

INDIA-UNITED STATES SECURITY COOPERATION:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INDIA-UNITED STATES SECURITY COOPERATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE by Major Virender Singh Salaria, Indian Army, 128 pages

With the end of the cold war, India-United States security cooperation underwent a significant positive transformation. This thesis traces the historical context, origins, evolution and the current level of security cooperation between India and the United States to answer the primary question, “Does the current level of security cooperation between India and the United States satisfy each nation’s interests in the foreseeable future?” This study draws on historical background, recent security partnerships, and information to analyze security cooperation while explaining obstacles to an enhanced security partnership between apparent “natural allies.”

The study reveals that there is a wide scope for deepened security cooperation based on mutual interests and that both countries are uniquely suited for enhanced security partnership in the current global security environment. This study concludes that India-United States security cooperation, especially in the areas of defense and counterterrorism, has made major progress from the days of estrangement prior to the Cold War, but that cooperation has not yet reached its full potential. Although present relationships are marginally sustaining the national security objectives of both countries, persistent efforts motivated by a combination of vital overlapping national interests and security objectives should produce bright and mature security collaboration. This study explores areas of potential cooperation and offers suggestions for expanding the scope and dimensions of future security collaborations. This thesis recommends that defense and counterterrorism cooperation must continue within a larger context of bilateral relations.

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ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BECA	Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation
CISMOA	Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum
CLAWS	Center for Land Warfare Studies
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DJWG	Defense Joint Working Group
DPG	Defense Policy Group
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ESG	Executive Steering Group
EUMA	End User Monitoring Agreement
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HuJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDSA	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad

JTG	Joint Technical Group
LCA	Light Combat Aircraft
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LSA	Logistics Support Agreement
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MMRCA	Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSS	National Security Strategy
POK	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
TMD	Theatre Missile Defense
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For in Asia and around the world, India is not simply emerging; India has already emerged and it is my firm belief that the relationship between the United States and India—bound by our shared interests and values—will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. This is the partnership I have come here to build. This is the vision that our nations can realize together.

— President Barack Obama,
Address to the Indian Parliament

India-United States relations have seen remarkable transformation over the last decade. The convergence of mutual interests and values has affirmed the global strategic partnership between the two countries. Common values and complementary strengths of India and the United States provide a strong foundation for addressing the global challenges of the 21st century. A broad consensus exists across the political spectrum in both countries to strengthen security cooperation to complement broader bilateral relations. Based on both principle and pragmatism, this point to a much more durable and multifaceted relationship in the future.¹

The aim of this thesis is to analyze India-US Security cooperation with special emphasis on defense, counterterrorism, and the strategic environment that directly affects both nations with a focus on long-term prospects for a better relationship. This study will also explore mutual interests that form the basis for cooperation. In addition, the thesis will delve into the origins, evolution, and current state of India-US security cooperation. The scope of the study also includes reasons for strategic convergence while explaining the differences in perception within both countries on certain issues. Most importantly, the study will explore and provide practical recommendations for stronger and more

meaningful security cooperation between the world's two largest democracies and apparent "natural allies." The author anticipates that the research will interest students of foreign policy and security studies in general.

The *National Security Strategy (NSS)* is the most important document in understanding the national security interests of the United States and security cooperation between the two countries. It is the keystone document that outlines the framework of US foreign policy. The *NSS* defines: "To achieve the world we [US] seek, the United States must apply our strategic approach in pursuit of four enduring national interests:"² These interests are:

Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.

Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.

Values: Respect for universal values at home and the world around.

International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.³

The *NSS* emphasizes that each of these interests is linked to the others; no single interest can be pursued in isolation, all must be pursued simultaneously—positive action in one area will help advance all four. The central theme of the *NSS* is expanding US engagement with other key centers of influence to include China, India, and Russia. The *NSS* treatment of China and India is markedly different. Although it welcomes a rising China, "that takes on responsible leadership in working with the US and the international community,"⁴ it makes it clear that the US "will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that US interests and allies regionally and globally are not affected." On the other hand, the *NSS* highlights India-US relations by recognizing, "The US and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned

by our shared interests and our shared values as the world's two largest democracies and close connections among our people.” It also underlines that, “India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations.”⁵

Unlike the United States, India has not yet developed a formal National Security Strategy. However, its national interests and core national values guide the foreign policy of India. The principles of India’s foreign policy are, first, a belief in friendly relations with all the countries of the world; second, the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means; third, the sovereign equality of all states; fourth, independence of thought and action as manifested in the principles of Non Alignment, and finally, equity in the conduct of international relations.⁶ Equally important, the strength of a foreign policy lies in its adaptability to change in a dynamic world order. On that count, Indian foreign policy has shown political acumen and agility by making appropriate changes to remain relevant in current strategic environments.

Recent strides in the relationship, including forward movement in strategic partnerships, have offered opportunities for cooperation in untapped areas such as defense cooperation, counterterrorism, and maritime security. Yet for all the promise of a budding relationship there remains a significant need for both countries to better understand each other’s strategic environment, defense assumptions, operational process, prospects for bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation. The path to a real defense partnership between India and the United States, while already underway, is one with substantial challenges. Whereas there appears to be a growing convergence of views at the strategic level, structural obstacles to defense and counterterrorism cooperation remain.

Analyzing Indo-US Defense Cooperation, General (Retired) V P Malik, former Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army argues, “Keeping in mind the differences in national and strategic interests for the foreseeable future, Indo-US Defense and Military relations will at best remain a strategic partnership—not an alliance—whenever there is a convergence of views and substantial domestic consensus in both countries.”⁷ Ashley Tellis, who is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues claims:

Given its size, history, and ambitions, India will always march to the beat of its own drummer . . . a strong and independent India represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a partner and not a formal ally. . . . Consequently, transformed ties that enhance the prospect for consistent “strategic coordination” between Washington and New Delhi serve U.S interests just as well as any recognized alliance.⁸

Notwithstanding growing bilateral cooperation based on mutual interests, suspicion and skepticism persists in both countries that can negatively affect security cooperation. One of the major factors underlying suspicions remains the United States’ relationship with Pakistan. Many analysts in both India and the United States view Washington’s tolerance of Pakistan as blatantly hypocritical. Pakistan’s role in sponsoring cross-border terrorism into India is well documented with solid evidence. Arthur Rubinoff, a Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies at the University of Toronto traces the US role in South Asia since the Second World War and reasons, “US Policy has persistently misunderstood Indian domestic constraints as well as New Delhi’s legitimate security concerns, particularly as they pertain to Pakistan.” He further explains, “Far from being signs of a healthy partnership, current trends are more reflective of a misguided attempt on the part of US policy makers to have it both ways by maintaining links with both India and Pakistan despite the mutually exclusive character

of these states' political objectives." Finally, he concludes, "Given this reality, Indo-US cooperation faces a formidable challenge."⁹ Nevertheless, India currently understands the United States constraints and perceived need to maintain links with Pakistan, particularly in light of broader US objectives in Afghanistan. However, Mr. Robert D. Blackwill, a senior Fellow at RAND Corporation and former US Ambassador to India, is surprised at the inability of the United States to understand the key role India can play in Afghanistan. Blackwill notes with concern:

It appears to me that India does not figure in an important way in US calculations regarding Afghanistan. Washington does not object to India's economic development activities in Afghanistan but is apparently sensitive to Islamabad's concerns. This is especially odd given that according to polls, 74 percent of Afghan's see India favorably while 91 percent of Afghans believe that Pakistan is playing a negative role in their country. For Washington to believe that India will not be a major player in the long term future of Afghanistan is to ignore centuries of history, culture, and mutual interaction between the two."¹⁰

India is one of Kabul's leading partners in capacity building and is heavily committed in the areas of health, power, and telecommunications.

Talking about counterterrorism cooperation, Polly Nayak, a former expert of the US intelligence community and expert on South Asia believes that both the countries share an emphasis on terrorism but hold conflicting threat perceptions. She adds, "While terrorism was and is important to both the United States and India, their divergent preoccupation and threat perceptions have put them at odds repeatedly; the relationship has been burdened by parochial expectations on both sides. India has been disappointed with the US approach to Pakistan, while Washington has been unhappy with India's attitude towards "rogue states" such as Iran and Iraq. Each side has suspected bias in information received from the other regarding its terrorism nemesis."¹¹

Primary Question

Does the current level of security cooperation between India and the United States satisfy each nation's national interests in the foreseeable future?

Secondary Questions

1. What is the current security cooperation scheme?
2. What national interests are protected with the current security scheme?
3. What interests could be served with additional security cooperation?
4. What are the impediments in India- United States security cooperation?

Assumptions

This thesis examines security cooperation between India and the United States based on four assumptions. First, security cooperation will be steered by the national interests of each country. Second, the foreign policies of both countries will not undergo major changes despite change in their governments or leadership. Third, an unfortunate assumption that both India and the United States will continue to remain targets of extremist violence primarily from radical Jihadi ideology in the near future. Fourth, the military and economic growth of India will not challenge the United States and vice versa.

Limitations

The foremost limitation of this study is the fact that unlike the US, India does not have a formal National Security Strategy. However, India's national interests and security objectives are covered in the reports of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and India's security behavior since independence has left a definite trail to understand India's

security objectives. Therefore, the author has relied on the speeches, statements of various bilateral agreements, commentaries by various analysts, and assessments of think tanks in both India and the US to analyze India's security strategy. However, bilateral security cooperation, especially in the field of counterterrorism, at times is conducted with secrecy and discretion. Therefore, open source research in counterterrorism suffers from this inherent handicap and poses a challenge to objective analysis. In addition, security cooperation has a vast scope, is dynamic in nature, and is affected by day-to-day events. Certain aspects of security cooperation like cyber security and maritime security are relatively new and therefore, provide insufficient public record to conduct meaningful analysis.

Delimitation

The security cooperation between two nations cannot be separated from overall bilateral relations. However, this thesis will only analyze security matters between the two countries with a major focus on defense and counterterrorism cooperation. The global security environment also affects security relations between India and the United States. However, this thesis will restrict itself to the immediate and most significant aspects of strategic environment that directly affect the India-United States security partnership.

¹Embassy of India, "General Overview of India-U.S. Relations," <http://www.indianembassy.org/general-overview-of-india-us-relations.php> (accessed 18 March 2011).

²White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 10 August 2011).

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Harsh Pant, "US-India Strategic Dialogue: Move beyond Symbolism," <http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/08/us-india-strategic-dialogue-move-beyond-symbolism.htm> (accessed 18 March 2011).

⁶Embassy of India, "India's Foreign Policy-50 Years of Achievement," http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/fp%28intro%29.htm (accessed 15 June 2011).

⁷V. P. Malik, "Indo-US Defense and Military Relations," in *"US-Indian Strategic Cooperation: Into the 21st Century,"* ed. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (New York: Routledge, 2006), 8.

⁸Ibid., 99.

⁹Ibid., 8.

¹⁰Ambassador Robert Blackwill, "The Future of US-India Relations," (Speech, New Delhi, 5 May 2009), <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/05/06/FT.html> (accessed 15 April 2011).

¹¹Polly Naik, "Prospects for US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation," in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell, *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation: Into the 21st Century* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 134.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of references used to analyze the security cooperation between India and the United States. Strategic analysts and think tanks in both nations have closely examined the relationship. Hence, abundant literature is available on the subject in the form of government documents, press releases, books, and articles in newspapers and journals. While books on the subject provide an historical perspective, recent articles bring a contemporary flavor to the theme in a dynamic global security environment. Therefore, a heavy reliance on the Internet and electronic media is desirable for the most recent information.

This chapter has four key sections. First, it examines the stated government policies and documents to understand the security interests and objectives of both countries. Second, it scans the literature for an historical perspective of the relationship. Third, it specifically looks at defense and counterterrorism cooperation, the key tenets of security cooperation in the current geopolitical environment and studies the current security agreements between the two countries. Fourth, it examines books on the subject, and reports and commentaries by eminent thinkers and think tanks. Finally, it analyzes current events to gauge the effects of security cooperation between the two nations.

Government Policies, Bilateral Documents, Speeches, and Press Releases

The *NSS* is the keystone document that lays out a strategic approach for advancing American interests. The new *NSS* released in 2010 stresses the increasing multipolarity of global power and the need for the United States to look beyond Iraq and

Afghanistan. The NSS states that the US is “working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India and Russia”¹The NSS identifies a strong convergence of complementary interests between India and the United States and notes:

The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world’s two largest democracies, and close connections among our people. India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations, and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific, environmental and security partnership. Working together through our strategic dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counter-terrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world”²

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress on “India-United States Relations” promotes a strong security relationship with India as increasingly vital to U.S. foreign policy interests. The report characterizes India as a nascent great power and “indispensable partner” of the U.S. The report highlights that the United States views defense cooperation with India in the context of “common principles and shared national interests” such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapon proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. This report also mentions the divergent perceptions and expectations of Indian and US strategic policy makers on several key issues especially the role of Pakistan, India’s relations with Iran, and repressive governments in places like Burma/Myanmar and Sudan. In the fields of intelligence and counterterrorism, the report highlights an emerging strategic partnership between the two countries.³

On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, India does not have a formalized national security strategy. However, the government vision is inspired by the security objectives

issued by the Ministry of Defense, Government of India. India's security concerns are defined by a dynamic global security environment and a perception that the South Asian region is of particular global interest. Since the country's independence in 1947, India has faced numerous security challenges and the volume of writing on security issues is enormous. Finally, there are speeches by the Indian Prime Minister and other key leaders who have spoken publically on India's security policy. Bilateral documents, press releases, and reports by strategic "think tanks" provide valuable input on India's strategic objectives and policies.

Lalit Man Singh, India's former Foreign Secretary and Indian Ambassador to the United States in his keynote address at the Army War College, Mhow (India) traces the history and current state of Indo-US security cooperation to find an answer to the key question, "Strategic Partnership: Are we there yet?" Ambassador Singh, while acknowledging the upward trajectory of India-United States relations, is of the view that, "the partnership will be effective only when it is more visible on the ground in both countries" and "there is still a wide gap between the declarations and their implementation."⁴ While highlighting the progress in the Indo-US security relationship, Ambassador Singh states that, "It would be more accurate to describe the current period of bilateral relationship as a phase towards a strategic partnership."⁵ Singh identifies three issues that remain outstanding—Pakistan, terrorism, and India's aspirations for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. To summarize, Ambassador Singh is confident that none of these problems are insurmountable and points out, "the destinies of our two nations [India and US] are interlinked and the strategic relationship between them will be one of the defining features of the 21st century."⁶

Robert D. Blackwill, former United States ambassador to India and currently a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation expresses optimism about long-term prospects for India-US relations. Blackwill brings out the context in which India-United States relations in the near term will develop. Quoting his mentor Henry Kissinger, “The world faces four major problems-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the movement of the center of gravity from the Atlantic Ocean to Asia, and the impact of the global economy on world order,” Blackwill advocates, “India and the US have compatible, indeed, overlapping vital national interests in all four areas.”⁷

Historical Background of India-United States Security Cooperation

Dennis Kux’s book *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* is a very carefully researched, balanced, and thoughtful account of India-United States relations in the past half century. There are chapters on each U.S. president’s policy towards India. In fact, “there is a particularly good account of how Nixon and Kissinger misread the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 and, with their pro-Pakistani bias, succeeded in needlessly transforming a regional dispute into one that threatened to become a great power show down. The main consequences were severe and long lasting damage to U.S. relations with India, and enhanced Soviet influence in New Delhi.”⁸ The author summarizes that the end of the Cold War should have a positive influence on India-United States relations and both countries should take advantage of this opportunity. The author suggests that one of the main obstacles is the often-negative attitude toward each other’s foreign policy and national security establishments, an assumption that is rapidly changing in contemporary times.⁹

Defense and Counterterrorism Cooperation

“Defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism” is one of the four key-shared security interests in the 2005 “New Framework for US India Defense Relationship.”¹⁰ General (Retired) V. P. Malik, the former Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army in his essay, “Indo-US Defense and Military Relations” reflects on the strengths and fragilities of Indo-US Defense and Military relations over the past half a century and future prospects for security relationships. General Malik notes, “Keeping in mind the differences in national and strategic interests for the foreseeable future, Indo-US defense and military relations will at best remain a strategic partnership- not an alliance- whenever there is a convergence of views and substantial domestic consensus in both countries.”¹¹ Echoing General Malik’s analysis, Col John H. Gill, an internationally recognized military historian and an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East-South Asia Center, highlights “the interconnections between defense ties and other aspects of bilateral relations.”¹² Gill argues, “The healthy ties cannot be separated from vibrant defense linkages,”¹³ and encourages the development of India- United States relations into broader realms. Gill also offers a vital suggestion that, “India must be aware of US domestic constraints and the perceived need to maintain its linkages with Pakistan, particularly in light of broader US objectives in Afghanistan.”¹⁴

The National Bureau of Asian Research, a nonpartisan research institute dedicated to informing and strengthening policy, in its report “The US-India Defense Relationship: An update for President Obama’s State Visit to India, November 2010” explores India’s strategic environment and defense policies to inform evolving dynamics in the US-India defense relationship. The main findings of the report are:

1. India faces a complex strategic environment of both extant and emerging challenges in the region as well as at home. Indian strategy has emphasized responding by pursuing maximum flexibility in terms of security partners but without diminishing the priority of domestic development.
2. China looms large in India's strategic thinking and defense planning. Indian concerns about the Chinese infrastructure development in Southern Tibet have led to forced development in the North Eastern provinces that increases the possibility of tension or conflict.
3. Pakistan continues to represent the greatest near-term military challenge to India, in both conventional ways and in its use of proxy insurgents. Moreover, in high-risk scenarios, Indian defense planners see potential Chinese military involvement in an Indo-Pak conflict, which would present a two front challenge for India.
4. Internal defense challenges include doctrinal issues, personnel shortfalls, and a structure that ill-serves India's peacetime and operational functioning.¹⁵

Another report by the same research institute, "The US-India Defense Relationship" explores India's strategic environment and defense policies to inform evolving dynamics in the defense relationship. The main findings and policy implications suggest a road map for strengthened cooperation. The report aims to answer two key questions: first, "Will the United States and India realize the promise of a new strategic partnership that becomes a stabilizing constant in Asia and broader international affairs?" and second, "Will trade challenges and structural barriers on both sides be resolved in ways that strengthen institutions and facilitate freer and more open commerce?"

