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THE "SMALL CHANGE" OF SOLDIERING?
PEACE OPERATIONS AS PREPARATION FOR FUTURE WARS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., U.S.M.A., West Point, New York, 1983
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE “SMALL CHANGE” OF SOLDIERING? PEACE OPERATIONS AS
PREPARATION FOR FUTURE WARS by Major Mark S. Martins, U.S. Army,
270 pages.

This paper examines the effects of peace operations on the warfighting capability of U.S. Army combat forces. It focuses upon operations in the Sinai, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, and Bosnia, and relies upon survey data, unit status reports, interviews, historical accounts, after action reports, and other sources.

If properly exploited, peace operations can provide valuable preparation for future wars. Such operations exercise a broad set of capabilities—particularly in the areas of command and control, planning, logistics, deployment, intelligence, and small unit tasks—that are essential to effectiveness across the range of military operations. Their strongest potential contribution to readiness lies in the cultivation of human factors, such as self-discipline, initiative, decision-making ability, leadership skills, unit cohesion, and endurance. Moreover, their contribution to endurance appears to be duplicated by no other form of peacetime training.

A view nevertheless persists that peace operations detract from the Army’s primary mission. This view is rooted in a paradigm of readiness that assumed its present form during General William E. DePuy’s tenure at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of this paradigm and suggests an alternative that better accounts for human and other factors integral to readiness.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
ALO	authorized level of organization
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CINC	commander-in-chief
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
C-rating	Category-of-readiness rating
CTC	Combat Training Center
FMC	fully mission capable
GAO	General Accounting Office
GHQ	General Headquarters
HMMWV	High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
METL	mission essential task list
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MRC	major regional contingency
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MTW	major theater war

NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NSIAD	National Security and International Affairs Division
NTC	National Training Center
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPFOR	opposing force
OOTW	operations other than war
PLA	People's Liberation Army
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missiles
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USR	unit status report
ZOS	Zone of Separation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For there is a fundamental difference between the sort of sporadic, small-scale fighting which is the small change of soldiering and the sort we characterize as a battle.

John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*

This paper is a study of how peace operations may affect the ability of U.S. Army combat forces to fight in wars.¹ The word “may” is important. Predicting the performance of a military force at war against an unknown enemy, in unknown strength, with unknown objectives, on unknown terrain is no exact science. The following scene from a hypothetical future war serves both to stimulate concrete analysis and to suggest the many large gaps in knowledge that assumptions must fill.

¹ Although it will be necessary to place the definition within a broader context at various junctures in this paper, “peace operations” will be used initially as official Army doctrine defines the term. Thus, it will be “an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities: activities with [a] predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).” U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Dec. 1994), 111. “Peace-enforcement” will be “the application of military force, or the threat of its use, . . . pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” *Ibid.* “Peacekeeping” will be “military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents . . . [consisting of] monitor[ing] and facilitat[ing] implementation of an existing truce and support [to] diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.” *Ibid.* at 112. For discussion of the relationship between peace operations thus defined, other nontraditional operations, and war, see below notes 360-405 and accompanying text.

Another Task Force Smith?

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth studied the morning landscape through his binoculars.² Only a few of the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in the battalion-sized task force he commanded could still be seen behind their camouflage. His soldiers, proud members of the fabled 1st Cavalry Division, continued to work on hiding their fighting positions. The date was 5 July 2000. The landscape Myth studied was the Chagang-do province of North Korea. His eyes moved methodically along the road that ran from his front toward the northwest, where only thirty miles away—beyond Myth's view—the road crossed the Yalu River and entered China.

² I am indebted to Dr. Gary Bjorge and to Majors Jeff Ballmer, Dale Jones, and Victor Solero for their assistance in giving this scene realism and plausible detail. In addition, I relied on the following sources to develop the scene: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Field Manual 100-7-1: Army Pre-Positioned Afloat Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 1996); Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook* (1996) (entries and maps on North Korea and China); "Defence—China," in *Jane's Sentinel: China and North-East Asia* (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Ltd., 1995), 16-35; "China," in Institute for National Strategic Studies, "Strategic Assessment 1997" (Washington, D.C.: INSS, 1997); U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Student Text 100-3: Battle Book* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Jul. 1997), 2-1 to 2-21, 9-1, 10-1 to 10-36; "China Aims to Gain on U.S. Arms," *Kansas City Star*, 19 Sept. 1997; Jonathon Wright, "Aid Group: North Korean Famine Worse Than Thought," *Reuters News Service*, 16 Sept. 1997; Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Military Modernization: Motives, Objectives, and Requirements," in *China's Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 320-338; Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook* (1996) (including entries and maps on North Korea and China); P. Young, Main Battle Tanks, Light Tanks, and Helicopters of the Peoples Liberation Army [database online], available from <http://www.cs.umanitoba.ca/~jdeng/english/chinamil/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 November 1997 (hardcopy of this otherwise unpublished material in possession of author).

Myth's task force had arrived on the Korean peninsula two weeks earlier. The fourteen M-1 Abrams Tanks, thirty M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and assorted equipment and supplies that would outfit the task force rolled onto docks in Pusan harbor from ships pre-positioned at sea. From Pusan, the vehicles, equipment, and supplies moved by rail to Seoul. The men of the task force flew by military airlift from Fort Hood, Texas, to Osan Air Force Base near Seoul, where they joined their new vehicles. After three days of inspections, minor repairs, and uploading of fuel and other supplies, the task force roadmarched northward. In a column that often stretched five miles, Task Force Myth—as the men liked to call the impressive formation—steadily rode out of Seoul on heavy equipment transports, across the demilitarized zone between South and North Korea, through Pyongyang, to Kanggye, the capitol of Chagang-do province.

Lieutenant Colonel Myth's mission, which he received upon arriving in Chagang-do, was to defend against an expected attack by forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Before arriving, he had received the mission to provide security for humanitarian relief workers who were distributing food to starving North Korean villagers. In May of the year 2000, a United Nations Security Council resolution called upon a multinational force, led by the United States, to use all necessary means to secure the distribution of aid throughout the famine-stricken, unstable country. The North Korean government—led by men who in late 1999 toppled dictator Kim Jong-Il—approved the United Nations action and invited the multinational force to assist the international relief effort.

Reluctant for U.S. forces to be operating so close to its border, China had abstained from the Security Council vote on the resolution. Later, China issued dark warnings against the deployment of a multinational force to North Korea, placed its northeastern Army Group on alert, and began a series of maneuvers near its border with North Korea. As Task Force Myth rumbled north out of Kanggye into hasty defensive positions on the outskirts of the city, Chinese artillery could be heard across the Yalu, pounding hillsides on nearby training ranges.

Exactly fifty years earlier, enemy tanks charging southward near Osan, South Korea had overrun a battalion task force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Brad Smith. Lacking in adequate training, ammunition, and antitank weaponry, the earlier task force was to become in the 1990s a popular case study in unpreparedness.³

Seemingly well-armed and equipped, Task Force Myth had deployed to its battle positions in North Korea almost immediately after conducting peace operations in Bosnia. For the first six months of the new millenium, most of the soldiers in the task force had helped keep the fragile Bosnian peace first established in December of 1995,

³ See, for example, T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Case Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 97-107; Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in *America's First Battles*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1986), 266-99. In 1992, a widely distributed videotaped presentation on the challenges of downsizing the Army included the emphatic statement by the Chief of Staff of the Army that "[t]here will be no more Task Force Smiths!" Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, "Downsizing the Army: Some Policy Implications Affecting the Survivors," *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 20 (Winter 1994): 199, n. 10, quoting General Gordon Sullivan in "The Changing Army" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Visual Information Center, 1992) (A0122-VTC-92-00022).

when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began implementing an accord signed by the three major warring factions.⁴ Commander and men had been home at Fort Hood only a week when they received the ominous order to fly to Korea. As Lieutenant Colonel Myth finished scanning the horizon, he silently wondered whether the arduous but mostly nonviolent operations in Bosnia had left him and his soldiers prepared for heavy fighting. The tank and Bradley crews had received only limited gunnery and maneuver training during the six-month tour. They were bound to be rusty in these skills. Still, Myth had also noticed quantum improvements in his soldiers' discipline, initiative, leadership, and decision-making. These countervailing virtues were hard to measure.

Myth put down the binoculars and crawled inside his Bradley. The radio promptly cackled with the voice of his intelligence officer. "Sir," came the voice, "they're coming. An unmanned aerial vehicle sent out by brigade headquarters twenty minutes ago spotted Type 79 PLA tanks in battle formation just south of the Yalu and heading our way." Even before the intelligence officer's report ended, Myth heard the roar of aircraft overhead and emerged from his Bradley to spot two A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft flying low and fast toward the northwest, their wings bristling with missiles intended for the advancing PLA tanks. As the noise from the aircraft faded, Myth could hear and see Chinese missiles and artillery striking the ground less than two kilometers ahead of his most forward positions.

⁴ Appendix A contains the essential facts surrounding Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard conducted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December of 1995 to the present.

As war once again began to engulf the Korean Peninsula, U.S. leaders in Washington, D.C. were anxiously questioning whether post-Cold War peace operations had degraded or enhanced the military's ability to win a shooting war such as this. How had the six-month assignment to Bosnia affected Chris Myth and his soldiers? More significant, how would Task Force Myth and the forces supporting it fare against the PLA, and why?

Peace Operations and Combat Readiness

This imagined scene from a future war raises questions that are among the most controversial and important in military affairs today. Congressional committees, administration officials, uniformed leaders, and military analysts hotly debate the effects of peace operations on combat readiness. Inferences about these effects serve as linchpins in influential modern arguments for or against the Army's role, missions, doctrine, training, equipment, force structure, and budget.

For example, some commentators who infer that peace operations degrade warfighting ability proceed to argue that the Army should not participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other operations in support of diplomatic efforts, lest these forces lose the combat edge.⁵ Others who infer that peace operations have no

⁵ See, for example, Harry Summers, "Powell Echoes Grant in Focusing Military," *Army Times* (Sept. 27, 1993), 78. Note that throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated or indicated by context, "combat" will mean "armed fighting or battle." *Webster's New World Dictionary of the English Language*, 1978 ed. s.v. "combat." "Battle," following Keegan, will mean that type of armed fighting that "obey[s] the dramatic unities of time, place and action. . . ." in that it seeks to secure a decision on an identifiable battlefield "within a fairly strict time limit." John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), 14 "Readiness" will connote the capability of an army or military to

appreciable positive or negative effects on warfighting prowess argue that the Army should embrace unorthodox missions, including peace operations—lest the United States lose opportunities to replace the rule of violence with the rule of law in disparate regions

achieve objectives set within national strategy. “Warfighting ability,” and “warfighting prowess” will be interchangeable with “readiness.” Although my use of the term “readiness” corresponds to its meaning in normal conversation and helps to point up a rigidity in traditional military thinking, it is important to note that such a use is broader than technical Department of Defense terminology. Purists schooled in force management employ “military capability” to describe what I am terming “readiness” and would reserve the latter term to describe a relatively short-term characteristic that expresses only one portion of that capability:

military capability—(DOD) The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

- a. force structure—Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings.
- b. modernization—Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments.
- c. readiness—The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipments to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays).
- d. sustainability—The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort.

U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub. 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Dec. 1989), 228. A recent addition to the components of military capability, one not listed in the 1989 official definition, is “infrastructure and overhead,” which one authority describes as “installations, training base, and war production capacity/ability.” See U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *C430 Text: Resource Planning and Force Management* (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, January 1998), 18-2 (introducing the lesson on “Force Readiness” and describing the “five pillars” of military capability).

of the globe.⁶ Views about proper roles and missions for the Army, in turn, generate views about the proper focus of doctrinal field manuals, the emphasis of training, and the balance between light and armored forces.

Yet analysis of the crucial inferences about peace operations and warfighting ability reveal that these inferences are drawn from assumptions rather than from evidence. The purpose of this paper is to describe and then methodically challenge the dominant prevailing inferences and assumptions—to go slowly where others have tended to go fast. Survey data (existing as well as newly collected), unit status reports, interviews, historical accounts, and after action reports will provide the primary sources of evidence with which to fulfill this purpose. It is a worthy purpose, for the questions raised by our hypothetical Task Force Myth are not only controversial and important, they are difficult—and thus ill-suited to treatment by sound-bite.

Because the pace of peace operations shows no signs of slackening, the questions are also unlikely to go away. Since the entry into force in 1945 of the United Nations Charter, which established an apparatus for collective security and envisioned military operations ranging from peacekeeping and support of preventive diplomacy (Chapter VI) to peace enforcement (Chapter VII), more than thirty operations have taken place under United Nations auspices.⁷ This number does not include other military operations in

⁶ See, for example, James Burk, “Why Peacekeeping?” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 323-26.

⁷ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 538-41.

support of diplomacy, such as the Multinational Force Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai, which are sanctioned by the United Nations but carried out under separate agreements between member states. The end of the Cold War and, for the time being, the disappearance of the Russian veto from Security Council deliberations, has ensured a prominent role in peace operations for the United States, the lone remaining superpower. In the 1990s alone, peace operations have sent U.S. Army units to Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Hungary, Bosnia, and Rwanda.

The steady global demand for peace operations coincides with the persistent demand for U.S. participation in all types of operations short of war. Twenty years ago, a prominent study of U.S. military operations short of conventional war counted 215 overseas interventions between the years 1946 and 1975.⁸ Many of these included deployment of ground troops. A recent Congressional Research Service study counted an additional fifty-four overseas interventions short of war between 1981 and 1996.⁹ Sixteen of these occurred during the Reagan presidency, thirteen occurred during the Bush presidency, and twenty-five occurred during the first term of the Clinton presidency. One thing seems probable in an era of shrinking defense resources: the United States will be unable to reserve the likes of Task Force Myth solely for conventional battles.

⁸ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As A Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 16.

⁹ Congressional Research Service, *Report For Congress 96-119F: Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1995* (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1996).

The “Small Change” of Soldiering?

In historical terms, this paper will regard the current debate as part of a long tradition of contrasting operations short of war—to which peace operations generally belong—with war itself. The epigraph to this chapter highlights military historian John Keegan’s distinction, in a famous book about British battles at Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), and the Somme (1916), between “the sort of sporadic, small-scale fighting which is the small change of soldiering and the sort we characterize as a battle.” While examining various modern U.S. contingency operations, historian Lawrence Yates has found it useful to sort “nontraditional” or “unorthodox” military operations separately from “traditional warfare.”¹⁰

Among official writings, a U.S. Marine Corps manual in 1940 found it useful to categorize “small wars” separately from “wars.”¹¹ More recently, the U.S. Army experimented with “low-intensity conflict”¹² and, later, “operations other than war,”¹³ two short-lived variations on the small wars theme.¹⁴ Today, the Army seems prepared to

¹⁰ Lawrence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes, *Military Review* (Oct. 1997): 51.

¹¹ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940). The same distinction is employed today by the *Small Wars and Insurgencies* journal, published by Frank Cass, London.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: 5 Dec. 1990).

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: June 1993), 2-0.

¹⁴ Colonel David Fastabend, in “The Categorization of Conflict,” *Parameters* (Summer 1997): 75-87, describes the Army’s abandonment of both terms.

adopt “stability and support operations” as the counterpoise to traditional “offensive” and “defensive” operations.¹⁵ Although these distinctions cannot be conflated into a single distinction without wrecking their authors’ intentions, each nevertheless has served the time-honored function of placing the variety of less consuming military operations into contrast with war. In this paper, the point of the contrast will be to isolate whether and how the former should figure into preparation for the latter.

In the end, a host of specific recommendations will flow from this paper’s principal conclusion that peace operations are a valuable training ground for future wars. A change to the Army’s Unit Status Reporting (USR) system, an amendment of the federal statute that defines the Army’s mission, and a shift in the process by which peace operations are funded by Congress will be the most conspicuous of these recommendations. Much questioning of assumptions and analysis of available evidence must precede these and other recommendations, however. Thus, chapter 2 will outline the prevailing view that peace operations are distractions from combat readiness and will identify the problematic points of such a view for subsequent analysis. Chapter 3 will seek out underlying causes for the prevailing view and will identify corresponding shortcomings in readiness reporting, institutions, training, and thinking. Chapter 4 will propose broad ideas, based on the causes, to remedy the shortcomings. Chapter 5 will detail conclusions and specific recommendations and anticipate concerns as well as future research.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Throughout, this paper will challenge the notion that peace operations are merely “small change” in the currency of soldiering. Do wars really require of individual soldiers and units conduct so fundamentally different from that required in other operations? If so, are normal peacetime exercises really better suited to training such conduct than actual overseas deployments? Is war itself better suited? How much can Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth count on the discipline, initiative, leadership, and decision-making his soldiers developed while enforcing the peace in Bosnia? In answering these and other questions, this paper will propose that human elements—though more difficult to measure than gunnery scores, personnel strength, and equipment wear and tear—are nevertheless the most reliable bases for war preparations.

CHAPTER 2

THE PREVAILING VIEW AND ITS PROBLEMS

Peace operations get little respect. Uniformed and civilian leaders, participating soldiers, and others sometimes acknowledge that peace operations can be pivotal to national security.¹⁶ Some of these people also credit peace operations with contributions to combat readiness.¹⁷ Still, the prevailing view, both among opinion leaders and in United States military ranks, is that peace operations are a distraction from the mission to fight “real” wars. At best, they are merely the “small change” of soldiering and thus of limited value to preparations for war. At worst, they can help create Task Force Smiths by degrading combat readiness. In between, peace operations may promote a variety of undesirable conditions, such as the displacement of authority from national to international bodies or the elevation of academic theories of military strategy over hard-won, practical lessons about the nature of war.

¹⁶ Since 1995, peacekeeping and peace enforcement have had prominent roles in the “peacetime engagement” and the “deterrence and conflict prevention” pillars of the National Military Strategy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 4.

¹⁷ See, for example, Major David Nichting, Former Signal Officer in 22d Signal Brigade During Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, January-December 1996 and Participant in a Rotation at the National Training Center in 1982, interview by author, 5 April 1998: “Peace enforcement in Bosnia was so beneficial to readiness because it was real world. There is no substitute for real-world deployments.” See also Lieutenant General John W. Hendrix, Commander of V Corps, testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1998, quoted in “Congress Questions Army Readiness,” *Army*, April 1998, (summarizing Hendrix as testifying that the impact of the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia was “a mixed bag, both beneficial and detrimental”).

Viewing peace operations as a distraction is problematic in five ways.¹⁸ Such a view discounts the frequency with which peace operations must actually be conducted, suggests that they are executed in the absence of “friction,” ascribes a passive mindset to the soldiers who serve in them, conflates operations that are different in important ways, and invites confusion about the legitimacy of United States participation. The following discussion outlines these problematic points in turn.

