

SECURITY INFORMATION

31

~~SECRET~~

~~IX US CORPS~~ **UNCLASSIFIED**

OFFICIAL USE ONLY **APD 264**

N-1705609
CGSC COMMENTS ENCL 2-1

REGRADED Unclassified
BY AUTHORITY OF US AFCE
BY Document Regrading
ON Bulletin #24, 1 Mar 56

UNCLASSIFIED
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
HILL 395 (WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN)
6-15 OCTOBER 1952

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Classification changed to
Confidential
By 84-7728-170-0

Special after action report, Hill 395
(White Horse Mountain), 6-15 Oct 52.
IX Corps, 22 Oct 52

UNCLASSIFIED

IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS


DOCUMENT NO. **UNCLASSIFIED** COPY NO. **UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPILED BY G 3 SECTION
23 OCTOBER 1952

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



ALLEY-F

SUBJECT: Special After-Action Report Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6-15 Oct 1952

TO: Exec for Instr

FROM: Exec for RAE

DATE: 9 Mar 1953

COMMENT NO. 2

Academic 01

02

03

04

Director, Dept

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

UNCLASSIFIED

Comment No. 1, attached, which is a summary of subject study, is forwarded for your information. Two copies of the study are available in the Archives.

EDGAR C. DOLEMAN, Col, Inf
Executive for Research & Evaluation

INFO COPY TO:

A/C

Security Information

3

UNCLASSIFIED
1725 1785

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Information

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

Special After Action Report
Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6-15 Oct 1952

TO

Exec, R&E

FROM

CDS

DATE

6 Mar 53 (Woolfolk
5184)

COMMENT NO. 1

1. Summary. The subject report describes an action of the Korean War in which the 9th ROK Division, successfully defended Hill 395, a critical terrain feature dominating the western portion of the Cherwon Valley, for ten days against almost most continuous attack by a Chinese Communist force totaling 33,000 men of the 38th CCF Army (corps) reinforced.

2. Character of Action.

a. Enemy (CCF). CCF forces followed their stereotyped pattern of nightly frontal assaults by massed infantry preceded by increased patrolling. Considerable artillery support was employed by the enemy as over 50,000 rounds were received by the 9th ROK Division during the ten day engagement. Some tanks (largest sighting - 14) were used by the CCF in supporting roles. The enemy again made excellent defensive use of the terrain and exhibited his ability to continue battle despite UN air superiority (approximately 700 UN sorties were flown in close support of the 9th ROK Division.)

b. Friendly. The 9th ROK Division employed a position type defense on Hill 395. Repeated counterattacks were made in battalion but only once in regimental strength. The majority of these ROK counterattacks were frontal assaults against the nose of the communist penetration. The almost complete absence of maneuver by counterattacking forces was probably dictated by the terrain. No IX corps reserves were ^{actively} actually involved in the action. Tanks were employed in a fire support role on the flanks of the 9th ROK Division and achieved good results. Artillery and air support was excellent. Counter battery results by corps artillery were not up to the standards achieved in World War II. Battlefield illumination probably assisted materially in the success of the ROK Defense. Good intelligence forwarned the IX Corps CG of the attack and allowed him time to make proper allocation of forces, to redeploy artillery, to shift reserves, and to arrange for adequate logistical support.

3. Results of the Action: At the end of the ten day action the 9th ROK Division remained in complete possession of Hill 395. It had inflicted approximately 9,600 casualties at a cost of 3,300. Losses of the 9th ROK Division are considered excessive by ^{US} standards; also

Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED

Secret

Security Information

the ratio of 1 to 3 versus enemy losses ^{is} ~~in~~ lower than that of similar actions fought by ~~US~~ ^{US} troops in Korea.

4. Lessons Learned. (Pages 48-59) A careful study of the "Lessons Learned" failed to reveal any new doctrine or concept not already taught at this College.

5. Value of the Report. a. The subject report is an excellent example of a well documented after action report.

b. It confirms previous published reports on CCF tactics in Korea.

c. It reveals the influence of terrain, political policy, and limited manpower on our own tactics in Korea.

d. It has historical value.

6. Recommendations:

a. That the subject report be circulated to Depts I-V for information.

b. That the report be retained for background and research material for the future preparation of problems, using a Korean locale.


SETH L. WELD, JR.
Colonel, Arty

Incl:

1- Copy Spec After Act Rept
Hill 395 (White Horse Mt) 6-15 Oct '52 (Secret)

Restricted Copy Info

CO FRENCH INF BN (PASSED)
CO 1ST TURKISH ARMED FORCES COMMAND (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, WASH 25, DC (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE ARMED FORCESTAFF COLLEGE, NORFOLK, VA. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL FIELD, ALA. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE COMD AND GEN STAFF COLLEGE, FT LEAVENWORTH, KAN. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE INFANTRY SCHOOL, FT BENNING, GA. (ELECTRICAL MEANS) (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL, FT SILL, OKLA. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE ARMORED SCHOOL, FT KNOX, KY. (PASSED)
COMMANDANT, THE GROUND GEN SCHOOL, FT RILEY, KAN. (PASSED)
SUPERINTENDANT, THE US MIL ACADEMY, WEST POINT, N.Y. (PASSED)

GX 7728 KGO-0

Report, subject: "Special After Action Report Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6 - 15 October 1952," Headquarters IX US Corps dated 23 October 1952, regraded from Confidential Classification to Restricted Security Information effective 1 August 1953.

Reading Copy

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER
BY: GEN DECLASSIFYING

Mark E. Daves
MARK E. DAVES
Captain, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

George C. Tucker
COL. R. H. TUCKER, COLONEL, GS
KGO-0 Victor 51-403

Page 2 of 2

Restricted Copy Info

N-17055-85

ACTIVITY
OFFICIALS

MAR 15 1956

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
and
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
(REAR)
APO 343

ACCESSION NO _____
FO REGIST. _____

DOCUMENT REGRADING BULLETIN
NUMBER 24

1 March 1956

1. The Special After Action Report, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), 6-15 October 1952, Headquarters, IX US Corps, 23 October 1952 is regraded from CONFIDENTIAL to UNCLASSIFIED and assigned the protective term "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" by authority of this bulletin.

2. In connection with the foregoing, attention is invited to the following:

a. Subparagraph 94c, AR 380-5, which directs that upon receipt of regrading notices, holders of regraded documents will promptly mark them as appropriate, to include the authority cited, except as authorized in subparagraph 94d, AR 380-5.

b. Subparagraph 9a, AR 380-1, which sets forth the procedure for the marking of documents assigned the protective term "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

c. Paragraph 93, AR 380-5, which directs in effect that officials who provided additional distribution (other than initial) to the above document, notify all recipients to whom the additional distribution was furnished unless such recipients were notified by other means. (AFFE AG 312.1 DRB)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

1

ALBERT PIERSON
Major General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

H. L. Whitten

H. L. WHITTEN
Colonel, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - TAG, DA, Wash 25, D.C. 17055-85	5 - CG, AFFE/8A, APO 301
5 - CONARC, Ft Monroe, Va	5 - CG, Fifth AF, APO 710
15 - CINCFE, APO 500	5 - CG, 1st Army, Governors Island, New York 4, NY
15 - CG, EUCOM, APO 128	5 - CG, 2d Army, Ft George G Meade, Md
2 - CG, KCRC, 601 Hardesty Ave, Kansas City, Mo	5 - CG, 3d Army, Ft McPherson, Ga
4 - Commandant, The National War College, Wash 25, D.C.	5 - CG, 4th Army, Ft Sam Houston, Texas
4 - Commandant, The Armed Force Staff College, Norfolk, Va	5 - CG, 5th Army, 1660 E Hyde Park Blvd, Chicago 15, Ill
4 - Commandant, The Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa	5 - CG, 6th Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif
4 - Commandant, The Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala	5 - CG, I US Corps, APO 358
4 - Commandant, The Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kan	50 - CG, RYCOM & IX Corps, APO 331
4 - Commandant, The Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga	2 - CG, 1st Cav Div (Inf), APO 201
4 - Commandant, The Artillery School, Ft Sill, Okla	2 - CG, 24th Inf Div, APC 24
4 - Commandant, The Armored School, Ft Knox, Ky	5 - Chief, KMAG, APO 102
4 - Commandant, The Ground General School, Ft Riley, Kan	2 - CG, 508th ARCT, APO 51
4 - Superintendent, The US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.	2 - G3
	1 - AG Supply Unit #38
	2 - Ord
	1 - AG Admin Center
	2 - MH
	1 - FEC Records Dep,
	2 - AG-EA Attn: Class Br
	2 - AG-CA
	5 - DRB
	1 - Hq Ref Library


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS IX US CORPS
APO 264, US Army

SPECIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395 (WHITE HORSE
MOUNTAIN) 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

The classification of this report will be
lowered to CONFIDENTIAL on 1 April 1953.

UNCLASSIFIED


SECURITY INFORMATION


SECURITY INFORMATION


HEADQUARTERS IX US CORPS
APO 264, US Army

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395 (WHITE HORSE
MOUNTAIN) 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNCLASSIFIED



[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS IX US CORPS
APO 264, US Army

29 October 1952

SUBJECT: Special After Action Report, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6-15 October 1952

TO: Commanding General
Eighth United States Army, Korea (EUSAK)
APO 301

1. There is attached a Special After Action Report prepared in IX Corps Headquarters on the Battle of Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6-15 October 1952.

2. This report contains the following materials pertinent to the action:

a. A brief terrain study of the positions involved.

b. A summary of the situation prior to the commencement of the battle, including enemy and friendly dispositions, intelligence data on the impending enemy attack, and measures taken by IX Corps and the 9th ROK Division to repel the attack.

c. A summary of each day's action covering the period of the battle, 6-15 October 1952.

d. A summary of the results of the action, including the specific parts played by each of the supporting arms.

e. A summary of logistical support rendered by IX Corps agencies during the action.

f. A brief resume of lessons learned.

3. In addition to its usefulness as a record of essential details covering this battle, the report also contains general and specific information and statistics that are believed to be valuable for future study throughout the Army.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

4. This Headquarters is planning to reproduce the subject report in order to make it available for such distribution as the Army Commander may direct. It is recommended that copies be forwarded to Headquarters, Far East Command, and European Command; appropriate staff divisions of the Department of the Army; the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces; the Headquarters of the XI Armies, Corps, and Divisions; and to the several General and Special Service Schools. It is believed that the report would also be of interest to the Boards of the several Arms and Services. Distribution to the other Corps and Divisions within this theater is likewise believed desirable.

/s/ Reuben E. Jenkins
/t/ REUBEN E. JENKINS
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

AG 320 KGO (29 Oct 52) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Special After Action Report, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain)
6-15 October 1952

Hq Eighth U S Army Korea, (EUSAK), APO 301, 18 November 1952

TO: Commanding General, IX US Corps, APO 264

1. The attached report of an extremely critical action, reflects thorough recording by your headquarters of essential details as well as excellent summarization and evolvment of "Lessons Learned".

2. This headquarters concurs that the after action report, because of its potential value, should be given wide distribution.

3. The report will be classified SECRET, but the first page inside the cover will show the following:

"The classification of this report will be lowered to CONFIDENTIAL on 1 April 1953".

