

MISC

N-13757

PUBLIC RELATIONS

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N-13757

ANALYTICAL STUDIES SUBCOURSE

PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

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Submitted by Committee No. 24

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend principles governing the missions, control, and methods to be employed in regard to public relations in theaters of operations in future wars.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Prior to World War II there was no clear-cut War Department public relations policy defining mission, control, or methods for use by theater commanders. As a result, public relations developed in the theaters of operations to fit existing local situations. In both theaters there were instances of lack of coordination between theater and War Department releases resulting in unfavorable public reaction. (Appendices A and E.)

3. As a result of World War II experiences, a public relations policy has been issued by the War Department which has effected better standardization in all theaters, but still permits wide latitude of interpretation by theater commanders. (Annex I - Appendix A.)

4. During operations strong emphasis was placed on public relations with the mission of telling the story of theaters to the American and Allied Public. In so far as was consistent with military security and good relations with our allies, theater policies strongly emphasized freedom of the press as paramount. Public relations was designated a command responsibility, and all units were directed to appoint personnel with public relations duties. (Appendices B & C.)

5. In the ETO, Public Relations Division, SHAEP was the control agency and supervised all press censorship activities. Press censorship was delegated as low as the army, with the categories of releasable news at each level prescribed. This system permitted rapid transmission of news by war correspondents from Army Press Camps. (Appendix B) In the Pacific, CINCPAC and GHQ, SWPA each exercised complete control over censorship and public relations but decentralized to armies or separate task forces when the situation warranted it. (Appendix C)

6. Professional war correspondents recognized by the War Department were the chief media through which public relations was exercised. In the ETO these correspondents were assigned to Army Groups and armies which maintained Press Camps to furnish them accommodations, transportation, censorship, and communications. In the Pacific, correspondents were assigned down to divisions or separate task forces. The principal duty of public relations personnel was to facilitate news reporting by these correspondents. (Appendices B & C).

7. Although T/O&Es did not provide for it, public relations staff sections were set up in all headquarters down through Army and in some cases Corps; in Corps it was usually a subsection of G-2. The latter arrangement proved unsatisfactory and the European Theater General Board recommended that public relations be a special section directly under the Chief of Staff in Corps and Army Headquarters. In divisions and lower units, public relations were irregular both in organization and results. Public relations personnel and equipment were inadequate in units below the Army. (Appendices B & C)

8. The value of home community publicity was recognized, and PROs were directed to secure as many home town news releases as possible. However, results could have been improved upon by better public relations organization in lower echelons. (Appendices B & C)

9. In some cases, theater newspapers were loosely controlled and not properly coordinated with public relations divisions. However, WD Circular

103, 6 April 46, should correct this situation.

10. The broad public relation mission in force during the operational phase remained the same during the occupational phase. However, there are the additional problems of utilization of captured press and radio facilities. These media are used as tools of both military government and public relations. (Appendices D and E)

11. In the European Theater there are two headquarters equally responsible for public relations, HQ, OMGUS and HQ, USFET. This is not true in the Pacific Theater. Here a special staff section is responsible to the Supreme Commander on all public relations matters. (Appendices D & E)

12. Except for relaxation of press censorship control, the methods of contact with American press and radio as previously established during operational phase, remain the same during the occupational phase. (Appendices D & E).

CONCLUSIONS

*Control
- June 46
- amended 1946* {
13. The War Department's public relations mission and directive to theater commanders, contained in AR 600-700 are too broad and should be more clearly defined.

14. The mission of public relations should include the development of morale and esprit de corps among troops by publicizing the achievements of units and individuals in their home communities.

line out {
15. There is a definite need for the addition of an organic public relations section to the staffs of all headquarters down through divisions and comparable units.

16. There is a need for more coordination between War Department and theaters in order to avoid official announcements getting into the press or radio before they are transmitted to concerned headquarters through official channels.

