having detailed and described these ephemeral interests individually, it is only prudent that they also be explored collectively in order to fully demonstrate how they are related and why the moniker "ephemeral" is an appropriate one. The Oxford Dictionary

²³³ See: "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement - 1994" (The White House, July 1994), <https://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/>; "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement - 1996" (The White House, February 1996), <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1996/>; "A National Security Strategy for a New Century - 1997" (The White House, May 1997), <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1997/>.

²³⁴ Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

²³⁵ Lake.

defines ephemeral as an adjective to describe something “that is in existence, power, favour, popularity, etc., for a short time only; short-lived; transitory.”²³⁶ As such, this triad of maintenance, enlargement, and engagement can be considered ephemeral in three primary ways.

First, they are ephemeral because they are not rooted in the fundamental. In other words, there is nothing intrinsically linking this triad to the maintenance of liberty and union in the United States. Indeed, the opposite may be true. The trappings accompanying a pursuit of this ephemeral triad necessarily included objects the Founders would have considered inherently hostile to American liberty and union in the long term. For instance, securing these ephemeral interests entailed the continued existence of a large peacetime military with all its attending costs, the solidification of “temporary alliances” into permanent ones, and the eternal interweaving and entangling of the United States’ destiny, peace, and prosperity in the toils of global “ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, [and] caprice.”²³⁷ Hence, as they are at best extraneous and at worst noxious to the maintenance of liberty and union within the United States, this triad cannot be considered truly grounded in its fundamental national interests.

Second, they are not necessarily based in the essential interests of the United States either. As discussed previously, the United States is an inherently secure country. The essential elements of its security depend upon little more than a Eurasian balance of power and a global order amenable to the “American System.” A properly functioning balance in Europe and Asia ensures that no Eurasian power can consolidate enough military and economic resources to threaten the United States in the Western Hemisphere.²³⁸ With the rehabilitation of the allies, such a balance was achieved long before the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s collapse eliminated the only Eurasian nation likely to achieve a consolidation truly threatening to the United States. In short, an American-

²³⁶ “Ephemeral, Adj. and n.,” in *OED Online* (Oxford University Press), accessed October 27, 2020, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/63199>.

²³⁷ Washington, “The Farewell Address,” 28.

²³⁸ See: Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: The Geographic Pivot of History*; Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*.

managed balance of power was not necessary after the Cold War in the same way that it arguably might have been after the end of World War II. Instability and conflict in the developing world or the former Soviet-bloc, however virulent and nasty, was not threatening to the United States' essential national interests in a way that absolutely demanded the pursuit of this ephemeral triad. Hence, as they are not based in the United States' enduring fundamental or essential national interests, this triad is inherently transitory and its longevity determined by the extent to which a domestic consensus on their pursuit could be sustained.

Third, this triad is characterized as ephemeral because their vigorous pronouncement and pursuit as American interests can only exist within a certain international context, namely that of American preeminence. American policymakers, experiencing the apogee of American power in what Charles Krauthammer famously termed the "unipolar moment," could claim such ambitious national interests and objectives because the geopolitical environment was, despite not being demanding of it, temporally amenable to their pursuit.²³⁹ Though one can, as many have, make cogent arguments that this triad offered the best course for a continued realization of the United States' essential interests, such arguments are actually a manifestation of preference for a specific method rather than a result. Maintenance, enlargement, and engagement, while the preferred consensus in Washington after the Cold War, were not the only options available to the United States to ensure a continued realization of its essential interests. Unfortunately, this confusing of ways and means with ends was to be a reoccurring feature of American grand strategy after the Cold War. Yet, ephemerality characterizes not just the pronouncement and pursuit of this triad, but also its conception. In other words, the strategic meaning and policy implications of maintenance, enlargement, and engagement were themselves ephemeral and would evolve over time. In contrast to the United States' fundamental and essential national interests which have always been vitally important to its survival, American dedication to this triad, especially as declared by the Clinton

²³⁹ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, no. Winter (1991 1990).

administration, was dependent on a confluence of domestic and international circumstances that are by their very nature—ephemeral.

C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY

*In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of marketbased democracies. During the cold war we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.*²⁴⁰

—William Clinton

Considered in its entirety, the Clinton grand strategy was fundamentally one of cooperative security. However, the administration's cooperative security strategy was not a wholly original one. Any thorough accounting of the nearly two and a half centuries of American grand strategy should at least include an acknowledgment of the United States' impressive record of employing cooperative security grand strategies. Though "cooperative security" is itself a modern term, the American record of implementing such strategies extends back to the earliest days of the republic. In their knitting together of thirteen disparate colonies, the Founders creatively implemented this strategy archetype both in their pursuit of independence and in their crafting of the United States Constitution. Broad in its scope, the strategy included cooperation on not only the military elements of security, but also those economic and diplomatic. In its final manifestation, it integrated the many states into an insulated whole and created the collective relationships, patterns, and institutions that would protect it. Though implemented with different intentions and on a much wider scale, the Truman administration's implementation of cooperative security grand strategies after World War II echoed the Founders' model. To secure its essential national interests and contain the Soviet Union, the Truman administration created international military, economic, and diplomatic relationships, patterns, and institutions so as to integrate its foreign allies into an insulated and American-led whole.

²⁴⁰ William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney" (Speech, Kearney, Nebraska, December 8, 2000), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-university-nebraska-kearney-nebraska>.

Upon the Cold War's conclusion, however, the future of this whole and with it the Truman cooperative security grand strategy were called into question. What exactly, now that the Soviet Union had collapsed, were the allies cooperating to achieve? How could the stationing of thousands of American troops in Europe and Asia continue to be justified both at home and abroad? Moreover, now that it had no peer competitor, would the United States remain the self-limiting guarantor of an open economic order, or would it begin to throw its economic weight around in ways more akin to a normal country? To answer these questions and others like them, the Clinton administration declared and implemented a cooperative security grand strategy that was designed to simultaneously reinforce, expand, and reimagine the Truman strategy and all its attending relationships, patterns, and institutions. On the other hand, the Clinton strategy was not specific in the way that the Truman strategy was directed against the Soviet Union. Instead, given the lack of a unifying threat, the strategy was general in its focus, guided by the United States' pursuit of its ephemeral interests, and global in its ambition. Perhaps most importantly, the strategy was a representation of the Clinton administration's belief that the United States' future prosperity and security lay in greater integration abroad, rather than less.

As alluded to previously, the Clinton cooperative security strategy was in many ways a new attempt at an old mission. One need only to examine the diplomatic elements of the administration's strategy to understand that the ideas animating it had deep roots, especially when considering the United Nations. The Roosevelt administration's original vision for the United Nations was for it to serve as a global collective security institution that would maintain peace and ensure the rights of all nations were protected. However, these lofty ambitions were quickly subsumed by Cold War antagonisms and the United Nations fast became an arena for superpower posturing and maneuvering while its original mission faded towards near obsolescence. With the Cold War over and the world moving into a new era, the Clinton administration saw an opportunity to breathe new life into its original vision. In a speech delivered to the United Nations shortly after taking office, President Clinton declared to the General Assembly that "through common effort our generation can take the bold steps needed to redeem the mission entrusted to the U.N. 48 years ago. I pledge to you that my Nation remains committed to helping make the U.N.'s

vision a reality.”²⁴¹ Though politics, both international and domestic, would complicate a strict adherence to this pledge, “assertive multilateralism” remained the overarching theme of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security grand strategy.

This diplomatic initiative was matched in both effort and style by the military elements of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security grand strategy. However, instead of a return to a long-delayed founding vision as was the case with the United Nations, the Clinton strategy was primarily concerned with crafting a new vision for a vast array of military alliances whose founding visions had largely been fulfilled. While the future of American military alliances and garrisons around the world were called into question by the conclusion of the Cold War, the indication as to how the United States would answer these types of questions was provided by the Clinton administration’s actions as they related to NATO in Europe. The military portion of the administration’s cooperative security strategy was pursued along two main lines of effort—reinvention and expansion. Put simply, the administration’s task was to determine not only NATO’s purpose in a new Europe, but also its boundaries. Andrew Bacevich describes this first challenge, writing that “having outlived its usefulness as a defensive alliance, NATO needed a new purpose, ideally one based on a broader definition of security and more proactive in its orientation.”²⁴² Indeed, NATO would now be viewed as a vehicle through which to promote and secure wider European stability and integration. Achieving these two conditions, however, implied that NATO would expand to those areas of Europe not already stable or integrated into the alliance. President Clinton, in a 1993 speech before the Polish parliament, stated as much, proclaiming that “bringing new members into NATO...is no longer a question of whether, but when and how.”²⁴³ He elaborated this point further, stating that “expansion will not depend upon the appearance of a new threat

²⁴¹ Clinton.

²⁴² Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 103.

²⁴³ William Jefferson Clinton, “Address to the Polish Parliament in Warsaw” (Speech, Warsaw, July 7, 1994), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-polish-parliament-warsaw>.

in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region.”²⁴⁴

In reinventing and expanding NATO, which officially occurred with the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, the Clinton administration secured victories for each of its ephemeral interests. First, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and its reinvention from an anti-Soviet defensive alliance into a greater European stability institution gave this Cold War relic new life in the post-Cold War world. However, the overhaul of NATO served other maintenance purposes as well. For one, it maintained Lord Ismay’s famous but likely apocryphal charge that NATO’s true purpose was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”²⁴⁵ This maintenance of the United States’ role as the provider and guarantor of European security also lent domestic rhetorical support to the bipartisan consensus on NATO’s maintenance and expansion. Secondly, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe was a notable success in the Clinton administration’s efforts to secure the enlargement of democracy and markets. Providing for the security of the liberalizing former Soviet satellites was seen as a way to solidify their inclusion into a burgeoning liberal world order. Though the Clinton administration only reigned over NATO’s expansion to three new countries, it laid the foundation for further expansions which have continued even into the Trump administration. Lastly, the Clinton administration’s renewal and expansion efforts were undertaken alongside parallel ones to engage with Russia. Engagement with its former foe was seen as necessary to assuage its fears that the Americans were taking advantage of Russian weakness to bring NATO to its borders. Yet, NATO’s eastward expansion was chiefly about consolidating the spoils of its Cold War victory and not necessarily about threatening Russia. The administration sought Central and Eastern Europe’s incorporation into NATO in order to stabilize, democratize, and capitalize them and ensure their incorporation into the United

²⁴⁴ Clinton.

²⁴⁵ Quoted in: Timothy Andrews Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 3.

States' emerging post-Cold War order.²⁴⁶ Russian fears about NATO enlargement, while publicly manifested by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's declaration that it risked plunging Europe "into a cold peace," were tempered by the undeniable difficulty associated with actually defending these new additions.²⁴⁷ In reality, there was little the Russians could do to stop NATO's expansion and the Clinton administration's efforts to engage with them were primarily intended to make the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the American orbit an easier pill to swallow. As it was with the Athenians and the Melians, the Americans would do what they could and the Russians would suffer what they must.