4. Attached as Inclosure No. 2 is desired distribution of report.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VAN FLEET:

/s/ Paul D. Adams
/t/ PAUL D. ADAMS
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

5-DA
5-OCAFF
15-CINCPAC
15-CG EUCOM

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION CONT'D:

5-CG Eighth Army
5-CG Fifth Air Force
5-C/S ROKA
5-CG 1st Army
5-CG 2d Army
5-CG 3d Army
5-CG 4th Army
5-CG 5th Army
5-CG 6th Army
5-CG I US Corps
5-CG X US Corps
5-CG I ROK Corps
5-CG II ROK Corps
5-CG XVI Corps
2-GOC 1st C/W Div
2-CG 1st Mar Div
2-CG 1st Cavalry Div (Inf)
2-CG 2d Inf Div
2-CG 3d Inf Div
2-CG 7th Inf Div
2-CG 24th Inf Div
2-CG 25th Inf Div
2-CG 40th Inf Div
2-CG 45th Inf Div
2-CG 1st ROK Div
2-CG 2d ROK Div
2-CG 3d ROK Div
2-CG 5th ROK Div
2-CG 6th ROK Div
2-CG 7th ROK Div
2-CG 8th ROK Div
2-CG 9th ROK Div
2-CG 11th ROK Div
2-CG Capitol ROK Div
5-Chief KMAG
2-CO 187th Airborne RCT
2-CO Belgian UN Command
2-CO Greek Expeditionary Force
2-CO 19th Bn Combat Team, Philippine Expeditionary Force
2-CO Thailand Inf Bn
2-CO Colombian Inf Bn
2-CO Ethiopian Inf Bn
2-CO Netherlands Inf Bn
2-CO French Inf Bn
2-CO 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION CONT'D:

- 4-Commandant, The National War College, Washington 25, DC
- 4-Commandant, The Armed Force Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
- 4-Commandant, The Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
- 4-Commandant, The Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala.
- 4-Commandant, The Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kan.
- 4-Commandant; The Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga.
- 4-Commandant, The Artillery School, Ft Sill, Okla.
- 4-Commandant, The Armored School, Ft Knox, Ky.
- 4-Commandant, The Ground General School, Ft Riley, Kan.
- 4-Superintendent, The U S Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.
- 5-ROK Service Schools
- 5-ROK Military Academy
- 50-IX US Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL


SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS IX CORPS
APO 264

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395 (WHITE HORSE
MOUNTAIN) 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

COMPILED BY G3 SECTION
23 OCTOBER 1952


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS IX CORPS
APO 264

SPECIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395, 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

Reference Table of Contents

<u>Section and Paragraph</u>	<u>Page</u>
SECTION I: SITUATION PRIOR TO THE ACTION	1 - 5
1. Analysis of the Terrain	1 - 2
2. Tactical and Strategic Importance of the Position	2 - 4
3. Friendly Dispositions	4 - 5
4. Enemy Dispositions	5
SECTION II: PRELIMINARIES TO THE ACTION	5 - 9
5. Indication of Enemy Attack	5 - 7
6. Preparatory Measures Taken	7 - 9
SECTION III: THE INITIAL ACTION OF 6 OCTOBER	9 - 11
7. Initial Enemy Attacks	9
8. Continuing Action	10
9. Enemy Effort to Flood Friendly Rear Positions	10-11
10. Situation at the Close of the First Day's Action	11

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION IV: CONTINUING ACTION, 7-15 OCTOBER	11-21
11. Action of 7 October	11-12
12. Action of 8 October	13
13. Action of 9 October	13-14
14. Action of 10 October	15
15. Action of 11 October	15-16
16. Action of 12 October	16-17
17. Action of 13 October	17-18
18. Action of 14 October	18-19
19. Action of 15 October	19-20
20. Situation at the Close of the Action	20-21

SECTION V: RESULTS OF THE ACTION	21-39
21. Recapitulation of Enemy Strength	21
22. Recapitulation of Enemy Attacks - Number and Type	21-22
23. Summary of Enemy Casualties.	22
24. Summary of Intelligence Obtained	23-25
25. Recapitulation of Friendly Counterattacks	25-28
26. Summary of Friendly Casualties	29
27. Summary of Friendly Artillery Action	29-32
28. Summary of Friendly Armor Action	32-37
29. Summary of Friendly Air Action	37-38
30. Battlefield Illumination	39

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION VI: CORPS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT	40-47
31. Engineer Support	40-41
32. Chemical Support	42
33. Ordnance Support	42
34. Quartermaster Support	42-43
35. Signal Support	43
36. Transportation Support	43-45
37. Medical Support	45-47
38. Other Logistical Support	47
SECTION VII: LESSONS LEARNED	48-59
39. Pattern of Enemy Action and Tactics	48-49
40. General Lessons from Combined Arms	49-51
41. Artillery	51-52
42. Armor	52-53
43. Air	53-54
44. Logistical - General	54-55
45. Engineer	55
46. Ordnance	55-57
47. Medical	57-58
48. Transportation	58-59

APPENDICES:

Map No. 1	Terrain Analysis
---------------------	------------------

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

APPENDICES: (Continued)

Map No. 2 Friendly and Enemy Dispositions
Overlays, No. 1 to No. 9 Illustrating the Action
Enclosure "A" Statistics on Air Support
Enclosure "B" Ammunition Expenditures

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

SPECIAL AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395, 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

SECTION I: SITUATION PRIOR TO THE ACTION

1. Analysis of the Terrain.

a. See Map No. 1, Hill 395, Korea, 1:25,000.

b. The position involved in the action on Hill 395 (commonly called White Horse Mountain) was situated on the extreme left (west) flank of the 9th ROK Division. The main position is enclosed from the rear and on its east and west flanks by a wide meandering loop of the YOKKOK River, which flows from the northeast in a series of irregular meanders, passing in a large bend around the rear of the position and changing course to the northwest, completely encircling the position except for outposted terrain forward of the MLR. The river course to the northwest formed the left limit of the position and generally the boundary between I Corps and IX Corps.

c. The terrain comprising this position includes a high, dominating hill mass, consisting generally of an irregular oblong ridge, roughly 3000 meters long and varying from 2000 to 1200 meters in width. The ridge extends in a northwesterly direction, rising in sharp relief from the river valley in rear to a series of high, broken knobs which reach the position's highest elevation at 395 meters about the center of the ridge. Forward of this high point the ridge is punctuated by three additional equidistant spurs of approximately 360 meters elevation, extending toward the forward extremity of the ridge. On the west edge of the main ridge, approximately 500 meters forward of the left sector of the MLR, still another knob rises

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

to an elevation of 320 meters.

d. The entire hill mass comprising the ridge is deeply serrated at its edges and is cut on its flanks by irregular draws and valleys of varying depth and width. On the west and southwest three prominent valleys deeply pierce the main ridge: One forward of the MLR, another along the general trace of the MLR and just forward of it, and still another some 500 meters in rear of the MLR. The last is cut by a small tributary stream which flows into the YOKKOK River.

e. From the axis of the main ridge, the profile drops sharply on the northeast (right) to a small stream valley which bounds the forward east flank of the ridge. From the low, narrow valley of this stream the ground rises in sharp relief to the enemy-held Hill 396. The stream in its containing valley flows northwest and turns in a sharp meander to the southwest, forming a loop around the forward end of the main ridge, and bends back to enclose the forward extremity of the ridge. The stream flows south by west to empty into the YOKKOK River. The valley of this tributary stream contains trails on both sides of the ridge, and widens to some 500 - 800 meters as it nears the YOKKOK River. From this wide valley the ground rises in bold relief to the ridge forward of the MLR.

f. To the rear and east of the MLR on Hill 395 the terrain slopes sharply down to low, open ground to the east and southeast, extending and widening into the western CHORWON Valley.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Tactical and Strategic Importance of the Position.

a. See Map No. 2, Hill 395 and CHORWON Valley, Korea, 1:50,000.

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

b. The position on Hill 395 is of critical importance to both the IX Corps and the entire center of the Eighth Army front. It constitutes a primary key position for the defense of the CHORWON Valley and its vital road complex. Because of its situation and elevation, the hill mass dominates the entire western CHORWON Valley. Its seizure and retention by the enemy would provide him with direct observation of the valley and permit him to bring fire to bear on the valley and its roads. This would deny the UN Forces the use of the CHORWON road net which now serves as the MSR and communications net for the western sector and a portion of the central sector of IX Corps.

c. Hill 395 is a key position in the 9th ROK Division line, being the left (west) anchor upon which the integrity of the division's line depends. Its loss to the enemy would uncover the left flank of the division and render the remainder of its present line untenable.

d. Situated on the boundary between IX Corps and I Corps, this position is also of vital importance to the right flank division (2d US Infantry Division) of I Corps since its loss would render that division's key position on Hill 287 (Arrow Head Ridge) untenable, and uncover the right flank of I Corps.

e. Enemy occupation and use of Hill 395 as a base of offensive operations would have far-reaching implications for the UN Forces. It would permit the enemy to strike into the CHORWON Valley and threaten a major penetration of the central UN front. Such a penetration would uncover the flanks of 9th ROK and 7th US Divisions on the right, and the I Corps

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

on the left. This would force withdrawal of the UN lines back to defensive positions south of CHORWON.

3. Friendly Dispositions.

a. See Map No. 2.

b. Prior to the action on Hill 395 the 9th ROK Division was disposed across the CHORWON Valley with the 30th and 29th Regiments abreast (from left to right) and the 28th and 51st Regiments in reserve. The 51st had been recently organized and trained but had not been tested in battle.

c. The 30th Regiment on the left had disposed its 1st Battalion astride Hill 395, with its 2d Battalion on the right of the 1st. The 3d Battalion was held in reserve.

d. The 29th Regiment on the right had the 1st Battalion, 51st Regiment attached. The regiment was disposed with its 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion, 51st Regiment on the left. The latter unit had been placed in the line for battle indoctrination. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 29th Regiment were held in reserve.

e. The 53d ROK Tank Company was held in division reserve in an assembly area approximately 500 meters southeast of CHORWON.

f. Artillery support for the 9th ROK Division consisted of the 30th ROK FA Battalion (light battalion organic to the division), the 1st ROK FA Group which included the 51st (light) and 52d (light) ROK FA Battalions, and the 213th (medium) and 955th (medium) US FA Battalions

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

of IX Corps Artillery. Organization for combat was as follows: 51st ROK FA Battalion, D/S to 29th Regiment; 52d ROK FA Battalion, D/S to 30th Regiment; 30th ROK FA Battalion, G/S reinforcing the fires of the 51st and 52d Battalions; and the 213th and 955th US Battalions in G/S.

4. Enemy Dispositions.

a. See Map No. 2.

b. Prior to the attack on Hill 395 the 114th Division, 38th CCF Army (Corps) was carried in contact with units of IX US Corps. This division was disposed with the 342d Regiment and unidentified elements of the division on line, the 341st Regiment in reserve, and the 340th Regiment withdrawn from contact and undergoing rehearsal training. The 113th Division was carried in contact. Its 337th and 339th Regiments were on line and the 338th Regiment in reserve. The 112th Division was carried in Army reserve. The 15th CCF Army (Corps) was carried in contact east of the 39th Army with its three divisions on line: The 29th, 44th and 45th Divisions from west to east respectively. The 60th CCF Army (Corps) was located immediately to the north of the 38th and 15th CCF Armies.

SECTION II: PRELIMINARIES TO THE ACTION

5. Indications of the enemy attack.

a. For a period of ten days prior to the action, definite signs

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

of enemy offensive intentions in this area were clearly manifest. Offensive action was indicated by increased sightings of personnel in the open during daylight hours, increased artillery sightings and the movement forward of anti-aircraft guns, and the highest number of vehicle sightings ever recorded in this portion of the IX Corps sector. Along the Eighth Army front, strong limited objective attacks were carried out on several key terrain features concurrently with increased probing attacks against friendly positions. Increased evidence of effective counter-reconnaissance screens was noted along the front, and enemy psychological warfare activities were markedly increased.

b. Statements of several PW captured prior to the attack indicated enemy intentions of initiating limited objective attacks against key terrain features. A PW (deserter) apprehended three days prior to the attack on Hill 395 gave positive information regarding a forthcoming attack on this position with diversionary attacks against Hill 231. The PW stated that his unit, the 340th Regiment, 114th Division, had received prior rehearsal training for a period of four weeks; that the attack would take place between the 4th and 5th of October 1952; and that the 340th Regiment would attack with two battalions and would possibly be supported by four companies of the 341st or 342d Regiments. The PW also stated that much artillery had moved into the area to support the attack on Hill 395 which would be further supported by many tanks. A PW captured on the morning of 6 October 1952 substantiated the above details and further indicated that the attack had been postponed until 6 October 1952 as a result of the desertion of the PW referred to above. Also elements of units out of contact had been dispatched

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

into this area to improve existing defenses, occupy outpost positions and institute ambush patrols for the purpose of intercepting UN patrols operating in this sector. This indicated establishment of a counter-reconnaissance screen in conjunction with planned offensive operations. In addition to the above, a PW report indicated that the exact UN strength and dispositions on Hill 395 were known to the enemy before the attack was launched. This information had been obtained by the enemy from a UN prisoner taken several days prior to the attack, and gave the accurate UN strength of one battalion on this position. The subsequent increase of friendly strength to two battalions on the position threw the initial attacking force off balance, and frustrated the enemy's original attack plan which had been based upon a one-battalion defending force.