17. Theater headquarters should exercise complete control over administration and coordination of public relations matters, except during operations, when control should be decentralized down to armies or separate task forces in order to facilitate rapid transmission of news releases to the United States.

18. During operations there is a need for the assignment of a Publicity Service Unit to each Army Headquarters in order to provide for war correspondents and operate press camps.

19. With the exception of the necessity for public relations personnel and equipment in units mentioned in Pars 15 and 18 above, the various methods used in public relations by theaters, during both operations and occupation, were sound and effective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. That Par I b, AR 600-700, 10 Jan 1946, be amended to read as shown in Appendix F in order to define more clearly the War Department's policy on public relations.

21. That an adequate public relations staff section be included in the T/O&Es of all headquarters down to and including the division or comparable unit.

22. That the War Department not release for publicity purposes, changes in policy until after theater commanders have been informed through official channels. Likewise the War Department should be informed of changes of theater policy before they are publicized.

23. That Theater Headquarters decentralize public relations control, during the operational phase only, down to the army or separate task force level to facilitate rapid transmission of news release to the U.S. During the occupational phase, control should be centralized under Occupation Force Headquarters.

24. That during operations a Publicity Service Unit, similar to the units of the 72d Publicity Service Bn, consisting of sufficient personnel and equipment to provide accommodations, transportation, and communications for correspondents, be assigned to armies and separate task forces to operate press camps, and that T/O&Es be changed to provide for this.

25. That the principle of utilizing professional newspaper correspondents, and exercising public relations through them, as practiced in all theaters in World War II, is sound and should be continued in future wars.

APPENDIX A

To

PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

During World War I, the need for new methods of influencing public opinion to support a nation's war aims, to counteract enemy propaganda, and to cause neutrals to decide in favor of particular groups, was recognized by all nations. Public relations during this period, of necessity, became a matter then of public information. The War Department made excellent use of public relations during the war period, but soon after withdrew into its time honored shell and shunned, as though it were leprosy, public relations.

World War II caught the War Department flat-footed as to a firm public relations policy. Not until 17 April 1942, when the War Department published Circular 113, was a policy announced. This policy affected all military personnel on active duty but did not include retired military personnel. Moreover the circular while stating the policy of the War Department was remiss in announcing control measures, only mentioning the "Codes of Wartime Practices"; control measures issued by the Office of Censorship for newspapers, magazines and radio.

On 7 October 1942, War Department Circular 337 prescribed control measures to prevent dissemination of information which might be of value to the enemy and also set up a standard for the guidance of all military personnel on active duty. It was not until 4 November 1942, when War Department Circular 363 was published, that retired military personnel were also restricted by War Department policy.

From time to time, the basic War Department policy and control measures were revised and brought up-to-date by publications of War Department Circulars. The last War Department Circular, Number 62, dated 2 March 1946 rescinded all War Department Circulars preceding its publication and remains in effect until 2 September 1947 unless rescinded or superseded. (Annex I)


As a result of World War II experience, it was felt necessary to prescribe a War Department policy for the mission, policies and control measures for Army Newspapers. Consequently on 6 April 1946, War Department Circular 103 was published. (Annex III)

Army Regulation 600-700, the guide and policy for Public Relation officers and all commanders, was revised during the period described above, and the latest publication, dated 10 January 1946, is a result, too, of World War II experiences. The mission, described as the "broad mission," is too broad in that it does not define the mission with sufficient clarity. (Annex II)

Appendix A

2 Annexes

- I - WD Cir 62, 6 Mar 46.
- II - AR 600-700, 10 Jan 46.
- III - WD Cir 103, 6 Apr 46.



WD CIR 62, 6 MAR 46

ANNEK I - APPENDIX A.