The last major element of the Clinton administration's cooperative security grand strategy concerned the economic aspects of security. As with the diplomatic and military elements, the administration's economic strategy was reflective of its belief that "to the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and peaceful."²⁴⁸ To achieve this spread of markets and democracy, the Clinton team sought to maintain and expand the same basic economic calculus that guided American economic strategy during the Cold War. As detailed in the previous chapter, the United States assumed leadership of an economic order in which it accepted less than reciprocal trade relationships so as to rehabilitate its allies and former enemies. Within the context of the Cold War, securing allied support against the Soviet Union often trumped protecting American domestic industries and securing market reciprocity. In short, the Americans, as Alfred Eckes Jr. notes in his history of American trade policy, "redefined the national interest to include the health of the cosmopolitical economic system [and] placed support for the open system over the tangible interests of import-sensitive American producers and workers."²⁴⁹ With economic policy no longer constrained by Cold War security

²⁴⁶ Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 106–10.

²⁴⁷ Noman Kempster and Dean E. Murphy, "Broader NATO May Bring 'Cold Peace,' Yeltsin Warns: Europe: Russian President Accuses U.S. of Being Power Hungry. Speech Comes as Nations Finalize Nuclear Treaty.," *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1994, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-12-06-mn-5629-story.html>.

²⁴⁸ Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

²⁴⁹ Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 282.

calculations, the Clinton administration sought to expand this economic order worldwide. Instead of limiting its economic might to create and sustain an anti-communist economic bloc, the Clinton administration would now do so in order to build a truly global system of integrated markets, finance, and trade.

The economic elements of the Clinton administration's cooperative security strategy manifested in two new economic institutions—one regional and one international. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an agreement originally negotiated by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 between the United States, Mexico, and Canada that created an integrated free-market trading zone in North America.²⁵⁰ Though NAFTA was originally a Republican initiative, the Clinton administration vigorously supported its approval in the Senate despite the opposition from American labor organizations and a majority of Democrats in both houses of congress.²⁵¹ Functionally, NAFTA entailed the reduction of protective tariffs across the zone and was intended to ease the passage of goods and investment across borders in North America. The ultimate idea behind NAFTA was that the United States had the most to benefit from economic openness and that the liberalization and integration of trade would spur economic growth for all involved. In the administration's view, the Americans would lead the world in leveraging the information revolution into a knowledge economy. Any economic dislocation caused by the outsourcing of rust belt industries would be massaged in the long term by lower priced imports and the gradual movement of American workers into new industries. Eckes highlights this thinking, writing that "accepting the inevitability of a global economy, instant communication, and the rapid movement of capital, goods, and people, leaders stressed the importance of investing in training and skills at home to improve the quality of the labor force. The elite exhorted ordinary workers to adapt and to accept the need for lifelong learning."²⁵²

²⁵⁰ James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush V. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 333.

²⁵¹ Maney, *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President*, 84–85.

²⁵² Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 286.

These particular notions also served as the basis for the Clinton administration's support for American participation in the WTO. Just as it had achieved the reduction of trade barriers on a regional basis in North America, the administration also sought them on an international scale. However, the WTO was neither a wholly new institution or an original Clinton initiative. Indeed, as was the case with much of the Clinton administration's strategy, the WTO was a Bush administration effort that the Clinton team carried forward. An effort that was, in reality, the post-Cold War evolution of the GATT framework first negotiated by the Truman administration in 1947. Over the course of its Cold War existence, the framework had been largely successful in reducing trade barriers and promoting trade. Though the GATT had been periodically amended and updated throughout the Cold War, its central shortcoming was that it enjoyed no mechanism with which to enforce its provisions. The WTO changed that. As an institution it was given the power to "review disputes between countries and enforce rulings by allowing sanctions against violators."²⁵³ Perhaps not surprisingly, this integrative enforcement power was the focus of many critiques lobbied against the agreement by those members in the American congress who were more protectionist on trade, defensive of American sovereignty, or both.²⁵⁴ Indeed, certain aspects of the agreement, such as Article XVI, Section 4, which stated that "each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements," seemed to suggest that legal and policy dictates from Geneva would supersede those passed in Washington.²⁵⁵ Yet, despite some objection in Congress and from labor groups that also opposed NAFTA, the Clinton administration secured American entry into the WTO in 1994.

Overall, there is little doubt that the Clinton administration achieved success in implementing its cooperative security grand strategy. Its attempt to rejuvenate the United

²⁵³ Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 156.

²⁵⁴ Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 284–85.

²⁵⁵ "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization" (World Trade Organization, 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.

Nations, its reinvention and expansion of NATO, and its inclusion of the United States in NAFTA and the WTO, were each a concrete accomplishment reflective of the administration's ephemeral interests. The administration succeeded in reinforcing, expanding, and reimagining the United States' Cold War relationships, patterns, and institutions into the post-Cold War era. Yet, while there is little debate about the administration's success in implementation, one can debate as to the overall success of the strategy in balancing integration and insulation. Militarily, the United States became further integrated yet less insulated in Europe as a result of repeated and continual NATO expansions. Moreover, the steady eastward creep of NATO made friendly relations between the United States and Russia more difficult to achieve in the long run. In an economic sense, the Clinton administration traded already meager economic insulation to secure further economic integration—the effects of which were either denied or obfuscated, but not effectively mitigated.²⁵⁶ Eckes notes this reality, writing that “regional and multinational trade liberalization might benefit business, but it appeared to expose low-skilled and high-wage American workers to the consequences of global wage harmonization.”²⁵⁷ In both its actions and its failure to extenuate its negative aspects, the Clinton economic strategy failed to match its increased integration with sufficient insulation.

In sum, the Clinton cooperative security strategy was a wager that in a rapidly emerging new world integration was an unqualified good and insulation was an anachronistic relic from a world that was quickly fading away. In the administration's view, the information revolution and the spread of technology were contributing to a world where insulation was not just no longer necessary, but increasingly impossible. While the Clinton administration should not be faulted for implementing a cooperative security grand strategy, the wisdom of implementing one that placed considerably more emphasis on integration than on insulation is certainly questionable. As integration inherently universalizes and insulation acts as a protection from the potentially harmful aspects of

²⁵⁶ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 95–101; Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 283–89.

²⁵⁷ Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, 287.

integration, a grand strategy unbalanced in favor of integration is one fraught with risk—just not the type the Clinton administration feared.

D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

*To be successful, a strategy of enlargement must provide distinctions and set priorities. It must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more traditional geostrategic interests. And it must suggest how best to expend our large but nonetheless limited national security resources.*²⁵⁸

—Anthony Lake

For those responsible for crafting American grand strategy, the conclusion of the Cold War was surely both cathartic and confusing. It was probably cathartic in the sense that, having secured an American victory after decades of effort, these strategists and policymakers likely felt an amazing sense of relief at having been freed from the stresses of managing a potentially catastrophic superpower rivalry. This sense of freedom was probably accompanied by a newfound confidence born of a much-deserved sense of accomplishment. However, one can also imagine that the end of the Cold War was an extremely confusing experience as well. Once freed from the routinized and somewhat predictable pattern of Cold War international relations, thoughts of the future might have seemed thoroughly disorienting and devoid of structure. Having witnessed the ultimate culmination of decades of strenuous effort in service to the nation, one could easily imagine these patriots seized by an unsettling sense of idleness as their country turned its focus inward. While these speculations about the possible mental and emotional states of American leaders upon the United States' triumph in the Cold War are little more than empathetic thought experiments, they do provide a useful way to understand the Clinton administration's employment of selective engagement grand strategy. For when one examines how the administration employed this type of strategy, it is not hard to imagine it being crafted and implemented by those hypothetical American leaders described above.

The Clinton administration's selective engagement grand strategy was that of a superpower unbound but not entirely unrestrained, that of a missionary nation in search of

²⁵⁸ Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

new crusades abroad but sensitive to domestic politics, and that of an idle hegemon attempting to make sense of a new era. Given the defeat of its superpower opponent and the lack of any great power challenger, the United States' engagements abroad were largely unmoored from a disciplined consideration of how they influenced great power relationships. Yet, this did not mean the administration was unrestrained by other factors. Having achieved a great national victory, American leaders were in search of a new heading on which to direct the crusading American spirit. However, given the comparatively low-stakes post-Cold War environment and the president's tenuous relationship with the American military, the Clinton administration was highly attuned to the politics of action and inaction both at home and abroad. Lastly, having emerged as the singular global "hyperpower" from a decades-long era of vigorous bipolar competition, the United States found itself confronted with no existential threats to its survival and its citizens increasingly skeptical of engagement abroad. In its pursuit of ephemeral interests, the Clinton administration's selective engagement strategy can be seen as an effort to make sense of this disorienting condition.

Built primarily around the interactions of great powers on the international stage, selective engagement strategies typically entail the measured application of a state's power in pursuit of its national interests.²⁵⁹ As one might expect, American selective engagement strategy during the Cold War was crafted, debated, and implemented with consideration as to how engagements would affect the hard balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the nature of the superpower competition, nearly all American engagement abroad was directed towards its effort to contain Soviet communism. This necessarily meant that issues which did not directly affect this effort, such as those of terrorism, human rights or ethnic strife, were often deemed a lower priority and not warranting of concerted American engagement. However, the end of the Cold War turned this entire paradigm on its head. No longer constrained by Cold War calculations, America's unmatched power was now available to pursue ephemeral interests. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier highlight this reality, writing that "because of its sheer power

²⁵⁹ Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 17–18.

[the United States] enjoyed tremendous freedom of action. Although policymakers and pundits debated when, where, and how America could act, there was rarely much doubt about whether it was capable of doing so.”²⁶⁰ As such, issues and regions largely ignored during the Cold War would now be the subject of American engagement.

In a pattern repeatedly highlighted thus far, the first example demonstrating the general thrust of the Clinton administration’s selective engagement strategy was actually an engagement it inherited from its predecessor. The Bush administration, despite the lack of a national interest in doing so, sent American military forces into Somalia in November 1992, in order to address the unfolding humanitarian disaster there. Once in office, the Clinton team absorbed the Somalia intervention into its larger pursuit of ephemeral interests. The administration saw interventions such as the one in Somalia as being, both in substance and style, the type of engagements the United States should undertake in a post-Cold War world. As Chollet and Goldgeier note, the engagement “showed the United States could command the moral high ground and act on principle, deploying military power to serve humanitarian ends; it would save hundreds of thousands of innocent lives; and it involved working with other countries through the United Nations.”²⁶¹ Yet, as was shortly demonstrated by its reaction to the infamous *Blackhawk Down* incident in October 1993, the administration’s efforts to channel the crusading American spirit were undoubtedly tempered by its sensitivity to the domestic and international politics surrounding the United States’ engagements abroad.

