A CYBER THREAT TAXONOMY AND A VIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR FALSE INJECTIONS IN THE TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS)

Abstract

This thesis provided background information on the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Additionally, the thesis developed a threat taxonomy for TCAS, resulting in the determination that a false injection attack presents the most comprehensive risk. Moreover, the thesis presents the development of a program to determine what ranges, altitudes, and relative bearings are most vulnerable to a false injection attack. The program includes test for all requirements of a successful false injection. Furthermore, the thesis presents an analysis of results and creates threat maps as situational awareness tools. Lastly, the thesis discusses potential solutions to the false injection attack, covers future work in the areas of TCAS vulnerabilities, and concludes the thesis.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 25, 2021
Accession Number
AD1132461

Entities

People

  • John W Hannah

Organizations

  • Air Force Institute of Technology

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Cyber
  • Engineered Resilient Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems
  • Aircrafts
  • Civil Aviation
  • Collision Avoidance
  • Collision Avoidance Systems
  • Control Panels
  • Cyber Threats
  • Cyberattacks
  • Denial Of Service Attack
  • Eavesdropping
  • Electronic Jamming
  • Engineering
  • Flight Paths
  • Flight Speeds
  • Governments
  • Information Operations
  • Insider Threats
  • Radar
  • Radio Transmitters
  • Security
  • Sense And Avoid Systems
  • Simulations
  • Traffic Collision Avoidance System
  • United States Government
  • Unmanned Vehicles
  • Vulnerability

Readers

  • Aviation Safety and Air Traffic Management
  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Systems Analysis and Design

Technology Areas

  • Cyber