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Preparatory Measures Taken.

a. By IX Corps: The Commanding General, IX Corps took immediate steps to reinforce the 9th ROK Division with armor, heavy mortars, a rocket battery, artillery, and AAA (AW) weapons in the ground role. Company "C", 73d US Tank Battalion was attached to the 9th ROK Division for operational control for disposition to cover the flanks of the position on Hill 395. The 2d Rocket Battery (US), Company "A", 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion (US), and the 50th ROK FA Battalion (light) were attached to the 1st ROK FA Group for operational control and placed in positions to support the threatened area. Battery "B", 17th FA Battalion (US 8" howitzer), was attached to the 213th FA Battalion. In addition, the 937th FA Battalion (US 155 gun) with

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

Battery "A" 424th FA Battalion (US 8" howitzer) attached was brought into position and placed in general support reinforcing the 1st ROK FA Group. A section (4 quad-50's) of the 140th AAA (AW) Battalion was also placed in flanking positions to support the defense. In addition, preplanned air strikes employing heavy ordnance were executed on enemy artillery positions, armor, and troop assembly areas, and on supply dumps and routes of communication. Plans for maximum air support during the expected action were prepared and coordinated. Plans and provision for battlefield illumination were prepared. Two sections, 3d Platoon, 36th Engineer Searchlight Company were attached to the 1st ROK FA Group for this purpose. Arrangements were made for constant employment of flare ships over the area during the hours of darkness. As an additional precautionary measure, the 7th Infantry of the 3d US Infantry Division was placed on 4-hour alert during daylight and on 2-hour alert at night for possible employment in case of emergency.

b. By 9th ROK Division: The Commanding General, 9th ROK Division took immediate steps to reinforce the friendly elements on Hill 395 and to strengthen the fortifications protecting this position. Tanks and quad-50 AAA weapons in the ground role were positioned to cover the flanks of Hill 395 and to rake the valley approaches to the position. The 3d Battalion, 30th Regiment was moved to Hill 395, increasing the regiment's strength on this position to two battalions. The 2d Battalion, 28th Regiment was attached to the 30th Regiment and placed in regimental reserve. Artillery, tank, and mortar fire support plans were prepared and coordinated. These were coordinated with plans for air support. Detailed counterattack plans were prepared for the employment of the 28th Regiment. On the eve of the


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

action, 9th ROK Division troops were alert and prepared for expected attack on Hill 395.

SECTION III: THE INITIAL ATTACK OF 6 OCTOBER

7. Initial Enemy Attacks.

a. See Overlay No. 1.

b. Commencing at 061900 October, after extremely heavy artillery concentrations on the Hill 395 positions, two battalions of the 340th CCF Regiment (114th CCF Division) passed through the 342d CCF Regiment and had approached the northern tip of Hill 395 by 1930 hours. Friendly mortar, and artillery fire from eight massed battalions was placed on the attacking force. Outpost troops on Hill 395 met the attack with small arms and automatic weapons, and rolled napalm charges down the slopes. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the attacking force, which was compelled to withdraw.

c. In conjunction with the initial attack on Hill 395, heavy diversionary fires were delivered against the entire IX Corps front and along the 2d US Division sector in I Corps on the left. These fires were quickly followed by company and battalion size limited objective attacks. It is significant that enemy artillery fire received in the 7th US Division sector during these initial attacks exceeded the volume of fire placed on Hill 395.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

8. Continuing Action.

a. See Overlay No. 1.

b. After regrouping, the enemy returned to the attack. The second assault was directed against the 3d Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment sector and effected a slight penetration. This attack was smothered by artillery, mortar, tank, quad-50, automatic weapons and small arms fire. By 2300 hours the enemy had withdrawn, after suffering heavy casualties.

c. Shortly after midnight the enemy again launched simultaneous attacks of battalion size against the right and left flanks of Hill 395. These attacks were also repulsed by well directed fire from all types of weapons, and by 070500 October after suffering 1500 casualties and expending over 10,000 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition, the enemy withdrew.

9. Enemy Effort to Flood Friendly Rear Positions.

a. In conjunction with his assaults on Hill 395, the enemy had planned to raise the water level of the YOKKOK River by opening the flood gates of the dam at the southern terminal of the PANGNAE-HO Reservoir. This action was intended to flood the YOKKOK to such an extent as to isolate Hill 395 and Hill 281 (in 2d Division I Corps sector), and prevent reinforcements from reaching these positions during the early stages of the action. Concentrated enemy artillery fire along the river line was planned to support this scheme.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. The floodgates of the PANGNAE-HO Reservoir were actually opened by one platoon of the 430th CCF Regiment about four hours prior to the initial attack on 6 October. The expected results did not materialize. The water level of the river rose only an average of 2 feet at any one time during the action did this increased level present a major tactical obstacle to the UN forces engaged in the defense of the area.

UNCLASSIFIED

10. Situation at the Close of the First Day's Action.

a. At the close of the first day's action, enemy elements remained under cover throughout the area beyond the Hill 395 positions. Enemy dead littered the slopes and flanks of the hill mass. Counted enemy killed exceeded 500. Hostile artillery fire against the friendly positions continued heavy, in preparation for further attacks.

b. The 30th ROK Regiment and its supporting artillery, tanks, mortars, and AAA elements had successfully repulsed the determined enemy attacks. The regiment sustained less than 300 casualties during the first day's action.

SECTION IV: CONTINUING ACTION, 7-15 OCTOBER

11. Action of 7 October.

a. See Overlay No. 2.

b. At 071330 October, remaining elements of the two battalions of

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

the 340th CCF Regiment assaulted the extreme northern outpost on Hill 395. This outpost was occupied by one company of the 30th ROK Regiment, and was soon surrounded by the superior numbers of the attacking enemy. A counter-attack was launched at 1400 hours by the 3d Battalion (-), 30th ROK Regiment to extricate the surrounded company. After bitter fighting, this battalion had advanced to within 200 meters of the outpost by 1730 hours, when it was halted by the enemy who was now reinforced by the remaining battalion of the 340th CCF Regiment and one battalion from the 342d CCF Regiment.*

c. Friendly air and artillery inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy during this period. Contact with the surrounded friendly outpost had been lost at 1530 hours, and continued heavy pressure by superior enemy strength forced the 3d Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment to withdraw to the MLR after 1730 hours. Despite stubborn resistance, which inflicted further heavy casualties, enemy pressure in superior strength forced a penetration of the MLR which overran the crest of Hill 395 by 2200 hours.

d. A strong counterattack launched by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 28th ROK Regiment restored the position by 2330 hours. Enemy casualties (as related by a PW later) suffered by these two CCF Regiments were such that only 10 to 20 men remained in most companies.

*The surrounded outpost company fought tenaciously in place until 0300 on the morning of 8 October, when its ammunition became exhausted. A total of 40 of its men eventually fought their way back to the friendly MLR.

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. Action of 8 October.

- a. See Overlay No. 3.
- b. During the hours of darkness October 7-8 the enemy relieved his depleted forces with two battalions from the 334th CCF Regiment (112th CCF Division) and a battalion of the 342d CCF Regiment of the 114th CCF Division. The battalion of the 342d was assigned the mission of holding present positions while the 334th attacked Hill 395. This attack was launched at 080500 with heavy artillery and mortar support, and met stiff resistance from the 28th ROK Regiment. At 1555 hours the crest of Hill 395 was secured by an enemy company. Further penetration however, was prevented by determined friendly resistance.
- c. The 3d Battalion, 28th ROK Regiment counterattacked at 1700 to restore the positions. After bitter fighting, and having gained and lost the crest several times, this battalion was finally able to retake and hold the crest at 2300.
- d. After the first two days, enemy diversionary action along the Corps front decreased sharply and his entire effort centered on Hill 395. Enemy artillery and mortar remained active, averaging 4500 rounds daily.

13. Action of 9 October.

- a. See Overlay No. 4.
- b. Heavy fighting on Hill 395 continued during the early hours of 9 October. The enemy succeeded in making a penetration at 0300 for a distance

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

of 300 meters down the south slope where they were stopped by massed fire of artillery and hand to hand combat.

c. One battalion from the 334th CCF Regiment (plus the remaining battalion of the 342d CCF Regiment relieved the elements of the 334th and 342d Regiments in contact during daylight hours of 9 October.

d. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 29th ROK Regiment were relieved in the right regimental sector by elements of the 51st ROK Regiment on the night 8-9 October and were quickly brought into the engagement to restore the position. The 29th ROK Regiment assumed responsibility for the sector of Hill 395 and attacked through the 28th ROK Regiment at 1100. Progress was slow and gains in ground were lost repeatedly throughout the day in a bitter contest to secure the crest. Friendly air and artillery support took heavy toll on enemy forces about to reinforce the enemy elements engaged. Not until 100135 was the 29th finally able to secure the crest of Hill 395.

e. A PW later stated that CCF forces suffered particularly heavy casualties due to continuous UN tactical air support. The 335th Regiment was reported to have suffered exceptionally heavy casualties from air attack in a forward assembly area north of Hill 395, and this explains the delay in the employment of this Regiment against UN forces. A PW statement had previously indicated that the 334th and 335th CCF Regiments would be in reserve. These forces were in numerous caves deep within Hill 396 just 2000 meters to the northeast of Hill 395.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

14. Action of 10 October.

a. See Overlay No. 5.

b. Employing the 3d Battalion, 394th CCF Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 342d CCF Regiment, the enemy counterattacked at 100800, forcing the 29th Regiment off the crest of Hill 395. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th Regiment counterattacked at 101140 and having seized the crest, moved beyond it 300 yards by 101400 hours. A counterattack supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire was launched by the enemy at 101815 hours. This attack penetrated the 29th Regiment's position, forcing a withdrawal to a position 200 yards south of the crest. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th Regiment again counterattacked at 101930 hours and advanced slowly throughout the night.

15. Action of 11 October.

a. See Overlay No. 6.

b. In a diversionary effort beginning at 110430 October in support of the friendly action on Hill 395, "B" Company of the 140th Tank Battalion supported by one company of the 51st ROK Regiment fired on the crest of Hill 395 and other strong points from positions northeast of the MLR. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th Regiment meanwhile continued their advance on the crest of Hill 395, and secured it by 0700. At 0800 "B" Company, 73d Tank Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 30th Regiment attacked the left flank of Hill 395.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

After more than two hours of heavy fighting this position was secured at 1035.

c. Fighting continued on the main crest of Hill 395. The enemy during this period was reinforced with the previously reported 1st Battalion 335th CCF Regiment and the 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment. He counterattacked with these forces at 111620 hours, forcing the 29th ROK Regiment to withdraw to a position 50 yards below the crest of the hill. The 29th Regiment now dug in and held this position. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment on the left flank was subjected to heavy pressure from the enemy and was forced to withdraw to MLR positions at 111300 hours.

d. The 29th Regiment continued to withstand heavy pressure and held their positions below the crest throughout the night of the 11th and 12th.

e. The enemy planned a relief of the 334th CCF Regiment by the 335th CCF Regiment during this period, but this action was delayed because of extremely heavy casualties being inflicted on the 335th by UN air action.

f. Action across the remainder of the IX Corps front dropped to insignificance. There were, however, numerous sightings of enemy movements south and southwest of PYONGGANG, and UN air continued to inflict heavy casualties.

