

OPERATIONS
OF THE
2D AMERICAN CORPS
IN THE
SOMME OFFENSIVE

AUGUST 8 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918

Monograph No. 10

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Historical Branch, War Plans Division
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The following monograph, entitled "Operations of the 2d American Corps in the Somme Offensive," is approved and published for the information of all concerned.

[062.1, A. G. O.]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

W. M. WRIGHT,

OFFICIAL: *Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.*

P. C. HARRIS,
The Adjutant General.

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GENERAL SCHEME OF MONOGRAPHS, HISTORICAL BRANCH.

(Where a title is given without special mark, the monograph is contemplated or in preparation; a title with a single * indicates a monograph completed and awaiting publication; a title with two ** indicates a published monograph.)

I. NARRATIVE HISTORY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The Major Operations of the A. E. F. (G. O. 83, W. D., 1919.)

*"Cambrai." H. B. Monograph No. 5, W. D. Doc. 1017, 1920.

"Somme Defensive and Lys."

"Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon."

"Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne."

(a) "The 3d Division on the Marne."

"Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys."

**(a) "Operations 2d Corps in Somme Offensive." H. B. Monograph No. 10. W. D. Doc. 1016, 1920.

"St. Mihiel."

"Meuse-Argonne."

**"Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne-Champagne). H. B. Monograph No. 9, W. D. Doc. 1010, 1920.

"Vittorio-Veneto."

**"Operations in North Russia, 1918-1919."

"Operations in Siberia, 1917-1920."

"Operations in Italy, 1917-1918."

II. STUDIES OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY.

**"Organization of Services of Supply, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 7, W. D. Doc. 1009, 1920.

"Replacement of Personnel, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 8.

"Procurement of Supplies, A. E. F."

"Initial Equipment and Supply, A. E. F."

III. SPECIAL TACTICAL STUDIES.

**"A Survey of German Tactics, 1918." H. B. Monograph No. 1, W. D. Doc. No. 883, 1918.

**"A Study in Troop Frontage." H. B. Monograph No. 4, W. D. Doc. No. 992, 1919.

**"A study in Battle Formation." H. B. Monograph No. 6, W. D. Doc. No. 1012, 1920.

IV. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

**"Economic Mobilization in the United States for the War of 1917." H. B. Monograph No. 2, W. D. Doc. No. 885, 1918.

**"A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917." H. B. Monograph No. 3, W. D. Doc. No. 908, 1919.

V. HISTORIES OF TROOP UNITS.

"Outline History of Divisions."

"Outline History of Regular Regiments."

OPERATIONS OF THE 2D AMERICAN CORPS IN THE SOMME OFFENSIVE, AUGUST 8 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

General Situation.

At the beginning of 1918 the German High Command was confronted with two alternatives. First, it could hold its present position on the western front, hoping that the Allies would consent to a "peace of understanding," and, second, it could stake everything on a fourth great offensive before the arrival of the Americans in force. It decided upon the latter course, which was rendered possible by the withdrawal of Russia from the war.

Starting on March 21 the German armies swept down the valley of the Somme. The British Fifth Army, standing in their path, was annihilated, and the advance was stopped only on March 31 just before it reached the important railway center of Amiens.

The object of the attack—the separation of the British and French Armies, their crushing in detail, and the capture of the channel ports—had not been achieved, but two deep salients, one at Merville and the other at Amiens, had been driven into the allied line. Further efforts to complete the disorganization caused by these salients, especially in the French and British communications, were to be expected.

During the period from April to July the Allies were satisfied to hold the Germans, while they repaired their communications, constructed new ones, and recruited their depleted divisions. What they needed above all else was men, and these were beginning to arrive in the shape of American divisions by the summer of 1918.

On July 15 the last German offensive was tried and failed. In this fighting American divisions bore a part. The Allies then assumed the offensive and retained it until the signing of the armistice. The German reserves had been expended and there were no replacements, while the Allies were receiving reinforcements from the United States at the rate of several hundred thousand monthly.

At a conference of allied commanders on July 24 it was decided to prepare plans for local operations with certain definite objectives of a limited nature. The British Army was to disengage Amiens and the Paris-Amiens Railroad by an attack between Albert and Montdidier. This attack, if successful, would be pushed toward St. Quentin and Cambrai and, in conjunction with the attack of the British and French toward Mézières, would endanger the German communications through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mézières by which the troops on the Champagne front were supplied. It would also threaten the communications of the German forces in Flanders.

The plan for the attack on the Amiens salient is given by Marshal Haig as follows: "The plan of the Amiens operation was to strike in an easterly and south-easterly direction, using the Somme River to cover the left flank of our advance, with the object in the first place of gaining the line of the Amiens outer defenses between Le Quesnel and Méricourt-sur-Somme, thereby freeing the main Paris-Amiens Railway. Having gained the Amiens defense line, the attack was to proceed without delay toward Roye, and to include the capture as soon as possible of the important railway junction of Chaulnes, thereby cutting the communications of the German forces in the Lassigny and Montdidier areas. If all went well, French troops would be in readiness to cooperate by pressing the enemy southeast of Montdidier."

In order to deceive the Germans, instructions were issued to make it appear that a British attack in Flanders was imminent. Later developments indicated that the measures taken there had had the desired effect, and that the Germans expected an attack in that region.

The date for the attack upon the Amiens salient, known in American accounts as the "Somme Offensive," was fixed for August 8. The British Fourth Army, under which the 2d American Corps later on operated, then occupied a line of about 19 kilometers, extending from just south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt, exclusive. The Canadian Corps under General Curry held the right of the line; the Australian Corps under General Monash the center; the 3d Corps under General Butler was holding the left, north of the Somme.

The Fourth Army attacked at 4.20 a. m. By dawn on August 9 it had gained the entire Amiens outer defense line and had disengaged the Paris-Amiens Railroad.¹ The French First Army attacked at 5.55 a. m. on the same day and gained the line Pierrepont-Plessier-Fresnoy.

From August 9 to September 23 the fighting on this front was practically continuous, as the Germans, yielding to the pressure of the British on the west and the French on the southwest, fell back to their successive lines, some of which had been utilized in the battles of previous years. On September 6 the French occupied Chauny and Ham and on the 8th had reached the line of the Crozat Canal. The British had reached the line Vermand-Epehy-Havrincourt. The Germans' next withdrawal carried them back to the Canal du Nord and to the Hindenburg line, which, south of Havrincourt, ran southeast to Bantouzelle, whence it followed the line of the St. Quentin Canal to St. Quentin. The Germans were occupying this position when the 2d American Corps entered the line the night of September 23-24.

The 2d American Corps.²

On August 8, when the Fourth British Army began its attack up the Somme Valley, the 2d American Corps consisted of five divisions, which were disposed in areas on the British front as follows:

Second Army:

2d British Corps, 30th American Division.

19th British Corps, 27th American Division.

¹ North of the Somme the Germans had succeeded in holding the village of Chipilly. The capture of this village and Gressaire Wood by the 131st Infantry of the 33d American Division is described later.

² Practically all American troops sent to the British front in 1918 were placed under the 2d Corps. Ten divisions, less their artillery and certain auxiliary units, arrived there in April and May. Under arrangements between American and British Headquarters all arms, supplies, and equipment were furnished by the British, except distinctive articles of uniform (caps, blouses, breeches, and overcoats). Each division was to be trained, first, out of the line in training areas, subsequently in the line by battalion and regiments serving with British brigades and divisions. This training period was to cover from 10 to 12 weeks, the divisions then to be at the disposal of the American commander in chief. The training was entirely controlled by headquarters, A. E. F., and was under the immediate supervision of 2d Corps headquarters. During the periods the smaller units were in line for training, or at any time in case of emergency, the tactical command rested with the British units with which the American unit was serving. For purposes of supply and administration the various organizations were attached to the British armies and corps in which their training areas lay, but all supply arrangements were controlled by G-4 of the 2d Corps. Organizations were moved only through corps headquarters, and the command of these organizations at no time passed to the British except when actually in line as stated above. The assistance of British instructors and their specialist schools was utilized, especially with reference to the British weapons, with which American troops on the British front were armed.

Letter 2d Corps
to G. H. Q.,
A. E. F., Aug. 9,

Memorandum,
C. of S., 2d Corps,
to Historical
Branch, W. P.
D., May 22, 1920.

First Army:

17th British Corps, 78th American Division.

Third Army:

5th British Corps, 80th American Division.

Fourth Army:

3d British Corps, 33d American Division.

On August 20 and 21 the 78th and 80th Divisions were withdrawn from the 2d American Corps. Units of these divisions had during their training with the British occupied the front line trenches and participated in raids which, however, had slight, if any, connection with the operation which the War Department calls the "Somme Offensive."

The 33d Division was withdrawn from the 2d American Corps on August 23. Its case, however, was somewhat different from that of 78th and 80th Divisions, as one of its units, the 131st Infantry, actively participated in the Somme offensive. For that reason it seems advisable to give a brief account of its operations while serving with the British.

The 33d Division.

The 33d Division, composed of National Guard troops from Illinois, arrived at Brest in May, 1918, and was transferred by rail to the Huppy area and assigned to the 2d American Corps.

On June 9-11 the division moved by marching to the Eu area and started training "with the assistance and advice of the British 30th Division."

On June 14 Field Marshal Haig wrote to Gen. Pershing requesting his sanction to the movement of the 27th and 33d Divisions to positions nearer the lines that these divisions would be called upon to occupy in case of a serious attack upon the British front. In the case of the 33d Division the position to be occupied lay northeast and east of Amiens. Gen. Pershing consented to this move, and June 20-21 the 33d Division moved by marching and by truck to the 3d Corps area west of the River Hallue and to the Long area. These areas are 2 kilometers northeast of Amiens, near Molliens-au-Bois, where division headquarters were stationed.

Upon its arrival on the British front, the 33d Division received its supplies from the British 19th Corps. Upon moving to the vicinity of Amiens this function was taken over by the 3d Corps.