Discounting the Frequency of Peace Operations

According to the prevailing view, Task Force Myth’s proper mission is to fight a conventional enemy force or deter aggression by remaining ready for war. Under this view, missions such as enforcing the peace in Bosnia should be the exception rather than the rule for use of military force. The use of such force should be a rare event, and when it is employed, it should overwhelm any opposing enemy or threat. General Colin Powell is a well-known proponent of the idea, contained in the prevailing view, that military force should be infrequently applied and—when applied—overwhelming:

Notwithstanding all the changes that have taken place in the world,
notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement,

¹⁸ The purpose of this chapter is not to disparage those who hold the prevailing view. Individuals may cite sound reasons, grounded in pragmatism or principle, for holding some version of it. As we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, this is particularly true when concerns over peace operations center on training in difficult collective tasks or on the wearing down of equipment. Moreover, few actually hold a pure bias against peace operations. The view that peace operations are a distraction from the mission to fight wars may be held “on balance,” after weighing competing observations and conceptions of one’s duty. The purpose here is rather to outline a representative version of the prevailing view so as to expose its problematic points. Every view has problematic points, and an outline of a view—though otherwise limited in its usefulness—can help isolate these points for subsequent analysis.

peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, . . . [armed forces] have this mission: to fight and win the nation's wars. That's what we do.¹⁹

Elsewhere, General Powell states that United States armed forces can and will “do these other missions,” and suggests that changes in doctrine, strategy, structure, equipment, training, and leadership techniques may be necessary.²⁰ But even then, he states, “we never want to [change] in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces—to fight and win the nation's wars.”²¹

As will be explained at greater length later in this chapter, the Constitution and statutory provisions amply justify United States participation in peace operations and other military operations short of war. These provisions permit a broader view of “why you have armed forces.” Yet it is possible to reconcile the preference for infrequent and overwhelming force with the purpose of the armed forces—the Army in particular—under federal law. For instance, Title 10 of the United States Code states that the Army “shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land,” and that it “shall be responsible for the preparation of

¹⁹ General Colin L. Powell, Remarks During News Conference on the Defense Department's Bottom-Up Review (made in Washington, D.C., on 1 Sept., 1993), quoted in Summers, “Powell Echoes Grant in Focusing Military,” 78.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid. General Powell's restrictive view of the use of military force was a matter of public interest during Powell's confirmation hearings in the Senate on September 20, 1989. Senator Sam Nunn questioned Powell about his commitment to the six rules for use of military force laid down by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during a famous speech at the National Press Club on November 28, 1984. Powell had been Weinberger's military assistant at the time of the National Press Club speech and agreed with the rules. See, for example, Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991), 89-90 (quoting Weinberger's speech and Powell's Senate testimony).

land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned . . .²² The words “primarily,” “combat,” and “war” make understandable the prevailing view’s concern with the high end of the conflict spectrum.²³

Traditional Warfare		Nontraditional Military Operations
<i>Total War</i>	<i>Limited War</i>	
American Revolution	War of 1812	Whiskey Rebellion
Civil War	Mexican War	Lewis and Clark Expedition
World War I	Spanish-American War	Reconstruction in South
World War II	Korean War	Pullman Strike
	Vietnam War	Nation Building in the Philippines, 1899-1904
	Gulf War	Nation Building in Cuba, 1899-1902, 1906-1909
		San Francisco Earthquake Relief
		Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34
		Occupation of Dominican Republic, 1916-24
		The Sandino Affair in Nicaragua, 1927-33
		Civilian Conservation Corps
		Greek Civil War, 1947-49
		Huk Insurrection in the Philippines, 1946-54
		Peace Operations in Lebanon, 1958
		Nation Building in Vietnam
		Stability Operations in Dominican Republic, 1965-66
		U.S. Civil Disturbances, 1960s
		Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960s
		Mayaguez Incident
		Peacekeeping in Beirut, 1982-84
		Peacekeeping in the Sinai
		Counterinsurgency in El Salvador
		Hurricane Andrew Relief
		Operations in Somalia
Nontraditional Military Operations		
<i>Expeditions/Contingency Operations</i>		
Undeclared Naval War with France		
Barbary Pirates		
Mormon War		
Indian Wars		
Boxer Rebellion		
Intervention in Cuba, 1906		
Intervention in Mexico, 1914, 1916		
Operation Blue Bat (Lebanon, 1958)		
Operation Power Pack (Dominican Republic, 1965)		
Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983)		
Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989)		

Figure 1. Examples of Traditional and Nontraditional U.S. Military Operations.
Source: Lawrence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns, and Recurring Themes,” *Military Review* (Oct. 1997): 51, 52.

The problem is simply that wars are *not*, as General Powell states, “what we do” most of the time. As has already been mentioned, the vast majority of the more than 260 uses of military force since 1945 have been peace operations, noncombatant evacuations,

²² *U.S. Code*, Title 10, sec. 3062 (1988).

²³ Compare the Army’s statutory mission, which makes slight mention of noncombat duties “otherwise assigned,” to that of the Marine Corps, which states more affirmatively that the Corps “*shall perform* such other duties as the President may direct.” *U.S. Code*, Title 10, sec. 5063(a) (1988) (emphasis added).

counterterrorism actions, humanitarian assistance missions, shows of force, and other military operations short of war.²⁴ To view peace operations as a distraction from the mission of remaining combat ready is to discount the sheer volume and frequency of the military's workload outside of war as it is traditionally conceived.

In discounting the frequency and volume of that workload, the prevailing view also glosses over the considerable dollar cost. During fiscal year 1995, for instance, military operations other than war in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, and Saudi Arabia, among other places, caused the services to report \$2.223 billion in "incremental" costs.²⁵ Incremental costs are those that are not budgeted and thus must be paid for out of other funds that the services receive (usually "Operations and Maintenance" funds) or out of

²⁴ This is the figure obtained by combining the data from Blechman and Kaplan, *Force Without War*, 16, with the most recent data from Congressional Research Service, *Instances of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad 1798-1995*. While the proposition that most uses of military force since 1945 have fallen short of war is surely true, it is important to note that the Blechman and Kaplan research employed a strict methodology that the Congressional Research Service report did not follow. To be counted within the area of interest of the Blechman and Kaplan study, the use of force had to have been a *political* use of the armed forces: "A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence." Blechman and Kaplan, *Force Without War*, 12. Thus Blechman and Kaplan excluded, for instance, the Korean and Vietnam War (between March 1965 and March 1972), regarding both as "continuing contests of violence." Ibid., 14.

²⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSAIID 96-121BR, Contingency Operations: Defense Cost and Funding Issues* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, March 15, 1996), 1. As of early 1996, the Department of Defense had reported over \$7 billion in incremental costs due to contingency operations for the preceding four years. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSAIID 96-115, Contingency Operations: DOD's Reported Costs Contain Significant Inaccuracies* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, May 17, 1996), 1.

additional funds solicited from Congress after the operations are underway. A budgeting process that relies on a view that big wars are “what we do” will consistently underfund the many brushfires that inevitably demand a superpower response.²⁶ The hidden costs of failing to budget for peace operations may range from cuts on training funds for nonparticipating units to dangerous monetary constraints on participating units.²⁷

²⁶ See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSAIID 96-120BR, Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain But Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, March 14, 1996), 1.

²⁷ See, for example, Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Background Briefing to the Press on the Fiscal Year 1998 Budget, at the Pentagon, February 5, 1997, reprinted in DefenseLINK News Home Page [news service on-line], available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/>; Internet; accessed 1 March 1998: “Even though the Bosnia operation, that which is not funded, is \$2 billion and it only represents less than one percent of our overall budget, it's two percent of our [Operations and Maintenance] budget, but by the time you look at just that little pie that's flexible that you can borrow against, it's eight percent if you start at the very beginning of the year. But if you wait until the third quarter or the fourth quarter to deal with it, if it's in the fourth quarter it's as much as a third of your OpTempo budget, so it has enormous impact on readiness if we don't get a supplemental passed, and we do have to get the supplemental passed. So we're going to have to be working very early on with the Congress to try to get a supplemental through as soon as possible. We really need it by the first part of April.” The fiscal controls imposed by Congress upon the military trace their lineage to abuses that occurred in England in the century prior to the American Revolution. See generally Charles M. Clode, *The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government* (London: John Murray, 1869), 110-131 (recounting the Crown's imposition of controls on expenditures, beginning from the Mutiny Act of 1688). Chapter 4 of this paper questions whether fiscal controls on procurement of new weapons systems are as effective as those imposed upon operations and maintenance funding for contingency operations. The latter must be sought after-the-fact and by exception. See 10 U.S.C. sec. 127a.

Suggesting That Peace Operations Are
“Friction-less”

War is characterized by friction. The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, well known for this insight, explains why in war even the simplest things become difficult. Friction is a combination of factors—uncertainty, chance, fear, exhaustion, confusion, bad weather—that act so as to clog the gears of the “military machine,” to delay things, and to make them go wrong.²⁸ The prevailing view is that peace operations are generally free of friction and therefore not suitable to the task of preparing a Task Force Myth for the difficult combat environment.

Consider the following words of General Max Thurman, who articulated this aspect of the prevailing view in testimony before Congress, which was deliberating on the optimal structure for military forces:

The troops in the Sinai today, the battalion that is located there, are not conducting battalion-level activities. They are on stationery outposts where eight to twelve people are located and that is not a squad or platoon so they are not doing the kind of duty that you would want them to do if they were going to go to war . . . The bottom line, in my view, is that Americans have grown to know that they expect a decisive outcome if American forces are committed . . . because decisive outcomes produce lower casualties, and that calls for the overwhelming application of force, not a friction-less force that we seem to be building at this time.²⁹

²⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rappaport and trans. Col. F. N. Maude (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982), 164-65: “The military machine, the Army and all belonging to it, is in fact simple, and appears on this account easy to manage. But let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions.”

²⁹ General Maxwell R. Thurman (retired), former Commander of the U.S. Southern Command and Senior Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, Testimony Before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on *The Impact of Peacekeeping on Army Personnel Requirements*, 103d Cong., 1st sess., 27 Oct. 1993, 123-24.

General Thurman opposed the idea of building a force that can conduct peacekeeping in the Sinai but cannot apply overwhelming force toward a decisive outcome in war. By “friction-less force,” he appears to have meant one that is built for a friction-less *environment*—the operating environment supposedly faced in the Sinai and during other peace operations.³⁰

The notion that peace operations are generally devoid of friction also echoes in statements that dismiss nontraditional military operations as “bloodless strategy,” or “moves on a gigantic chessboard.”³¹ The derision flowed freely, for instance, in a recent article by John Lehman and Harvey Sicherman entitled “Demilitarizing the Military”:

Seizing the high ground, overcoming the enemy, and victory itself are replaced by neutrality, politically driven deployments, and rules of engagement written by lawyers and diplomats on the manicured turf of international negotiations. Peace-keeping “demilitarizes the military,” creating forces more schooled in police and diplomatic work than in winning wars.³²

Here, the reader is invited to conjure up an image of operations that are played out on “manicured turf,” molding forces that cannot win wars. Lehman and Sicherman attempt to seize the rhetorical high ground by identifying peace-keeping with “police and

³⁰ Thurman’s preference for decisive outcomes and overwhelming application of force are well-documented with respect to his criticisms of the original *Blue Spoon* plan for the projection of United States military force in Panama in 1989. See, for example, Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 56.

³¹ Summers, “Powell Echoes Grant in Focusing Military,” 78.

³² John F. Lehman, Jr., and Harvey Sicherman, “Demilitarizing the Military,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute WIRE: A Catalyst for Ideas* 5, no. 8 (1997): 1-2.

diplomatic work.” The authors depict peace operations as unopposed by a determined enemy and by friction and thus color them something less than “military.”

Yet the notion that peace operations are friction-less ignores the simple truth that they are beset with uncertainty, chance, fear, exhaustion, confusion, bad weather, etc., and that things can and frequently do go wrong. Soldiers driving over unrecorded foreign landmines in the Sinai,³³ subduing hostile bandits hidden behind human shields in Mogadishu,³⁴ and confronting provocative armed Serbs in Macedonia³⁵ know well the look, the smell, and the feel of friction. So do commanders attempting to restore order in Haitian streets controlled by gunmen loyal to the Cedras regime³⁶ or seeking to enter Bosnia across a Sava River that has been swollen by winter storms.³⁷ While peace operations will often lack the clear definition of progress toward success that marks

³³ Major Jeffery A. Ballmer, Former Executive Officer, C Company, 3-47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division and Former Company Commander, B Company, 2-22d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division and Participant, in 1988 and 1992, in Multinational Force Observer Missions in the Sinai, interview by author, 29 September 1997.

³⁴ See, for example, John Lancaster, “Mission Incomplete, Rangers Pack Up; Missteps, Heavy Casualties Marked Futile Hunt in Mogadishu,” *Washington Post*, 21 October 1993, p. A1.

³⁵ David Bolgiano, “Firearms Training,” *Army Lawyer*, October 1995, 79.

³⁶ United States Army Training And Doctrine Command, Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 To D+40* (Fort Leavenworth: December 1994), 145-47.

³⁷ United States Army Training And Doctrine Command, Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Operation Joint Endeavor, Initial Impressions Report, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: May 1996), 3 (describing the difficulties of “simultaneous deployment/employment”).

decisive wars, it is inaccurate to suggest that they are conducted in a rarefied atmosphere, devoid of real-world friction.³⁸

Ascribing a Passive Mindset to Soldiers

Under the prevailing view, soldiers fighting in real wars must maintain a mindset totally at odds with the requirements of peace operations. The prevailing view holds that in order to repel the PLA's advance into Chagang-do, the soldiers in Task Force Myth must concentrate upon fury, death, and destruction—states of mind that conflict with the sober calculations necessary to help keep peace in Bosnia or anywhere else. “Simple, ruthless, and direct” describes the appropriate mindset for war, according to the author of “Peace Missions Dull the Army’s Combat Edge,” an opinion column that appeared in the *Army Times*:

In contrast, a peace operation is normally a dispassionate effort to stop or prevent battle and bloodshed. It is not a crusade. Victory and defeat are irrelevant, and success is never certain. The goal offers less clarity and more shades of gray. Being simple, direct, and ruthless contributes little to this aim or method and can even lead to failure. . . . Initiative does not thrive in such undertakings. Caution and compromise do. This nuanced “peace focus” is diametrically opposed to the traditional creed of the American warrior. . . . [T]he combat focus of the successful war fighter is fundamentally incompatible with most peace operations. And a peace focus is worthless on the battlefield.³⁹

³⁸ It is also inaccurate to suggest, as Lehman and Sicherman do, that rules of engagement are written by civilian lawyers and diplomats. See, for example, Yates, *Military Stability and Support Operations*, 59: “An interesting point regarding ROE in both the Dominican intervention and Panama was that these constraints were not imposed by political authorities on reluctant military commanders. Rather, the rules in each case were promulgated by military commanders who, while certainly following political guidance, truly believed the constraints were necessary and appropriate for mission accomplishment. That troops in the field held a different view was a challenge for small-unit leaders and for field officers performing liaison duties in higher headquarters.”

³⁹ Lieutenant Colonel James A. Baker, “Peace Missions Dull the Army’s Combat Edge,” *Army Times* (6 Dec. 1993): 37. Concern over loss of the “warrior ethic”

Noteworthy in this contrast between the “peace focus” and the “combat focus” is the implied assertion that the former breeds “caution and compromise,” whereas the latter breeds “initiative.” Far from leaning forward in their foxholes (or in their Bradley Fighting Vehicles), the soldiers of Task Force Myth—or any soldiers who have recently served in a peace operation—are passive souls, content to let the environment shape their response, rather than proactive shapers of their environment.⁴⁰

Ascribing a passive mindset to soldiers who deploy to peace operations is problematic in at least four ways. First, it contradicts the Army’s own insistence that the same soldiers and units can excel in both war and operations other than war.⁴¹ Second, it

frequently appears in conjunction with other arguments challenging participation in peace operations. See, for example, Richard J. Newman, “Can Peacekeepers Make War?,” *U.S. News and World Report*, 19 Jan. 1998, 39: “Throughout America’s armed forces, there is mounting evidence that conventional combat skills—and the warrior ethic that goes with them—are being eroded by a combination of downsizing, budget cuts, and widespread commitments to noncombat operations in Bosnia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.”

⁴⁰ See Donald Kagan, “Panel #1: Missions,” in Foreign Policy Research Institute, *The Demilitarization of the Military: Report of a Defense Task Force* (Philadelphia: FPRI, March 1997), 13, 19: “Opponents of secondary missions also fear another source of degradation. They point to the danger that a focus on these lesser activities could undermine the army’s war-fighting capacity in more subtle, yet fundamental ways. The skills and qualities needed for peacekeeping are not the same as those required for war fighting. The toughness, aggressiveness, and ferocity that are essential for the latter are the opposite of the tact, patience, and caution often needed for the former. The fear is that the training needed to produce effective peacekeepers would degrade the trainees’ capacity for war fighting. Some believe that the kind of soldier who excels in one assignment, regardless of training, is less well suited to the other.” See also David Hackworth, *Hazardous Duty* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), 283: “We have got our warrior built up to fight wars, but he is doing missions where he has to pull his punch—and this pulls all his muscles.”

⁴¹ *Field Manual 100-5*, 13-8: “The leadership, organization, equipment, discipline, and skills gained in training for war are also of use to the government in operations other than war.”

contradicts research that suggests peace operations demand soldiers who not only demonstrate appropriate restraint, but who also display timely initiative and a willingness to take risks.⁴² Third, it contradicts historical experience that confirms armies can be victorious in combat while attempting to shield from “ruthless” conduct the civilians and noncombatants who inevitably populate modern battlefields.⁴³ Fourth, it trivializes the role of leadership and individual decision-making in military units by depicting soldiers in war as automatons who are programmed to fire indiscriminately.⁴⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth is wise to question whether his soldiers will have sufficient aggressiveness after months of mostly nonviolent operations in Bosnia. It is plausible that violent combat actions against the PLA will require a spirit of the attack, a boldness, and even a mindset, that are distinct in some respects from those suited to de-escalating tense standoffs between rival factions. Yet the prevailing view mostly ignores

⁴² See, for example, Major David M. Last, Canadian Armed Forces, “Theory, Doctrine, and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations,” (Fort Leavenworth: Master of Military Arts and Sciences diss., June 1995), 148; Joan Harman, “Peacekeeping in Somalia,” Research Report 1663 (U.S. Army Research Institute, July 1994), 2-3; Brigadier General Michael Harbottle, British Army, *The Impartial Soldier* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 7: “There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more on anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operations rests.” See also Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Former Brigade Commander in Bosnia from December 1995 to December 1996, interview by author, 6 August 1997 (describing the importance of soldier initiative).

⁴³ See, for example, William J. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1956), 513-15.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Daniel P. Bolger, *The Battle For Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1996), 94-100.

the question of how individual soldiers can develop the mental agility needed to make the switch between mindsets: one for combat against a clearly identified enemy and one for more restrained and calibrated actions when confronted with ambiguous circumstances. More important, by asserting that there is no overlap between the “peace focus” and the “combat focus,” the prevailing view dodges the challenge of promoting those attributes—such as discipline, good decision-making, initiative, physical and mental toughness—that surely must have utility across the entire spectrum of military operations.

Conflating Operations That Have Important Differences

Under the prevailing view, the “spectrum” of military operations really is not a spectrum at all. That is, the prevailing view draws a sharp distinction between peace operations and war. The drawing of sharp distinctions between two grand categories, though sometimes useful for making a point, also has the disadvantage of yoking together things that may have important differences. A representative example of this sort of sharp categorization recently appeared in one of the Army’s professional journals:

Soldiers conducting peacekeeping operations who merely observe and stand in the line of fire do not effectively demonstrate American resolve; they merely provide convenient targets . . . An additional danger in conducting [operations other than war (OOTW)] . . . is the degradation of combat skills. Units deploy for six-month periods, often without their organic equipment, and conduct operations not included in their [mission essential task lists (METLs)]. During this period, soldiers learn new skills and conduct time- and resource-intensive missions at the cost of METL training.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Captain Sean A. Kushner, “Opinion: OOTW—The Winning Role of the U.S. Army,” *ADA Bulletin* (Mar.-Apr. 1996): 43, 45.

In this passage, a particular operation other than war (peacekeeping) is first reduced to “observ[ing] and stand[ing] in the line of fire” and then equated with the entire range of operations other than war. The implication is that Lieutenant Colonel Myth’s unit, irrespective of the specific mission conducted in Bosnia before deploying to North Korea, will have inevitably suffered the same “degradation of combat skills” supposedly inflicted upon peacekeeping units in the Sinai.