16. Action of 12 October.

a. See Overlay No. 7.

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

b. At 120800 October the 30th ROK Regiment launched an attack through the 29th ROK Regiment. This assault encountered stiff resistance, since the enemy had been reinforced with the 2d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment and the 8th Company, 3d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment and possible elements of the 1st Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment on Hill 395. At noon the crest was gained through intense and bitter fighting by elements of the 30th ROK Regiment. Fighting continued, however, for the control of the crest until 121330. By 121500 hours enemy resistance weakened and the 30th ROK Regiment advanced 100 yards further down the ridge and dug in for the night.

17. Action of 13 October.

a. See Overlay No. 7.

b. Three Company size enemy counterattacks were repulsed and driven back during the night, and at 0300 hours on the morning of the 13th of October the 28th ROK Regiment passed through the 30th ROK Regiment to continue the attack.

c. In the meantime, diversionary action on the remainder of the front of IX Corps subsided. The enemy made several small probes in the 9th ROK Division sector, and hostile company size elements captured two UN outposts along the 7th US - 9th ROK Division boundary in a night attack. These outposts were recaptured the following day.

d. On Hill 395 the seesaw battle continued with troops from the 28th ROK Regiment slowly regaining the upper hand and retaking terrain lost.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

previously. Enemy counterattacks were limited to reinforced company size. UN air and artillery took a heavy toll of casualties among CCF troops dug in on the north slope of Hill 395. This conclusion is especially in view of the subsequent enemy reinforcements which had been committed piecemeal on Hill 395 without actually effecting any further reliefs, and without being able to stem the tide of battle. The 2d Battalion 335th CCF Regiment, supported by 8th Company 3d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment had arrived at 121830 October to reinforce units in contact. The 3d Battalion, 335th CCF Regiment plus the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment were committed on the night of the 13th of October.

18. Action of 14 October.

a. See Overlay No. 8.

b. Action continued sporadic throughout the early morning hours, until 0600 when 1st Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment passed through the 23th and by a hard-hitting attack wiped out two enemy platoons in the initial assault. Enemy resistance stiffened as the attack progressed. By 1600 the advance was halted after the arrival and commitment of enemy reinforcements. The 2d Battalion, 336th CCF Regiment was possibly reinforced by elements of 1st Battalion, 336th, and elements of two other Battalions (probably the 3d Battalion, 335th and 3d Battalion, 336th).

c. The 3d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment passed through the 1st Battalion at 1630 and became heavily engaged with the above enemy force.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

Coordinated fire support by artillery and air inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. His repeated attempts to dig in and build revetments and shelters on the slopes met with failure due to the devastating effect of direct fire from friendly tanks, located to the rear on each flank of Hill 395. The enemy, however, still presented formidable strength, and exerted pressure on the 29th ROK Regiment. Unable to advance, the 29th ROK Regiment was forced back slowly to objective A, approximately 300 meters north of the crest of Hill 395. It held this position in spite of repeated attacks. Action became sporadic at 2400.

d. Although the 114th CCF Division was still listed in contact there was increasing evidence that it had been withdrawn and remnants of the 112th CCF Division had taken its place. This was supported by one PW statement, and the fact that no more PW from units of the 114th Division had been identified after the withdrawal of the 340th and 342d CCF Regiments from action on Hill 395. It also seemed logical that the enemy would withdraw the 114th CCF Division which had not been depleted as badly as the 112th CCF Division, (the 114th Division's 341st Regiment being uncommitted and its 342d used mainly in defensive tasks) in order to have available a reserve of sorts, should a strong UN counterattack be forthcoming in this sector.

19. Action of 15 October.

- a. See Overlay No. 3.
- b. At 150430 October the 2d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment passed

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

through the 3d Battalion and engaged in a bitter hand to hand fight with the remnants of the 112th CCF Division. At 1030 resistance crumbled and Objective B was taken. Aggressive action by the 3d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment to exploit this success forced remaining enemy elements to flee down the north slope of Hill 395 at 151100. Further enemy resistance ceased. At this time the depleted 112th CCF Division was apparently in no condition for offensive action. Elements of 3 regiments had been identified within a two day period on Hill 395, and had suffered extremely heavy casualties. PW reported that in some cases, only 15 to 20 men remained in their companies and that the dead far exceeded the wounded because of the lack of evacuation facilities and the tremendous UN interdicting artillery fire.

20. Situation At the Close of the Action.

a. The final attack of the 2d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment in the early morning of 15 October, followed by aggressive support by the 3d Battalion of the same regiment, brought the action of 6-15 October on Hill 395 to a close.

b. The enemy's repeated and determined efforts to dislodge the 9th ROK Division and seize the key positions on Hill 395 had been decisively repulsed. The enemy had suffered heavy casualties in all units committed, and had been driven completely from Hill 395. He was now in no condition to renew the action.

c. The original positions held by the 9th ROK Division were

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

intact. Friendly units were in undisputed possession of the field, and were now strengthening and improving the MLR and outposts on Hill 395.

SECTION V: RESULTS OF THE ACTION

21. Recapitulation of Enemy Strength Employed.

a. The enemy employed an estimated strength of 23,000 troops throughout the period, which included 5 infantry regiments of an estimated strength of 3,000 each (total of 15,000 regimental strength), plus an estimated total of 3,000 armor, artillery, and other supporting troops.

b. The above totals are exclusive of some 10,000 troops reported by 2 PIR to have been utilized as ammunition carriers and litter bearers. If this additional strength is included, the total force, combat and service, employed by the enemy in the combat area may be estimated at 33,000.

22. Recapitulation of Enemy Attacks - Number and Type.

a. Detailed analysis of the enemy's action during the period 6-15 October shows the following summary of enemy attacks and probes in the 9th ROK Division Sector and the west (17th US Infantry) sector of the 7th US Division:

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

(1) Attacks/Counterattacks

Size	Number
2 Platoons	1
1 Company	8
2 Companies	2
1 Battalion	1
2 Battalions	1
1 Regiment	1
<u>Unknown Number of Enemy</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	23

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Probes

Size	Number
1 Squad	1
1 Platoon	2
1 Company	1
<u>Unknown Number of Enemy</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	7

b. The majority of these attacks and/or counterattacks were frontal assaults, with an occasional attempt to flank friendly defensive positions.

23. Summary of Enemy Casualties.

a. Cumulative casualties assessed against the enemy during the action 6-15 October totaled 9,567.

b. The total has been broken down as follows:

KIA(C)	KIA(E)	MIA(E)	FW	TOTAL
2695*	1873	4241	51	8860
<u>Casualties inflicted by tactical air support</u>				<u>707</u>
TOTAL				9,567

*Since the completion of this report, the 9th ROK Division has reported the burial of 3,244 enemy bodies from Hill 395 alone (not including the peripheral valleys, draws, and woods), and the 3d US Division, which is presently (28 October 1952) occupying the sector, has reported that there are 300 enemy bodies still remaining unburied on this hill.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

24. Summary of Intelligence Obtained as A Result of the Action -
PW Interrogation, Documents, etc.

a. Training of Enemy Units: As evidenced by PW statements obtained during the period of the action, the enemy had made elaborate preparations for this attack. With the exception of the 342d Regiment of the 114th Division, training at regimental level was carried out for a period of from 1 to 4 weeks prior to the attack. Training included rehearsal assault practice in the destruction of bunkers and trenches and the passage of barbed wire, and offensive small unit tactics. A dress rehearsal on terrain similar to Hill 395 was conducted on 30 September by the 340th Regiment. Extensive political indoctrination was emphasized prior to the attack and political officers took pains to explain reasons for this action.

b. Enemy Armor: In preparation for the attack the enemy apparently reinforced his armor support. His armor strength was accepted as one tank or SP gun battalion in the east half of the 38th Army (Corps) sector, with an additional battalion of armored vehicles drawn from positions north of the limiting point on the IX Corps - I Corps boundary. These armored vehicles delivered indirect and direct supporting fires for enemy units engaged in the vicinity of Hill 395 and Hill 281. The objectives proper were unsuited for direct armor assault and confined enemy armor to this less active role. No indication of reinforcement of enemy armor across the remainder of the Corps front was indicated.

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~Enemy Artillery:~~ Increased construction of enemy artillery positions in the 38th CCF Army sector, increases in the confirmed IX Corps counter-battery list, and reinforcement by other artillery units characterized hostile artillery build-up in the 10-day period prior to the attack. PW reports indicate that the artillery regiment from the 15th CCF Army was shifted to the west and placed under control of the 38th Army Artillery; that the 1st Motorized Artillery Division was brought into the sector of the 38th CCF Army (Corps); and that two battalions of enemy truck-mounted rocket launchers (Katyushas) were brought forward into positions to support the attack. The rocket batteries were fired for short periods only and then removed to bunkered shelters prior to utilization on other missions. Preliminary preparation of artillery fires was evidenced by the fact that just prior to the attack the enemy registered in on UN artillery locations with a minimum of rounds. As a result, fires during the attack in support of his operations were timely, accurate and usually effective. Decline in fires recorded after the initial stages of the attack was probably attributable at least in part to transportation difficulties, since the supply of artillery ammunition appeared to be fairly adequate.

d. Summary of Hostile Artillery and Mortar Rounds Received:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Corps Total</u>	<u>9th ROK Total</u>	<u>7th US Total</u>
6 October	1637	649	762
7 October	19429	10964	7337
8 October	6542	4546	1577
9 October	13474	3145	5227
10 October	4881	4422	314
11 October	6459	3157	204
12 October	4236	3119	228
13 October	7272	5639	1357
14 October	7038	4245	2160
15 October	6243	1681	2577
TOTALS	77,311	50,357	22,243

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

c. Enemy Supply and Combat Rations: Combat rations and extra ammunition were issued to all participating units to assure a two day supply after commitment in the attack. A 60-day supply of ammunition of all types and of class I supplies was reported on hand in forward areas and in back-up supply points in the vicinity of SEPO-RI and HOEYANG. A typical company from the 334th Regiment carried the following amounts of ammunition into combat:

80 rounds per rifle
1600 rounds per HMG
1000 rounds per LMG
30 rounds per mortar
6-8 grenades per man

Mortar ammunition in forward areas was depleted within two hours and small arms ammunition lasted 9 hours. Resupply was severely curtailed due to UN fire. Enemy troops had to rely on defensive-type grenades until relief by fresh troops was effected. Ammunition supply in excess of basic load was delivered by transportation companies within regiments which are reported to have about 70 horses each for supply purposes.

25. Recapitulation of Friendly Counterattacks and Their Results.

a. Detailed analysis of friendly action during the period 6-15 October shows the following summary of counterattacks launched by elements of the 9th MOK Division in the Hill 395 sector:

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

Size	Number
Local C/A by local reserves	1
C/A by 2 companies	1
C/A by 1 battalion supported by 1 battalion	1
C/A by 1 battalion supported by 2 battalions	2
C/A by 2 battalions	1
C/A by 1 regiment	1
TOTAL	9

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Chronological summary of the above friendly counterattack actions and their results:

(1) During the initial enemy assault of 6 October the enemy effected only a slight penetration on the right flank which was repulsed by local reserves of 3d Battalion, 30th ROK Regiment. Friendly artillery, mortar, tank and quad-50 fire interdicted this avenue of attack and made it an untenable position. Further attacks in this vicinity were negative.

(2) On the afternoon of the 7th of October the 3d Battalion of the 30th ROK Regiment launched a counterattack with two companies to relieve its third company on outpost at the extreme tip of Hill 395. This counterattack was repulsed due to the fact that the enemy was employing elements of two battalions that had been committed the previous day, plus a fresh battalion. It is apparent from this that the counterattack force was too small for the task.

(3) A counterattack launched by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 23th ROK Regiment at 2330 hours 7 October to restore MLR coupled with supporting fires from all available sources was highly successful. PW reports that of two GCF Regiments defending, only 10 to 20 men remained in most companies after the action.