F. O. 7, 2d
Corps.
F. O. 8, 2d
Corps.

F. O. 9, 2d
Corps.

Operations
33d Division.

Report of operations of 33d Division, War Diary, 33d Division.

Letter Haig to Pershing, June 14, O. A. 100/1.

O. A. 190, British G. H. Q.
Report of operations of 33d Division.

Fourth Army, No. G. T. 5/9, May 25.
Fourth Army, No. 10/3(g), June 18.

At this time the 33d Division had a total strength of 504 officers and 16,937 enlisted. Its artillery, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, had been separated from the division upon the latter's departure from Texas and did not rejoin it before the armistice. During the operations on the British front the Artillery support was furnished by the Australians and British. Transportation was also furnished by the British, as neither the ammunition nor supply trains served with the division on the British front. The field signal battalion was also absent during these operations.

W. Dl. 33d Division; Report of operations 33d Division.

605 4/7 (G. B. 2), Fourth Army.

Instructions from British general headquarters, dated June 18, stated: "While in these forward areas, the training of American divisions (27th and 33d) will be continued, but they will be available for manning back defenses under orders of Third and Fourth Armies, respectively, should the necessity arise. Plans for such employment should be worked out in consultation with the American 2d Corps."

Letter 2d Corps to 33d Division, June 27.

The period June 22–August 21 was devoted to training, principally in trench warfare. The infantry battalions and the machine gun companies were attached to British and Australian units for duty in the front line of the Amiens sector. Tours of duty were from 2 to 10 days, and each organization had at least one such tour, while most of them had three.

Report of operations of 33d Division.

On June 27 the commanding general, 2d Corps, authorized the commanding general, 33d Division, to utilize not more than the equivalent of a battalion in a raid that the British proposed to make in the near future. This raid, quite an elaborate affair, was made on July 4 by the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. The objective was the village of Hamel and the ridge to the east and southeast thereof from which the Germans had good observation over the British line. The attack proper was made by the 4th Division, the operations of the other divisions being undertaken to assist the attack of the 4th and to readjust the new line.

Letter 2d Corps to 33d Division, June 27.

W. Dl. Australian Corps; W. Dl. 4th Australian Division.

The troops of the 4th Division attacking Hamel and Vaire Wood were in order from right to left: 6th Brigade, 4th Brigade, 11th Brigade. Companies C and E, 131st Infantry, were attached to the 42d and 43d Battalions, 11th Brigade and Companies A and G, 132d Infantry, to

Operations of 33d Division.

the 13th and 15th Battalions, 4th Brigade. The American companies were at full strength of 250 men each. Following the British plan, 40 men were withdrawn from each company to form the nucleus of a new company in case the remainder were annihilated. The companies were then formed into four platoons, and a platoon was attached to each company of the British battalion with which the American company was serving.

The attack was rehearsed on June 30 and July 1, and on July 2 the troops entered the front line trenches. H hour was at 3.10 a. m., July 4. By 6 a. m. all objectives were taken, and by evening the new line had been consolidated. The American companies rejoined their regiments on July 6. Losses were 24 killed, 131 wounded, and 21 missing.

W. DI. 4th Australian Division.

Report on operations of 33d Division.

Letters from Halg, Rawlinson and Monash to C. G. 33d Division.

This was the first fighting in which the 33d Division participated and the complete success of the operation did much for the division's morale. The fact that both American and British troops had in conjunction attacked the Germans on Independence Day was made much of by the British high command, and on August 12 the King of England personally decorated twelve officers and enlisted men who had distinguished themselves in the engagement.

Report of operations of 33d Division.

Report of operations 131st Infantry.

Letter, 2d Corps to 33d Division, June 28.

The only other fighting in which troops of the 33d Division participated on the British front is known as the action of Gressaire Wood. This operation was undertaken for the purpose of capturing Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood, both of which were strongly fortified and dominated the British line south of the Somme. The circumstances under which the operation was initiated and carried out lead to the inference that the British suddenly decided to capture the ridge so as to remove the necessity of evacuating their line directly south of the Somme which it crossed near Sailly-Laurette. The tactical control of the units of the 33d Division during certain phases of training, and at any time in case of emergency, rested with the British. The attack on Gressaire Wood undoubtedly was an emergency in the opinion of the British.

The only American unit participating in this affair was the 131st Infantry, formerly the 1st Infantry, Illinois National Guard.

The morning of August 8 the 131st Infantry was occupying the Bazieux trenches, 10 kilometers west of Albert. At 12.10 p. m. a warning order from the 166th Brigade notified the regiment to be ready to move at a moment's notice, and at 4.30 p. m. orders from the British 3d Corps were received to the effect that the 131st Infantry had been placed under the orders of the 58th British Division in corps reserve and would move immediately to the trenches north and northwest of Heilly. Arriving here by 9 p. m., the regiment was shortly after directed to prepare to attack early on August 9 from a point about 3 kilometers south of Heilly, but the men being exhausted from marching far into the night, this attack was abandoned and the regiment was sent to Sailly-le-Sec. Here it was formed along the road in column of squads when the final attack order was received at about 3.30 p. m., August 9. H hour was fixed at 5 p. m. but it was changed to 5.30 when the commanding general, 58th Division, who in person delivered the order to the 131st Infantry, realized that the troops could not arrive at the line of departure by 5 o'clock. By dint of hard marching the regiment reached its position about 1 kilometer north of Chipilly in time to advance at 5.30. The line faced northeast with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2d on the left, and the 3d in reserve in Malard Wood. The entire assaulting line from right to left consisted of the 10th London Battalion, 131st Infantry, 175th Brigade (less 10th London Battalion, and plus a battalion of the 174th Brigade).

Report of operations 131st Infantry, Aug. 8-10.

Report of operations of 33d Division.

The attack was most hurriedly planned and executed; nevertheless Chipilly and Gressaire Wood were in our possession by the morning of August 10, when the British and American line extended along the eastern slope of Chipilly Ridge, facing southeast, and crossing the ridge 1 kilometer northwest of Etinehem. Thus the advance, which had started toward the northeast, had pivoted on Chipilly and swung around until the general line ran north and south. On the north the line of the 131st Infantry ran along the Bray-Corbie road where this road crosses Chipilly Ridge, thus forming an acute angle with the line to the south.

On the night August 11-12 Etinehem and the bend in the river to the south were cleared of the enemy. On August 15 the troops were advanced to a line running north and south just west of Bray and following the

eastern slope of the ridge in the river bend in which Etinehem is located. This advance was made without opposition.

The 131st Infantry remained in line until the night of August 19-20, when it was relieved by the 11th Australian Brigade.

Report on operations, 33d Division.

Appendices 31 and 32 to operations of 33d Division.

The losses of the 131st Infantry in the action of Gressaire Wood were 78 killed and 677 wounded. Seven hundred prisoners, 2 pieces of heavy and 28 of light artillery, besides machine guns and rifles, are reported captured.

The reports on this operation are far from clear. This is largely due to the fact that the operation itself was something of a puzzle to all concerned; it must have been decided upon very suddenly by the British authorities.

The commanding general, 33d Division, in his report stated that the tactical control of the units of the 33d Division rested with the British in certain phases of training and always in case of emergency. The Gressaire Wood affair was such an emergency which "arose from the fact that the enemy was holding up the movement of the Australians (south of the Somme) and had, by turning back part of the British line, menaced the success of the entire operation, and the 131st Infantry were the only troops available to straighten out the situation."

None of the reports mention any artillery support and the inference is that there was little or none.

Operations of 33d Division.

After the action of Gressaire Wood the division continued its training until August 21, when orders for its transfer by rail to the 1st American Army were received. British arms and equipment were turned in, and on August 23 and 24 the division entrained at Vignacourt, St. Roch, and Longueau for the area 10 kilometers southeast of Bar-le-Duc.

The withdrawal of the 78th, 80th, and 33d Divisions left the 2d American Corps with but two divisions, the 27th and 30th, and it was with these two that it fought in the Somme offensive.

The 27th and 30th Divisions.

Operations report, 2d Corps, Sept. 29 to Oct. 20.

When the Somme offensive started, the 27th and 30th Divisions were serving with the British Second Army in Flanders and during the latter part of August had entered the line side by side in the Canal and Dickebusch sectors, the former on the left of the 19th British Corps and the

19th Corps, Order 190, Aug. 27.

latter on the right of the 2d British Corps. Arrangements had been made whereby a new corps sector was to be formed for these two divisions which were then to operate directly under the American 2d Corps, but before this plan had been put into effect both divisions were withdrawn from the Second Army and moved to the vicinity of Doullens. Corps headquarters were established at Beauval, 5 kilometers south of Doullens. This concentration marks the time at which the 2d American Corps really commenced to function as such.

F. O. 10, 2d
Corps, Aug. 28.

Operations re-
port, 2d Corps.

F. O. 11, 2d
Corps.

From September 3 to September 22 the 2d Corps was held in the general reserve of the British forces, and continued its training. Corps headquarters and the 27th Division were attached to the Third Army. The 30th Division was attached to the First Army until September 17, when it was moved closer to corps headquarters and stationed in the Puchevillers-Toutencourt area. Here it was attached to the Third Army.³

Orders Third
Army, G 13/405.
Orders Second
Army, G 31.
F. O. 12, 2d
Corps.

On September 20 the 2d Corps was released from the general reserve and transferred to the Fourth Army, which at that time was operating against the Hindenburg line east of Peronne. The 27th Division moved by rail (transport by road) to the vicinity of Tincourt (7 kilometers east of Peronne) on September 23 and 24. The 30th Division moved by truck to the same area on September 22. Corps headquarters moved to Méricourt-sur-Somme on the same day.

Third Army,
Orders No. G
13,523.
F. O. 14, 2d
Corps.

At this time neither division had its divisional artillery, ammunition, or supply train. Of the sanitary trains the only organizations present were two of the field hospitals and two of the ambulance companies of the 30th Division.

Report of 27th
Division. Battles
of 30th Division.