Conflating operations other than war in this way oversimplifies and misleads. Even assuming that nothing about combat resembles the tasks required to observe and report violations of the agreement between Egypt and Israel—a dubious assumption in itself—why should this be true with respect to all other peace operations? Consider, for instance, the events of October 4, 1993, when what began as a security mission in Somalia, sponsored by the United Nations, escalated into a fierce engagement between United States forces and those of a Somali warlord.⁴⁶ The Somalis shot down two United States helicopters with shoulder-fired rockets, and both sides fired thousands of rounds before Americans at the crash site could be evacuated.⁴⁷ The bloody engagement claimed the lives of twelve United States soldiers and hundreds of Somalis.⁴⁸ Surely, operations

⁴⁶ See Rick Atkinson, “Night of a Thousand Casualties: Battle Triggered the United States Decision to Withdraw From Somalia,” *Washington Post*, 31 January 1994, p. A1. See also Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down: An American War Story* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Inquirer, 1998), [a 29-chapter book on-line, including video and audio clips of interviews with participants in the October engagement, photos, and documents]; available from <http://www3.phillynews.com/packages/somalia/sitemap.asp>; Internet; accessed 26 April 1998.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

in these hostile conditions were similar in many respects to traditional combat operations, despite the Somalia mission's technical status within Army jargon as a mere "peace operation."⁴⁹

Or consider the tense prelude to military operations in Haiti on September 18, 1994, when the paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division departed in aircraft from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, convinced that they would soon be parachuting into hostilities.⁵⁰ Three days earlier, the President had stated that the United States would forcibly oust the Cedras regime from power, if necessary. In one last attempt to persuade the junta to step down without massive bloodshed, the President had dispatched former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn to Haiti. That this team succeeded in persuading the junta to cooperate in the deployment of United States military forces does not alter the fact that as the paratroopers took off from North Carolina and headed toward the Caribbean, they had planned, rehearsed, and expected to execute a combat assault. The nonviolent insertion of marines and 10th Mountain

⁴⁹ See, for example, Major General S.L. Arnold & Major David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, Winter 1993-94, 4-26. Within the definitions provided in note 1 above, Operation Restore Hope was clearly "peace enforcement," consisting as it did of the "application of military force, or the threat of its use, . . . pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."

⁵⁰ The background information contained in this paragraph is based upon Center for Law and Military Operations, *Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-1995: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates* (Charlottesville: The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1995), 11-22. A history of Uphold Democracy based on exhaustive interviews with participants in the Haiti operations will soon be completed by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Robert Baumann, and published by Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Division soldiers on 19 September began a peace operation that had required combat preparations of the most realistic sort.

Or consider the complex command, control, communications, and logistics challenges faced in Bosnia during December of 1995 and the early months of 1996.⁵¹ During this early period of the peace operation in which our own imagined Task Force Myth would eventually serve, two United States armored brigades spearheaded a multinational effort to establish a zone of separation (ZOS) between heavily armed former warring factions. Each brigade assumed responsibility for enforcing the terms of an agreement between the factions over a very large area of operations. Even as United States forces were still making their way into Bosnia over long routes that stretched back to central Germany, mechanized and armored teams moved quickly to key spots in the countryside to aid the disengagement of factional elements and secure freedom of movement. They helped coordinate a massive de-mining effort, patrolled hundreds of miles of roads, began the disarmament of the ZOS, and faced down dozens of armed, would-be bullies. Because of the prevalence of armed and potentially hostile elements, plans and unit rehearsals throughout this peace operation always included sequels

⁵¹ The background information in this paragraph is based on Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Operation Joint Endeavor, Initial Impressions Report 1* as well as Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Newsletter No. 96-5, Drawing a Line in the Mud: Establishing and Controlling a Zone of Separation (ZOS)* (Fort Leavenworth: CALL, May 1996), Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Newsletter No. 97-12, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sustainment Training While Employing: Lessons Learned from Operation Joint Endeavor* (Fort Leavenworth: CALL, June 1997) and Major Fred Johnson, Former Member of Combined Arms Assessment Team Serving With Multinational Division North, Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1996, interview by author, 7 November 1997.

addressing combat engagements. Because Nordic, Polish, Russian, and other nations would eventually send forces to assist, the liaison with adjacent military forces in the area grew complex and sophisticated. Can it be accurate to identify this sort of operation with a routine six-month rotation by light infantry forces as observers in the Sinai?

This is precisely what the prevailing view does. It places war and combat in a higher, exclusive sphere—one that is explosive, climactic, and a bit mysterious.⁵² Every other form of military operation flows together into a lesser sphere that is governed by more pedestrian and discernible rules. The two spheres do not touch. The sharp categorization employed by the prevailing view is nothing new. A few military historians have noted the traditional reluctance of their colleagues to puncture the higher sphere and ask hard questions about the true nature of warfare and combat.⁵³

Yet the conceptual segregation of war and combat from all other types of military operations not only hampers historical analysis of the former category; it greatly complicates the challenge of drawing useful lessons about readiness from the various types of operations in the latter category. A lack of differentiation is to blame. Recent refinements in Army and joint doctrine have resulted in distinctions not only between

⁵² See, for example, Roger J. Spiller, “The Tenth Imperative,” *Military Review* 69, no. 4 (April 1989): 2, 10: “Warfare, and especially combat itself, belonged to the mysterious side of life; any knowledge of these events was exclusively the business of soldiers and was wholly segregated from life outside, as remote as a regimental depot.”

⁵³ Ibid.: “All along, and perhaps even today in some quarters, the posing of intimate questions about the act of combat was considered in the military trades somehow impertinent, as if the nobility of military deeds was beyond the realm of inquiry.” See also Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 35-45.

“peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement” operations, but also between these two types of “peace operations,” and “counterdrug operations,” “combating terrorism,” “noncombatant evacuation,” “humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,” “security assistance,” “support to domestic civil authorities,” “shows of force,” and “support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.”⁵⁴ Army and joint doctrine also now distinguish between conventional wartime operations and “contingencies,” which they define as “emergenc[ies] involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations.”⁵⁵ Because of “the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.”⁵⁶ Still, these diverse operations remain—at least for the moment—locked together in the doctrinal sphere known as “military operations other than war.” Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for these operations have been slow to find an ardent training audience within the Army.⁵⁷ Moreover, the paltry influence of these still-emerging military doctrinal concepts on views held by the wider public ensures the continued dominance of the prevailing view outside military ranks.

⁵⁴ *Field Manual 100-5*, 13-5 to 13-8.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 86.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See, for example, Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations,” 51.

Inviting Confusion About the Legitimacy of Peace Operations

How the wider public views peace operations is no easy thing to establish conclusively. Enough ambivalence has existed in public opinion for the President to deploy United States soldiers again and again as peacekeepers and peace enforcers without suffering fatal political damage. Still, Congress' persistent refusal to pay national assessments to the United Nations provides some indication that operations under the aegis of that international body are unpopular.⁵⁸ Similar indications can be found in the forces of public opinion that drove President Clinton to end operations in Somalia,⁵⁹ to sign a decision directive carefully circumscribing United States participation in peace operations,⁶⁰ to pull the bulk of United States troops out of Haiti on a strict timetable,⁶¹ and initially to promise an early exit from Bosnia.⁶² Also, the

⁵⁸ See, for example, Judy Keen, "U.S. Warns U.N. On Dues Cut: Lower Payment Or Risk 'Damage' To Relationship," *USA Today*, 21 October 1997, p. 6.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Susan Page, "Rangers Pulled Out; Clinton Orders Somalia Exit," *Newsday*, 20 October 1993, p. A1.

⁶⁰ This is the classified document known as "Presidential Decision Directive 25" or "PDD-25." An unclassified summary of PDD-25 appears in U. S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *Publication No. 10161: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: DOS, 1994).

⁶¹ On 4 October 1994, close to 21,000 United States soldiers and marines were in Haiti. By 31 March 1995, the number had dropped to about 2,400. Center for Law and Military Operations, *Law and Military Operations in Haiti*, 18, 22.

⁶² Remarks by President Clinton at the Signing of the Presidential Proclamation Of Human Rights Day (Dec. 10) And Human Rights Week (Dec. 10-16), Washington, Dec. 5, 1995, reprinted in *Defense Issues* 10, no. 3 (1995): 1.

public's preference for restricting use of military forces to traditional wars has figured in the dispute between Congress and successive presidents over the latter's war powers.⁶³

Although two recent studies reveal that the isolationism of middle America may be overestimated by policy-makers,⁶⁴ even these studies reflect strong popular feeling that the United States should not serve as "world policeman."⁶⁵ Big wars that clearly threaten United States interests provide the surest basis for public support of a decision to send troops overseas. The lack of an immediate threat to the United States in Korea caused many Americans to think, by December of 1950, that forces following Task Force Smith to the peninsula no longer had business there.⁶⁶ The lack of an immediate threat to the United States in Bosnia could well place many Americans in disfavor of Task Force Myth's deployment there in the year 2000.

The view that peace operations are a distraction from the mission to fight wars is only a short, if distinct, step from the view that traditional wars are the only legitimate overseas uses of military force. One of the more celebrated recent voices for this extreme view is former Army Specialist Michael New, a medic who was convicted by court-

⁶³ The modern era of this age-old dispute began with the War Powers Resolution of 1973. See 87 Stat. 555, Public Law 93-148, 93d Cong. (H.J. Res. 542, adopted over presidential veto on 7 November 1973).

⁶⁴ Steven Kull, I.M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (College Park, MD: The Center for International and Security Studies, Oct. 1997); Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

⁶⁵ Kull, *The Foreign Policy Gap*, 128.

⁶⁶ Larson, *Casualties and Consensus*, 20 (fig. 2-4).

martial for failing to obey an order to don the United Nations blue beret and patch.⁶⁷

New claimed that the order was unlawful because his allegiance did not extend to the United Nations. On July 28, 1996, New spoke in Conroe, Texas, to a hometown crowd that greeted him as a hero following his bad conduct discharge from the Army:

Some of you may be veterans of the Korean War. Korea was the first limited UN war in which victory was not the primary objective. Orders began coming from New York instead of Washington, and General MacArthur, who said, "In war there is no substitute for victory," had to be relieved of command. That kind of winning attitude had to be eliminated. Then came Vietnam. It badly marked a generation. Men, deceived by their political leaders, fought half a world away when the real battle was being fought here for the heart and soul of America. It seemed, as I learned more about how the UN military wages "peace" in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Somalia, that Macedonia and Bosnia seemed like more of the same limited "no-win" UN wars."⁶⁸

Today, the "Official Michael New Homepage" on the Internet features a large color photograph of New in uniform with full decorations, a menu of articles and legal documents justifying New's disobedience, and a slick digital recording that automatically greets browsers with renditions of "America the Beautiful," "Mine Eyes Have Seen the

⁶⁷ See *United States v. Specialist Michael New* (3d Infantry Div. 1995). See also *United States ex rel. Michael G. New v. Perry*, 919 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1996) (denying New's habeas petition following conviction) and *New v. Cohen*, 129 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's decision). Secondary sources commenting upon the litigation include "G.I. Is Charged After Refusing U.N. Duty," *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1995, p. A12, Robert S. Winner, "SPC Michael New v. William Perry, Secretary of Defense: The Constitutionality of U.S. Forces Serving Under U.N. Command," *DePaul Digest of International Law* 3 (1997):30, and Major Michael Newton, "Appeals Court Denies Michael New's Petition for Habeas Corpus," *The Army Lawyer*, March 1998, 27-30.

⁶⁸ Michael G. New, Speech during homecoming rally at the Montgomery County Courthouse, Conroe, Texas, on July 28, 1996. Transcript of remarks are available in database online at <http://www.techmgmt.com/restore/new1.htm>; accessed 2 November 1997.

Glory,” and the “Ballad of Michael New.”⁶⁹ Other, “unofficial” homepages maintained by web users in political sympathy with New feature hyperlinks to supportive articles and solicit contributions for News’ legal defense, which continues on appeal.⁷⁰

New has not lacked support within the ranks of lawmakers. His conviction resulted in renewed support for a House of Representatives Bill seeking withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations.⁷¹ It also spurred supporters in the House to draft a bill that would prohibit United States soldiers from wearing United Nations insignia.⁷² Congressmen James Traficant (Ohio) and Roscoe Bartlett (Maryland) co-authored a 1996 resolution condemning New’s court-martial,⁷³ and in 1997, Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth (Maryland) authored a resolution condemning the deployment of United States military personnel in the service of the United Nations in Macedonia.⁷⁴ In Oklahoma, New’s supporters dredged up copies of a resolution passed in that state’s legislature in 1994, which called upon the United States to “[c]ease engagement in any

⁶⁹ See <http://www11.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8817/index.html>; accessed 2 November 1997.

⁷⁰ See <http://www.infinet.com/~jaylor/mikenew.html>; accessed 2 November 1997.

⁷¹ U.S. Congress, House, *A Bill to Withdraw the United States from the United Nations*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, H.R. 2535.

⁷² U.S. Congress, House, *A Bill to Prohibit the Armed Services From Adorning United Nations Indicia or Insignia*, 104th 1st sess., 1995, H.R. 2540.

⁷³ U.S. Congress, House, *A Resolution Condemning the Court-Martial of Specialist Michael New*, 104th Cong. 2d sess., 1996, H.C.R. 134.

⁷⁴ U.S. Congress, House, *A Resolution Condemning the Deployment of United States Military Personnel in the Service of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997.

military activity under authority of the United Nations or any world body.”⁷⁵

Throughout, lawmakers have followed New’s attorneys in citing the United Nations Participation Act, the Constitution, and even New’s oath of enlistment as authority for his disobedience.

The arguments on New’s behalf are specious in legal and constitutional terms. Under U.S. law, an order requiring the performance of a military duty or act—such as the donning of a uniform—is inferred to be lawful and is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate.⁷⁶ A person’s conscience, religion, philosophy, or personal interpretation of where his loyalties should lie cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order.⁷⁷ As long as the order is understandable, the form of the order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted.⁷⁸ New believed that his own interpretation of the enlistment oath and his own determination of appropriate national security policy superseded specific orders from his immediate superiors. It is true that an order is not lawfully binding if it is in conflict with the lawful order of a superior authority⁷⁹ or if contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States. However, before any other suggested source of guidance—here article I of the Constitution,⁸⁰

⁷⁵ State of Oklahoma, House of Representatives, Oklahoma Resolution #1047 (adopted 28 March 1994).

⁷⁶ *Manual for Courts-Martial*, United States 1984 [hereafter MCM], Part IV, para. 14c.(2)(a)(i).

⁷⁷ MCM Part IV, 14c.(2)(a)(iii).

⁷⁸ MCM Part IV, para. 14c.(2)(a)(iv)(c)

⁷⁹ See generally *United States v. Green*, 22 M.J. 711 (A.C.M.R. 1986)).

⁸⁰ U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8 (consisting of 18 clauses that give Congress

section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act,⁸¹ or New's enlistment oath—can legally supersede an order from an immediate superior, it must first meet certain criteria of enforceability with respect to individual servicemembers.⁸² The alternative sources of guidance cited by New and his defenders meet none of these.⁸³

As a Constitutional matter, the President has independent authority, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, to deploy forces in United Nations peace operations.⁸⁴ This authority springs from Article II of the Constitution, into which the drafters

broad powers, including the power to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” and the power to “raise and support Armies”).

⁸¹ United Nations Participation Act of 1945, § 7, Pub. L. No. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619 (amended by legislation and codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1 (1988 & Supp)) [hereinafter UNPA] (comprising one of the nine sections of the Act that are codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287 to 287e-1).

⁸² These criteria of enforceability stem from Articles 90 and Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which are codified at U.S. Code, Title 10, secs. 890 and 892. To be considered a conflicting order under Article 90, the guidance must be a specific mandate by a superior officer to do, or not to do, a specific act. *See* MCM Part IV, para. 14 (c)(2)(iv)(d)). *See also* MCM Part IV, para. 16c (1)(e) (“Regulations which supply only general guidelines or advice for conducting military functions may not be enforceable under Article 92(1).”); MCM App. 21, para. 16, pg. A21-92 (“The general order or regulation violated must, when examined as a whole, demonstrate that it is intended to regulate the conduct of individual servicemembers, and the direct application of sanctions for violations of the regulation must be self-evident.” (citing *United States v. Nardell*, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 327, at 329; 45 CMR 101, at 103 (1972))).

⁸³ *See also* *Orloff v. Willoughby*, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) (opining that the military is an organization in which the essence of the service “is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual.”).

⁸⁴ Conrad K. Harper, U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor, “Legal Authority for U.N. Peace Operations,” (March 4, 1994), 7 (manuscript in possession of the author).

incorporated those national security and foreign affairs powers that were ill suited for legislative bodies.⁸⁵ While constitutional authority tends to increase when two or more branches of government act in concert,⁸⁶ it is incorrect to assert—as New’s lawyers asserted—that the President’s independent powers are trumped by the will of Congress as reflected in the United Nation’s Participation Act. Our system of government contemplates that the President will have the freedom to throw United States support behind diplomatic and military tools that help prevent and resolve conflicts before they pose direct threats to the nation. He also has the power to support initiatives that serve United States interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth. For Congress to deny him the prerogative of deploying peacekeepers in support of these goals would be to arrogate to the legislative branch powers reserved for the executive branch.⁸⁷

Yet as ill-founded as Michael New’s legal and constitutional arguments are, the popularity of New’s cause demonstrates how the prevailing view of peace operations can invite public misunderstanding about the legitimacy of such operations. Again, the view

⁸⁵ See, e.g., U.S. Constitution, art. II, sec. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”), sec. 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . .”), sec. 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, . . .”).

⁸⁶ See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1988), 231-32.

⁸⁷ The literature in this area of constitutional law is massive. See generally Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Abraham Sofaer, *War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976).

that peace operations distract the military from its “real” mission is only a short step from New’s view that peace operations are illegal.

Still, the step exists, however short, and many who hold the prevailing view of peace operations clearly oppose New’s view.⁸⁸ Perhaps the more serious potential misunderstanding engendered by the prevailing view is not that of the general public over the legitimacy of peace operations, but rather that of civilian leaders over military resistance to peace operations. United States military officers—sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution—acknowledge the legitimacy of all operations duly directed by civilian governmental leaders, but an Army general’s pure motives for resisting a particular overseas deployment may get lost in the noise surrounding the prevailing view. The risk is that political leaders in the United States government will misunderstand the military’s resistance and conclude that civilian control over the military is at risk.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ See, for example, Baker, “Peace Missions Dull the Army’s Combat Edge,” 37: “Peace operations are a military task, legitimately assigned to the U.S. armed forces.”

⁸⁹ See generally Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, “Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military,” 29 *Wake Forest Law Review* 341-92 (1994); Eliot A. Cohen, “Panel #3: The Civil-Military Balance,” in Foreign Policy Research Institute, *The Demilitarization of the Military: Report of a Defense Task Force* (Philadelphia: March 1997), 31-38; Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” *The National Interest* (Washington: Spring 1993): 3-17; Thomas E. Ricks, “Politics and Policy: Military is Becoming More Conservative, Study Says,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 Nov. 1997, A20; Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); William J. Gregor, “Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs: Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World,” (unpublished manuscript on file with the author, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1985); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960); Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” *The Journal of Military*

Presidents seek a range of diplomatic and military options when facing crises.⁹⁰

While senior uniformed leaders must always counsel against the foolhardy employment of military force, their arguments against a proposed deployment must articulate principles—such as force protection, lack of clarity in goals, inadequate training and equipment, or risk of dangerous escalation—and must cite compelling, specific data. The prevailing view, based as it is upon a broad concept that the Army's "proper" mission is combat, invites skepticism that our elected and appointed civilian leaders are actually in control of the armed forces.⁹¹

History 57 (October 1993): 28. One of the more direct and colorful recent exchanges on the issue of whether civilian control really is at risk appeared in Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, review of *Making the Corps*, by Thomas E. Ricks, *Parameters* (Winter 1997-98): 175-83: "My second reservation is more serious, and extremely troubling to me. In the book's only ill-judged chapter (which was recently excerpted in *The Atlantic Monthly*), Ricks takes on a big issue and gets it flat-out wrong. He describes a wildly exaggerated rift between America's military and contemporary society. If you read the credits at the back of the book, you will find that Ricks has been listening to a pathetic little club of failed military types and sensation-seeking professors who have tried to rescue stagnant careers by raving about the secession of America's officer corps from its citizenry. This is shameful nonsense. If anyone is alienated from middle America, it is our domestic elites and their Washington panders, who—far too important in their persons to serve in uniform—no longer have the decency to reserve their sympathy for America's enemies until those enemies are defeated. It was not the folks back home who panicked at the success of American arms in Desert Storm or who rewarded the Somalis who dragged a soldier's corpse through the streets by running away. Americans are fighters. It doesn't take a village, it takes a backbone."

⁹⁰ See, for example, Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, 315: "Cheney had also discovered that some of the flexibility that all presidents wanted in the [Single Integrated Operation Plan], and had ordered in a series of presidential directives, was missing. For example, the ability to demonstrate restraint to the Soviets by limiting or controlling the size of a nuclear attack was not there. These issues went right to the heart of presidential and civilian control over the military."