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

(4) On 9 October the enemy holding the crest of Hill 395 with an estimated 3 battalions was counterattacked by the 3d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment at 1700 with the 1st and 2d Battalions supporting the attack by fire. Forces were approximately equal here and a bitter fight ensued. Both sides gained and lost the crest several times before it was secured by the 3d Battalion, 29th Regiment at 2300. A superior mass of supporting artillery, mortar and heavy weapons fire turned the tide of battle in our favor.

(5) The 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th ROK Regiment counterattacked at 1100 on 9 October to restore MLR positions that had been penetrated some 300 meters down the slope of Hill 395 by two fresh CCF Battalions and elements of a third battalion previously committed. Again a bitter fight continued all day. PW reports indicate that the 335th CCF Regiment attempting to reinforce this action sustained exceptionally heavy casualties from UN air and artillery. The weight of the friendly attack never decreased throughout the day and night. The friendly positions were restored at 100135 hours.

(6) Elements of the 29th Regiment were forced off the crest of Hill 395 again at 100800 by a counterattack of two fresh enemy battalions. A counterattack was quickly launched by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 29th to restore this position. This attack was highly successful and the vigor of the attack carried the friendly forces 300 yards beyond the crest by 101400 hours.

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

(7) On 10 October the enemy counterattacked at 1800 and regained previous positions on the crest. Quickly regrouping the 2d and 3d Battalions, the 29th Regiment held and counterattacked at 1930 hours. Progress was slow throughout the night, these troops having been heavily engaged in combat for over 36 hours. By 0700 on 11 October friendly positions on the crest of Hill 395 were again restored. It is evident that the tenacity of this regiment played a large part during a critical period of the engagement.

(8) On 12 October at 0800 the 30th Regiment was used to counterattack through the 29th Regiment which had been forced to withdraw under heavy pressure from the 336th CCF Regiment now employed to reinforce other enemy depleted elements. The initial success in seizing the crest was somewhat dulled by the bitter enemy's resistance that continued for 3 hours. Continuing heavy UN air and artillery support with supporting infantry and tank weapons played a large part in preventing any maneuver of the large opposing CCF force and in depleting its strength.

(9) The last counterattack of any importance occurred following a final desperate attempt by remaining elements of the 114th CCF Division to take Hill 395. The 3d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment met this attack and was slowly forced back approximately 300 meters north of the crest of Hill 395 at 142400 October. At 150430 October the 2d Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment counterattacked against the last dispirited enemy forces and a bitter battle continued until 1030. Enemy resistance crumbled under the weight of the attack at this time and vigorous action by the 3d Battalion exploited this success. The enemy was completely cleared from Hill 395 at 1100.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

26. Summary of Friendly Casualties.

a. Cumulative friendly casualties sustained during the action 6-15 October totaled 3,319.

b. The total has been broken down as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
421	2,391	507	3,319

27. Summary of Friendly Artillery Action.

a. On the evening prior to the enemy attack on Hill 395 the artillery with IX Corps was deployed in positions from which maximum support could be given friendly troops. Early information on the enemy attack plans permitted the artillery to complete thorough prior fire planning. A complete counterbattery preparation plan was prepared and disseminated to all artillery units by 5 October. This plan was executed as soon as the action commenced and was revised throughout the operation. It was subsequently fired several times daily with great success in silencing enemy artillery.

b. Artillery organization for combat at the start of the period was as follows:

1st FA Group (ROK)

30th FA Battalion (ROK) (105 H) Operational control
51st FA Battalion (ROK) (105 H)
52d FA Battalion (ROK) (105 H)

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

50th FA Battalion (ROK) (105 H) Operational control
2d Rocket Battery, Operational control
"A" Company, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, Operational control
Two Sections, 36th Engineer Searchlight Battalion, Operational control

UNCLASSIFIED

Provide Artillery Support 9th ROK Division

213th FA Battalion (155 How)

Attached "B" 17th FA Battalion (8" H) Operational control

G/S reinforced 1st FA Group (ROK)

937th FA Battalion (155 Gun)

Attached "A" 424th FA Battalion (8" H) Operational control

G/S

955th FA Battalion (155 How)

G/S reinforced 1st FA Group (ROK) (until 13 October)

This organization was maintained with minimum changes throughout the action.

c. As the enemy attack started it was obvious that the attacking forces had the maximum artillery support they could bring to bear. The average daily number of incoming artillery rounds was about 244 for the 30-day period prior to the Hill 395 operation. Some idea of the change in enemy effort can be seen from the following recapitulation of incoming artillery in the Corps Sector during the period 6-15 October.

<u>Day</u>	<u>Number of Rounds</u>
October 5 (1800) to 6 (1800)	1468
October 6 (1800) to 7 (1800)	10930
October 7 (1800) to 8 (1800)	2226
October 8 (1800) to 9 (1800)	12024
October 9 (1800) to 10 (1800)	4474
October 10 (1800) to 11 (1800)	4340

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

Day

Number of Rounds

October 11 (1800) to 12 (1800)
October 12 (1800) to 13 (1800)
October 13 (1800) to 14 (1800)
October 14 (1800) to 15 (1800)

3430

UNCLASSIFIED

Enemy artillery was fired in close support of his attacks and withdrawals; also in counterbattery, harrassing, and interdiction fires.

d. A summary of the fires, by rounds, of the artillery with the Corps in support of the Hill 395 operation is shown below:

<u>Date</u>	<u>H & I</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
5-6 October	934	1249	2183
6-7 "	633	13795	19428
7-8 "	403	11848	12251
8-9 "	202	30900	31102
9-10 "	1223	17994	19222
10-11 "	977	22478	23455
11-12 "	1425	17515	18940
12-13 "	1093	21925	23023
13-14 "	1458	17129	18587
14-15 "	881	18927	19808

e. (1) In addition to counterbattery, fires in support of the infantry, H & I and fires on targets of opportunity, and many destruction missions were fired. The net result of all these fires was a decrease in enemy artillery effectiveness after 8 October and an effective isolation of the battlefield both in the immediate objective area, and also in deeper locations. Effective fires delivered in the deeper locations proved to be a critical factor in preventing a greater enemy build-up.

(2) Information from friendly forces regarding the effectiveness of our artillery in the immediate battlefield area was abundant. TOT's involving several battalions time and time again hit the enemy at critical

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

periods in the battle and played a major part in his inability to hold ground gained. Likewise, reinforcements were dispersed and made ineffective at a time when their commitment to the battle could have been an influential factor.

f. Of special note was the assistance given by the flank (I) Corps Artillery. In the area of overlap, fires on enemy artillery and targets of opportunity gave a wider area of artillery coverage to the operation.

23. Summary of Friendly Armor Action.

a. See Overlay No. 9.

b. (1) On 4 October 1952, "C" Company of the 73d Tank Battalion was attached to the 9th ROK Division to assist in repelling the expected enemy assault on Hill 395. Positions for this company were selected in the 2d US Division, I US Corps Sector at CT372485 on the western flank of Hill 395 where the valley approaches to the hill from the north. From these positions mounting areas for enemy envelopments of the friendly positions could be interdicted by direct fire of M46 tanks. The positions selected were then, and during the attack continued to be, subjected to heavy and accurate enemy artillery and mortar fire.

(2) Following the placement of "C" Company 73d Tank Battalion, the Commanding General 9th ROK Division placed his attached 53d ROK Tank Company (22 - M36 tank destroyers with 90mm guns), at CT395397 covering the eastern flanks of Hill 395 and the valley approaches from the northwest. From these positions the route used by enemy reinforcements (CT385423 to CT382402) could be interdicted.

(3) An additional US Tank Company was placed on two-hour alert

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

to proceed from the 7th US Division Sector to an assembly area vicinity CT452313 for employment as required. In addition, the forward CP of the 73d Tank Battalion was alerted to proceed to CHONUCN vicinity CT428350, if the major portion of the battalion were committed to the action on Hill 395.

c. (1) Beginning at 1100 on the morning of 6 October the enemy increased his artillery and mortar fire to between 300 and 400 rounds per hour. Continued sightings of enemy moving into logical assembly positions for assault on Hills 281 and 395 were received. Enemy tanks were sighted at the following locations:

At 1520	5 tanks at CT356510
At 1520	14 tanks at CT341404
At 1606	10 tanks at CT345433
At 1606	14 tanks at CT342425

(2) At 1902 6 October Hill 395 was shelled heavily. At 1905 the left flank battalion, 9th ROK Division called for final protective fires. At 1915 enemy foot troops were observed 1000 yards north of Hill 395. In the 2d Division (I Corps Sector) at 1925 the French Battalion was in contact with the enemy and at 1950 the outposts of Hill 281 were heavily engaged. At 2000 hours, "C" Company, 73d Tank Battalion, was committed in defense of Hill 395 and began firing from CT373385. At 2015 outposts on Hill 395 were heavily engaged.

(3) During the period 6 to 10 October tanks inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. At the same time the tanks came under heavy enemy fire. Throughout this brief period it was estimated that the enemy fired over 8000 rounds of artillery and mortar at the tanks. Illustrative of the use of tanks during all hours of the day and night are the following actions:

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

On 9 October at 2300 an enemy battalion attempted to envelop the 9th ROK left flank. Tanks virtually annihilated this effort. Again at 2345 on 10 October an enemy infantry company crossed the YOKKOK River in an effort aimed at the French Battalion in the area. Tanks again crushed the enemy effort. This unusual use of tanks at night was made possible only by the preparation of exact range cards to all known points in front of the tank positions and by excellent coordination with artillery and air to provide illumination of targets on call.

(4) At 1830 on 10 October the forward CP of the 73d Tank Battalion moved to CHORWON CT423350. On 11 October "B" Company, 73d Tank Battalion supported by a company of ROK infantry was committed to the action in vicinity CT415413 to direct fire on Hill 396 CT385423 from which Chinese reinforcements were reaching enemy forces on Hill 395. At this time three tank companies were committed to support friendly forces on Hill 395, "C" Company 73d Tank Battalion at CT369375, the 53d ROK Tank Company at CT366395 and "B" Company 73d Tank Battalion at CT403405.

(5) At 1700 on the 11th of October, "A" Company, 73d Tank Battalion moved into assembly areas in the vicinity of CHORWON CT432376. This movement, executed in plain view of the enemy, was designed as part of the Corps Commander's deception plan to attract the attention of the enemy to his left flank, in the vicinity of Hill 323 CT412428, in order to pin down his reserves and artillery which might intervene on Hill 395. Additional troops participating in this deception plan were the 3d Battalion, 51st ROK Infantry Regiment which moved from CT460380 to CT433375 and the 2d Battalion, 17th US Infantry Regiment which moved to the vicinity of CT460380.

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

These boldly conspicuous concentrations and movements into the CHORWON Valley had the desired effect on the enemy.

(6) At 1805 on 12 October, "B" Company, 140th Tank Battalion was attached to the 73d Tank Battalion on closing into assembly area vicinity CT428350. At this time "C" Company, 73d Tank Battalion moved to the 7th US Division sector vicinity CT515276 to reform and to rest and rehabilitate after eight (8) days and nights in combat. "B" Company, 140th Tank Battalion then moved to vicinity CT403405 replacing "B" Company 73d Tank Battalion. At 1830 on 12 October "A" Company, 73d Tank Battalion departed from CHORWON CT428350 and moved to assembly area in the 7th US Division sector in preparation for a forthcoming offensive in the KUMHWA area.