On the night of September 23-24 the 30th Division relieved the 1st Australian Division in the Nauroy sector, which was directly west of Bellicourt. The 27th Division relieved the 18th and 74th British Divisions in the Gouy sector, southwest of Gouy, the night of September 24-25. This arrangement placed the 30th Division in the right of the corps sector opposite the southern half of the St. Quentin canal tunnel, and the 27th Division in the left of the corps sector opposite the northern half of the tunnel. Each division placed one regiment in line, one in support, and one brigade in divisional reserve.

F. O. 15, 2d
Corps, report of
operations 30th
and 27th Divi-
sions.

³During the period Sept. 3-Sept. 22 the 2d Corps formed part of the general (G. H. Q.) reserve of the British forces, but its divisions were attached, for training and administrative purposes, to the British Armies, in whose areas they were located.

The German Position.

Report of operations,
2d Corps.

Opposite the sector occupied by the 2d Corps the country was gently rolling and open, with a fairly well-defined ridge running from near Vendhuile at the northern limit of the sector to Bellicourt near the southern limit. This ridge roughly paralleled the front line at a distance of 2,000 yards. Through it, longitudinally, the St. Quentin canal passes by means of a deep tunnel. The main Hindenburg line, consisting of a complicated system of trenches, all heavily wired, ran along this ridge 200 to 400 yards west of the tunnel which passes under the eastern slope of the ridge. The main line included the village of Bony, situated on a high point opposite the sector of the 27th Division and forming a very strong point. Parallel to the main defensive line and about 1,000 yards in front of it was the Hindenburg outpost line, consisting of several trenches, well wired, with many strong points and machine-gun nests. The outpost line was connected with the main line by many ravines and well-concealed communication trenches. Both lines and the country between contained numerous deep dugouts.

The portion of the outpost line opposite the 30th Division had already been taken by the British except in a few places, but the portion opposite the 27th Division had never been captured. Three strong points, the Knoll, Guillemont, and Quennemont farms, lay in this latter area.

The tunnel added to the natural strength of the position. From a point about 1,500 yards southeast of Vendhuile it runs slightly east of south, passes under the town of Bellicourt, and emerges at Riqueval, about 1,000 yards south of Bellicourt. Its length is about 6,000 yards and its depth below the surface of the ground from 15 to 25 yards. It is 10 yards wide at the top, 18 yards wide at the water level, and strongly built of masonry. There were blocks in the center and at each end which were utilized as machine-gun emplacements. On the canal inside the tunnel were numerous barges used for quartering troops. There were several approach galleries from the rear, and numerous underground passages connected the tunnel with all parts of the main position, thus permitting any part of the line to be reenforced under cover. Along the ground above the tunnel was a spoil heap which contained dugouts and concrete machine-gun emplacements.

The canal outside the tunnel has high banks. The water was from six to nine feet deep, and the western bank contained emplacements for machine guns and minenwerfer.

Parallel to the Hindenburg line and from one to two thousand yards east of it was a support line joining the villages of Le Catelet and Nauroy. This line consisted of a single trench.

Four to five thousand yards still farther east was a third line known as the Beaurevoir line. It extended south from Villers Outreaux, passing about 2,000 yards west of Beaurevoir, just east of Estrées, west of Wiancourt and east of Joncourt.

The sector assigned to the 2d Corps consisted of that part of the line directly opposite the tunnel and extended slightly beyond it at each end.

Plan of Operations.

The attack of the British Fourth Army was to be made on a two-corps front, the objective being the Hindenburg defenses between Vendhuile and St. Quentin. The 9th Corps was to attack on the right and the 2d American Corps affiliated with the Australian Corps⁴ on the left.

F. O. 16, 2d
Corps.
Australian
Corps. Battle
Instructions, Se-
ries "E," No. 2,
Sept. 22.

The Australian Corps was to pass through the 2d Corps when the latter had gained the first objective and continue the advance to the final objective. The objective of the 2d Corps was a line running north and south from just northeast of Le Catelet to just east of Nauroy. Here the line bent to the southeast. The objective of the Australian Corps lay 4,000 yards farther east. The 3d British Corps was not to attack, but was to hold a defensive front between the Australian Corps and the 5th British Corps of the Third Army until the 2d Corps reached its objective. Thereafter the 3d Corps was to be used for cleaning up, and later was to pass to the Army reserve.

The attack was to be preceded by an artillery bombardment to start 56 hours before the advance, of which the first eight hours was to be a special gas bombardment. A total of 1,634 guns and howitzers was assigned to the different units of the Fourth Army, which was to attack on a front of about 10 miles. As

Battle Instruc-
tions, Series "E,"
No. 4, Australian
Corps.

⁴ The 2d American Corps was in reality serving under the Australian Corps, although in all orders and reports it was said to be "affiliated" with it.

the 2d Corps had no artillery, British and Australian guns were assigned to it, each division receiving three brigades (battalions) of field artillery and one of heavy.

The following British troops were placed at the disposal of the 2d Corps:

4th Tank Brigade, 84 tanks.

A squadron of the Australian Air Force.

1st Siege Company of Railway Engineers.

A section of an Electrical and Mining Company.

182d Company of Engineers (tunneling).

The main attack was to be preceded by a preliminary operation for the purpose of advancing the line of departure to the outpost line of the Hindenburg defenses. The 30th Division, upon its entry into line, had partially occupied the outpost position, but the 27th Division was still to the west of it.

F. O. 17, 2d
Corps.

F. O. 17, 2d Corps, prescribed that the 27th Division, supported by nine battalions of artillery, and a company of 12 tanks, should attack with the infantry brigade that was holding the front line. The 30th Division was simultaneously to advance its line so as to occupy the portions of the outpost line not already occupied.

F. O. 47, 27th
Division. Opera-
tions report, 27th
Division, Sept.
23-Oct. 1.

The troops designated for the attack were:

53d Infantry Brigade, 104th Machine Gun Battalion, 106th Machine Gun Battalion, 12 tanks of 4th Tank Brigade, 9 battalions field artillery (British), detachments of 102d Engineers and 102d Field Signal Battalion.

The objective was the rearmost trench of the Hindenburg outpost line, to gain which would require an advance of about 1,100 yards from the line already occupied by the 27th Division.

The advance started at 5.30 a. m. September 27. The 106th Infantry attacked with its three battalions in line, four tanks being assigned to each battalion. There was hard fighting, which lasted all day. The infantry seems to have advanced in places to the objective, but the strong points at the Knoll and Guillemont and Quennemont farms were not taken, and German counter-attacks forced the withdrawal of those fragments that had reached the objective, except on the extreme right, where groups held on and were connected with the left flank of the 30th Division. The fighting died down during the afternoon and evening, and during the night the 27th Division front line was established at approximately the position it occupied prior to September 27.

Here the 54th Infantry Brigade relieved the 53d Brigade the night of September 27-28.

The losses of the 106th Infantry were heavy. The 105th Infantry supported the attack, and was not so heavily engaged. Two hundred and sixty-seven prisoners were reported captured.

This preliminary operation, which had been undertaken to secure a more advanced line of departure for the main operation, was unsuccessful. It could hardly have been otherwise. One infantry regiment, presumably not at full strength, as no replacements had been received in France, attacked on a front of 4,000 yards. Deployment on a wide front for an attack is justified where no penetration or advance is expected, but here a penetration of 1,100 yards was expected, and this in the face of an enemy that had successfully prevented the troops that preceded the 27th Division from making the same advance. The task was too great, especially as the 105th Infantry did not enter the fight. However, the plan for the main operation was not changed when the 53d Brigade was unable to secure the new line of departure, and the barrage was laid east of the German advanced trench line. This necessitated an advance by the 27th Division of 1,100 yards without the protection of the barrage. This division's attack was also complicated by the fact that its line after the attack on September 27 was not clearly defined, and that detachments were still out in front of the actual line of departure.⁵

⁵) "In the 27th Division sector, after the relief of the 53d Brigade by the 54th in the front line on the night of the 27th-28th of September, the 54th Brigade was engaged at various times and places all day the 28th endeavoring to hold the points that had been gained in the preliminary operation of Sept. 27 and to improve their positions preparatory to the jump off. At 3.25 p. m. on the 28th I was personally called to the phone by Gen. Monash, who wished to talk over the situation with me. After giving him the line according to latest reports, I expressed my concern at the obscure situation in front of the 27th Division and urged that the barrage lines for the jump off of the 29th be altered to bring them back closer to the actual front of the 27th Division. To this he objected on the grounds that reports from officers were to the effect that several detachments of the 27th were out in front and well up in the line set for the jump off. It was his belief at the time that Guillemont and Quennemont farms were in our possession, but that the Knoll was still held by the enemy. I renewed my recommendation and stated that if approved we would make every effort during the night to get the advanced detachment back. He finally definitely decided that the barrage line would not be altered and I so informed Gen. Read. At about 7 p. m. Gen. Knapp (British), who commanded the Corps Artillery, came into corps headquarters and reported that he personally had been at Guillemont farm about 4 p. m. and that it was at this time in our possession, although the men reported that they had had to fight to hold it. He stated it as his belief that in that part of the line at least our men were on the jump off. This would indicate that during the day on the 28th the 27th Division did have some detachments on the jump off line. However that may be, the division had severe fighting on the 29th at the Knoll, Guillemont, and Quennemont farms."

Statement of
Chief of Staff, 2d
Corps, to Historical
Branch, W.
P. D., May 22,
1920.

Attack of September 29.

F. O. 16, 2d
Corps.

Corps orders directed that the capture of the first objective should be made by the brigade that had been in divisional reserve prior to September 27. This necessitated the relief of the brigades holding the front line, which was accomplished the night of September 27-28. In the 30th Division this placed the 60th Brigade in front, and the 59th in reserve. In the 27th Division the 54th Brigade was in front and the 53d in reserve.

Prior to "H" hour the troops were formed in the following order:

<i>Left.</i>			<i>Right.</i>	
107th Infantry	108th Infantry	↑	119th Infantry	120th Infantry
105th Infantry				117th Infantry
106th Infantry				118th Infantry

Report of operations of 30th Division, Sept. 27-30.