This sensitivity, while not wrong or unwarranted in its own right, certainly played a role in the administration’s decision-making that was likely exaggerated by the low-stakes character of the post-Cold War international environment. An often-overlooked benefit of great power competition is that it provides both the positive and negative cues necessary for a truly effective selective engagement grand strategy. Cues that, as a consequence of American unipolarity, the Clinton administration did not enjoy. As such, its engagement strategy was largely directed by both its pursuit of ephemeral interests and

²⁶⁰ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*, 317.

²⁶¹ Chollet and Goldgeier, 54.

the pressures exerted by domestic and international politics. This was reflected in its decision both to embrace the Bush intervention in Somalia and to remove American troops from there despite not having resolved the issues they were sent to address. However, Somalia was not the only place where this phenomenon occurred. As a result of the domestic backlash against its actions in Somalia, the administration refrained from intervening in an analogous ethnic civil war in the African country of Rwanda. This war between the Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis ultimately resulted in the massacre of an estimated 800,000 people.²⁶² “The president and his advisors were,” as the historian Warren Cohen notes, “unwilling to risk American lives in a country few Americans could find on a map.”²⁶³

Ironically, the backlash and guilt which stemmed from the administration’s decision to not intervene in Rwanda ultimately contributed to its undertaking of corresponding interventions elsewhere. Whereas the fear of provoking a political backlash prevented the administration from engaging in Rwanda, the fear of allowing another genocide to continue compelled it to engage in Bosnia and Kosovo. With the Europeans unwilling or unable to stop the fighting in the Balkans, the Clinton team, after a fair amount of foot-dragging, eventually intervened to stop the massacres and violence, albeit in a limited fashion. In Bosnia, the administration led NATO in an air war against the Serbs that culminated in the cessation of fighting and the signing of the Dayton Accords.²⁶⁴ Later, in Kosovo, the administration repeated this model in its efforts to halt the civil war in Serbia and it took the threat of American ground troops and Russian diplomatic intervention to end the conflict.²⁶⁵ Interestingly, the American-led engagements in the Balkans were likely as much about saving “NATO’s standing as a relevant alliance” as they were halting the violence.²⁶⁶ Bacevich notes this duality, writing that “it was not

²⁶² Maney, *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President*, 127–28.

²⁶³ Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991*, vol. Volume 4, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 273.

²⁶⁴ Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush V. Gore*, 368–71.

²⁶⁵ Maney, *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President*, 241–44.

²⁶⁶ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2003), 250.

Kosovo that counted, but affirming the dominant position of the United States in a Europe that was unified, integrated, and open.”²⁶⁷

The Clinton administration’s engagements abroad demonstrated both the centrality of American power in a world devoid of focus on great power competition and the extent to which American policymakers and the foreign policy establishment were uncomfortable with idleness. With their great foe defeated, American swords would not be beat into American ploughshares, but turned to new purposes. This often resulted in issues truly unrelated to the United States essential national interests being redefined as crucial not just for the security and prosperity of the United States, but also for the world. Such actions even led to President Clinton himself equating intervention in Kosovo with the allies intervening to stop Adolf Hitler.²⁶⁸ A number of rationales explain this penchant for engagement. A first concerns the interplay of domestic politics in the United States. Throughout the Cold War there was a perception that while the Republicans were true “cold warriors,” the Democrats were weak or inept on foreign policy and protecting the country from external threats. The end of the Cold War and the ascendance of Clinton to the presidency offered Democrats an opportunity to reframe this political narrative. In fact, during the Clinton administration, it was common for Democrats to support American interventions abroad, while the Republicans generally opposed. As a “New Democrat,” Clinton could help his party shed its reputation for weakness by “being tough on human rights and active in promoting democracy.”²⁶⁹ Another factor at play on the Clinton selective engagement grand strategy was the evolution of the American media and its ability to pressure policymakers to “do something.” In truth, overcoming this “CNN effect” may have been an insurmountable obstacle even if the Clinton administration was not predisposed towards engagement. However, this is not likely as American interventions in Somalia and the Balkans were largely unpopular with Americans. It is not surprising,

²⁶⁷ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 105.

²⁶⁸ Quoted in Maney, *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President*, 242; Nick Gillespie, “Milosevic No Hitler, And Clinton’s No Churchill,” *Reason.Com* (blog), April 19, 1999, <https://reason.com/1999/04/19/milosevic-no-hitler-and-clinto/>.

²⁶⁹ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*, 28.

though it is incredibly ironic, that George W. Bush was subsequently elected on a presidential platform that decried Clinton's interventionist engagements abroad. It is doubly ironic that the Clinton administration, despite its predisposal towards engagement, did not launch a war with Iraq, whereas President Bush, who initially campaigned on an end to "nation building," eventually did.

In total, the Clinton selective engagement strategy was influenced by a host of complex factors. Set free from the considerations that normally govern a selective engagement grand strategy, the administration enjoyed a free hand to engage and intervene, as its ephemeral interests, guided by domestic and international politics, so counseled. American policymakers, their confidence and ambition buoyed by American preeminence, outlined an engagement strategy that sought to harness the American spirit for a new global crusade to secure human rights and spread democracy. What they encountered, however, was an American people increasingly skeptical of engagement abroad. In the final analysis, the Clinton selective engagement grand strategy, much like the Clinton presidency, amounted to a transition between two distinct eras. The presidency, a transition from the Cold War to the War on Terror; the selective engagement strategy, a transition from one bound by superpower competition to one of unilateral universalist-interventionism. While the Clinton administration's selective engagement strategy did not lead to any catastrophic policy errors, in defining itself as a break from the confines of the past, it laid the foundation for American over-reach and over-extension in the future.

E. PRIMACY

*The train of globalization cannot be reversed, but it has more than one possible destination. If we want America to stay on the right track, if we want other people to be on that track and have the chance to enjoy peace and prosperity, we have no choice but to try and lead the train.*²⁷⁰

—William Clinton

The Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy. Yet, to say that the Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy is not to say the United States did not enjoy political, economic, and military primacy during the Clinton

²⁷⁰ Clinton, "Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney."

administration's tenure. It did. In fact, under the Clinton administration the United States could claim the world's largest economy, its most powerful military, and increasingly, its most ubiquitous culture.²⁷¹ Instead, what is meant by stating that the Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy is that the administration did not have a strategy that sought "to preserve U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger."²⁷² However, one should not take this to mean that the Clinton administration did not have a strategy to preserve the United States' political, economic, and military preeminence. The distinction is made in the goals the administration sought to achieve in pursuit of its ephemeral interests. Put simply, the Clinton administration implemented a strategy to maintain American global dominance but not necessarily unrivaled American primacy; a strategy to be *primus inter pares* within an open world order, not *primus solus* in an international state of nature.²⁷³ Guided by its view that the world was moving inexorably towards greater interdependence and integration, the administration sought to create an open American-led global order that all nations, even those with the potential to become peer competitors, could participate in and benefit from. This open global order would be underwritten and maintained by a preponderance of American political, economic, and military power. Hence, the Clinton primacy strategy, if it indeed required a name, could be aptly characterized as a strategy of benevolent preponderance.

This strategy of benevolent preponderance consisted of two primary objectives. The first, and arguably the most important, was the maintenance of peace and stability through deterrence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main mission and the central function of American military power was to be a global deterrent against aggression. While the Clinton administration oversaw a post-Cold War drawdown of American military forces, it retained the force capacity to wage two simultaneous regional wars.²⁷⁴ The

²⁷¹ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, 917–22.

²⁷² Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 32.

²⁷³ Posen and Ross, 32.

²⁷⁴ Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Future of Land Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 144–45.

United States also maintained sizable military garrisons in Western Europe, Korea, and Japan. Moreover, its air and naval forces still enjoyed a global network of airfields and ports. However, the most important military assets, at least in terms of deterrence, were the United States' nuclear triad of strategic bombers, submarines, and inter-continental ballistic missiles.

Though nearly all of these military tools had been developed to deter and if necessary, defeat the Soviet Union, they now served to deter conflict and contain potential rivals. In Europe, American military forces, along with their NATO allies, halted the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and acted as a military hedge against a potential resurgence of Russian power. In the Middle East and Africa, the Clinton administration used American military forces to contain Saddam Hussein's Iraq and conduct strikes on terrorist training camps. In Asia, the Clinton team sent American aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and maintained forces in South Korea as a check on North Korea.²⁷⁵ Overall, the American military served as the world's pacifier so as to maintain the security conditions appropriate for the Clinton administration's pursuit of its ephemeral interests.

The second major objective of the Clinton administration's strategy of benevolent preponderance was the securing and maintenance of global economic stability and prosperity. The Clinton administration's endorsement and advocacy of NAFTA and the WTO have already been discussed above and, while part of the administration's efforts to promote economic integration and prosperity, will not be rediscussed here. However, a different initiative pursued by the Clinton administration is perhaps more illustrative of its commitment to promoting an open global order based on a benevolent preponderance of American power rather than American primacy. This commitment is most apparent in the Clinton administration's approach to the People's Republic of China. Ever since President Richard Nixon went to China in 1972, the Americans had encouraged and supported the growth of Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military power. Originally envisioned as "a strategic effort to balance China and the Soviet Union against one another in hopes of

²⁷⁵ See: Cohen, *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*, Volume 4:253–301.

producing more moderate behavior by each of them,” by the Clinton administration’s tenure American policy towards China was based on an assumption that “conciliatory U.S. policies toward Beijing - such as trade, education, and cultural contacts - would in the long run help serve the causes of [Chinese] liberty and democracy.”²⁷⁶

The Clinton administration’s goals with regard to China were commendable and certainly within the bounds of its strategy of benevolent preponderance. Clinton’s ultimate hope was that as it became more powerful China would become a responsible stakeholder in the global order that had enabled and supported its ascendance. This view was outlined in a speech he delivered to advocate for China’s admission into the WTO, he declared that:

China’s entry into the WTO...is about more than our economic interests. It is clearly in our larger national interests. It represents the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970s...the path that China takes to the future is a choice China will make...we can work to pull China in the right direction, or we can turn our backs and almost certainly push it in the wrong direction...Membership in the WTO...will not create a free society in China overnight or guarantee that China will play by global rules. But over time, I believe it will move China faster and further in the right direction and certainly will do that more than rejection would.²⁷⁷

While the logic of Clinton’s, indeed Washington’s, approach to China was simple and clear, the same could not be said for its endstate. Hardly explained or addressed publicly by the Clinton team was the much more likely outcome that, instead of gaining a responsible stakeholder in an open global order, the United States was supporting and encouraging the rise of a new peer competitor. That in its efforts to build a global order open to all nations, the United States may ultimately be responsible for the rise of a new superpower that brutally suppressed human rights, that blamed the West for its “century of humiliation,” had more than a billion citizens, and that historically viewed itself as the Asian hegemon or “middle kingdom.” It is possible that Clinton’s approach to China was

²⁷⁶ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: First Vintage Books, 2000), 370, 376.

