China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?
Abstract
The Defense Department determined last fall that China had a nuclear arsenal in the "low 200s," and that it could "at least double" it by 2030. Subsequently, the US claimed China could triple or quadruple its current arsenal by 2030. These estimates, however, failed to factor in China's planned "civil" nuclear program or China's plutonium fast breeder reactor program, which will be capable of producing a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium. If one includes it and China's nonweaponized military stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, China conservatively could obtain roughly 1,270 warheads by 2030 - nearly as many as America currently has deployed on its intercontinental-range ballistic missile force. China has a variety of additional nuclear materials production options that could increase this number by a factor of two or more. Production of weapons-grade plutonium from its fast reactor program, however, is the least burdensome approach to enlarge its arsenal of advanced, two-stage thermonuclear weapons. What is troubling is China agreed to report annually to the IAEA on what China's civil plutonium holdings and production capabilities are but stopped doing so in 2017. The United States, which also files these reports, should ask China why. Before China completes construction of its fast reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants, Washington should also explore with Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul pausing commercializing fast reactor fuel cycles, all of which are exceedingly uneconomic in comparison to other forms of nuclear and nonnuclear electricity production.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1129490
Entities
People
- Henry D. Sokoloski
Organizations
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center