Battle Instructions, 30th Division, Sept. 25.

Report of operations of 2d Corps Sept. 29-Oct. 20.

The advance started at 5.50 a. m. September 29. In addition to the artillery barrage two machine-gun battalions in each division delivered overhead fire on the main Hindenburg line. The weather was foggy, and this fact, together with the smoke, caused by the bombardment in which many smoke shells were used, caused communication between the different elements to be very difficult. All reports state that the battle consisted of a series of independent actions in which isolated groups attacked whatever enemy formations they chanced to encounter. The reports also agree that the fog and smoke blinded the enemy's artillery and machine guns, thereby facilitating the attack.

Nevertheless, the operation of the 2d Corps achieved success only in the right of the 30th Division's sector. The 120th Infantry, which attacked on the right, reached Nauroy. The 117th Infantry, which at first followed the 120th, had faced southeast after crossing the tunnel and connected the 120th in Nauroy with the 46th British Division of the 9th Corps.

The 119th Infantry, because its progress was more rapid than that of the 27th Division, soon received fire from its left front and was forced to face in that direction. Bellicourt was captured and the right of the regiment seems to have almost reached the objective north of Nauroy, from which point its line was bent back to the tunnel. During the day a battalion of the 117th and one of the 118th Infantry were sent to the assistance of the 119th and helped to hold its line, which had become unduly extended.

The 5th Australian Division passed through the 30th during the afternoon of September 29 and took over the latter's line which, at that time, rested on the first objective only in the vicinity of Nauroy. The 30th Division, upon being relieved, withdrew slightly and remained in support of the Australians until the night of October 1-2. It then marched to the Mesnil-Harbecourt area.

It will be remembered that in the 27th Division's front the Germans were still holding the Hindenburg outpost line, while the British barrage was laid on the Hindenburg main line, over 1,000 yards to the east of the outpost line. This fact enabled the enemy to put up a much stouter resistance than in the 30th Division's sector, especially since the 27th Division's advance immediately encountered the strong points at Quennemont and Guillemont farms and the Knoll.

F. O. 18, 2d
Corps. Opera-
tions report, 2d
Corps.
Operation re-
port, 27th Divi-
sion, Sept. 23-
Oct. 1.
Report of opera-
tions, 2d Corps.
Sept. 29-Oct. 20,

The 108th Infantry, attacking on the right of the 27th Division's sector, immediately encountered Quennemont farm, and although a detachment of some 80 men passed the farm and reached the main German line south of Bony, the remainder of the regiment was held up by the farm until the afternoon.

The 107th Infantry, attacking on the left, met immediate resistance from the trenches southeast of the Knoll. These trenches, a part of the Hindenburg outpost line, were captured, but all efforts to advance to the main German line were fruitless. A composite battalion of the 106th Infantry⁶ followed in rear of the 107th Infantry to clean up, and later entered the fight with the 107th.

The 105th Infantry, which was to follow the left regiment of the leading brigade across the canal, change direction to the left and deploy so as to cover the left flank of the division, soon lost touch with the 107th Infantry, and engaged in a fight across the Knoll in the direction of Vendhuile. Part of it got into the British sector northeast of the Knoll. Unable to advance, its battalions, considerably disorganized, took shelter in the trenches just east of the Knoll.

At 11 a. m. the line of the 27th Division was in the trenches of the Hindenburg outpost line between Quennemont farm and the Knoll. Fighting was still going on around the farm, which was finally captured with the

⁶ The 106th Infantry, after its attack on Sept. 27, was reorganized into one battalion for the operation of Sept. 29.

assistance of the Australians. Parts of two companies, 3d Battalion, 108th Infantry, were in the main Hindenburg line south of Bony.

All reports state that small groups, here and there along the line, passed between the German defenses and penetrated as far as the main Hindenburg line, some even arriving as far as the tunnel. To what extent this was done it is impossible to ascertain. A few groups seem to have held on until the arrival of the Australians on September 30–October 1, but generally speaking such men as were able to penetrate the Hindenburg line were unable to maintain their positions and fell back to the line described above.

About noon the 3d Australian Division advanced to the line then occupied by the 27th Division. The two divisions occupied the line together the remainder of the day. The arrival of the Australians enabled the 108th Infantry to complete the capture of Quennemont farm, but otherwise did not affect the day's operation. On September 30 the 27th Division remained in the positions occupied by it the night of September 29–30. During the day the 3d Australian Division attacked the Hindenburg line and groups of the 27th participated in the fighting. The Hindenburg line north of Bony was not cleared of the enemy until the morning of October 1.

Messages Oct. 1
to 2d Corps from
Fourth Army, 3d
Corps and Aus-
tralian Corps.

F. O. 18, 2d
Corps, amend-
ment 2.

The 27th Division was withdrawn from line the night of September 30–October 1, and marched to the Peronne area.

Report of oper-
ations of 30th
Division, Sept.
27–30.

On the right of the 2d Corps the 46th British Division of the 9th Corps had crossed the canal and was abreast of the 30th Division with which it was connected south of Nauroy. On the 2d Corps' left the 18th British Division of the 3d Corps had had no greater success than the 27th Division. These two divisions seem to have been in communication north of the Knoll.

Battle Instruc-
tions, Series "E,"
tanks, Australian
Corps, Sept. 25.

The 4th Tank Brigade (British) and the 301st Tank Battalion (American) had been allotted to the 2d Corps for the operation of September 29. Tanks were assigned as follows:

30th Division: 12 tanks to each front line regiment and 10 tanks to the leading regiment of the brigade in reserve.

27th Division: 15 tanks to each front line regiment and 10 tanks to the leading regiment of the brigade in reserve.

Corps reserve: 31 tanks.

Reports indicate that the tanks were of little service. They were handicapped by the fog and smoke which caused them to lose their direction and their contact with the infantry. The 30th Division, however, mentions them as assisting in the capture of machine guns, and the 27th as destroying wire.

The casualties suffered by the 2d Corps in its operations against the Hindenburg line, September 23-October 1, have not been separated from its total losses while on the British front. On October 2 the corps reports total casualties (estimated) during operations, September 28, 1918, to October 1, 1918:

Operation report, 2d Corps, to G. H. Q., Oct. 2.

27th Division: 65 officers; 3,721 other ranks.

30th Division: 1,500, all grades.

The two divisions report that they captured 58 officers and 1,867 other ranks during the period September 23-October 1.

Operation report, 2d Corps, to G. H. Q., Oct. 1.

The 2d Corps objective in its attack of September 29 was generally a line running north and south along the eastern edges of the villages of Gouy and Nauroy. This line was 3,000 yards east of the main Hindenburg line, and was reached on September 29 only by certain organizations of the 30th Division in the vicinity of Nauroy. The Hindenburg line north of Bellicourt was not broken on September 29, though undoubtedly the attack of the 27th Division weakened it and rendered its capture by the Australians on September 30 and October 1 much easier.

Map attached to F. O. 16, 2 Corps.

From October 2 to October 5 the 2d Corps rested in rear, the 30th Division in the Mesnil area, and the 27th in the Peronne area, where it had been stopped while en route to the Suzanne area. Some time between noon October 2 and noon October 3 a warning order notified the corps to be prepared to relieve the Australian Corps on October 5.

Operation reports of 2d Corps to G. H. Q., Oct. 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Message of 2d Corps to 27th Division, Oct. 3.

While the 2d Corps had been resting, the Australians, as the center corps of the Fourth Army, had continued the attacks, and the German line had been driven back to a line connecting the villages Beaurevoir and Montbrechain. The 9th Corps was still on the right of the Fourth Army, but the 13th Corps had on October 1 relieved the 3d Corps on the left.

Fourth Army No. 20/29 (G).

Map attached to report of operations of 2d Corps, Sept. 29-Oct. 20.

On October 4 orders from the Fourth Army directed the 2d Corps to relieve the Australian Corps in the line on the night of October 5-6. The command was to pass at 9 a. m., October 6. Certain British units, including

Fourth Army, No. 42/65 (G).

Fourth Army, artillery, three transport companies, two tunneling companies, and a section of a mining company, were to remain in place and be transferred to the 2d Corps. The artillery turned over to the 2d Corps comprised ten battalions of light artillery and eight of heavy artillery, and included the artillery in line, in mobile reserve, and in corps reserve.

R. A. VII (British), Corps No. R. A. O. /36.

2d American Corps Operation Instructions "A," No. 1, and amendments 1 and 2.

Report 30th Division, Oct. 5-20.

The 59th Brigade, which was designated to relieve the front line of the Australian Corps, moved by truck on October 5, and on the night of October 5-6 relieved the 5th Australian Division. The Australians, when relieved, were occupying a front of 4,000 yards, extending from Montbrehain (inclusive) northwest to the Canal des Torrens, 1,000 yards southeast of Beaurevoir. The 118th Infantry was on the right of the brigade sector and the 117th Infantry on the left. On the right of the 118th Infantry was the 6th Division of the 9th British Corps and on the left of the 117th Infantry was the 25th Division of the 13th British Corps. The village of Montbrehain had been taken by the Australians the afternoon of October 5, but the 6th British Division was not abreast of the 118th Infantry when the latter took over its sector. This necessitated a defensive flank toward the southeast and lengthened the 118th's line, which was already considerably longer than that of the 117th and in advance of it, as it was bent around the village to the east.

W. Di. 60th Brigade, Oct. 6.

The 60th Brigade, moving by truck on October 5, occupied the trenches in the area between Bellicourt and Villeret.

Operations report 27th Division, Oct. 3-Nov. 26, 1918.

Message 2d Corps to 27th and 30th Divisions, Oct. 5.

The 27th Division was designated as corps reserve. On October 6 the 53d Brigade started for its new position in the corps sector. On October 8, when the Fourth Army attacked, the division was in the Tincourt and Bellicourt areas.

Operations of 59th Brigade, Oct. 4-22, 1918. **Battle Instructions No. 2 "B,"** headquarters, 30th Division, Oct. 6.