²⁷⁷ William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies” (Speech, Washington, D.C., March 8, 2000), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-paul-h-nitze-school-advanced-international-studies>.

a well-conceived effort to avoid a Cold War redux. It is possible that it will eventually be successful and that China will become a responsible stakeholder in a globalized order. It is also possible that the American approach to China rested upon a series of questionable assumptions and amounted to a wager that China's rise would deviate from a well-understood and predictable historical pattern. Historians will ultimately determine the wisdom of the Clinton administration's approach to China. Today, the United States and the world are reckoning with its consequences.

In both words and action, the Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy. Instead, it crafted and implemented a strategy of benevolent preponderance. The administration would not try to prevent the rise of peer competitors, it would merely try to stay ahead of them. It did so by leveraging American political, economic, and military power to underwrite and sustain an open order that sought to promote global integration and interdependence. By maintaining a global deterrence posture, it hoped to foster a global environment favorable to stability and economic prosperity. The United States' unrivaled economic and military might were not leveraged to prevent the rise of rival nations, but to cement its role as *primus inter pares* and encourage other nations to accede to the next era of *pax Americana*.

F. ISOLATIONISM

*Americans are basically isolationist. They understand at a gut level Henry Kissinger's vital-interest argument. Right now the average American doesn't see our interest threatened to the point where we should sacrifice one American life.*²⁷⁸

—President Bill Clinton

Despite claims to the contrary, Americans are not basically isolationist. Even a cursory glance at their history will show that Americans have been involved abroad, in one form or another, since the landings at Plymouth. However, as a consequence of their detached and distant situation, one might accurately say that they are predisposed towards isolationism. The power and natural security afforded to them by the location, size, and

²⁷⁸ Quoted in: George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (New York: Little Brown, 1999), 214.

bountifulness of their nation instills within them a sense of “strategic immunity.”²⁷⁹ As what goes on in distant lands seems to affect life in the United States in only minor ways, Americans have developed a reputation for being ignorant of or disinterested in foreign affairs. Moreover, isolationism has deep cultural and political roots in the American body politic. As a nation founded to be a rejection of the Old World’s politics, avarice, and militarism, the Americans have long viewed themselves and their institutions as being distinctly separate from and superior to those left behind across the seas. On account of these factors, any American leader who intended to embark the United States on a great undertaking beyond its shores has had to reckon with and overcome the isolationist qualities inherent to the American people. President Wilson did this by proclaiming that the Americans had a duty to “make the world safe for democracy.”²⁸⁰ Roosevelt, in response to an “unprovoked and dastardly attack,” embarked the United States on a crusade to defeat Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany.²⁸¹ Truman, however, faced a different kind of challenge than did Wilson and Roosevelt. As he needed a long-term solution to the United States’ isolationist predilection in order to wage the Cold War, he attacked isolationism directly rather than circumvent it. In his efforts to permanently discredit isolationism as a legitimate basis for American foreign policy, he implemented an isolationist grand strategy that was designed to discount, disparage, and dismiss not just isolationism, but also those politicians, academics, and citizens who may have extolled its virtues. In its style, methods, and intent, the Clinton administration’s isolationist grand strategy was nearly identical to the one implemented by the Truman administration.

The Clinton strategy to isolate isolationism was, however, built upon a considerably less stable foundation. In Truman’s day, the United States had just emerged victorious from a global conflagration that many believed was at least partially a product of American isolationism after World War I, and a slow but steady appeasement of Germany and Japan.

²⁷⁹ Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*, 63–91.

²⁸⁰ Wilson, Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany.

²⁸¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War with Japan” (Speech, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1941), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-congress-requesting-declaration-war-with-japan>.

Confronted with the emergence of another hostile authoritarian state in the form of the Soviet Union, the Truman administration did not hesitate to point to the supposed failures of the interwar years in making its case for a rejection of isolationism. Simply put, at the outset of the Cold War the specter of isolationism and the ghost of Munich, when combined with a faith and confidence in the American government, were very effective in frightening the American people into supporting an era of unprecedented internationalism. Yet, by the Cold War's end much had changed. For one, as a consequence of controversies such as the Vietnam War and Watergate, American faith in government was considerably diminished. So too was the potency of invoking events such as Munich. Most importantly, however, the Soviet Union's collapse left the United States as the world's sole remaining superpower. As a result, the Americans enjoyed a level of security unmatched by any other nation on the planet. Hence, justifying a new era of American internationalism—especially one dedicated to the pursuit of ephemeral interests—by attacking isolationism, amounted to a task considerably more difficult upon the end of the Cold War than at its beginning.

The Clinton administration's efforts to discredit isolationism were made more difficult by two primary factors. The first was the obvious reality that the world had changed and that the United States, while still facing threats from abroad, was undeniably more secure than it was during the Cold War. The second factor was the reemergence and rise to prominence of politicians willing to point this out. While voices calling for a more reserved American foreign policy came from both the political left and right, the loudest and most effective at shaping the national narrative emerged from the right. Patrick Buchanan, Ross Perot, and the infamous Contract Republicans each emerged as prominent critics of the bi-partisan consensus on the United States' post-Cold War internationalism. Buchanan, a kind of proto-Donald Trump who himself ran for president in 1992, 1996, and 2000, called for an end to the United States' engagements abroad and a "new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second and third as well."²⁸² Perot, who also ran for president in 1992 and 1996, also saw many failings in the Bush and Clinton policies. He famously quipped that NAFTA would lead to

²⁸² Patrick J. Buchanan, "America First - and Second, and Third," *National Interest* Spring (1990): 79, 82.

a “giant sucking sound” of American jobs to Mexico and that “keeping U.S. troops on European soil...is akin to a parent leaving a light on in a child’s room at night to ward off ghosts.”²⁸³ Lastly, the Contract Republicans, who swept into congress in the 1994 midterm elections, largely “scoffed at the notion that America had to be engaged in the world” and were determined to torpedo the entire Clinton presidency any way they could.²⁸⁴ Yet, despite these loud and often cantankerous critics, the Clinton administration had one major advantage in its war against American isolationism—inertia.

Though the American people may have been inherently predisposed to isolationism and though they might have been eager to reap the rewards of a post-Cold War “peace dividend,” they had become, as a consequence of the Cold War, quite accustomed to international activism. In a sense, the Cold War had nurtured the public to be comfortable with an internationalism that was not innate to their nature. Just as it took decades of elite prodding and two world wars to shake the Americans from their historical preference for non-entanglement, the effects of five decades of vigorous internationalism would not disappear from the American psyche quickly. The Clinton administration and the foreign policy establishment understood this reality and made every effort to perpetuate its continuance. For example, President Clinton, speaking at the United Nations, proclaimed that “isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.”²⁸⁵ Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, disparaged those favoring a more restrained grand strategy, stating in a speech that “calls from the left and the right to stay at home rather than engage abroad are re-enforced by the rhetoric of Neo-Know-Nothings.”²⁸⁶ One prominent analyst lamented isolationism’s survival and ascribed it to “the sentiment among the poor and the poorly educated that, however noble our purposes, most of the things we do for the rest of

²⁸³ Ross Perot, *United We Stand: How We Can Take Back Our Country* (New York: Hyperion, 1992), 103.

²⁸⁴ Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*, 109.

²⁸⁵ Clinton, “Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney.”

²⁸⁶ Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

the world are wasteful, pointless, unappreciated, and tragic.”²⁸⁷ Clearly, those who questioned American internationalism, even in a new era of relative peace and security, risked being dismissed as an isolationist, a Neo-Know-Nothing, or an uneducated and poverty-stricken dolt.

Ultimately, the Clinton isolationist strategy was designed to discredit both isolationism and those who opposed American internationalism. If the administration and the bi-partisan foreign policy establishment could tar and discredit those who promoted restraint or retrenchment as isolationists, they could maintain control of American grand strategy and ensure that the United States continued to pursue an internationalist agenda.²⁸⁸ In this regard, the Clinton isolationist strategy was entirely successful. Yet, given that this success was largely built on a foundation of rhetoric and Cold War inertia, there is reason to believe that it may not be lasting. The inherent qualities of the American people and the American geography will ensure that isolationism remains a factor in American grand strategy. President Clinton, in one of his final speeches as president, spoke to his efforts to overcome American isolationism stating that “people say I’m a pretty good talker, but I still don’t think I’ve persuaded the American people by big majorities that you really ought to care a lot about foreign policy, about our relationship to the rest of the world.”²⁸⁹ In truth, it is unlikely that any American leader could do so in perpetuity—not even one as convincing as President Clinton.

²⁸⁷ William Schneider, “The Old Politics and the New World Order,” in *Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 63.

²⁸⁸ Charles Kupchan, *Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 328.

²⁸⁹ Clinton, “Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney.”

G. TOWARD A SINGLE SPHERE: INSULATED SPHERES OF INTEGRATION AFTER THE COLD WAR

*This is the truth as I see it. We served history well during the cold war, but now history calls on us again to help consolidate freedom's new gains into a larger and more lasting peace.*²⁹⁰

—William Clinton

Likely to its delight and chagrin, the Clinton administration had to answer grand strategy questions not forced upon any presidential administration since that of President Truman after World War II. Just as Truman was the first president of the Cold War and was tasked with crafting and defining American grand strategy for that era, Clinton was the first president after the Cold War and faced a similar challenge. In some ways, Clinton's task may have been more perplexing. The Truman administration faced a clear threat and enjoyed an American public largely prepared to confront it. By contrast, the Clinton administration faced no catalyzing threat and had to manage an American public intent on turning inward. As such, it is not surprising that the Clinton administration maintained the general arc of the Truman post-World War II grand strategy. In this case, inertia was a quality of its own. What is interesting, however, was how the Clinton administration's pursuit of integration was intended to erode the distinctions between the United States' insulated spheres of integration and increasingly merge them into a single sphere.

While the Clinton grand strategy maintained certain elements of the insulated spheres of integration cast by the Truman administration, its pursuit of enlargement altered their size, composition, and boundaries. The United States' internal sphere was expanded to include those nations integrated into NATO, NAFTA, and the WTO. Though some distinctions between an internal and external sphere were maintained, the Clinton team's pursuit of ephemeral interests eroded the boundary between them. As a consequence, the internal sphere enjoyed considerably less insulation, both within the internal sphere and in its relation to the external sphere. Insulation was eroded within the internal sphere in that its boundaries were no longer set by the limits of the United States' cooperative security

²⁹⁰ William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels" (Speech, Brussels, Belgium, January 9, 1994), <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-future-leaders-europe-brussels>.

and primacy grand strategies as they had been under the Founders and the Truman administration. For example, with its incorporation into the WTO, the Clinton administration moved away from the principle set by the Founders and maintained by Truman which held that only things over which the United States could maintain primacy should be included within its internal sphere. As this integration into a global institution was not insulated with corresponding protections—such as the veto power enjoyed by the United States at the United Nations—this integration partially eroded the distinction between the United States’ internal and external spheres. While the political and military expansions of the internal sphere amounted to a difference in degree and were merely an expansion of those put in place by Truman, Clinton’s economic integration was a difference in kind. The overall result was insulated spheres of integration that were much more integrated, less protected by robust forms of insulation, and increasingly—a single sphere.