(7) On 13 October at 1700 hours the 64th Tank Battalion was moved into the 9th ROK sector vicinity CT455414. At 1730 hours the 1st Battalion, 7th US Infantry Regiment (3d US Division) detrucked at CT437320 and moved conspicuously to an assembly area at CT458335. Both these movements were part of a new deception plan of the Corps Commander to pin down enemy reinforcements and to distract the enemy artillery and infantry from displacing east to the KUMHWA area CT659417, where a planned IX US Corps offensive was scheduled to take place. The plan provided for the 64th Tank Battalion to move deep into the CHORWON Valley to the vicinity of CT454435 where it would execute an assault by fire on the enemy north and east of the valley. The 1st Battalion, 7th US Infantry's part of the plan was to move north from its assembly area in deployed formation as though it were following the 64th Tank Battalion preparatory to an assault on enemy

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

positions on the east flank of the 9th ROK Division sector. On 14 October the 64th, supported by one company of ROK infantry and the 1st Battalion, 7th US Infantry Regiment executed the deception plan with marked success.

d. Among tank units the following casualties were sustained: 21 WIA, of which 2 were company commanders with wounds serious enough for immediate evacuation to the ZI; 4 tanks were damaged, 2 trucks were damaged beyond repair; 2 quarter-ton trucks were destroyed; and 8 other vehicles were hit by shell fragments.

e. The contribution of tank units to this action was significant. Their positions, which interdicted all routes of enemy approach to the flanks of Hill 395, prevented the enemy from enveloping or turning the friendly positions. As a result, the enemy was forced to execute a costly frontal assault on ground unsuitable for such an action. At the same time, under cover of tank direct fire, friendly elements preserved freedom of action for envelopments and flanking actions when required. Thus, tank units were instrumental in narrowing the enemy's opportunities for maneuver to the extent that the friendly commander was always able to meet him with fresh forces at the decisive point.

f. During the period 4-15 October, the following ammunition was expended by tanks:

73d Tank Battalion (Medium) (with "B" Company 140th Tank Battalion attached)

90mm HE	6391
90mm AP	113
90mm AFC	15
Caliber .30	71,850
Caliber .50	121,475

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

64th Tank Battalion (Medium)

90mm HE	1108
90mm WP	30
90mm APC	75

53d ROK Tank Company

90mm HE	7940
90mm APC	2060
Caliber .50	115,350

Total

90mm	17,737
Caliber .30	71,850
Caliber .50	236,325

b. Tanks inflicted the following enemy casualties:

73d Tank Battalion:	KIA 502	WIA 560
53d ROK Tank Company:	KIA 450	WIA 1000
64th Tank Battalion:	KIA 45	WIA 100
<u>TOTAL</u>	KIA 997	WIA 1660

29. Summary of Friendly Air Action.

a. Continuous close and deep air support was provided during daylight hours throughout the entire period. In addition, MPQ-2 night bombing missions were flown in support each night of operational weather during the action. This supporting air action was timely, effective, and greatly contributed to the defeat of the enemy's attacking forces.

b. In the daylight fighter-bomber effort during the period 6-15 October, a total of 669 sorties were flown in close and deep support of

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

ground action. The ordnance used and the results obtained are summarized as follows:

Ordnance Dropped

1000 lb GP	187
500 lb GP	783
260 lb GP	120
250 lb GP	358
100 lb GP	78
5" HVAR Rockets	758
Napalm	359

Results Observed

UNCLASSIFIED

15 Gun positions destroyed
9 Gun positions damaged
34 Secondary explosions
12 Gun positions destroyed
61 Bunkers destroyed
970 Yards trench destroyed
1 Tank damaged
4 Tanks destroyed
2 Fires
4 Vehicles destroyed
2 Caves damaged
640 KIA

c. In the night bombing effort (MPQ-2), a total of 76 sorties were flown in close support. A total of 1,266 general purpose bombs, and 13 firebombs were dropped. Breakdown of the ordnance used and the results are shown as follows:

Ordnance Dropped

500 lb GP	355
260 lb GP	149
250 lb GP	36
220 lb GP	256
100 lb GP	470
Firebombs	18

Results Observed

7 Large secondary explosions
13 Secondary explosions
14 Fires

d. See Inclosure "A" for detailed analysis of daily and nightly effort and its results during the period.

e. In addition to the daylight and night bombing support, a flare ship was made available during the hours of darkness to provide battlefield illumination. See paragraph 30a, below.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

30. Battlefield Illumination During the Action.

a. Battlefield illumination during the hours of darkness was provided throughout the action by flare-ship, searchlights of two sections of the 3d Platoon, 86th Engineer Searchlight Company and artillery and mortar illuminating shell. The combined effects of these media of illumination greatly aided the infantry and tank action throughout the period.

b. During the period 6-15 October 1952, G3 Air, IX Corps, requested and received from JOC use of a flareship during the hours of darkness on an "on call" basis by request of Commanding General, 9th ROK Division to G3 Air, IX Corps. The greater part of the period the flareship was committed for use in illuminating the area vicinity CT3641. Control of the flare drops was exercised by the Tactical Air Control Party stationed at the 1st FA Group (ROK) Headquarters. The flareship dropped one to three one million candlepower flares on each east and west or west to east run dependent upon illumination of the battle area needed.

c. In addition to searchlights and flare aircraft, artillery provided battlefield illumination throughout the operation. This illumination was used to supplement the others mentioned, and at times in lieu of the aircraft dropped flares. A recapitulation of rounds expended is shown below:

6 October	14
7 October	0
8 October	77
9 October	7
10 October	213
11 October	371
12 October	7
13-15 October	0


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION VI: SUMMARY OF CORPS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

31. Engineer Support.

a. Throughout the period, 14 Corps engineer staff and troops rendered support as needed to sustain the action. This support included the supply of engineer materiel issued to the 9th ROK Division and its supporting artillery units; preparations for bridge removal and construction; road construction and maintenance; the furnishing of transportation to haul ammunition; and the provision of Korean Service Corps personnel to unload ammunition.

b. The following summary covers engineer materials issued to the 9th ROK Division and supporting units during the action:

Sandbags	450,000
Concertina	725 rolls
Barbed Wire	2,000 reels
Mines	2,000*
Trip Flares	500*
Pickets	60,000
Timber, Heavy	6,400 board feet
Explosives	12 tons
Bangalore torpedoes	50*

*Allocated for issue at AS.

Short supply necessitated the rationing of sandbags and concertina.

c. The following covers a chronological summary of additional engineer activity during the period:

(1) 5 October: 36th Engineer Combat Group was alerted to be prepared to: Remove two M2 Treadway bridges at CT391380 and CT397363; supply,

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

install and maintain M2 Treadway bridges and ML938 Footbridges as ordered by the Corps Engineer; constructed access roads, 937th FA Battalion area CT460298-CT460334.

(2) 9 October: Furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition.

(3) 10 October: Hauled fortification materials - 12 - 5 ton trucks; furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition.

(4) 11 October: Hauled fortification materials - 12 - 5 ton trucks; furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition.

(5) 12 October: Furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition.

(6) 13 October: Furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition; furnished 100 KSC's to ASP 56A to assist in unloading ammunition.

(7) 14 October: Furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition; furnished 100 KSC's to ASP 56A to assist in unloading ammunition.

(8) 15 October: Furnished 50 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with 100 drivers to 231st Transportation Truck Battalion to haul ammunition.

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

32. Chemical Support. **UNCLASSIFIED**

In support of the action, 500 pounds of napalm were available to prepare 1,210 gallons thickened fuel, 200 napalm incendiary bombs to charge 19 portable flame throwers. In addition, 200 napalm land mines (X-200) were issued. These chemical supplies were issued in addition to those already in position when the attack started.

33. Ordnance Support.

a. For ammunition expended during the action, 6-15 October, see Inclosure "B".

b. Battle losses of ordnance items reported are listed as follows:

Rifle, caliber .30 M1	673	Projector, pyro M9	9
Carbine, caliber .30	297	Binoculars, M9	1
BAR	45	Binoculars, M16	4
Pistol, caliber .45	6	Binoculars, M13	6
Pistol, Russian	1	Compass, M2	5
Gun, sub-machine caliber .45	2	Plate, base 81mm	2
Gun, machine, caliber .30 M1917A4	8	Mount, tripod 60mm	1
Gun, machine, caliber .30 M1917A1	4	Mount, tripod M2 LMG	4
Mortar, 60mm	2	Mount, tripod M1917A1	3
Mortar, 81mm	1	Chest, water	16
Rifle, 57mm RR	1	Sights, 57mm RR	1
Launcher, grenade M7	191	Device, hose water	11
Bayonet, knife M1	1600	Sights, 60mm	3
Launcher, rocket 3.5"	9	Bayonet, knife	322

34. Quartermaster Support.

Immediately prior to the action, the Corps Quartermaster arranged for KMAG to ship 1,000 Complete Individual Field Equipment Kits, which

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

arrived at 9th ROK Division in sufficient time to be used for the equipping of replacement personnel.

35. Signal Support.

a. Prior to start of action, the 51st ROK Light Infantry Regiment did not have its authorized signal equipment on hand. The Corps Signal Officer arranged with the EUSAK Signal Officer for the 51st to draw needed signal equipment from US sources rather than wait for normal ROK channels for supply. The equipment was drawn and delivered to the 9th ROK Division by the 101st Signal Battalion in time to be on hand at the start of the action.

b. Battle losses of signal items reported are listed as follows:

Flashlight T122	292	Telephone EES	48
TE 33	131	Reel, Equipment CE11	102
Radio SCR 536	73	Microphone T45	7
Reel unit RL 39	3	Base Switchboard SB 18	3
ST 13	7	Handset TS9	7
TS 13	11	Bag, EG 153	8
ST 19	2	Antenna AN 29	9
Radio SCR 609	1	Lantern MX 290	4
Headset HS 30	3	Wire P1 MC 123	2
Test Set TS 79	3	TS 34	1
Radio SCR 619	1	Microphone T17	2
Headset TS 10	6	AB 21/GR	7
AB 22/GR	3	AB 23/GR	4
AB 24/GR	3	Mast Section MS 118	1

36. Transportation Support.

a. Prior to the action it was estimated that approximately 3000

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

JNCLASSIFIED

tons of Class V would be required daily at ASP 56A. This tonnage would have to be moved from ASP 56, 40 miles distant, which would require 8 hour turn-arounds on vehicles with prompt loading and unloading. On this basis, it was decided that sufficient trucks must be provided to permit the dispatch of fifty to sixty loaded trucks per hour on Class V, this was assumed to require a minimum of 400 operational trucks. At the time of this estimate, 60 of the Corps supporting trucks were engaged in a tactical move and would not be available until 6 October.

b. Vehicles of the supporting Truck Battalion were augmented by 52 trucks from EUSAK and 149 trucks from various Corps units, making a total of 367 trucks available on 9 October. This figure was increased to 530 trucks by 16 October by further augmentation.

c. The following tonnages of Class V were moved from ASP 56 to ASP 56A.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Truck Loads</u>	<u>Estimated Tonnage</u>
5 October	94	376 s/tons
6 "	389	1556 "
7 "	245	980 "
8 "	220	880 "
9 "	572	2288 "
10 "	738	2952 "
11 "	941	3752 "
12 "	1121	4484 "
13 "	762	3048 "
14 "	542	2168 "
15 "	506	2024 "

d. In addition to Class V tonnages in (c) above, a total of 2007 loads of miscellaneous cargo was moved in this sector of the Corps and 2578 loads in the eastern sector.

e. Area to rear of Hill 395 was reconnoitered and forward

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

helicopter landing strips established.

f. 4 DUKW's were secured for use in event area to rear of Hill 395 was flooded. These were shipped in by rail and kept in the reserve division area on an alert status.