Engaging India-US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy is a collection of essays that provides a clear picture of several crucial aspects of the relationship between India and the United States. Jyotika Saksena, an associate professor of International Relations, who has worked on projects funded by the United States Institute of Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation on issues related to South Asian security; and Suzette Grillot, Associate Director of International Programs Center, and

Associate Professor of the School of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma trace the development of Indo-US Defense Cooperation in their essay “The Emergence of Indo-US Defense Cooperation: From Specific to Diffuse Reciprocity.” The paper suggests that, “An Indo-US defense relationship was possible on the basis of specific reciprocity and through such specific exchanges the pattern of cooperation may deepen and evolve, leading to stronger relations based on trust.”¹⁶ The essay provides a brief historical overview of Indo-US defense relations, offers a theoretical framework for defense cooperation, and finally, concludes by discussing the findings of the study and their implications for the future of Indo-US defense cooperation.

Ashok Sharma, a post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, in his paper, “Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An overview of Defense and Military Cooperation,” published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, (an autonomous think tank dealing with national security) looks into Indo-US defense cooperation in the cold war era and traces the defense and military cooperation in the changed international scenario in the post-cold war period. Ashok opines that defense cooperation has now moved to the center of the relationship. However, the author argues “Indo-US defense cooperation will depend on the wider perspectives of political and economic relations between the two countries.”¹⁷

Polly Nayak, a former US Intelligence community’s senior expert who has written and consulted on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear policy, political stability, and foreign relations, with special emphasis on South Asia, expands on the American view of the Indo-US strategic relationship, with a particular focus on counter terrorism. Nayak maintains that both nations have “a shared emphasis on terrorism but conflicting threat

perceptions.” She elaborates on this contradiction by explaining, “While terrorism was and is important to both the United States and India, their divergent preoccupations and threat perceptions have put them at odds repeatedly; the relationship has been burdened by parochial expectations on both sides. India has been disappointed with the US approach to Pakistan, while Washington has been unhappy with India’s attitude towards rogue states such as Iran and Iraq.”¹⁸ Nayak further describes India’s dim view of unilateral actions in combating terror and on the use of preemptive force by the US in the war against terror as another place where the perceptions of the two nations differs. B Raman, an expert on security matters, Honorary Editorial Consultant to the *Indian Defense Review*, and a former member of the Working Group on Terrorism and Trans-National Crime of the Committee on Security Co-operation Asia Pacific (CSCAP) also critiques the US’s unilateral approach, and “the attendant policy contradictions it breeds.” Raman notes that, “US policies toward Pakistan continue to bedevil bilateral cooperation in counter-terror operations. Washington’s willingness to acknowledge Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism only when it serves its national interests will continue to be thorn in the side of bilateral relations.”¹⁹

Commentaries by Eminent Strategists and “Think Tanks”

Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) an Indian think tank, in its report “India-United States 2020” summarizes a study on the future of Indo-US relations in the coming decade. They report that defense cooperation between the two countries has progressed substantially in recent years, but has not reached its full potential. The report identifies certain roadblocks in the relationship and offers suggestions to improve

the relationship to its optimal potential. The report also recognizes potential areas for counter terrorism cooperation, cyber security, and intelligence sharing.

Raja Mohan in his paper, “India’s New Foreign Policy” examines the origins, dynamics, and implications of India’s new foreign policy. Raja argues that a broad national consensus has emerged on foreign policy based on core ideas like an independent foreign policy, non-alignment, and third world solidarity as advocated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. While he maintains that India has made some structural changes in foreign policy, the tension and challenge between the imperative of the new and the resistance of old ideas is persistent in the conduct of foreign policy.²⁰ He identifies five major transitions in Indian foreign policy: first, a national consensus from building a “socialistic society” to building a “modern capitalist” one; second, stress on addressing economics in the foreign policy; third, shifting from being a leader of the “Third World” to recognition of the potential that India could emerge as a great power in its own right; fourth, rejecting an “anti-Western” mode of thinking; and, finally, transition from idealism to realism. Raja concludes that “the innovations in India’s foreign policy strategy since the early 1990s has resulted in the happy situation of simultaneous expansion of relations with all the major powers, growing weight in Asia and the Indian Ocean regions, and the prospects of improved relations with important neighbors. In conclusion, Raja highlights that India’s rise in the international system will pose a number of challenges ranging from taking positions on major international issues to the danger of great power rivalries.”²¹

Stephen J. Blank, a Research Professor of National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on Asia, and commentator on foreign affairs, in his book,

Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation highlights India's rising status and capabilities. The author also notes the major issues pertaining to India's bilateral defense agenda with United States. By revealing the dimensions of India's growing capabilities and interests, Blank provides a strategic rationale for developing the India-US partnership further. However, the author brings out challenges to Indian Security, bureaucratic hurdles to the partnership and defense cooperation, and ways to overcome these obstacles in the relationship.²²

Sumit Ganguly, a specialist on regional security issues in South Asia, and Andrew Scobell, an Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, in their book *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation-Into the 21st Century* trace the origin, evolution, and current state of Indo-US strategic cooperation. The book highlights the differences between the two countries during the Cold War and the considerable improvement in their relationship during recent times. Drawing on new information and with contributions from both academics and policy makers, this book analyzes the strategic convergence and obstacles to the relationship. Finally, the book offers suggestions for expanding the scope and dimensions of partnership.

Mr. Amit Gupta, a Visiting Professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air War College in his monograph "The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?" examines the security relationship. "Can India and the United States create a strategic partnership that will further the security and foreign policy interests of both countries?" Gupta argues that divergent worldviews preclude the development of a strong strategic relationship at present and suggests rather that the two countries have complementary interests, and the

relationship should be based on securing these matching interests. The author sums up by suggesting that it is in American interests to facilitate the development of a strong India that can play a pivotal role in ensuring strategic stability in Asia. Most significantly, Gupta offers certain concrete recommendations to strengthen India-US relations.

Vikas Slathia, a serving Colonel in the Indian Army, in his thesis “United States-India Strategic Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges in the Twenty First Century” assesses the possibility of India achieving its national objectives through a lasting relationship with US vis-à-vis other major global players. Slathia advocates that there is great potential for a security partnership but that current efforts are more rhetorical than practical. Relying on historical evidence, Slathia argues that the US is not a reliable security partner and will not be able to support India in the event of war with either Pakistan or China. The author summarizes his work by recommending that India should continue to pursue multilateralism adopting a combination of realist and liberal policy which is likely to safeguard its long term national interests.²³

Current Events

India’s rejection of the F-16IN Super Viper and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in its hotly contested medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition has disappointed many in the United States. Many American observers concluded, “The country has settled for an airplane, not a relationship.”²⁴ Decoding India’s MMRCA decision, Ashley Tellis describes “how India’s decision was made entirely on technical grounds and precluded political, strategic, or financial considerations.”²⁵ Tellis dispels speculation on the decision and argues, “Though this process might not serve India’s larger national security interests in an age of limited resources and numerous threats,

India's decision does not represent a strategic setback for India- United States defense cooperation over the long term.”²⁶

Recently, India and the US have agreed to enhance their maritime security cooperation, asserting that the safety of sea-lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean is crucial for the economic growth of the entire area. According to Indian Ambassador to the US, Nirupama Rao, “One fifth of the world's energy supplies now travel across the Indian Ocean. The safety of sea lanes of communications which criss-cross the Indian Ocean is crucial for the economic growth not just for India and the US but for the entire region.”²⁷ Rao further added, “Maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean are vital for international commerce and global energy security and we have a shared interest in our maritime security cooperation. For instance, we [India] are working together with the US and the international community to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Indian and US navies are enhancing their collaboration to deal with natural disasters building on the experience gained so far from coordinated action.”²⁸

¹The White House, *The National Security Strategy*, 2010.

²Ibid.

³The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century. CRS is well known for analysis that is authoritative, confidential, objective and nonpartisan. Its highest priority is to ensure that Congress has 24/7 access to the nation's best thinking; Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, US-India Relations, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> (accessed 16 September 2011); Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> (accessed 7 November 2011).

⁴Lalit Man Singh, India's former Foreign Secretary and Indian Ambassador to US, "India-US relations- Are We There Yet,?" (Speech, Army War College, Mhow India, 25 September 2006), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/439796419IB39-LalitMansingh-IndoUSStrategicPartnership.pdf (accessed 25 June 2011).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Blackwill.

⁸Dennis Kux, *India and United States: Estranged Democracies* (Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, DC The National Defense University Press, 1992); Reviewed by Donald Zagoria; <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49856/donald-zagoria/india-and-the-united-states-estranged-democracies> (accessed 18 June 2011).

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰"New Framework for The U.S.-India Defense Relationship" was signed on 28 June 2005, in Washington DC by Minister of Defense of India, Pranab Mukherjee, and Secretary of Defense of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld. This path breaking agreement set the tone for improved security cooperation and continues to be the base document for the present security cooperation scheme.

¹¹Malik, 99.

¹²Ibid., 8.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵National Bureau of Asian Research, "The US-India Defense Relationship: An update for President Obama's State Visit to India, November 2010," <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=107> (accessed 16 August 2011).

¹⁶Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 145.

¹⁷Ashok Sharma, "Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An overview of Defense and Military Cooperation," www.claws.in/download.php?action...2,%202008.pdf (accessed 15 July 2011).

¹⁸Nayak, 131-153.

¹⁹Bahukutumbi Raman, “Indo-US Counterterrorism Cooperation: Past, present, and future,” in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation: Into the 21st Century*, eds. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell, (New York: Routledge, 2006).

²⁰C. Raja Mohan is a renowned Indian academic, journalist and foreign policy analyst. He is currently Strategic Affairs Editor of the Indian Express, New Delhi. He is also Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He was the Henry Alfred Kissinger Scholar in the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. during 2009-10 He has worked as Diplomatic Editor and Washington Correspondent of *The Hindu*. Mohan was a member of India's National Security Advisory Board during 1998-2000 and 2004-06. His recent books include *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave, 2004) and *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006). The complete text of the draft paper titled “India’s New Foreign Policy Strategy” is available from <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2011).

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Stephan J. Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005).

²³Vikas Slathia, “United States-India Strategic Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges in the Twenty-First Century,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA460767> (accessed 15 March 2011).

²⁴Ashley Tellis, “Decoding India’s MMCA Decision,” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=44332> (accessed 3 October 2010).

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷MaritimeSecurity.Asia, “India, U.S Agree to Enhance Maritime Security Cooperation,” <http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-asia/india-u-s-agree-to-enhance-maritime-security-cooperation-nirupama/> (accessed 24 October 2011).

²⁸*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will outline the research methodology used to collect information and to analyze the available information and data to understand the current level of security cooperation between the two countries to conclude whether or not it meets the national interests of each nation. It is pertinent to understand that the research questions are not quantifiable. Furthermore, the scope of this thesis is limited to security- related national interests of India and the US and therefore the analysis will focus on the ability of current defense and counterterrorism cooperation scheme and security partnership agreements between India and the US to support the national interests of both countries in the foreseeable future. This thesis uses a combination of critical analysis and comparative evaluation of the stated problem and questions.

The basic criteria for finding the answer to the research question is to evaluate the potential of current security cooperation scheme (defense and counterterrorism cooperation) and partnership agreements between India and the US to help both countries in meeting the national security objectives set by their respective governments. The research will also trace the development of India's foreign policy to evaluate whether it is suitable to achieve the national security objectives as established by India. The research will be carried out in the following phases.

Phase 1: Historical Perspective. The relationship between India and the US has never been consistent. Both nations respect democracy, human values, and freedom, yet their approach to international relations is different.¹ This divergent approach to common goals manifests itself in several issues, such as the UN reforms, WTO, and terrorism.² An

analysis of the past relationship will help to determine the course of the future partnership. This phase will trace obstacles to the relationship in the past and understand whether those issues had been resolved or continue to mire the relationship. Therefore, this phase will answer one of the secondary questions, “what are the impediments to the relationship?”

Phase 2: India and United States’ Strategic Interests. Understanding the national interests of India and the United States is vital to comprehend security relations because national interests essentially drive foreign policy and in turn shape the security cooperation scheme between nations. Comparative analysis of the national interests and national security objectives will provide an understanding of converging and diverging national interests. India’s national interests and national security objectives will be identified through government documents, speeches made by national leaders, official declarations, and commentaries by analysts in both India and the United States. An analysis of the *NSS* would also be necessary to determine US national interests to evaluate convergence and divergence of the interests of the two nations. The analysis will also discuss India’s foreign policy and the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) of the United States with particular reference to the effects of following such policies on India-United States security cooperation. This step will answer two secondary questions: First, “What national interests are protected with the current security cooperation arrangement? Second, what are the impediments to the relationship?”

Phase 3: Evaluate the Defense and Counterterrorism Cooperation Scheme. The convergence of interests of the two nations has manifested in various security partnership agreements between the US and India establishing the framework of the current security

scheme. The analysis would only focus on defense and counterterrorism cooperation, two of the most important segments of security cooperation between India and the US. This phase will evaluate defense and counterterrorism cooperation to date and the ability of the current security scheme and security agreements to accomplish stated national interests of both countries. This step will partly answer three of the secondary questions: first, “what is the current security cooperation scheme?” Second, what national interests are protected with the current security scheme? Third, what are the impediments to the relationship?

Phase 4: Analysis, Recommendations, and Conclusions. This phase will analyze the strategic convergence on security issues, explore areas of further cooperation in the larger security relationship, and understand why important differences do remain. This part will also offer suggestions for expanding the scope and dimensions of future collaboration. Lastly, the thesis will make recommendations based on the above evaluation and analysis to overcome the identified obstacles in order to deepen security cooperation. The recommendations would focus on the framework and process the Indian and US governments must follow while conducting their foreign policies to achieve their national security objectives. Hence, this step will answer two secondary questions; first, what interests are protected by the current security scheme? Second, what additional national interests can be protected with enhanced security cooperation?

¹Vikas Slathia, “United States-India Strategic Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges in the Twenty-First Century,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA460767> (accessed 15 March 2011).

²Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The first section of this chapter will trace the genesis of India-US security relations and historical perspective to shed light on the issues that have caused estrangement. The second section will cover the shift from “estrangement to engagement” while explaining the factors behind this shift. The third section will examine the national interest of both nations to bring out the converging and diverging interests. The fourth section will trace the development of India’s foreign policy to evaluate whether it is suitable to achieve the national security objectives as established by India. The last two sections of the chapter will gauge defense and counterterrorism cooperation to assess the ability of the current security scheme and security agreements to accomplish stated national interests of both countries.

Historical Perspectives: India-United States Security Cooperation

In the past, India-United States relations have been marked by divergent worldviews that led both countries not to develop the type of relations that the United States has with other major democracies, despite several instances of overlapping national interests.¹

India gained independence on 15 August 1947. At that time, the United States was shaping the concept of containment of communism that became the driving force behind US national security policy for the next five decades.² The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The act created many of the institutions that

Presidents found useful when formulating and implementing foreign policy, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Air Force, and what is now known as the Department of Defense and National Security Council (NSC).³ “This legislation and those instruments of national power were designed at the dawn of a new era in international relations for the United States – an era dominated by the Cold War.”⁴ On the other hand, India maintained its independence in foreign policy. India’s founder, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru favored a policy of ‘non alignment’⁵—not joining either of the two major blocs.⁶ In his interaction with the first US Ambassador to India, Dr. Henry Gardy, Nehru articulated his thoughts on India’s foreign policy: first, India desired to avoid power involvement with either of the power blocs, but at the same time, wanted a warm relationship with the United States. Second, the Soviet Union held an attraction for India as an example of rapid development in a formerly backward country. Politically, however, India disliked the undemocratic and totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime.⁷

By standing apart, Nehru believed India would preserve its freedom of action, increase its international stature, and reduce the possibility that foreign affairs would emerge as a divisive domestic issue.⁸ Moreover, India saw itself as the strongest power in South Asia that did not need external support to bolster its foreign policy position.⁹

The first major difference between India and the United States emerged over the Kashmir issue. Ironically, the United States, due to its over-commitment globally and the fear of providing the Soviets with an excuse to enter the affairs of South Asia, was reluctant to get involved in the Kashmir issue.¹⁰ However, the United States cooperated with Great Britain when the issue came before the Security Council. The Indian government was dejected that the UN failed to condemn Pakistan as an aggressor. It also

believed that the US perception of the issue was biased towards Pakistan. Nehru saw the US stance on Kashmir as influenced less by the merits of the dispute than by US global interests in light of tensions with the Soviets. Nehru also called the American and British attitude on Kashmir, “completely wrong,” warning that their stance would have far reaching results in our relations.”¹¹ Nehru believed that “the motives of the United States were to get military and economic concessions in Pakistan.”¹²

Besides Kashmir, India and the United States also differed on many other issues, such as international control of atomic energy, policy towards Palestine, creation of Israel, policy toward Indonesia, and Indo-China disputes. However, the Korean Crisis brought warmth to India-United States relations. To the surprise of the United States, India voted for the Security Council’s condemnation of the invasion. However, India strenuously disapproved linking the Korean conflict with the problems of Formosa and Indo China.

The Korean War triggered American interests in containing the Soviet threat through a chain of security alliances. Whereas India was advocating an independent foreign policy, Pakistan was voicing support for US foreign policy and urged the United States to provide military assistance to them. In 1952, India sought to buy a substantial number of tanks and aircraft to modernize its defense forces. Although this request received immediate approval from the US, strong opposition from Pakistan and fears that this deal would provide the communists a propaganda weapon stalled the deal.