However, was this such a bad thing? If the United States could create and sustain a single global sphere of integration that was based on shared values, common institutions, economic interdependence, and American military power, was that not a strategic objective worthy of pursuit? Furthermore, if the mechanisms of integration within this single sphere were akin to those implemented by the Founders, was this not at least a continuation of their strategic grammar, if not their logic? In other words, even if Clinton aimed to secure American liberty via integration instead of balance, were his efforts not at least reflective of the intent of the Founders’ logic, even if not a representation of it? Truthfully, it is likely still too early to tell. The only determination that can be made for certain is that the Clinton grand strategy did not seek to preserve liberty by blending archetypal grand strategies to achieve a balance between integration and insulation in the same way the founding generation and the Truman administration did. In this sense, the Clinton administration indeed went beyond the Founders’ logic even if the effects and wisdom of it having done so are not yet readily apparent. This strain placed on the insulationist paradigm endures today.

H. CONCLUSION

*Economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world towards integration. These forces are fueling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization. But they also threaten to destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people feel more insecure.*²⁹¹

—William Clinton

As discussed herein, the Clinton administration strained the Founders' logic in its pursuit of integration. This begs the question if the Founders' vision for the United States is still relevant. Is the United States still a nation that prioritizes the fundamental interests of its own citizens? Or, is it something more? Something with a broader mission for the world? There is little doubt that the United States' pursuit of the Clinton ephemeral interests has largely been a long-term net positive for the world. There have been no major interstate wars. Global standards of living have risen, while the numbers of people who die from preventable causes have fallen. Global institutions, such as the WTO, have increased levels of international trade and commerce. Countries such as China and India, as result of increased trade, have lifted hundreds of millions from abject poverty. On the whole, the world has benefitted tremendously from the Clinton administration's strategy of benevolent preponderance.²⁹²

Yet, from an American grand strategy perspective, one should ask to what extent the United States has benefitted from the Clinton administration's legacy? Is the United States more powerful and more prosperous today than it was in 1996? In 2000? Have the benefits enjoyed by the world accrued equally to the United States or to the average American citizen? In truth, one can find data to support an answer in the affirmative and in the negative. It depends on how and what one decides to measure. The data that would answer in the affirmative would point to steady, though anemic, rises in GDP, lower costs

²⁹¹ Clinton, "Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney."

²⁹² Max Roser, "The Short History of Global Living Conditions and Why It Matters That We Know It," Our World In Data (University of Oxford, 2019), <https://ourworldindata.org/a-history-of-global-living-conditions-in-5-charts>.

of consumer goods, and a generalized notion of global peace.²⁹³ Those who might answer in the negative would likely cite soaring levels of national debt, stagnant middle-class wage growth, increasing income inequality, and intractable political polarization.²⁹⁴ Moreover, where positive aspects for Americans can be found, one must ask which Americans have benefited. There are indications that certain sectors and regions of American life have benefited tremendously, while others have stagnated or fallen behind. Interestingly, from a grand strategy perspective, is the extent to which these benefits have accrued to the sectors of American life that exert vastly disproportionate amounts of influence on national politics and the direction and course of American grand strategy.

Alexis de Tocqueville, in his famous work *Democracy in America*, asserted that democratic nations may require their foreign affairs be managed by elites so as to separate them from the whims of popular opinion. He wrote that “the main vice for which aristocracy is reproached is that of working for itself alone and not for the whole community. However, in foreign policy it very seldom happens that an aristocracy has an interest distinct from that of the people.”²⁹⁵ Yet, what happens when the aristocracy, or in the case of the United States—a political, academic, media, military and foreign policy elite, view themselves in a sense broader than their national identity? Or, if this is not the case, what happens when a political demagogue can spuriously claim that the grand strategy long favored by the American elite does not benefit the common American and can cite legitimate data to make his or her claims believable?

²⁹³ The World Bank, “GDP Growth (Annual %) - United States,” 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=US>.

²⁹⁴ Fred Dews and Tylene Patton-Bullock, “Charts of the Week: Middle Class Income and Wages” (Brookings Institution, January 24, 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2020/01/24/charts-of-the-week-middle-class-income-and-wages/>; Melissa S. Kearney, “Income Inequality in the United States” (Brookings Institution, 2014), <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/income-inequality-in-the-united-states/>; David Wessel, “How Worried Should You Be about the Federal Deficit and Debt?” (Brookings Institution, July 8, 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-worried-should-you-be-about-the-federal-deficit-and-debt/>; Michael Dimok and Richard Wike, “America Is Exceptional in the Nature of Its Political Divide” (Pew Research Center, 2020), <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/>.

²⁹⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: First Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006), 229.

As with many aspects of this chapter, the answer is not yet knowable. The history is still unfolding. Future generations may place Clinton and his administration among the upper echelons of strategic leaders in American history. Though they will likely never consider his tenure to be in the same league as a Washington, Lincoln, or Roosevelt, it is possible that with the passage of time, and with his personal failings and controversies largely forgotten, he could rank among those such as Adams, Grant, and Truman, who have become respected and appreciated once a clearer picture of their tenure is achieved. Yet, history may not be kind at all. Analysis in the future may hold that the Clinton administration's efforts to embrace integration and globalization led to a significant straining of the insulationist paradigm and a weakening of the American republic; that in its elaboration of the Truman grammar on a global scale, it did not just strain the Founders' strategic logic, it abandoned it. Indeed, like the famous Pericles leading his people behind the walls of Athens, Clinton may ultimately be remembered as a gifted politician and statesman whose reputation is forever tarnished by his failure to see or adequately prepare for the tragic, but entirely predictable, consequences of his grand strategy. Only time and history will tell.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

*The world being a dangerous place, they saw that a union that would aggregate strength against potential enemies was a necessity, but they wondered whether great size in the union or great power in the general government would introduce into their association forces that made for its disruption, or otherwise corrupted its republican principles.*²⁹⁶

—David C. Hendrickson

As was noted in the first pages of this work, Liddell Hart’s assertion that “the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita*—still awaiting exploration and understanding” is not entirely true.²⁹⁷ The former, while maybe an understandable lament for an Englishman witnessing the final glories of the British Empire, is certainly not accurate today. Grand strategy is a well-studied subject in graduate schools and think-tanks across the United States and explorations on the topic fill the pages of many books, journals, and publications. Truly, one would find it difficult to bemoan a lack of exploration on grand strategy in general or American grand strategy in particular. However, Hart’s latter lamentation still rings partially true. Though grand strategy does not suffer from a lack of exploration, universal understanding or agreement as to the purpose, goals, or future course of American grand strategy is not as robust. As is generally so in all eras but particularly true today, political and academic disagreements about the future arc of American grand strategy are legion and enjoying a particular salience on the account of domestic and geopolitical upheaval. As such, this thesis traced the seams of American grand strategy during periods of geopolitical change in the past so as to offer considerations for its future. Indeed, much of the history discussed herein is well-traveled ground. Explorations and understandings of the founding era and of the Truman administration are among the most extensive and diverse in American history. Moreover, the Clinton tenure, though not yet enjoying the full benefits of detached hindsight, will likely be subject to further illumination with the passage of time. The significance of this thesis, therefore, is

²⁹⁶ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 14.

²⁹⁷ Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, 322.

not in discovering new material but in the questions it has posed and in its new articulation of the fundamental problems of American grand strategy. In other words, in its exploration of these well-studied periods of American history, it arrives at a distinct understanding of how the United States has balanced integration and insulation in the crafting of its grand strategy and poses new questions about how it may do so in the future.

B. AN EXPLORATION AND AN UNDERSTANDING

*Many of the friends of freedom in America congratulate themselves on their role as the indispensable nation and as the agent chosen by History and Providence to spread political freedom in the world. But few seem much troubled by the massive globe-spanning American national security state and its implications for limited constitutional government, political liberty, and global security.*²⁹⁸

—Daniel H. Deudney

Weaved throughout this understanding is an exploration of the insulationist paradigm and the relationships between two fundamental tensions in American grand strategy: the seemingly immortal one that exists between integration and insulation, and the increasingly strained one between the Founders' first impressions and the demands put upon them by a constantly evolving world. While the former is a tension germane to grand strategy in general, the latter is unique to American grand strategy. In other words, how a nation defines itself, its interests, and its relationship to the world is a labor tasked to all nations. By contrast, the particular manner in which the Founders originally answered these questions is fundamental to the logic and grammar of American grand strategy. The central task of American grand strategists for most of the republic's history has been to carry forth the Founders' logic while creating a grammar appropriate to the peculiarities of their contemporary situations. Such a tension might be considered the happy burden borne by a nation enjoying the strategic architecture built upon enlightened foundations laid by uniquely brilliant men. Alternatively, it may be regarded as a perpetually frustrating and self-limiting cage anchored by nostalgic attachment to the glorious anachronisms of eighteenth-century statesmen not fitting for or appropriate to the needs of a modern state in an increasingly integrated world. Yet, the most considered view likely lies somewhere

²⁹⁸ Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, xiii.

in the equatorial range between these polar positions. Regardless of one's judgement of it, the heart of this tension derives from the simple truth that the Founders' first impressions contained strategic wisdom not just for their time, but for all time.

As this work makes clear, the wisdom undergirding the Founders' insulationist paradigm functions not only as blueprints for the balancing of integration and insulation, but also as a metric by which to judge the edifices constructed from them. Put differently, their first impressions illuminate a path to managing one fundamental tension of American grand strategy and serve as the anchor for the other. The logic of their grand strategy holds that liberty is maintained as a consequence of an appropriate equilibrium between integration and insulation contrived through the blending of archetypal grand strategies. Derived as it was from their understanding of history and other more immutable factors such as human nature and geography, the Founders' strategic logic represents a wisdom that is at least durable if not eternal. In question, then, is the extent to which this durability corresponds to elasticity. In other words, how far can the Founders' strategic logic be expanded before it reaches something akin to a Clausewitzian culminating point where to go beyond it "would not merely be a *useless* effort which could not add to success. [But] would in fact be a *damaging* one, which would lead to a reaction."²⁹⁹ Put plainly, at what point does the United States' sphere of integration contain a multitude of interests and factions too diverse to hold together? Or rather, to what extent can integration be increased without corresponding insulation before the vices of consolidation exert their maleficence? Indeed, determining the point at which the Founders' logic exceeds its limits may be the principal question around which the future of American grand strategy revolves.

This exploration suggests at least the outlines of a potential answer. In their blending of archetypal grand strategies and creation of distinct internal and external insulated spheres of integration, the Founders' established patterns which were carried forward by subsequent American leaders. One such pattern embraced by the Truman administration in the crafting of its grand strategy but partially eschewed by the Clinton administration was the non-incorporation of entities into the internal sphere over which the

²⁹⁹ Clausewitz, *On war*, 570.