37. Medical Support.

a. In addition to 9th ROKA Division organic units, medical support for the operation included the following Army units:

- (1) 5th ROKA MASH.
- (2) 8063d MASH.
- (3) 2d Platoon (-) 618th Clearing Company.
- (4) 2d Platoon (-) 618th Clearing Company.
- (5) 8191st Army Helicopter Detachment.
- (6) 2d Platoon, 560th Medical Ambulance Company.

b. Medical treatment was furnished in the conventional manner. Treatment and triage of patients was provided at each echelon of medical service. Treatment was completed and patients returned to duty at the lowest possible echelon. Those requiring more definitive medical care were evacuated further to the rear.

c. Prior to and during the first seven days of the operation, all patients evacuated from 9th ROKA Division were processed through the 5th ROKA MASH. As the number of casualties increased it was found that this arrangement severely hampered performance of the primary mission of a MASH and arrangements were made to evacuate the less serious surgical cases and all medical cases by Hospital Train from ~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

d. All neurosurgical cases were evacuated immediately from the 5th ROKA MASH to the 763d MASH for surgery. This was done to assist the 5th ROKA MASH and to assure that these patients received adequate surgical care.

e. The 2d Platoon, 618th Clearing Company operated medical holding units at both CHONG-GONG-NI and SINTAN-NI. Patients transported to these railheads for further evacuation by Hospital Train were hospitalized by these units while awaiting arrival of trains.

f. Evacuation within the 9th ROKA Division was accomplished with organic vehicles. Evacuation of the seriously wounded to the 5th ROKA MASH was accomplished by the 8191st Army Helicopter Detachment. Ambulance evacuation from the 9th ROKA Division to the 5th ROKA MASH was accomplished by one platoon of the 1st ROKA Medical Ambulance Company. Upon initiation of evacuation by Hospital Train from SINTAN-NI, EUSAK attached 2d Platoon, 560th Medical Ambulance Company to 2d Platoon (-), 618th Clearing Company, vicinity SINTAN-NI for the purpose of evacuating from the division to the railhead.

g. On 14 October 1952, a delinquent between CHONG-GONG-NI and SINTAN-NI halted operation of Hospital Trains north of CHONG-GONG-NI for a period of 25 hours. During this period patients were evacuated to 2d Platoon (-), 618th Clearing Company, vicinity CHONG-GONG-NI for further evacuation by Hospital train. No particular difficulty was presented by this change and it did not impede efficient evacuation of divisional medical units.

h. During the period 6 October to 15 October the 9th ROKA Division Medical Service had a total of 2,136 patient admissions of which 2,033 were battle casualties, 97 were from non-battle causes and 6 were PW. Of the

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

above 2,136 patient admissions 1,299 were evacuated to the 5th ROKA MASH and 693 were evacuated direct to the SINTAN-NI and CHONG-GONG-NI railroads for further evacuation to the rear; 20 were returned to duty and 5 died. A total of 119 were remaining in the Division Clearing Station at the end of the report period.

UNCLASSIFIED

i. During the operation medical supply support was furnished by the Seoul ROKA Medical Supply Company. On 7 October supplies were received from a regular 15 day supply level requisition which had been submitted on 3 October. Five emergency requisitions were submitted on an "As required" basis as emergency requirements arose. These requisitions were hand carried to the Seoul ROKA Medical Supply Company and supplies were delivered to the Division on the return trip. Medical supply support for the period was adequate.

38. Other Logistical Support.

A team composed of one officer from each technical service section headed by a Corps G4 representative, was sent to the 9th ROK Division CP to assist the KMAG Advisors in replacing battle losses. This action was necessary to overcome the slow supply processes in KMAG and ROK Army Channels by dealing with EUSAK when necessary.

UNCLASSIFIED

100-443887-100

100-443887-100

a. Enemy action has continued to follow its recent pattern of limited objective attacks along the entire front. The manner and method of his attacks continue to be mass employment of infantry. His use of intense artillery and mortar fire in heavy volume in preparation and support of his attacks continues as before.

b. The small unit commander seemingly has no individual initiative, or is greatly restricted in maneuver. This had been indicated by his repeated fanatical attempts to attain objectives on the same positions from which he has been consistently repulsed. In his successive efforts following defeats in his attempts to take positions, he has followed the same tactic of massed frontal assault. This pattern indicates that a unit, once given a mission and plan of attack, adheres to it regardless of losses. In the attacks on Hill 395 the enemy continued to commit reserves piecemeal even though the attainment of their objectives was rendered impossible by UN combined arms fire power.

c. The enemy continues in his tactics of making small unit probes in several directions followed by commitment of reserves for exploitation. His reserves, however, are committed in some cases after the initial attacks have been unsuccessful. He continues to funnel his troops on narrow fronts an action which limits the number of troops he can employ

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

simultaneously. This pattern of enemy attack greatly increases the killing power and effect of our artillery, mortars, tanks, automatic weapons and small arms fire, and furthers our ability to reinforce units which receive the brunt of attacks.

d. Improved enemy artillery technique has been evidenced by accurate, timely and effective concentrations preceding and during initial stages of the attack. Massed fire of battalion size artillery units was reported, and counterbattery information was apparently compiled by the enemy over a prolonged period of time and used efficiently during the action. The enemy's difficulty in maintaining ammunition supply in a forward area greatly reduced the effectiveness of his fires during the action.

40. General Lessons - Combined Arms.

a. Alert, effective intelligence collection, evaluation, and dissemination made it possible to anticipate the enemy's plan of attack, and to take timely measures to prepare for its repulse.

b. Prompt, effective, and well designed preparation to meet the attack contributed greatly to the successful defeat of the enemy's repeated and determined efforts to take the positions. The positioning of armor and quad-50's to sweep the flanks of Hill 395, the reinforcing of the supporting artillery, and the coordination of the combined ground arms proved to be major factors in the successful defense. Coordination of ground and air action was likewise a powerful contributing factor.

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

c. The Division Commander's effective action and measures to insure preservation of the integrity of his units in action, and his provision of fresh troops by timely and considered reliefs to meet successive attacks and to launch strong counterattacks were outstanding causes of the UN success in this battle. Likewise, the Commander's anticipation of the culminating points of the enemy's strength in his several attacks, and the provision of fresh troops to meet them, were of equal importance in the successful defense. These features of the action were among the outstanding lessons learned.

d. The Corps Commander's plan for deception by the use of tanks and infantry in the diversionary action in the CHORWON Valley, and its successful execution pinned down enemy reserves and artillery, and prevented their intervention at the crucial period of battle. The conception of this plan and its execution provide a valuable lesson for future operations similar to that in the defense of Hill 395.

e. The use of tanks to interdict normal routes of maneuver for the enemy against Hill 395 required him to execute a costly frontal assault rather than employ double envelopment. Thus, by our skillful use of armor, the CCF was forced to attack on a narrow front on ground unsuitable for such an action. At the same time, under cover of direct tank fire, friendly elements preserved freedom of action for envelopment and flanking action when required.

f. The need for provision of fresh troops to defend Hill 395 against successive assaults was fully met by the Corps Commander. His

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

action in providing for the 7th US Division's backing of the right (east) flank of the 9th ROK Division line in emergency enable the Division Commander to utilize troops he would not otherwise have been able to employ.

41. Artillery.

a. (1) Prior information on enemy operations is as important to the artillery as to other arms. Despite the flexibility and mobility of artillery support, relocation and re-laying of certain artillery units prior to an operation plays a vital part in giving support during the early stages of defense. In the Hill 395 operation, had the artillery not been relocated and re-laid, the early support could not have been so effective.

(2) Further, as the defense progresses to the counterattack phase the artillery must be kept informed of the friendly plan of maneuver. Effective integration of artillery fire support with the infantry plan is not possible without this information at all stages of its development.

b. Forward observer training must be constantly stressed. Forward observers are a vital part of the battlefield intelligence system. Close liaison and good communication will produce valuable and usable data.

c. Complete and accurate shell reporting must be taught in basic training for all personnel serving in combat areas. Effective counterbattery measures depend on locations of the enemy batteries. Our intelligence in

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

this respect still leaves much to be desired.

d. A flash platoon of Battery "C", 1st Observation Battalion was placed in operation in the 9th ROK Division sector and gave many excellent locations of hostile guns and other intelligence data. The performance is characteristic of this unit. A full observation platoon is greatly needed in the Corps.

UNCLASSIFIED

e. In a stabilized defense, OP bunkers should be either better concealed, or dug in on reverse slopes with several actual observing positions on forward slopes. Under the present stabilized OP set-up the enemy at the start of an operation can accurately and consistently hit OP's thereby reducing their effectiveness.

f. There is a need for a larger supply rate of illuminating shells.

42. Armor.

a. Under the conditions and terrain prevailing in this action, the following points of experience received sharp emphasis: Communications, tank-infantry action, and tank action at night.

b. Communications: The keystone of successful combat, communications, again proved difficult in the Korean terrain. Complicated by action across Corps boundaries, accentuated by language difficulties, French, Korean and English, it was again demonstrated that effective communications are a must in combat. Wire and radio with numerous relay stations required for the latter were the principal mainstays in this


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

action. It was again demonstrated that wire is frequently destroyed by hostile fire and that in a fluid situation radio becomes the principal means of communication.

c. Tank-infantry: Standard techniques, such as panels on the backs of lead infantry, multiple means of communication, and pyrotechnics for emergency action signals were all employed in this action.

d. Tank Action at Night: Tank action at night emphasized the need for preparation of accurate range cards to all known enemy locations and avenues of approach. Frequently in this action, tanks gave a superlative account of themselves at the hours of 2300 and 2400 at night. Assisting this night tank fire were illuminating shells of the artillery, flares dropped from planes, and tank-mounted searchlights. (The latter, however, again proved of little use in the normal dust and smoke caused by incoming enemy artillery and mortar, because of the light's inability to pierce the haze.)

43. Air.

a. Napalm was especially effective against troop concentrations and assembly areas. It produced many enemy casualties and created disorganization of impending enemy attacks.

b. When maximum air effort is being rendered to a Division it is essential that the Division have two Airborne TACP (Mosquito Aircraft). Thus, the possibility of having flights of aircraft orbiting over the

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

target area waiting to be directed onto the target is minimized. This is particularly true where the fighter-bombers are jet aircraft having a limited time, by fuel capacity, in the target area.

c. The G3 Air must be kept constantly abreast of the situation as to intelligence information and counterattack plans. During this action the Division FAC acted in the capacity of Division G3 Air since the assigned G3 Air lacked essential experience.

d. Effective use of MPQ-2 (Radar) bombing.

(1) Night bombing: During the period, constant MPQ-2 strikes were directed against personnel and assembly areas within 1000 to 4000 meters from friendly MLR. These strikes produced excellent results against reserves being brought into the attack and in destroying supplies and equipment brought up for the attacking forces.

(2) Daylight MPQ-2: On 15 October the weather was non-operational for fighter-bombers until 1500 hours. On this occasion the air effort against enemy build-up areas was continued with the effective use of daylight MPQ-2 bombing.

44. Logistical - General.

a. It proved to be desirable for Corps to assist ROK units in the procurement of supplies by maintaining close contact with Eighth Army and KMAG Headquarters.

b. Teams consisting of representatives of the Corps Technical

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

Services and the Corps G4 can assist forward units in resupply by being physically present in the unit areas and keeping Corps G4 and Army Technical Services informed of supply status.

45. Engineer.

a. Critical fortification materials must be conserved in rear areas in order to be used in forward areas, where substitutes are not satisfactory.

b. ROK Army Divisions do not have sufficient organizational transportation to haul required fortification materials from an ESP which is about 45 miles to their rear. Transportation must be furnished them, or where possible, materials should be rail-shipped to the division area.

46. Ordnance.

a. Army must be informed of anticipated ammunition expenditures with the earliest advance notice possible, otherwise large withdrawals will cause a breakdown in the ammunition supply channels. Corps Ordnance, being in a position to foresee expenditures, must provide the impetus to get the ammunition moving forward.

b. The following average daily rates of expenditure of ammunition occurred during the defensive action and provide a basis for future

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

planning:

105mm How	-	132 rounds per tube
155mm How	-	83 rounds per tube
155mm Gun	-	59 rounds per tube
8" How	-	59 rounds per tube
4.5" Rocket	-	56 rounds per tube
60mm Mortar	-	31 rounds per tube
81mm Mortar	-	72 rounds per tube
4.2" Mortar	-	81 rounds per tube

c. The maximum and minimum rates of expenditure of ammunition for weapons indicated for any one day of the action in rounds per tube, were:

	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
105mm How	270	75
155mm How	123	45
155mm Gun	115	33
8" How	115	23
4.5" Rocket	220	0
60mm Mortar	68	15
81mm Mortar	148	16
4.2" Mortar	199	23

d. The factors of 0.04 tons per artillery round and 0.01 tons per mortar round irrespective of caliber, proved to be sufficiently accurate for transportation planning purposes.

e. Units should draw ammunition from forward ASP's, but may be diverted to back-up ASP's either to supplement transportation or because of shortages in forward ASP's.

f. Corps ammunition section must continually watch the ASP's to assure balanced components of rounds.

g. Removing salvage delays transportation. If scrap is permitted to accumulate at gun positions (or forward ASP's) movement of ammunition can be speeded.