As a preliminary to the main operation on October 8, the 59th Brigade was directed to advance and rectify its line so as to bring that portion occupied by the 117th Infantry up to the line of the 118th Infantry, which was from 800 to 1,000 yards ahead. The 117th Infantry attacked at 5.15 a. m., October 7, covered by a barrage. The fighting lasted all day, but the objective was not gained, and the attack on October 8 was made approximately from the line taken over from the Australians.

2d Corps operations instructions "A," No. 4, Oct. 5.

Fourth Army, No. 273 (G).

The warning order for the attack of October 8 was issued on October 5 and stated that the attack in the 2d Corps sector would be made by the 30th Division.

The order of battle of the 2d Corps during its first independent operations as a corps was as follows:

27th Division (less artillery).

30th Division (less artillery).

10 brigades ⁷ of Australian Field Artillery.

7 brigades and 4 batteries of British Garrison Artillery.

3d Squadron, Australian Flying Corps.

H. Q. 4th Tank Brigade (also served 13th Corps).

6th (light) Tank Battalion, less 1 company (18 Whippets).

301st American Tank Battalion (20 Mark V).

4th Tank Battalion (12 Mark V).

146th and 238th Army Transport Companies, Royal Engineers, No. 1 Australian Army Transport Company, Royal Engineers, 1st and 2d Australian Tunneling Companies, Royal Engineers.

Detachment Australian Electrical and Mining Company, Royal Engineers.

The 30th Division's battle instructions prescribed that the attack should be made by the 59th Brigade from the line it was then occupying. The 118th Infantry was to place two battalions in the front line and one in support; the 117th, one battalion in front, one in support, and one in brigade reserve. One battalion of the 60th Brigade was placed at the disposal of the 59th Brigade for flank protection. The remainder of the 60th Brigade was in division reserve. The first or normal objective was a line running northwest from Brancourt (inclusive), to reach which required an advance of 3,000 yards. The second or contingent objective was 3,000 yards farther to the northeast and included the village of Prémont. Tanks were to advance with the assaulting troops.

The 59th Brigade attacked at 5.10 a. m., October 8, covered by an effective barrage. The fighting was severe, but the normal objective was gained by 10 a. m. and the contingent objective by evening. The progress of the British divisions on the flanks was slower than that of the 30th, whose task was thus rendered more difficult by flank fire.

The success of the day's work may be ascribed in part to the fact that the Germans had already decided upon a general retreat on this front and were fighting merely a rear guard action.

Battle Instructions, Nov. 1, Series "B," 30th Division, Oct. 6.

Operations of 59th Brigade, Oct. 4-22.

Report 30th Division, Oct. 5-20.
Message 30th Division to 2d Corps, Oct. 8, 10.35 a. m.
Message 30th Division to 2d Corps, Oct. 8, 4.15 p. m.
Message Fourth Army to 9th Corps, Oct. 8, 6.04 p. m. Messages 2d Corps to Fourth Army and 30th Division, Oct. 7.
Fourth Army, 20/37/G.

⁷ The British artillery brigade corresponds approximately to our battalion. A War Establishment field artillery brigade ordinarily consists of three batteries, each of six 18-pounder guns, and one battery of six 4.5-inch howitzers. The organization of a garrison artillery brigade depends upon the guns with which it is armed. British War Office, 1918.

Fourth Army On the night of October 8-9 the Fourth Army had advanced to the line Méricourt-Fresnoy-Brancourt Prémont-Elincourt, and the French First Army on the right and the British Third Army on the left had made corresponding progress. The 2d Corps front extended from Brancourt to Prémont, both inclusive. The 59th Brigade was occupying the front line, and the 60th Brigade was in division reserve near Estrées and Joncourt. The 27th Division had followed the movement of the 30th and had placed one brigade in the Hervilly area and one near Bellicourt.

Fourth Army, Fourth Army orders directed a resumption of the attack at 5.20 a. m. October 9. All indications pointed to a general German retreat, and all orders and instructions emphasized the use to be made of the cavalry when the expected break should come. It never did, and the cavalry was not used at all in these operations.

F. O. 21, Second Corps orders directed the 30th Division to attack at 5.20 a. m., October 9, in the general direction of St. Souplet, with one brigade in the front line and one in reserve. Tanks were allotted, and the usual barrage was to precede the infantry. The first objective was a line running north from Bohain (which village was in British sector) to west of Busigny. This required an advance of between 4,000 and 5,000 yards. The line of exploitation or second objective was 2,000 yards farther to the northeast and included Busigny and Becquigny.

Battle Instructions No. 1, Series "C," The 30th Division order directed the 59th Brigade to capture the first objective, after which the 60th Brigade was to pass through the 59th and take the second objective.

Operations of 59th Brigade, Oct. 4-22. The advance started at 5.20 a. m., October 9, as ordered. The 118th Infantry, still on the right, put all three battalions in line, and the 117th Infantry held out one, which, however, was soon absorbed by the firing line. The 60th Brigade followed the 59th at 800 yards, the 120th Infantry on the right and the 119th on the left. The 59th Brigade advanced on a 5,000-yard front. The 118th Infantry, delayed by machine-gun fire from Bohain, reached the first objective about 4 p. m., when the 120th Infantry passed through it. The 117th Infantry was on the first objective about 12.30 p. m. Here it was passed by the 119th Infantry. The 60th Brigade then proceeded to the second objective, with apparently little opposition. The villages Busigny and

Becquigny were captured and the brigade bivouacked the night of October 9-10 on a north and south line running just east of those places. The line had been advanced approximately 7,000 yards by the day's operations, the enemy retreating without offering much resistance.

The 59th Brigade on the night October 9-10 camped on the first objective. It was very much exhausted, having been in action on three successive days.

On October 9 the 54th Brigade of the 27th Division marched from near Bellicourt to the vicinity of Brancourt. The 53d Brigade marched from near Hervilly to Bellicourt.

The night of October 9-10 the Fourth Army front ran from Bois de Tauves (where it was in touch with the First French Army), Bohain, inclusive, Vaux-Andigny, exclusive, Escaufourt, exclusive, Maurois, inclusive (in touch with Third Army near Maurois).

Of this line, the 2d Corps held the section Vaux-Andigny-Escaufourt, both exclusive.

Fourth Army orders for October 10 directed the 2d Corps to continue its advance at 5.30 a. m. to the objective prescribed for the operations of October 9, viz, the line Le Cateau-St. Souplet-Andigny, with advanced troops pushed across the Selle River to cover the crossings.

The 2d Corps orders designated as objective the line of the Selle River-St. Benin-St. Souplet-Molain (all inclusive) and the crossings over the river. The 30th Division was to be in front, and the 27th, in reserve, was to move to and remain in the Brancourt-Bellicourt area.

The 30th Division advanced at 5.30 a. m. October 10, the 60th Brigade still leading. The 119th Infantry by 12.50 p. m. had captured St. Souplet and St. Benin, the latter in conjunction with the British, and had established its line on the western bank of the Selle River. No attempt was made to cross the river on account of fire from high ground east of the stream.

The 120th Infantry took Vaux-Andigny, but the British 9th Corps on its right, got only as far as the west edge of the Bois de Riquerval. The 120th being then exposed to fire from the south and southeast, it was compelled to refuse its right along the railway south of Vaux, and was unable to reach its objective, the village of Molain and the Selle River.

Summary of intelligence, 2d Corps, Oct. 9.

Operations of 59th Brigade, Oct. 4-22.

Operation report, 27th Division, Oct. 3-Nov. 26.

Message of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, Oct. 9, 8.50 p. m.

Message of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, Oct. 9, 8.50 p. m.

F. O. 22, 2d Corps, Aug. 9.

Operation report, 60th Brigade, Oct. 4-20.

Message of 30th Division to 2d Corps, Oct. 10, 9.10 p. m.

Message of 13th Corps to 2d Corps, Oct. 10, 7.50 p. m.

Message of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, 9.10 p. m., Oct. 10.

On the whole, however, the resistance offered during the day had been slight; the Germans were retreating along the entire front, as was shown not only by the lack of resistance, but by the congestion of transport upon roads and railroads leading to the rear, and by the destruction of German dumps by the Germans themselves.

W. Di. 118th
Infantry, Oct. 10.

The 118th Infantry, early on October 10, was directed to follow the 120th Infantry at 1,000 yards. When the latter regiment was held up at Vaux, the 118th was used to cover the exposed right flank and to close the gap between the Americans and British. It remained in this position the night of October 10-11.

W. Di. 117th
Infantry, Oct. 10.

The 117th Infantry remained in the position west of Busigny which it had occupied when the 119th Infantry passed through its line on October 9.

Operation re-
port, 27th Divi-
sion, Oct. 3-Nov.
26.

On October 10 the 54th Brigade, 27th Division, marched to the vicinity of Prémont and the 53d Brigade to the vicinity of Brancourt.

Message of
Fourth Army to
2d Corps, Oct. 10,
9.10 p. m.

The Fourth Army line the night of October 10-11 extended from the west edge of the Bois de Riquerval-Vaux-Andigny-la Haie Manneresse-St. Souplet-St. Benin-Le Cateau, all inclusive, except Le Cateau. The Germans still held the eastern part of the town of Le Cateau.

Message of
Fourth Army to
2d Corps, Oct. 10,
10.15 p. m.

The Fourth Army was directed to gain on October 11 the objectives not reached on October 10. For the 2d Corps this meant an advance in the right half of its sector to the Selle River, the 119th Infantry in the left of the sector having reached the river on October 10.

Message of 2d
Corps to 30th Di-
vision, Oct. 10,
11.35 p. m.

The 2d Corps orders for the operations of October 11 were embodied in a message to the 30th Division which directed the division to attack at 5.30 a. m. and gain the objectives given in F. O. 22, 2d Corps. This message also gave the information that the 9th Corps would attack with objective Andigny les Fermes.

Operation re-
port, 30th Divi-
sion, Oct. 5-20.