United States could not maintain primacy. Truman's recasting of the Founders' insulated spheres of integration maintained this principle despite its notable expansion of the internal sphere. Yet, as detailed in the previous chapter, the Clinton administration's integration into the WTO likely amounted to a partial abandonment of this principle. China's economic rise means that the United States risks being incorporated into a global institution in which it does not enjoy primacy. Moreover, as this integration was not matched with corresponding mechanisms of insulation, it is possible that the cooperation and benefit it was supposed to provide will stagnate or diminish as China's economic star continues to wax. All this can be taken to suggest that the limits of the Founders' logic and the insulationist paradigm may correspond with the limits of American primacy; that the boundaries of their wisdom cannot and should not be extended beyond the fundamental and essential interests of the United States as doing so may ultimately undermine its ability to secure them.

However, other voices, many of them prominent and measured, have different views on the limits of the Founders' strategic wisdom. It has been suggested herein that the Clinton administration's drift away from the Founders' logic might indicate that the Founders' solution to the first fundamental tension of American grand strategy is not the one pursued today. This work's articulation of that administration's move towards a single sphere of integration at least approximates the views of those who hold that the Founders' insights can be used as the basis by which to order a global zone of integration or a "global village."³⁰⁰ If this is indeed the implied purpose and goal of American grand strategy today, then the question of whether the United States' pursuit of a single sphere of integration is a worthy strategic objective warrants a brief consideration.

An optimistic view of this move towards a single sphere might be that in order to avoid the greatest destroyer of liberty and free government—war—the United States seeks to replicate the Founders' mechanisms on a global scale. For example, if the Americans continued to guarantee the security of the global commons and field an overwhelming

³⁰⁰ Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, 273–77; Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order*, 286–311; Lissner and Rapp-Hooper, *An Open World*, 120–53.

military deterrent, would this not dissuade lesser nations from arming themselves or acting in aggressive ways towards other states? Or, if under the WTO global trade could be managed and regulated by an overarching authority, would global commerce not eventually resemble something akin to that of the individual states within the United States? Not surprisingly, many of the arguments made for the United States' post-Cold War bout of liberal internationalism are echoes of arguments made by the Federalists in favor of the Constitution's ratification. Perhaps their most related contention is that disintegration would invariably lead to a system plagued by war and that in preparing for and protecting against this hobgoblin, the Americans would sacrifice not only their economic vitality, but would also risk their liberty. Hamilton wrote in *Federalist No. 6* that "to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties...would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of the ages."³⁰¹ The remedy suggested for the amelioration of this evil, both in the founding era and today, is the incorporation of the many into a sphere of integration informed by republican principles. Yet, here again, this exploration returns to a discussion of limits. Hamilton also wrote that "excess is always error" and that "there is hardly any theoretic hypothesis, which, carried to a certain extreme, does not become practically false."³⁰² Where, then, does the Founders' strategic logic reach the extreme at which its tenets are no longer true—in a practical sense?

Setting aside questions concerning the limits of its practicality, one must also consider the prudence of applying the Founders' wisdom globally. Is such expansion a natural evolution of their logic or the placement of corrosive demands upon it? Does it increase liberty at home? Or, in the pursuit of global integration, will it merely preserve some lesser form for those increasingly accustomed to or demanding of the adjuring hands of the state? In a manner similar to how the Federalist's arguments for integration mirror those who favor the same on a larger scale today, the Anti-Federalist's dissertations in

³⁰¹ Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 6," in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles Kesler (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 48.

³⁰² Alexander Hamilton, "The Examination Number XVI, [19 March 1802]," in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25, July 1800-April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 564–69.

opposition to the Constitution outline some potential pitfalls of a global sphere of integration. First, it must be noted that the Anti-Federalists generally did not believe that a failure to integrate would necessarily lead to war or, if it did, that war would not necessarily be the liberty-consuming destructive force the Federalists described.³⁰³ Hendrickson notes this dichotomy of views, writing that “it was in the nature of the argument for the Federalists to paint the American situation in the darkest of colors, and for Anti-Federalists to minimize the dangers.”³⁰⁴ A similar dichotomy might be said to exist today. True, some of the Anti-Federalists believed that war as a phenomenon was not eliminable and that its occasional occurrence was preferable to the “despotism” that the Constitution made possible. Centinel wrote that “to avoid the possible and transitory evils of one extreme, [the Constitution] is seduced into the certain and permanent misery necessarily attendant on the other.”³⁰⁵ Today, nuclear weapons complicate this calculus both in that their existence makes total war between states unthinkable and that the United States’ large inventory of them, when combined with its detached situation, gives it favorable advantages not enjoyed by other nations.

Yet, for all their diverse foibles and ostensibly short-sighted perspectives, those Founders who opposed the Constitution made several claims about it which time have proven if not exactly accurate, then at least mostly true.³⁰⁶ The one perhaps most relevant to this discussion was their fear that integration under the Constitution would over time relocate power and political control away from that which is essential to republican government—the people. In what is likely his most read essay, Brutus wrote of the

³⁰³ The Anti-Federalists, though diverse in their views, largely subscribed to what today is often referred to as Democratic Peace Theory or Economic Interdependence Theory. For a description of these views see: Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 249–56; Roger Barrus, “Federalists and Anti-Federalists Then and Now: The Unfinished Ratification Debate,” in *From Reflection and Choice: The Political Philosophy of the Federalist Papers and the Ratification Debate*, ed. Will R. Jordan (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2020), 120–38.

³⁰⁴ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 253.

³⁰⁵ Centinel, *Centinel XI [January 16, 1788]* (Teaching American History, 2020), <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/centinel-xi/>.

³⁰⁶ Those who opposed the ratification of the Constitution are not generally thought of as being among the Founders. However, Herbert Storing argued that those who did not support the Constitution played “an indispensable if subordinate part in the founding process” and are entitled “to be counted among the Founding Fathers.” See: Storing, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For*, 3–6.

Constitution that it “does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”³⁰⁷ Herbert Storing wrote that “the Anti-Federalist’ defense of federalism and of the primacy of the states rested on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the states and the preservation of individual liberty, which is the end of any legitimate government.”³⁰⁸ Given that the American union has itself tended steadily towards integration and ever greater federal power, would not a global union, even if it did not terminate in a perfect consolidation, inevitably move power and political control even farther way from the people and their interests?

This question brings to the fore a final consideration that, though an essential aspect of any measured grand strategy, is of particular relevance to this discussion and exploration. This is, of course, the feasibility of securing and maintaining a domestic consensus on the pursuit of such a globally integrative grand strategy. James Wilson asserted during the Constitutional Convention that “no government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential.”³⁰⁹ By a similar logic, it can be asserted that no grand strategy, at least not one implemented by popular government, could long subsist without the confidence of the people. Gaddis writes that grand strategy is “the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”³¹⁰ One must consider whether it is possible to permanently align the extensive aspirations of global integration with what at least seems to be the increasingly limited capability of convincing voters to support it. The Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump, and the widespread unilateralism witnessed in response to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic all might indicate that popular support for internationalism and global cooperation is on the wane. Indeed, the most consequential inquiry when considering a grand strategy whose purpose and goal is a global sphere of

³⁰⁷ Herbert J. Storing, ed., “Brutus I,” in *The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution*, Abridged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 110.

³⁰⁸ Storing, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For*, 15.

³⁰⁹ Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), 49, <https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html>.

³¹⁰ Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*, 21.

integration might not be whether it is possible, practical, or even prudent, but rather if it is politically sustainable.

An observation such as this, returns this exploration to a discussion of the tensions present in American grand strategy. Already noted were both the eternal tension between integration and insulation and the fraying one between this work's understanding of the Founders' logic and the apparent goals of the current American grand strategy. Yet, another tension may be just as central to the future of the United States' grand strategy as those explored above. Though the preceding paragraphs raise a number of questions about the viability of a global sphere of integration, they should not be taken to mean that such a goal is necessarily impossible or undesirable. Instead, they might be viewed as the building blocks of political and academic arguments that could be made against the United States' post-Cold War grand strategy. Hence, a final tension likely to influence American grand strategy in increasing ways over the coming years is that which has always existed between those who desire more integration and those who do not; between those who see global integration as the natural progression of the Founders' wisdom and those who see it as a straining of their logic at best and an abandonment of it at worst. In truth, more likely depends on how the American people intuit the effect of their nation's grand strategy on their daily lives than whether would-be grand strategists see the Founders' wisdom as merely the logic undergirding grand strategy intended to secure the fundamental and essential interests of the United States, or as something more. Yet, "whatever our nation's choice," Hendrickson notes, "it is striking that the founders' discourse on federalism anticipates in crucial aspects our own discourse on nationalism, internationalism, and imperialism, with the structure of the argument continuing to revolve around similar theories, predicaments, and aspirations."³¹¹ Indeed, if the past is any indication of what is to come, then further exploration of these many tensions is needed before an adequate understanding of the Founders' wisdom can be achieved for the future.

³¹¹ Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*, 260.

C. AN UNDERSTANDING LOOKING FORWARD AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION

*Malum consilium quod mutari non potest—bad is the plan that cannot change.*³¹²
—Publius Syrus

The significance of this thesis is its provision of new ways to understand that which was previously thought to be well-understood. It is not in its discovery of new facts from important periods of American history, nor is it in the detailing of or advocacy for a new American grand strategy. Notwithstanding these realities, this work does provide some answers to enduring questions of American grand strategy while simultaneously suggesting new ones. A first concerns an answer to one of the primary questions examined by this work, detailed in its chapters, but not yet addressed specifically. Asked at the outset of this thesis was a question about the extent to which different grand strategy archetypes were blended during previous periods of geopolitical change. The answer, though hopefully clear by this point, is that grand strategy archetypes have been blended in consonance with the Founders' logic for much of American history. Moreover, the synthetic manner in which they were employed implies that the eclectic way they are often discussed in the literature and in policy deliberations is overly simplistic. This research suggests that the American motto, *e pluribus unum*, represents a more useful way to think about and discuss these grand strategy archetypes. Further research on the blending of archetypal grand strategies might include examinations of periods not covered by this thesis or how they may be blended in the future.

Other potentially fruitful lines of inquiry about the future of American grand strategy entail the examination and consideration of how the United States may correct the imbalance in its grand strategy identified by this thesis. Three specific directions might include research on how each set of the insulated spheres of integration detailed in this work might be reconstructed, corrected, or improved. First, one might examine how to continue the United States' current grand strategy of global integration while correcting for its straining of the Founders' logic. Those who read this thesis and disagree with its

³¹² Publius Syrus, *The Moral Sayings of Publius Syrus A Roman Slave*, trans. Darius Lyman (Cincinnati: L.E. Barnard & Company, 1856), 45.

conclusions or its interpretations of the problems facing American grand strategy would still find it difficult to deny that the effects of that strategy are undermining the likelihood of its continuance. One might examine this issue of integration and insulation from the perspective of style, form, and terms instead of limits; not in an effort to find the limits of integration, but to create more efficient and sustainable manifestations of it. In his 1791 *Report on Manufactures*, Hamilton noted that, while free trade in principle was conducive to the generation of liberty, wealth, and peace, the United States' practice of it "could not but expose [it] to a state of impoverishment" because "the want of reciprocity would render [it] the victim of [the contemporary economic] system."³¹³ In other words, though the United States may desire free trade, it could not practice it because no other countries did at the time and unilaterally allowing free access to the American market would stunt or damage the American economy. As today the primary backlashes against globalization and the liberal international order are economic in nature, one might study how Hamilton's reasoning in 1791 might be applied today to secure the best possible forms of integration—instead of trying to find its limits. In order to secure a future for liberal internationalism, the United States must do a better job of insulating the effects of global integration or risk seeing it undermined in the voting booth. Research exploring how this may be done would likely be of value to those who believe that the application of the Founders' principles abroad is beneficial, possible, and or required.