2
A

AR 600-700

~~10 JAN 46~~

16 AUG 46

ANNEX II - APPENDIX A

3
A

WD CIR 106, 6 APR 46

ANNEX III - APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

To

Public Relations in a Theater of Operations

Public Relations in the ETO

Operations Phase

The importance of public relations to the national war effort was well recognized in the ETO, and considerable effort was directed on these functions. In this theater, public relations activities at higher headquarters were generally well handled and successful, but decreased in effectiveness at lower echelons.

The mission of public relation efforts in this theater was to tell the story of the theater to the American and Allied public in a manner that would reflect credit on the military forces, and to prevent the release of information that would be detrimental to the conduct of military operations. The concept of this mission was good, and it was executed in a liberal and sympathetic manner through the medium of official releases and pictures, and the activities of accredited war correspondents and photographers. The principle of freedom of the press was accepted as paramount and only two reasons were accepted for refusing to publish news, i.e.,

1. Observance of security requirements, including the need for carrying out training and operations without interference, and
2. Nothing to be published that would materially injure good relations with our Allies.

It was emphasized in theater policy that the supervisory power over publication was to be used sparingly and in no way to be construed as limiting the freedom of activity of accredited or recognized correspondents. Freedom to criticize and point unfavorable news was recognized as an important part of the freedom of the press. Public relations was specifically designated as a function of command, and was directed to be decentralized as far as practicable.

Army Groups and Armies were given the following public relations missions:

1. Inform the world press of the activities and operations of the unit.
2. Insure the support of public opinion for the command.
3. Facilitate the prompt release of news of military operations.
4. Provide for the prompt dispatch of news and photographs by electrical transmissions, by courier, and other means.
5. Provide accommodations for correspondents and official visitors to the command and facilitate the accomplishment of their missions.

These principles upon which the theater policy was based were sound, but in their execution two weaknesses were exhibited, i.e.,

1. The strong emphasis on freedom of the press caused the great majority of people concerned to err on this side rather than that of telling the story in a manner so as to reflect credit on the military forces.

2. The lack of trained competent personnel concentrating on public relations in a unit lower than the Army Hqs caused the decentralization to be ineffective and inefficient.

The Public Relations Division, SHAEF was charged with the control of public relations matters, and guided the censorship activities of the major units. One important point in SHAEF control policy was that no US military personnel would be quoted directly or indirectly in material for publication until such material was cleared by the PRO, SHAEF. Press censorship was established at Army Group and Army levels to censor the news at its source and facilitate quick transmission. Its primary object was to prevent transmission of any matter that would violate security.

SHAEF reserved to itself decisions on matters of high policy and certain operational details such as casualty figures. Other censorship guidance was transmitted periodically to Army Groups and Armies. Certain definite categories of subjects were releasable at Army level, such as day to day situation reports, identification of enemy formation, data on prisoners taken, and data on the number of enemy guns and tanks destroyed. Before releasing any information to the press, material was first thoroughly checked with the G-2 and G-3 of the headquarters. Army Groups generally reserved to themselves the release of units and senior officers. The Army was the lowest unit to which press censorship was delegated.

Numerous difficult censorship problems were encountered, especially of operations. These were further complicated by the aggressive activities of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which sometimes broadcasted operations which had been blacked out on the Army level. There were instances of unnecessary delay in release of units, but in general press censorship was conducted effectively and to the best interests of the military operations.

All correspondents were either Accredited, permanently attached to a command, or recognized, permitted by the theater to temporarily visit a command. War Department passes and identification were required of all correspondents. Military personnel were permitted to serve as correspondents, under certain conditions, but under the same regulations as regular correspondents.

In order to implement the public relations policies in the European Theater a section on the special staff level was organized in each headquarters down to and including the Army. One Army, the Third, attached enough importance to this section to place it on the General Staff level, calling it the G-6 Section. Generally these sections were Publicity and Psychological Warfare Sections, but these two functions were too diverse and required different operating personnel so the grouping was not satisfactory. Some headquarters separated them into different sections before the end of hostilities, and subsequent recommendations emphasize that these matters are too unrelated to be in the same staff section.