The Korean War transformed the Cold War into a global struggle where subsequently Indian and the United States’ worldviews clashed sharply on a number of fundamental security issues. The United States saw a worldwide threat from communism

and advocated a strong military posture and security alliances to secure peace. India, in contrast, argued that the communist threat was overstated. Nehru's concern was that this security psychosis would end not in preserving the peace, but in provoking the war. India saw peace best preserved through dialogue not force, and pursued this method as actively as the United States pursued a stronger security posture. Added to this was the issue of Kashmir, an issue of far greater importance to India than to the United States. Therefore, a sense of mutual disappointment affected the relationship from the very beginning. Whereas democratic and secular India expected the United States' support on Kashmir, the United States expected the support of democratic India to contain communism. The United States did not appreciate India's effort to follow a path between the Western democratic and Communist camps. Hence, India- United States relations had a shaky start in the early years of Indian independence.

In October 1964, China exploded a nuclear weapon and the United States became concerned that India might follow China to become the world's sixth nuclear power. Ever since its independence in 1947, India had been pursuing the development of a civil nuclear energy program. India also opposed American efforts "to impose international controls as an infringement on sovereignty as far back as the 1947 UN discussions regarding the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy."¹³ Prominent US scientist Dr. Jerome Weiser of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who visited India in early 1965, believed that "Indians could produce a weapon in two to three years."¹⁴ During this time, India was trying to get a UN sponsored guarantee for the defense of India against the Chinese threat. However, neither the United States nor the Soviets were forthcoming to secure that guarantee. The Indian Ambassador to the US, B

K Nehru commented, “It is all very well to ask a person not to defend himself, but then somebody else has got to take on that defense.”¹⁵ As an aftermath of the Chinese nuclear explosion and the fear that India might follow suit, both the United States and the Soviets were heavily engaged in shaping a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to check further proliferation. In spite of heavy pressure from both these countries, India refused to sign the treaty for two primary reasons. First “was India’s contention that the NPT was an unequal arrangement between nuclear haves and have-nots.” Second, India was concerned about the very real threat from China especially after the 1962 Border War with China. India was also worried since it “found the NPT silent on the question of any security guarantee for the non-nuclear powers against the threat of nuclear attack.”¹⁶ India’s refusal to sign NPT further soured its relations with the United States.

In spite of vehement opposition from Ambassador Bowles, the United States announced a new arms agreement with Pakistan in 1967. The new arms agreement offered a limited supply of military hardware on a case-to-case basis. Meanwhile, in 1968, the Soviets crushed the liberal communist government in Czechoslovakia. Despite the fact that India strongly condemned the Soviet action, it “refused to join in the vote to condemn Moscow in the United Nations by abstaining in the Security Council.”¹⁷

In the late 1960s, when Richard Nixon assumed the presidency, American foreign policy concern was focused on the war in Vietnam. Moreover, President Nixon disliked India and its policy of non-alignment. In the words of Kissinger, “Nixon, to put it mildly, was less susceptible to Indian claims of moral leadership than some of his predecessors; indeed he viewed what he considered alleged obsequiousness toward India as a prime example of liberal soft-headedness.”¹⁸ To make matters worse, the Indian Prime Minister

reciprocated in a similar vein by saying, “I think I had excellent relations with everybody [American Presidents] except Mr. Nixon. And he had made up his mind beforehand.”¹⁹

In 1970, the Nixon government approved a defense deal with Pakistan comprising 300 armored personnel carriers and the same number of aircraft in contradiction to its 1967 policy of not exporting lethal weapons to India and Pakistan.²⁰ India obviously opposed this deal. Meanwhile, “the Soviets in late 1969 decided to abandon their efforts to pursue balanced relations with both India and Pakistan, reverting to the previous policy of closer links with India.”²¹ The change in Soviet foreign policy and the leftward turn in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s domestic policy strengthened India-Soviet relations and formed the basis for the Indo-Soviet Treaty. In addition, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) membership swelled to over a hundred countries providing credible significance to the NAM. At the same time, the United States was also reshaping its foreign policy to bring “Communist China into the family of nations—reversing two decades of US policy to isolate Beijing.”²² United States’ foreign policy in South Asia in 1970 can be summed up in the National Security Study Memoranda (1970) (NSSM) which made three important points:

US strategic concerns in South Asia were limited to seeing that neither China nor the Soviet Union gained a dominant position in the subcontinent;

The United States accepted Pakistan altered foreign policy and India’s non-alignment. “We have no desire to press on them a closer relationship than their own interests leads them to desire.” Nixon declared; and,

The main US interests in the subcontinent were to promote economic development, to respond to humanitarian concerns and to encourage India and Pakistan to put aside their differences.²³

The report clearly indicates that the United States assigned lower priority to its foreign policy in South Asia. However, the subcontinent once again reached the center of

US foreign policy with the emerging crisis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970. East Pakistan's demand for autonomy was met by a military crackdown. The brutal repression by the Pakistan Army triggered a mass exodus of refugees to India. The flood of refugees, "India claims, transferred an internal Pakistani problem to one between India and Pakistan."²⁴ To India's concern, the United States remained uncommitted on the refugee issue and mass atrocities committed by the Pakistani security forces in East Pakistan. On the contrary, the United States was shipping arms worth \$50 million to Pakistan. The matter became worse when Kissinger made a secret visit to China. Until then, India was hopeful of support from either the Soviets or the United States against China. However, this hope was shattered when Kissinger called Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha to inform him, "We [United States] would be unable to help you against China" if there were a Chinese military response to a war between India and Pakistan."²⁵ India presented her own surprise a few weeks later when New Delhi and Moscow signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.²⁶ With millions of refugees in India and the worsening situation in East Pakistan, war between India and Pakistan became imminent. On the night of 3 December 1971, "Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields in the western part of the country, and the next day declared war on India."²⁷ India counterattacked and completely routed Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. The United States criticized India as responsible for the war and urged support for an immediate ceasefire. The matter shifted to the UN Security Council where China joined the United States. However, the Soviets vetoed the resolution and "both Britain and France abstained in the Security Council vote."²⁸ The war ended on 16 December 1971 when 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered unconditionally. The United States worried that India might pursue an attack on West

Pakistan directed the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* with its supporting vessels to proceed to the Bay of Bengal. The unstated mission of the *Enterprise*, “was to send a signal to the Indians and the Soviets—as Kissinger put it, “To give emphasis to our warnings about West Pakistan.”²⁹ Although, the *Enterprise* did not play any role in resolving the issue, it deeply angered the Indians. Indira Gandhi wrote a scorching letter to Nixon in which she asserted:

United States paid lip service to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about. . . . We are deeply hurt by the innuendoes and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis. . . . We have not received, even to this day, the barest framework of the settlement, which takes into account the facts as they are.³⁰

The 1971 crisis clearly indicated that the United States was favorably inclined towards Pakistan. The minutes of secret White House meetings dealing with the Bangladesh crisis published by journalist Jack Anderson confirms that favoritism. The documents revealed, “that contrary to what the administration was publically saying about an even handed approach, Nixon was demanding “the tilt” toward Pakistan and giving Kissinger “hell every hour” for not doing enough against India.”³¹ Some observers argue that the United States tilt towards Pakistan was a reward for Pakistan for the role it played in opening US relations with China. NSC South Asia staffer Harold Saunders recalled Kissinger saying on several occasions:

We are opening a relationship with China based on the proposition that we are both concerned about Soviet intentions. . . . While we are in the process of opening up our dialogue with China, we face a crisis in South Asia in Pakistan, our traditional ally. China will be looking at how we treat that ally. . . . If the United States stands by and sees an ally dismembered what will the Chinese think about our reliability.³²

The 1971 crisis did considerable damage to India-United States security relations. The Indian Prime Minister lambasted the United States in an October 1972 article in

Foreign Affairs, “the dispatch of the warship Enterprise to support a ruthless military dictator and to intimidate a democracy.”³³ She further went on to show her disdain by saying, “The United States has yet to resolve the inner contradiction between the tradition of the founding fathers and of Lincoln, and the external image it gives of a super power pursuing the cold logic of power politics.”³⁴

As the broken relationship between the two countries was recovering from the 1971 crisis, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission exploded an underground nuclear device on 18 May 1974. The test invited a strong response from the United States. The United States feared that it would only be a matter of time before others followed suit. Although India insisted that the explosion was in pursuit of a peaceful users program and did not represent a shift to nuclear weapons, it badly damaged its standing in the United States. The 1971 crisis and India’s nuclear explosion negatively affected security cooperation and required some robust diplomacy to repair the damage. In October 1974, Kissinger, “took a personal step to repair the damage with India, spending three days in India.”³⁵ He spoke of “past misunderstandings as removed and a better, more realistic relationship between the two countries in the future.”³⁶ He also stressed, “The US acceptance of India as a preeminent power in the region, and indicated Washington had no quarrel with India’s non alignment.”³⁷ “The United States recognizes India as one of the major powers of the world and conducts its policy accordingly.”³⁸ During this visit, the two countries also signed an agreement to establish an Indo-US Joint Commission. However, this upswing in the relationship did not last long because, once again, the US-Pakistan arms relationship caused problems. The State Department lifted its arms embargo with Pakistan—in effect since 1965. The Indian Prime Minister asserted, “The

US decision amounted to the reopening of old wounds.”³⁹ However, the United States was of the view that following India’s crushing victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war and the inflow of Soviet arms to India they had little basis for opposing arms supply to Pakistan.

In order to give a push to Indo-US security relations, President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Morarji Desai issued a “Delhi Declaration” during the former’s visit to India in 1978.⁴⁰ However, the differences between the two countries came up again in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act (NNPA). The NNPA legislated that “the United States could henceforth export sensitive nuclear materials, such as enriched uranium fuel, only to countries that placed all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.”⁴¹ This means, “unless the Indians accepted IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities, not just Tarapur,⁴² the United States would have to stop supplying enriched uranium fuel.”⁴³ Although India agreed to safeguards on those nuclear facilities established with the help of foreign countries, such as Tarapur; it refused to accept similar safeguards on “nuclear facilities which the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) built without outside help.” India argued that, “full scope safeguards would be an unjust infringement on their sovereignty.”⁴⁴ India was also worried about Pakistan’s covert effort to develop nuclear weapons.

The demons of the Cold War once again came to haunt India-United States Security Relations when on 27 December 1979; the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state for the US against the threat of Soviet expansionism. NATO members, most of Latin America and Africa joined in censoring Soviet intervention. However, the statement by Indian UN Representative irked the

United States who felt that India had shown a soft response to the Soviet intervention. The Indians responded, “That the Soviets intervened only after Pakistan started arming Afghan rebels against the Kabul government.”⁴⁵ India also felt that US military aid to Pakistan was a bigger threat to India than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. However, as a response, the United States made some significant policy changes in its relations with India primarily for two reasons. First, it was hopeful that it might be able to use India’s influence with the Soviets. Second and more importantly, out of fear that the events might push New Delhi even closer to Moscow. Therefore, “In a major departure, an Indian military procurement team visited the United States in 1980 to explore procurement of large numbers of TOW anti-tank missiles and long-range howitzers.”⁴⁶ The US administration similarly “reversed its earlier action to disapprove of the use of an advanced US electronic guidance system in the Jaguar aircraft India was buying from Great Britain.”⁴⁷

The US foreign policy underwent other significant changes due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: “Rebuilding US military power so that the United States could counter the spread of Soviet influence in various parts of the world.”⁴⁸ The United States saw “covert military assistance to the Afghan guerrillas, humanitarian assistance to the refugees, and renewed military and economic assistance to Pakistan as prime measures.”⁴⁹ Thus, geopolitics again affected the India-United States relationship. However, India did not want to lose its freedom of maneuvering and wanted to bring greater balance into India’s non-alignment between the two superpowers. In order to achieve this, India moved to reduce its dependence on Soviet weaponry by diversifying military equipment procurement. New Delhi acquired “Jaguar bombers from Great

Britain, submarines from West Germany, and the Mirage aircraft and other equipment from France.”⁵⁰

As a reward for Pakistan’s willingness to support US covert assistance to the Afghan cause, Pakistan received a whopping 2.5 billion aid program, “that envisaged a multiyear commitment, including F-16 fighters, the most advanced US aircraft, previously supplied only to NATO allies.”⁵¹ In addition, the US avoided seeking assurance that the arms would not be used against India. India strongly opposed the US arms supply to Pakistan but the United States denied that Pakistan arms aid posed a problem for India. Moreover, the arms talks with the United States for the procurement of 155 mm howitzers and TOW anti-tank missiles still had not resulted in sales. While the Indian Army wanted to procure these weapons system, the Ministry of Defense was not sure of the US as a reliable arms supplier. The unilateral cutoff of arms during the 1965 war and US reluctance to provide fuel for the Tarapur Nuclear Plant made Indians skeptical towards the US as an arms supplier. Furthermore, “many officials, especially in the US Defense Department where anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani sentiments persisted, did not like the idea of selling weapons to India.”⁵² In the end, in the face of so many uncertainties, India decided not to proceed with the arms deal.⁵³

The departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1988 marked another change in United States policy in South Asia. With the Soviets gone, “the United States continued to funnel arms aid to the Mujahedeen to parallel continuing Soviet aid to Afghan government forces, but Pakistan ceased to be a “frontline” state.”⁵⁴ In fact, the United States in keeping with the Pressler⁵⁵ amendments stopped US military assistance to

Pakistan when “Pakistan refused to roll back its uranium enrichment program—a key element in its covert effort to develop nuclear weapons capability.”⁵⁶

The end of the Cold War promised a surge in the Indo-US relations, however, the outcome was less than expected. With the end of the Cold War, “the goal of trying to wean India away from the Soviet Union thus had much reduced strategic relevance in Washington.”⁵⁷ The most important aspect of defense cooperation between the two countries remained US collaboration on the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). Other than the slow progress on the LCA project “no new projects came to fruition, nor did there appear to be any serious considerations about other major military procurement initiatives.”⁵⁸ The Pentagon’s traditional reluctance to expand security relations with India did not change. The United States Defense Planning Guide for the post-cold war era in their threat analysis stated, “There was an American interest in suppressing Indian aspirations in South Asia, and once again arming its worst enemy and neighbor Pakistan.”⁵⁹ The document declared:

We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race in the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive US Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South West Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution to our nuclear concerns.⁶⁰

In summary, the history of India-US security cooperation demonstrates a half century of relations that have been uneven. The root cause of the differences was the clash over national security issues and divergent worldviews. Whereas for India, US relations with Pakistan had been the main obstacle, India’s attitude towards Soviet Union

remained a concern for the US. Moreover, India's nonaligned stance did not sit well with the US, whose foreign policy was driven by the need to contain the Soviet Union through security alliances. The end of the Cold War, which had shaped foreign policies of both nations for almost half a century, brought promise to India-US security cooperation. The new international system that emerged after the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to take the relationship forward and the relations between the two countries were no longer hostage to US-Pakistan and Indo-Soviet relations. The new international environment also brought a convergence of interests in the stability of IOR and global balance of power. The relations seemed to be repairing but the scars of the past remained. In order to reach the full potential of cooperation, it was imperative that both nations learn from the mistakes of the past and absorb the lessons of five decades to forge a constructive security relationship. The next section of this chapter will examine how both nations made constructive efforts in a new international order to take the security relations forward—from “divergence to convergence.”

Strategic Shift: From Divergence to Convergence

On 11 May 1998, India exploded three nuclear devices that shocked the United States and the world. The immediate fallout was to plunge India-United States relations (already vexed by decades of tension and estrangement) into a new and vigorous standoff. Whereas “India's decision to conduct nuclear tests was a manifestation of long festering differences over the rules governing international systems,”⁶¹ on the other hand, from the American perspective, “what was at stake was the stability of global nuclear order.”⁶² Moreover, Indians “saw the matter in terms of sovereignty, security, and equity; if those other five powers (United States, Britain, China, France, and Russia) had an

internationally recognized right to be nuclear armed, why did India not have the same prerogative?”⁶³ However, the reconciliation and the political maneuvers more famously called “Jaswant-Talbott Talks” marked the turning point in India-United States relations. The high-level talks led by US Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh were the most extensive engagement ever between the United States and India. They met fourteen times in seven countries on three continents and grappled with the urgent issues of arms control and nonproliferation, but also discussed their visions for India-US relationship, the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries, and the implication of Indian nationalism for the evolution of Indian society, politics, and security.⁶⁴ Several officials including former US Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, stressed the need to co-opt India and stated, “The United States must learn to live with, as well as work with, a nuclear India. Having gone nuclear, there would be no more ambiguity on India’s nuclear policy, and the related issues could be dealt with in a direct manner.”⁶⁵

Because of these talks, India and the US developed a shared perspective on issues ranging from the questions of proliferation and nuclear policy to larger issues such as the shape of the international system, terrorism, and strategic cooperation between the two countries.⁶⁶ In the meantime, the Kargil⁶⁷ crisis occurred and for the first time, from India’s perspective, the US administration viewed the problem objectively and impartially. They refused to buy any false arguments from Pakistan, and declared Pakistan guilty of misadventure. For the first time, the US also seemed to understand India’s security concerns “including the strategic reasons that compelled India to go nuclear and the Sino-Pak nuclear and missile cooperation.”⁶⁸

A positive transformation of the relations between the two nations was seen in the words of US National Security Strategy, 2000. The document stated:

The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on the conviction that US interests require a stronger relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and creating a strategically stable Asia.⁶⁹

The success achieved through the dialogue resulted in a very successful visit by President Clinton to India in March 2000. The Bush Administration built on the start made by the Clinton Administration, and George Bush, during his campaign, stressed the need for stronger relations with India, stating, “Often overlooked in our strategic calculations is the great land that rests at the South of Eurasia. This coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world . . . we should establish more trade and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability in Asia.”⁷⁰ The Bush administration also shifted in its foreign policy towards China, categorizing China as a ‘Strategic Competitor’ rather than a ‘Strategic Partner.’⁷¹ In May 2001, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage came to India to explain President Bush’s strategic framework that included the missile defense program and extended cooperation on tackling the growing menace of terrorism.⁷²