⁹¹ See Cohen, "The Civil-Military Balance," 32: "Seared by its experience in Vietnam, the officer corps reacted by seeking to manipulate political leaders and

The Alternative

There is an alternative. A more complete, accurate, and balanced view of peace operations can replace the current prevailing view. Civilian and military leaders can base decisions relating to military funding, deployment, organization, equipment, and training on a clearer understanding of how peace operations affect readiness for war. They can counteract the particular ways in which Task Force Myth's readiness for combat may erode during months of duty in Bosnia, while also relying upon any of the ways in which it's combat readiness may improve during those months of duty.

More specifically, decision-makers can fully acknowledge the relative frequency of peace operations and incorporate a realistic picture of the Army's workload into planning assumptions. Measures of readiness can reflect the value of exposing units, leaders, and soldiers to the friction inherent in all overseas deployments while accounting for the wear and tear and other deficiencies caused by those deployments. Training can better cultivate the "mental agility" necessary to prepare soldiers for both peace operations and combat. Doctrine can more fully account for differences between types of peace operations and for similarities between certain peace operations and war, while tactics and techniques can build upon these differences and similarities. Military leaders can express principled reservations about aspects of peace operations without either

processes so that any commitment to conflict would be made under circumstances that it approved."; Kohn, "Out of Control," 9: "Even more troubling, General Powell took it upon himself to be the arbiter of American military intervention overseas, an unprecedented policy role for a senior military officer, and the most explicit intrusion into policy since MacArthur's conflict with Truman."

casting the legitimacy of such operations into doubt or raising concerns about the maintenance of civilian control.

In short, we can take peace operations seriously as inevitable training grounds for future combat even as we note and respect their differences from traditional wars. In a passage describing how British colonial campaigns prepared Churchill's generals for World War II, John Keegan himself exemplifies the alternative to viewing peace operations as distractions:

The small wars of empire gave [British officers] frequent practice in the command of troops in action; the politics of empire, which underlay such wars, accustomed them to co-operating with imperial civil servants in the implementation of strategies which, though small in scale, were often complex in nature; while the varied terrain and climate of the empire itself, and the absence of resources and difficulties of supply in remote campaigning-grounds imposed an excellent practical training in logistics.⁹²

Within Keegan's own currency of soldiering, the "small wars of empire" were most certainly also "small change," consisting as they usually did of sporadic, small-scale fighting rather than "battles." Yet the differences between the colonial campaigns and those against the Axis Powers do not prevent Keegan from identifying key parallels in the demands both types of campaign placed upon generalship.⁹³ Our challenge is to adopt a

⁹² John Keegan, introduction to *Churchill's Generals*, ed. John Keegan (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Ltd., 1991), 9.

⁹³ The search for key differences and parallels between colonial and conventional warfare is a stated objective of the core course in military history for officers attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. See Lawrence A. Yates, "Advance Sheet, Lesson 13," in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August 1997), 362 (questioning students, on the basis of assigned readings about French, British, and American colonial campaigns, "[c]an a military officer be equally proficient in both colonial warfare and conventional warfare?"); Ibid. at 366: "As students examine the

similarly balanced view of United States peace operations, one that uncovers not only considerations relating to the readiness of generals, but also guidance for the combat preparation of units and soldiers.

assigned readings, they should be cognizant not just of the ways in which different countries devised different approaches to colonial warfare at different times and places, but also of the dynamics by which conventional military institutions adjusted to unorthodox military operations and the impact that this adjustment had on the ability of those institutions to fight traditional wars.”

CHAPTER 3

THE MECHANICAL PARADIGM OF READINESS

To overcome the problems inherent in the prevailing view it is not enough simply to expose those problems on a symptomatic level. The symptoms identified in chapter 2 are readily apparent to the receptive mind. Yet one who concedes that peace operations are frequent, are beset with friction, and are better served by soldier initiative than soldier passivity may still believe strongly that they detract from the mission to fight real wars. One who recognizes differences between peace operations—i.e., that peace enforcement in Bosnia approximates wartime conditions more closely than peacekeeping in Macedonia—may still insist that both are poor training grounds for war. One who acknowledges that peace operations are legitimate military missions may still maintain that they are unwise, regardless of their legitimacy.

A compelling alternative to the prevailing view must do more than treat symptoms. It must build upon descriptive analysis, upon a diagnosis of the prevailing view in general terms. A persuasive alternative must sort the various assumptions and propositions of the prevailing view into categories and suggest causes. In other words, it must develop a theory, however tentative, of why the prevailing view persists even after confrontation with points that are problematic for it. Moreover, this theory must organize

our knowledge about the effects of peace operations on Army combat forces while also suggesting ideas for specific actions consistent with our newly organized knowledge.⁹⁴

The remainder of this paper develops such a theory. A close analysis of unit status reports, of combat training centers, and of mission essential task lists contributes the core of the theory. The role of these three fixtures in how the Army perceives and evaluates its own ability to fight wars cannot be overstated. The theory also sifts and sorts raw information from surveys, interviews, and research pertaining to five important peace operations in the 1990s, as well as from historical accounts of past wars. Whenever possible, Task Force Myth provides the context for illustrations of theoretical concepts.

In short, the theory is that a flawed paradigm of readiness underlies and explains the prevailing view of peace operations. The term “paradigm” is not used casually here. Since 1962, when Thomas Kuhn employed the notion to expose the structure of scientific

⁹⁴ With the support of my thesis committee, I have departed somewhat from the strict research model and methodology described in Director of Graduate Degree Programs, *Student Text 20-10: Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis* (Ft. Leavenworth: U.S. Army C&GSC, July 1997), 10-22, to pursue Michael Howard’s definition of military science as “no more than disciplined thinking about military affairs.” Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* 119 (March 1974): 3, 4. I assess survey data, interviews, reports, and other primary evidence, along with secondary sources, within a framework for disciplined thinking commonly used to address large, complex questions. The framework can be depicted graphically using the circle chart presented in Figure 2. Chapters 2 through 5 of this thesis correspond to the four quadrants of the circle. I am indebted to Dr. William Gregor for acquainting me with authoritative works in decision-making and problem-solving theory, such as David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), which helped me settle upon a framework for this paper.




Figure 2. A Framework for Disciplined Thinking. Source: Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 70.

revolutions,⁹⁵ all manner of social scientists, legal scholars, physicians, psychologists, educators, management theorists, and military analysts have claimed to hail new paradigms.⁹⁶ In the past fifteen years alone, for instance, social scientists have been

⁹⁵ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁹⁶ One informal measure of the popularity of Kuhn's term is that an Alta Vista Internet search for "paradigm" yielded 286,660 "hits." See <http://au.yahoo.com/bin/query?p=paradigm&hc4&hs=219>; accessed 26 April 1998.

courted with “Rasch measurement,”⁹⁷ the medical community with “holistic healing,”⁹⁸ and military professionals with everything from “uncomfortable wars”⁹⁹ to “the revolution in military affairs,”¹⁰⁰ all supposedly grounded in dramatic paradigm shifts.¹⁰¹ While there is no intrinsic harm to importing the paradigm concept from Kuhn’s

⁹⁷ M. Singleton, “Rasch Measurement as a Kuhnian Revolution,” in *The Institute for Objective Measurement* (Chicago: MESA Press and MESA Psychometric Laboratory, 1997).

⁹⁸ M.H. Cohen, “A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic Healing,” *Arizona State Law Journal*, vol. 27 (1995), 79.

⁹⁹ John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” *Parameters* (Winter 1986): 7.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., Gordon R. Sullivan and Anthony M. Corrales, *The Army in the Information Age* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 31 March 1995), 1819; David Jablonsky, *Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order* (Carlisle, Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993); Ralph Peters, “After the Revolution,” *Parameters*, (Summer, 1995): 7.

¹⁰¹ One indication that the notion of the paradigm is separable from the most recently touted revolution in military affairs (RMA) is that some of RMA’s most vocal proponents do not speak in terms of paradigm shifts. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996): 20-35; Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996): 37-54. One commentator who finds neither a paradigm shift nor a revolution in RMA is John A. Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000,” *The International History Review*, vol. XVIII, Issue 3 (August 1996): 505-45. Another, who draws a distinction between “paradigm shifts” and “paradigm reinterpretations” and places RMA in the latter is Robert F. Baumann, “Historical Perspectives on Future War,” *Military Review* (March-April 1997): 40-48. For other perspectives on the nature of the RMA, see Michael Mazarr, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning* (Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1994); Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994); Paul Brachen and Raoul Henri Alcalá, *Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow’s Army* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994); Steven Metz and James Kievit, *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994); Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994); Douglas A. MacGregor, *Breaking the Phalanx* (London: Praeger, 1997).

discipline, the history of the basic sciences, prudence and precision demand that the term be defined before proceeding.¹⁰²

A paradigm is a collection of assumptions about the world, by which individuals define the boundaries of their inquiry into that world.¹⁰³ A paradigm gains adherents when it explains observed reality more readily than do alternative paradigms. Adherents deny or explain away problems and methods that lie outside the paradigm. Kuhn notes that those who follow the accepted paradigm are welcomed within the dominant community, while those who articulate problems or solutions in terms other than those supplied by the paradigm are shunned. Alternative methods are regarded as implicit assaults on the existing order, and because they are frequently resisted rather than assimilated, the process of paradigm-shifting tends to be revolutionary rather than evolutionary.

Spectacular achievements form the basis for a new paradigm. These achievements must have two characteristics.¹⁰⁴ First, they must be sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from the old paradigm. Second, they must be sufficiently open-ended to suggest refinements, or smaller problems

¹⁰² See, for example, Daniel G. Cedarbaum, "Paradigms," in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, ed. Gerd Buchdahl (Oxford: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1984), 173, 174: "The fundamental obstacle to a proper understanding of [*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*] results from the fact that the term 'paradigm', as Kuhn has said of the book as a whole 'can be too nearly all things to all people.'" (quoting Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 293).

¹⁰³ See Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 10.

¹⁰⁴ See *ibid.*

to solve. Kuhn called the work left undone by the initial spectacular achievements “normal science.” Great progress can be made by normal science in the wake of a paradigm shift because adherents are not always challenging first principles.¹⁰⁵ A classic example is the work done by normal science to measure the gravitational constant within Newtonian physics, a parameter undetermined by the path-breaking Newton himself.

A paradigm shift is preceded by the discovery of “anomalies.”¹⁰⁶ Anomalies are observations or data that the old paradigm explains awkwardly or not at all. Frequently, Kuhn perceived, it is the young or those new to the field who take the anomalies seriously, describe them using distinct concepts, and eventually exert pressure on the categories and procedures of the old paradigm. Being less committed to the old paradigm, they are more capable of conceiving a new one. An older paradigm confronted with a growing number of anomalies is said to be in “crisis.”

Each of these defining attributes describes the flawed paradigm of readiness that is responsible for the prevailing view of peace operations. That paradigm is “mechanical,” in that it conceives of war as the natural extension of competing military machines. The role of materiel is dominant, and both soldiers and units exist principally to service the vast array of lethal weapons that technological advances and the

¹⁰⁵ See *ibid.*, 76: “So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived.”

¹⁰⁶ See *ibid.*, 52-65.

procurement race have placed before them. Notwithstanding official pronouncements to the contrary, numbers of weapons and soldiers and units, and a particular sort of training that stresses technical competence with those weapons, are more important than morale and character. The brute apparent strength and size of the machine are regarded as more accurate reflections of readiness than the demonstrated functioning of the whole under conditions of stress and adversity.

The mechanical paradigm of readiness emerged during the first World War, following a century in which genuine social, industrial, organizational, and technological revolutions shook the world and the foundations of warfare. Since World War I, this paradigm has sponsored an enormous amount of “normal military science”—evolutionary refinements that have not challenged the basic assumptions about how a nation’s army readies itself for war. The balance of this chapter charts the history of the mechanical paradigm, examines the highest forms these refinements have taken in the United States Army since the Great War, and then describes recent developments that have pushed the mechanical paradigm into crisis.

The History of the Mechanical Paradigm

The century leading up to World War I unleashed enormous forces that would find expression within the mechanical paradigm of warfighting strength. By 1815, Napoleonic France had already undergone fundamental sociopolitical and organizational changes in the wake of the French Revolution, and France’s European rivals spent much of the 19th century catching up. Waves of conscripts, and later reservists, came to fill the

ranks of most serious field armies.¹⁰⁷ Entire nations took to arms.¹⁰⁸ In the first fifty years following the Peace of Paris, warfare witnessed breathtaking advances in technology—from steam power, to the electric telegraph, to the mass-produced rifled musket, to the Minie ball.¹⁰⁹ Then, as World War I approached, the battlefield was further transformed by railroads that ran efficiently and on time, by high explosive and smokeless ammunition propellant, by recoilless and quick-fire cannons, and by machine guns and magazine-loaded rifles.¹¹⁰

In Prussia, and later throughout the western world, military education and professionalism kept pace with technological change through the rise of the general staff. Scharnhorst's general staff of 1809 has been termed "the brains and the nerve center" of the Prussian army,¹¹¹ but Max Weber's more apt characterization of the institution that later evolved alludes to "specialization," and "bureaucratic rationalization" that could

¹⁰⁷ See generally Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," in Peter Paret ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 282. See also Captain Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 7-9.

¹⁰⁸ It is important to note that before 1914, the United States and Great Britain were exceptions to the "Nation in Arms" trend. See, for example, Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 112-113.

¹⁰⁹ See generally House, 7-8. See also Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914" in Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 511.

¹¹⁰ See House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare*, 8.

¹¹¹ Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," 283.

accommodate the growing complexity of warfare.¹¹² The rise of the general staff is closely identified with von Moltke the Elder, who as a general staff officer in the 1840s studied topography and geography, prepared a detailed technical map of Silesia, and deepened his military education on specialized topics. These activities built upon the rigorous studies he had begun years earlier at the Prussian War College.¹¹³ Later, when von Moltke became chief of the general staff, Prussia relied upon technical staff studies and plans that calculated how quickly armies could be mobilized and transported by rail to a point of concentration.¹¹⁴ Von Moltke's successor, von Schlieffen, accelerated the reliance upon technical staff work in devising the famous war plan for enveloping the French army with a grand thrust through Belgium.¹¹⁵

These technological and institutional developments furnished elements essential to the mechanical paradigm, even as they produced the established order that would be challenged and ultimately replaced by that paradigm. When swift victory eluded the German general staff in 1914, the paradigm shift had begun. The spectacular achievements cementing the shift would take place between 1916 and 1918, under the

¹¹² Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought 2: Pareto, Weber, Durkheim* (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1967), 219, 247-48; Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich and trans. Ephraim Fischoff et. al., (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1978), vol. 1, 223-26 and vol. 2, 980-82.

¹¹³ The commandant at the time of Moltke's attendance was Carl von Clausewitz. Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," 284.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹¹⁵ See also Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 296.

brilliant if reckless Third Supreme Command of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Michael Geyer explains:

The Supreme Command's reforms amounted to a comprehensive effort to 'rationalize' warfare much in the same way that German industry 'rationalized' production. The substitution of machines for men forced the adaptation of the army to the handling of 'war machines.' The shift from hierarchical structures to functional ones was a drastic, even revolutionary step, because it shed more than a century of military traditions within half a year. The Supreme Command began to approach operations in terms of 'tasks' and 'available resources,' assessing units according to their weapons capabilities. Battle plans were drawn up accordingly, stressing the capabilities of the assembled weaponry rather than specific principles of strategy. The optimal use of weapons, instead of the 'art' or 'science' of military leadership, was seen as guaranteeing military victory. *Material* won out over *Geist* as the contemporary debate put it—or more precisely: technical and instrumental rationality replaced the remnants of a holistic approach to the conduct of war. Operational planning and strategy became a matter of the management of arms. It is this system that made Ludendorff and the Third Supreme Command into the most radical exponents of machine-culture in the military.¹¹⁶

That the potent Ludendorff offensives of 1917 ultimately failed, resulting in eventual victory for Germany's enemies, did not slow conversion to the new paradigm. By 1945, all significant armies had accepted it.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945" in Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 541.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 543: "The German transition to a military machine-culture, which by 1945 was accepted by all armies, brought to an end a century of land warfare. The formation of a military machine-culture and the instrumental organization of units undermined the very essence of the Prusso-German military institution and profession, traditionally based on uniformity, hierarchy, and subordination. It altered the way battles were fought and armies were organized, and created a new kind of military leader, who developed the laws of operations from the available means rather than deriving them from eternal and scientific laws of operational knowledge about war and leadership. The 'strategist' became the supreme organizer of weapons—or, to use the role model of the time, he turned into an engineer." For one perspective of the achievements of the Third Supreme Command, see Timothy T. Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat

Acceptance by the United States Army began with the mustering of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 1917. In July of that year, the G-3 section of Pershing's General Headquarters (GHQ) determined that the AEF would use heavy French howitzers for artillery support. These 75mm and 155mm guns influenced the size and organization of American divisions, which the GHQ designed to be large and heavy in infantry and artillery.¹¹⁸ These features would permit the envisioned advances against German defenses arrayed in depth. Already consistent with the mechanical paradigm of readiness, the GHQ organized and began training the AEF to permit the most rational and effective employment of its borrowed weapons systems.¹¹⁹

The development of combined arms warfare and the introduction of armored and air power to the battlefields of World War II only accelerated the acceptance of the mechanical paradigm. In England, J.F.C. Fuller and later Sir Basil Liddell Hart advocated a mechanized army, built around the firepower and mobility of the tank.¹²⁰

Studies Institute, 1981). See also Keegan, *Face of Battle*, 234: "The appearance of the machine-gun, therefore, had not so much *disciplined* the act of killing – which was what seventeenth-century drill had done – as *mechanized* or *industrialized* it."; Alfred Vagts, *The History of Militarism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1937), 235: "When the militaristic way is followed in war, there are high losses in men and little inclination to think of reducing them by the most effective and persistent application of machines and materials."

¹¹⁸ Timothy K. Nenniger, "Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917-1918," *Military Review* 51, no. 4 (October 1987): 177-81.

¹¹⁹ See, for example, Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, 161.

¹²⁰ Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, "Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense," in Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 598-623, 601-02 (containing statements of Liddell Hart quoted here).

After early fits and starts, mechanization flourished on both sides of the Atlantic. Liddell Hart speculated excitedly that the tank presaged “the revival of generalship and the art of war, in contrast to its mere mechanics.” Yet while the tank later “rescue[d] . . . mobility from the toils of trench warfare,” the dream that a mechanized army would actually prove less mechanical was not to be. The age had come that force structure and training of men were to be designed around the combination of weapons systems perceived to produce the most potent battlefield effects.¹²¹ That age would not soon pass. Even more radical was the acceptance of the mechanical paradigm by those less committed to vested interests in land warfare. The theory and practice of air warfare—as propounded by Douhet, Mitchell, and Seversky—literally began from the assumption that all future military doctrine should acknowledge a particular weapon (the aircraft) as the predominant instrument of war.¹²²

Although the mechanical paradigm of readiness became so dominant that army professionals scarcely contemplated developments in this light, army tactical doctrine in

¹²¹ See, for example, Major Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 5; Christopher R. Gabel, *See, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), 67; Mark S. Watson, *United States Army in World War II (The War Department)—Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Historical Division, 1950), 148n, 156, 158, 204, 238, 366 (describing efforts of General Leslie McNair to develop the triangular division).

¹²² David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter, *Makers of Modern Strategy*; Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 223-241.

the United States from 1945 to 1976 was the product of evolutionary advances within the paradigm. For instance, in 1955, the doomsday weapons—atomic bombs—stimulated the development of the pentomic division and concomitant doctrine and training for dispersing units throughout a checkerboard battlefield so as to avoid atomic strikes.¹²³ Later, the helicopter formed the center of air mobile doctrine and training that would prove effective, though not determinative of the war's outcome, in Vietnam. General Eisenhower's warning during this period against the influence of the "military industrial complex" encountered the response Kuhn predicts when a major assumption of the dominant paradigm is questioned. The warning was vehemently opposed, or ignored altogether.

Following the United States defeat in Vietnam, the strongest voice to emerge in the Army on readiness was that of General William H. DePuy, the Commander of the United States Army's newly formed Training and Doctrine Command from 1974 to 1977. DePuy's efforts to "harness doctrine in the service of reform"¹²⁴ would lead to an influential new field manual. That manual, championed principally by proponents of armored and mechanized forces, would spawn training and doctrine institutions that today

¹²³ Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine*, 17-18.