██████████
SECURITY INFORMATION

56

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

h. A reserve of labor must be readily available to assist in loading and unloading ammunition in the ASP's.

i. Direct communication between forward and back-up ASP's is a must.

j. ASP's should not refuse the issue of ammunition without first contacting the agency approving the Transportation Order.

k. In a fast changing situation, a Corps representative at the forward ASP's is essential in order to obtain current storage information.

UNCLASSIFIED

47. Medical.

a. Prior to and during the first seven (7) days of the operation, 5th ROKA MASH processed all evacuees from 9th ROK Division. It had, in fact, been operating as an Evacuation Hospital. The heavy influx of casualties during the operation severely hampered performance of the primary mission - immediate surgical care to the seriously wounded. For this reason it was necessary to by-pass the MASH and evacuate the less serious surgical cases and all medical cases. This is not a "lesson learned" in a strict sense, it is more in the nature of a confirmation of basic medical doctrine as regards the employment of MASH units.

b. A basic principle of helicopter limitation was again demonstrated in this operation. This is the fact that helicopters can function well in daylight hours during good weather, but that adequate ambulance service must be provided to evacuate during the hours of darkness, and

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

during inclement weather.

c. It was noted that there was tendency for the Division to completely exhaust the medical supplies on hand prior to requisitioning replacement supplies. This point was discussed with the KMAG G1-G4 Advisor with a view to have timely requisitions placed to prevent such complete exhaustion of supplies. The KMAG Advisor discussed this with the Division Surgeon and arrangements were initiated to requisition supplies as supply levels are reduced rather than delay until supplies are completely exhausted. Where the supply lines are long, it is desirable to build up an excess 5 to 7 day supply of expendable medical items when possible.

48. Transportation.

a. Responsibility for setting up priority for movements should be vested in one individual. Considerable difficulty was experienced in determining who should receive truck support. This was particularly difficult in areas where one truck battalion served more than one Corps area.

b. It is essential to have two drivers per vehicle to permit continuous movement of transportation.

c. Traffic regulation points should be established on all major MSR's and provided with adequate telephone service so that they are in constant communication with the originating and destination points.

d. In an emergency vehicles used for common purpose, such as moving Class V, should be pooled. If this were done, loads arriving from

[REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED


SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

rear supply points could be turned over to drivers from forward units and, without unloading, be driven to the ultimate destination.

e. Wrecker service and ordnance patrols should be established along MSR's. It is advisable for them to use telephone service available at MP Check Points.

f. Pools of Corps vehicles under control of Corps Transportation Officer proved successful in augmenting Army transportation necessary for forward hauls of supplies.

g. Due to limited transportation in ROKA units, it was necessary to implement divisional transportation with vehicles under control of Corps Transportation Officer.


SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395, 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

ENCLOSURE "A"

Daylight Fighter-Bomber Effort

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Type of Ordnance</u>	<u>Results</u>
6 October	44	88 - 500 lb GP	3 Bunkers destroyed 2 Secondary Explosions Other results unobserved due to intense flak.
7 October 1952	46	18 - 1000 lb GP 80 - 500 lb GP	6 Arty positions damaged 1 Large Secondary explosion Other results negative due to smoke.
8 October 1952	67	20 - 1000 lb GP 88 - 500 lb GP 72 - 250 lb GP 18 - 100 lb GP 48-5" HVAR Rockets 22 - Napalm	8 Secondary explosions 3 Trucks destroyed 6 Gun psns destroyed 5 Bunkers destroyed 150 KIA 1 Fire
9 October 1952	52	6 - 1000 lb GP 52 - 500 lb GP 60 - 260 lb GP 6 - 250 lb GP 96-5" HVAR Rockets 69 - Napalm	1 Secondary explosion 7 Bunkers destroyed 10 KIA Other results negative- Smoke and flak.
10 October 1952	44	32 - 500 lb GP 32 - 260 lb GP 48 - 250 lb GP 60-5" HVAR Rockets 56 - Napalm	60 KIA 2 Secondary Explosions Other results negative - weather.

ENCLOSURE "A"

(Reference to para 29a of Report)

1


SECURITY INFORMATION

██████████
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

(Fighter-Bomber Daylight Effort Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Type Ordnance</u>	<u>Results</u>
11 October 1952	72	29 - 1000 lb GP 110 - 500 lb GP 142 - 250 lb GP 16 - 260 lb GP 32 - 100 lb GP 4 - Napalm 16 - 5" HVAR Rockets	6 Arty psns destroyed 6 Secondary explosions 1 Gun psn destroyed 2 Caves damaged Other results negative due to smoke.
12 October 1952	190	50 - 1000 lb GP 239 - 500 lb GP 12 - 260 lb GP 10 - 250 lb GP 464 - 5" HVAR Rockets 140 - Napalm 12 - 100 lb GP	2 Arty psns damaged 720 yds trench destroyed 38 Bunkers destroyed 1 Tank damaged 7 Secondary explosions 4 Fires 4 Vehicles destroyed 13 Arty psns destroyed 1 Tank destroyed 5 Gun psns destroyed 325 KIA
13 October 1952	69	44 - 1000 lb GP 62 - 500 lb GP 48 - 250 lb GP 24 - 100 lb GP 62 - 5" HVAR Rockets 40 - Napalm	2 Arty psns damaged 5 Secondary explosions 4 Arty psns destroyed 95 KIA 2 Caves destroyed
14 October 1952	66	120 - 1000 lb GP 32 - 250 lb GP 4 - 100 lb GP 20 - Napalm 12 - 5" HVAR Rockets	150 yds trench destroyed 2 Secondary explosions 7 Bunkers destroyed 2 arty positions destroyed Other results negative due to smoke
15 October 1952	19	32 - 500 lb GP 8 - Napalm	1 Fire Other results not observed

██████████
SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

(Fighter-Bomber Daylight Effort Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Type Ordnance</u>	<u>Results</u>
TOT L for 10 day period 6-15 Oct 1952	665	197-1000 lb GP 783-500 lb GP 120-260 lb GP 358-250 lb GP 78-100 lb GP 758-5" HVAR Rockets 359-Mapalm	25 Arty psns destroyed 9 Arty psns damaged 34 Secondary explosions 12 Gun psns destroyed 61 Bunkers destroyed 870 yds trench destroyed 1 Tank destroyed 2 Trucks destroyed 2 Fires 4 Vehicles destroyed 2 Caves destroyed 2 Caves damaged 640 MIA

MPQ-2 (Radar) Night Bombing
(Close Support of the 9th BOM Division)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Type Ordnance</u>	<u>Results</u>
6 October 1952	11	62-500 lb GP 82-100 lb GP	3 Large secondary explosion
7 October 1952	15	97-500 lb GP 36-260 lb GP	1 Secondary explosion
8 October 1952	9	59-260 lb GP 72-220 lb GP 25-100 lb GP	7 Large secondary explosion 2 Secondary explosions 13 Fires
9 October 1952	Negative		
10 October 1952	2	25-500 lb GP	Negative
11 October 1952	18	116-500 lb GP 54-260 lb GP 48-220 lb GP 127-100 lb GP	2 Secondary explosions

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Type Ordnance</u>	<u>Results</u>
12 October 1952	10	40-500 1b GP 36-250 1b GP 52-220 1b GP	Negative
13 October 1952	7	3-500 1b GP 84-220 1b GP 193-100 1b GP	4 Secondary explosions 1 Fire
14 October 1952	4	12-500 1b GP 13-200 1b Firebombs 43-100 1b GP	2 Secondary explosions
TOTAL For 10 day period 6-15 October 1952		355-500 1b GP 149-260 1b GP 36-250 1b GP 256-220 1b GP 470-100 1b GP 13-200 1b Firebombs	7 Large Secondary Explosions 13 Secondary explosions 14 Fires

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

AFTER ACTION REPORT, HILL 395, 6-15 OCTOBER 1952

ENCLOSURE "B"

Summary of Ammunition Expenditures

1. Ammunition expenditures during the period 6-15 October, both dates inclusive, were as follows:

TYPE	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	TOTAL
<u>105mm How</u>											
HE	4312	25309	23150	23293	14897	17882	16604	23214	53627	64815	267603
WP	336	43	26	-	29	46	86	27	111	60	764
HC	3	-	134	1	74	49	21	-	70	199	551
Total											268918
<u>155mm How</u>											
HE	478	11193	15414	11746	3403	7510	5715	6146	14756	16165	92526
WP	-	585	971	879	234	3	375	32	44	15	3138
HC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ILLUM	-	206	182	288	102	3	168	2	99	481	1471
Total											97135
<u>155mm Gun</u>											
HE	752	1143	1336	727	378	1027	1159	1055	915	523	9015
WP	46	23	29	31	11	30	26	68	71	6	341
ILLUM	-	-	17	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
Total											9378
<u>8" How</u>											
HE	111	770	442	1019	357	987	1044	1080	2315	1955	10080
<u>4.5" Rkt</u>											
HE	-	1188	2641	642	-	-	774	593	779	61	6678
TOTAL:	6038	40960	44342	38571	19485	27537	25972	32217	72787	84280	392189
<u>60mm Mort</u>											
HE	299	7164	6117	8090	5838	2748	7260	4719	19140	17623	78999
WP	-	18	182	-	1	1	72	20	1040	10	1344
ILLUM	6	280	1299	593	191	531	188	362	596	1593	5644
Total											85987

ENCLOSURE "B"

(Reference to par 33a, of Report

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION

	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	TOTAL
<u>81mm Mort</u>											
HE(1t)	37	2070	7663	8494	1577	1169	6399	6952	15616	20115	70162
HE(hv)	174	2688	7071	1767	3220	1348	1350	1319	3799	5435	28221
WP	8	42	1065	292	114	172	241	265	948	386	3533
ILLUM	1	295	235	568	1001	299	223	242	662	1572	5098
<u>Total</u>											107014

<u>4.2" Mort</u>											
HE	352	1078	6630	5940	2129	3070	1186	1337			9424
WP	238	4	2358	2276	745	199	10	10			9121
<u>Total</u>											58545

TOTAL: 1121 13633 32620 28026 14316 9537 19450 16081 54472 61790 251546

90mm Gun 480 1909 2044 2175 1758 1150 2398 2074 11345 1167 26500

<u>76mm Gun</u>											
HE	0	0	2444	900	17	32	210	0	3036	1615	9304
WP	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	70	80	152
APC	0	0	1147	0	0	5	4	0	15	22	1193
<u>Total</u>											10649

57mm RR 13 171 4485 558 36 178 155 147 2327 1644 10214

75mm RR 7 145 667 239 38 289 24 149 2137 1723 5423

Grenade, Hand 855 9176 13202 13444 2633 3812 9641 14307 12532 16590 96192

2. Percentage of types of ammunition within each caliber:

	<u>105mm How</u>	<u>155mm How</u>	<u>155mm Gun</u>	<u>60mm Mort</u>	<u>81mm Mort</u>	<u>4.2" Mort</u>
HE	99.9951%	95.25%	96.12%	91.87%	91.94%	84.40%
WP	.0028%	3.23%	3.65%	1.57%	3.30%	15.60%
HC	.0021%	-	-	-	-	-
ILLUM	-	1.52%	.23%	6.56%	4.76%	-

All others were essentially 100% HE

2


[REDACTED]

SECURITY INFORMATION


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

GERMAN



UNCLASSIFIED



COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
3 1695 00618 2521