What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression
Abstract
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled What Deters and Why: North Korea and Russia, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purposes of the project were (1) to provide the Army with improved and new frameworks for evaluating the deterrence of aggressor activities for both interstate aggression and aggression short of that threshold and (2) to apply those two frameworks to assess the United States' conventional and nonconventional deterrence relationships with Russia and North Korea. In the latter case, for comparative purposes, the authors also examine U.S. efforts to deter Chinese aggression. The challenge of deterring major conventional aggression is taking on renewed importance in an era of strategic competition. But the nature of that competition, which is primarily playing out below the threshold of major war (at least so far), has created amore immediate and persistent challenge for deterrence: the rise of gray zone aggression, as opposed to conventional interstate aggression. We define gray zone aggression as an integrated campaign to achieve political objectives while remaining below the threshold of outright warfare. Typically, such campaigns involve the gradual application of instruments of power to achieve incremental progress without triggering a decisive military response.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2021
- Accession Number
- AD1130162
Entities
People
- Jeffrey W. Hornung
- Joe Cheravitch
- Michael J. Mazarr
- Stephanie Pezard
Organizations
- RAND Corporation