Theater directed that each unit have personnel with public relations duties down to public relations noncoms in battalions. Generally, Corps and Divisions set up subsections under G-2 with personnel borrowed from other jobs. This arrangement was not satisfactory and the Theater General Board recommended that public relations and historical be combined as a subsection of the Chief of Staffs section in Army and Corps Headquarters. Units lower than Divisions usually appointed public relations personnel in addition to their other duties, and results were irregular and more often poor.

Experience in this theater indicates the definite need of a T/O Public Relations Section in every headquarters down to and including Division. To obtain proper results, trained personnel with sole public relations duties should be assigned to regiments and battalions.

Correspondents were assigned by SHAEF to Army Group and Armies who established press camps to assist and accommodate them. Communications equipment including wireless, radio, and teletype were located at the press camps for direct traffic to the United States. Communications were excellent and experience clearly demonstrated the soundness of the policy of providing war correspondents with high speed transmission near the front, adequate transportation, and as good accommodations as could be obtained in a combat zone. Service to war correspondents was always a primary concern of PRO's and SHAEF organized the 72d Publicity Service Bn to perform these functions, attaching sections to each Army.

Correspondents were briefed daily and before important operations to give them a complete picture of tactical developments. Feature stories including views of service units, special awards, biographies, etc, were prepared by PROs and held an important place in the coverage of Army activities. Facility visits for special operations were used to emphasize newsworthy material.

The morale effect to troops of the publication in home papers of their achievements was recognized and efforts were made to receive a large production of home town news releases. The assembly of material for these releases was one of the most important duties of unit PROs and results were not entirely satisfactory due to the inadequacy of unit public relations organizations as previously discussed.

The Stars and Stripes Army Newspapers were separate from the Public Relations Division in the European Theater. However, their activities were closely tied together, and much of the news and publicity about the theater reached the US through this paper. These papers were practically free from censorship, except regarding matters of military security, and were allowed to operate pretty much as they desired. The resulting publicity was often detrimental to the military forces, and caused difficulties in public relations affairs. More rigid control over these papers and closer coordination with public relations is indicated.

Public relations in the ETO were conducted in an aggressive efficient manner and whereas the over-all results were good, "and many units maintained a substantial and continuous flow of home town news securing adequate publicity for their activities, others had little coverage in these fields, so important to the morale of troops and of vital interest to the public." A definite T/O Public Relations organization for all units is indicated from experience in this theater.

APPENDIX C

To

Report on Public Relations In a Theater of Operations

Public Relations During Operations in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater

In the Pacific Ocean Areas, CINCPAC, Admiral Nimitz's Headquarters, exercised complete control over the administration and coordination of censorship and public relations matters. All Army, Navy and Marine units in this theater followed the policy of, and cleared everything pertaining to public relations through CINCPAC.

CINCPAC's policy was to make information regarding operations compatible with military security, available through public media to the people of the United States at the earliest time. To implement this policy, public relations officers and censors were temporarily attached to subordinate commands from CINCPAC with the express purpose of processing and transmitting press copy, photographs and voice radio programs direct from scenes of operations to news agencies in the states.

Numerous factors in the Pacific made the job of public relations very difficult. The many amphibious operations, the complexity of command, and the great distances involved were a few headaches to public relations officers. In the Okinawa operation, CINCPAC had representatives from its headquarters with the staffs of Task Forces and subordinate commands. In addition, war correspondents and photographers representing the press and various magazines were assigned to Army, Navy and Marine units down through Divisions. War correspondents were the principal public media through which publicity was released. It was public relations job to keep correspondents properly briefed on the situation, get them ashore at the proper time or when they desired, take care of them ashore, and get their copy back to proper communication centers for transmission. During the amphibious phase of operations, press boats visited Corps beaches as well as command ships daily, collecting press material and returning it to the Task Force flag ship where releases amounting to 5,000 words on L day and 10,000 words each day thereafter, were transmitted by direct Navy radio to the United States when no interference with the tactical situation resulted. In addition, two courier planes made daily trips to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters at GUAM carrying film, photographs and additional copy which could not be transmitted by radio. In other words, daily communique were dispatched to the States by radio or sent to CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters on GUAM by courier plane for transmission from there. In addition, radio broadcasts direct to the US were made during the operation and a complete motion picture of the operation was made for newsreel release.