Though it is the configuration least likely to become the goal of American grand strategy in the future, research exploring a return to the Founders' arrangement of the nation's insulated spheres of integration would find a field fertile and largely unplowed. Despite the unlikelihood of its pursuance, a reimagining of the Founders' spheres is not as impossible as some suggest or would like to believe. The political seeds are available were there to be a politician skilled and articulate enough to plant them. With the likely exception of Joseph Biden, every new president elected since the end of the Cold War has been the candidate promising to do less abroad. Research studying the effects of a United States

³¹³ Alexander Hamilton, *Report on Manufactures: Communication to the House of Representatives [Dec. 5, 1791] from Alexander Hamilton...on the Subject of Manufactures*, Kindle (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1913), Location 415-420.

returned to economic relations with all and political attachment to none would do much to bring into sharper relief the benefits and costs of such a move. Moreover, those wishing a return to the United States' historical pattern of strict non-entanglement would benefit from research providing a cohesive plan to do so. Roger Barrus notes that a weakness in the Anti-Federalist's strategy in the debate over integration was their efforts to "counter the Federalists' comprehensive proposal with a series of specific criticisms rather than with a comprehensive proposal of their own." He continues, writing that "the American people generally had come to the conclusion that substantial changes needed to be made to the Articles of Confederation" and that "in this situation, to defend the existing government, the Anti-Federalists needed to go back to first principles and present an argument for the small republic as robust as the Federalists' argument for the large one."³¹⁴ If the American people of today can be characterized as at least open to drastic change in their nation's grand strategy, then those who wish a return to the Founders' spheres will likely need research that presents their arguments for a smaller sphere of integration as robustly as those who advocate for a larger one.

Yet, given the rise of China, perhaps the best option is a return to insulated spheres of integration akin to those cast by the Truman administration at the outset of the Cold War. Though one should be cautious in comparing the burgeoning competition with China to the Cold War and the Soviet Union, much of the basic fundamentals is likely to be similar. Hence, research that looks at how the United States' Cold War institutions can be retooled would likely be beneficial for those who believe that China, like the Soviet Union before it, can be contained or mellowed over time. Specific research on modernizing the American alliance system or the global economic order should be near the top of the list.

Lastly, for those searching for big questions and seeking to avoid applied research, there are always the abstract theoretical questions raised by this thesis. Further research examining the limits of the Founders' wisdom might consider the questions posed in the previous section. Those examining the practicality, prudence, and political sustainability of pursuing a global sphere of integration would not only add greater context to the points

³¹⁴ Barrus, "Federalists and Anti-Federalists Then and Now: The Unfinished Ratification Debate," 131.

raised in this research, but would also be useful for those seeking to solve global problems, such as nuclear proliferation and climate change, or manage the emergence of the “new global commons” of space and cyberspace.

D. CONCLUSION

*The plan of the fathers would have no controlling authority for us if it had been proved by experience that that plan was narrow, inadequate, and mistaken. Are we prepared to vote that it has proved so?*³¹⁵

—William Graham Sumner

Both this thesis and this final chapter began with a quote from a man whose life spanned the twilight of British global hegemony. Liddell Hart was born into a world where “the sun never set” on the British Empire. He died in one where *pax Britannica* had been swept away by the unflagging and inexhaustible “winds of change.”³¹⁶ Ironically, this fate was foreshadowed by no less than one of the American Founders. At the outset of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine wrote in his pamphlet, *Common Sense*, that “there is something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be perpetually governed by an island.”³¹⁷ By a simple expansion of Paine’s logic, one could assert that it is even more absurd to suppose that that same island could perpetually govern a quarter of the entire world. Indeed, in hindsight it seems that British hegemony and the world order that sustained it were destined to fall by the hand of ascendant nationalism in an era dominated by a pair of competing superpowers. Today, however, grand strategists, politicians, and academics do not spend so much effort pondering the sustainability of *pax Britannica* in the twentieth century as they do the proximate sustainability of its successor in the twenty-first. They wonder whether Paine’s expanded logic applies—as many things did that were passed from Greeks to Romans—to the United States’ extended Empire of Liberty in the same manner that it did Britain’s colonial empire of perpetual sunlight. Writing in the

³¹⁵ William Graham Sumner, “The Fallacy of Territorial Extension,” in *On Liberty, Society, and Politics: The Essential Essays of William Graham Sumner*, ed. Robert C. Bannister (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992), 270.

³¹⁶ Harold Macmillan, “Address to Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa” (Speech, Cape Town, February 3, 1960), <https://web-archives.univ-pau.fr/english/TD2doc1.pdf>.

³¹⁷ Thomas Paine, *Common Sense - 1776* (Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books, 2020), 33.

1890s, William Graham Sumner noted that “England, as a penalty of her greatness, [found] herself in all parts of the world face to face with the necessity of maintaining her jurisdiction and of extending it in order to maintain it.”³¹⁸ While this description aptly applies to the United States’ current situation and grand strategy, must America’s course mirror Britain’s just as Rome’s eventually echoed those of the Greek republics? Like *pax Britannica* before it, will *pax Americana* end with the rise of nationalism in an era dominated by new superpower competitions? Is it absurd to suppose, as Paine might have suggested, that the North American superpower could preside over a liberal international order in perpetuity? If so, is it less absurd to suppose that it could perpetually head a more limited sphere of integration? Or, is the only permanent dominion to be enjoyed by the Americans that which is subject to their constitution? This thesis does not provide these answers—only more questions. The American economist Herbert Stein famously said that “if something cannot go on forever it will stop.”³¹⁹ If one accepts this work’s claim that the United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy of integration is the product of the Founders’ strategic logic strained to the point of fracture, should one not expect an inevitable reversion towards insulation? Moreover, should learned and alert grand strategists and students of history be surprised that such a move would be heralded by a figure such as Donald Trump? Indeed, Trump and his administration are more the products of the contemporary domestic and international situations than the causes of them. The Trump presidency, if it accomplishes nothing else lasting, may, however crudely, at least provide the incoming Biden administration and “the Establishment” with the shock and political cover they need to bring American grand strategy back into balance with the insulationist paradigm and the Founders’ logic. If it does, history may not see the Trump administration as the greatest American-bred danger to liberty and republican security to manifest in generations, but their ultimate savior. Of course, many different outcomes are just as likely. Trump may also serve as a harbinger of things yet to come. Despite the efforts

³¹⁸ Sumner, “The Fallacy of Territorial Extension,” 271.

³¹⁹ United States, *A Symposium on the 40th Anniversary of the Joint Economic Committee: Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, January 16 and 17, 1986*. (Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007414519>.

of strategists to pierce its depths, the future is unknowable and cloaked in uncertainty. As was noted previously herein, the only mechanisms that will reveal all the answers sought by grand strategists are those which are the only true and final judges of presidents and grand strategies—history and time.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774–1875*. Vol. 32. Journals of the Continental Congress, Created and Maintained by the Library of Congress. <https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=032/lljc032.db&recNum=349>.
- “A National Security Strategy for a New Century - 1997.” The White House, May 1997. <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1997/>.
- “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement - 1994.” The White House, July 1994. <https://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/>.
- “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement - 1996.” The White House, February 1996. <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1996/>.
- “Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.” World Trade Organization, 1994. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
- Art, Robert J. *A Grand Strategy for America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- . “Geopolitics Updated.” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998): 79.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Barrus, Roger. “Federalists and Anti-Federalists Then and Now: The Unfinished Ratification Debate.” In *From Reflection and Choice: The Political Philosophy of the Federalist Papers and the Ratification Debate*, edited by Will R. Jordan. Macon: Mercer University Press, 2020.
- Betts, Richard K. *American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
- . “Is Strategy an Illusion?” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 5–50.
- . “The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy.” *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 7–22.
- Biddle, Stephen D. *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005.
- Biden, Joseph R. “Why America Must Lead Again.” *Foreign Affairs*, April 2020. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>.

- Brands, Hal. *American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018.
- . *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment.” *International Security* 37, no. 3 (2013): 7–51.
- Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. *America’s Strategic Choices*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
- Buchanan, Patrick J. “America First - and Second, and Third.” *National Interest* Spring (1990): 79, 82.
- Centinel. *Centinel XI [January 16, 1788]*. Teaching American History, 2020. <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/centinel-xi/>.
- Chollet, Derek, and James Goldgeier. *America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On war*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Clinton, William Jefferson. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” Speech, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1994. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-12>.
- . “Address to the Polish Parliament in Warsaw.” Speech, Warsaw, July 7, 1994. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-polish-parliament-warsaw>.
- . “Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.” Speech, Washington, D.C, March 8, 2000. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-paul-h-nitze-school-advanced-international-studies>.
- . “Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney.” Speech, Kearney, Nebraska, December 8, 2000. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-university-nebraska-kearney-nebraska>.
- . “Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels.” Speech, Brussels, Belgium, January 9, 1994. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-future-leaders-europe-brussels>.

- . “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City.” Speech, New York, September 27, 1993. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-48th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-city>.
- Cohen, Warren I. *Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present*. Vol. Volume 4. The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Crowl, Philip. “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian.” In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Cullison, Dustin Volz and Alan. “‘Putin Has Won’: Mueller Report Details the Ways Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election.” *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 2019, sec. Politics. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-has-won-mueller-report-details-the-ways-russia-interfered-in-the-2016-election-11555666201>.
- Deconde, Alexander. *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1958.
- Deuck, Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Deudney, Daniel. *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Dimok, Michael, and Richard Wike. “America Is Exceptional in the Nature of Its Political Divide.” Pew Research Center, 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/>.
- Eckes Jr., Alfred E. *Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
- Edel, Charles. *Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.
- Edelstein, David M., and Ronald R. Krebs. “Delusions of Grand Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs*, October 25, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-10-20/delusions-grand-strategy>.
- Elkins, Stanley M., and Eric L. McKittrick. *The Age of Federalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- “Ephemeral, Adj. and n.” In *OED Online*. Oxford University Press. Accessed October 27, 2020. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/63199>.

