The Boomerang Soldier: Does Recruitment of Former SOF Officers and Enlisted Require Revision?
Abstract
For the past five years, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) have relentlessly labored on recruiting and retention efforts to achieve both their quantitative and qualitative missions of recruiting and retaining. Currently, there is not enough research into why prior service recruitment of formerly separated Soldiers, known as boomerang Soldiers, is a cheaper and more viable recruitment option. Using an in-depth case study of civilian sector boomerang policies, this thesis shows what the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and even the Army at large can learn from a civilian sector that embraces hiring former employees. This thesis examines the value of recruiting former SOF Soldiers and why effective high-cost methods of recruitment and retention through bonuses/special and incentive pay (S and I pay) may be unsustainable in a fiscally conservative future. A future Army faces the unknown effects of the militarys new Blended Retirement System (BRS), growing economic concerns, and COVID-19 aftereffects. This thesis explains why a boomerang Soldier recruitment policy is cheaper for the U.S. military and serves to reduce monetary personnel expenditures while achieving both quantity and quality in SOF recruiting and retention. The thesis recommends prescriptive steps needed for a boomerang policy to be implemented as an innovative talent recruitment solution for SOF.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1127100
Entities
People
- Brandon P. Sirois
- Kevin A. Chesnut
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School