The Corps and Divisions of the ground forces including Army and Marines had much the same mission and policy for public relations as that announced by CINCPAC, except that the XXIV Corps (Army) emphasized the preparation of home town stories - stories which stressed the achievements of individual soldiers and were sent to their home town newspapers for publication.

Corps collected copy from Divisions four times daily and evacuated it to press boats or Yontan air fields for dispatch to Guam. In addition to releases on the operation proper, about 9,000 home town stories were prepared and sent to newspapers by the four Divisions of this Corps during the campaign.

The XXIV Corps organized a public relations section consisting of 1 officer and 1 enlisted man and placed it under G-2. In addition, this headquarters had

a public relations team and a photo assignment team both of which were attached from USAFPOA. The public relations team, consisting of 1 officer and 4 men, had as its primary mission the task of assisting and acting as rewrite personnel for war correspondents. The photo assignment team consisted of two officers and 8 men and was equipped with both motion and still cameras. Its job was to take combat pictures of the operation. The need for this additional personnel and equipment was readily realized but the method of attaching these teams on a temporary basis had many faults. The teams invariably joined the unit to which they were attached, late and short equipment. In most cases they had never been in combat before. One of the greatest faults was that they were attached only temporarily, had no knowledge of the organization they were working with, and therefore did not have the same incentive and interest in the organization as they would have had were they organic. Therefore the necessity of having organic in Corps and Divisions personnel and equipment which can originate professional news and photo copy in order to assist civilian correspondents seeking to inform the United States public of the activities of our forces, was time and time again borne out in combat in the Pacific.

There are no references at this school which provide a picture of how public relations was conducted in the Southwest Pacific Theater. However, according to officers who served there, its policies and control measures were much the same as those exercised by CINCPAC, except that individual units were not featured in the news as much as they were in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and control was not so decentralized.

The situation is much the same in regard to the China and the Burma-India Theaters. References from these theaters on public relations procedures are not available; however, it is assumed that the mission, control and methods utilized in public relations in these theaters varied little from those followed in other theaters.

Throughout the entire war the Marine Corps consistently received better publicity than any of the other services. This is undoubtedly the result of a very aggressive public relations policy. The Marines have always placed great emphasis on publicity particularly that which glorifies the Marine and the Corps. Each Marine Division has organic public relations personnel properly equipped to take action pictures and prepare news releases of operations. Their success certainly proves the necessity for more emphasis on public relations in the Army and the inclusion of public relations personnel in units down to and including the Division.

APPENDIX D

To

Public Relations in the Theater of Operations


Public Relations During Occupation Phase, European Theater

Consideration for public relations was included in Plan "Eclipse," the code name for the plans for operations in Europe in the event of German surrender. Many of the aspects of Operation "Overlord" applied equally as well to Operation "Eclipse." This was true of public relations.

Definitions, policies, control and methods, set forth in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Operational Memorandum Number 27 dated 25 April 1944 applied after Plan "Eclipse" became operational. Again, as in the Operational Memorandum referred to above, the final authority on all press censorship matters affecting Operation "Eclipse" was, as in Operation "Overlord," Supreme Headquarters. There was to be some regrouping of personnel initially, but the personnel for the performance of public relations was drawn from SHAEF personnel established for Operation "Overlord." Personnel to deal with local press, radio and other public relations media, was drawn from, and under operational policy of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF. This general policy was to remain in force until the termination of the Supreme Commander's responsibility.