¹²⁴ See Roger J. Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam," *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (December 1997): 1, 7.

represent the highest form of the mechanical paradigm.¹²⁵ DePuy's thinking on readiness was straightforward:

DePuy believed that the Army's increased dependency on highly sophisticated weapons and equipment and the support services necessary to sustain them signaled the Army's evolution from an organization of people with weapons to an *organization of weapons with crews*. In this sense, the Army was becoming more like the Air Force and Navy and needed to prepare accordingly.¹²⁶

One of DePuy's proteges, Brigadier General Paul Gorman, instituted the training and evaluation system designed to accompany the new doctrine. This system demanded "performance-oriented training," along with a comprehensive assessment of each task that a warfighting unit and its soldiers would need to perform on a battlefield featuring the new weapons and equipment.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ A popularized account of the Army's reforms in the wake of Vietnam appears in General Fred Franks and Tom Clancy, *Into the Storm* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 84-165. Franks and Clancy describe the procurement of the "big five" weapons systems--the M1 Abrams, the Bradley, the Apache, the Blackhawk, and the Patriot--and the placement of armored and mechanized maneuver warfare at the center of doctrine. See also Richard M. Swain, "AirLand Battle," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Unpublished Manuscript, December 1997).

¹²⁶ Major Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 95 (emphasis added). See also General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "The Army Training System Overview," (speech to the TRADOC/FORSCOM Training Conference IV, at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 24 May 1977), reprinted in *Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy*, ed. Richard M. Swain (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 225-37, 36: "The Air Force is an industrialized business and many of the methods they have developed are going to have to be adopted by the Army to cope with our problems."

¹²⁷ Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam," 7. See also Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," in B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, eds., *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 147-172. Gorman's

The mechanical paradigm of readiness ushered in by Ludendorff—and, arguably, taken to its logical extreme by DePuy—still lives. Though nascent even at the mechanical paradigm’s inception, “anomalies”¹²⁸ have received greater attention since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps this is because the United States army is unrivalled in its dominance and thus can reflect upon approaches other than the optimal use of weaponry. Perhaps this is because ambitious claims for a new family of weapons and communications systems have stretched the credulity even of believers in the machine culture. Many of the anomalies appear in their modern manifestations during peace operations.

Under the theory offered by this paper, the prevailing view of peace operations—that they are distractions from the business of preparing for real wars—serves the purpose of dismissing anomalies they generate and resisting alternative paradigms they may encourage. By its nature, this theory cannot be conclusively proved or disproved. Yet the possibility remains that the mechanical paradigm’s survival or decay will determine the U.S. Army’s readiness for the next war, whatever shape that war may take.

Unit Status Reporting

The mechanical paradigm of readiness is today embodied in the Unit Status Reporting System. The stated objective of that system is “to provide . . . [t]he current

system would eventually provide the model for Joint training. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual 3500.04: Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 Sept. 1996).

¹²⁸ See the discussion of anomalies within Kuhn’s theory of paradigms above at notes 105-106 and accompanying text.

status of U.S. Army units to National Command Authorities (NCAs), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), HQDA, and all levels of the Army chain of command.”¹²⁹ Unit status reports seek “to portray Army-wide conditions and trends,” to identify factors “which degrade unit status,” to assist in allocating resources, and to “[a]llow senior decision-makers to judge the employability and/or deployability of reporting units.”¹³⁰

¹²⁹ See Department of the Army, *Regulation 220-1—Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Dep’t of Army, 1993), para. 1-1.

¹³⁰ Ibid. The Army’s Unit Status Reporting System implements a joint services program that has nearly identical purposes. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Publication 1.03-3: Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)* (Washington, D.C.: Operations Directorate, Command Systems Operations Division, J-3, Joint Staff, 1993). See generally John C. F. Tillson, “Building a Joint Training Readiness Reporting System,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer, 1996): 22-28. For the past year, the Secretary of Defense has been submitting quarterly readiness reports to Congress pursuant to a statutory requirement:

Quarterly readiness reports

(a) Requirement. - Not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar-year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on military readiness. The report for any quarter shall be based on assessments that are provided during that quarter -

(1) to any council, committee, or other body of the Department of Defense (A) that has responsibility for readiness oversight, and (B) the membership of which includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher;

(2) by senior civilian and military officers of the military departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and

(3) as part of any regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the Department of Defense as a whole.

(b) Matters To Be Included. - Each such report shall -

(1) specifically describe identified readiness problems or deficiencies and planned remedial actions; and

(2) include the key indicators and other relevant data related to the identified problem or deficiency.

Our Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth, like all battalion commanders in the Army, files a unit status report each month during his command. The Unit Status Report System establishes the readiness criteria against which he rates Task Force Myth: (1) C-1, indicating that the unit is fully ready to perform the wartime mission for which it was organized, designed, or tasked; (2) C-2, indicating that the unit is substantially ready; (3) C-3, indicating that the unit is marginally ready; (4) C-4, meaning that the unit is not ready; (5) C-5, meaning that the unit is not combat ready by design, such as a unit being redesigned or re-equipped.¹³¹ The C-ratings (“C” stands for “category”) attempt to provide a standardized scale of unit readiness measured at a selected point in time.

The Unit Status Reporting System measures four areas: personnel, training, equipment on hand, and equipment serviceability. Each of these areas generates a separate rating that the commander considers before determining the C-rating for his unit.

Lieutenant Colonel Myth assesses his unit’s personnel status from a “P-level,” which compares the number of soldiers, the number of soldiers qualified in their assigned specialties, and the number of soldiers in senior grades with predetermined “wartime requirement[s].”¹³² The P-level is the latest in a tradition of strength reports that extends

(c) Classification of Reports. - Reports under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form and may, as the Secretary determines necessary, also be submitted in classified form.

10 U.S.C. § 482 (1997).

¹³¹ Battalions, separate companies, and separate detachments prepare Unit Status Reports. See *Army Regulation 220-1*, para. 2-2.

¹³² *Ibid.*, ch. 4.

back to the Grand Army of Napoleon. Because it incorporates a comparison of the simple headcount of the battalion to a fully manned battalion of the same type, the P-level preserves a useful piece of the pre-mechanical paradigm, in which readiness was linked to raw numbers of soldiers in the ranks.¹³³ Because it also incorporates a measure of how many soldiers in the battalion are qualified in their specialties—specialties distinguishable by the particular weapons and equipment employed—the P-level furthers the mechanical paradigm’s conception of a battalion as “an organization of weapons with crews.”¹³⁴

Myth assesses the training readiness of the task force from a “T-level” that purports to indicate “the current ability of the unit to perform assigned wartime missions.”¹³⁵ The ability to perform wartime missions, in turn, is a function of proficiency in “mission essential tasks.”¹³⁶ Training doctrine requires Myth to derive the

¹³³ See, for example, Ardant Du Picq, *Battle Studies*, trans. Col. John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton, in *Roots of Strategy, Book 2: 3 Military Classics*. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991), 157: “The Theory of Strong Battalions--Today, numbers are considered the essential. Napoleon had this tendency (note his strength reports). The Romans did not pay so much attention to it. What they paid most attention to was to seeing that everybody fought. We assume that all the personnel present with an army, with a division, with a regiment on the day of battle, fights. Right there is the error.”

¹³⁴ Recall the quotation of General William DePuy in the text accompanying note 126 above.

¹³⁵ See *Army Regulation 220-1*, para. 7-1.

¹³⁶ See U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 25-100: Training the Force* (Fort Monroe, VA: Nov. 1988), Glossary-5 (defining “mission essential task” as “[a] collective task in which a unit must be proficient to accomplish and appropriate portion of its wartime mission(s)”).

mission essential tasks of his unit by analyzing various sources that suggest how his unit would be employed in wartime¹³⁷ and to submit his unit's mission essential task list (METL) to the next senior commander for approval.¹³⁸ When determining the unit's T-level, Myth first assesses its ability to execute these mission essential tasks. He makes use of personal observations, records, reports, and the assessments of others (both inside and outside of the unit). Then he estimates the number of training days needed for his unit to achieve full proficiency in the mission essential tasks. The estimated number of training days needed to reach full proficiency determines the unit's T-level.¹³⁹ Because METLs consist of collective tasks that can be accomplished only through the proficient operation of hundreds of individual and crew-served weapons and items of equipment,¹⁴⁰ the T-level itself is a sophisticated composite index of readiness under the mechanical paradigm.

Before Myth assesses the overall readiness of his task force each month, he also considers an "S-level" that reflects what proportion of the unit's weapons and equipment are on hand¹⁴¹ and an "R-level" that indicates how well the unit is maintaining its on-

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 2-1 (listing as examples wartime operations and contingency plans, mission training plans, mobilization plans, and installation wartime transition and deployment plans, force integration plans).

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 2-7.

¹³⁹ See *Army Regulation 220-1*, para. 7-5.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 25-101: Battle Focused Training* (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1990), 2-4.

¹⁴¹ See *Army Regulation 220-1*, ch. 5.

hand equipment.¹⁴² The calculation of these two indicators—both unambiguous features of the mechanical paradigm of readiness—relies upon careful collection of data from subordinate units and upon formidable expertise from Myth's staff. The S-level is a comparison of "the fill of selected equipment to wartime requirements."¹⁴³ The unit's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) establishes its "wartime requirements,"¹⁴⁴ and the levels of all of the principal weapons systems and equipment¹⁴⁵ as well as specified "pacing items"¹⁴⁶ and "support items of equipment"¹⁴⁷ are checked against the levels in the MTOE.¹⁴⁸ The R-level is calculated by comparing the "FMC rates" of various samples of equipment on hand and selecting the lowest of these.¹⁴⁹ The

¹⁴² Ibid, ch. 6.

¹⁴³ Ibid, para. 5-1.

¹⁴⁴ See *ibid.*, para. 1-6b: "As a general policy, all equipment listed on the unit TOE is considered minimum mission-essential to allow the unit to execute its primary combat tasks and provide sustainment capability" (citing U.S. Department of Army, *Regulation 71-31: Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment*).

¹⁴⁵ These have Equipment Readiness Code A/P (ERC A/P). *Ibid.*, para. 5-1.

¹⁴⁶ These have Equipment Readiness Code P (ERC P). *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ These have Equipment Readiness Code P (ERC B/C). *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ The unit's overall equipment-on-hand S-level is equal to the lower of the ERC P/A or ERC P computations. *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ The calculation is as follows:

The R-level is calculated by comparing the aggregate Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate for "all on hand reportable equipment" regardless of ERC and including pacing items and a separate calculation for each "individual pacing item" (ERC-P). The unit's overall R-level is equal to the lower of these determined R-levels. While FMC, as determined by the "Not ready if" column of the Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) in the TM -10/20 series manuals, is the criteria for USR computations, the goal of Army maintenance is to eliminate all deficiencies in the PMCS, including those that do not cause the equipment to be rated as "not ready". The goal is for all

FMC rate of a sample of equipment is the proportion of that equipment that is “fully mission capable” as that term is defined by Army technical manuals for equipment maintenance.

Almost in recognition that too strict reliance on these four readiness indicators alone will yield anomalous outcomes, the Army requires that Lieutenant Colonel Myth exercise independent judgment.¹⁵⁰ For instance, even if the unit is at S-2, Myth has the discretion to assess the unit at C-1 overall. Myth also has discretion within the T-level, given that his personal observations are important bases of the unit’s training readiness rating. Furthermore, in the regulation governing the readiness reporting system, the Army formally cautions that “Unit Status Reports are designed to measure the status of resources and training of a unit at a given point in time,” and that “[t]he report[s] should not be used in isolation when assessing overall unit readiness or the broader aspect of Army readiness.”¹⁵¹ Elsewhere, the regulation hedges that “these reports do not contain all of the information needed to manage resources” and that they “identify problem areas,

units to maintain their on hand equipment to an R-1 level regardless of their assigned ALO.

Ibid., para. 6-1.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 1-6: “The status of each measured resource area (personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training) is assigned a numerical category level. In addition, each commander determines an overall unit status level based on a combination of the unit’s measured resource area levels and his or her professional judgment.” See also para. 9-1 (detailing guidance on Commander’s Remarks).

¹⁵¹ Ibid., para. 1-5a(1).

but in many cases these problems must be examined using more detailed personnel, logistic, and training administrative systems to determine causes and solutions.”¹⁵²

Still, command discretion and formal cautions aside, decision-makers at higher levels expect the report to be “a timely single source document for assessing key elements of a unit’s status.”¹⁵³ It is precisely the “streamlined” nature of such reports that enables them to “retain their operational utility.”¹⁵⁴ Besides, there are surely limits to the extent of command discretion, even if these are unwritten. If his battalion rates a P-1, T-1, S-1 and R-1 in a particular reporting period, Lieutenant Colonel Myth will look arbitrary if he rates the unit at anything less than a C-1 overall. Similarly, if the battalion were to be P-4¹⁵⁵, T-4,¹⁵⁶ S-4,¹⁵⁷ and R-4,¹⁵⁸ Myth could not justify a high C-rating without fundamentally questioning the unit’s pre-established manning, mission essential tasks, and organization. In gross and over time, then, the Unit Status Report system produces concise, quantified data that purport to measure readiness. Moreover, consistent with the prevailing mechanical paradigm of readiness, these data are heavily weighted with

¹⁵² Ibid., para. 1-5a(2).

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ The approximate meaning of which is that it has less than sixty-nine percent of its personnel strength. See *ibid.*, Table 4-1.

¹⁵⁶ Meaning that the commander estimates forty-three or more days are needed to train the unit to standards on mission essential tasks. See *ibid.*, Table 7-1.

¹⁵⁷ The approximate meaning of which is that it has less than sixty-four percent of its equipment on hand. See *ibid.*, Table 5-1.

¹⁵⁸ The approximate meaning of which is that less than fifty-nine percent of its on-hand equipment is fully mission capable. See *ibid.*, Table 6-1.

weapons and equipment factors. Congress and senior civilian and uniformed leaders rely upon these data.¹⁵⁹

Hypothetical (but realistic) data from Task Force Myth's reports in the months preceding the battle of Chagang-do help illustrate the role of the Unit Status Reporting system within the current paradigm of readiness.¹⁶⁰ Myth's entries in "Commander's

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSIAD-86-94, Unit Training: How It Is Evaluated And Reported To The Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 1986), 14; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSAIID-97-107, Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Congress* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, March 1997); U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSAIID-98-126, Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 20 March 1998); Winslow Wheeler, Report to the Senate Budget Committee on Visits to the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center 30 Nov.-5 Dec., 105th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 1997 (citing "extremely serious Army-wide personnel and training (i.e., readiness) problems," such as fifty percent understaffing in infantry and mechanic positions). The data also receive the attention of the news media when readiness is a matter of public or Congressional concern. See, for example, "Another Hollow Army?" *U.S. News and World Report*, Nov. 15, 1993, 50 ("Fully one fourth of the units in the army are reporting that they are 'Category 2,' meaning they have only about nine men where they need 10."); "Pentagon: Peacekeeping Not Hurting Readiness," *Leavenworth Times*, 24 Dec. 1997, A-12; Richard J. Newman, "Can Peacekeepers Make War?," *U.S. News and World Report*, 19 Jan. 1998, 39, 43 ("[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton] and others say that the Pentagon's carefully monitored readiness statistics do not indicate serious degradations in the force.").

¹⁶⁰ For the data in Table 1, I thank Colonel Michael W. Alvis, who is currently Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace, and who from January to July of 1997 was Deputy Division Chief, Force Readiness Division, Directorate of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Colonel Alvis reviewed the entire mass of unit status reports submitted by units participating in operations in Bosnia and on 17 November 1997 forwarded a sample of representative reports to me. Except for the dates, the unit name, and the pre- and post-deployment locations, the data in these tables—and the commanders' comments—match those of reports submitted by actual mechanized infantry battalions that deployed to Bosnia. Because the unit identifications remain classified, they are not revealed here. See also Colonel Michael W. Alvis, former Deputy Division Chief, Force Readiness Division, Directorate of

Remarks” for June through October 1999, justified the C-1 ratings with reference to the unit’s favorable performance at the National Training Center in June 1999 (see Table 1).

His remarks from November 1999 to June 2000 justified C-1 ratings with reference

Table 1. USR Data for Task Force Myth
Before and During Deployment

Month	Unit Location	Over-all	Pers- onnel	Train- ing	Equip- ment on Hand	Service- ability
<i>Year 1999</i>						
Jun	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-2	T-1	S-3	R-1
Jul	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-2	T-1	S-3	R-1
Aug	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-3	T-1	S-3	R-1
Sep	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-3	T-1	S-3	R-1
Oct	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-2	T-1	S-3	R-1
Nov	Deploying	C-1	P-2	T-1	S-3	R-1
Dec	Deploying	C-1	P-2	T-1	S-3	R-1
<i>Year 2000</i>						
Jan	Bosnia	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-3	R-1
Feb	Bosnia	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-1	R-1
Mar	Bosnia	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-1	R-1
Apr	Bosnia	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-1	R-1
May	Bosnia	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-1	R-1
Jun	Ft. Hood	C-1	P-1	T-1	S-1	R-1

to “continued METL proficiency” gained as a result of the operational deployment to Bosnia itself.¹⁶¹ His remarks in March, April and May 2000 also made reference to

Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, interview by author, 29 December 1997, in Washington, D.C.

¹⁶¹ The rationale for such justification appeared in a quote attributed to “Commander of a Brigade Combat Team” in the first report on operations in Bosnia prepared by the Army’s center for lessons learned:

training in gunnery that the unit received in March at Taborfalva, Hungary, where the Army maintains a modern training facility designed specifically for units in Bosnia. By June 2000, Myth also was partially—and implicitly—justifying the C-1 ratings with his own relatively long experience in command. He had begun the scheduled two-year command tour in January 1999 and had led the unit at the National Training Center during its June rotation there.

Indeed, it is plausible to assume that one factor in Task Force Myth's selection for our hypothetical North Korea deployment would have been Myth's experience. The important thing to note here, however, is that if Myth's battalion were to follow the pattern of other units, its readiness under the mechanical paradigm would sharply drop following completion of its participation in the peace operation—regardless of Myth's

As you know we had a couple of standoffs; we got real close in terms of planning—into heavy operations. The brigade staff was synchronizing the close air support, the heavy artillery, the maneuvers, putting it all together—ground, air, and JAAT—in quick order. I'm convinced that we are not losing that much in our ability to conduct heavy operations.

I read a lot that would indicate that folks within the Army think we're losing a lot of our skills in terms of heavy operations. Some of that's obviously true. But crews are spending lots of time in Bradleys and tanks. The artillery community is working hard here. We do daily hip shoots—dry. Much work is being done to keep those skills up to a high level. The engineers have never worked as hard as they do in this sector. These guys do more combat engineering in a month than most engineers do in an entire career—with mine clearance overwatch, route clearance, construction of cantonment areas—the basecamps—they're stressed out. And within this command post, the planning process has not suffered a bit. Everything is doctrinally applied. So I'm very happy with it. I think that this brigade could transition to heavy operations in short order."

Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Initial Impressions Report: Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Fort Leavenworth: CALL, May 1996), 54.

experience and regardless of any “METL proficiency” gained from the deployment itself. Had Task Force Myth remained at Fort Hood following its Bosnia rotation, its reports could be expected to resemble the ratings, taken from actual readiness reports, reflected in Table 2. In his accompanying remarks, Lieutenant Colonel Myth would likely have made reference to a mass exodus of personnel in July, August, and September due to the backlog of scheduled reassignments and soldier schooling that could not be relieved

Table 2. USR Data for Task Force Myth
Following Deployment

Month	Over -all	Pers- onnel	Train- ing	Equip- ment on Hand	Service- ability
<i>Year 2000</i>					
Jul	C-2	P-2	T-2	S-2	R-1
Aug	C-2	P-2	T-2	S-1	R-1
Sep	C-3	P-3	T-2	S-1	R-1
Oct	C-3	P-3	T-2	S-1	R-1
Nov	C-3	P-3	T-2	S-1	R-1

while the unit was deployed.¹⁶² The “T-2” rating, a strong contributing factor in the lower C-ratings, would have become unavoidable because more than a year had passed since the unit’s rotation at the National Training Center. Even assuming, as we did in chapter 1, that Task Force Myth was quickly notified of the Chagang-do mission after returning from Bosnia—and thus that personnel losses due to reassignment and schooling

¹⁶² U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special Study: The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Leavenworth: CALL, February 1996), A-4 and A-5.

could be minimized—this training shortfall would be critical. Under the mechanical paradigm of readiness, the battle drill rehearsals, small arms marksmanship, and gunnery tasks executed during the deployment and at Taborfalva are simply not adequate substitutes for the comprehensive training in METL tasks that occurs at the National Training Center and at the other Combat Training Centers.¹⁶³

Combat Training Centers

In the 1990s, it has become difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Combat Training Centers to official thinking about readiness.¹⁶⁴ Although their dynamism, their stressful yet systematic approach to unit performance, and their sheer success have inevitably confronted the mechanical paradigm of readiness with anomalies, the centers themselves nevertheless continue to be sanctuaries for adherents to that paradigm. The four centers are well-resourced and elaborate training grounds where Army units are

¹⁶³ Unit Status Reporting data from the Haiti deployment reveal similar patterns to those from Bosnia, though the lighter force structure (and therefore mission essential task lists that exclude employment of armored and mechanized vehicles), the mission, the threat, and the terrain resulted in somewhat weaker downward pull on T-ratings in the months following deployment. Again, I thank Colonel Michael W. Alvis, see *supra* note , for reviewing the entire mass of unit status reports submitted by units participating in operations in Haiti and in February 1998 forwarding a sample of representative reports to me for analysis.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Newman, “Can Peacekeepers Make War?,” 39: “During a November mock battle at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., the division’s gunners failed to destroy any of the anti-aircraft missiles of the ‘opposition force.’”; Wheeler, Report to the Senate Budget Committee, (basing report on readiness problems upon observations made at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center).

tested in mission essential tasks.¹⁶⁵ The first center to be established was the National Training Center, which opened at Fort Irwin, California in October, 1981 following a four-year effort begun by then Brigadier and later Major General Paul Gorman—DePuy's protégé—to reform Army training institutions in the aftermath of Vietnam.¹⁶⁶

The National Training Center was a natural outgrowth of the training and evaluation system Gorman had developed with DePuy's strong support in the mid-1970's. As Richard Swain describes,

Gorman began a process to produce a Cartesian analysis for every combat task (i.e., to reduce each task to its simplest components) and then to establish standards of performance against which their execution could be evaluated. Gorman and DePuy drew upon new laser technologies to lay a foundation for evaluated free-play exercises, and, ultimately, to create the National Training Center in California. Although the actual conduct of training remained the province of unit commanders, Training and Doctrine Command established the standards and methodologies that govern army training to this day.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ See generally Daniel P. Bolger, *Dragons At War: Land Battle in the Dessert* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986). Dep't of Army, Reg. 350-50, Combat Training Center Program at 1-5b(4) (June 1993) (Interim Draft).

¹⁶⁶ See generally Anne W. Chapman, *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 1976-1984* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992); Anne W. Chapman, *The National Training Center Matures, 1985-1993* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997); John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993).

¹⁶⁷ Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," 152-53.

Although the Gorman initiatives, to include the National Training Center, were part of a so-called “revolution” in training,¹⁶⁸ it is clear that the major impetus was the lethality and range of modern weapons demonstrated during the mechanized battles of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.¹⁶⁹ The subsequent reshaping of United States Army doctrine and institutions thus merely applied greater rigor and different weapons systems to training that otherwise had much in common with that undertaken in the German Army in the latter part of World War I.¹⁷⁰ From 1916-1918, German tactical doctrine incorporated concepts of elastic defense-in-depth and combined arms offense, which were disseminated to units through an effective and realistic training program.¹⁷¹ The Gorman initiatives also resembled other effective training that had occurred since World War I in other armies around the globe.¹⁷²

This is not to discount the genuine innovations associated with the establishment of the National Training Center. As the Army emerged from Vietnam with doubts about its readiness to face the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe, it refined and then

¹⁶⁸ Chapman, *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center*, 7. See also Thomas N. Burnette, Jr., “The Second Training Revolution,” *Army* (Oct. 1997): 111-16; Anne W. Chapman, *The Army’s Training Revolution, 1973-1990: An Overview* (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), 3.

¹⁶⁹ See, for example, Spiller, “In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam,” 6.

¹⁷⁰ See, for example, Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine*, 24, 43-44.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² See, for example, Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 142-146 (describing how the British-Indian 15 Corps conducted training on the Ranchi plateau in 1942-43 that would lead to Japanese defeat in 1945).

implemented three promising training concepts at Fort Irwin. The first was that of the “box.” The thought was to put armored and mechanized infantry battalions into a desert area as big as Rhode Island wearing eyesafe lasers and alarms that would permit tanks, armored personnel carriers, and soldiers to shoot and be shot.¹⁷³ The unit and all of its equipment were transported to and then isolated on the large but bounded training ground, where the flow of logistical and other support could be strictly controlled to enhance realism and preclude resort to outside resources.

The second concept was that of the “OPFOR.” Joining the training unit in the box was an opposing force (OPFOR) of superior numbers that had been equipped with Warsaw Pact weapons and schooled in Warsaw Pact doctrine, tactics, and strategy. Like the training unit, the OPFOR wore lasers, enabling unscripted, “force on force training” to occur. The OPFOR routinely bested the training unit. It enjoyed not only the advantage of numbers: its soldiers had mastered the terrain of Fort Irwin in rotation after rotation of training, and they spent more time each year in the field perfecting their individual and small unit skills.

The third concept was that of the “operations group.” This consisted of several hundred permanently assigned observer-controllers, whose duties were roughly analogous to those of referees in a boxing match. The referee analogy, however, fails to capture the fact that the operations group carefully compared unit performance to the

¹⁷³ The lasers and alarms comprised the newly procured Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES). See Chapman, *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center*, 68-70.

standards that had begun to appear in written manuals during mid-seventies, when Gorman had spurred the creation of the Army Training and Evaluation (ARTEP) System.¹⁷⁴ The operations group gathered data on the training unit's performance, analyzed it, and determined how and whether the unit had completed its collective wartime tasks as published in these manuals.¹⁷⁵ Sophisticated sensors, instrumentation, displays, and audiovisual technology helped the operations group present this information during "after-action reviews" or "AARs." In AARs, observer-controllers conducted a Socratic dialogue that explored what had happened during a particular battle, and why it had happened that way.

The National Training Center today justifiably receives a generous share of the credit for the United States Army's resurgence after Vietnam. It also garners praise for its contribution to the credibility of United States conventional deterrence in the latter part of the Cold War and for its preparation of the armored and mechanized units that helped defeat Iraq in 1991.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ This was the formal name for the system developed by Gorman, as discussed above in notes 127 and 167 and accompanying text. See also Romjue, *Prepare the Army for War*, 23-24 (describing the ARTEP within the larger Systems Approach to Training (SATS)).

¹⁷⁵ These manuals were known as ARTEP manuals or "Mission Training Plans," which also described the conditions and standards to which different types of units were expected to perform the tasks. Although today observer-controllers no longer meticulously adhere to the training and evaluation outlines contained in mission training plans, these outlines remain an important source of guidance. Major James Cassella, former Observer-Controller at the National Training Center, interview by author, 9 April 1998.

¹⁷⁶ See, for example, Chapman, *The National Training Center Matures*, xi: "The victory achieved by the U.S. Army, its sister services, and the United States' allies over

The three other combat training centers are best understood as attempts to replicate the successful innovations of the National Training Center.¹⁷⁷ The Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany provides a box, an OPFOR, and an operations group for units based in Europe. The Joint Readiness Training Center, in Fort Polk, Louisiana provides a box, an OPFOR, and an operations group for airborne, air assault, and other special and light units.¹⁷⁸ Though its “box” is a notional one dictated by a computerized simulation program rather than by physically bounded terrain, the Battle Command Training Program offers an OPFOR and an operations group designed to train division and corps commanders and staffs in command and control.¹⁷⁹

Iraq in the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, seemed to vindicate the Army’s huge investment in the CTCs to provide highly realistic tactical engagement and live-fire training.”

¹⁷⁷ See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Morgan, “BCTP: Preparing for War,” *Military Review* (Nov. 1989): 2-10 (“The success of the Army’s National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, has been the catalyst for the initiation of a broader combat training center (CTC) program.”).

¹⁷⁸ See Draft Army Regulation 350-50.

¹⁷⁹ See *ibid.* This brief discussion of the four combat training centers is not intended to suggest that they uniformly adhere to the mechanical paradigm of readiness. The Joint Readiness Training Center and Combat Maneuver Training Center have both taken significant steps to ready training units for situations other than mechanized, attrition warfare on a sterile battlefield. See, for example, Bolger, *Battle for Hunger Hill*; Center for Law and Military Operations, *Tackling the Contingency Deployment: A Judge Advocate’s Guide to the Joint Readiness Training Center* (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s School, 1996); Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Initial Impressions Report 1, Bosnia*, xiii. See also Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Hughes, U.S. Army, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, “Peace Operations Training,” unpublished 14-page paper that describes, among other things, JRTC peacekeeping rotations by units of the 25th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division in 1994 (copy in possession of the author); Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Hughes, U.S. Army, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, “The Evolving Nature of Peace Operations,” unpublished and unofficial analysis that contains a description, in paragraph

While the combat training centers are essentially paradigmatic of prevailing notions of readiness, they have also given rise to anomalies that challenge the mechanical paradigm. They have demonstrated the importance of testing the functioning of units under conditions of stress and adversity and have validated the role of morale and character in fighting forces. This is an insight at odds with a tidy equation between readiness and numbers of weapons and crews. The centers have also convincingly established the utility of after-action review sessions and associated processes for capturing and recording lessons.¹⁸⁰ These sessions and processes implicitly acknowledge the human elements that enable units, and the Army, to become “learning organizations.”¹⁸¹ In this way the mechanical paradigm has generated the very developments that have come to undermine it.¹⁸²

Even though he might feel that the National Training Center rotation of June 1997 did not incorporate aspects—such as civilians on the battlefield—that could have better prepared his task force for Bosnia, Chris Myth also felt that the Combat Training Centers

7, of tactical peace operations tasks trained at Army training centers (copy in possession of the author).

¹⁸⁰ See U.S. Department of the Army, *Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application* (Washington, D.C.: 10 Oct. 1989).

¹⁸¹ See, for example, U.S. Army Center for Army Leadership, Revised Initial Draft of Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth: 1 Nov. 1997), pp. 6-29 to 6-30, 8-55 to 8-56, and 10-22 to 10-25 (describing leadership of learning organizations and citing Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization* (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990)).

¹⁸² See generally Robert F. Baumann, “Historical Perspectives on Future War,” *Military Review* (March-April 1997), pp. 40-48, 45 (describing this feature of paradigms).

contributed greatly to readiness, however defined. In the latter, he joined the consensus within the Army. Like the Bosnia deployment, the National Training Center rotation demanded enormous efforts from subordinate commanders and leaders while challenging individual soldiers and small teams to perform tasks in a dynamic, arduous, austere setting. Unlike the Bosnia deployment, it also enabled Task Force Myth to move and fire almost all of its MTOE equipment and weapons over rugged terrain, often in darkness. Also unlike the Bosnia deployment, the rotation comprehensively tested him, as well as his brigade commander and other battalion commanders in the brigade, on the complex tasks associated with command and control¹⁸³ of combined arms operations.¹⁸⁴ Though only four weeks long, the rotation exercised all of the unit's battlefield operating systems¹⁸⁵ and most of its METL.

¹⁸³ See U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub. 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 77, which defines "command and control" as follows: "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."

¹⁸⁴ See U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 101-5-1: Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: 30 Sept. 1997), 1-32 to 1-33, which define "combined arms" as follows: "The synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms, such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation, to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy in sequence."

¹⁸⁵ See *ibid.*, which defines "battlefield operating systems" as follows: "A listing of critical tactical activities. The BOS provide a means of reviewing preparations or execution in discrete subsets. Critical to this review is the synchronization and coordination of activities not only within a BOS, but among the various BOS. The BOS are not all inclusive: they include intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility and survivability, air defense, combat service support, and command and control but do not address timing, tempo, reconnaissance, information operations, or tactics."

The Mission Essential Task List

The METL of Task Force Myth—along with the Army doctrine that enshrines the METL as a pivotal apparatus in achieving training readiness—subtly perpetuates both the mechanical paradigm and the related view of peace operations as distractions. The fundamental concept behind the METL is that a unit “cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible training task.”¹⁸⁶ The commander must be selective. Hence, Army doctrine formally defines “mission essential task” as “a collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission(s).”¹⁸⁷ The “mission essential task list,” in turn, is “a compilation of collective mission essential tasks which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission(s).”¹⁸⁸ The circularity is removed from these definitions only when one examines which tasks commanders typically include on their units’ METLs. The METL comprises specific tasks that effectively define the unit mission while exposing key assumptions about the nature of the “wartime” for which the unit must get itself ready.¹⁸⁹

When originally developing his METL, our Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth paid close attention to the general mission for which his battalion task force was designed: “to

¹⁸⁶ See *Field Manual 25-100*, 2-1.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Glossary-5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ This paper uses the concept of the METL as a point of entry into an entire system of training that is described in Romjue, *Prepare the Army for War*, 21-40 and elsewhere.

close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”¹⁹⁰ Accordingly, in spite of the global realities that would cause Task Force Myth to participate in a peace operation devoid of conventional enemy forces, the tasks of “assault” and “defend” formed the heart of Task Force Myth’s METL.¹⁹¹ Similarly, the company teams forming the battalion task force included these tasks on their METLs.¹⁹² Examination of the “defend” task in the context of the hypothetical battle of Chagang-do helps illustrate the deficiencies in the mechanical paradigm.

In our hypothetical battle, as Chinese tanks and armored personnel carriers stream south across the Yalu, the performance of the crew in the M1A2 Abrams tank closest to Lieutenant Colonel Chris Myth would provide him a graphic and visible measure of the impact of the Bosnia deployment on his unit’s readiness. Assume that tank, one of the

¹⁹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force* (Washington, DC: 27 September 1988), 1. Similarly, the doctrinal mission of the next higher echelon of command, the brigade, was “to close with and destroy enemy forces using its mobility, firepower, and shock effect . . . [and to] defeat[] enemy assault by defensive fires, obstacles, and counterattacks.” U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade* (Washington, DC: 11 May 1988), 1-1. Note 137 above lists other sources to which Lieutenant Colonel Myth would have turned to develop his METL.

¹⁹¹ The tasks, conditions, and standards for the battalion defend task appears in a training and evaluation outline (T&EO) contained in U.S. Department of the Army, *ARTEP 71-2-MTP: Mission Training Plan For The Tank And Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force* (Washington, D.C.: 3 Oct. 1988), Task 7-1-3009.

¹⁹² The tasks, conditions, and standards for the company team’s defend task appear in U.S. Department of the Army, *ARTEP 71-1-MTP: Mission Training Plan For The Tank And Mechanized Infantry Company And Company Team* (Washington, D.C.: 3 Oct. 1988), Task 17-2-1021.

fourteen in Task Force Myth, is part of a platoon defensive position. A platoon consists of four tanks. Each tank is manned by a crew consisting of a tank commander, a gunner, a driver, and a loader.¹⁹³

Task Force Myth and the Battle of Chagang-do

Having advanced through withering artillery and air-to-surface rocket fire, four Chinese Type 79 tanks closed in on the Abrams tank, the primary, alternate, and supplementary firing positions of which Myth himself had inspected. Standards of execution for the “defend” task require the United States tank to defeat four enemy tanks. The firing positions, selected prudently by the platoon leader, were well-dug by supporting engineers equipped with bulldozers, loaders, and backhoes. The tank enjoyed excellent observation and fields of fire over likely enemy avenues of approach, a sturdy

¹⁹³ The details of this hypothetical tank engagement are accurate. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, *ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP: Mission Training Plan For The Tank Platoon* (Washington, D.C.: 3 Oct. 1988), Task 17-3-0225 (“Execute A Platoon Defensive Mission”); U.S. Department of the Army, *Soldier Training Publication STP 17-19K1-SM: Soldier's Manual MOS 19K M1/M1A1/M1A2 Abrams Armor Crewman Skill Level 1* (Washington, D.C.: 1 November 1994), Task 171-126-1068 19K (“Troubleshoot The 120mm Main Gun On An M1A1/M1A2 Tank”); U.S. Department of the Army, *Soldier Training Publication STP 17-19K23-SM: Soldier's Manual MOS 19K M1/M1A1/M1A2 Abrams Armor Crewman Skill Level 2/3* (Washington, D.C.: 15 December 1994), Task 171-126-1115 19K (“Troubleshoot Fire Control System On An M1A2 Tank”), Task 171-126-1036 19K (“Engage Targets With The Main Gun From The Gunner's Station On An M1/M1A/M1A Tank”); U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 17-15: Tank Platoon* (Washington, D.C.: 3 Apr. 1996); U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 17-12-1-1: Tank Gunnery (Abrams) Volume I* (Washington, D.C., 19 Mar. 1993); U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 17-12-1, Tank Combat Tables M1* (Washington, D.C.: 3 Nov. 1986); Glen A. Meade, *M1 Tank Gunnery: A Detailed Analysis of Conditions, Behaviors, and Processes* (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 1989).

and invisible hide position, and a good network of trails enabling rapid movement between firing positions. Each of the tank's various firing positions permitted quick adjustment from "turret-down" scanning for targets to "hull-down" firing. In Bosnia, between patrolling missions to enforce the Dayton Accord, Task Force Myth had been able to practice many of the tasks associated with the arrangement and construction of these positions.

The tank remained in its hide position until the loader—a fleet-footed soldier in an observation post about 200 meters in front of the tank—identified smoke, dust columns, and sounds of the approaching Chinese tanks. Upon receiving the loader's report, the tank commander ordered the loader to leave the observation post and return to the tank, and he directed the driver to start the tank and move it to the firing position. At the firing position, the driver maneuvered the tank so that only the turret was exposed to frontal view (the "turret-down" position) while the tank commander, the gunner, and the loader scanned their sector for the enemy tanks.

"Four T-79 tanks at two-zero-zero mils and two-six-five-zero meters," the tank commander barked into his radio headset to alert the crew and the platoon to the direction and distance of the sighted targets. He then layed the 120-mm main gun for direction, issued fire commands to the crew, oriented the gunner on the closest approaching enemy tank, and radioed the platoon leader, "Raptor is ready to engage." The platoon leader replied "Engage at the trigger point on your order." Precoordinated artillery and mortar fires rained down onto the enemy tanks, causing them to button up, disrupting their

advance, and exposing them to the big gun of Raptor—the unofficial name given to the tank by the affectionate crew. As the lead enemy tank reached a rock formation 2,500 meters to the front, the driver quickly rolled Raptor upward, exposing its turret. “Fire!”

The sabot round hurtled out of the long gun barrel of the Abrams and in an instant exploded the distant enemy tank. The crew readied Raptor to engage the second T-79. “Fire!” Another round blasted out of the main gun barrel, but this time the round missed its target and careened into the earth hundreds of meters short and to the left. Within seconds, the crew again loaded, fired, and missed, with the anti-tank round again detonating short and to the left of the approaching tank. Convinced now that the miss was not due to gunner error, the tank commander ordered the driver to “turret-down” while the crew initiated diagnostic checks. The gunner reported that the proper ammunition button on his primary sight had been pressed and that his control and display panel reflected the proper settings for the sabot ammunition. The computerized fire control system then completed its own automatic diagnosis, indicating that it was functioning properly. Next, the gunner reported the air temperature, ammunition temperature, barometric pressure, and crosswind readings from his panel, all of which appeared correct. Automatic sensors revealed no problems with “pitch and roll” and “hull/turret adjustment.”

As the crew reached the bottom of the diagnostic checklist, the problem finally revealed itself: the tank’s automatic “cant adjustment” device was not working. Several measurements with the gunner’s quadrant, a calculation to convert degrees to mils, and

two manual adjustments later, the main gun of Raptor was again capable of accurate fire. Within minutes, the Abrams destroyed the three remaining enemy tanks. It then moved to its supplementary firing position to engage additional enemy targets reported to be advancing from a different direction. Although the “cant adjustment” problem had never before plagued Raptor—not even during gunnery exercises at Taborfalva—the tank commander’s anticipation of myriad similar problems during periods of inactivity had impelled him to conduct nonfiring drills with the crew in Bosnia. The self-imposed preparation had paid off.