India’s wholehearted response to the 9/11 attacks and its unconditional support for war on terrorism gave momentum to India-US security cooperation. The Indian Navy escorted high value shipping through the Straits of Malacca. Additionally, India permitted transit support to US Naval Ships and allowed over-flight rights to US

aircraft.⁷³ In return, the US also eased most of the sanctions that were levied after the nuclear explosions in 1998. Another positive development was the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which was one of the obstacles to the military cooperation. The signing of GSOMIA gave India greater access to dual-use technologies and paved the way for the sale of US weapons to India.⁷⁴

The upward trajectory in the relationship gave a solid impetus to speed up otherwise slow military cooperation. India and the United States revived the Malabar series of Joint exercises. The Naval ESG also intensified their cooperation by including search and rescue, sharing intelligence on fighting terrorism, ensuring protection of sea-lanes, anti-piracy and maritime security. In April 2002, India signed an arms deal with the US for acquiring Raytheon System AN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery locating radar systems. Thereafter, a subsequent deal included GE F404-GE-F2J3 engines and advanced avionics for India's indigenous LCA project.⁷⁵ Furthermore, both countries negotiated for the sale of P-3 Orion Naval reconnaissance planes. India also purchased some equipment for modernizing its Special Forces.⁷⁶ The positive drive gave impetus to another significant event in November 2002 when a High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) was established with two objectives:

First, the facilitation and promotion of high technology trade on a whole range of categories, including information technology, biotechnology, Nano-technology, and defense techno; and second, confidence building measures for additional strategic trade. This second component of the HTTG works to increase trade between India and the United States in sophisticated goods and technology, while continuing to pursue issues such as WMD proliferation.⁷⁷

The momentum in security cooperation was put a test when the US and coalition forces invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003. There were expectations that India might contribute to the coalition effort but India could not muster a political consensus for such

a commitment. Although there was disappointment in the US, the US Administration understood the political constraints and there was no adverse effect on the cooperation built up between India and the US. Nevertheless, “the disjuncture demonstrated that India’s domestic political constraints might produce outcomes that run counter to US expectations. Without adequate understanding of such political factors in the two nations, there will always be a danger of a derailment of defense ties.”⁷⁸

With change in the geopolitical landscape with the end of the Cold War, India has been recognized as an increasingly important player on the global stage. “India dominates the geography of the now strategically vital South Asia region, and its vibrant economy, pluralist society, cultural influence, and growing military power have made the country a key focus of US foreign policy attention in the 21st century.”⁷⁹ Many analysts also view this warmth in the face of the rapid rise of China, as a tool towards global balance of power. The relationship is apparently on the upswing and “under President Bush and continuing with the President Barack Obama the US and Indian governments have been seeking to sustain a substantive “strategic partnership,” even as bilateral commercial and people to people contacts flourish on their own accord.”⁸⁰

India’s Strategic National Interests

India's security interests are defined by a dynamic global security environment and a perception that the South Asian region is of particular global interest.⁸¹ The presence of terrorists and fundamentalist forces in its neighborhood has prompted India to maintain a high level of defense vigilance and preparedness to face any challenge to its security.⁸² India's Ministry of Defense (MoD) sums up the salient features of India's current security environment as follows:

India is strategically located in relation to both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. India's geographical and topographical diversity, especially on its borders, poses unique challenges to our armed forces in terms of both equipment and training.

Its peninsular shape provides India a coastline of about 7600 kms and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over 2 million sq kms. The island territories in the East are 1,300 kms away from the main land, and physically much closer to South East Asia. India is adjacent to one of the most vital sea-lanes stretching from the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca through which much of the oil from the Gulf region transits. This is an area which has attracted super power rivalries in the past and continues to be a region of heightened activity by extra regional navies on account of current global security concerns.

India's size, strategic location, trade interests and a security environment that extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, underpin India's security response. In view of this strategic spread, it is essential for the country to maintain a credible land, air and maritime force to safeguard its security interests.⁸³

India's national security objectives have evolved against a backdrop of India's core values namely, democracy, secularism and peaceful co-existence, and the national goal of social and economic development. The first and most significant national security objective is defending the country's borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution. Second is protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats, and militant activities. Third, protecting the country from instability, religious, or other forms of radicalism, and extremism emanating from neighboring states. Fourth, securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. Fifth, development of material, equipment, and technologies that have a bearing on India's security, particularly its defense preparedness through indigenous research, development and production. Sixth, promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighboring countries and implementing mutually

agreed to confidence-building measures. Seventh, and finally, pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners.⁸⁴

In view of the security environment that surrounds India, the MoD identifies four key elements that are fundamental determinants of its security planning. First, the Indian Armed Forces have a two front obligation, which requires them to safeguard the security of its borders with Pakistan as well as with China. Second, India is not a member of any military alliance or strategic grouping, nor is this consistent with its policies necessitating a certain independent deterrent capability. Third, due to external abetment, India's Armed Forces are involved in internal security functions on a relatively larger scale than is normal. Fourth, India's interests in the North Indian Ocean, including the security of our EEZ and Island territories, highlight the need for a blue water naval capability commensurate with its responsibilities.⁸⁵

India's location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a critical vantage point in relation to both Central Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).⁸⁶ Moreover, India's size, strategic location, trade links and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) links its security environment directly with an extended neighborhood, particularly neighboring countries and regions of Central Asia, South East Asia, the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.⁸⁷

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and terrorist strikes in many other parts of the world have also brought global convergence on security issues and challenges, therefore, linking India's security directly with its extended neighborhood. Fighting against ideology-based terrorism; concerns regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and globalization have also aligned India's

strategic interests with the rest of the world.⁸⁸ The South Asian region, besides facing challenges like terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, also “hosts a diversity of political experiences and systems.”⁸⁹ India, “a center of economic dynamism in the region, a plural democracy, a bastion of stability and peaceful coexistence stands as a bulwark against fundamentalism and extremism.”⁹⁰

A secure, stable, peaceful, and prosperous neighborhood is an integral part of India's security construct.⁹¹ Therefore, India continues to pursue positive and collaborative relationships with its neighbors. Furthermore, the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan (besides threatening Pakistan) has a direct impact on India's security environment. The continued infiltration “across the Line of Control (LOC), the existence of terrorist camps across the India-Pak border, and the dubious role of Pakistan in the 2008 Mumbai terrorists attacks, all demonstrate the continuing ambivalence of Pakistan in its actions against terrorist organizations.”⁹² It is a well-established fact that India has “exercised exemplary restraint in the face of the gravest provocation. However, Pakistan needs to take effective steps to address India's concerns on terrorism directed against it from the territory under Pakistan control.”⁹³ Therefore, the pressure on Pakistan to take effective measures to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism on its soil remains one of India's key strategic goals.

The security and stability of Afghanistan are crucial to India's own security concerns. India remains committed to “a pluralistic, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan and to continue its developmental partnership with Afghanistan which has earned it tremendous goodwill from the people.”⁹⁴ India advocates that the “ultimate solution to ensuring the security of Afghanistan lies in training an Afghan force to engage

the Taliban, undermining support for the Taliban and dealing with Al Qaeda's forces along the Pakistani border and in the rest of Afghanistan."⁹⁵

India is mindful of China's increasing power and its impact in Asia and the world. Although, India has a strategic and cooperative partnership with China, which has generally progressed well so far, India also remains conscious and alert about the implications of China's military modernization on the regional and national security situation.⁹⁶ A regular mechanism for exchanges in the military sphere has been established through ongoing confidence building measures between the two nations.⁹⁷ The border dispute between India and China remains unresolved; nonetheless, India seeks to engage China to find commonalities that can give depth to a strong bilateral relationship and enable both countries to pursue common goals of growth and development.⁹⁸

The Indian government is concerned about the security situation in some areas of the African region. The incidents of piracy off the coast of East Africa pose dangers to the safety of sea-lanes. The linkages between terrorists based in Somalia and transnational organized crime is a cause of major concern globally.⁹⁹ The Indian Navy has been actively involved in combating maritime piracy in the region on its own and in coordination with the navies of other countries. India has also been actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa under the UN mandate and seeks to consolidate its relations with many countries in the region with which India has historical linkages.¹⁰⁰

India's "Look East Policy" envisages a progressive and multifaceted partnership with the Southeast Asian Region with the long-term goal of creating harmonious and prosperous relations that would facilitate the pooling of resources to tackle common

challenges.¹⁰¹ India is supportive of the view that a pluralistic security order based on a co-operative approach is the answer to the polycentric security concerns in the Southeast Asian region.¹⁰² The ‘Look East Policy’ also envisages engagement through dialogue both at bilateral and multilateral platforms, to attain the full promise of India’s relations within the region.¹⁰³

India’s security environment is closely linked with the West Asia region and India has repeatedly called for de-escalation of tensions in the region. India-Iran relations, which at times are a factor in India-US relations, are dominated by the Indian import of Iranian crude oil, besides sharing some historical and cultural ties. The total volume of bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to US \$ 13.4 billion during 2009-2010. Therefore, India “continues to support a peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue which would be in the interests of peace and stability in West Asia.”¹⁰⁴ Longstanding civilizational links reinforced with wide-ranging mutual geostrategic and economic interests underlie India's policy towards Central Asia.”¹⁰⁵

India is considered a reformist state and therefore largely accepts the international system. At the same time, “India wishes to make incremental changes to it [international system] in order to improve its own power potential and status within the international system.”¹⁰⁶ India has been a consistent supporter of the United Nations and has participated in over 50 peacekeeping operations. Therefore, India rightly claims to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

United States National Interests

We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering

innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken—you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.¹⁰⁷

As President of the United States, I will work tirelessly to protect America's security and to advance our interests. However, no one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate its terms to the world. That is why America seeks an international system that lets nations pursue their interests peacefully, especially when those interests diverge; a system where the universal rights of human beings are respected, and violations of those rights are opposed; a system where we hold ourselves to the same standards that we apply to other nations, with clear rights and responsibilities for all.¹⁰⁸

The *NSS* drives the foreign policy of the United States. The *NSS* advocates a strategic approach in pursuit of four enduring national interests: Security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners; prosperity through a strong, innovative, and growing US economy; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and, an international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.¹⁰⁹

Expanding on Security, the *NSS* envisions to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaida and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the World.”¹¹⁰ The *NSS* proposes that “success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power—both military and civilian—as well as the concerted efforts of likeminded states and multilateral institutions. It further adds, “We will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out.”¹¹¹

Denying terrorists WMD is one the of vital security objectives mentioned in the *NSS*. The *NSS* articulates the need for accelerating and intensifying efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by the end of 2013, and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.¹¹²

Pakistan and Afghanistan lie in the center of NSS strategic thinking. The NSS sums up its security objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan stating:

This is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaida. The danger from this region will only grow if its security slides backward, the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan, and al-Qaida is allowed to operate with impunity. To prevent future attacks on the United States, our allies, and partners, we must work with others to keep the pressure on al-Qaida to increase the security and capacity of our partners in this region. In Afghanistan, we must deny al-Qa'ida a safe haven, deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. Within Pakistan, we are working with the government to address the local, regional, and global threat from violent extremists.¹¹³

The NSS further identifies cyber security threats as the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges the country faces today. Furthermore, the NSS puts more emphasis on international partnerships to meet the challenges facing the US and the world.

The US believes that promoting democracy and human rights abroad fosters an environment that supports America's national interests. The NSS highlights five ways to promote democracy in the world. First, by ensuring that new and fragile democracies deliver tangible improvements for their citizens; second, by practicing principled engagement with non-democratic regimes; third, by recognizing the legitimacy of all peaceful democratic movements; fourth, by building a broader coalition of actors to advance universal values; and, fifth, by marshaling new technologies and promoting the right to access information.¹¹⁴

The NSS acknowledges, "The US has an interest in a just and sustainable international order that can foster collective action to confront challenges."¹¹⁵ In addition, the NSS acknowledges the significance of international institutions in conflict resolution;

however, it points out that there is a need to make changes in the international infrastructure to meet contemporary challenges. Furthermore, it emphasizes, “No international order can be supported by international institutions alone. Our mutual interests must be underpinned by bilateral, multilateral, and global strategies that address underlying sources of insecurity and build new spheres of cooperation.”¹¹⁶ The *NSS* therefore puts the utmost importance on ensuring strong alliances and strengthened security relationships for collective security. The *NSS* advocates, “Building cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence to include China, India, and Russia.” The *NSS* states that Asia’s dramatic growth has increased its connection to America’s future prosperity, and its emerging centers of influence make it increasingly important, and therefore, the US has taken substantial steps to deepen its engagement in the region through regional organizations, new dialogues, and high level diplomacy.¹¹⁷ The US also seeks to advance mutual interests through alliances, deeper relations with emerging powers, and a stronger role in the region’s multilateral architecture, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Forum, the Trans-Pacific, and the East Asia Summit.¹¹⁸

The *NSS* pays significant attention to the importance of maintaining constructive relationships with both China and India. The *NSS* lays out the roadmap for its relationship with China:

We will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China. We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to

make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises. We are using our newly established Strategic and Economic Dialogue to address a broader range of issues, and improve communication between our militaries in order to reduce mistrust. We will encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ. However, disagreements should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century.¹¹⁹

At the same time, the *NSS* visions a strategic partnership with India based on mutual interests and shared values. Expanding on the relationship with India, the *NSS* notes:

The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world's two largest democracies, and close connections among our people. India's responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations, and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific, environmental, and security partnership. Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India's growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world.¹²⁰

The Commission on America's National Interests is organized by Harvard's Belfar Center for Science and International Affairs, the Nixon Center, and RAND, and is supported by the Hauser Foundation. The goal of the commission is to help focus thinking on one central issue: "What are the United States' national interests?"¹²¹ The commission identifies core national interests as the driving force behind foreign policy. This commission studies the international security environment; identifies threats, challenges, and opportunities; and articulates the vital national interests of the US. Vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance

Americans' survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.¹²² The report by this commission identifies five vital US national interests:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad;
2. Ensure US allies' survival and their active cooperation with the US in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on US borders;
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.¹²³

Common National Interests

Numerous common interests bind both India and the United States: First, eliminating the threats posed by state sponsors of terrorism who may seek to use violence against innocents to attain political objectives. Second, arresting the further spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies to other countries and subnational entities. Third, promoting the spread of democracy not only as an end in itself but also as a strategic means of preventing illiberal polities from exporting their internal struggles abroad. Fourth, protecting the global commons, especially the sea lanes of communication, through which flow not only goods and services critical to the global economy but also undesirable commerce such as drug trading, human trafficking, and WMD technologies. Fifth, promoting energy security by enabling stable access to existing energy sources through efficient and transparent market mechanisms. Sixth, the peaceful growth of China. Seventh, peaceful growth and capacity building of Afghanistan for long-term stability in the region.

It is obvious that the national interests of both nations are convergent in many fields. However, it would be an unfair assumption that both countries will automatically collaborate on all these converging national interests. Each country may follow different paths to achieve their national interests. Both India and the US have different priorities and at times variance in perceptions of the issues facing them. For instance, in the United States, “the ultimate value of an India-United States relationship is that it helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by constructing a partnership that aids the preservation of the balance of power in Asia, enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy, and strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-Western exemplar of successful democracy such as India.”¹²⁴ On the other hand, although India, advocates a multi- polar world, it also acknowledges, “American primacy is unlikely to be dethroned any time soon.”¹²⁵ Therefore, for India, “the ultimate value of an India-United States relationship is that it helps India to expand its national power.”¹²⁶ Furthermore, there is an increasing understanding among Indians that “Indian national power and ambition will find assertion in geographic and issue areas that are more likely to be contested immediately by China rather than the United States.”¹²⁷ However, it must be understood that containing China is not in the national interest of either of these two countries. Although, India is wary of rising China and its implications in Asia and the World, “Indian policy makers believe that the best antidote to the persistently competitive and even threatening dimensions of Chinese power lies, at least in the first instance, in the complete and permanent revitalization of Indian national strength—an objective in which the United States has a special role.”¹²⁸

The growing partnership between the two countries does not necessarily mean that it will mature into an alliance. However, a partnership based on certain convergent interests will benefit both countries. Moreover, it is a fair assumption that “the United States and India will never threaten each other’s security through the force of arms—and have never done so historically despite moments of deep disagreement.”¹²⁹ Given the history of the United States’ relations with Russia and China, it is not possible to imagine a similar assumption with these two countries. Therefore, India-United States relations “represent an investment not only in bettering relations with a new rising power in what will become the new center of gravity in global politics, but also, and more fundamentally, an investment in the long term security and relative power position of the United States.”¹³⁰

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, US Pacific Command, in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on Defense describes the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) as vital to U.S. national interests. Speaking specifically about India, the Admiral states:

Cooperation is especially noteworthy in the areas of counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime security. The recent removal of Indian defense-and space related industries from the US Entity List not only recognizes India’s record of responsible stewardship of sensitive technologies but further enables bilateral cooperation in the areas of mutual interests. Nevertheless, India’s historic leadership of the non-alignment movement and desire to maintain the strategic autonomy somewhat constrain cooperation at a level USPACOM desires. The US-India relationship remains challenged by a degree of suspicion fueled by Cold War influenced perceptions, complicated Indian political and bureaucratic processes, and the US-Pakistan relationship.¹³¹

The US views defense cooperation with India in the context of “common principles and shared national interests such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability.”¹³² In a report accompanying the

Department of Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, the Senate Armed Services Committee, in expressing its belief that a deepened strategic partnership with India will be critical to the core mutual national interest in 21st century, directed the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress a detailed plan to enhance US-India security cooperation. The said report titled “US-India Security Cooperation” released in November 2011 highlights the current state of US-India security cooperation and provides a roadmap for enhancing the relationship. This report emphasizes the significance of India-US security cooperation and states:

The relationship between the United States and India-what President Obama has called one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century-is the priority for the US Government and for the US Department of Defense. The United States and India are natural partners, destined to be closer because of shared interests and values and our mutual desire for a stable and secure world. A strong bilateral partnership is in US interests and benefits both countries. We expect India’s importance to US interests to grow in the long run as India, a major regional and emerging global power, increasingly assumes roles commensurate with its position as a stake holder and a leader in the international system.¹³³

It is unlikely that there will be complete congruence on national security objectives of both nations in the near future. While on one hand the convergence is identified in areas such as shared values, democracy, the emergence of balance of power arrangement in the region, challenges posed by WMD, Islamist extremism, and energy security; conversely, divergence is evident on several issues like role of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism in India and its policies toward the ongoing Afghan insurgency, and India’s relationship with Iran and Burma.