- Farrand, Max. *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911. <https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html>.
- Franklin, Benjamin. "From Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper, 26 December 1782." In *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol 38, August 16, 1782 through January 20, 1783*, edited by Ellen R. Cohn, 503–4. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- French, David. *Divided We Fall: America's Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2020.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *On Grand Strategy*. New York, New York: Penguin Press, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2018.
- . *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- . *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
- . "The Insecurities of Victory: The United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat After World War II." In *The Truman Presidency*, edited by Michael J. Lacey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- . *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*. 2000th ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- George, Alexander L. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005.
- Gholz, Eugene, Darryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. "Come Home, America." *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 5–48.
- Gillespie, Nick. "Milosevic No Hitler, And Clinton's No Churchill." *Reason.Com* (blog), April 19, 1999. <https://reason.com/1999/04/19/milosevic-no-hitler-and-clinto/>.
- Hamilton, Alexander. "Federalist No. 1." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . "Federalist No. 6." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . "Federalist No. 8." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.

- . “Federalist No. 11.” In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . “Federalist No. 15.” In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . “Federalist No. 23.” In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York, N.Y.: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . “From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [14 April 1794].” In *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 16, February 1794-July 1794*, edited by Harold C. Syrett, 266–79. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- . *Report on Manufactures: Communication to the House of Representatives [Dec. 5, 1791] from Alexander Hamilton...on the Subject of Manufactures*. Kindle. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1913.
- . “The Examination Number XVI, [19 March 1802].” In *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 25, July 1800-April 1802*, edited by Harold C. Syrett, 564–69. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Hendrickson, David C. *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- . *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate Over International Relations 1789–1941*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.
- Herring, George C. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Paperback. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996.
- Ikenberry, G. John. *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Inc, Gallup. “Americans Split on Outlook for U.S. Power.” Gallup.com, February 20, 2019. <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/246974/americans-split-outlook-power.aspx>.
- . “Democrats More Positive About Socialism Than Capitalism.” Gallup.com, August 13, 2018. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/240725/democrats-positive-socialism-capitalism.aspx>.
- . “New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem.” Gallup.com, June 21, 2019. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-immigration-important-problem.aspx>.

- Jay, John. "Federalist No. 3." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . "Federalist No. 5." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- . "John Jay to Robert R. Livingston, 17 November 1782." In *The Selected Papers of John Jay Digital Edition*, edited by Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014. <https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JNJY-01-03-02-0076>.
- Jefferson, Thomas. "From Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Ellsworth and William Vans Murray, with Levi Lincoln, 18 March 1801." In *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 33 17 February-30 April 1801*, edited by Barbara B Oberg, 346–49. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- . "The Declaration of Independence." In *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Charles Kesler. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- Jervis, Robert. "U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible." *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 22–36.
- Kearney, Melissa S. "Income Inequality in the United States." Brookings Institution, 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/income-inequality-in-the-united-states/>.
- Kempster, Noman, and Dean E. Murphy. "Broader NATO May Bring 'Cold Peace,' Yeltsin Warns: Europe: Russian President Accuses U.S. of Being Power Hungry. Speech Comes as Nations Finalize Nuclear Treaty." *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1994. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-12-06-mn-5629-story.html>.
- Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy*. Sixtieth Anniversary Expanded Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- . "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In *American Diplomacy*, Sixtieth-Anniversary Expanded Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Kennedy, Paul M. *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Kesler, Charles, ed. "Articles of Confederation." In *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.

- , ed. “Constitution of the United States.” In *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Signet Classics, 2003.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Touchstone, 1995.
- Kochin, Michael S., and Michael Taylor. *An Independent Empire*. Ann Arbor: Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2020.
- Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” *Foreign Affairs*, no. Winter (1991 1990).
- Kupchan, Charles. *Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Kupchan, Charles, and Clifford Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): 114–61.
- Lake, Anthony. “From Containment to Enlargement.” Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9013>.
- Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy.” *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 86–124.
- . *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. 2015th ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.
- Levin, Norman Gordon. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics; America’s Response to War and Revolution*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*. Second Revised Edition. London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967.
- Lippman, Walter. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943.
- Lissner, Rebecca, and Mira Rapp-Hooper. *An Open World*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Mackinder, Halford. *Democratic Ideals and Reality: The Geographic Pivot of History*. Singapore: Origami Books, 2018.

- Macmillan, Harold. "Address to Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa." Speech, Cape Town, February 3, 1960. <https://web-archives.univ-pau.fr/english/TD2doc1.pdf>.
- Maney, Patrick J. *Bill Clinton: New Gilded Age President*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016.
- Mann, James. *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton*. New York: First Vintage Books, 2000.
- Marks III, Fredrick W. *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution*. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1984.
- Marshall, George C. *The Marshall Plan Speech*. The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1947. <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/>.
- Martel, William C. *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- . "Grand Strategy of 'Restraint.'" *Orbis* 54, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 356–73.
- Mastanduno, Michael. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88.
- McCoy, Donald R. *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
- McDonald, Forrest. *The Presidency of George Washington*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974.
- Mclaughlin, Andrew C. *The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783–1789*. Harper, 1905. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/miun.acm7980.0010.001>.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018.
- Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. "The Case for Offshore Balancing," August 14, 2019. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>.
- Meyer, Gregory. "US Is Net Exporter of Oil for First Time in Decades," November 29, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/9cbba7b0-12dd-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a>.
- Middlekauff, Robert. *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

- Murdock, Clark, and Kevin Kallmyer. "Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint." *Orbis* 55, no. 4 (2011): 541–557.
- Murray, Williamson, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and Jim Lacey. *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- National Security Council. "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950. <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. *The Future of Land Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
- Oye, Kenneth A. "Beyond Postwar Order and New World Order: American Foreign Policy in Transition." In *Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. New York: Harper Collins, 1992.
- Paine, Thomas. *Common Sense - 1776*. Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books, 2020.
- Patterson, James T. *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- . *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush V. Gore*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Patton-Bullock, Fred Dews and Tylena. "Charts of the Week: Middle Class Income and Wages." Brookings Institution, January 24, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2020/01/24/charts-of-the-week-middle-class-income-and-wages/>.
- Perkins, Bradford. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865*. Vol. 1. 4 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Perot, Ross. *United We Stand: How We Can Take Back Our Country*. New York: Hyperion, 1992.
- Pollard, Robert A. "The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945–1950." In *The Truman Presidency*, edited by Michael J. Lacey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

- Posen, Barry. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- Posen, Barry, and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 5–53.
- Preble, Christopher A. *Peace, War, and Liberty*. Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 2019.
- Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2003.
- Rapp-Hooper, Mira. *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War with Japan." Speech, Washington, D.C, December 8, 1941.
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-congress-requesting-declaration-war-with-japan>.
- Roser, Max. "The Short History of Global Living Conditions and Why It Matters That We Know It." Our World In Data. University of Oxford, 2019.
<https://ourworldindata.org/a-history-of-global-living-conditions-in-5-charts>.
- Stratfor. "Russia Takes on Its Demographic Decline." Accessed March 11, 2020.
<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-takes-its-demographic-decline>.
- Sayle, Timothy Andrews. *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019.
- Schlesinger, Arthur. "Origins of the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 01 (October 1967): 22.
- Schneider, William. "The Old Politics and the New World Order." In *Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. New York: Harper Collins, 1992.
- Siracusa, Joseph M., and Aiden Warren. *Presidential Doctrines: U.S. National Security From George Washington to Barack Obama*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
- Spykman, Nicholas J. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*. 2017 Routledge. New York: Harcour, Brace, and Co., 1942.
- Steil, Benn. *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

- Stephanopoulos, George. *All Too Human: A Political Education*. New York: Little Brown, 1999.
- Storing, Herbert J., ed. "Brutus I." In *The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution*, Abridged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- . *What the Anti-Federalists Were For*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Sumner, William Graham. "The Fallacy of Territorial Extension." In *On Liberty, Society, and Politics: The Essential Essays of William Graham Sumner*, edited by Robert C. Bannister. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992.
- Syrus, Publius. *The Moral Sayings of Publius Syrus A Roman Slave*. Translated by Darius Lyman. Cincinnati: L.E. Barnard & Company, 1856.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Edited by J.P. Mayer. Translated by George Lawrence. New York: First Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006.
- Truman, Harry. *Address Before the Rio Do Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security September 02, 1947*. The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, n.d. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-rio-de-janeiro-inter-american-conference-for-the-maintenance>.
- . "Inaugural Address." Speech, Washington, D.C, January 20, 1949. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-4>.
- . "The President's Farewell Address to the American People." Speech, Washington, D.C, January 15, 1953. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-farewell-address-the-american-people>.
- Truman, Harry S. *1946–52: Years of Trial and Hope*. Kindle. Vol. 2. Memoirs. New Word City, Inc, 2014.
- . *Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union*. The American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, 1947. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-the-union-15>.
- . *Truman Doctrine: President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress*. The Avalon Project, 1947. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.
- Trump, Donald J. "Videotaped Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly." Speech, Washington, D.C, September 22, 2020. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/videotaped-remarks-the-united-nations-general-assembly>.

- United Nations. "United Nations Charter," October 24, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>.
- United States. *A Symposium on the 40th Anniversary of the Joint Economic Committee: Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, January 16 and 17, 1986*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1986. <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007414519>.
- United States Senate. "U.S. Senate Resolution 239 - 80th Congress, 2nd Session - ('The Vandenberg Resolution')," June 11, 1948. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17054.htm.
- Van Der Wee, Herman. *Prosperity & Upheaval: The World Economy 1945–1980*. Translated by Robin Hogg and Max R. Hall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Varg, Paul A. *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963.
- Walling, Karl. "Old and New Testaments in American Grand Strategy." In *From Reflection and Choice: The Political Philosophy of the Federalist Papers and the Ratification Debate*, edited by Will R. Jordan. Macon: Mercer University Press, 2020.
- . *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
- Walt, Stephen. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.
- Washington, George. "Neutrality Proclamation, 22 April 1793." In *The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, Vol. 12, 16 January 1793–31 May 1793*, edited by Christine S. Patrick and John C. Pinheiro. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005.
- . "The Farewell Address." In *Washington's Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Century*, by Burton I. Kaufman. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969.
- Weeks, William E. *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Dimension of the Early American Empire, 1754–1865*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Wessel, David. "How Worried Should You Be about the Federal Deficit and Debt?" Brookings Institution, July 8, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-worried-should-you-be-about-the-federal-deficit-and-debt/>.

- Wilson, Woodrow. Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany (1917). <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-2-1917-address-congress-requesting-declaration-war>.
- Wohlforth, William C. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41.
- Wood, Gordon S. *Empire of Liberty a History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815*. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- The World Bank. "GDP Growth (Annual %) - United States," 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=US>.
- Yarger, Harry R. "Toward A Theory Of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," n.d., 8.
- Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Fifth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014.
- Zall, Paul. *Ben Franklin Laughing: Anecdotes from Original Sources by and about Benjamin Franklin*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Zeihan, Peter. *Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World*. New York: Harper Collins, 2020.
- Zoellick, Robert B. *America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*. New York: Twelve, 2020.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California