The Power of Checklists for Training Tactical and Technical Tasks

While the individual soldier tasks and crew drills executed by the single Abrams crew would be essential building blocks of Task Force Myth’s success in the battle of Chagang-do, the execution of the battalion-level defense would also require competence in hundreds of other individual, unit, and leader tasks. Would the other elements of the Task Force fare as well as Raptor? For example, Myth himself must ensure that the task force conducts effective counterreconnaissance to deny the advancing enemy knowledge of his positions. He must integrate his fire support and obstacle plans with the natural choke points and avenues created by the terrain. He must ensure subordinate units coordinate their fields and patterns of fire to eliminate deadspace and gaps in the defense and to conserve ammunition. He must see to it that the weapons receive adequate ammunition and that maintenance problems beyond the crews’ capacity to fix are

promptly handled by specialists. He must decide to employ his reserve at the proper time.

All of these technical and tactical tasks, and many more, have been dutifully recorded in manuals and checklists derived from the “Cartesian analysis” that swept through the Army during the tenure of Depuy and Gorman at Training and Doctrine Command.¹⁹⁴ The manuals and checklists—many of them developed by the Armor Center at Fort Knox, the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, and similar proponents of training on modern weapons and equipment—interlock. Together, they provide complex but orderly procedures for accomplishing tasks on the battalion’s METL. Appendix B reprints the cross-referenced excerpts of battalion, company, platoon, and soldier manuals applicable to Raptor’s engagement of the Chinese tanks. Today, these and similar manuals are readily available through the Army Training Digital Library, which maintains an exhaustive collection on the Internet.¹⁹⁵

Without such a system of manuals, and without unit METLs dedicated to developing competence on technical tasks and subtasks, actions like the cant adjustment made by Raptor’s crew would be impossible to train. With them such tasks are trainable. This fact is a crowning achievement of the mechanical paradigm and a major factor in the paradigm’s persistence. Yet close comparison of the excerpts at Appendix B to the fluid

¹⁹⁴ See Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 3-4.

¹⁹⁵ See <http://www.atsc-army.org/atdls.html>; accessed on 2 November 1997.

circumstances encountered by Task Force Myth reveals anomalies that performance checklists are ill-equipped to capture. The checklists inevitably give more weight to actions that are quantifiable and measurable, but no more essential to true readiness. They dictate correct use of the gunner's quadrant to assess whether the automatic cant adjustment device is working, but cannot dictate the initiative that impelled the tank commander to drill his crew during periods of inactivity in Bosnia. The manuals and checklists help school Lieutenant Colonel Myth to integrate artillery and tank fire with his obstacle plan but not to persuade local North Korean villagers to stay away from key movement routes during the battle. They state the ratio of enemy to friendly tanks that must be killed for a successful engagement but cannot precisely identify the stamina, calmness, morale, discipline, courage, and other human factors that also contribute to success in combat.

Peace Operations and "Crisis" Within the Mechanical Paradigm

In the 1990's, United States Army deployments in support of peace operations have pushed the mechanical paradigm of readiness into "crisis." The old paradigm cannot fully accommodate new discoveries (and rediscoveries) about the nature of operations other than war and new thinking about readiness in light of those discoveries. Diverse separate military activities, governmental agencies, and private individuals have considered the impact of peace operations upon readiness in the context of deployments this decade to the Sinai, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, and Bosnia, among others, and their research has generated anomalies for the mechanical paradigm. Yet this important

research has also had the curious effect of reinforcing that paradigm by attempting, in varying degrees, to explain key findings within the old terms or by declining to articulate an alternative.

CALL and the Return-to-Readiness Timeline

In June, 1994 the Army¹⁹⁶ tasked Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to conduct a study to determine “the effect that participation in a peace operation has on unit readiness for combat operations.”¹⁹⁷ TRADOC relayed the tasking to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), with the specific guidance that CALL should develop “working timelines for units to prepare for a peace operation and then to return to a normal level of readiness afterward.”¹⁹⁸

This special study generated a wealth of material and provided a sizeable amount of primary source data for subsequent research by others. CALL examined peace operations in the Sinai, Macedonia, Somalia, and Haiti. It relied upon interviews, surveys, Unit Status Reporting (USR) data, unit files and records, and direct observation to collect information about the four areas that—following the USR system—it identified with readiness: personnel, training, equipment availability, and equipment readiness. CALL also sought to capture a cross-section of experience from combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units and personnel.

¹⁹⁶ Specifically, Headquarters, Department of the Army (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations).

¹⁹⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special Study*, 1.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

CALL surveyed a sample of officers and noncommissioned officers who had filled “key positions” during the deployments. These key positions included battalion commander, battalion executive officer, command sergeant major, primary and assistant staff officer, staff section noncommissioned officer in charge, company commander, company executive officer, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and some squad and section leaders. The fifteen-part survey instrument collected 86 pieces of information pertaining each surveyed individual’s deployment experience and perceptions of unit readiness. It sought detailed information about perceptions of individual and collective preparedness to conduct both the peace operation tasks and combat tasks. It sought perceptions of how well individuals and units were prepared before, during, and after the peace operation. Of those provided surveys, 221 turned in responses. Of these, 128 respondents were participants in peace operations in Haiti.

The CALL special study reported the following general observations from the survey:

- Key leaders perceive readiness in all areas (personnel, equipment, training) to fall well below predeployment levels immediately upon return from the peace operation and to stay below normal until the unit has been at home station between four and six months.
- Intensive training and recovery programs after participation in a peace operation generally enjoy success, causing the unit to exceed the normal readiness level following the four to six month period.
- Key leaders rated personnel readiness (essentially the overall level of staffing as well as the level of staffing in required occupational specialties and ranks) significantly lower than equipment and training readiness, and perceived that personnel readiness was slowest to return to predeployment levels.

The CALL special study identified four “emerging lessons” after analyzing its survey and other data:

- A Mission Training Plan for Operations Other Than War needs to be developed and supported.¹⁹⁹
- Department of the Army should consider authorizing a unit to report ‘C-5’ (under the Unit Status Reporting (USR) system) for four months after it returns from a peace operation.
- Department of the Army guidance is needed concerning how units that are deployed to Operations Other Than War report their readiness within the USR and how units supporting deployed units should report their readiness within the USR.
- Installations should develop “Return to Readiness” plans similar to current deployment plans.

The CALL study also prominently featured a “return to readiness timeline,” which identified phases (initial recovery, block leave, maintenance, personnel restructuring, individual training, collective training, transportation of equipment) and common issues associated with each phase (e.g., “catch-up on calibration schedule” during the maintenance phase).²⁰⁰ According to CALL, the ideal measure that a return to readiness has been completed is the unit’s participation in a Combat Training Center rotation with all of its assigned equipment and personnel.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ See *Field Manual 25-100*, Glossary-6, which defines “mission training plan” as follows: “Descriptive training document which provides units a clear description of ‘what’ and ‘how’ to train to achieve wartime mission proficiency. MTPs elaborate on wartime missions in terms of comprehensive training and evaluation outlines, and provide exercise concepts and related training management aids to assist field commanders in the planning and execution of effective unit training.”

²⁰⁰ See Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special Study*, 11-12.

²⁰¹ See *ibid.*, Tables 1 and 15.

Even as it attempted to provide a timeline that could be methodically applied to units returning from peace operations, the CALL study noted a factor that could hasten the return to readiness:

A very important highlight is that units participating in peace operations develop very high levels of team cohesion which allow the unit to train quickly, if the team stays together.²⁰²

The finding that peace operations place units four to six months away from combat readiness is an intuitive one within the mechanical paradigm, but this reference to the importance of human factors is more difficult to assimilate, as is the finding that “motivated, trained, and disciplined soldiers” are the keys to success in both war and operations other than war.²⁰³ Similar observations about unit cohesion, training, motivation, and discipline surface in interviews with veterans of the Somalia and Haiti deployments, the major data sources of the CALL study.²⁰⁴

²⁰² See *ibid.*, 14, which also notes other factors muddying precise calculation of return to readiness time. Unfortunately, the team rarely seems to stay together. See *ibid.*, A-4: “Upon return from the deployment, all of those losses that would have been attrited over the last eight months (preparation time and the time actually deployed) occur. This attrition happens within about 30 to 90 days of the unit’s return. Most units report this figure at approximately 30 percent of unit strength.”

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰⁴ See, for example, Major Dave Stahl, Army Forces Plans Officer, Captain Mark D. Axelberg, Battle Captain for G-3 Operations, and Captain John L. Cuntz, Battle Captain for Army Forces Headquarters, all deployed in Somalia in 1993, group interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., CMH Catalog No. RHIT-C-022 transcript, pages 115-119, Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.; Unnamed Captain, Joint Task Force Ground Operations Officer, 10th Mountain Division, deployed in Somalia in 1994 and 1995, surveyed by Major Paul M. Rivette, Center for Army Lessons Learned, in December 1995 for *Special Study*, survey forms on file with CALL; Colonel James Campbell, Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force 190, deployed in Haiti in 1994, interview by Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, U.S.M.C., 22 October 1994, printed in *Oral History*

GAO and the Importance of Unit and Operation Types

In a 1995 report entitled *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*²⁰⁵ the National Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD) of the General Accounting Office examined, among other things, “what effect peace operations have on maintaining combat readiness.” It prepared the report in response to a request from Congress. The research methodology consisted of reviewing the experiences of combat, support, and special operations forces who participated in Operations Restore Hope in Somalia, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Able Sentry in Macedonia, Deny Flight in Bosnia, and Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. Representatives of NSIAD visited home bases of units that had deployed on these peace operations, and in the case of Able Sentry, visited Macedonia during the conduct of the operation. Representatives also examined the CALL study, interviewed commanders concerning their assessment of units’ combat readiness, and reviewed documents pertaining to combat readiness status.

The GAO found, first, that “participation in peace operations can both enhance and reduce a unit’s war-fighting capability,” and, second, that “the extent to which peace operations affect combat capability depends upon a number of factors, including the type

Interviews: Operation Uphold Democracy, ed. Cythia L. Hayden (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIIIth Airborne Corps, 1995), 49-56.

²⁰⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSIAD-96-14, Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, October 1995).

of peace operation, the type of unit participating, the length of participation, and in-theater training opportunities.”

The report concluded that aviation, naval, ground support, special operations forces, and sometimes light infantry forces may gain “excellent experience that can improve [their] ability . . . to operate in combat scenarios.” Skills that could be improved during a peace operation included “command and control, intelligence, logistics, individual and team training, deployment training, staff experience.” The report concluded, however, that other forces suffer atrophy of “technical skills that are not employed in the operation and maneuver skills that require close coordination and integration.” Among those adversely affected, it cited the examples of forces designed to fire artillery, air defense missiles, or Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles.

The report stated more generally that ground combat units were the “most adversely affected” and that, of these, “mechanized infantry, armored units, and units that are heavily equipment dependent” suffer the most severe combat skill erosion, particularly when they deploy without their equipment:

For example, a mechanized infantry unit from the 3rd Infantry Division in Europe experienced significant combat skill degradation during its 6-month deployment to Operation Able Sentry in 1994. Most of the required tasks were different from the unit’s war-fighting tasks. For example, the major task in Macedonia was to observe and report. However, the unit’s combat tasks included breaching an obstacle, attacking, defending, and supporting by fire. The unit deployed without its primary tactical vehicle, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and did not have access to a Bradley simulator while in Macedonia (citing 3rd Infantry Division official who said deployment of a simulator would have caused a divisionwide shortage of simulators). Furthermore, U.N. guidelines prohibited the unit from engaging in maneuver or other collective training in Macedonia. Lack of training in gunnery

and maneuver skills resulted in degraded combat capabilities. Upon redeployment, the unit received the lowest score in its divisionwide Bradley qualification test. With 3 months of training, the unit increased its readiness ranking to satisfactory.²⁰⁶

The report also cautioned that “each peace operation differs in terms of its effect on a unit’s combat capability,” noting that “[s]ome operations provide excellent experience that can improve the ability of various types of military units to operate in combat scenarios; others may benefit only certain types of units.”²⁰⁷

While the anecdote about the “degraded combat capabilities” of the peacekeeping battalion in Macedonia echoes traditional thinking about readiness, the GAO report’s findings also suggest a more complicated picture. The distinction between types of units expressly recognizes the possibility that there are classes of units (and skills valuable in combat) that can benefit from peace operations. The distinction between types of peace operations acknowledges that factors pertaining to materiel will not be the dominant influence on combat readiness if the peace operation in question resembles combat and requires use of identical weapons and equipment. New distinctions such as these help explain findings that are anomalous within the older paradigm and lay important groundwork for an alternative.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. The report also generally substantiated the return to readiness period established in the CALL study. See *ibid.*: “Army commanders generally estimate a range of 3 to 6 months to fully restore a unit’s war-fighting readiness after a peace operation.”

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Military Officers and the Importance of Training Opportunities

The Army's professional ranks have produced an impressive number of papers on peace operations and readiness.²⁰⁸ These works are frequently nuanced in their discussions of Army training doctrine and techniques, attentive to approaches used by military professionals in other armed forces, and specific in their recommendations. This section surveys three representative papers.

John Abizaid and John Wood, both Colonels while conducting their research, examined the cost of peace operations in training terms. The resulting 1994 article,

²⁰⁸ See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry D. Hatley, "The Effects Operations Other than War Has on the Readiness of the United States Army," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College diss., April 1996); Major Thomas F. Greco, "A Survey of Selected Peace Operations Doctrines, and the Utility of Current US Army Peace Operations Doctrine," (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Master of Military Arts and Sciences diss. June 1995); Major Robert J. Everson, "Light Infantry Vulnerabilities That Represent Strategic Vulnerability In Operations Other Than War," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Dec. 1994); Major Michael J. Flynn, "Battle Focused Training for Peacekeeping Operations: A METL Adjustment for Infantry Battalions," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Dec. 1996); Major Thomas S. James, Jr. "Big Tank Little Bridge: Is There a Position on the Peace Operations Team for Heavy Armor?" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Dec. 1996); Major Daniel J. Schuster, USMC. "Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, May 1995); Major Michael F. Beech, "Quasi-War: Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other than War," (Fort Leavenworth, KS :School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Dec. 1995); Major Maurice L. Todd, "Army Tactical Requirements for Peace Support Operations," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 1994).

“Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment,”²⁰⁹ contains findings based on personal experiences in a variety of operations on those of experienced officers in the British, Swedish, and German armies. The principal conclusion is that peace operations occur in a distinct environment that requires dedicated attention in training:

Peacekeeping is less a specific type of military mission and more an operation conducted in a unique environment. It is an environment just like mountain, jungle or desert, that leaders must understand and train for. This environment can be characterized as austere, disordered, dangerous, extremely close to local populations, and politically charged.²¹⁰

The training approach appropriate for such an environment, Abizaid and Wood maintain, is no different from that employed to ready soldiers and units for other demanding environments. The authors also find that “proficiency in warfighting, in both basic soldiering and functional specialties, underlies success in peacekeeping”²¹¹ and that “necesssary changes can be taught as refinement to operations, expansion of basic skills and enhancement of fundamental procedures in a relatively short period before deployment.”²¹²

Abizaid and Wood recommend several training techniques to prepare soldiers, units, and staffs for peace operations. Soldier training should stress force protection,

²⁰⁹ Colonel John P. Abizaid and Colonel John R. Wood, “Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment,” *Special Warfare* PB 80-94-2 (April 1994): 14-20.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 14-15.

²¹¹ Ibid., 15.

²¹² Ibid.

intelligence collection and use, use of force, regional awareness, along with common tactical tasks. Unit training should include the building, manning, and operating of checkpoints, techniques of mounted movement, and patrolling. Staff training should emphasize special planning for civil affairs, counterintelligence, and psychological operations and should test coordination with joint and coalition forces as well as with diverse civilian governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations. The need for distinct training translates into resources as well as time: “[l]eaders must simply recognize that there is a cost in additional resources to prepared soldiers for success in this unique environment.”²¹³

In a 1995 thesis for the School of Advanced Military Studies, Major Robert Botters examined two questions that remain implicit in the Abizaid and Wood paper. If there is a cost associated with training combat ready soldiers for peace operations, is there also a cost associated with retraining those same soldiers for combat? If so, can this cost be met while the unit is participating in the peace operation? The thesis—entitled *The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?*²¹⁴—reviews and applies many traditional Army training concepts, including that of the mission essential task, discussed above in connection with the mechanical paradigm of readiness. He defines a “core competency” as a mission

²¹³ Ibid., 20.

²¹⁴ Major Robert J. Botters, “The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Dec. 1995).

essential task and analyzes United States experiences in Somalia as well as Canadian experiences in various peace operations and British experiences in Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia.

Botters concludes that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units.²¹⁵ For instance, he finds that although participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia did not adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units in the 10th Mountain Division, this is attributable to the fact that the division deployed in its traditional task organization and to the nature of the Somalia operation, which allowed the division to “conduct[] missions that were derived from mission essential task lists.”²¹⁶ When these two factors are not present, the impact could be significant. Botters adds that “evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations, if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills.”²¹⁷

In a collaborative article for a newsletter published by CALL in late 1996, two captains and two sergeants reported their findings on how such perishable skills could be maintained during the Bosnia peace operation. The article, *Maintaining Warfighting Skills While Keeping the Peace in Bosnia*,²¹⁸ favorably reviewed the training strategy

²¹⁵ Ibid., 41-43.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 38-40.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 41.

²¹⁸ Captain Robert Murphy, Captain Fred Johnson, Sergeant First Class Barry Tankersley and Staff Sergeant John Shaw, “Maintaining Warfighting Skills While

adopted and implemented by the 1st Armored Division, the major United States commitment of ground forces to the Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia. The authors noted that the Division faced severe obstacles to the conduct of realistic training. These included the immediate mission of implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace, the limited physical area in which to train, the decentralized nature of the operations, and the unavailability of training assets and aids.

Yet commanders and trainers developed ingenious techniques to overcome these obstacles. One example was that used by a tank platoon operating a checkpoint in the Zone of Separation. Despite having little available terrain and no training devices,

it was able to conduct gunnery training by building a mini-range out of on-hand materials. The master gunner fabricated targets out of MRE boxes and affixed them to a 2x4. A string was added to raise the target and a rubber band attached to the back allowed the target to fall. Later, reverse polarity thermal paper was added to the target to provide thermal training. To add a moving target scenario, a track was designed from a 4x4 and 1x4s were nailed together to fit over the track. A string was added to provide movement.²¹⁹

The Army also made large investments in facilities to assist the effort to train marksmanship and gunnery, “[p]robably the most degradable of all skills in any unit”²²⁰ In Glamoc, Bosnia, it built an artillery and attack helicopter range, and as mentioned above in relation to Task Force Myth, in Taborfalva, Hungary, it constructed and manned a tank and Bradley gunnery range, along with small unit maneuver live-fire

Keeping the Peace in Bosnia,” *Center for Army Lessons Learned News From the Front* (Nov.-Dec. 1996): 1-10.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 7.

²²⁰ Ibid., 5.

ranges. Although not quite equal to the training available at the Combat Training Centers, these in-theater facilities combined with leader ingenuity to create a formidable program for the maintenance of warfighting skills.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures recommended by military professionals are quintessential attempts to conduct “normal military science” within the existing paradigm. The goal of these writings is almost invariably functional, specific, and practical—as it should be. As Kuhn recognized, it is the willingness not to challenge first principles that enables meaningful progress and accumulation of knowledge to occur within a paradigm commanding respect. Here, the mechanical paradigm of readiness—reflected in the Unit Status Reporting system, the Combat Training Center program, and a training system built around Mission Essential Task Lists—is never intentionally challenged. Instead, methods are explored toward the end of maximizing readiness as traditionally conceived.

Yet exploration of these methods also inevitably yields anomalies for the older paradigm. One of these is the oft-noted commonality between many warfighting skills and many peace operations skills. Another is the frequent conclusion that resources must be dedicated to training, rather than merely to numbers of men and materiel. Still another is the recurring pattern of examples in which individual initiative and ingenuity have been indispensable to effective training.