India’s Foreign Policy

The foundations of India were laid during the freedom movement when its leaders, even when fighting for independence, were engaged with the great causes of the

time.¹³⁴ India firmly believes that the principles of India's foreign policy that emerged during that time have stood the test of time. The tenets of India's foreign policy are based on beliefs that the resolution of conflicts should be by peaceful means, the sovereign equality of all states, independence of thought and action as manifested in the principles of Non Alignment, and equity in the conduct of international relations.¹³⁵

India was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement, played an active leadership role in strengthening the NAM, and has aggressively represented the collective aspirations and interests of the developing countries on vital issues like peace and stability.¹³⁶ However, after the end of the Cold War India has been focused on strengthening the Movement by redefining its priorities in keeping with changing times.¹³⁷ India has also been in the forefront of the world community against colonialism and its freedom struggle through nonviolent means acted as a catalyst in removing colonialism from the world scene. India was also the first country to raise the question of racial discrimination in South Africa in 1946.¹³⁸

Another important aspect of India's foreign policy has been its strong support of general and complete disarmament. India has led several such initiatives within the UN and outside. In 1988, India presented to the 3rd Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament an Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapons Free and Non Violent World Order. In addition, India was also a member of the Six-Nation Five-Continent joint initiative in the 1980s.¹³⁹ However, at the same time, it has consistently opposed such discriminatory treaties as the Nuclear non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has refused to give up its nuclear

options until all countries in the world (including nuclear weapons states) embrace the idea of nuclear disarmament in a phased manner.¹⁴⁰

India was also a founding member of the United Nations and has firmly supported and committed to the UN. India made significant contributions to its various activities, including peacekeeping operations, and is the second largest troop contributor.

India's foreign policy has always regarded the concept of neighborhood as one of widening concentric circles, around a central axis of historical and cultural commonalities. Guided by this perspective, India has given due priority to the development of relations with Southeast Asia.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, India is implementing the 'Look East' policy, which is underpinned by important economic considerations. Today, India is a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum.¹⁴² Commensurate with national interests and security, bilateral relations is an important component of any foreign policy, and India has succeeded in establishing a network of mutually beneficial relations with countries of the world.¹⁴³

An important attribute of a dynamic foreign policy is its ability to respond to the changing environment. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Central Asian Republics have guided India's foreign policy to engage with these new nations due to their economic and strategic importance. India maintains very strong bilateral relations with these countries.¹⁴⁴ The countries of the Gulf have a political and strategic importance to India since the region is a major market for Indian exports. Moreover, three million Indians are employed in this region. Therefore, a strengthened tie with these countries is one of the important guiding factors of India's foreign policy.¹⁴⁵

China has a very significant place in India's foreign policy. "With China the aim of Indian foreign policy has been to develop a relationship of friendship, cooperation and good neighborliness, exploiting the potential for favorable growth wherever it exists, even as India seeks to find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the unsettled border issue."¹⁴⁶

The end of Cold War political constraints and the rapid growth of India's economy has given India a unique position in the new global order. For example, in 2010 alone the Indian government made 26 bilateral defense arrangements with various countries. In addition, every world leader paid a visit to India, including those from all five permanent UN Security council members.

The argument that India does not act on the global stage in the manner expected of a country of such stature and a rising power could be detrimental to India's position in the world and its security relation with the US. India has apparently appeared unwilling to take assertive stances on issues ranging from Iran, Burma, the Arab Spring, and Libya. In March 2011, India officially opposed NATO's military action in Libya and notably abstained along with Brazil, China, Russia, and Germany from voting on UN Resolution 1973, which approved such action.

"Many analysts also view India's foreign policy establishment-its foreign service, think tanks, public universities, and relevant media-as being too small and/or too poorly developed for India to achieve true power status in the foreseeable future."¹⁴⁷ In the absence of a revitalized and revamped foreign policy establishment, "India's worldview will be parochial, reactive, and increasingly dominated by business rather than by strategic or political concerns."¹⁴⁸

India-United States Defense Cooperation

Defense cooperation has many dimensions today including the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment, transfer of technology, intelligence sharing and coordination for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, cooperation in jointly providing relief after natural calamities, coordination in transnational anti-drug trafficking activities and the joint patrolling of sea-lanes of communication against piracy and terrorism.¹⁴⁹

Defense cooperation is an important aspect of bilateral cooperation and therefore cannot be separated from overall bilateral cooperation between the nations. As evident from the historical perspective, defense cooperation between India and the United States has suffered due to their very different perceptions of the global order, determined in part by their positions in the international system. Despite contradicting national interests, there were a few initiatives during the Cold War years. The US approved the sale to India of 200 Sherman tanks worth \$19 million.¹⁵⁰ Defense cooperation intensified during the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, when the US responded to India's request for assistance. This assistance came in the form of small arms, ammunition and communication systems suitable for mountain warfare.¹⁵¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and with that the end of the Cold War, changed the international order, ushering in a new era in defense cooperation. India broke free from the Cold War paradigm and made some significant changes in its foreign policy. In fact, the first indication that India wished to seek a better relationship with the US came during the Gulf War. India allowed US military planes to refuel in India, and despite having good relations with Iraq, condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and "adhered

to all 12 mandatory UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions on sanctions against Iraq.”¹⁵² In December 1990, an American defense delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Henry Rowen, visited India to discuss the framework for defense cooperation.¹⁵³

India-United States defense relations entered a new era in 1991 after the visit of Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific Command. The “Kicklighter Proposals” included service-to-service exchanges and an expansion of the defense cooperation framework. Executive steering groups were established in both countries to intensify military-to-military cooperation. The proposals also enabled first time Indo-US military to military level exercises named “Iroquois,” and “Malabar” that later became a regular feature between the two militaries. Thereafter, India-US Defense relations received another boost with the signing of the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations in 1995 to strengthen and expand defense cooperation.

The defense ministers of the United States and India signed a 10-year agreement in 2005, paving the way for stepped-up military ties including joint production and cooperation on missile defense.¹⁵⁴ Titled the “New Framework of India-United States Defense Relationship” this agreement built on the 1995 Agreed Minutes on Defense Relations. Under this agreement, “The United States offered to step up a strategic dialogue with India to boost missile defense and other security initiatives as well as high-technology cooperation, defense procurement and a policy group that deals with cooperation on military research, development, testing and evaluation.”¹⁵⁵ This agreement also “envisages joint exercises and cooperation in peacekeeping operations to promote regional and global peace and stability.”¹⁵⁶ This defense relationship is a

significant element of the broader strategic partnership between India and the United States. The present defense cooperation scheme is based on this 'New Framework in the India-US Defense Relationship'. Under this framework, both countries agreed to ten proposals. First, conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges. Second, collaborate in multinational operations if they reflect common interests. Third, strengthen capabilities of militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism. Fourth, promote regional peace and security. Fifth, enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, research and development. Seventh, expand collaboration relating to missile defense. Eighth, strengthen abilities of the armed forces to respond quickly to disasters, including in combined operations. Ninth, conduct successful peacekeeping operations. Finally, the tenth proposal is to conduct and increase exchanges of intelligence. The signing of this framework led to the establishment of the Defense Procurement and Production Group and the Defense Joint Working Group, under the comprehensive bilateral mechanism of the Defense Policy Group. Thereafter, in March 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush, inspired by the success of these initiatives, affirmed a shared commitment to protect the free flow of commerce and safety of navigation, and agreed to conclude a Maritime Security Cooperation Framework to develop new avenues of maritime cooperation in the prevention of transnational crimes at sea such as piracy, armed robbery, smuggling and trafficking in arms and narcotics, response to natural disasters, and enhance cooperative capabilities. One of the significant outcomes of the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations is the setting up of the Defense Policy Group as an intergovernmental body between the

office of the Secretary of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense to: (1) review issues of joint concern such as post-Cold War security planning and policy perspectives on both sides; (2) provide policy guidance to the joint technical group supporting cooperation in defense research and production; (3) resolve policy issues raised by the service to service steering groups; and (4) promote senior-level civilian exchanges and joint seminars between the two sides on defense and security issues.¹⁵⁷

The Defense Policy Group (DPG) gives policy level direction to defense cooperation, reviews all matters and resolves broader policy issues. Presently, the following institutional mechanisms under the DPG are working to enhance defense cooperation between the two countries:

1. Defense Joint Working Group (DJWG) – undertakes mid-year review of progress made in the fulfillment of decisions taken by the DPG. It also reviews matters that need to be taken up by the DPG.
2. Senior Technology Security Group (STSG) –reviews technology security issues and increases mutual understanding of each other’s policies and systems in respect of technology security for defense-related equipment.
3. Defense Procurement and Production Group (DPPG) –reviews opportunities for cooperation in defense acquisition, transfer of technology/collaboration and defense related industries.
4. Joint Technical Group (JTG) –looks at potential for cooperation in defense research and development.
5. Military Cooperation Group (MCG) – reviews services-related cooperation matters and inter-service coordination.
6. Service-to-Service Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) – these review service-to-service cooperation and report to the Military Cooperation Group.

Besides, the subgroups operating under the DPG, additional framework agreements help guide interactions in key areas such as maritime security, cyber security,

aviation security, etc. The 2006 Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation showed the resolve of both nations to cooperate to tackle challenges like maritime threats, transnational crime, and maritime proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, and national disasters.¹⁵⁸ According to the Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation agreement:

1. Consistent with their global strategic partnership and the new framework for their defense relationship, India and the United States committed themselves to comprehensive cooperation in ensuring a secure maritime domain. In doing so, they pledged to work together, and with other regional partners as necessary, to protect the free flow of commerce and to counter threats that could undermine maritime security.

2. The two countries reaffirmed their commitment to support existing multilateral efforts to enhance maritime security, including initiatives undertaken by the International Maritime Organization and other relevant UN programs. They noted the contribution to maritime security of the ongoing Indo-U.S. cooperation on disaster relief.

3. India and the United States will address, in a joint and combined manner as necessary, consistent with respective national legal authorities and relevant international law, maritime threats, including: piracy and armed robbery at sea; threats to safety of ships, crew, and property as well as safety of navigation; transnational organized crimes in all dimensions; the illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials; environmental degradation; and natural disasters. In pursuance of the above objectives, the two countries will:

(a) Hold regular maritime security policy and implementation discussions in the Defense Policy Group, the Naval Executive Steering Group, and Military Cooperation Group. They will discuss current policies and emerging maritime issues to develop new avenues of cooperation, including exercises.

(b) Pursue cooperation in the following areas:

(i) Prevention of, and response to, acts of transnational crime at sea such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling, and trafficking in arms and drugs;

(ii) Search and rescue operations at sea;

(iii) Exchange of information and facilitation of technical assistance on combating marine pollution, as mutually agreed;

(iv) Enhancement of their cooperative capabilities in the maritime domain through technology cooperation and defense trade, as well as an appropriate agreement on logistic support.¹⁵⁹

The military-to-military relationship consists of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, reciprocal visits, and personal exchanges. The exercises have grown dramatically in size, scope, and sophistication across all services to deepen military and defense relationships.¹⁶⁰ In FY11, there were 56 cooperative events across all services—more than India conducted with any other country.¹⁶¹ In 2010 USPACOM and the Indian Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) conducted the inaugural Joint Exercise India (JEI).¹⁶²

Army: YUDH ABYAS, an annual exercise forms the basis of India-US Army's engagement. This exercise was conceived in 2001 and since then has expanded in scope and size, from a company level exercise to brigade level command post exercises.¹⁶³

Air Force: COPE INDIA is the primary exercise between the two air forces. The last exercise focused on the humanitarian assistance scenario. According to a report:

The IAF intends to participate in RED FLAG-NELLIS in 2013, likely with both fighters and airborne warning and control system aircraft. RED FLAG is a joint, combined training exercise that provides a peacetime "battlefield" to train interoperability across a variety of mission sets, including interdiction, air superiority, defense suppression, airlift, aerial refueling, and reconnaissance. The IAF last participated in RED FLAG-NELLIS in 2008. In June 2010, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and IAF conducted a UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT seminar focused on planning for future employment of airpower concepts, including: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning; targeting hardened and deeply buried targets; and combat search and rescue operations. The course of air force engagement is charted annually at the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)-IAF Executive Steering Group, and several subject matter expert exchanges are conducted annually on topics such as airfield engineering, intelligence, weapons and tactics, and flight safety.¹⁶⁴

Navy: American and Indian defense analysts broadly agree that naval cooperation represents one of the most promising areas of defense cooperation for five reasons: first, naval cooperation supports the strongest areas of strategic convergence—sea lane protection. Second, naval cooperation in the Strait of Malacca represents the first concrete example of Indo-U.S. military cooperation. Third, the Indian Navy is best equipped to lead military cooperation with the U.S. military because its mission dovetails naturally with the larger cooperation agenda. Fourth, naval cooperation can occur without causing political anxieties in India—the U.S. Navy leaves no "footprint" in India. Finally, India's The Andaman and Nicobar Command of the Indian Armed Forces is based at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. They represent the only joint structure in the Indian military.¹⁶⁵ A report by DoD sums up the naval and coast guard cooperation between the two nations as follows:

Naval cooperation between the United States and India helped to lay the groundwork for military-to-military cooperation and our exercises continue to evolve in complexity. Our navies conduct four exercises annually: MALABAR, HABU NAG (naval aspects of amphibious operations), SPITTING COBRA (explosive ordnance destruction focus), and SALVEX (diving and salvage). MALABAR is the premier annual bilateral maritime exercise conducted to reinforce maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of both nations. In alternate years, MALABAR has been a multinational exercise, including the navies of Japan, Australia, and Singapore. HABU NAG is also increasing in scale and complexity, and was conducted this year in conjunction with USPACOM's JEI to leverage the complementary characteristics of amphibious and HA/DR operations. These exercises are important vehicles in developing professional relationships and familiarity between the two navies and run the gamut of high-end naval warfare, including integrated air/missile defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and naval special warfare. In addition to the annual Pacific Fleet-Indian Navy Executive Steering Group meeting, we also hold regular naval bilateral staff talks, engage in port visits, and conduct personnel exchanges at all ranks. The U.S. Coast Guard, with the support of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, has also recently begun engagement and training with the Indian Coast Guard.¹⁶⁶

In addition, the US SOF interacts with Indian SOF through Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events. “VAJRA PRAHAR is the SOF exclusive exercise with India. It focuses on advanced rifle marksmanship, combat marksmanship, close quarters combat, helicopter insertion, medical evacuation, combined mission planning, and scenario based missions.”¹⁶⁷

Defense Sales: Since 2002, India has signed more than 20 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements for defense articles and services such as C-17 and C-130J aircraft, TPQ -37 radars, Self-Protection Suites (SPS) for VVIP aircraft, specialized tactical equipment, harpoon missiles, sensor-fuzed weapons, and test pilot school training.¹⁶⁸ A recently released report to Congress on US-India security cooperation while highlighting the significance of defense sales to enhance overall defense cooperation, compatibility, and strengthen the US resolve to become a reliable and transparent defense supplier to India, notes:

Defense sales provide the Indian military with capabilities that mutually support both our nations’ strategic priorities. Additionally, we view defense sales as a mechanism to enable new training and exchange opportunities between our militaries. The last five years have given us several opportunities to reach a new level of interaction between our militaries through defense trade. The C-130Js delivered in February 2011 are the first U.S. military aircraft to have been delivered to India in half a century and have already been successfully employed to provide critical humanitarian assistance following an earthquake in Sikkim in September 2011. As part of that sale, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) trained more than 100 Indian Air Force personnel– including pilots, loadmasters, and maintenance staff. Once the C-17 contract is fulfilled, India will operate the second largest fleet of C-17s in the world. The former USS TRENTON, which was transferred to the Indian Navy in 2007 and christened the INS JALASHWA, has helped the Indian Navy expand its amphibious and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The United States and India continue to seek ways to educate each other on our respective procurement and acquisition systems to enable further compatibility. We are working to find ways to adopt processes that will improve efficiency and make it easier for us to cooperate on defense trade. Over the past seven years, we have sent mobile training teams to India to present courses on the

FMS process. U.S. defense personnel also participated in international acquisition seminars hosted by think tanks affiliated with the Indian Ministry of Defence.¹⁶⁹

The U.S. DoD has assigned highest priorities to relationship building between the US and Indian defense personnel to help build the foundation for strengthened partnerships. The IMET program is one of the most significant tools to enhance familiarity with each country's armed forces, strengthen professionalism, and facilitate cooperation during bilateral exercises and strategy discussions. Armament cooperation is another significant field where both nations are increasingly cooperating.¹⁷⁰ "India's capabilities in technology are rapidly improving, particularly in the private sector. In the defense sector, India has over fifty defense laboratories in the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), presenting opportunities for collaboration over the broad range of defense technologies and systems."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, "Naval Postgraduate School and DRDO are implementing a letter of agreement signed in February 2011 establishing an educational exchange and joint research project programs."¹⁷²

The two militaries have carried out numerous joint exercises over the years. Defense procurement has also stepped up with the purchases of a US Landing Ship, C130 J and P81 maritime aircraft, and with more defense procurements in the pipeline. End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) one of the obstacles to deepened defense cooperation, has been resolved. Furthermore, several companies, including those involved in defense research and development, have been removed from the US "Entity List." Removal from the "Entity List" eliminates a license requirement specific to those companies, and results in a removed company being treated in the same way as any other destination in India for export licensing purposes. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke applauded this positive step and remarked, "Today's action marks a significant milestone

in reinforcing the US-India strategic partnership and moving forward with the export control reforms that will facilitate high technology trade and cooperation.”¹⁷³

Furthermore, “this action removes India from specific export administration regulations resulting in the removal of requirements that were tied to India’s placement in those groups.”¹⁷⁴ Certainly, this significant change reaffirms growing security cooperation between the two nations. There are two other agreements which are proving to be obstacles in the enhanced FMS—CISMOA and LSA. India is reluctant to sign these agreements. CISMOA enables higher levels of operational interoperability between ships and aircrafts of the two countries whereas LSA allows for book adjustments of costs incurred on ship/aircraft movements, fuel, ration and port charges. Although India has not given any concrete reasons for reluctance to sign these agreements, one possible explanation is that Indians see them as unequal since more US platforms will visit India than Indian ships visit the US. Premvir Das, former Director General, Defense Planning Staff, and a former member of the National Security Advisory Board suggests that India must look at these issues holistically, and remarks, “A better way of looking at these agreements is to get them out of the way if that satisfies the Americans, so long as there are no serious negatives. Keeping the issues alive is a needless irritant to cooperation. The fear that these may be seen to be putting us [India] in the American ‘camp’ is so naïve that it is laughable.”¹⁷⁵

The analysis of India-US security cooperation shows that security relations experienced several vicissitudes in the last five decades. Defense cooperation was adversely affected due to variance in security objectives and divergent policies. However, defense cooperation between these two nations has shown considerable improvement in

the past decade. The upswing in defense cooperation is inspired by the contemporary geopolitical realities and the convergence of key strategic interests. While India needs US assistance to achieve its national security objectives and global power status, India's growing geopolitical importance, the role it can play in counterterrorism, counter-proliferation activities, maritime security, energy stability and India's key role in the global balance of power has motivated the US to build a lasting defense relationship with India. Indian and American leadership has consistently stressed the need for improved defense cooperation. Undoubtedly, achievements are self-evident and the relations have progressed in each field of defense cooperation. However, the relationship is still new and will require continuous efforts on both sides so that it remains relevant and focused on core geopolitical interest of both nations. Therefore, "moving defense ties beyond narrow visions hobbled by the past to new levels appropriate to the twenty first century will require patience, hard work, and compromise from both sides."¹⁷⁶ US leadership has to demonstrate commitment to sustain and strengthen the defense partnership. The Indian side will also be required to show flexibility in their dealings with the US commensurate with changing geopolitical realities. However, defense cooperation must be embedded solidly in overall bilateral relations. Pragmatic defense cooperation between India and the US is a vital asset to both nations to tackle common challenges like terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and piracy, and to optimize opportunities like Asia's rise to strategic and economic prominence on the global stage.

Although India-US defense relations have improved considerably, challenges to enhanced cooperation remains. These challenges are the irritants and obstacles that will require attention in order to achieve the full potential of defense cooperation. The

historical context of India-US bilateral relationship (defense cooperation being a subset of it) has been contentious prior to the Cold War. Improvement in relations has not entirely erased the legacy of a thorny past. Some Indian officials argue, “The US is a fickle partner that may not always be relied upon to provide reciprocity, sensitivity, and high technology transfer, and may act inclusively.”¹⁷⁷ Therefore, the Indian government is reluctant to sign CISMOA, BECA for Geospatial Cooperation, and LSA.¹⁷⁸ Meanwhile, US law require that certain sensitive defense technologies can only be transferred to recipient countries that have signed these agreements. These agreements have been opposed by Indian administration and ironically were not taken up at the July 2011 strategic dialogue talks.¹⁷⁹

Although India signed the EUMA after repeated negotiations and assurance that the time and location of the equipment will be decided by the Indian officials, India may be extremely reluctant to sign these other three agreements. “Despite US claims that India’s military capabilities are hampered by lack of access to US equipment and technologies, senior Indian military officers have reported to their government that the absence of these agreements makes no substantial differences in their operational abilities.”¹⁸⁰ Indian defense officials desire a relationship built on equality and view technology transfer as the engine for development. Therefore, “technology transfer is the acid test of US commitment. It demonstrates US confidence and trust in the relationship, it confirms the US understanding of India as a strategic partner, and it signals that India is a friend and we treat India as a friend.”¹⁸¹ In other words, it would not be incorrect to state that both nations are seeking different gains out of security cooperation and therefore have distinct benchmarks by which they assess this relationship.

Another obstacle to an enhanced defense relationship is India's view of their strategic environment. India sees their vital national interests in West Asia and Central Asia, primarily motivated by energy and security concerns, Indian nationals working in the Middle East and sensitivity to Islamic issues (being the second largest Muslim population in the world). India has traditionally enjoyed cordial relations with countries in the Middle East including Iran and Iraq. At the same time, India has developed a robust defense relationship with Israel. Afghanistan is considered extremely vital from the Indian point of view, a reality that the Indian decision makers feel is not fully endorsed by the US.

The US relationship with Pakistan will remain one of the biggest challenges to an enhanced defense cooperation. Although, much progress has been made by the US to address Indian skepticism of persistent hyphenation of India-Pakistan dynamics, doubt still exists among Indians because of the provision of American arms to Pakistan. On the contrary, US counterparts accuse India of overlooking US interests in Pakistan. Americans see Indians as still locked into the past and unable to move forward at the pace expected out of a rising power.

Yet another obstacle to enhanced relationship is organizational. The organization of US geographical commands is not compatible with India's strategic vision. At present, the US Unified Command Plan uses the India-Pakistan border to divide military responsibility between Central Command and Pacific Command, with India falling within the Pacific Command.¹⁸² Since the military-to-military programs are driven primarily by these commands, it does not honor India's strategic security objectives that lie in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and West Asia.

PACOM does not cover India's complete strategic interests and concerns. Therefore, Indians argue that many of India's security objectives and concerns lie outside of PACOM's area of responsibility and essentially lie in CENTCOM and the recently formed AFRICOM. In fact, India's security and strategic concerns ranging from cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan, instability in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle East, and energy flow from the Persian Gulf lies outside the PACOM's area of responsibility. Therefore, Indian believes that "PACOM has neither the authority nor the means to engage the US military across India's full range of strategic interests. Due to these organizational hazards, Indians prefers to deal directly with Washington, bypassing PACOM. In contrast, the US lauds the "benefits of dividing India and Pakistan into separate AORs, arguing that including both states in the same AOR would compromise the credibility of each commander and make it impossible for them to build trust and forge a satisfactory relationship with each state."¹⁸³ A DoD report sums up this dichotomy, stating:

Americans believe that India has fundamentally misunderstood the unified command's central role in designing and executing the military's security cooperation programs, which includes wielding power and authority and allocating the resources. (Indians counter that they understand the US structure perfectly. They are not averse to dealing with PACOM, but PACOM fails to serve all their interests both geographically and functionally.¹⁸⁴

From the American perspective, "bureaucratic structure has also been an obstacle on the Indian side. Given their limited roles in the Indian governing establishment, the Ministry of Defence and armed services have not traditionally had a large foreign policy function."¹⁸⁵ Additionally, "until the opening of US-India defense engagement in the 1990s, India had never had a bilateral defense relationship of the type the US has developed with dozens of friendly and allied countries across the globe. The Indian link

with the Soviet Union was centered on hardware, technical training, and logistical support; it did not encompass the broad array of exercises, exchanges, discussions, and military sales that the US considers part of normal defense cooperation.”¹⁸⁶

Counterterrorism Cooperation

This section examines the pattern of counterterrorism cooperation, an important facet of security cooperation between nations. It studies the pattern of cooperation to date, the current counterterrorism scheme, and its ability to meet the national security objectives of both nations. This section also identifies major hurdles in counterterrorism cooperation.

India and the United States face significant threats from terrorism and both countries have cooperated on counterterrorism for years. This cooperation started immediately after the Second World War when both nations saw the externally supported communist insurgencies as a threat to national security. India joined the United Kingdom sponsored Security Liaison Network (SLN) to share intelligence and enhance its counterinsurgency capability.¹⁸⁷ At the same time, Indian intelligence agencies worked bilaterally with US intelligence agencies to counter the threat posed by communist insurgencies. International terrorism emerged as a major threat to security in many countries after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. However, cooperation on counterterrorism has not been satisfactory due to differing perceptions and definitions of terrorism, (one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. dissimilar definitions of terrorism and international terrorism), divergent national interests, and failure to reach a consensus on “state sponsored terrorism.”

The beginning of Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism is traced to the early 1980s “when some Sikh organizations, acting in the cause of an independent Khalistan¹⁸⁸ in the Punjab state of India started engaging in terror acts.”¹⁸⁹ Some of these organizations had a covert presence in the US, Canada, and Europe. Pakistan was providing training, logistic and moral support to these terrorist groups. Hijacking remained one of the modus operandi of these terrorist groups and in fact, all hijacked aircraft were forced to fly to Pakistan.¹⁹⁰ Although, the US refrained from criticizing Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism in India, at the same time the US worried that such activities, if not checked, could exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan. Therefore, initial cooperation came in the form of training of Indian intelligence officers in the US in anti- hijacking and hostage negotiation techniques. Thereafter, cooperation extended to intelligence sharing about the groups based in the US, Canada, and Europe. However, once again the US refrained from providing intelligence on terrorist activities based in Pakistan. The early 1990s saw an improvement in counterterrorism cooperation. The turning point came with the kidnapping of Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in New Delhi, by Khalistani terrorists. Although the incident received very little attention, “US intelligence agencies were deeply concerned after Washington and New Delhi simultaneously intercepted a telephone conversation between a Khalistani terrorist based in Lahore (Pakistan) and another in Frankfurt in which the former advised the latter to order the release of Radu and kidnap an American in order to get more publicity for their cause.”¹⁹¹

At the same time, an attack on a group of Israeli tourists in Kashmir received widespread notice that led to “pressure from Jewish groups to show greater sensitivity to

the problems faced by India from terrorism.”¹⁹² In 1993, there was a series of explosions in economic targets in Mumbai at the behest of Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence. In fact, counterterrorism experts from the US, Austria, and the UK identified the hand grenades as made in a Pakistani factory and “US forensic experts identified the timer recovered as made in the United States and as part of a consignment supplied to Pakistan during the Afghan war in the 1980s.”¹⁹³ The British and Austrian experts were willing to share the collected evidence in the trial against the accused. On the contrary, the US experts chose not to do so. On top of that, the US forensic experts never returned the timer, which they had taken to the US for detailed forensic examination, claiming, “It had been destroyed by mistake.”¹⁹⁴ Concisely, the US was reluctant to accept terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, and more specifically, the role Pakistan played in sponsoring violence. Therefore, counterterrorism cooperation was limited to counterterrorism training.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, India received mixed US cooperation in tackling Sikh terrorism in India. In 1996, the US passed a law that barred fund raising in the US by terrorists groups, although the Council of Khalistan, whose founding members were wanted by India for their role in blowing up an Air India flight over the Atlantic in 1995, remained functional as a lobby group in the US. In the early 1990s terrorism in Punjab ended, and the focus shifted to increased violence in Kashmir. Pakistani-based terrorist organizations like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) started a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. The kidnapping and alleged killing of six Western tourists, including two Americans, forced the US to reassess its view on

terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁹⁵ In a positive departure from its earlier stance, the US declared HuM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and started cooperating with Indian agencies in monitoring the activities of Pakistani jihadi organizations.

Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, India-US counterterrorism efforts were undermined by mutual misperceptions, prejudices, and divergent views on terrorism, despite shared concerns about terrorism and regional stability. In the late 1990s, a consensus seemed to be building between India and the US on the threat posed by terrorism. The US had started identifying Afghanistan as a frontrunner state with close ties with al Qaeda. In fact, “Al Qaeda leaders had publically declared both India and the US to be enemies of Islam and, hence, targets for attack by true Muslims.”¹⁹⁶ At the same time, Pakistan was not ready to end its support for the Taliban regime—key sponsors of al Qaeda. However, India’s nuclear tests in 1998 hindered the progress that had been made with the US on counterterrorism. One of the positive outcomes of deteriorating India-US counterterrorism cooperation was an upswing in India-Israel counterterrorism cooperation due to similar threats and compatible approaches to terrorism.

The formal launch of the India US Joint Counterterrorism Working Group in January 2000 “marked the transformation of a previously obscure partnership into a leading element of the haltingly expanding bilateral relationship.”¹⁹⁷ In fact, the plan was to initiate the working group two years earlier in 1997 when the Clinton administration had emphasized a new “India-focused South Asia policy,” in which counterterrorism was high on the agenda. However, the nuclear tests by India in 1998 delayed the process. The process was reinitiated in 2000 when consensus was building internationally to tackle the growing terrorist threat. According to Polly Nayak, counterterrorism cooperation seems

promising for three reasons: first, years of de facto bilateral cooperation on specific terrorism issues had built up a reservoir of good will; second, terrorism was an issue important to both governments; third, the issue of counterterrorism was relatively free of the baggage associated with US nuclear nonproliferation policy in South Asia.¹⁹⁸

Counterterrorism cooperation is important to both India and the US; however, their differing threat perceptions continue to negatively influence counterterrorism cooperation. While India is disappointed with the US stance towards Pakistan, the US has been concerned with India's relations with states like Iran, Iraq, and Myanmar. For India, terrorism has been largely a homeland security issue.¹⁹⁹ The country has faced violence linked with ethnic, ideological, and religious insurgencies with cross-border support from Pakistan. Therefore, India has been frustrated by the US stance on Pakistan involvement in cross border terrorism in India as evident in the State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism.²⁰⁰ The report acknowledges, "India remains one of the countries most affected by terrorism. While the report mentions Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsor of terrorism, it ignores the most active role Pakistan is playing in supporting cross border terrorism in India."²⁰¹ Moreover, it fails to make even a veiled suggestion that the Pakistan establishment may in any way be abetting the terrorists. On the other hand, the report lauds Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts.

While the US declared Iran and Iraq as state sponsors of terrorism, India maintained cordial relations with both countries. India shares a cultural and historical relationship with Iran and Iraq but its expanding ties with these countries are primarily driven by India's quest for energy and trade. The US has been opposing the Iran-Pakistan-India gas line, which is essential for India's growing energy needs. The US and India's

threat perceptions on Iraq also differed. While the US viewed Iraq as a security threat capable of threatening the stability of the Middle East, India had a different perception of Iraq's alleged link with terrorism. Furthermore, "following bombings in Mumbai in the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein's government alone offered to help India track down the responsible terrorists."²⁰²

The 9/11 attacks spurred counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries. India offered complete assistance to the US to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice. India's offer of unlimited support was "unprecedented and came as an enormous surprise to many Indian and American observers alike."²⁰³ Some observers argued that India's offer was not merely symbolic but supported coalition building. According to a monograph published by the RAND Corporation, "India's support was an enormous factor in Islamabad's decision calculus."²⁰⁴ However, the US made Pakistan the mainspring for the United States response to 9/11 attacks because of its geographical location and closer ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan.²⁰⁵ The US imposed sanctions on JeM, a Pakistan based terrorist group operating in India. More importantly, "as a result of 9/11 Washington finally moved closer to India's view of Kashmir militants as international terrorists—a diplomatic triumph for India."²⁰⁶ Although India could not play a direct role in countering terrorism in Afghanistan, it provided logistics and intelligence support to the effort. India provided naval escorts to US high value ships through the Strait of Malacca.

India's Minister of External Affairs Mr. S.M. Krishna and the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met in New Delhi on 19 July 2011, for the second annual meeting of the U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue.²⁰⁷ The leaders recognized the

achievements made since the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in June 2010 and President Obama's historic visit to India in November 2010 in advancing our two countries' shared interests. Secretary Clinton was accompanied by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute. Some of the key decisions of the strategic dialogue between the two countries are as follows:

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment for consultation, coordination, and cooperation on Afghanistan, and to work jointly in Afghanistan in capacity building, agriculture, and women's empowerment, expanding on work already underway. Both sides agreed to Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and inclusive reconciliation. The two sides acknowledged that increased trade, transit, and commercial linkages across South and Central Asia would benefit Afghanistan and contribute to the region's long-term peace, stability, and prosperity.

Secretary Clinton recalled President Obama's statement that, in the years ahead, the United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.

The two sides launched the Homeland Security Dialogue in May 2011 in New Delhi, and have decided upon a program of cooperation in global supply chain management, megacity policing, combating counterfeit currency and illicit financing, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, and capacity building and technology upgrading. They reiterated their commitment to further strengthen counterterrorism cooperation, including through intelligence sharing, information exchange, operational cooperation, and access to advanced counter-terrorism technology and equipment. The two sides had their ninth meeting of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in March 2011 in New Delhi.

The two leaders agreed that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security requires elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Condemning terrorism in all its forms, the two sides confirmed that all terrorist networks must be defeated and called for Pakistan to move expeditiously in prosecuting those involved in the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.

The two sides reiterated their commitment to comprehensive sharing of information on the investigations and trials relating to the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.

The two countries held cyber consultations on July 18, led by their two National Security Councils, at which they exchanged views on a broad range of cyberspace issues and coordinated bilateral cooperation on cyber issues. The United States

and India signed on July 19, 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding between our Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT-IN and US-CERT) to exchange information on cyber-attacks and mutual response to cyber security incidents, to cooperate on cyber security technology, and to exchange information on cyber security policy, best practices, and capacity building, and exchange of experts.

The United States and India agreed to continue consultations on maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region in existing forums such as the Defense Policy Group and its appropriate sub-groups. They also agreed to exchange views on promoting regional security architecture that enhances maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.

The United States welcomed India's decision to chair a plenary of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in 2012.

India welcomed steps taken by the United States to remove Indian entities from the U.S. Department of Commerce's 'Entity List' and realignment of India in U.S. export control regulations. Both sides agreed to continue efforts to fulfill objectives of strengthening export control cooperation envisaged in the Joint Statement of November 2010 as well as on the basis of discussions in the High Technology Cooperation Group.²⁰⁸

The content of the joint statement clearly indicates that since the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in June 2010 and President Obama's visit in November 2010, the scope of the strategic partnership has increased manifold and both countries are advancing their shared national interests. With respect to security interests, both India and the US understand that "new threats to global security are more nebulous, harder to define and originate from multifarious sources."²⁰⁹ Therefore, both countries have a mutual interest in ensuring political stability in Afghanistan, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Central and South Asia. While officials in both countries recognize threats posed to global security, particularly after 9/11, there are still divergent views regarding terrorism especially related to the role of Pakistan in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir. As one official in the Ministry of External Affairs explained:

Even while our long-term expectations for Pakistan are similar (for example, rebuilding social institutions, restoring democracy, social, political, and economic

reforms . . . our approaches are quite different in the short term. For the US, success in Afghanistan has come to be equated with the relationship with Pakistan. The US has accepted Pakistan's willingness to have different approaches with respect to the Taliban and the jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir.

Despite numerous assurances by Pakistan, the cross border infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir continues. Therefore, India complains that the US, due to its immediate national interests in Afghanistan, has not made forceful demands on Pakistan to permanently disassemble its terrorist support infrastructure. Because of this, Indians remain skeptical about the US's Global War on Terrorism. Indians argue, "The US initially declared a "global war on terrorism," but has since altered its stance to declare war on terrorists groups with a global reach. This altered strategy reflects the United States' narrow pursuit of its own security interests."²¹⁰ India has always maintained that Pakistan remains an epicenter of terrorism. The tacit support of Pakistan in perpetuating terrorism in India is seen by Indians as a security threat not only to India but also to Central and South Asia, and globally.

In spite of many positive developments in counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries, the trust deficit impedes deeper cooperation. A House of Representatives' subcommittee on terrorism, non-proliferation, and trade was told by an expert, Lisa Curtis, a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and a former CIA officer, that certain actions of the US had "reinforced Indian beliefs that the US will gloss over Pakistani involvement in the attacks in India, so long as Pakistan continues to cooperate with the US against groups that attack the American Homeland."²¹¹ Ms. Curtis goes as far as saying that "a trust deficit has pervaded the US-Indian relationship"²¹² and India has been frustrated by inconsistencies and backsliding in US public statements concerning the Pakistan-based terrorist threat to India.

Although the 2008 Mumbai attacks elicited increased counterterrorism cooperation, yet the momentum has been lost to build a meaningful partnership on counterterrorism. In fact, Indian authorities had to wait for almost nine months to gain direct access to David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani American responsible for conducting surveillance for the attacks. According to one observer, “Indian authorities believed that the US continued to withhold information on al-Qaeda operatives with ties to Kashmiri militants”²¹³ and this was because of “possible repercussions on its relationship with Pakistan and a desire to avoid creating a perception that the US is taking India’s side in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.”²¹⁴

The present cooperation in counterterrorism operations is riddled by US attention to Pakistani sensitivities. There is also a lack of institutionalized relationship between the various agencies working towards counterterrorism. The US-India Homeland Dialogue launched this year provides opportunities to expand counterterrorism cooperation, yet both countries have to overcome suspicion to achieve the full benefits of counterterrorism cooperation. In this regard, the US will be required to walk an extra mile since India has shown ample sincerity in cooperation in this particular field. The US recently took a positive step by designating the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization with significant links with Pakistan.

The recent visit of US Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano marked a change in counterterrorism cooperation by launching Homeland Security Dialogue. As a result, “India and the US exchanged information, training materials, and methods related to interrupting terrorist financial networks, and have taken institutional and law enforcement measures.”²¹⁵

Security cooperation between the two countries is resulting in improved ties in many fields like defense and Nuclear Non Proliferation but the biggest benefit will come from the expansion of counterterrorism. Both countries will benefit from sharing good practices to prevent terrorist attacks. While the US can strengthen India in achieving potent homeland security mechanisms from its own experience since 9/11, India can help the US by providing information and databases on terrorists operating in India, many of whom have links with al Qaeda. In fact, Indian authorities provided the FBI direct access to interrogate Ajmal Kasab,²¹⁶ the captured gunman involved in the Mumbai attacks.

India faces a terrorist threat that comes in various forms. However, the major threat emanates from the Islamist terrorist organizations primarily operating from Pakistan. There is also evidence of terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harakat –ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI) operating mainly in Kashmir but with ties to al-Qaeda. HuJI leader and close confidante of Osama bin Laden, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reportedly killed in a drone strike in Pakistan in June 2011. However, many analysts have now started to put less emphasis on the designation of these organizations but are looking more closely at the network of the individuals responsible for terrorist strikes.

The David Coleman Headley²¹⁷ case has revealed the international reach of LeT and its close connection with Pakistani intelligence agencies. Headly, a Pakistani-American citizen was arrested along with his accomplice Tahawhur Rana in the US in October 2009 for involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and a plot to bomb a Danish newspaper that first published cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005. In the trials that followed their capture, Headley pleaded guilty in both plots. Headley testifies that he had travelled frequently to Pakistan to receive training from LeT and had scouted the sites of

the Mumbai attacks and many other sites for future attacks. He also agreed to “detailed meetings he had with a Pakistan intelligence officer, an army major, and a navy frogman, who were among the key players in orchestrating the Mumbai attacks.”²¹⁸ Ironically, the US took nine months to grant direct access to Indian authorities to interrogate Headley. The delay in granting access to Headley and the failure of the US to pursue arrest and prosecution of Pakistani service members involved in the Mumbai attacks strengthened Indian suspicion of the US as a partner in counterterrorism partnership.

The foremost problem is that the US tends to view the terrorist organizations active against India through the Indo-Pakistani prism rather than as a part of an international terrorist syndicate. For example, LeT, which started with the aim of waging Jihad in Kashmir, has increasingly acquired al Qaeda’s extremist pan Islamic agenda. In her testimony before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non Proliferation and Trade, Lisa Curtis testified:

LeT involvement in Afghanistan also has picked up since 2006. The LeT apparently trained at camps in Kunar and Nuristan provinces in the 1990s. In the last four years as the Taliban has regained influence in Afghanistan, the LeT has supported the insurgents by recruiting, training, and housing fighters and facilitating their infiltration in Afghanistan from tribal areas of Pakistan. The LeT has also helped al-Qaeda by recruiting men for training at al Qaeda camps to become suicide bombers in Afghanistan. LeT fighters were also part of a group that attacked a US outpost in Wanat, Afghanistan that killed many US soldiers.²¹⁹

Limited counterterrorism cooperation with India, especially “the hesitant US approach to sharing information on Pakistani based terrorist organizations does not serve US interests and cripples US ability to fully get a handle on the terrorist threat emanating from South Asia.”²²⁰ Many analysts believe that downplaying connections between al-Qaeda and the terrorist groups that focus primarily on India is counterproductive—an obstacle to counterterrorism cooperation. Lisa Curtis firmly emphasized that “by

choosing to view the activities of al- Qaeda and other Pakistani based terrorist groups, such as LeT, through a separate lens, US officials have failed to hold Pakistan accountable for dealing effectively with terrorists located in its territory.”²²¹

Furthermore, Pakistan’s support and tolerance of groups operating in Pakistan has facilitated freedom of movement for al-Qaeda since it can leverage the support these groups receive from the Pakistan establishment. Osama bin Laden’s ability to hide in Pakistan for an extended period confirms the support al-Qaeda receives from Pakistani-based terrorist organizations and certain members of the Pakistan government itself. For instance, information gathered from bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad revealed contacts between members of the Pakistan terrorist group Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and bin Laden’s courier.²²² The former Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair told the US Senate Intelligence Committee that “Pakistan’s conviction that terrorist groups help blunt India’s military and economic advantages over Pakistan limit its incentive to pursue a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism.”²²³ Blair further argues, “Pakistan’s segmented approach to terrorism helped al-Qaeda maintain a safe haven in the country since some of the groups that Pakistan supports also aid al-Qaeda.”²²⁴

The analysis of counterterrorism cooperation between India and the US shows that before 9/11, intelligence cooperation in counterterrorism was not satisfactory. The factors responsible for limited cooperation were differing perceptions of terrorists and freedom fighters, conflicting definitions of domestic and international terrorism, divergent national interests and failure to reach a consensus on the issue of state-sponsored terrorism, cross border terrorism, and non-state actors. Another limiting factor

was the legalistic approach adopted by the US on matters like arrest, extradition, deportation, and evidence collected during the interrogation. Despite the differing perception of terrorism, a limited degree of functional bilateral counterterrorism cooperation existed between two nations. However, India's dissatisfaction over repeated US failures to call Pakistan to account for its sponsorship of terrorism remains the major obstacle to the counterterrorism cooperation.

Nevertheless, with the introduction of the US-India Joint Working Group on terrorism in 2000, Indo-US Cyber Security Forum in 2002, New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship in 2005, and finally, US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative in 2010 and US-India Homeland Security Dialogue in 2011, the India-US counterterrorism cooperation has reached higher levels of partnership.²²⁵

The present scheme of counterterrorism cooperation includes exchanges of law enforcement best practices, reciprocal visits of senior level officials, and joint exercises based on counterterrorism scenarios.²²⁶ According to one report, "The FBI's Quantico laboratory has hosted visits by senior Indian forensic experts and the agency regularly shares best practices with senior law enforcement officials. The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program has conducted scores of training courses for more than 1600 Indian law enforcement officials."²²⁷ Additionally, the CIA and FBI have worked in India to investigate terrorist attacks, including the 2006 bombing in Mumbai and 2008 Mumbai attacks. FBI agents also provided testimony to the Indian court in Ajmal Kasab's trial. Furthermore, after initial reluctance, "in June 2010, the Indian government was granted access to David Headley, a Pakistani-American national who confessed to participating in planning the November 2008 Mumbai attacks."²²⁸ The US is also

providing cooperation on launching a National Counterterrorism Center in India modeled on that in the US. In a nutshell, counterterrorism cooperation has improved considerably; however, the biggest obstacle that holds this relationship from reaching its full potential is the lingering and significant distrust of US due to its close relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence services. For example, in spite of US official denial that any useful information was withheld from India regarding the Mumbai attacks, Indian officials remain skeptical that US counterparts had received warnings about LeT intentions to attack Mumbai from Headley's former wives.²²⁹

Another major challenge to enhanced counterterrorism cooperation is how each side views the terrorist threat. While Indian officials are frustrated that the US does not push the Army leadership in Pakistan to dismantle the LeT infrastructure, "the US on the other hand, has been occupied with trying to get the Pakistan Army to sustain current operations in FATA while undertaking new ones in North Waziristan. For the US, asking Pakistan to also aggressively pursue the dismantling of LeT as vigorously as militants in the FATA could stretch Pakistan's capacity and detract from the US's primary aim of disrupting al-Qaeda and the Taliban."²³⁰ In other words, the US does not meet Indian expectations of placing LeT and al-Qaeda or Taliban on the same plane.

Despite India's dissatisfaction over repeated US failure to hold Pakistan responsible for terrorist acts in India, a functional consensus has developed post 9/11 that counterterrorism cooperation should be sustained and further developed. This consensus has developed due to mutual concerns towards terrorism and the pain suffered by both nations being on the receiving end of this menace. More importantly, the

counterterrorism cooperation is endorsed by public opinion in both nations and therefore is sustainable by whichever party is in power in India as well as the US.

¹Amit Gupta, "The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complimentary Interests?" (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2005), 10.

²Dennis Kux, *India and United States: Estranged Democracies* (Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1992), 262.

³US Department of State, "Milestones: 1945-1952," <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NationalSecurityAct> (accessed 10 November 2011).

⁴US Department of Defense, "Landon Lecture (Kansas State University)," Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 2007, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (accessed 23 November 2011).

⁵The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states considering themselves not aligned formally with or against any major power bloc. As of 2011, the movement had 120 members and 17 observer countries. The organization was founded in Belgrade in 1961, and was largely the brainchild of India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Yugoslavia's President, Josip Broz Tito, Egypt's second President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah, and Indonesia's first President, Sukarno. The purpose of the organization as stated in the Havana Declaration of 1979 is to ensure "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" in their "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics." They represent nearly two-thirds of the United Nations' members and 55% of the world's population, particularly in countries considered to be developing or part of the Third World.

⁶Kux, 56.

⁷Ibid., 57.

⁸Ibid., 56.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., 60.

¹¹Ibid., 61.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., 262.

¹⁴Letter from Professor Weisner to President Johnson, 24 February 1965. An 18 October 1965 CIA study said the Indians could produce a test device “in about a year or so.” CIA Memorandum to the NSC, “The Indian Nuclear Capability,” 18 October 1965, Quoted by Kux, 263.

¹⁵Kux, 263.

¹⁶Kux, 263.

¹⁷Ibid., 267.

¹⁸Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), 848. Quoted in Kux, 280.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., 284.

²¹Ibid., 285.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., 289.

²⁴Ibid., 290.

²⁵Ibid., 295.

²⁶Ibid., 297.

²⁷Quoted in Kux, 302.

²⁸Ibid., 303.

²⁹Ibid., 305.

³⁰*New York Times*, 16 December 1971; Quoted in Kux, 305.

³¹Kux, 306.

³²Quoted in Kux, 306.

³³Indira Gandhi, “India and the World,” *Foreign Affairs*, 50 (October 1972): 75-76; Quoted by Kux, 309.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 328.

³⁶Ibid., 327.

³⁷Ibid., 328.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., 332.

⁴⁰Ibid., 356.

⁴¹Ibid., 357.

⁴²Tarapur Atomic Power Station is located in Tarapur, Maharashtra (India). Bechtel and GE under the 1963, 123 Agreement between India, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency initially constructed it with two boiling water reactor (BWR) units of 160 MW each.

⁴³Kux, 357.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., 369.

⁴⁶Ibid., 371.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., 379.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., 380.

⁵¹Ibid., 382.

⁵²Ibid., 394.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 425.

⁵⁵The Pressler Amendment banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the President certified on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

⁵⁶Kux, 426.

⁵⁷Ibid., 429.

⁵⁸Ibid., 430.

⁵⁹Ibid., xvii.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Talbott, 4.

⁶²Ibid., 5.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Malik, 87.

⁶⁶Ashok Sharma, “Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An overview of Defense and Military Cooperation,” www.claws.in/download.php?action...2,%202008.pdf (accessed 16 September 2011).

⁶⁷The Kargil War also known as the Kargil conflict was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LOC). The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay, which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers into positions on the Indian side of the LOC, which serves as the *de facto* border between the two states. The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC.

⁶⁸Malik, 88.

⁶⁹Ibid., 87.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., 89.

⁷²Sharma, “Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An overview of Defense and Military Cooperation.”

⁷³Malik, 90.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., 91.

⁷⁹Congressional Research Service, “India-US Relations,” <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/150780.pdf> (accessed 16 November 2011).

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “Security Environment – An Overview,” <http://mod.nic.in/forces> (accessed 16 August 2011); Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Annual Report 2010-2011,” <http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=2702> (accessed 16 August 2011).

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Gupta, 12.

¹⁰⁷The White House, *The National Security Strategy*, 2010.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Graham Allison and Douglas Dillon, “America’s National Interests: A Report from the Commission on America’s National Interests 2000,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2058/americas_national_interests.html (accessed 6 October 2011). The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs is a permanent research center located within the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Belfer was founded in 1973 as the 'Program for Science and International Affairs' within Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences to provide analysis on arms control and nuclear threat reduction. Following a grant from the Ford Foundation, the program was re-established as the Center for Science and International Affairs, becoming the first permanent research center at the newly formed School of Government.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Ashley J. Tellis, “What Should We Expect from India as a Strategic Partner,” in *Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation*, ed. Henry Sokolshki (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 244.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Ibid., 244.

¹²⁸Ibid., 247, For a detailed analysis of this matter, see Ashley J. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” in Khalilzad, et al., 203-240.

¹²⁹Ibid., 244.

¹³⁰Ibid., 246.

¹³¹Excerpted from the Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, US Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the US Pacific Command Posture, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Willard%2004-12-11.pdf> (accessed 8 October 2011).

¹³²Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> (accessed 23 November 2011).

¹³³US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation,” http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/20111101_NDAA_Report_on_US_India_Security_Cooperation.pdf (accessed 21 November 2011).

¹³⁴Embassy of India, “India’s Foreign Policy-50 Years of Achievement,” http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/fp%28intro%29.htm (accessed 4 October 2011).

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

¹³⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

¹⁴²*Ibid.*

¹⁴³*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations.”

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹Gurmeet Kamal, “Indo-US Defence Cooperation: Forging Ahead,” http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=19&u_id=7 (accessed 15 October 2011).

¹⁵⁰Dinesh Kumar, “Defense in Indo-US Relations,” *Strategic Analysis*, August 1997. Quoted in Malik.

¹⁵¹Malik, 83.

¹⁵²Sharma, “Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An overview of Defense and Military Cooperation.”

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴Defense Industry Daily, “US-India Sign 10 Year Defense Pact,” <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-india-sign-10year-defense-pact-0783/> (accessed 19 August 2011).

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

¹⁵⁷“New Dimension in India-US Cooperation,” *The Naval Review*, 83, no. 4 (January 1995): 323; Malik.

¹⁵⁸US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

¹⁵⁹US Department of Defense, “Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation,” <http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2006/d200600302indo-usframeworkformaritimesecuritycooperation.pdf> (accessed 20 November 2011).

¹⁶⁰US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, “The Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA500476&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 22 November 2011).

¹⁶⁶US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Excerpted from report to Congress on US-India Security Cooperation.

¹⁶⁹US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

¹⁷⁰Excerpted from report to Congress on US-India Security Cooperation.

¹⁷¹US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

¹⁷²*Ibid.*

¹⁷³Leading Indian newspaper, *The Hindu*, “US removes Indian companies from Entity List” 25 January 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1123708.ece> (accessed 2 October 2011).

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵Premvir Das, “Indo-US Engagement at Crossroads,” *Business Standard*, 1 May 2011, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/premvir-das-indo-us-engagement-atcrossroads/434038/> (accessed 10 October 2011).

¹⁷⁶John H Gill, “US-India Military to Military Interaction,” in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation: Into the 21st Century*, eds. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 127.

¹⁷⁷Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations.”