In compliance with the above orders, the 118th Infantry, which was covering the right flank of the 30th Division sector near Vaux-Andigny the night of October 10-11, was ordered to pass through the 120th Infantry and attack at 5.30 a. m. October 11 in an endeavor to reach the river. For this attack the 118th Infantry was placed under the orders of the 60th Brigade. The 119th Infantry was to attack from its position along the west bank of the Selle, but by fire only, as it

was ordered not to cross the river until the 118th Infantry had straightened out its line, or in other words, had reached its objective, the river valley.

The 118th Infantry advanced with all three battalions in line, supported by a battalion of the 120th Infantry. The reports state that the regiment reached the river on the extreme left (south of St. Souplet) and captured the villages of La Haie Manneresse and Vaux-Andigny.^a While it may have made some progress on the left, on the right the regiment was unable to advance beyond the eastern edge of the latter village. During the afternoon the 115th Machine Gun Battalion reinforced the line. The 9th Corps was still being held up by the Germans in the Bois de Riquerval, which exposed the right flank of the Americans and effectually prevented its progress.

W. Di. 118th Infantry, Oct. 11.

The Fourth Army front line was practically unchanged the night of October 10-11. The 9th Corps had made only slight progress in the Bois de Riquerval, the 2d Corps line was unchanged except that a few yards had been gained north of Vaux-Andigny, and the 13th Corps were still fighting in Le Cateau. The German resistance had stiffened considerably, and it looked as if they intended to make a stand east of the Selle.

Message of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, Oct. 10, 9.10 p. m.

About midnight October 10, the 2d Corps directed the 27th Division to prepare to relieve the 30th on the night of October 11-12, and at daylight, October 11, the 54th Brigade marched to the woods east of Prémont, and the 53d Brigade and divisional troops to Prémont.

Message of 2d Corps to 27th Division, Oct. 10, 11.50 p. m. Operation report, 27th Division, Oct. 3- Nov. 26.

The 54th Brigade, plus 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, relieved the 60th Brigade the night of October 11-12. When relieved, the 60th Brigade's line ran from the southeastern outskirts of Vaux-Andigny northeast to St. Souplet, inclusive, thence north along the western bank of the Selle River to St. Benin, inclusive. The 107th Infantry, with the battalion of the 105th Infantry, took over the right of the brigade sector and the 108th Infantry the left.

F. O. 60, 27th Division, Oct. 11.

Operation report, 27th Division.

W. Di. 54th Brigade, Oct. 12.

The 107th Infantry was in communication with the 6th British Division on the railroad just south of Vaux-Andigny and the 108th Infantry with the 50th British Division in the southern part of St. Benin.

Message of 2d Corps to Fourth Army, 5.25 p. m., Oct. 12.

The 53d Brigade marched to the vicinity of Busigny on October 11, where it was in divisional reserve. Division headquarters were at Busigny.

Operation report, 27th Division.

^a These villages were already within the American front line the night of Oct. 10-11.

Message of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, Oct. 11, 3.30 p. m.

W. D. 59th and
60th Brigades,
Oct. 12-15.

The 30th Division, upon being relieved, was assembled in the area Bohain-Prémont-Busigny. The 117th Infantry was already in this area west of Busigny. The remainder of the division marched to the area the night of October 11-12. The period October 12-15 was spent in rest, and in supplying necessary equipment and clothing.

F. O. 25, 30th
Division.

From October 6 to October 11 the 30th Division made an advance of 18,000 yards on a front of about 7,000 yards. Except for the fighting around Vaux-Andigny on October 10 and 11, the German resistance was slight, and the operation was in fact a slow pursuit, which had to overcome the German rear guards. Losses had been light.

Operation re-
port, 60th Bri-
gade.

The 60th Brigade reports a total loss for this period of two officers killed, 13 wounded, and 560 enlisted killed, wounded, and missing.

M e s s a g e s
Fourth Army to
2d Corps, Oct. 14.

The 27th Division occupied the line taken over from the 30th until the night of October 14-15. The front was quiet except for a raid undertaken to obtain prisoners. The Germans were preparing to make a stand east of the Selle to cover their further retreat, and the British Fourth Army, in conjunction with the French First and British Third Armies, was preparing for another attack.

Messages 9th
Corps to 2d Corps,
7 a. m., Oct. 12.
M e s s a g e s
Fourth Army to
2d Corps, 10.20
and 10.45 p. m.,
Oct. 12.

The 9th Corps, in conjunction with the French, attempted to advance its line through Riquerval Wood on October 12. The British first withdrew west of the wood to allow it to be thoroughly shelled, and then tried to take the wood, but without success.

F. O. 61, 27th
Division.

The front occupied by the 27th Division was reduced the night of October 14-15. The 6th British Division of the 9th Corps took over the southern portion to include Vaux-Andigny, and the 50th British Division of the 13th Corps the northern portion to St. Souplet, exclusive.

2d Corps, Series
E, No. 3, F. O.
26, 30th Division.

The night of October 15-16 the 30th Division took over from the 27th Division the right half of the corps sector; the 59th Brigade relieved the 53d, placing the 117th Infantry on the right and the 118th Infantry on the left. Each regiment had a battalion in front, one in support and one in reserve. The 60th Brigade and the 113th Machine Gun Battalion remained in division reserve in the Bohain-Busigny area.

Operation re-
port, 59th Brigade.

This rearrangement gave each division of the 2d Corps a front of 2,000 yards, the point of separation being 1,500 yards west of the village of St. Martin-Rivière.

Operation re-
port, 27th Divi-
sion.

The 27th Division held its front with its brigades side by side, 53d on right and 54th on left.

The German line opposite the 2d Corps sector followed the eastern bank of the Selle as far south as St. Souplet. Here it crossed to the west bank and continued south through the village of Molain. The Selle was a small river easily fordable in most places. A high railway embankment paralleled the river a few yards east of it from north of Le Cateau to a point east of St. Souplet. Here it left the river and ran toward the southeast. Four thousand yards east of the river was a low ridge, which was the first objective of the proposed attack; 2,500 yards farther east was the second objective, another ridge, which dominated Catillon and the valley of the Sambre-Oise Canal. The German position was not a prepared one in the same sense as the Hindenburg line, but there were many trenches and strong points. The German front line seemed to be lightly held, and it was believed that the first strong resistance would be encountered near the first objective.

Orders were issued on October 13 for vigorous counter-battery work, the bombardment of important localities, and harassing fire to be kept up until H hour. To comply with these orders the divisional artillery of the 2d and 4th Australian Divisions, then in line supporting the 2d Corps, was on the night of October 13-14 reinforced by the divisional artillery of the 3d and 5th Australian Divisions. At the same time three battalions and one battery of heavy artillery (6-inch, 8-inch, and 9.2-inch) were ordered into line from the corps reserve.

The bombardment proper in conjunction with the attack was to commence at 8 a. m. the day before.

The Fourth Army order directed the change in the front of the 2d Corps as described above, specified objectives and boundaries, and prescribed the usual barrage. It also allotted tanks, which had become so reduced in number that only about 20 were given to the 2d Corps. Corps orders allotted 10 heavy tanks to the 27th and 12 to the 30th Division. These tanks belonged to the 301st American Tank Battalion. The attack was to be in conjunction with one by the First French Army on the right of the Fourth, but the Third British Army on the left was not to participate.

The 2d Corps was ordered to attack with both divisions in line, the 30th on the right and the 27th on the left. H hour was at 5.20 a. m., October 17. The attack was to be covered by a double barrage of 18-pounders 200

Fourth Army
Artillery instruc-
tions, Oct. 13.

R. A. 7th Brit-
ish Corps, No.
0/101/9.

Fourth Army,
No. 20/40/(G).

Fourth Army
No. 20/33(G); 2d
Corps, Series E,
No. 3.

Fourth Army,
No. 20/33/(G).

2d Corps opera-
tion instructions,
Series "B," No.
1.

yards in front of the troops, and 4.5-inch howitzers 200 yards in front of the 18-pounder line. Upon the arrival of the troops on the west crest of the ridge upon which the village of Arbre Guernon⁹ is located, the barrage was to halt for 30 minutes. The troops were then to advance to the first objective on the east crest of the ridge, where the reserve troops were to pass through the line, while the barrage was to become protective for 30 minutes and then search eastward for 2 hours and 30 minutes.

The orders do not indicate that the army and corps commanders really expected an advance beyond the first objective on October 17.

Battle Instructions No. 1, Series "D," 30th Division. Operation report, 30th Division.

The 30th Division attacked at 5.20 a. m. with the 59th Brigade in front of the 60th in reserve. The latter was to pass through the former at the first objective, but this was not reached on October 17. The 59th Brigade had its regiments side by side, 117th Infantry on right, 118th on left. Each regiment had a battalion in front, one in support and one in reserve. The front occupied by the division was 2,000 yards.

Battle Instructions, Series "D," No. 4, 30th Division. Operation reports, 113th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions.

The 113th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions for 21 minutes after H hour delivered fire on the villages St. Martin-Rivière and Molain, and on the road connecting these villages. Both of these villages were in the 30th Division sector and apparently constituted the principal obstacle to the advance of the 59th Brigade.

Operation report, 59th Brigade.

W. Di. 118th Infantry, Oct. 17.

The 59th Brigade encountered difficulty in crossing the Selle River, probably more from the German fire than from the terrain. Fog is also reported to have made trouble by causing the troops to lose the direction of advance. All reports agree that the brigade fell behind the barrage and give that as the reason for the failure to reach the objective. The leading troops of the brigade finally reached an unimproved road running southwest from Arbre de Guise, where they dug in. They had advanced a little beyond where the barrage made its first 30-minute halt, a distance of about 3,500 yards. The 59th Brigade was in communication with the 105th Infantry of the 27th Division, near Arbre de Guise. The 1st British Division relieved the 6th during the attack of October 17, and the night of October 17-18 its left connected with the right of the 119th Infantry.

W. Di. 118th Infantry, Oct. 17.

Field Notes, Col. L. Halstead, May, 1919; Hist. Sec. G. S., A. E. F.