After VE-Day, Germany was to be divided into four Zones of Occupation, American, British, Russian, and French. In each Zone, the Zone Commander exercised supreme Military Government authority in his respective Zone. The four Zone Commanders, as the Allied Control Authority, acting jointly under the basic aims and policies of the occupation of Germany contained in the Potsdam Agreement, decided matters affecting Germany as a whole. There was no central authority for public relations. Each zone acted independently for its own interests.

It would be well at this time to examine the US Military Government organization.




It should be borne in mind that this organization was superimposed on Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater which had replaced European Theater of Operations, United States Army. True, the commander in each headquarters was the same, nevertheless there was two headquarters with, in most cases, different operating personnel. This was true of public relations.

The Public Relations Division in ETOUSA remained as the Public Relations Division for USFET. The Psychological Warfare Division in ETOUSA became the Office of the Director of Information Control in the Office of Military Government, United States Army. However, added to this we have the additional public relations setup of OMGUSA which is in effect the office responsible for occupational public relations.

~~Chart Page 38. N 13442~~

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION CONTROL



The mission or basic responsibility of the Office of Director of Information Control is:

~~Quote Page 36. N 13442~~

1. To obtain agreement for uniform or coordinated policies with respect to control of public information media in Germany.
2. To determine and coordinate policy on the control and reconstitution of German information services in US controlled areas.
3. To obtain and report through Information Control channels, and make available to the Director of Intelligence, information in the following fields:

a. German reaction and attitudes toward American Military Government and German Civil Government.

b. German political activity in the US Zone and throughout Germany including purposes, programs, and leaders.

c. Evidence of trends towards nationalism, militarism, Pan-Germanism, and fascism.

d. Separatist movements.


e. Political effects of refugee movements.

This office is necessary and accomplished the desired result of selling USA to Germany.

Now a glimpse at the organization and basic responsibilities of the Office of Public Relations for OMGUSA.

~~Chart Page 41 N 13443~~

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS



The mission of this office is to furnish the American press, radio, and other media a complete and accurate account of US activities in the Military Government of Germany.

It is apparent that there is a duplication of effort. All United States troops in Germany are, in some way connected with OMGUSA. The divisions remaining as occupational troops in Germany are engaged primarily in occupational duties. The Constabulary, the other major force in Germany, is actually the Occupation Police Force. Yet we see that two offices charged with public

relations for the same troops are the Public Relations Division, USFET and the Office of Public Relations, OMGUS. True there is liaison contact between these two offices yet there is a strong likelihood of two distinct and separate presentations of the same news concerning the same troops to the same public.

This duplication was probably necessary as an interim measure, but its continued existence could only lead to confusion and hesitant, timid and doubtful, public relations. Public relations during occupation phase should be centralized in Occupation Headquarters. Two examples caused by decentralization can be cited. They are the furor created by the differences in OTB computed by HQ, OMGUSA and HQ, ETOUSA and also the publicity given ASR scores as a basis for redeployment.

APPENDIX E

To

Public Relations in the Theater of Operations

Public Relations in the Occupation of Japan

1. During the occupational phase in the Pacific the primary mission of public relations was to tell the story of the Army's activities in the rehabilitation of Japan and in the establishment of democratic principles and ideals in the minds of the Japanese.

2. In so far as the mechanics of public relations operations were concerned the chief difference between the operational phase and the occupational phase was the employment of media of expression in Japan. The same operating procedures previously established for contacts with war correspondents and with the American press and radio continued into the occupational phase. However, with the occupation of Japan, direct employment of a press and radio network available in Japan became another problem. Information disseminated through these media was public information and available to the entire world.

3. GHQ, SCAP organization included nine special staff sections to advise the Supreme Commander on various aspects of the occupation. One of these staff sections, the Civil Information and Education Section was responsible for policies on public information, including press, radio, motion pictures and theaters.