¹⁷⁸The CISMoa requires purchasers of U.S. defense equipment to ensure that equipment supplied to India is compatible with other American systems. The BECA provides for mutual logistical support and enables exchanges of communications and related equipment. The LSA permits armed forces of both countries to enjoy reciprocal use of facilities for maintenance, servicing, communications, refueling, and medical care. New Delhi is wary of LSA provisions, which some there believe could lead to India’s being caught up in U.S. regional military operations (“US and India Urged to Complete Defense Cooperation Deals,” *Jane’s Defence Industry*, June 2, 2010). Quoted in Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, 86.

¹⁷⁹Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations,” 86.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁸¹Net Assessment Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,” in Varun Sahni, “Limited Cooperation between Limited Allies,” in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation: Into the 21st Century* eds. Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (New York: Routledge, 2006), 181.

¹⁸²Gill, 120.

¹⁸³Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, “The Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions.”

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵Gill, 121.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 122.

¹⁸⁷Bahukutumbi Raman, “Indo-US Counterterrorism Cooperation: Past, present, and future.”

¹⁸⁸Khalistan refers to a global political secessionist movement to create a separate Sikh state, called *Khālistān*, and carved out of parts mostly consisting of the Punjab region of India, depending on definition. The movement reached its zenith in 1970s and 1980s, flourishing in the Indian state of Punjab, which has a Sikh-majority population and has been the traditional birthplace and homeland of the Sikh religion. Pakistan provided training, logistics, and moral support to Khalistani terrorists. However, the movement virtually died in early 1990s due to Government of India’s coherent and determined counterinsurgency policy.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 157.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Ibid., 158.

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

¹⁹⁶Nayak, 138.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 132.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 133.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., 134.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹U.S. Department of State, “Countries Reports on Terrorism,” <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm> (accessed 25 August 2011).

²⁰²Nayak, 138.

²⁰³C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterrorism Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG141.pdf (accessed 4 October 2011).

²⁰⁴Ibid.

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Nayak, 141.

²⁰⁷U.S. Department of State, "U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168745.htm#> (accessed 20 August 2011).

²⁰⁸Ibid.

²⁰⁹Fair, "The Counterterrorism Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India."

²¹⁰Ibid.

²¹¹Narayan Lakshman, "Trust deficit hinders India-US Counterterrorism cooperation," *The Hindu*, 15 September 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2456301.ece> (accessed 5 October 2011).

²¹²Ibid.

²¹³Ibid.

²¹⁴Ibid.

²¹⁵Ibid.

²¹⁶Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab is a Pakistani Islamic terrorist who was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Kasab is the only attacker captured alive by the Indian police and is currently in Indian custody. The Government of Pakistan initially denied that Kasab was from Pakistan, but in January 2009, it officially accepted that he was a Pakistani citizen. On 3 May 2010, an Indian court convicted him of murder, waging war on India, possessing explosives, and other charges and eventually sentenced him to death on four counts and to a life sentence on five other counts. Kasab has been sentenced to death for attacking Mumbai and killing 166 people on 26 November 2008 along with nine Pakistani terrorists. He was found guilty of 80 offenses, including waging war against the nation, which is punishable by the death penalty; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ajmal_Kasab (accessed 5 November 2011).

²¹⁷David Coleman Headley, formerly known as Daood Sayed Gilani, is a Chicago-based Pakistani American, who conspired with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and, he claims, Pakistani military officers to launch the 2008 Mumbai attacks and other terrorist activity. He changed his Islamic name to a Christian name to hide his Pakistani-Muslim identity to make travel to India easier. Since his arrest and guilty plea, Headley has been cooperating with U.S. and Indian authorities, and has yielded much information about his associates.

²¹⁸Lisa Curtis, “US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership,” Testimony before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/09/us-india-counterterrorism-cooperation-deepening-the-partnership> (assessed 5 October 2011).

²¹⁹Ibid.

²²⁰Ibid.

²²¹Ibid.

²²²Ibid.

²²³Dennis C. Blair, former Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf (assessed 24 October 2011).

²²⁴Ibid.

²²⁵The White House, “The US-India Partnership: the fact sheets,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/us-india-partnership-fact-sheets> (accessed 13 November 2011).

²²⁶Ibid.

²²⁷Congressional Research Service, “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and US Relations,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> (accessed 12 November 2011).

²²⁸Ibid.

²²⁹Dr. Sahibzada Amer Latif, “US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership,” Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non Proliferation, and Trade, http://csis.org/files/ts110914_Latif.pdf (accessed 12 November 2011).

²³⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

An analysis of overall security cooperation, the *NSS*, and bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation indicates that the United States is pursuing a policy of developing security cooperation with India to further its security objectives in Asia. This endeavor is based on an assumption that the proliferation of strong democratic states in Asia represents the best insurance against intercontinental instability as well as against threats that may emerge against the United States and its regional presence. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns testifying before the House International Committee on September 8, 2005 stated, “By cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India’s rise brings to the region and the world.”¹ Furthermore, George Perkovich in his essay, “Is India a major power?” argues that deepened India-United States relations that have the effect of strengthening India make strategic sense whether or not India supports the United States on a range of political issue because:

India is too big and too important in the overall global community to measure in terms of its alignment with any particular US interest at any given time. It matters to the entire world whether India is at war with its neighbors, is producing prosperity or poverty for its citizens, stemming or incubating the spread of infectious diseases, or mimicking or leapfrogging climate warming technologies. Democratically managing a society as big, populous, diverse, and culturally dynamic as India is a historical challenge . . . this capacity to do things on one’s own is autonomy, a form of power that India has achieved to its great credit.²

In order to take the relationship of security cooperation between India and the United States to a higher level, a larger overview of national interests and the strategic

security challenges India will face in the near future will be required. If India wants a multipolar Asia and multipolar world with India as one of the pillars, relations with the US will play a significant role in accomplishing these objectives. That the China factor is presently been downplayed by both nations is also one of the key reasons for improved India-US security cooperation. As of now, neither containment nor confrontationist policy with China is in favor of each nation since the economic interest of both the nations are closely linked with China. Although India does not want to be regarded as an element in the US strategy toward China, the US, undoubtedly offers the best opportunity for India to ensure the peaceful growth of China and ensure that China does not assume a hegemonic role in Asia. Moreover, US support is necessary in securing a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, one of the primary objectives of India's foreign policy.

Analysis of defense cooperation shows a significant upward trajectory in the changed international scenario after the end of the cold war. From minimal defense cooperation until the early 1990s, defense cooperation has improved based on present geo-political realities and convergence of strategic objectives. There has been a positive shift in all aspects of defense cooperation. The US has openly acknowledged India's growing geo-political importance and the role it can play in fighting global challenges like terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. The China factor has also influenced cooperation between the two nations as they closely watch emerging China and its implications in Asia and the World.

The Indian Ocean is another important factor that is continuously shaping defense cooperation between the two nations. "India's strategic location in the Indian Ocean, across the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) linking West Asia and East Asia makes

India attractive to US military.”³The importance of the Indian Ocean brings naval cooperation to the forefront of defense cooperation. Indian and US navies are constantly engaging in joint training, fighting piracy, and overall maritime security.

India is one of the key rising powers of the World and will exert significant leverage in the near future. Moreover, both nations share many interests and values as indicated in the “common national interest” section of the previous chapter. At this moment, both countries are strategically aligned to take the relationship to the next level. At the same time, this partnership must not be taken for granted because situations in the future may put both countries at odds. Therefore, the political leadership in both the countries should work extensively to make the best of when the interests are relatively aligned. While both the nations must work to enhance cooperation, the US must respect India’s sovereignty and freedom in foreign policy and must not treat India as a secondary partner. On the other hand, India must make adequate changes in its foreign policy to undertake additional responsibility for dealing in international security issues.

Recommendations

The analysis of the history of India-US security cooperation suggests that the cooperation between the two countries was affected by the perceptions of divergent worldviews. Divergence in national security interests leads to an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. Although security cooperation has shown tremendous improvement over the years manifesting in meaningful partnership and cooperation on many global issues, some of the historical differences continue to be roadblocks to an optimal cooperation. Therefore, in order to forge a stronger security partnership, it is essential that historical differences be bridged through open dialogue. While there are significant challenges to

the joint effort, the common security interests of both nations demand a stronger relationship. In order to rejuvenate the relationship, the following recommendations are offered:

In the past India has been accused of lacking adequate strategic direction.⁴ Therefore, India must articulate its national security strategy. The security strategy must outline the goals, ways, and means to achieve those goals. A formal security strategy will give the US a better understanding of India's goals and the roadmap to achieve those goals, therefore providing direction to align the ways and means to achieve common ends. India must also understand that the US, because of its current position in the international order and varied national interests, has many international priorities and can move dynamically between those priorities. While the US must show consistency in its relationship with India, "Indian policymakers should attempt to recognize the bureaucracy to prepare itself, so that when India is in the United States' bureaucratic spotlight the two countries can move quickly to strike while the iron is hot and make progress quickly."

The present day structure of the UN Security Council does not reflect the distribution of power within the world and specifically, fails to acknowledge India's growing stature and position in the global order. In order to give a meaningful push to strategic cooperation, the United States should commit publicly to support India's membership in an enlarged UN Security Council. Although US leaders have of late supported India's bid to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, they have not taken the necessary action to make it happen. India as a permanent member of the Security Council will be in the US national interests since both nations have, with few

exceptions, consensus on global security issues. India is also the second largest troop contributor to the United Nations and its contributions have continuously been valued. One of the reasons the US is not wholeheartedly supportive of India's permanent membership is because of differences on a few global issues. India and the United States must work together to examine these contentious issues and develop consensus and collaboration to mitigate them.

India traditionally has shown disdain towards unilateralism preferring to support multilateral organizations. India and the US also differ in their policy towards Iran and Burma/Myanmar. The US must understand India's growing energy needs and the importance of maintaining a relationship with these countries. In fact, the US can leverage India's relations with these countries to reach out to them.

India and the US have a tremendous scope and potential in spreading the growth of democracy in the world since democracy is the inherent strength of both countries. However, differences between the two countries on the definition of democracy manifest in policy disagreements about countries like Pakistan and Burma/Myanmar. Whereas the US has been openly supportive of military regimes and military backed quasi-democracy in Pakistan, the US accuses India of not exercising enough pressure on Burma/Myanmar to embrace democracy. India is the best example of a successful model of a diverse, non-Western democracy. India was one of the 10 founding members of the Community of Democracies and a co-founder and contributor to the UN Democracy Fund. The spread of Democracy is one of the key tenets of the US Security Strategy and there cannot be a better model than India, one that appeals to many.

The defense trade is an important component of enhanced defense cooperation. Although, defense sales have made significant progress over the past decade, they have still not achieved their expected potential. Technology transfer lies at the heart of this problem. India believes the US export system hinders India's acquisition of high technology defense items. At the same time, India's current reluctance to allow foreign investment in the defense sector also limits defense sales. In addition, the outstanding agreements like CISMOA and LSA hinders India's ability to acquire high-end defense technology. While the US must make changes in its export control measures, India must also look at these outstanding agreements holistically.

Both governments should consider consolidating the various dialogues, rules, and regulations regarding export controls and technology transfer into a single forum that addresses dual use, munitions and civil nuclear trade. The forum should be led by an appropriate senior official from each nation with the authority to resolve overlapping regulatory and policy issues relating to export controls.⁵

The government of India should consider adhering to the policies of two important multilateral agreements, the Wassenaar Arrangement⁶ and the Australia Group⁷, which would establish greater confidence in India's export control system and open the door to more significant liberalization of US export control. The US must support India's inclusion to these regimes.⁸

The US Commerce Department should consider modifications to the Validated End User program that will make the program less burdensome and more appealing to US and Indian industries. The Commerce Department should also implement the intra

company license exceptions and other initiatives that would facilitate dual use trade with India.⁹

The United States and India should discuss how to facilitate the timely conclusion of Technical Assistance Agreements and Manufacturing Licensing Agreements, which are important for technology transfer and manufacturing activities in India. The U.S. government should examine whether licensing entire defense projects to India, rather than each stage of such projects, could be permitted.¹⁰

The government of India should consider revising its offset policy to make it more transparent and predictable, which would encourage greater defense technology transfers and investment in India. In addition, India should consider raising its limit on foreign direct investment in the defense sector from the current 26 percent limit to 49 percent or more.¹¹

India offers one of the best training opportunities with varied terrain from ice clad mountains to vast deserts. India also has an extensive counterinsurgency training facilities developed from its vast experience in fighting the insurgency and terrorism over the past 60 years. The US and India can make use of these realistic training facilities to share good practices in fighting insurgency and terrorism.

India and the US must also enhance interoperability between their forces. Although this aspect has shown considerable improvement over the years with increased interaction through regular joint exercises and exchange of military students and visiting delegations, both countries must undertake certain institutional steps like concluding a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and a mutual Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). To maximize exchange and better

understanding of each other's' armed forces India and the US must expand the number of officers attending professional military schools in both countries.

The relationship with the US is critical for India to accomplish its national security objectives. For an enhanced relationship, defense cooperation is a vital and inescapable requirement; therefore, defense cooperation must intensify. Premvir Das, former Director General, Defense Planning Staff, and a former member of the National Security Advisory Board offers some key suggestions to build stronger security cooperation: first, the existing military interfaces and acquisitions should proceed apace; second, both countries should be in agreement on India's interests in the Indian Ocean Region and act in a manner that will sustain them; third, maritime forces of both countries must act together in a campaign against piracy in the Indian Ocean; fourth, India must be prepared to render military assistance in 'out of area' contingencies; and, finally, the US must take punitive measures against acts of terrorism originating in and/or sponsored from Pakistan.

To facilitate more effective cooperation, the US Department of Homeland Security and India's Home Ministry must become the pivotal agencies to deal with counterterrorism issues. Both these departments must share best practices, lessons learned and sharing intelligence to prevent future terrorist attacks. India must give more freedom of action to its Home Ministry to deal directly on a counterterrorism agenda.

The US must acknowledge India's legitimate concerns about terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The US must identify the connections between the terrorist groups operating against India and Afghanistan. Therefore, LeT should be given the same importance as al-Qaeda and Taliban. The US should also apply genuine pressure on

Pakistan to dismantle the militant infrastructure in Pakistan. Because of current strategic interests in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the US will push Pakistan aggressively on this issue; however, this ambiguity is harmful for regional stability in the region.

The US must acknowledge India's genuine concern with and interest in the current situation and future of Afghanistan. As the US heads towards a possible drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, it must look at the significant role India can play in resolution of the Afghanistan crisis. India had long civilization ties with Afghanistan and has strong legitimate strategic interests in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Moreover, the situation in Afghanistan directly affects the security of India. India has also strongly opposed the Taliban government in the past. India, unlike Pakistan, has been a responsible stakeholder in Afghanistan and has contributed significantly in Afghanistan's development, stability and security. Therefore, the US must encourage India's role in Afghanistan. India and Afghanistan recently signed a strategic partnership agreement expanding the scope of India's commitment in Afghanistan ranging from development and reconstruction to rendering security assistance extending from military training to capacity building of the Afghan forces. By expanding India's role in Afghanistan, the vital national security interests of both nations are honored. Enhancing India's role in Afghanistan will also provide the US a solid tool to leverage Pakistan to demonstrate their genuine commitment in the fight against the Taliban. The US must also involve India more inclusively in the capacity-building efforts of the Afghan National Forces. India-US security cooperation is at a defining moment due to the convergence of national interests of both nations, presently and in the near future.

With the US forces drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014, US dependence on Pakistan will reduce significantly. The US is also likely to offer military and economic aid with far more conditions attached to it and require Pakistan's genuine commitment to fighting the extremists. Therefore, it is valid to assume that the "Pakistan factor" would no longer queer India-US relations. India will be eager to fill the vacuum left by the US withdrawal and therefore, likely to play a proactive role in the capacity building effort of Afghanistan-a positive development for India-US security cooperation.

India faces terrorist threats not only from Pakistan but also from other countries in the region since these terrorist groups are successful in exploiting the porous borders. Numerous incidents of terrorists and illegal arms entering India from Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and the Gulf countries have occurred in the recent past. These terrorist groups have regularly exploited the weak governments and ongoing conflicts in these countries and used them as transit routes, launch pads, and training bases for terrorist activities in India and its neighbors. Therefore, "India and the United States must explore possibilities for working together on strengthening borders, building counterterrorist capability, improving maritime security, and improving the professionalism of security forces in India's neighboring states."¹² India must view this trilateral cooperation as an opportunity. On the other hand, US must honor India's sensitivities towards such cooperation in its immediate neighborhood and whenever possible such efforts must happen in close coordination with India.

To conclude, India-US security cooperation, which was marginal in the Cold War period, had made significant gains in the last two decades. Both nations share important security interests and therefore have a high stake in increasing the scope, quality and

intensity of security cooperation to take it to a new level. The relationship for a long time has been plagued by mutual suspicion and misperception that have impeded collaboration between the two largest democracies. However, the convergence of key security interests has presented a unique opportunity that must be exploited by both nations in order to secure enhanced and lasting security cooperation. The strong security cooperation benefits both countries as it secures common national interests, promotes peace and stability in Asia, tackles global challenges like terrorism, and ensures the global balance of power.

¹R. Nicholas Burns, “The US and India: An emerging Entente?” Remarks as prepared for the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2028_1/Burns.pdf (accessed 4 October 2011).

²George Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power?” *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no.1 (Winter 2003-04): 142-143.

³Sharma.

⁴Ashley J. Tellis, “India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal,” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2008/MR1127part1.pdf, (accessed 5 October 2011).

⁵Kenneth I. Juster and Ajay Kuntamukkala, “Unleashing US-India Defense Trade,” <http://www.cnas.org/node/5125> (accessed 8 October 2011).

⁶The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities, which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. For more on Wassenaar Arrangement also see their website <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html>.

⁷The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries, which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfill their obligations under the

Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. For more on the Australia Group, also see their website <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html>

⁸Juster and Kuntamukkala, “Unleashing US-India Defense Trade.”

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Richard L. Armitage, R. Nicholas Burns, and Richard Fontaine, “Natural Allies: A Blue Print for the Future of US-India Relations,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Natural%20Allies_ArmitageBurnsFontaine.pdf (accessed 7 October 2011).

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