⁹ The British maps and all reports based on them, give the name of the village 2,500 yards east of St. Souplet as "Arbre Guernon." Its real name is Arbre de Guise. Arbre Guernon is a large and conspicuous tree. In this monograph the two names are used indiscriminately so as to agree with the references.

During the night of October 17-18 the 60th Brigade relieved the 59th, the 119th Infantry relieving the 117th, and the 120th Infantry, the 118th. The 59th Brigade passed into division reserve except for two battalions, 3d of the 117th Infantry and 1st of the 118th Infantry, which were attached to the 60th Brigade for flank protection.

The 27th Division attacked at 5.20 a. m. October 17 with its brigades side by side, 53d on right and 54th on left. In the 53d Brigade the 105th Infantry was in front and the 106th in support. In the 54th Brigade the 108th Infantry was in front and the 107th in support. Each regiment was in column of battalions. The brigade machine gun battalions at first covered the advance of their respective brigades by a barrage directed upon suspicious areas. The divisional reserve consisted of the division machine gun battalion and the 102d Engineers. The divisional front was 2,000 yards, covered by a strength of 2,377 rifles.

The experiences of the 27th Division on October 17 were almost identical with those of the 30th. The Selle did not present much difficulty and the river was crossed on time, but the fog caused the troops to lose direction and touch with adjacent units. This, and the necessity of cleaning up strong points, such as the eastern portion of St. Souplet, Baudival, and Avantage farms, caused the infantry to fall behind the barrage, whose advance seems to have been too rapid for this operation. The 105th Infantry by noon had reached the main road along the ridge 3,000 yards east of St. Souplet. This was about 300 yards east of the line where the barrage halted for 30 minutes and was 1,000 yards short of the first objective. The 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, had entered the fight on the right flank of the divisional sector. Shortly after noon it arrived at Arbres Guernon. The other two battalions of the 106th followed in support to a sunken road west of Arbres Guernon.

The 108th Infantry claims to have reached the main ridge road, which was the barrage halt line, and to have been compelled to withdraw therefrom by the withdrawal of British troops on their left. However this may be, the line finally taken up by the 108th Infantry was some 300 yards west of the halt line. The 107th Infantry followed the 108th to a hollow near Baudival farm.

Operation re-ports, 27th and 30th Divisions. The tanks assigned to the 27th Division, as well as those with the 30th Division, had difficulty in crossing the Selle. Such of them as crossed were soon disabled and the assistance given by all of them on October 17 was negligible.

Messages received by 2d Corps on Oct. 17. The German resistance on October 17 was stiff and the Americans' casualties were heavy. The Germans had reinforced this part of the front, and for the first time marine organizations were identified. However, the character of the fighting and prisoners' statements indicate that the action was still a rear guard one, although of a more determined character.

Messages of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, 9.15 p. m., Oct. 17. By noon of October 17 the first attack was pretty well spent, and the troops had dug in. The Fourth Army front extended from west edge of Andigny Woods--Andigny les Fermes--la Vallée Mulatre--Arbre Guernon--Le Cateau Station--Baillon farm. The 2d Corps, although it had not reached the first objective, was in advance of the corps on its flanks. Its line extended along the ridge, generally following the main road, from the northern divisional boundary to Arbre Guernon, thence south along an unimproved road to the southern boundary near Demilieu. It was in touch with the 1st British Division of the 9th Corps on the right and with the 50th British Division of the 13th Corps on the left.

Messages of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, 8.30 p. m., Oct. 17. Fourth Army orders directed the resumption of the attack on October 18. The 9th Corps and the right of the 2d Corps were to attack as early as possible, the hour to be arranged by the two corps. The 13th Corps and the left of the 2d Corps were to attack at 5.30 a. m. The objective was the line Wassigny--la Haie Tonnoile farm--Bazuel, which was practically the second objective of the attack on October 17.

Messages 2d Corps to 27th and 30th Divisions, 9 p. m., Oct. 17. The 2d Corps orders directed the attack to start at 5.30 a. m., the corps objective extending from Mazinghien, inclusive, along the eastern crest of the ridge between the Jonc de Mer and the St. Maurice brooks, to the southern outskirts of Bazuel. This line was somewhat in rear of the second objective, and required an advance of between two and three thousand yards.

Messages, 30th Division to 59th and 60th Brigades, 11.30 p. m., Oct. 17. The 60th Brigade, which had relieved the 59th in line the night of October 17--18, was ordered to attack at 5.30 a. m. October 18, covered by a barrage which was to be a resumption of the barrage of October 17. As the 1st British Division was not to move until 10 a. m., the right

of the 60th Brigade was also to stand fast until that hour, while the left was to keep abreast of the 27th Division, which advanced at 5.30 a. m. also. The 59th Brigade was to remain in division reserve, except two battalions which were attached to the 60th for flank protection.

The 60th Brigade attacked as ordered on October 18, and although it gained a few hundred yards at first, it was soon compelled to fall back to its original position along the road south of Arbres de Guise, where it remained during the day. After dusk it advanced again, carrying its line from one to two thousand yards forward. The advance this time was unopposed and the village of Ribeaupville, which the 119th Infantry had been unable to capture earlier in the day was taken without firing a shot, the enemy having evacuated it.

The British 1st Division, on the right of the 30th, had also been unable to advance until evening. At 9.10 p. m. it was reported as attacking the line Ribeaupville-Wassigny.

The 27th Division made no changes in its dispositions for October 18. The 53d and 54th Brigades were directed to continue the advance to the corps objective, which, in the sector of the 27th Division, was the St. Maurice brook. Divisional and brigade boundaries remained unchanged.

The 53d Brigade attacked on October 18 with the 105th Infantry, plus the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, in front. In the 54th Brigade the 107th Infantry passed through the 108th and led the advance. The troops, covered by a barrage, started from a line 200 yards west of the Le Cateau-Arbres Guernon road, and the line was advanced to the ridge west of the Jonc de Mer. The German resistance was slight and the reports state that the line could have been further advanced if the 30th Division had kept abreast of the 27th. This is probably true, but the 30th was confronted by the two villages Ribeaupville and Mazinghien, which were strongly held, while the 27th had to overcome only a few groups of farm buildings.

During the night October 18-19 patrols were sent across the Jonc de Mer. Finding the ridge west of the St. Maurice brook unoccupied, both brigades advanced early in the morning of October 19 and by 8.30 a. m. occupied this ridge. The left flank of the 27th Division was then south of Bazuel, which the British did not occupy until later—on October 19. The right flank was bent back to connect with the 30th Division.

Operation reports, 60th Brigade, W. Di. 119th Infantry and 120th Infantry, Oct. 18 and 19.

Messages of 30th Division to 2d Corps, 5.18 p. m., Oct. 17. W. Di. 3d Battalion, 119th Infantry, Oct. 18. W. Di. 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry, Oct. 18 and 19.

Messages of information officer with 9th Corps to 2d Corps, 9.10 p. m., Oct. 18.

F. O. 64, 27th Division, Oct. 17.

W. Di. 53d Brigade, W. Di. 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, W. Di. 105th Infantry, W. Di. 54th Brigade, W. Di. 107th Infantry, Oct. 18.

W. Di. 107th Infantry.

Messages of
Fourth Army to
2d Corps, 9.11
p. m., Oct. 18.

Before the last advance of the 27th Division, i. e., while its line was still west of Jonc de Mer, the line of the Fourth Army as a result of the day's operations ran from Wasigny (which had been captured by the 9th Corps) to Ribeaupville (inclusive), Jonc de Mer farm and Bazuel; from this village the line bent back toward Le Cateau, beyond which it had been advanced only about 2,000 yards. Progress had been made, but the objective, the ridge overlooking Catillon, had not been reached.

The unopposed advance of the 27th Division during the night of October 18-19 had placed it almost upon its objective of October 18. The right of its line was bent back to connect with the 30th, which was still west of Mazinghien.

The fighting in the 2d Corps sector during the day had been severe, but the capture of Ribeaupville without resistance the evening of October 18, and the unopposed advance of the 27th Division across the Jonc de Mer during the night, indicated that the Germans were withdrawing beyond the canal.

Army, corps, and division orders for the operations of October 19 were probably not issued, as none can be located. In all probability such units as had not already gained the October 18 objective were told to do so on October 19.

W. Di. 119th
Infantry, Oct. 19.

The 60th Brigade, supported by two battalions of the 59th, advanced at about 5.15 a. m. October 19. The 119th Infantry passed through Mazinghien without much trouble, and established a line in the eastern outskirts of that village. The 120th Infantry, after several unsuccessful trials, finally at 6.30 p. m. pushed eastward, passing north of Mazinghien, as far as an unimproved road running parallel to and 1,000 yards west of the second objective of the attack of October 17.

W. Di. 60th
Brigade, Oct. 19.
W. Di. 120th
Infantry, Oct. 19.

The resistance offered by the Germans could not have been great, as the total casualties in the brigade were 14 killed and 43 wounded and missing. A little stronger push would have probably shoved them across the canal, but the 2d Corps had been in line practically since September 24, and was tired out, besides being greatly depleted in numbers. The advance of the 30th Division on October 19 was undertaken merely for the purpose of bringing its line abreast of adjacent troops. In this it was successful, and by evening its right was on a line

with the 6th British Division, which was reported at Rejet, and its left was in touch with the 27th Division south of la Jonqui re farm.

The 27th Division on October 19 organized and strengthened its line on the ridge west of the St. Maurice River. It claims to have assisted in the capture by the 30th Division of Mazinghien by sending a mixed detachment of about 100 men to reconnoiter toward that village from the north, this demonstration being sufficient to cause the enemy to withdraw. This claim is substantiated by the statement of the 120th Infantry that in its third and final attack at 6.30 p. m., October 19, the enemy withdrew without resistance.

The night of October 19-20 the situation on the front of the Fourth Army was as follows: The 9th Corps front extended from Oisy, where it was in touch with the French First Army, to Rejet-de-Beaulieu. The 2d Corps was on the ridge that connects Mazinghien and Bazuel with patrols on the ridge east of the St. Maurice River overlooking Catillon. It was in touch with the British near the two former villages. The 13th Corps had cleared Bazuel and its patrols had advanced to the Richemont Brook. Resistance along the entire front had noticeably decreased, and the Germans were believed to have withdrawn east of the canal.