4. One of the first steps taken was to abolish the Domei News Agency. This agency was replaced by the Kyodo News Agency which began operations 1 Nov 1945. The Kyodo Agency supplies news to 60 Japanese Newspapers and is connected with Reuters, United Press and Associated Press.

5. Radio broadcasting is supervised by SCAP. The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, operated by Japanese, but supervised by SCAP, operates three networks. Number one network consisting of 100 stations covers the entire nation and broadcasts 15 hours daily. Number two network consists of 7 stations and covers the major metropolitan areas 4 evening hours a day. Number three network of 7 stations is used exclusively for the information and entertainment of American troops. It broadcasts 16 hours a day. SCAP initiated several new programs such as "The Man on the Street," "The Voice of the People," "The Woman's Hour," and "The Farm Hour," all of which contribute to democratization of Japan.

6. SCAP requires both press and radio to discuss action taken and directives issued by SCAP in such a way as to keep the public informed of the aims and accomplishments of the occupation forces. Restrictions imposed on news dissemination are:

- a. All news must adhere strictly to the truth.
- b. Distortion of news for propaganda purposes is prohibited.
- c. Criticism of Allied powers is prohibited.
- d. Security of troop movements must be maintained.
- e. All radio scripts are censored and all radio programs monitored.

7. The problems of information and public relations required comprehensive planning and use of all media. Analysis of results as reflected by editorial comment in both the US and Japan indicate that the occupation forces are accomplishing their mission and that the American public is pleased with the results. Essential features of this apparently successful program are:

- a. Full use of all media of expression.
- b. Emphasis on truthful presentation without distortion of facts.
- c. Coordination of information, public relations and censorship activities.

8. One serious mistake was made early in the occupation. This was a release by the theater pertaining to the troop requirements for the occupation. The War Department had made public a considerably higher estimate than that of SCAP. The result was a general wave of public criticism of the War Department for allegedly keeping many fathers, husbands, brothers and sons overseas unnecessarily. This public attitude was one of the factors responsible for widespread public clamor to speed up demobilization to an impractical rate. Close coordination between theater and War Department releases would have prevented this situation.

APPENDIX F

To

Public Relations in a Theater of Operations

AR 600-700
C 1

PERSONNEL

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Change)
No 1)

War Department
Washington 25, D.C.
21 June 1946

AR 600-700 10 January 1946 is changed as follows:

1. * * * * *

b. The mission of public relations is:

(1) To inform the public continuously on the state of the Military Establishment and its activities in a manner that will reflect credit on the Army and prevent non-releasable information from reaching the public. Only those news items should be refused publication which are:

- (a) Inaccurate.
- (b) Supply information to the enemy.
- (c) Injure good relations with our Allies.

(2) To develop morale and esprit de corps among troops by publicizing the achievements of units and individuals in their home communities through all public relations media.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

EDWARD F. WISELL
Major General
Acting the Adjutant General

Distribution

A

APPENDIX G

To

Public Relations in the Theater of Operations

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Control Office OMG (US)	Organization Manual Status Report 15 Mar 46	Archives N 13446
15th Army General Board Report	Organization of Army Hq	Archives R-12859
" " " "	Organization of Corps Hq	Archives R-12858
Supreme Allied Exp Force	Public Relations Operations	Archives S-7667
War Dept	Public Relations	Pamphlet Sec AR 600-700 10 Jan 46
War Dept		Cir 111 18 Mar 44
" "		Cir 113 17 Apr 42
" "		Cir 62 2 Mar 46
" "		Cir 72 28 Mar 46
" "		Cir 103 6 Apr 46
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War Dept		FM 30-25 FM 30-26
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ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEE NO. 24

Lt Col Dan C. Russell (Chairman)	Appendices A, D
Lt Col F. C. Bridgewater	Appendix C
Col J. W. Gurr	Appendix E, G
Lt Col J. S. Billups	Appendix B

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