RAND and the MRC Capability Question

Whereas the research reviewed thus far principally examines the impact of peace operations on particular units and skills, another class of studies focuses upon the impact across the total force. The *National Security Strategy* states that the United States, “in concert with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.”²²¹ This requirement to “fight[]and win[] major theater wars”²²² replaces a similar provision in previous recent versions of the Strategy that required the military to fight and win “two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.”²²³ The capability to fight and win such a conflict—now abbreviated “MTW” and formerly “MRC”—forms the point of departure for evaluating the impact of a particular peace operation.

How does the conduct of one or more peace operations affect the Army’s MRC capability? This was the question addressed by the RAND Arroyo Center in a 1997 study entitled *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War*.²²⁴ The study analyzed peace

²²¹ President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1997), 12.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1995).

²²⁴ See Ronald E. Sortor, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997, which frames the precise question as follows: “How does the conduct of operations such as peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and lesser regional contingencies influence the readiness and availability of Army forces to deploy to an MRC?” The Sortor study built upon previous work by RAND. See, for example, Ronald E. Sortor, *Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993). The

operations performed by the Army since 1975, as well as plans for future operations. From this analysis, it determined a likely approximate force requirement for peace operations in terms of unit types, numbers of units, and duration of deployment. Next, it added this force requirement to that needed to fight and win a MRC. Then, it compared this overall force requirement with the Army force structure that emerged from the Bottom Up Review that was completed in September 1993.²²⁵

The RAND study actually experimented with three different MRC scenarios. The first involved two separate, nonsimultaneous MRCs, each requiring four to five divisions. The second involved one MRC requiring reinforcement up to a total of eight divisions. The third involved two nearly simultaneous MRCs requiring a total of eight to ten divisions.

The Somalia deployment was used to approximate the peace operations force requirement, and some consideration was given to effects of adding other small operations other than war to the peace operations load.²²⁶ The study also assumed various scenarios of reserve mobilization, generally assuming that mobilization would occur in response to the MRC, but that only selected reservists would be called to active duty for the peace operation alone. Incorporating the CALL return-to-readiness timeline

RAND Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

²²⁵ The Bottom Up Review led to an Army force structure of eighteen divisions (ten active and eight reserve) with 1,070,000 personnel (495,000 active and 575,000 reserve). See Sortor, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War*, 8.

²²⁶ For instance, the study considered operations in southern Florida, Rwanda, Panama, MFO Sinai, Macedonia, and Guantanamo Bay. See *ibid.*, 56.

data, the study also took into consideration the time required for units first to prepare and deploy for a peace operation and then to regain combat-ready status after their return. It also considered the effects of rotation and tour length policies on the availability of forces. Without conducting formal analysis, the study also considered the impact cross-leveling of personnel and equipment could have upon non-deployed units as well as the effects of different authorized levels of organization (ALO) for active and reserve units.

The study concluded that the Army had an adequate number of most types of units to perform both a limited number of peace operations and win in the various MRC scenarios. It discovered shortages, however, in support units like petroleum supply companies, water purification teams, maintenance teams, terminal operations teams and companies, and light-medium truck companies, units that typically deploy to peace operations but are in short supply in the active component. The study briefly considered various approaches to eliminating the shortfalls, including changes in participation and roles of reserve component forces.²²⁷

²²⁷ For a popularized rendition of “MRC capability” problem, see David Hackworth, *Hazardous Duty* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), 282-83: “It worries me when I see Bosnia soaking up 10 percent of the U.S. Army’s total combat and support power. It worries me even more when I see how overextended we are in a world where we have made commitments to so many places. There will be somewhere between fifteen and twenty battalions in Bosnia. We have had up to twenty battalions in Haiti. We have a battalion out in the Sinai on another peacekeeping mission. We have battalions in Kuwait and Macedonia and the equivalent in Green Berets with the Kurds in northern Iraq and troops outposted in dozens of other hot spots. We are talking about putting others up on the Golan Heights. The problem is even worse when you consider the multiplying factor of these deployments. Consider our battalion in Macedonia, for example. We don’t just have a single battalion tied up. We also have a battalion getting ready to go to Macedonia and a battalion that is retraining to become hard-edged war fighters again after a tour there. It’s not that you lose only one battalion that is deployed,

Methodologies similar to that used by RAND formed the basis of several studies completed by the United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, the specific findings of which remain classified.²²⁸ Two GAO Reports employing less formal analysis concluded, consistent with the RAND study, that key support units represented the largest risk to MRC capability. The GAO reports also recited data reflecting the impact of deployments on peace operations upon "PERSTEMPO," the number of days individual soldiers and units are deployed in a given period of time.²²⁹ All of the studies were generated as the result of Army or government interest in the continuing size and

but you lose the battalion that just came out of there and you lose the battalion that's preparing to go. So for every battalion on these scattered missions, you can multiply the effect by three."

²²⁸ See United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Assessment of Long-Term Peacekeeping (ALP)* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-94-2, 18 Aug. 1993); United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Assessment of Long-Term Peacekeeping—Personnel Turbulence (ALP-PT)* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-94-16, 7 Oct. 1993); United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Korea, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda (KOBOSH) Quick Reaction Analysis* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-94-35, Aug. 1994); United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Korea, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Version II (KOBOSH II) Quick Reaction Analysis* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-94-53, Nov. 1994); United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Korea, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Version III (KOBOSH III)* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-xx-xx, Dec. 1997); United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, *Matching Army Requirements to Yearly Resources (MARTYR)* (Bethesda, MD: CAA-MR-97-48, Aug. 1997). The United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency is an analysis organization that supports Headquarters, Department of the Army and major Army commands. See United States Army Concepts Analysis Agency, "CAA Strategic Plan," (30 Dec. 1997) (copy in possession of author).

²²⁹ See U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSIAD-96-105, Military Readiness: A Clear Policy is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, April 1996); U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report Number NSIAD-95-51, Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Mar. 8, 1995).

structure of the peacetime Army. More studies using the RAND methodology can be expected as proposed force structures emerge from ongoing policy debates.²³⁰

The conclusions of the RAND and other MRC capability studies can be illustrated within the hypothetical battle of Chagang-do. That battle, while triggered by Task Force Myth's deployment to a peace operation in North Korea, is part of an MTW. According to these studies, although there may be combat units available to deploy against the

²³⁰ The most recent General Accounting Office report points to a particularly acute shortage in infantrymen for later deploying divisions:

We found significant personnel shortfalls in all the later-deploying divisions. For example:

- At the 10th Infantry Division, only 138 of 162 infantry squads were fully or minimally filled, and 36 of the filled squads were unqualified.
- At the 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 25th Infantry Division, 52 of 162 infantry squads were minimally filled or had no personnel assigned.
- At the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, only 56 percent of the authorized infantry soldiers for its Bradley Fighting Vehicles were assigned, and in the 2nd Brigade, 21 of 48 infantry squads had no personnel assigned.
- At the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, only 16 of 116 M1A1 tanks had full crews and were qualified, and in one of the Brigade's two armor battalions, 14 of 58 tanks had no crewmembers assigned because the personnel were deployed to Bosnia. In addition, at the Division's engineer brigade in Germany, 11 of 24 bridge teams had no personnel assigned.
- At the 4th Infantry Division, 13 of 54 squads in the engineer brigade had no personnel assigned or had fewer personnel assigned than required.

General Accounting Office, *Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions*, 6.

attacking Chinese, the continuing peace operations in Bosnia, the Sinai, and whatever other commitments exist in the year 2000 threaten to deprive Task Force Myth of crucial combat service support. They also threaten to guarantee that Task Force Myth will arrive tired and strung out from six previous months of deployment.

Such admittedly quite useful studies, more than any other research on the impact of peace operations, epitomize the mechanical paradigm of readiness. Sharing a direct lineage to the famous Lanchester models of warfare,²³¹ these studies seek to provide a scientific basis for decisions within the control of senior uniformed and civilian leaders. They stress quantitative methods and formal modeling, techniques that while present in the services since the end of the Great War, acquired their modern institutions since World War II. These techniques are often identified with “operations research and systems analysis” and the reforms to military decision-making effected by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.²³² This is Ludendorff’s rationalization of warfare taken to a logical extreme.

Yet even in these studies, strains on the mechanical paradigm are discernible. For instance, the RAND study speculates that “repeated and frequent deployments, or even occasional deployments to unpopular operations, may be expected to affect morale and reduce retention.”²³³ It proposes a future model in which a desired minimum time

²³¹ See, for example, James G. Taylor, *Lanchester Models of Warfare*, vol. 1 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Operations Research Society of America, March 1983), 1-83.

²³² See Swain, “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army,” 151.

²³³ Sortor 1997, *Army Forces for Operations Other Than War*, 45.

between deployments be incorporated to account for these morale and retention factors.²³⁴

One of the GAO reports, while stating that peace operations “can impair unit and personnel combat training and equipment readiness and divert funds from planned operations and maintenance activities”²³⁵ also recognizes that “such deployments provide excellent experience in the tasks essential to wartime proficiency for light infantry, supply, or other support units.”²³⁶ In this crude way, quantitative models begin to accommodate anomalies resulting from human factors.

Academic Surveys and Soldier Attitudes Toward Peace Operations

One human factor absent from operations research models is the attitude the individual soldier brings to the peace operation. If that attitude is wholly negative, then the peace operation could be expected to command a higher cost in terms of readiness for combat operations. Also, a negative attitude by the participating soldier might reflect underlying inconsistencies between duties during peace operations and duties in war.

Continuing a tradition begun by Morris Janowitz in 1960²³⁷ and furthered by Charles Moskos in 1976,²³⁸ academic surveys in the 1990s have explored the relationship between peace operations and the warrior mindset. The most recent of these was conducted by Laura L. Miller, a University of California sociologist who recorded soldier

²³⁴ See *ibid.*

²³⁵ General Accounting Office, *Frequently Deployed Units*, 1.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*.

²³⁸ Charles Moskos, *Peace Soldiers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

perceptions of peace operations in a 1997 article entitled “Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia.”²³⁹ At the title suggests, the surveyed population consisted of a sample of United States Army participants in the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia in 1994. That mission, Operation Able Sentry, involves the policing of the Macedonia-Serbian border by a United Nations force dedicated to preventing the spread of the conflict that engulfed the former Yugoslavia. Miller conducted the research with the support of then Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan.

One portion of Miller’s survey sought the soldiers’ answer to the question “Does Serving in Peacekeeping Operations Improve or Detract from Soldier’s Abilities to Conduct Combat Operations?” Citing earlier research in Macedonia, Miller recognized that this question is an important one from the point of view of senior leaders:

This question was foremost in the senior leaders’ minds. Those directly in command of troops were especially concerned about any possible negative effects of serving in Operation Able Sentry. According to Bartone and associates’ research on the first rotation of U.S. soldiers out of Macedonia, “Soldiers are split on whether U.S. infantry units should be used to perform UN peacekeeping missions. They claim that they can accomplish any mission handed to them, but are worried about maintaining warfighting or ‘peacemaking’ skills.”²⁴⁰

Miller’s own research revealed that nearly equal proportions of survey respondents (i.e., soldiers rather than leaders) thought the mission made them better prepared for combat

²³⁹ Laura L. Miller, “Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3. (Spring 1997): 415-50.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 436.

(22 percent) as thought it made them less well prepared (24 percent). She also reported that roughly half of the troops surveyed thought the deployment to Macedonia would have little effect on their ability to carry out a combat mission.

In a section entitled “Does Peacekeeping Improve Soldier Skills?” Miller observed that

[b]oth leaders and common soldiers remarked that peacekeeping deployments improve soldier skills at the small-unit level and develop leadership skill among NCOs. Each outpost was operated entirely by an NCO living with his men, and was supervised by senior NCOs who made regular visits to the OPs. Teams worked together to manage living arrangements, patrols, and observation duties. One NCO wrote that improvement occurred “at the squad ordnance and fire team level, but at the battalion and task force level, not much.” A higher ranking NCO commented, It will not so much help me but I feel it will help [junior enlisted soldiers and junior NCOs].”²⁴¹

The Miller study also noted that living under harsh conditions, in freezing winter or summer heat, was perceived by some as useful experience for soldiers. One soldier commented that “[a]ny mission is a million times better than training,” a view shared by others who felt that the benefits of a real-life deployment outweighed the temporary deterioration of some combat skills.²⁴²

²⁴¹ Ibid., 438. I am indebted to Professor Miller for providing me copies of additional tables containing unpublished data.

²⁴² Ibid., 437-39.

In a section entitled "Does Peacekeeping Detract from Soldier Skills?" the study generally agreed with findings stated in the GAO report and the CALL study. It found that

In the squad mission that characterizes Able Sentry, company maneuver skills are eroded somewhat. Moreover, soldiers may lose some skills in individual and (especially) crew-served weapons. . . .

Some combat soldiers believed they would have a different mindset at the end of their mission: "I think it has a negative effect on combat skills. We might slip in combat and do a peacekeeping move."²⁴³

Miller further found that the impact of peacekeeping deployments on readiness varied with occupational specialty, rank, and level of training, a slightly different set of factors than that identified by the GAO report (which identified "type of peace operation, the type of unit participating, the length of participation, and in-theater training opportunities" and which analyzed whether a unit had deployed with its equipment). She also reported that soldiers tended to think that restoration of combat skills would take place in shorter than the six month figure cited by some leaders.

Such survey data are vulnerable to the criticism that junior soldiers do not know what they do not know: those who have not been required to master combined arms

²⁴³ Ibid. 439. The negative responses obtained by Professor Miller from some soldiers in Macedonia echo a portion of survey responses obtained by the Center of Army Lessons Learned regarding operations in the Sinai, also the scene of a traditional peacekeeping mission characterized by restrictive rules of engagement, constraints on deployable weaponry, and a posture of strict neutrality. See, for example, Unnamed Major, Battalion S-3, deployed in the Sinai in 1994, surveyed by Major Paul M. Rivette, Center for Army Lessons Learned, in December 1995 for *Special Study*, survey form on file with CALL: "We were degraded on every one of our METL tasks. We had to 'train down' to perform the Sinai mission, not 'train up' for it."

training at a Combat Training Center or in war could be expected to minimize shortcomings in combat skills that have never been exposed. Still, these data present a challenge to the mechanical paradigm that cannot be sensibly dismissed. If the attitudes of young combat soldiers are readily adaptable to strict peacekeeping, a type of mission that is arguably more distant from combat than any other type of peace operation, what becomes of the view that peace operations and war demand incompatible mindsets?²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ For related research into soldier attitudes, mindsets, and kindred issues pertaining to peace operations, see generally Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal, "Observations from the Sinai: Boredom—A Peacekeeping Irritant," (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Medical Research Unit, 1984); Mark Paris and Joseph Rothberg, "A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1984); United States Army Medical Research Unit, "The Stress of Transitions: Illness Reports and the Health of the United States Battalion During the Initial Sinai MFO Deployment," (Fort Bragg, NC: USAMRU, 1984); David R. Segal and Katherine Gravino, "Peacekeeping as a Military Mission," in *The Hundred Percent Challenge*, ed. Charles D. Smith (Cabin John: Seven Locks Press, 1985); Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal, "Observations from the Sinai: the Boredom Factor," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1985): 235; David R. Segal, Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg, and David H. Marlowe, "Deterrence, Peacekeeping and Combat Orientation in the U.S. Army," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Institute of Research, 1987); Mark A. Vaitkus and Paul T. Bartone, "Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among U.S. Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslavia of Macedonia," (Germany: USAMRU, 1994); Joan Harman, "Peacekeeping in Somalia," Research Report 1663 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute, July 1994); Paul T. Bartone, Mark A. Vaitkus, and Amy B. Adler, "Psychological Issues in Peacekeeping Contingency Operations," (Germany: USAMRU, August 1994); Ernest G. Cunningham, "Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of Their Effect on Unit Cohesion," (Monterey, CA: MA in National Security Affairs diss., March 1995); Ronald R. Halverson, Paul D. Bliese, Robert E. Moore, and Carl A. Castro, "Psychological Well-Being and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti," (Washington, D.C.: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 17 May 1995).

Miller's findings are broadly consistent with survey data collected by Army Major Robert Young in early 1997 from forty Command and General Staff College students who had previously participated in operations other than war.²⁴⁵ The stated research goal of the Young study was "to understand how participation in [operations other than war] has affected officers' attitudes, and the implications of these experiences for the future."²⁴⁶ Young reported that sixty-five percent of these officers (twenty-six in number) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "The skills/tactics learned/employed during OOTW missions are useful to warfighting."²⁴⁷ Eighty-three percent (thirty-three in number) responded that their participation in such missions had made no difference in their willingness to employ lethal force in future combat operations.²⁴⁸ Ninety-five percent (thirty-eight in number) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "A soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁵ Major Robert G. Young, "The Impact of Operations Other than War on the Midgrade (O-3/4) Army Officer," (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Master of Military Arts and Sciences diss. June 1997). Young actually received survey responses from 113 fellow officers in his Command and General Staff College class, only 40 of whom had experienced operations other than war. Ibid. 72-73. Peace operations in the Sinai, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia accounted for 30 of the 40 officers' experiences. Ibid., 88. Because Young found that data on the attitudes of participants and non-participants were very similar, see *ibid.*, 101, the treatment here is confined to the responses submitted by the 40 participants.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., iii.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 101.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

Yet these findings appear ancillary to Young's true research aim. Young warns at the outset of his paper that the Army's transformation as a result of recent OOTW missions "is potentially dangerous" and that "[t]he warrior ethos and associated skills required for warfighting may not be compatible with this OOTW role."²⁵⁰ Young also approvingly quotes Michael New and sympathetically reviews New's legal troubles without any reference to the constitutional underpinnings for peacekeeping summarized in chapter 2 above.²⁵¹ Not surprisingly, Young places particular emphasis on his finding that seventy percent of the officers (twenty-eight in number) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I would like to see less OOTW deployments for the U.S. Army."²⁵²

Continuing Vitality

The anomalies confronting the mechanical paradigm in all of the research reviewed in this chapter do not alter that fact that the paradigm continues to explain certain basic questions about readiness. Herein lies its formidable continuing vitality. As Kuhn illustrated in his account of the emergence of Copernican (sun-centered) astronomy, the Ptolemaic (earth-centered) system was "admirably successful in predicting the changing positions of both stars and planets."²⁵³ Even as newly collected observations generated minor discrepancies with the Ptolemaic paradigm's predictions, the discrepancies could be eliminated by making some particular adjustment in the

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 2.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 20-21.

²⁵² Ibid., iii.

²⁵³ Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 68.

paradigm's system of compounded circles. Because it addressed basic questions well—Kuhn noted in 1962 that it was still widely used as an engineering approximation—Ptolemaic astronomy survived centuries of such adjustments before it was perceived as cumbersome and inaccurate.

Despite the increasing body of observations suggesting that the combat readiness of an Army depends upon more than numbers of weapons and units and technically competent soldiers, the mechanical paradigm persists in addressing these factors with compelling logic. Task Force Myth is certainly less combat ready if five of its thirty Bradleys are inoperable because of wear and tear from patrolling the Zone of Separation in Bosnia, or if thirty percent of its tank commander positions are not filled, or if its mortar crews have not fired and adjusted live rounds in the past 12 months. It is certainly less ready for the battle of Chagang-do if an Army-wide shortage in port terminal specialists has prevented artillery rounds and anti-armor missiles from reaching the weapons systems in time to repel the Chinese attack. The Army is certainly less ready for that battle if other worldwide commitments prevent it from positioning additional battalions in Chagang-do.

An older paradigm gives way only when an alternative emerges to replace it.²⁵⁴ Ptolemaic astronomy lost few adherents before Copernicus, postulating that the planets revolved around the sun, predicted their positions in the sky with greater ease and accuracy. Similarly, the mechanical paradigm can be expected to hold sway so long as it

²⁵⁴ See Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 84.

—complete with minor modern adjustments—faces no coherent competitor. The description of a more persuasive paradigm of readiness is thus necessary before the prevailing view of peace operations as distractions, grounded as that view is in the mechanical paradigm, can change. Such a description is the project of chapter 4.