The relief of the 2d Corps was ordered to take place the nights of October 19-20 and 20-21, its front being taken over by the 9th British Corps. The command passed at 10 a. m., October 21, when the 2d Corps became a part of the Fourth Army Reserve. All British units attached to the 2d Corps were transferred to the 9th and 13th Corps.

The 30th Division was relieved by the 1st British Division during the night of October 19-20. Upon relief the troops marched to the Tincourt-Roisel area. On October 23 they entrained for the Querrieu area northeast of Amiens, arriving early on October 24.

The 27th Division was relieved by the 6th British Division the night of October 20-21 and marched to the Tincourt-Roisel area. It entrained on October 24 and 25 for the Corbie area, arriving on October 25.

In the movement of the 2d Corps from the Tincourt-Roisel area to the Corbie and Querrieu areas the transport moved by road.

Corps headquarters opened at Bertangles at noon October 25.

Messages of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, 2.56 p. m., Oct. 19.

Operation report, 27th Division.

W. Di. 120th Infantry, Oct. 19.

Messages of Fourth Army to 2d Corps, 2.56 p. m.

Statement C. of S. 2d Corps, May 22, 1920; filed Hist. Br., W. P. D.

2d Corps operations instructions, Series "B," Nos. 9 and 10.

W. Di. 59th and 60th Brigades, Oct. 19-24.

W. Di. 53d and 54th Brigades, Oct. 20-25.

Operation report, 2d Corps, Oct. 25.

Operation re-
port, 27th Divi-
sion.
W. D. Head-
quarters 30th Di-
vision, Nov., 1918.

After a few days of rest, training was resumed. Some replacements were received, and every effort was made to prepare the 2d Corps for reentry into line, but the signing of the armistice put an end to active service. During the latter part of November the corps was transferred to the Le Mans area, preparatory to its embarkation for the United States.

From the time the 2d Corps entered the line west of the Hindenburg position on September 23 until it was relieved just west of Catillon on October 19, the Germans were pushed back a distance of 21 miles in the corps sector. The gain between Nauroy and Beaurevoir, a distance of 4 miles, must, however, be credited to the Australian Corps who relieved the 2d Corps from September 30 to October 5.

Appendix to re-
port of operations
of 2d Corps. 1.
Prisoners; 2. Ma-
tériel captured;
3. Casualties.

A total of 152 officers and 5,794 other ranks are reported as having passed through the corps prison cage. Its captures of matériel included 9 heavy guns, 72 field guns, 741 machine guns, 47 trench mortars, 2,406 rifles, besides other articles.

Its total casualties are shown in the following table:

Organization.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Prisoners.		Total.	
	Offi- cers.	En- listed.	Offi- cers.	En- listed.	Offi- cers.	En- listed.	Offi- cers.	En- listed.	Offi- cers.	En- listed.
Corps troops (American).....	1	2	1	0	3	0	1	0	6	2
27th Division.....	51	1,270	140	4,889	3	257	2	168	196	6,584
30th Division.....	44	1,021	113	4,999	2	196	3	24	162	6,240
Total.....	96	2,293	254	9,888	8	453	6	192	364	12,826

Appendix to re-
port of operations
of 2d Corps: 4.
British troops at-
tached.

During its operations northeast of Amiens the following Artillery organizations served under the 2d Corps:

2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Australian Divisional Artillery; 6th and 12th Army Brigades,¹⁰ Australian Field Artillery; 8 brigades and 4 batteries, Royal Garrison Artillery. The above organizations had an authorized strength of 21,068 officers and men and 426 guns. The latter consisted of—

18 pounders.....	180
60 pounders.....	48
6-inch guns.....	12
4.5-inch howitzers.....	60
6-inch howitzers.....	84
8-inch howitzers.....	24
12-inch howitzers.....	2
9.2-inch howitzers.....	16

¹⁰ Divisional artillery consisted of two brigades, thirty-six 18 pounders, and twelve 4.5 inch howitzers.

Besides artillery, the 2d Corps lacked practically all auxiliary labor and administrative troops, which were supplied by the British as follows:

4th Tank Brigade.....	700
2d Anti-aircraft Search Light Section.....	230
3d Squadron Australian Air Forces.....	191
2 anti-aircraft batteries.....	612
5th Balloon Wing.....	128
20th Regiment Hussars.....	545
Labor and administration troops.....	¹¹ 33,060

The identification of the enemy troops that fought in the sector of the 2d Corps in September and October, 1918, is extremely difficult, because at that time the Germans were hard pressed and were shifting their divisions rapidly from one part of the line to another. On September 23, when the 2d Corps entered the line, that portion of it opposite the Fourth Army was being held by Von Boehn's group, which consisted of the Second Army (24 divisions) and the Eighteenth Army (13 divisions). Divisions were added to and taken from these armies almost daily, seemingly for use in the armies immediately adjacent. Their number, however remained about the same, and on October 10, the last report which shows a separate Von Boehn group, the Second Army contained 21 and the Eighteenth 16 divisions. The report of October 14 shows the Von Boehn group dissolved. The Second Army became the left army of Crown Prince Rupprecht's group, and the Eighteenth Army, the right army of the German Crown Prince's group.

Enemy order of battle, western front, Sept. 23-Oct. 18, 1918.

Of the 37 divisions, more or less, that constituted the Von Boehn group, the 30th Division claims to have identified 17. Sixteen of these appear in the enemy order of battle, showing that the British High Command believed that their presence had been confirmed.

Appendix to report 30th Division, Oct. 5-20, 1918.

The 27th Division identified prisoners from 12 divisions, of which 9 appear in the enemy order of battle.

File of messages, 27th Division, Sept. 27-30 and Oct. 14-19.

From the above it appears that parts at least of 25 German divisions fought in the 2d Corps sector, which at no time covered a front greater than 9,000 yards and whose width after October 4 was about 5,000 yards. To be sure, the German divisions were depleted, and on

¹¹ The above figures, taken from the Appendix to the Report of Operations of the 2d Corps, evidently show the authorized strength of certain British units which were either utilized by the corps, or which could have been utilized had the occasion therefor arisen. The tactical units seem to have been all employed.

War Establishments, 1918, British War Office.

Enemy order of
battle, western
front, Sept. 28-
Oct. 14, 1918.

Special report,
2d Corps, Sept.
27-Oct. 21.

September 28 the enemy order of battle shows only three "fit" divisions in the Von Boehn group and after October 11 all of this group were reported "unfit." The above is interesting principally because it shows the straits to which the Germans were reduced at this time.

The following message was received by the corps commander on October 20 from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to Gen. Read, 2d American Corps:

I wish to express to you personally and to all officers and men serving under you my warm appreciation of the very valuable and gallant services rendered by you throughout the recent operations with the Fourth British Army. Called upon to attack positions of great strength held by a determined enemy, all ranks of the 27th and 30th American Divisions under your command displayed an energy, courage, and determination in attack which proved irresistible. It does not need me to tell you that in the heavy fighting of the past three weeks you have earned the lasting esteem and admiration of your British comrades in arms whose successes you have so nobly shared.

(Signed) D. HAIG, F. M.,
Commander in Chief, British Armies in France.

In addition to the above, Gen. Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth Army, and Gen. Monash, commanding the Australian Corps, expressed their appreciation of the services of the 2d American Corps in this the final offensive of the war.

ORGANIZATION OF 2D ARMY CORPS, OCTOBER 5, 1918.

Maj. Gen. G. W. Read, commanding.
Brig. Gen. G. S. Simonds, Chief of Staff.
Lieut. Col. R. K. Hale, G-1.
Lieut. Col. K. T. Riggs, G-2.
Col. F. E. Buchan, G-3.
Lieut. Col. J. P. Terrill, G-4.

27TH DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. J. F. O'Ryan, commanding.
Col. S. H. Ford, Chief of Staff.
Lieut. Col. E. Olmstead, G-1.
Maj. W. T. Starr, G-2.
Col. T. B. Taylor, G-3.

- 53d Infantry Brigade—Brig. Gen. Albert N. Blanding, commanding.
 - 105th Infantry—Col. J. M. Andrews, commanding.
 - 106th Infantry—Col. W. A. Taylor, commanding.
 - 105th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. K. Gardner, commanding.
- 54th Infantry Brigade—Brig. Gen. P. E. Pierce, commanding.
 - 107th Infantry—Col. C. I. Debevoise, commanding.
 - 108th Infantry—Col. E. S. Jennings, commanding.
 - 106th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. M. D. Bryant, commanding.
- 104th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. C. H. King, commanding.
- 102d Engineers—Col. G. B. Pillsbury, commanding.
- 102d Field Signal Battalion—Maj. A. L. Howe, commanding.

30TH DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. E. M. Lewis, commanding.
Lieut. Col. J. K. Herr, Chief of Staff.
Lieut. Col. A. M. Pope, G-1.
Capt. C. C. Rutledge, G-2.
Lieut. Col. C. Burnett, G-3.

- 59th Infantry Brigade—Brig. Gen. L. D. Tyson, commanding.
 - 117th Infantry—Col. C. F. Spence, commanding.
 - 118th Infantry—Col. O. R. Wolfe, commanding.
 - 114th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. E. B. Cantey, commanding.
- 60th Infantry Brigade—Brig. Gen. S. L. Faison, commanding.
 - 119th Infantry—Col. J. Van B. Metts, commanding.
 - 120th Infantry—Col. S. W. Minor, commanding.
 - 115th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. W. W. Pierce, commanding.
- 113th Machine Gun Battalion—Maj. W. H. Hyde, commanding.
- 105th Engineers—Lieut. Col. J. M. Pratt, commanding.
- 105th Field Signal Battalion—Maj. F. A. Montrose, commanding.

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Operation Report, 60th Infantry Brigade, October 4–20, 1918.
Operation Reports, 113th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions.

Above documents are filed in the archives of the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, and of the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces.